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
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Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2017



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
Happy New Year!

It is an exciting time to be part of the Army Press, as we have some big changes in store for 2017. First, this year our new website will become operational, enabling us to provide more content for our readers, additional opportunities for publication for our contributors, and enhanced search functionality for researchers. Furthermore, this year we are expanding U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO) authentication and archiving to cover our online content. This will ensure articles you publish online with Army Press, like our printed products, will carry the GPO Seal of Authenticity and will be archived on govinfo. (Govinfo is the new GPO site that will replace the Federal Digital System as GPO's central portal for official government documents; access this site at https://govinfo.gov). Finally, this year we are adding a new affiliate to our family of publications, the *Journal of Military Learning*. This semiannual, peer-reviewed journal is dedicated to advancing ideas and insights that improve education and training for the U.S. Army and the overall Profession of Arms. Look for the first issue this spring.

With the presidential inauguration in January and Presidents Day in February, *Military Review* dedicates this issue to our commanders in chief. Our cover photo for this issue was taken in 2013 during the last presidential inaugural parade; it reflects the rich tradition of military participation in the event. Also, on the inside of our back cover, we present a montage to honor all the past presidents who have served in the military. You might be surprised by how many there are.

This issue of *Military Review* contains articles that will appeal to a wide range of interests. In "Reducing the Size of Headquarters, Department of the Army: An After-Action Review," a team from the Office of Business Transformation led by Lt. Gen. Thomas Spoehr describe how the number of personnel in the Army headquarters was reduced by 25 percent to meet lower manning mandates. Maj. Adam Scher argues for a new brigade-level staff position in "The Need for a Brigade Politics-and-Policy Staff Officer," and Col. Andrew Morgado discusses how the U.S. Army Cadet Command is changing its approach to leader development in "Leadership Innovation in the Reserve Officer Training Corps and the Future of the Force." This issue also contains the second-place winner of the 2016 DePuy writing contest, "Writing: Maximizing Returns on the Army's Investments in Education," by Maj. Hassan Kamara.

Thank you all for supporting the Army Press and its flagship publication, *Military Review*. Find us online at http://armypress.dodlive.mil/, like us on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/ArmyPress/, and follow us on Twitter @ArmyPress. ■



The U.S. Navy Parachute Demonstration Team, The Leap Frogs, jump out of a C-130H aircraft assigned to the 139th Airlift Wing, Missouri Air National Guard, and into Arrowhead Stadium in Kansas City, Missouri, during the Kansas City Chief's Salute to Service football game 11 September 2016. (Photo by Sr. Airman Sheldon Thompson, U.S. Air National Guard)

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2017 General William E. DePuy

Special Topics Writing Competition


This year's theme: "What needs to be fixed in the Army?"

Articles will be comparatively judged by a panel of senior Army leaders on how well they have clearly identified issues requiring solutions relevant to the Army in general, or to a significant portion of the Army; how effectively detailed and feasible the solutions to the identified problem are; and the level of writing excellence achieved. Writing must be logically developed and well organized, demonstrate professional-level grammar and usage, provide original insights, and be thoroughly researched as manifest in pertinent sources.

Contest closes 14 July 2017

1st Place	$1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place	$750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place	$500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*


For information on how to submit an entry, please visit http://militaryreview.army.mil.



Staff Sgt. Shelby Johnson, squad leader, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, observes the area around Forward Operating Base Torkham, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, 26 September 2013, while wearing the Capability Set 13 communications suite. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Jerry Saslav, U.S. Army)

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Themes and Suggested Topics for Future Editions



Sgt. Adam Weber looks out the door of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter before refilling a bucket firefighting system in Cook Inlet while assisting in the response to the McHugh Creek Fire 20 July 2016 near Anchorage, Alaska. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Balinda O'Neal Dresel, U.S. Army National Guard)

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War by Other Means

- Are there nations that consider themselves to be at war with the United States? If so, how are they conducting war, and what are the probabilities of their success?
- Insurgent warfare: case studies of winning by outgoverning
- Clash of cultures: Is winning the struggle for cultural hegemony a prerequisite for final victory?
- Case studies: immigration as a strategic weapon of war
- What must the United States do to defend itself against economic, political, or informational warfare?
- Economic war with the West: China's presence in Latin America and Africa
- The relationship of Russia and Turkey as related to the Syrian conflict
- Syria and beyond: Dealing with a reestablished Russian presence in the Middle East
- Kleptocracies: Why they matter to the United States, and the military's role in dealing with them

Dealing with a Changing World

- Adjusting to changing societal norms: how they impact the Army
- Military role in dealing with revival of global slavery
- Security implications of the new Syrian, Iranian, and Russian triad in the Middle East
- Security implications of growing Chinese hegemony over the South China Sea
- Security implications of the new Islamic Europe
- Preparing for the collapse of Venezuela: coping with the adverse effects of a failed state in the Western Hemisphere
- Filling the ranks: how to deal with the long-term challenge of finding people who want to serve in the military and who are qualified
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Operational Level of War

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- Is the center of gravity concept still relevant in today's operational environments?
- Converging cavalry columns: Does this frontier American Indian war concept have any relevance today?

"Sacred Cows": What Should Go Away but Won't

- Barnacles: Army institutions, processes, customs, or doctrine that are anachronistic and impede needed change and progress
- Relevance of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: What needs to be updated? Is military justice applied fairly and equitably across all ranks?
- Military policing: Is racism or excessive force an issue of concern for military police? How well trained are military police as compared to civilian counterparts?
- Straining tradition: What legal guidelines should be imposed on the participation of senior retired officers in partisan elections?

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- Modularity ten years after: an evaluation
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Soldiers assigned to Special Operations Detachment–C conduct airborne operations from a UH-60 Black Hawk piloted by a Florida National Guard helicopter crew 23 April 2016 in Brooksville, Florida. (Photo by Ching Oettel, Florida National Guard PAO)

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Against Bureaucracy

Richard Adams, PhD



(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Milton*)

This article argues against bureaucracy, which is choking the military. It explains how red-tape routine corrodes the deep competence and independence that are critical to mission command, and it portrays the devastating rise of the military bureaucracy as a failure of leadership.

The Mission Command Idea

The doctrine of mission command derives from *Auftragstaktik*, a German army methodology that espouses initiative at lower levels of command.[1] Perceived and realized in the Napoleonic Wars, Auftragstaktik achieved prominence in the German

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armies during the First and Second World Wars, finding forceful and famous expression in the 1933 *Truppenführung*—the German army manual for troop command.[2] Articulating the mission command idea, the *Truppenführung* underlines the strategic value of individual soldiers amidst the confusion of conflict, arguing, "the emptiness of the battlefield requires soldiers who can think and act independently, who can make calculated decisions and daring use of every situation."[3] In its discussion of Auftragstaktik, the *Truppenführung* sets down views that "would still be considered radical in many of the world's armies today."[4]

Written largely by Generals Ludwig Beck, Werner von Fritsch, and Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, the *Truppenführung* established that individual soldiers would be expected to have a clear understanding of circumstances so they could act on their own initiative in accordance with larger strategic intent. Giving doctrinal weight to ideas known later by U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Charles Krulak's colloquialism—the "strategic corporal"—the editors of the *Truppenführung* recall Hans von Seeckt, who argued, "The principal thing is to increase the responsibilities of the individual man, particularly his independence of action, and thereby to increase the efficiency of the entire army."[5]

But, while ideas of initiative and enterprise resonate in military lore, they have become essentially rhetorical since militaries have grown more centralized, less adaptable, more prescriptive, and more bureaucratic. Honeycombed by legalism, avoidance behavior, and inconclusive language, bureaucracy cultivates irresolution, and excuse. Bureaucracy suffocates personal trustworthiness, which should distinguish leaders, and the independent responsibility that hallmarks effective soldiers.

Merit and Responsibility

Richard Gabriel explains why bureaucratic thinking is antithetic to that of the military, arguing it is "nonsense when ... institutions attempt to substitute bureaucratic procedures for ethical judgment and responsibility. [The end result is] a reliance upon bureaucratic rules and mechanisms of control, while undercutting the soldier's opportunities to exercise ethical judgment."[6]

Arguing against bureaucratic thinking, Gabriel points to what Michel Foucault called the "subtle, calculated technology of subjugation ... the separation, coordination and supervision of tasks [that] constitutes an operational schema of power."[7] This is bureaucratic panopticism, designed "to ensure the prompt obedience of the people and the most absolute authority of the magistrates," which Alasdair MacIntyre understood to depend for success upon disguise and concealment.[8] Valued for calculable data, for seeming impartiality, and for the centralization of its control, bureaucracy commodifies people and dissolves moral autonomy.

The bureaucracy's oppressive attention to marginal detail is in parallel with the technical evolution of communications networks, which have made it possible and appealing for headquarters to exercise control to a meddlesome degree. Bureaucratic centralization means information from the seat of events is passed upward to headquarters, which issue direction. This dissolves the autonomy of individuals and, as Jim Storr observes, is fundamentally unconstructive since

> the amount of information passed between a group of people increases roughly with the square of the number involved (a consequence of many-to-many information strategies), while the ability to deal with it increases only linearly.[9]

Red-Tape Routine

Inherently centralizing and controlling, red tape has the overwhelming effect of inhibiting human initiative and responsibility. There comes to be a Kuhnian cultural gestalt or paradigm.[10] Samuel Huntington describes a "professional mind," which structures distinctive and persistent habits of thought and action—framing a worldview from within which bureaucratic behavior is rationalized.[11]

Pervasive and suppressive, bureaucracy induces habits of wooden compliance. Soldiers are duped by a culture of compulsory consensus into thinking character equals rule

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following, but soldiers must think differently; the military system fails them. Soldiers, who ought to think for themselves and act decisively, are disabled by the military proclivity for bureaucratic hesitancy. They are deceived and compromised by the cordial hypocrisy that hallmarks military life. The 2012 Australian Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee's *Procurement Procedures for Defence Capital Projects: Final Report* offers an illustration. The report noted that in the Australian Defence Organisation,

> personnel get "bogged down" with too much paper work ... and "miss the important things going on" ... [There are] confused or blurred lines of responsibility ... [and] accountability that is too diffuse to be effective—the organisation is unable or unwilling to hold people to account ... [As well, people have] little understanding or appreciation of the importance of contestability and a mindset simply cannot, or refuses to, comprehend the meaning of "independent advice."[12]

This report spells out the officialdom, which dissolves individual decision. The report makes clear that, inoculated by bureaucracy, soldiers are immunized against self-reliance; their sense of responsibility is numbed by rituals of fudging and double-talk.

Yet, responsible independence is critical; for soldiers to be effective, it is insufficient that they are obedient, that they follow conventions, and that they abide by rules. Soldiers also must be conscientious and decisive. They must answer the call to individual action, which is constricted in the bureaucratic system. Regarded by Jonathan Shay as "the most fundamental incompetence in the Vietnam War," the misapplication of bureaucratic-process thinking is an institutional failing and the death knell for autonomous and strategically effectual soldiers.[13]

Dereliction of Duty

Military enlistment confers not an excuse to be obedient at all costs, but an obligation to act deliberately for justice. Underlining this idea, philosopher Jeff McMahan asks rhetorically how establishment by certain people of political or bureaucratic relations among themselves may confer on them a right to behave in ways that are impermissible in the absence of those relations. McMahan asks, "How could it be that merely by acting collectively for political goals, people can shed the moral constraints that bind them when they act merely as individuals?"[14] He illuminates the moral duty people bear as individuals. These obligations are jeopardized by the modern bureaucracy.


Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster makes the risk plain in his book, *Dereliction of Duty*. Considering the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Lyndon Johnson's presidency, McMaster describes "five silent men."[15] He describes how the Joint Chiefs, trapped by an alleged military code in routines of bureaucratic deference, were acquiescent and persuadable. These men were silent when they should have spoken, malleable when they ought to have been conscientious and uncompromising.

Analyzing the political calamity of Vietnam, McMaster describes a uniquely human failing. Among the many and reinforcing frailties he identifies, the biggest was the craving by the Joint Chiefs for approval, their need to appear loyal, to fit in, and to do the accepted thing. Playing along with bureaucratic convention, the Joint Chiefs abdicated their responsibility to speak up and to exert constructive influence over the policy they were entrusted to enact. The generals failed to act with the purpose and resolution expected of the soldier. Conforming reflexively to familiar punctilios, the generals perpetuated the dependencies of bureaucratic custom. Their rococo politesse and invertebrate conformance embellished military failure.

History provides examples of the failure by soldiers to measure up. In his text *Criminal Case 40/61, the Trial of Adolf Eichmann*, Harry Mulisch coined the term "psycho-technology," which describes the bureaucratic engrossment with obedience and the culpable torpor that sustains bureaucratic habit.[16] Mulisch explained how "a dull group of godforsaken civil servants doing their godforsaken duty" turned the bureaucracy into a weapon—and an excuse.[17] The polymath Charles Percy Snow underlines the evil that follows from unthinking conformance:

> When you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you will find more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have ever been committed in the name of rebellion. If you doubt that, read William Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. The German Officer Corps were brought up in the most rigorous code of

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(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

The Conundrum of Bureaucracy versus Mission Command

obedience ... in the name of obedience they were party to, and assisted in, the most wicked large-scale actions in the history of the world.[18]

Conditioned by bureaucracy to obey, soldiers may commit crimes of obedience: acts "performed in response to orders from authority that [are] considered illegal or immoral by the larger community."[19] Such crimes reveal the military delusion that the observance of routine equals rightness, while deviation from standard procedure is the opposite. But military people have allowed themselves to be duped against the weight of evidence. There is no failure to understand.

The strategic implication of unthinking compliance at the tactical level is well known. As an illustrative phrase, the strategic corporal derived rhetorical power from appreciation of the large-scale significance of tactical autonomy.

Focused on formalities and official rules, the bureaucracy fails to secure background conditions critical to effective soldiering. Bound by red tape and conditioned to seek the go-ahead before they do anything, soldiers are not conditioned to trust their own judgment, to act responsibly on their initiative. They are made hesitant by the unfair application of justice.

Failure of Leadership

In the modern military bureaucracy, the soldier who loses a rifle suffers more obviously than the general who loses the war. This is because senior elites, who do not police themselves or their friends, are too good at ducking responsibility. Their shortcomings are on record, since their legalistic dodging hallmarks the official reports, which follow the fiascos.

The reports are important since they reveal the habituated phraseology of people unaccustomed to taking a stand. Shy of moral language, scared of ideals, overeager to seek the asylum of formulaic and morally

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The Royal Australian Navy's Kaman SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite helicopter 19 March 2005 at the Avalon Airport in Avalon, Victoria, Australia. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

meaningless language, the official reports allow bureaucrats to speak for themselves.

The report of the Australian National Audit Office into the Super Seasprite helicopter project offers a prime example. The significance of this report lies in the official trick language—the slippery, astute, and downright devious words and phrases with which the military bureaucracy is regrettably comfortable.[20]

Super Seasprite helicopters were acquired to enhance the capability of the Royal Australian Navy's eight ANZAC class ships. The project was approved in February 1996, with a budget of $746 million, and provisionally accepted aircraft were operated by the Navy between late 2003 and early 2006, when flying was suspended. The project was canceled in 2008. Overall, expenditure exceeded $1.4 billion.

The Seasprite report reveals a bureaucracy riddled with habits of avoidance. Despite evident waste and obvious failure—since no Seasprite helicopter capability exists, or ever existed—the Australian National Audit Office report manages to avoid moral language and ideas. The word "wrong," for example, occurs three times in the report. On pages 260 and 319, the word "wrong" appears in the phrase, "wrong side of the aircraft." On page 334, we read of a "wrong impression." Despite the nonevent that was the Seasprite helicopter, no person is seen to have been wrong. No person is seen to have made a mistake.

Yet, recalling Robert Kempner's interrogation of the truculent Wannsee participants after the Second War, there were people who "knew the things you had to know," and who made the decisions significant people make.[21] Such people accept large salaries from the public purse to remunerate the heavy burdens of responsibility. Incredibly, no person was considered responsible. No person was wrong. No person was found to bear any blame.

The word "blame" appears once in the report, on page 333, where we read that the Australian National Audit Office Report "summarise(s) the apportionment of blame against the audit objective to identify those

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factors that contributed to the ongoing poor performance of the project." So, factors are responsible, but not people. And, the word "responsible" appears in the report as a descriptive word in reference to legal or bureaucratic responsibility. The word responsible is never used in a normative or moral sense.

Materially unrevealing and inscrutable, this report was accepted by the bureaucracy as an explanation. But the report is not enlightening, not a proper account of reasons why the Seasprite project failed. Gnomic phrasing, such as "the failure of the project to provide the required capability," skirts around the fact that the project was an unequivocal catastrophe.[22] The project is described as "canceled," not "failed."[23]

Evading moral ideas by euphemism, the Seasprite report, and the others like it, speaks in the voice of a bureaucracy preserving its modus operandi and senior cadre. Lacking any sense of right and wrong, the report reveals a critical insolvency and demonstrates the need for institutional reform. On what basis, then, can soldiers be expected to face grave psychological and physical dangers, when the big fish cannot face the truth?

In the words of Adm. R. C. Moffitt's *Review of Submarine Workforce Sustainability*, there is a "crisis of leadership" and a feckless "benign acceptance of the status quo [among] more senior rank groups."[24] Describing the "poor leadership," of people "in positions of power," Moffitt recalls the tone and accent of Lord Peter Levene's 2011 review of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence.[25] Investigating the senescence of British military bureaucracy, Levene makes official shortcomings explicit. In categorical style, Levene criticizes a "culture of consensual, committee-based decision-making," and an institutionalized failure to hold people to account.[26] Notably, he identifies an overinflated senior cadre, a pervasive "inability to take tough, timely decisions," and an insidious "conspiracy of optimism."[27]

The Western Military Hypocrisy

No military ought to expect soldiers to face danger while bureaucrats sit in pleasant chairs, unwilling to face facts. But, this is precisely the nature of the Western military hypocrisy.

When some people write shrewd reports to disguise real reasons and other people accept those reports as a knowing gloss-over, which diminishes or disguises the gravity of events, then no people seem to have the self-respect and courage to stand for truth and right. Confronted by an adversary, motivated by the most repellent ideology to commit acts of abhorrent viciousness, such a failure of the Western military bureaucracy is deeply concerning.

Speaking to these ideas, Norman Dixon observed in his seminal work *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* how military officers regularly slough off all sense of moral awareness. Dixon's concern was that officers, convinced of their own superiority, lose all feeling for the moral basis upon which they exercise command.[28] Similarly, on the account of this paper, military leaders, habituated to bureaucratic hokum, lose touch with ideals that will inspire soldiers to act decisively with a mind to translating high ideals into practice.

Conclusion

The military must wean itself from the heroin of bureaucracy. Writing should be judged by clarity and power, not by margins and tabulations. Speaking should be frank and courteous, not phobic and weak-kneed. Action should be purposeful.

Medal of Honor recipient Vice Adm. James Stockdale illustrates this idea powerfully. As president of the U.S. Naval War College, Stockdale argued against the overprominence of legalistic and bureaucratic thinking. Arguing against officers' ticket punching (focusing on) organizational efficiency at the expense of honor, Stockdale observed,

> In the Naval Service we have no place for amoral gnomes lost in narrow orbits; we need to keep our gaze fixed on the high-minded principles standing above the law. ...
>
> Today's ranks are filled with officers who have been weaned on slogans and fads of the sort preached in the better business schools of the country. That is to say that rational managerial concepts will cure all evils. ... We must regain our bearings. ...
>
> Regardless of the fairness of our judicial system, it must not be allowed to take the place of moral obligation to ourselves, to our Service, to our country. Each man must bring himself to some stage of ethical resolution.[29] ■

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Aerial view of the Pentagon on 15 November 2012 in Washington, D.C. (Photo by Carmen Stevenson)

Reducing the Size of Headquarters, Department of the Army

An After-Action Review

Lt. Gen. Thomas Spoehr, U.S. Army, Retired


Brig. Gen. David Komar, U.S. Army

Lt. Col. Terrence Alvarez, U.S. Army

Lt. Col. Raymond Shetzline, U.S. Army, Retired

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From July 2014 through March 2015, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) completed an organizational redesign aimed at reducing overall personnel authorizations 25 percent and reducing operating costs by fiscal year (FY) 2019. This effort was known as the "HQDA Comprehensive Review."[1] While some would compare this task to performing liposuction on a whale, the people charged with executing it stepped up to the challenge, ensuring HQDA took appropriate reductions alongside the rest of the Army. This article offers discussion on the challenges, successes, and missed opportunities encountered during the redesign and ensuing approval efforts.



Objectives

- Establish a fact-based shared understanding
- Reach a shared vision and commitment
- Optimize the organization in a way that is fast, fair, and disciplined
- Quantify the opportunity, develop a compelling case for going forward
- Establish design principles, targets, and detailed process and execution plans
- Engage the organization at every level

(Graphic by authors)

Figure 1. Overview of the Phased Approach to De-layer Department of the Army Organizations and Field Operating Agencies

After a brief review of HQDA guidance and reductions, Kotter International's "8-Step Process for Leading Change" will serve as a comparative framework, helping illustrate the key points.[2] Finally, this article provides recommendations for organizational redesign within headquarters that support and operate subordinate to higher echelons (e.g., the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget) and in response to congressional oversight.

Background and Guidance

Prior to the HQDA Comprehensive Review, HQDA leaders had already identified personnel authorization reductions as part of a focus-area review process, designed to downsize all headquarters led by a major general or higher to meet the Army's end-strength requirements. Known as the FARG (Focus Area Review Group) within HQDA, this effort established the original 25 percent reduction target for thirty-two main Army secretariat and Army staff (ARSTAF) agencies, with twenty-five additional field operating agencies (FOAs) and all two-star–and–above headquarters throughout the Army.[3] Leaders soon realized that the FARG focused purely on numeric reductions and did not look at potential organizational redesign, accounting for the various work schedules and workloads specific to each organization.

On 17 July 2014, the secretary of the Army (SA) directed the under secretary of the Army (USA), in coordination with the vice chief of staff of the Army (VCSA), to conduct a comprehensive review of HQDA to "determine the optimal organization and strength and, subsequently, any adjustment of programmed [personnel authorization] reductions."[4] Specifically, the review sought to optimize HQDA's size, roles, functions, and organizational structure to best support its mission. The new structure would be constrained by the projected budget and the overall Army end strength while addressing senior leader priorities. The review needed to maintain a view of the future strategic environment and provide recommendations for an implementation plan no later than 31 March 2015.

The SA guidance outlined a phased approach, as depicted in figure 1.[5] The "initial diagnostic" phase established the facts, to include previous HQDA growth

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over time, a mission-to-workforce analysis, and benchmark comparisons against other relevant organizations. The second phase, "set up the program," tasked the USA and VCSA to create a shared vision of the future for HQDA and establish design principles. The USA and VCSA would approve organizational redesigns in a top-to-bottom methodology, moving through the leadership echelons that make up staff organizations. At the end of the final "structure and design the organization" phase, the USA and the VCSA would brief the recommended designs to the SA.

On 23 July 2014, the SA concluded the 2013 Army FARG's effort to identify the number of authorizations required to achieve a 25 percent aggregate reduction within Army headquarters at the two-star–and–above level.[6] Armed with the approved reduction numbers and with the assistance of all ARSTAF and Army secretariat agencies, the USA and VCSA established a core working group to execute the ensuing HQDA review. Their first task was to establish the program and design principles utilized during the HQDA design review effort. Once the principles were agreed upon, the ARSTAF and secretariat empowered the staff to develop their own organizational designs with help from the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) as outlined in the last phase.

Scope and Initial Phases

During the nine months allocated for the HQDA Comprehensive Review, the USA and VCSA tasked the Office of Business Transformation (OBT) in coordination with the BCG to review the thirty-two main ARSTAF agencies with twenty-five additional FOAs that compose the HQDA tables of distribution and allowance (TDAs).[7] BCG had specialized knowledge on business analysis techniques and design experience with other large organizational headquarters. They mapped out the formal and actual organizational structures, identified core missions and functions, conducted in-depth echelon analysis, and provided impartial expertise.

BCG began with a review of a subset of the total HQDA agencies to understand the full scope of the HQDA organization and their roles. In total, they identified that the Army secretariat and ARSTAF agencies with associated FOAs included approximately fourteen thousand personnel authorizations with up to ten echelons, or internal organizational layers, between the first-echelon senior decision

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Brig. Gen. David Komar, U.S. Army, has led U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Capability Development Directorate since June 2016. Prior assignments include director, CJ7, NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan; and deputy chief of staff and chief of force design for the Chief of Staff, Army's Task Force Modularity, HQDA. He earned a bachelor's degree from Lafayette College, and master's degrees from the Naval War College, the Air University, and Webster University. His military education includes the Air Command and Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College.


Lt. Col. Terrence "Terry" Alvarez, U.S. Army, was the executive officer to the director of the Business Operations Directorate, Office of Business Transformation. He was previously assigned to U.S. Army Alaska and the 1st Infantry Division, and he has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. He holds a BA from Gettysburg College, an MA from Webster University, and an MMAS from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Lt. Col. Raymond Shetzline, U.S. Army, retired, led one of the small groups for the HQDA Comprehensive Review as an analyst for the Office of Business Transformation, Performance and Analysis Division. His previous Pentagon assignments include deputy chief of staff G-8, Director's Initiative Group, and Program Development Division. He holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy, and master's degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School and George Mason University

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makers (e.g., the SA, CSA, USA, and VCSA) and action officers or individual contributors at echelons seven and below (see figure 2).

The larger the number of echelons or layers in an organization, the more diluted reporting chains became, preventing the full employment of top talent.[8] As indicated in figure 3 (on page 19), BCG's findings from other large organizations showing the increase of time and degradation of message clarity as the number of echelons or levels increase. BCG also found approximately 50 percent of colonels and GS-15–level civilians reported to someone of the same grade, and many general officers (GOs) and their civilian counterparts, senior executive service (SES) leaders, had little or no supervisory responsibilities. They also found that 23 percent of colonels and GS-15s were buried deeper than echelon five within most organizations. The use of additional echelons created shadow reporting chains through the extensive use of deputies deep within organizations, which further confused and lengthened the decision-making processes. Based on this initial review and the developed redesign principles, the USA and VCSA began the "structure and design the organization" phase to change HQDA and FOAs through a methodical de-layering approach, seeking to "flatten" organizations to gain efficiencies.



(Graphic by authors)

Figure 2. Initial Department of the Army Echelons with Rank and Duty Responsibilities (Examples)


Kotter's 8-Step Process

Kotter International's "8-Step Process for Leading [Organizational] Change" serves as our comparative model because it provides an authoritative, structured outline with stated goals, and it is a prime example of business redesign best practices. It shares two fundamental goals with the HQDA Comprehensive Review: to decrease operating costs through personnel-authorization reductions and to create more effective and efficient functional processes. Kotter's 8-Step Process follows:

1. *Create a sense of urgency* for change that appeals to the organization, and identifies and communicates the need and what is at stake for success or failure.
2. *Build a guiding coalition* from within that can guide, coordinate, and communicate their activities during the change.
3. *Form a strategic vision and initiatives* that use coordinated activities to make the "to-be" vision a reality.
4. *Enlist a volunteer army* that communicates and works to make the change occur.
5. *Enable action by removing barriers* or obstacles by allowing employees to remove inefficient processes or hierarchies from across boundaries and create an impact.
6. *Generate short-term wins* that track and communicate progress and energize the volunteers to drive change.
7. *Sustain acceleration.* Leaders must adapt quickly, determine what can be done, and build on the change toward the vision.
8. *Institute change* through new behaviors, and define and communicate the connections between the behaviors and the organization's success.[9]

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Through a comparative analysis of the 8-Step Process, this article will discuss the HQDA Comprehensive Review's ability to achieve its 25 percent authorization reductions and de-layering while simultaneously maintaining and improving work functions.



(Graphic by authors)

Figure 3. Increased Communication Time and Degradation of Message Clarity with Increased Echelons

Comparison to the Kotter Model and Insights

The SA accomplished the first step, "create a sense of urgency," during the FARG effort and continued with his tasking memorandum to the USA that established the need and authority for the HQDA Comprehensive Review. Simply put, the Army needed to reduce personnel levels and associated costs by FY 2019 to meet established force structure goals. There were clear reduction targets and a set timeline for completion. On 28 October 2014, the USA and VCSA, supported by OBT and BCG, held an HQDA de-layering kickoff meeting with the Army secretariat and ARSTAF principals. The intent of the meeting was to outline the requirements, introduce the de-layering design principles, ensure all HQDA agencies would participate, and avoid the pitfall of a uniform "salami slice" 25 percent reduction within each agency. The design principles in figure 4 (on page 20) defined how the leaders of each HQDA agency should de-layer, or flatten, the echelons that make up their agency; the principles were used by the USA and VCSA as approval criteria for every redesign submission.[10]

Following the second step of the Kotter process, "build a guiding coalition," the USA and VCSA attempted to build a guiding coalition from within the HQDA principals during the de-layering kickoff meeting. The review had a small core working group, led by OBT and supported by BCG, to enable change, report on progress, and provide an alternative point of view for redesign progress. Senior leaders relied heavily on this group to coordinate efforts, track progress, and communicate pertinent activities throughout the effort. While this reliance on OBT and BCG ultimately proved successful, the HQDA agencies often viewed them as outsiders forcing change rather than assisting the agencies' champions with implementing common plans and design constructs. Because of this friction, the USA and VCSA often had to directly address concerns and provide guidance to HQDA principals rather than manage other lines of effort such as reorganizing work flow to determine if larger inter- or intraorganization agency change was warranted. A successful example of

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this guiding coalition was the coordinated effort of the USA, the VCSA, and the director of the Army staff, working as a united front to pull together all thirty-two HQDA principals to achieve the end state on 31 March 2015. However, by limiting the guiding coalition to a small core working group outside of the other agencies, the review did not reach the full potential as envisioned by Kotter.

in terms of work and information flow, as proven in other large civilian business headquarters. In addition to the de-layering efforts within each of the HQDA organizations, the USA wanted to examine ways to reorganize the HQDA work flow across the ARSTAF and secretariat agencies. An OBT-led group of subject-matter experts reviewed several enterprise work flow functions, to include the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and

- Span of control (SoC) target of eight—executive assistants, executive officers do not count in span of control
- Seven echelon maximum
- Deputies will not be used as "span breakers"
- If principal and principal deputy both fill the principal role, then SoC target is ten
  - Principal and principal deputy "two in a box" model is applicable only at principal level
  - Both principal and principal deputy exist at echelon 2
  - Any additional deputies reporting to the principal must meet SoC target of eight
- No deputies for leaders below echelon 3
- No new deputies
- All executive assistants shared for leaders below echelon 2
- No same-grade reporting
- All general officers (GOs) and senior executive service (SES) leaders must have direct reports
- GOs, and SES leaders (level 1) within the top four echelons (secretary of the Army, under secretary of the Army, chief of staff of the Army, vice chief of staff of the Army are layer 1)
- No general schedule (GS)-15s below echelon 5
- All positions—managers and individual contributors—should be considered for re-leveling
- Cost and structure targets must be met before proceeding to the next echelon
- Exceptions held to an absolute minimum and must be aired to the senior team
- If work is pushed somewhere else, the people must move with it and it must be accepted by receiving organization

(Graphic by authors)

Figure 4. Comprehensive Review Design Principles

The USA and VCSA supported the third step of Kotter's process, "form a strategic vision and initiatives," by forming a singular strategic vision and set of initiatives that guided redesign activities toward the "future state." They used the information gleaned from the initial documented review phase to illustrate that HQDA had too many echelons in place for clear and effective communication, leaders had low spans of supervisory control, and numerous deputies or senior employees were too deep within organizations to operate effectively and often reported to each other. The USA and VCSA stated their intent to reduce the number of echelons and redundant management processes, or "de-layer" the headquarters, to reverse these trends. In the long run, de-layering the HQDA could offset some of the impact of the 25 percent personnel authorization reductions, making organizations easier to manage and more efficient

Execution (PPBE) process and the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process.[11] While the future strategic vision and initiatives were well supported with quantitative data, they were not well communicated across the HQDA and FOA population, except downward through the existing information channels, which were suboptimal in rapidly passing information throughout the thirty-two agencies. Many participants suggested publishing "frequently asked questions," a headquarters concept plan, and senior-leader meeting notes to the workforce; however, these approaches were never implemented. The lack of information had a significant impact on the speed of the effort and the ability of the workforce to understand how the redesigns would support future state.

In addition, this lack of information transparency made it extremely difficult to "enlist a volunteer army" as identified in Kotter's step 4. Without this internal

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ground swell of support, the project moved forward more by established deadlines and through force of will than by an open dialogue—which could propose, develop, or explore nonstandard organizational designs. This lack of information transparency also resulted in many HQDA agencies and FOAs greeting the supporting teams with a range of emotion from indifference to open hostility. BCG and small "subject-matter expert" teams had to overcome this agency bias before they could effectively communicate how organizations could make effective changes within the agreed upon de-layering principles in figure 3 (on page 19).

The review was not successful in Kotter's step 5, "enable action by removing barriers and obstacles," allowing employees to remove inefficient processes or hierarchies from across boundaries. As mentioned earlier, HQDA had to maintain its daily workload while reducing authorizations and attempting reorganization through de-layering. HQDA core functions and daily processes had their own distinct management hierarchies and timelines embedded in them that still had to be met. The USA and VCSA tasked the organizations' principals with de-layering, but OBT with small teams of the agencies' process subject-matter experts handled the day-to-day work, reviewing the core processes and potential staff mergers as a second line of effort. These teams encountered the same support and information obstacles as discussed above because they were outside the organizations and were not process owners. Despite these barriers, and to the credit of the process owners and involved participants, these small teams gathered and reviewed a vast amount of information that led to recommendations for further analysis and concept exploration. However, there were no significant changes to the HQDA core functions or processes. To improve processes in the future, process owners and stakeholders would have to prepare, plan, and execute their own process-improvement efforts, vice an outside organization, in order to ultimately achieve their defined goals and implement change effectively.

In support of Kotter's sixth step, the USA and VCSA did "generate short-term wins," tracking and communicating success and progress, by quickly approving many smaller agency redesigns. Picking this "low-hanging fruit" was achieved through a stepped review process, focusing first on echelons two through five, as depicted in the final phase of figure 1 (on page 16). Throughout the overall echelon reorganization review and approval briefings, the principals informed the USA and VCSA simultaneously on their projected reorganization design and, if necessary, sought exceptions for specific "violations" of the de-layering principles. Requests for exception usually dealt with span-of-control limitations due to the nature of work required by U.S. Code, General Order 2012-01, or public law.[12] At each of these briefings, the USA and VCSA attempted to further energize the principals to drive change. Due in part to the principals' thoroughness, and with support from the BCG, in terms of documentation and alternative design development, the USA and VCSA quickly reviewed and approved the organizations' concepts. As the approval process matured, the USA and VCSA showed flexibility as decision makers, acknowledging that not every organization could achieve 25 percent reductions within the constraints of the entire rule set. They understood that, in the long term, work flow mattered more than the de-layering principles (rules) as long as leaders preformed due diligence and did not recommend growth. The one rule that remained firm was the 25 percent reduction, which had to be achieved by each organization.

During the effort to reorganize, the HQDA Comprehensive Review was successful in achieving Kotter's seventh step, "sustain acceleration." By completing the echelons in descending order, starting with echelon two and proceeding downward into the more populous echelons, the principals and organizational designers could build on the previous work as well as gain more experience with the application of the concepts and design principles.

The HQDA Comprehensive Review "instituted change" as defined in the eighth step of Kotter's process through the codification of the de-layered organizations' concepts in revised TDAs, which clearly identified the removal year for each authorization. The review, however, largely did not create new behaviors across the ARSTAF and the Army secretariat, as most organizations continued to function as before with only changes to the number of echelons, providing supervisors greater span of control and ensuring no deputies existed below echelon three. Ultimately, change decisions remained internal to each agency instead of across agency functions. The USA and VCSA also sped the TDA documentation process by temporarily suspending the requirement for

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the preparation of command-implementation plans and concept plans per Army Regulation 71-32, *Force Development and Documentation*.[13]

While the main effort to create new TDAs for FY 2019 did not create any significant new behaviors, the core-process review and staff-merger effort did attempt to identify potential new organizational options. One option considered was combining the Office of the Assistant Secretariat of the Army for Manning and Reserve Affairs and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-1 so that policy creation and operational planning and execution would be within one organization vice two. In addition to new organizational structures within the headquarters, the core-process review and staff-merger effort looked at potential new processes to streamline the existing workload. Task force subject-matter experts examined the TAA (a process that supports the size and skill distribution of the Total Army) and select steps of the PPBE process. These potential changes in organizations and processes were tasked as areas for further analysis due to external oversight factors, the ongoing reorganization, and existing roles and responsibilities defined in General Order 2012-01, vice tackling as part of the overarching effort.

What Was Achieved

The HQDA Comprehensive Review developed and executed the reduction of the HQDA staff by approximately 2,100 personnel authorizations by FY 2019.[14] These reductions constitute approximately 15 percent of the effort; the headquarters does achieve the 25 percent target when incorporated with the FARG reductions and significantly reduces the number of echelons within the staff by flattening the organization. These reductions also increased manager median span of control to eight from as little as one across much of the headquarters, in addition to reducing the percentage of managers by one-third. The reorganized agencies eliminated 70 percent of same-grade reporting, vastly improving vertical information flow, and senior leaders (those at the GO and SES levels) have increased roles and direct responsibilities over more processes and information. The effort moved 94 percent of the GS-15s to or above echelon five, which better aligns talent to decision making, rather than just informing decisions. Additionally, it reduced the use of deputies below echelon three (two-star GO and SES level) by FY 2019. Overall, these changes successfully flattened HQDA, increasing effectiveness and efficiency, and placed the headquarters on par with other large corporate headquarters. While implementation and rebalancing of personnel to open positions remains to be accomplished, the Office of the Administrative Assistant supported by the United States Army Force Management Agency (USAFMSA) and the affected organizations completed documenting the de-layered and reorganized changes in TDAs by 1 October 2015 (FY 2016).

To complete implementation, HQDA developed the Intermediate Review Council, allowing a forum to adjudicate issues not addressed or developed during the effort and ensuring the de-layering principles would not be violated or discarded in the future. They managed TDA documentation with USAFMSA and the affected agencies, working to align on-hand personnel and remaining authorizations so the authorization reductions could be reached through natural attrition. The full implementation and realization of the loss of the personnel authorizations identified during the FARG and the HQDA Comprehensive Review will incrementally run until FY 2019.

Conclusion

While the effort will not be fully implemented until 1 October 2018 (FY 2019), the senior leadership must maintain awareness of any external changes or decisions that may affect the HQDA Comprehensive Review implementation. As with any project or reorganization, stable leadership continuously measuring the effort is key to achieving the objectives as defined in their vision. Despite senior leadership (SA, USA, and CSA) moving on to other duties, the new leadership continues to implement the authorization reductions in accordance with the documented changes.

The HQDA Comprehensive Review effort would have benefited from having a continuous communication plan throughout the change review that was targeted to inform all levels of the organization. The lack of information transparency was a critical misstep. Better communication to the lowest level in HQDA could have aided in the speed of change and overall support for the effort. Publishing a headquarters concept plan could have provided a clear end state for the workforce to align to and identify other potential ways to accomplish the various tasks.

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Sharing meeting notes with all leaders could create support and enlist the army of volunteers that this effort failed to achieve.

The initial reorganization research and planning greatly benefited from the use of the support contractors. They augmented the staff, provided business practices, and documented their findings. They were crucial to the effort—not only for their expertise in conducting a review, but also for serving to expand the concepts and help move the project forward. This need for contractor support made it apparent that the Army lacks the specialty institutional training to complete the art and science for an organizational redesign of this scale. This could be addressed in professional training. Army training builds deployable units, and task-organizes for operations. However, current training focuses on building instead of creating organizations by merging and sharing or removing existing force structure. The Army could benefit from a greater understanding of organizational design that focuses on building lateral instead of hierarchical organizations that support the rest of Department of Defense, the joint community, and the Army.

The HQDA Comprehensive Review built a sound design to achieve its reductions by FY 2019, along with the rest of the Army. It enabled leaders at all levels to redesign their organizations to effectively and efficiently meet their mission, while absorbing a mandated 25 percent personnel authorization reduction. This comparative analysis discussed the challenges, successes, and hindrances of this dynamic and complex effort. As the Army moves into more reductions and the need for more innovative organizations becomes the norm, it can benefit from looking back at this and other previous efforts to learn from our mistakes and to build on our successes. ■

Notes

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5. Ibid.; Under Secretary of the Army and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Briefing, "HQDA Comprehensive Review Delayering Kickoff Meeting with HQDA Principal Officials," 28 October 2014.

6. Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army Memorandum for Distribution, "Focus Area Review Group Decision Implementation," 23 July 2014, accessed 25 October 2016, https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/44288646.

7. A table of distribution and allowance is a document that authorizes missions, equipment, and infrastructures for Army units that are organized to perform specific missions and are made up of military or civilian personnel, or a combination of both.

8. Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army Memorandum, "Focus Area Review Group Decision Implementation."

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10. Ibid. The design principles were approved by the under secretary of the Army and presented at the HQDA Comprehensive Review delayering kickoff principals meeting.

11. Harold W. Lord, ed., *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2011-2012* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2011), accessed 26 October 2016, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a551164.pdf. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process is described in para. 4-14 and the Total Army Analysis process is described in para. 5-16.

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Producing Strategic Value through Deliberate War Planning

Lt. Col. Jim Cahill, U.S. Army

The U.S. military invests sizable resources in deliberate war planning to prepare for future operations in defined crisis conditions. However, the actual value of current deliberate war planning to military readiness and future combat performance is questionable. This article starts with a brief assessment of the modern U.S. war planning system, then addresses two factors that would enable the deliberate war planning community to deliver greater strategic value.

The first factor, oriented toward prospective planners, is promoting awareness of tensions in both bureaucratic politics and civil–military relations that pervade the process and influence the outcomes. Failure to understand and respect the power of these two tensions equates to letting them become the dominant forces in deliberate war planning to the detriment of any operational or strategic value planning is supposed to provide.

The second factor is the construction of a theoretical framework to understand the actual and potential value added by deliberate war planning. This theoretical framework consists of seven dimensions of planning utility that are sorely needed to counteract the bureaucratic politics and civil–military relations tensions that currently pervade the process and curb its effectiveness. The potential advantage of these planning factors is that they can be applied empirically to gauge the value of a given deliberate planning effort.

This is not the first attempt to undertake empirical research on war planning.[1] The new contribution sought here is greater understanding of the utility of the activity. Such an understanding could set conditions for increasing effectiveness in future practice. Based on the presumption that deliberate war planning positively influences the manner in which the United States applies military force, this matter is vital to U.S. national security.

Soldiers from the 329th Regional Support Group, based in Virginia Beach, Virginia, team up with soldiers from the 1030th Transportation Battalion from Gate City, Virginia, 13 November 2010 to rehearse for a staff exercise during their annual training at Camp Dodge, Iowa. The soldiers focused on improving military decision-making processes, improving communication from group to battalion level, and setting conditions for better future operations during the annual two-week training period. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew H. Owen, Virginia National Guard PAO)

The Modern U.S. War Planning System

The United States is the only country in the world that currently professes to "underwrite international security ... uphold our commitments to allies

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Latvian Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma (*standing left*) meets Lt. Gen. Tim Evans, commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (*seated fifth from left*), and other members of the exercise staff during the Latvia Cabinet of Ministers Exercise Kristaps 2015 on 10 November 2015 at Lielvārde Airbase, Lielvārde, Latvia. The exercise combined the majority of ministers, the president, and military leadership in a national-level simulated emergency cabinet session to discuss crisis response plans. (Photo by WO 2 Dan Harmer, GBR Army/NATO)

and partners, and address threats that are truly global."[2] Under these guiding principles, the U.S. military's role is to "ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States and areas vital to its interest."[3] This is a tall order.

One of the military's key enabling mechanisms to carrying out its role is deliberate war planning, a function intended to "enable understanding and facilitate the development of options to effectively meet the complex challenges facing joint forces throughout the world."[4] This intellectually resource-intensive mechanism seems as though it would naturally contribute strategic value. However, the utility derived from deliberate war planning has been widely debated. Some contend that military doctrine and education are ill suited to deal with unfamiliar problems or to satisfy civilian policy-makers' needs.[5] Others criticize the common tendency to focus on point scenarios without considering branches, sequels, or the need for rapid adaptation.[6] Still others argue that the military services' cultural preferences of planning for future interstate conventional wars impedes effective planning for the more likely unconventional scenarios that the United States has engaged in much more often, a tendency reinforced by the need to justify high-end conventional military modernization programs.[7]

Beyond the contemporary debate, the utility of deliberate war plans to the past one hundred years of U.S. combat performance is not encouraging. In most of the cases that necessitated U.S. involvement in wars, the deliberate war plans that were available at the time of need were not relevant. For example, following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the U.S. national leadership directed the military to initiate a campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan and other locations. At that point, the military had a sizable inventory of war plans, but none of them dealt with this specific need. This lack of relevant war plans also existed when the United States entered the First World War, the

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Korean War, the Vietnam War, the War for Kosovo, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Doctrine and Definitions

U.S. military doctrine provides a detailed treatment of the role of joint operational planning, but does not adequately characterize deliberate war planning as a distinctive subcomponent within that larger planning construct.[8] The doctrinal definition of deliberate war planning—"a planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation"—fails to capture the essence of the discipline, as we shall see.[9] The result is a chaotic diversity of practice carried out by a disparate and distributed community of practice exposed to influence by powerful forces that degrade strategic value.

Thus, a more precise definition that would enable objective evaluation, unity of effort, and value-adding practices is *the process undertaken by multiple disparate organizations to conceptualize military options, support future U.S. government efforts and objectives, and generate knowledge and understanding—all oriented on assumptions-based, defined future circumstances.* This definition is superior because it emphasizes three key value-adding concepts: deliberate planning as a mechanism for cross-organizational connective tissue, for subordinating military activities to a broader U.S. government campaign, and for individual and organizational learning. The internal and external tensions that adversely influence these value-adding concepts are addressed next.

Bureaucratic Politics: Military-Internal Participants

The U.S. military deliberate war planning enterprise is vast in terms of depth, breadth, and diversity. As a result, bureaucratic politics have a powerful influence on the inputs, processes, and outcomes of deliberate war planning. The point is not that bureaucratic politics should be eliminated, because it will always be present in any large-scale, multiorganizational effort. The idea is to become aware of the role that bureaucratic politics plays, thereby allowing the deliberate war planning community to mitigate adverse influence where possible, as well as amplify the benefits that come from a cross-dimensional enterprise effort.

The vast scale of the undertaking becomes apparent by considering the aggregate effort: over six hundred military professionals engage in full-time deliberate war planning, and several thousand more are integral but part-time contributors.[10] The full timers are predominantly field grade officers in the prime of their professional careers. Beyond aggregate scale, practitioners represent a diversity of organizations, including geographic and functional combatant commands, service component commands, subunified commands, and the military services. These organizations' interests and motivations sometimes align but often conflict.

There are nine combatant commands whose geographic and functional roles are established by the president in the biannually updated unified command plan.[11] Six combatant commands are geographically oriented and together cover the entire globe, including the global commons outside the sovereignty of any state. Three functional combatant commands focus on specific military missions that cross geographic boundaries: strategic deterrence, global distribution, and special operations. Combatant commanders are directly responsible to the secretary of defense for deliberate war plans. As a result, the combatant command plans teams form and lead the plan-specific joint planning groups within which the rest of the community is represented and serve as honest brokers to achieve joint interdependence and unity of effort.

The problems that deliberate war plans deal with do not typically conform to geographical or functional boundaries, so combatant commands must collaborate on mutual challenges. The result is an interwoven web of supporting relationships and interactions. Because the geographic boundaries, functional roles, and force assignments established by the unified command plan rarely change, each combatant command has developed a unique philosophy and way of doing business, which corresponds to varying regional security environments, as well as differences in the commanders' personalities and the staffs' culture. Combatant commanders with overlapping jurisdiction for a particular future contingency scenario understandably view that scenario from different perspectives. Furthermore, relatively constant resource and planning prioritization establish an informal hierarchy among combatant commands. For example, U.S. Central Command's stature has recently been accentuated because its area of responsibility encompasses the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of war.

Individual combatant commands are not monolithic organizations. They consist of a range of

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sub-organizations, including component command headquarters from each of the four military services and from U.S. Special Operations Command. Component command headquarters serve two masters: their combatant commander and service chief. Thus, the perspectives and motivations within a combatant command enterprise are not identical. The combatant commander and his or her staff focus primarily on war plans that can generate strategic outcomes and do so through joint interdependence. The service chiefs and their staffs have a narrower, single-domain focus, and thus concentrate on the contribution made by land, air, or sea power. This is not to say that the services have malicious intent; they simply have the responsibility to ensure that operations in their domain are effective. When conflicts arise, or when combatant commanders' guidance is vague, the services wield the more powerful influence because they control resourcing.

Another important bureaucratic relationship within combatant commands is between the "J5" strategy and plans directorates and the "J3" operations directorates. The J5 directorate produces and maintains deliberate war plans on a continuous basis. If the scenario that a war plan focuses on actually materializes, then a transition process is triggered. During transition, the J5 directorate transfers the relevant war plan to the J3 directorate to form the framework for necessary military operations. The J3 directorate must deal with the present in concrete terms, so if the plan is not presented well, it will seem irrelevant and be ignored, wasting the time that went into it. The outcome of this transition process, which, as a result of the crisis nature of such situations that generally occur under stress, is the ultimate litmus test of the strategic value of a given war plan.

The military services are also important stakeholders in deliberate war planning. Military services rely on war plans to guide their readiness-generation efforts, such as training. This is also the case with Special Operations Command and the National Guard Bureau. In this way, established deliberate war plans provide a common reference point to cope with future uncertainty. However, at some point, the military services' use of deliberate war plans becomes problematic. For example, when services become involved too early, they tend to introduce nonstrategic and biasing concepts intended to establish requirements and drive resources by reverse osmosis. At the other end of the spectrum, when the military services shift focus from near-term readiness generation to long-term defense strategy choices, deliberate war plans become much less suitable. The Department of Defense has a separate function called *support for strategic analysis* (SSA), which provides plausible scenarios and alternative futures for these types of uses. In practice, the uses of deliberate war plans and SSA scenarios are often mixed up.[12]

One implication of the size and scale of the planning bureaucracy is the impossibility of adding value through an elite, small group of planners. While a roundtable format comprised of handpicked planners appears on its surface to offer the greatest prospect for free-flowing ideas and flexibility, in practice such an approach excludes the participation of individuals and organizations the view points and expertise of which will be vital if the scenario covered by the war plan comes true. Thus, value-added planning must be explicitly carried out to bridge organizational barriers and establish networks up front that will become essential in a crisis.

Another implication is that organizational reform to enhance the effectiveness of deliberate war planning might be part of the answer, but, in isolation, even reform cannot eliminate the intrinsic reality of bureaucratic politics. Therefore, the operative question is how to understand and accommodate the influence that bureaucratic politics has on the potential strategic value of deliberate war planning.

Bureaucratic Politics: Interagency Stakeholders

Bureaucratic politics between the U.S. military and other U.S. government agencies is an equally influential determinant of any value derived from deliberate war planning. This is the case because the military activities described in war plans are necessary, but usually insufficient, to achieve national strategic objectives. Some would disagree by invoking the classic example from the European Theater during the Second World War, where the Combined Chiefs of Staff ordered Gen. Dwight Eisenhower to "enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces."[13] Eisenhower's mission could be (and, indeed, was) carried out with purely military tools. However, ultimate victory relied on the pursuit of sequential objectives that were primarily pursued through nonmilitary tools: the reestablishment

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President Barack Obama meets with combatant commanders and other military leadership 12 November 2013 in the White House Cabinet Room. (Photo by Pete Souza, White House)

do not see value in such hypothetical planning and resist military efforts to prod them in that direction.

Consequently, because of the disparity in capacity and culture between the military and other nonmilitary agencies that would have to be involved to achieve long-term political objectives associated with a potential conflict, the military deliberate war planning community finds itself operating in a vacuum. Thus, when left alone, interagency bureaucratic politics degrade the dimension of value-added deliberate war planning. This is reflected adversely in the emergence of a dysfunctional bias toward the use of military force in planning for situations where other value-added tools might generate better outcomes. Furthermore, the formidable expertise that resides in the intelligence community to guide planning is often left largely untapped.

Individual planners' initiative and major interagency organizational reform might help on the margins to resolve such friction, but attempts to achieve improvement through organizational reform have been mixed or even counterproductive. Therefore, what is important here is to understand and acknowledge the inescapable effect of interagency bureaucratic politics and use that understanding to design a more effective theoretical framework to mitigate the most adverse political tendencies of the process.

Deliberate war planning is a mechanism that offers great promise to connect individuals across stovepiped organizations into a multifunctional community of practice. The challenge becomes one of promoting a broad understanding of the magnitude of these intangible benefits and utilities among those involved in planning. Positing such a framework to overcome this challenge will be a contribution of this article. With such an understanding, deliberate war planning can be carried out in a manner that increases its value to the national security community.

Civil–Military Relationship Tensions

Civil–military relations are another source of tension that influences the strategic value offered by deliberate war planning. The relational dynamics between the officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and

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uniformed planners is a central driver of planning progress, process, and content. These dynamics are complicated by competing perspectives on the utility of deliberate war planning.

For military planners, value-added deliberate planning starts with predetermined national strategic objectives that come from civilian officials. Such established national strategic objectives then become the goalposts toward which all efforts can be directed. As we have seen, the deliberate war planning enterprise is substantial, so clear direction is quite useful in channeling enterprise-wide effort along a relatively effective and efficient path. However, experienced military planners do appreciate that as the strategic and political environment evolves, guidance will evolve with it, requiring flexibility in planning. And, innovative planning practices can effectively cope with a finite range of policy preferences. Nevertheless, from the military's perspective, relatively stable and clear policy guidance enables more value-added deliberate war planning.

Civilian officials view war plans as mechanisms for generating decision space through development of a broad range of courses of actions with various mixes of military as well as value-added options. Such options enable high-level decisions that usually involve trade-offs between equally important priorities. Thus, if the outcome of deliberate war planning is a broad range of options that correspond to a broad range of potential policy choices, then this buys valuable time for arriving at the optimal decision. At the practitioner level, this desire for decision space amplifies because there is the added pressure of not getting ahead of the secretary of defense or key Department of Defense undersecretaries.

Neither civilian nor military perspectives are superior over the other. The most productive way to reconcile them is to have awareness and respect for the role that civil–military relationship tensions have on the process for and content of deliberate war plans. With greater awareness, both sides can achieve a better dialogue, and do so at all levels from principals to practitioners.

In summary, bureaucratic politics and civil–military friction become overbearing in the absence of a guiding theory. Individual planners' personality and talent can provide some mitigation, but to achieve a broader increase in added strategic value, a need exists for the theoretical framework that is the topic of this article. As Carl von Clausewitz advised, "So long as no acceptable theory ... of the conduct of war exists, routine methods will tend take over even at the highest levels."[15]

Conceptualizing the Elements of Deliberate War Planning Utility

This section offers a theoretical framework that will enable the military planning community to cope with the tensions described above, thereby adding increased strategic value to deliberate war planning.

The proposed framework conceptualizes the abstract concept of planning utility into seven dimensions: military validity, strategic validity, organizational learning, organizational networking, resourcing influence, flexibility, and clarity. These dimensions can then serve as propositions to help current and future planning leaders and practitioners to assess the value that their efforts are adding. The dimensions also can aid data collection and analysis for future research oriented on historical case studies.[16]

Military validity. The first dimension of utility is *military validity*. Military validity (or invalidity) is observed when a deliberate war plan is implemented in actual war. Deliberate war plans are militarily valid if the actual operations carried out resemble the course of action described in the war plan. Conversely, if a war plan was largely abandoned at the time of need, then that would indicate it was invalid.

Military validity is measured by calculating the extent to which the war plan matched the battlefield outcomes, from three perspectives: whether the planning assumptions upon which the war plan was designed were validated, whether the adversary's anticipated course of action matched what the deliberate plan predicted, and whether the U.S. military forces actually adopted the operational approach the war plan called for.

Strategic validity. The second dimension is *strategic validity*. As with military validity, strategic validity can only be observed when a war plan is implemented in actual war. Deliberate war plans are strategically valid if the military operations they prescribe are strategically successful. To illustrate the difference between military validity and strategic validity, the achievement of military objectives does not automatically lead to strategic victory. A good example was the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, where the achievement of the initial military objective, the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime, did not result in strategic victory. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion

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of Iraq was militarily valid but strategically invalid, because the assumptions undergirding the policy direction to the war proved false.

Organizational learning. The third dimension is *organizational learning*. The process of designing a deliberate war plan should generate insights and innovation that otherwise would not emerge. President Dwight D. Eisenhower characterized the value of learning through the medium of planning in a quote that is often invoked in the contemporary American prewar planning community: "Plans are useless but planning is indispensable."[17] Approached from this perspective, deliberate war planning can add value by facilitating individual and organizational understanding of complex problems.[18] Organizational learning as a dimension of war planning utility is measured by observing the number of doctrinal changes and professional journal articles published because of the planners' insights and innovation.

Organizational networking. The fourth dimension is *organizational networking*. Deliberate war planning should breach organizational stovepipes and connect communities of interest. Organizational networking is measured by observing the formation of networks (at all levels) that would not have otherwise occurred had the planning effort not taken place. Additionally, experience should validate that such networks proved to be invaluable in a crisis.

Unfortunately, in some cases, organizational networking is inhibited when deliberate war planning becomes exclusionary because of formal security compartmentalization, informal information sharing barriers, or even restrictions established by the chain of command. Exclusivity is sometimes necessary because of operational and political sensitivities, though it reduces the effectiveness of organizational networking.

Resourcing influence. The fifth dimension is *resourcing influence*. Effective deliberate war plans should influence the military's investments in technology, equipment, organizational restructuring, and overseas basing posture. Resourcing influence is measured by observing changes in military resource allocations that resulted from the plans.

Flexibility. The sixth dimension is *flexibility*. War plans should offer a range of options, thereby providing a wide enough range of planning latitude to effectively adapt to unpredicted situations.[19] Flexibility is measured by determining the number of potential adversary actions that the plan anticipates as well as the number of options it provides for the U.S. military commander to deal with such actions.

Clarity. The seventh dimension is *clarity*. War plans should articulate an operational approach that is clear to multiple different organizations and users, thus increasing the possibility of unity of effort and lowering the probabilities of miscalculation and miscommunication.[20] Clarity is measured by observing accurate cognition by operational planners in a crisis and service planners in steady-state readiness generation.

Note that the last two dimensions, clarity and flexibility, are inversely related. How to manage this tradeoff is a pervasive question being grappled with by contemporary practitioners and thus must be accounted for in any useful model. In doing so, Albert Einstein's advice is instructive: "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler."[21]

Military planning doctrine accounts for aspects of these seven dimensions (see the footnoted references). But their articulation as separate analytic concepts is insufficient. Elaboration of the dimensions into a theoretical framework is the contribution sought here. To be sure, this theoretical framework is not a panacea, but there is plenty of room for incremental improvement, as we have seen.

Further research is needed to validate the theoretical framework, potentially through its application to a series of case studies from U.S. military deliberate planning experience. Case studies would ideally include the definitive U.S. military deliberate war planning efforts: Plan Orange, 1924–1941; the General Defense of Western Europe, 1945–1989; and Plan 1002/1003, 1991–2003.[22] Ultimately, this research will equip future practitioners with a framework to overcome the tensions that will otherwise pervade the process and generate greater satisfaction at all levels.

Conclusion

While deliberate war planning has real benefits, the environment in which it is carried out today is riven with competing tensions that at best impair its effectiveness and at worst render it irrelevant. This outcome is, perhaps, inevitable. The way to improve the benefits of deliberate planning is not to tinker with the process. The process brings all the relevant parties together. What is needed is a way to improve the outcomes of the process.

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The solution proffered here is a theoretical framework populated by an objective set of criteria that can be used to assess the validity of a plan objectively and, in so doing, shift the focus from institutional and bureaucratic concerns to the strategic merits of war plans and war planning. ■

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17. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference," 14 November 1957, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project website, accessed 13 October 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951.

18. The U.S. military's planning doctrine accounts for the value that prewar planning provides to individual and organizational learning in "Constant Change, Learning, and Adaptation," JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, I-6–I-7.

19. Ibid., I-5–I-6. This theory is best described in JP 5-0's "Providing Options, Aligning Resources, and Mitigating Risks."

20. Ibid., I-16–I-18. This theory is best described in JP 5-0's "Developing Commander's Planning Guidance."

21. Paraphrased from remarks by Albert Einstein in "On the Method of Theoretical Physics," *Philosophy of Science* 1, no. 2 (April 1934): 163–69.

22. Plan Orange refers to a series of joint Army-Navy war plans focused on potential scenarios for war with Japan during the interwar years. The General Defense of Western Europe refers to war plans relating to the defense of Europe, specifically against the threat posed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Plans 1002 and 1003 refer to war plans for fighting in Southwest Asia.

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The Need for a Brigade Politics-and-Policy Staff Officer

Maj. Adam Scher, U.S. Army

By June 2015, morning battlefield-update briefs were routine in the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 82nd Airborne Division's Baghdad command post. On one morning of that month, however, there was a critical difference: it was the first time a member of the staff was asked to provide commentary and analysis about the politics-and-policy decisions of regional governments, coalition partners, and the government of Iraq. Given my position as an assistant professor of American politics, policy, and strategy at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Col. Curtis Buzzard, the 3rd BCT commander, asked me to help explain how the 7 June national elections in Turkey might influence our partnership with the Iraqi Army's Ninewa Operations Command and the operational planning to liberate Mosul.

This was not the first time that a brigade commander asked me to fill this role. In 2008, while serving with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Yusifiyah, Iraq, Col. Dominic Caraccilo asked me to study the Iraqi political process, interact with key State Department (DOS) officials, meet regularly with local political leaders, act as an advocate for the Iraqi population, and advise him on the political landscape within the areas of operations and interest.[1] Seven years later, I volunteered to spend the summer with 3rd BCT because I believed the setup of brigade staffs did not account for the difference between its evolving operational needs and the structure and responsibilities of its staff. I worked with 3rd BCT in the summer because they, like every other BCT in the Army, had no officer at the brigade level to examine the politics and policy of their assigned region, and no foreign-service officers embedded in their formations.

Spc. Rose Lewis, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division, interprets for Maj. Adam Scher, Iraqi Security Forces development officer and political officer for 3rd BCT, and Col. Mohammed, Ninewa Operations Command action officer for popular mobilization forces integration, as they discuss the effect of Turkey's elections on the planning process for liberating Mosul 27 July 2015 at the Iraqi Ground Forces Command Headquarters compound, Baghdad, Iraq. (Photo by James Polk, U.S. Army)

During discussions in Iraq with others on the brigade staff, subordinate battalions, and our higher headquarters, it became apparent we lacked a clear procedure or person to assist in interpreting the Iraqi government's political decisions, in exploring the domestic politics of regional partners and adversaries, or even in understanding the differences between the Title 10, U.S. Code, authorities and functions of the combined joint task force and the Title 22 functions of the Office of Security Cooperation that has been operating in Iraq since 2011.[2] This lack of understanding reduced our capacity to partner, advise, and assist when our counterparts asked questions about regional dynamics or global issues with which we were not familiar or for which we lacked an appreciation. The BCT staff structure limited our ability to fully understand our operational environment and best apply combat power.

This gap also highlighted the apparent beginning of what has become a recurring complaint about field grade officers and more senior military leaders—that the "best military advice" they provide is too frequently tactically sound but strategically and politically uninformed. As former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright noted,

> We forget the other elements of national power will be integrated into the objective at the highest levels of government. We fail to recall the use of force is a political decision—part of

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British Middle East scholar Emma Sky initially served 2003–2004 as political adviser to Col. William Mayville, U.S. commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, Kirkuk, Iraq. She developed such admiration and affection for the soldiers of the brigade that when they rotated home in early 2004, she reportedly "sobbed inconsolably all afternoon." In 2006, Gen. Raymond Odierno, who had been Mayville's division commander, invited her to become his political adviser when he was appointed the deputy American commander in Iraq. She served as his political advisor in 2006–2008 and in 2008–2010 when he returned as top commander in Iraq. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Curt Cashour, U.S. Army)

> a larger strategy—and that the end state will not be the political introduction of force; it will be a political settlement. That is, the principal reason for military intervention is to facilitate the political objectives.[3]

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process,* indicates that commanders and staffs must consider operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time—when conducting analysis and planning, stating, "The operational variables are *fundamental* [emphasis added] to developing a comprehensive understanding of an operational environment."[4] Consideration of *just* the political and social operational variables may require staffs to evaluate up to seventeen different subvariables.[5] Quite simply, most commanders and staffs at the tactical level are too task-saturated to acquire the breadth and depth of knowledge needed to create operationally sound plans in an extraordinarily complex political environment. The creation of a modified-table-of-organization-and-equipment billet for a brigade politics-and-policy staff officer could address this issue by assigning officers who are well versed in the political, social, and economic complexities of their operational environment to BCTs.[6]

Some may argue that the intelligence (S-2), civil affairs (S-9), and foreign area officers already exist within our formations and could or should accomplish this mission. While the S-2 can produce the "road to war" prior to a deployment—which typically includes some analysis of the broader region, its stakeholders, and other key influences—the tactical S-2 is enemy-focused. The daily demands of intelligence production at the BCT level do not leave much time for examining the larger strategic environment, or host-nation (HN) security forces.

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Similarly, the S-9 typically focuses on infrastructure development, and the operations officer (S-3) is engrossed in planning operations, evaluating key terrain, and coordinating between the other warfighting functions within the brigade. No functional area officers—whether foreign area officers, strategists, or strategic intelligence officers—are assigned at the brigade level. Given the likely continued emphasis on partnerships between conventional Army units and their HN counterparts, the Army cannot continue to accept this deficiency in the brigade staff. Without a trained and resourced politics-and-policy officer, only in rare instances will a commander obtain critical information by setting aside one of his or her officers or directing a staff element to look at these issues instead of or in addition to their mission-essential tasks.

The politics-and-policy officer need not be its own functional area that forces an officer out of the operations track and command pipeline like the strategist, acquisition, or foreign-area officer specialties. Rather, it could be an additional skill identifier consisting of formal schooling and a utilization tour. Selection must be competitive and nominative, and schooling should consist of formal master's degree programs in international relations, foreign policy, public administration, finance and business, or regional studies, with coursework in economics and public policy. Officers who acquire this additional skill identifier should be managed similarly to those who complete the School of Advanced Military Studies.

With a planned reduction to thirty BCTs by fiscal year 2017, the Army would only need to allocate a minimum of sixty officers to a maximum of ninety officers per year to this program.[7] One politics-and-policy officer per BCT would require thirty officers, with an additional thirty in a one-year graduate school program ready to replace the existing politics-and-policy officers after a twelve-month utilization tour. If the Army wanted to send each politics-and-policy officer to a two-year graduate program, an additional thirty officers would be required.

The question of how to incorporate these officers back into the appropriate key development and command pipelines remains. The Pentagon is already implementing personnel reforms that are expanding officer opportunities for advanced civilian schooling. Such enhanced education proposals are a key component of Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's effort to overhaul the military personnel system. According to the *Military Times*, "the emerging slate of reforms will include new benchmarks designed to encourage officers to go to civilian graduate schools and other 'broadening assignments' that involve spending time beyond the insular military community."[8] The politics-and-policy officer billet could be a necessary component to institutionalize already existing military education reforms and bring enhanced capabilities to the BCT without making new, costly investments outside of existing personnel reforms.

Deployed BCTs could benefit from a politics-and-policy officer immediately. During my time with 3rd BCT, it was clear that the brigade's separate missions of building partner capacity, training and equipping an HN security force, and advising and assisting HN political and military leaders at times had competing strategic ends. In some cases, our efforts to equip and train the Kurds undermined our efforts to advise and assist the government in Baghdad. At an even more granular level, our partnership with units committed to the defense of Baghdad often took training time and space away from our HN partner units that were apportioned to liberate areas north and west of the capital. Given that no existing brigade staff section had a primary responsibility to aid the commander in processing or prioritizing competing tactical and strategic measures of performance and effectiveness, it was incumbent upon the leaders within the brigade to come up with creative solutions.

The brigade task-organized and established an advise-and-assist cell comprised of officers for whom the advise-and-assist mission was neither their primary mission nor their area of expertise. Each day, they had to make decisions on how and where to spend their finite time and resources, a situation that could be at least partially alleviated by the politics-and-policy officer, whose daily responsibility should be to organize

Maj. Adam Scher, U.S. Army, is the executive officer of 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment. He previously served as an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy. He graduated from West Point in 2004 and from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs in 2013. A veteran of multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, he most recently served as a brigade politics-and-policy officer for 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, during its deployment to Iraq in 2015.

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what might otherwise be a somewhat ad hoc effort, and relieve some of the task-saturation problem for other staff officers.

The brigade was also constrained by a number of other factors, particularly restrictions on the number of personnel in theater and an inability to operate outside forward operating bases. The operational environment was also complicated by numerous other U.S. and coalition government agencies as well as many factions within the Iraqi government and security apparatus. The BCT quickly recognized that regional and Iraqi-specific context and information were critical to accomplishing its training and advising mission. Buzzard explains,

> Without this context and understanding, multiple units could have easily inadvertently caused a long-term problem while pursuing a seemingly logical short-term solution. Given the complexity of the operational environment, the brigade prioritized a "mission first" perspective over concerns about lines of authority, task organization, or who received credit—3/82's deployment adopted a "one team" approach.[9]

Despite this "mission first" attitude, some missions conflicted with others, and adjacent units, superior and subordinate command headquarters, and peers on the brigade staff did not have refined processes for evaluating the myriad of stakeholders' interests. Various parties' interests, both within and external to the immediate BCT battle space, influenced the area of operations and decision making for applying combat power. This is not an indictment of any individual or command—on the contrary, it is an observation that the task organization of the Army's unit of employment, the BCT, has not been adapted to meet the changing battlefield environment, and it is less than ideally suited to operate and exercise lethal and nonlethal force among large populations of noncombatants. Operations that require the skills of a politics-and-policy officer include—

- training an HN security force,
- equipping an HN security force,
- advising and assisting HN military and political leaders on employment of their force, and
- conducting lethal and nonlethal fires in support of HN ground maneuver.

BCTs will not be able to effectively balance these tactical missions and their strategic consequences unless we task-organize and manage our talent appropriately to bridge the gap described above. Therefore, the brigade politics-and-policy officer should be given the following duty description:

An assigned officer on the BCT staff will be responsible for making tactical recommendations to the brigade commander based on an assessment of governmental influences on HN security forces training, equipping, and employment. This recommendation should include the officer's evaluation of data from multiple sources and, upon the brigade commander's approval, it can be used to create products that support advise-and-assist teams at the battalion level in their evaluation of partnered forces. Equally important, a focus on this type of HN security forces assessment will help provide the brigade commander with an accurate understanding of the capabilities of training units, enabling better decisions about employment in support of all aspects of urban land operations.

The brigade politics-and-policy officer should be given the following key tasks:

- understand HN political leaders' party affiliation, legal obligation, and election cycle;
- identify informal or opposition leaders not in government (by definition, a key leader engagement only allows us to interact with the winners of the democratic process even if they do not represent more than 51 percent of any given population); and
- track political and policy outcomes of numerous interested governments and assess the potential impact politics and policy will have on HN security force capacity building.

The purpose of formalizing this staff position is to institutionalize intellectual capital within the BCT in the same way we already focus on building tactical and operational expertise for our company commanders and field grade officers. Interestingly enough, the Army already has a repository of officers that could immediately fill this gap. They have already completed advanced civilian schooling, many have published in the fields of political science and force employment, and all have proven to be successful company grade officers at the tactical level.

Prior to making any changes to the modified table of organization and equipment, a pilot program could allow the Army and BCT commanders to test this concept. Officers teaching in the U.S. Military Academy's Department of Social Sciences are already spending their summers attached to fielded-force units to provide this support. Col. Cindy Jebb, who heads the

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A role player portraying an Afghan provincial governor addresses security concerns to Col. Michael Getchell, commander of 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, and other brigade leaders 11 June 2012 during a key-leader engagement exercise at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. Such engagements are greatly enhanced by the presence of trained and experienced political officers. (Photo by Sgt. Christopher M. Gaylord, U.S. Army)

Department of Social Sciences, spent the summer of 2015 working with the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and the department considered ways to send another officer to support the joint force land component commander in Iraq again during the summer of 2016.

Additionally, during the summer of 2015, I functioned as the 3rd BCT's politics-and-policy officer, providing the brigade commander with regional and political analysis of the major stakeholders for Iraq, as well as analysis of U.S. influences on policy decisions and recommendations. This analysis was informed by participation in key-leader engagements every day and was disseminated by publishing a daily report that gave commanders, staff officers, and soldiers down to the platoon level the ability to understand the politics relevant to their operations and to leverage that understanding in their advise-and-assist mission. Buzzard believes his building-partner-capacity and advise-and-assist missions could be enhanced if he and his team assigned a staff officer to generate a political understanding of 3rd BCT's HN and coalition partners; despite how critical political understanding is, even at the tactical level, the Army did not provide him with an officer dedicated to this task.[10]

The success of this "proof of concept" has generated interest from multiple brigade commanders who are interested in enhancing their units' understanding of their operational environments and their ability to accomplish their missions. For the Army to truly benefit from the creation of a politics-and-policy officer billet, there must also be value added to the BCT organization in garrison or during home-station training, not just a deployed mission requirement. The lessons learned from 3rd BCT's preparation and deployment provide unique insight into how the potential functions of a brigade politics-and-policy officer could enhance predeployment training. Buzzard describes his brigade's predeployment training focus in the following manner:

> Upon receipt of the mission, the BCT had to conduct a rapid mission analysis—there

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were few facts and a lot of assumptions about this evolving mission. First, and foremost, the brigade aggressively implemented a leader development program that initially leveraged the Security Force Assistance Advisor Team (SFAAT) Academy, which is based at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Their program of instruction was an excellent primer for advise-and-assist tasks, refreshed the unit's understanding of Iraq's cultural nuances, and provided a great start point to examine the mission.[11]

Ideally, the politics-and-policy officer could supply this type of "primer" at home station, using the SFAAT Academy program of instruction as a base and adding regionally specific context from a variety of sources, including academia. This type of training at home station would allow the unit's training-center rotation to serve as a certifying exercise.

In addition to existing military training programs, Buzzard expanded his predeployment preparation to other nontraditional resources that focused on leader professional development:

> Col. Joel Rayburn, author of *Iraq After America,* presented a session to key leaders on his recent book and research on Operation Iraqi Freedom. His insights into Iraqi political and military institutional change since U.S. forces departed Iraq was hugely beneficial, and his connections to experts that the BCT would later leverage during the deployment were equally important. In addition, the BCT hosted the West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, which shared its most recent products on the Islamic State and offered valuable perspectives on the politics in Baghdad and the retreat of Iraqi forces in 2014. The BCT also invited the Negotiations Project from West Point and executed a seminar on developing negotiation strategies for the BCT's leaders.[12]

A full-time politics-and-policy officer could develop and implement this type of unconventional, "out of the box" training. The officer would work closely with the brigade S-3 to ensure the training was properly balanced with other mandatory and predeployment training.

Finally, the Army does not have to do this alone. A whole-of-government approach that leverages interagency partners could also help fill this gap. Adapting the State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team program to assign foreign-service officers to Army BCTs could be explored as a pilot program for improving the task organization and enhancing the building-partner-capacity and advise-and-assist effectiveness of Army formations. Another option would allow the Army to send its politics-and-policy officers to a civilian graduate school and follow such study with an assignment to an interagency partner such as the DOS. Doing so would enable these officers to serve in an embassy as a member of an ambassador's country team or at the DOS headquarters in order to understand how the political-military sections integrate their specific country's perspectives into U.S. foreign policy goals. As I wrote in an article for the Task and Purpose website, "The United States already has experience with security sector reform and has published doctrine to define the relationship between the DOS, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Department of Defense. In it, these agencies are tasked to work together to provide reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law in a host country."[13]

Expanding this arrangement to incorporate civilian experts into a BCT's culminating training event as well as its real-world deployments could be another option for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of BCTs deployed to conduct partnership operations. While this would not expand the intellectual capital within the Army, it would leverage the knowledge of career civil servants who arguably have a better understanding of culture and politics.

The risk to the interagency support program is in the civilian's lack of experience with Army tactical operations. The advantage of training a successful company commander with an additional skill rests with this officer's ability to understand and integrate politics and policy into existing warfighting functions like fires and maneuver.

While I expect my next job to be a return to a tactical infantry battalion, what became apparent over my time with 3rd BCT was that for tactical decisions at the battalion and company level to be truly exceptional, they must be informed by a political, strategic, and cultural understanding of the HN, by the interests of other governmental and nongovernmental actors, and

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by a greater appreciation for other elements of national power that support the overall U.S. strategy. As former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno said, "We now have ... the opportunity to study and recommend changes to our brigade combat team organization. ... It is critical that this vital war fighting formation remains dominant against the evolving hybrid threats in tomorrow's operational environments."[14] One way to accomplish this is to create a position on the BCT staff charged with the responsibility to analyze and understand the politics and policies of partnered governments and interested stakeholders that affect our partnered HN security forces. ■

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

Notes

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2. 10 U.S.C. §§ 101-18506 (2015); 22 U.S.C. §§ 1-9308 (2015). Title 10 of the U.S. Code outlines the role of the armed forces. Title 22 outlines the role of foreign relations and intercourse.

3. James E. Cartwright, "Best Military Advice," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (September 2015): 14–15.

4. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, May 2012), 1-7, accessed 19 September 2016, http://www.apd.army.mil/Search/ePubsSearch/ePubsSearchDownloadPage.aspx?docID=0902c851800123fe.

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6. A modified table of organization and equipment is a document that authorizes the organization and equipment for each Army unit.

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
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12. Ibid.

13. Adam Scher, "The Problem with Iraqi Security Forces Isn't Just an Unwillingness to Fight," Task and Purpose website, 1 December 2015, accessed 19 September 2016, http://taskandpurpose.com/the-problem-with-iraqi-security-forces-isnt-just-an-unwillingness-to-fight/.

14. Raymond Odierno, "Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Winter Symposium speech" (AUSA Winter Symposium, Fort Lauderdale, FL, 24 February 2012).

WE RECOMMEND



An early opponent of Operation Iraqi Freedom, British Middle East scholar Emma Sky nevertheless volunteered to help rebuild Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Subsequently, her educational background, language skills, and gift for diplomacy as well as her blunt honesty ingratiated her with senior military leaders struggling with the issues of occupation. She initially served as the political adviser to Col. William Mayville, commander of the U.S. Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade, Kirkuk, Iraq, and then as political adviser to Gen. Raymond Odierno during his tours in Iraq as deputy commander and later as commander of coalition forces. Sky became among Odierno's closest confidants during the most painful stages of the war. *The Unraveling* details her observations and critical analysis stemming from more than a decade of experience as a political adviser serving in time of war. It provides invaluable insight into the role and the risks of service as a political adviser at the brigade and major command levels.

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Battle of Churubusco. Fought near the City of Mexico 20th of August 1847 (1847), hand-tinted lithograph, by John Cameron (artist) and Nathaniel Currier (lithographer), digitally restored. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Expeditionary Land Power
Lessons from the Mexican-American War

Maj. Nathan A. Jennings, U.S. Army

Since drawing down its large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns in the Middle East, the U.S. Army has been increasingly adopting, as described by its thirty-eighth chief of staff, "an expeditionary mindset" to "conduct forced entry in denied areas under extremely austere conditions anywhere in the world."[1] While many are turning to the two world wars and interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq for applicable lessons, the campaigns of the nineteenth century—with the exception of the Civil War—may offer more relevant case studies where relatively small, technologically advanced, and professionally led forces deployed to distant theaters. From the Indian Wars that raged across expanding American frontiers to the global attacks of the Spanish-American War, the republic's oldest military service evolved to negotiate rapid and economized expeditionary warfare in both conventional and guerrilla settings.[2]

In the Mexican-American War, 1846–1848, a series of sparsely resourced but highly effective expeditions exemplified the *U.S. Army Operating Concept's* imperative for future forces to jointly "present the enemy with multiple dilemmas" by being able to "conduct expeditionary

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maneuver through rapid deployment and transition to operations," and "overwhelm the enemy physically and psychologically."[3] Beginning with border skirmishes along the Rio Grande and ending with the occupation of half of Mexico from San Diego to Veracruz, the Army, in concert with the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the diplomatic corps, employed unprecedented joint unity of effort, robust "total force" cooperation between professionals and volunteers, and relatively sophisticated foreign governance policies to achieve strategic objectives. Although the *casus belli* remains controversial, the efficient implementation of joint force effort across the continent established the United States as the dominant nation in North America.

Future U.S. forces will need to achieve mastery of force projection methods reminiscent of successful operations in the contested cities of Los Angeles in 1846 and Mexico City in 1847, while incorporating twenty-first century technologies to project land power effectively. While the modern U.S. military could potentially replicate massive mobilizations similar to the Second World War or the substantial deployment of the Persian Gulf War in the near future, it is more likely to conduct forced entry and security efforts along accelerated political timelines with limited but tactically effective joint and combined arms teams.

Campaigning in Mexico

The Mexican-American War and its relevance to the Army's current interests in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and East Asia can be readily assessed according to modern U.S. military doctrine. The operational phases of shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority, as outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, provide a ready conceptual framework to contextualize the nineteenth-century confrontation.[4] While all historical engagements must be assessed as unique events within distinct panoramas, the sequenced invasions and occupations of north, west, and central Mexico by land and sea followed a campaign pattern similar to phased models that regionally aligned forces may potentially apply during forced-entry operations in the twenty-first century.

The first, and enduring, phase of U.S. military operations abroad centers on shaping the security environment. According to joint doctrine, aligned forces conduct continuous missions, tasks, and actions to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends while "influencing adversaries' and allies' behavior."[5] These efforts often focus on robust security cooperation by partnered elements to reinforce and enable political objectives. As seen in Europe, the Persian Gulf region, and the Korean Peninsula since the rise of American global leadership, expeditionary operations by combined arms teams remain a primary instrument for influencing foreign affairs in accordance with national interests.

For decades before the Mexican-American War, the Army shaped the North American security environment by operating in dispersed contingents as it secured frontiers and coastlines against both tribal and nation-state competitors. Similar to contemporary deployments by regionally aligned detachments, America's mid-nineteenth-century ground formations rarely united for large-scale training maneuvers or campaigns. Instead, under constant fiscal constraints, they focused on economized security efforts that, contrary to popular belief, often included partnership with Amerindians and territorial militias.[6]


When shaping operations prove insufficient, joint forces conduct intensified posturing and maneuver to "deter an adversary" through demonstration of "friendly capabilities and the will to use them."[7] The current positioning of rotational American and allied brigades in eastern Europe and South Korea, for example, underscores how military deterrence through physical presence remains viable in the twenty-first century. While effective messaging can emanate from a variety of instruments of national power, ground forces often provide the most credible demonstrations of national resolve. As argued by Lt. Gen.

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H. R. McMaster, "forward deterrence involves land forces. ... It is very difficult to achieve political outcomes from standoff range."[8]

When Mexico threatened war over American annexation of its former territory, Texas, scattered U.S. Army garrisons coalesced to deter potential incursion across the Rio Grande. In January 1846, in response to a Mexican Army buildup along the border, Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor led the newly formed "Army of Observation," comprising approximately 3,900 infantrymen, artillerymen, and dragoons, to the Gulf Coast.[9] Similar to the massing of allied forces in West Germany in the 1950s to deter Russian aggression, Taylor aimed to dissuade Mexico from challenging U.S. territorial claims through physical presence. Also similar to today, the ad hoc army benefited from a degree of professionalization that allowed the regiments to join, if imperfectly, as a combined arms team.



Daguerreotype of Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor, ca. 1843–1845. Taylor was appointed by President James K. Polk to lead U.S. forces sent to deter Mexican aggression along the Texas–Mexico border brought on by the U.S. annexation of Texas. Deterrence failed, and the Mexican-American War broke out in April 1846. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Because of the regular army's strength at fewer than 7,500 soldiers at the onset of war, the United States was compelled to adopt a mobilization model similar to what it uses today: heavy reliance on volunteer units to conduct "total force" campaigns of mass and scale.[10] When Taylor established camp at Corpus Christi, he received, integrated, and trained state regiments from Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Texas to create the "Army of Occupation" in the contested territory. Throughout the next two years, thousands of volunteers from nearly every state would rotate to provide the combat power necessary to defeat the far larger Mexican military. Though use of volunteers often came at a heavy price due to their indiscipline, many recruits, such as western frontiersmen who specialized in irregular tactics, added special capabilities to the regulars' conventional strengths.[11]

The third phase of joint operations begins when deterrence fails and decisive action is required. When conflict becomes unavoidable, American forces transition from posturing to seizing operational initiative. According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, this foundational action is designed to "gain a position of advantage that degrades and defeats the enemy throughout the depth of an organization."[12] As proven in the Inchon Landings of the Korean War and the sweeping envelopments of the Persian Gulf War, unified teams that attack rapidly and forcefully at the onset of hostilities or at advantageous points during major combat operations can dictate the battle and exploit opportunities.

For Taylor and his small army, deterrence soon failed and both sides moved to seize initiative. The American main force quickly won bloody victories at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma along the Rio Grande in May 1846. These victories allowed invasion of northeast Mexico while smaller columns conducted deep attacks into New Mexico and California. Though small in size, each of the expeditions employed technological overmatch to defeat an array of defending Mexican garrisons—except for a tactical setback near San Diego.[13] Akin to numerous twentieth-century campaigns where operational initiative compensated for inferior numbers, rapid successes allowed American troops to occupy favorable political terrain and ultimately empowered the U.S. government to demand strategic concessions.

The economized forced entry into Alta California, in particular, reflected a high degree of joint cooperation between Army forces, the Navy's Pacific Squadron, and rebel militia as they defeated and expelled the Presidio garrisons. When an element of the 1st U.S. Dragoons under Brig. Gen. Stephen Kearny initially suffered defeat at the Battle of San Pasqual in December 1846, a coastal contingent of marines and sailors reinforced the horsemen to win several follow-on engagements, retake Los Angeles, and establish a provisional government. Though the partnership was marred by interservice rivalry, the joint success accelerated American gains. Two thousand

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
miles to the east, the Navy's Home Squadron likewise blockaded enemy ports across the Gulf of Mexico while protecting logistical transports in support of Taylor's capture of Monterrey.[14]

The dominate phase of an operation, according to joint doctrine, "focuses on breaking the enemy's will to resist" or on "control [of] the operational environment."[15] Usually reflecting the most destructive moments in expeditionary warfare, Army formations dominate their adversaries through both traditional military means and emerging technological offsets. The phase often culminates a successful campaign—sometimes deceptively so, as seen in the American invasion of Iraq in 2003—by shattering the opposing nation's military and economic capability to resist and allowing advancing forces to control politically important spaces.

In the Mexican-American War, the American culmination occurred when Winfield Scott, commanding general of the U.S. Army, led an audacious amphibious attack into Central Mexico via the Atlantic Coast (figure 1). Similar to when a modestly sized and technologically advanced coalition rapidly attacked in Afghanistan in 2001, the Army relied on operational mobility and combined arms superiority to accomplish the contested entry. Outnumbered and far from support, Scott's eleven thousand soldiers captured the port of Veracruz and marched inland along increasingly vulnerable lines of communication to defeat over thirty thousand defenders and capture Mexico City. Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, renowned for his 1815 victory at the Battle of Waterloo, reportedly called the invasion "unsurpassed in military annals."[16]

As with previous successes in northern Mexico, the littoral attack relied upon cooperation by diverse military elements. In the largest wartime collaboration between U.S. ground and naval forces to that point in American history, the Home Squadron transported Scott's entire invasion force to the coastal fortress of Veracruz, blockaded the city, and provided heavy cannon to allow an intensive eighty-eight-hour bombardment. Following the "Gibraltar of Mexico's" timely capitulation, U.S. Marines then marched with the Army brigades "to the halls of Montezuma" while fighting in nearly every battle. Throughout the domination of Central Mexico, just as had occurred under Taylor, thousands of volunteers fought alongside regulars while warships secured maritime lines back to supply depots in New Orleans (figure 2, page 46).[17]

The fifth, and sometimes most challenging, phase of expeditionary warfare is stabilizing the theater after the end of major combat operations. Intended to "restore local political, economic, and infrastructure stability," American joint forces conducting stabilization have remained in numerous countries, sometimes indefinitely, as exemplified by postwar military partnerships with Germany and Japan, after winning large-scale



(Graphic courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 1. Route of Ground Force Led by Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott that Culminated in the Surrender of Mexico

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confrontations.[18] In other situations, U.S. elements have completely departed with disastrous results—perhaps best illustrated by Vietnam—or retrograded and then returned to stabilize, as is currently occurring in Iraq. Regardless of residual intensity, American incursions formed to, as proclaimed by one Mexican general, "attack and destroy the Yankee's invading army in every way imaginable."[19] Only by implementing stability policies that ordered civilians left unharmed, quartermasters to purchase provisions locally, demonstration of respect for



(Graphic courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Figure 2. The Mexican-American War, 1846–1848

often evolve into partnerships with allied governments in order to create desired strategic conditions.

The Army's mandate to occupy and govern Latin America's most populous country proved just as difficult in the nineteenth century as similar efforts would centuries later in places like Indochina and Mesopotamia. Frustrated American garrisons pacified restive urban centers from Sacramento to Veracruz while countering a determined "Guerrilla Corps" Catholic traditions, and partnership with Hispanic constabularies, did the occupiers prevent a popular uprising. In the end, despite numerous violations by ill-disciplined soldiers, Scott's relatively sophisticated approach, in addition to rising internal conflict among Mexican factions, allowed him to "conquer a peace."[20]

Scott's occupation of central Mexico, and to a lesser extent, Taylor's occupation of Monterrey, featured critically needed integration of the specialized skills that both

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General Scott's Entrance into Mexico City (1850), hand-painted lithograph, by Carl Nebel. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

regulars and volunteers contributed to the combined force. The commanding general employed a disciplined professional infantry to occupy the urban centers and to train allied Hispanic soldiers. He unleashed federalized Texas Rangers—irregular cavalry who had fought Mexicans and Indians for decades along embattled frontiers—to suppress the implacable guerrillas that preyed on convoys and outposts. Despite their tactical effectiveness, the Rangers' brutality toward Hispanic civilians threatened to undermine the expedition's broader pacification efforts.[21]

The final phase of expeditionary warfare enables a civil authority to "regain its ability to govern and administer to the services and other needs of the population."[22] As seen in recent operations in the Middle East, ideal transition conditions can be difficult to achieve. They sometimes require reengagement of forces. Identifying and empowering legitimate indigenous governing institutions can also be complicated by social and ethnic fracturing common in war-torn countries. In the end, expeditionary forces usually attain a manageable political outcome—as opposed to a perfect one—in order to allow redeployment of combat power from the occupied territory.

Despite its precarious position at the close of the Mexican-American War, the Army's threat to occupy northern Mexico indefinitely, with enduring naval support, enabled diplomatic counterparts to negotiate strategic concessions in exchange for a peaceful withdrawal.

The United States paid $15 million for 529,000 square miles across parts of what is now New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado, Utah, and California, while solidifying control of Texas.[23] Mexico, under foreign rule and suffering massive peasant revolts in the Yucatan region, bitterly conceded the territory to regain sovereignty. The American garrisons then redeployed to once again secure newly expanded frontiers. Though the settlement reflected aggrandizement that the international community now would consider unacceptable, the phased campaign set precedence for similar force projection cycles—some successful and some not—throughout succeeding centuries.

Given the strategic success of the American expeditions that fought through adversity and uncertainty

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in Mexico, the underappreciated conflict holds opportunity for further study as heirs to the legacy of nineteenth-century forces train to "win in a complex world." While the Civil War and the Second World War typically garner the attention of historians, they reflect mobilization paradigms the United States is unlikely to soon experience. Later interventions in Korea and Vietnam, though less vast, likewise reflected far larger investments than recent campaigns in Mesopotamia and South Asia enjoyed. Though no future is certain, these trends suggest that the Army—now smaller than at any time since 1940—will accomplish future forced entries under substantial resource constraints with increasing reliance on joint cooperation.[24]

This circumstance imparts new relevance to the Mexican-American War. Beyond decisive victories at storied places like Buena Vista, Cerro Gordo, and Chapultepec, the Army's ability to collaborate with maritime partners, integrate volunteer contingents into a "total force" concept, and apply balanced governance policies in occupied territories led to the efficient attainment of most national objectives. These mutually reinforcing tactical, operational, and strategic efforts, especially when contrasted against recent suboptimal outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan, reveal a time when commanders successfully planned and directed, as now required by joint doctrine, the "deployment of forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives."[25]

Looking forward to a new century of campaigns, the implications of the United States' historic victory in the Mexican-American War are clear: its land power institution must train and equip to win across all the phases of expeditionary warfare as it deploys to seize initiative, dominate the enemy, and stabilize war-torn regions. Accomplishing these tasks, which fulfills the *Operating Concept's* requirement to "deter adversaries; respond rapidly to crises; and conduct expeditionary maneuver against enemy forces," will require seamless unity of effort between diverse elements of U.S. national power.[26] If the war against Mexico demonstrated the potential for the Army to lead multifaceted teams to decisively win on distant and unfamiliar terrain, future endeavors in far-flung theaters will surely provide the opportunity, and ultimate crucible, to do so once again. ■

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Sgt. Jon Findley (*right*), 311th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) intelligence noncommissioned officer, explains how to brief the enemy situation using the Command Post of the Future computer system to Pfc. Arturo Gonzalez during the 311th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Command Post Exercise–Functional 19 September 2015 at Camp Parks, California. (Photo by Maj. Gregg Moore, U.S. Army)

Cutting Our Feet to Fit the Shoes

An Analysis of Mission Command in the U.S. Army

Maj. Amos C. Fox, U.S. Army

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The U.S. Army has sought to integrate mission command over the past decade but has run into resistance in many arenas. Mission command has not taken hold in the Army because it lacks specificity in relation to the Army's conditions and culture. Nor does it align with the contemporary American way of war, which is highlighted by its information and data-obsessed pursuit of efficiency and precision. This article seeks to develop a method of command and control more in line with the praxis of Army methods and principles. It recommends rescinding the doctrinal definition of mission command, while retaining mission command's principles. Army doctrine for command and control should incorporate a continuum that includes both mission command and centralized control, rather than preaching mission command but all too often practicing excess control.

The Army defines mission command as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."[1] The Army assigns the following principles to guide mission command: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander's intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk.[2]

There are two primary theories on mission command, both of which reflect the German concept of *Auftragstaktik*. In mission command, a commander clearly communicates his or her intent in relation to friendly forces, the enemy, and the mission but leaves the decisions on how to complete the mission with the subordinate leaders. The higher echelon commander allows subordinate leaders to develop the "how" based on the situation, the conditions, the terrain, familiarity with their unit, and their equipment.[3] This idea, providing latitude in execution, is at the heart of mission command, and its intellectual fountainhead, Auftragstaktik. While not explicitly referenced in any doctrinal publication, both concepts serve as the foundational underpinning of the Army's command philosophy of the art of command and the science of control.

The other school of thought treats mission command and command and control as sides of the same coin. In this line of reasoning, the theory of command and control finds its genesis in the relationship between information flow and decision making. Mission command, or what military theorist Robert Leonhard calls *directive control*, is required when decision making can no longer keep pace with the flow of information.[4] Command and control, what Leonhard calls *detailed control*, is required when decision making can maintain pace with the flow of information. In this school of thought, both forms of command and control—directive control and detailed control—are acceptable and viable in modern war. The key is to balance information flow with decision-making authority.[5]

However, a more granular examination suggests mission command—Leonhard's directive control—is messy, inefficient, and ambiguous. Mission command is messy because it provides parameters within which one must operate instead of an instructive method of operation. Mission command is inefficient and ambiguous because it relies on imprecise, bottom-up understanding and information instead of perfect, or near-perfect, understanding. Because of this, mission command is slow in relation to higher echelons of command as lower echelons develop the situation, analyze the situation, execute courses of action, and report to higher echelons.

Mission Command in the Army Today

The Army's adoption of mission command has been great for generating discussion about empowering junior leaders and developing mutual trust within formations. In 2016, the Army released several works on mission command, to include *Mission Command in the 21st Century*, *Training for Decisive Action: Stories of Mission Command*, and *16 Cases of Mission Command*.[6] Additionally, the Army's professional journals and Army-related blogs are continually filled with essays advocating for mission command and the principles it entails.

However, resistance to the ethos of mission command can be found everywhere. For all the success of mission command appears to be having across the Army, there are some critical shortcomings to full application across the force. Today's Army finds itself operating in an environment in which messy,

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inefficient, and slow methods of command are unwelcome and counterproductive. Regardless of the method of command and control stated in doctrine, commanders have always and will always evaluate their units and subordinates based on how much they trust them. Then commanders will allocate varying degrees of independent action based upon that trust.

Mission Command in Doctrine

In his seminal work on maneuver warfare theory, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War*, Leonhard states that nothing in military doctrine is everlasting, regardless of how strong it is at a given time. Leonhard continues, "Therefore, doctrine has a life span, and its death is certain."[7] In analyzing mission command, perhaps it too is approaching its timely demise.

Army mission command doctrine is, in effect, being applied in a prescriptive manner. The Army dictates the primacy of mission command instead of providing commanders and staffs with options for directing action within their commands. Leaders are forced into a dilemma: do they faithfully follow doctrine—potentially at the expense of what is the smart decision—or do they deviate from doctrine based upon their understanding of their organization and its leaders?

This dynamic highlights the need for the Army to shelve the notion that mission command is a singular, unquestionable approach. Instead, the Army should encourage a more flexible approach that encourages leaders to consider options based on their understanding of their unit and their subordinate leaders in relation to the unit's operational environment.

The Operating Environment's Influence on Command and Control

Today's operational environments often place Army units in situations in which their actions must be deliberate and restrained. In many cases, the U.S. government uses the Army as a tool to shape the strategic environment. Where national interests are at stake but limited objectives do not warrant large-scale combat operations, Army units must operate with finesse, in a manner not necessarily compatible with mission command. Concepts such as the "strategic corporal" highlight the limits of mission command—the independent actions of a single soldier on the battlefield can have strategic impact.[8] If soldiers' actions are not carefully controlled, the consequences could affect national security. However, that notion stands in stark contrast to the principles of mission command, which allow soldiers to choose their actions in accordance with commander's intent and vision, disciplined initiative, shared understanding, and mutual trust. Command and control methods are influenced not only by strategic mission constraints but also are strongly influenced by technological developments.

The proliferation of communications technology, information collection systems, and precision weaponry led the Army to over-engineer battlefield solutions. The thinking was that near-perfect situational understanding could be achieved, enabled by using precision weapons to kill without closing with the enemy while greatly minimizing collateral damage. Though these ideas are virtuous, they erode the principles of mission command and are largely unachievable.

In many cases, technological advancement has been geared toward providing commanders better situational awareness and improved ability to communicate, as with digital systems such as Blue Force Tracker, Command Post of the Future, and unmanned aircraft systems. In the past, commanders relied on reports from the field to populate friendly positions on maps. Today, Blue Force Tracker and Command Post of the Future allow commanders to see their formations down to the individual vehicle on high-resolution digital maps in near-real time. The employment of unmanned aircraft systems in conjunction with battle-tracking systems allows commanders a relatively high degree of understanding. A high degree of understanding, coupled with ubiquitous communications systems, has led to an environment similar to that of Vietnam, where commanders at multiple echelons were directing the actions of platoons and squads on the ground.[9]


Maj. Amos Fox, U.S. Army, is a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a BS from Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis and an MA from Ball State University. He has served with the 4th Infantry Division, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the U.S. Army Armor School.

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Successful Innovation and Mission Command

Historian Williamson Murray defined four critical factors of successful military innovation: specificity; a reflective, honest military culture; proper use of history; and cognitive openness.[10] Murray's thoughts on innovation are important to mission command because they suggest that philosophies and operational methods must be derived from the culture they are intended to support. In attempting to shoehorn mission command into Army doctrine, some could argue that the Army is improperly using history and ignoring specificity to justify the incorporation of the concept based solely on theoretical preference, or that the Army is cutting its feet to fit the shoes. Joint doctrine's retention of command and control instead of wholesale adoption of mission command could be seen as an acknowledgement of this idea. The Army's mission command doctrine lacks specificity of the environments in which the U.S. Army finds itself, the nature in which technology has influenced how the Army operates, and how the information age has shaped the Army's thinking about fighting. Based on Murray's factors of successful military innovation, it is time for the Army's approach to mission command to evolve.

Further exacerbating the command and control confusion is that mission command does not provide specificity to the Army in relation to the contemporary American way of war. The Germans' Auftragstaktik was an evolutionary innovation specific to the tactical, doctrinal, and cultural needs of the German army.[11] The conditions that allowed the concept of Auftragstaktik to develop organically over time and flourish in the German military are not found in today's U.S. Army operations.



(Graphic by author)

Figure 1. Continuum of Command and Control to Mission Command

The theoretical underpinnings of Auftragstaktik were products of vast battlefields in which large field armies were dispersed across great distances, generally operating against opponents similar in style and organization. However, in twenty-first century Army operations, conditions have changed.


The United States traditionally fought according to what many have called the "Western way of war." Historian Geoffrey Parker suggests that it is characterized by a focus on seeking a quick, decisive victory

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through annihilation. Furthermore, according to Parker, it is built on finance, technology, diversity, and overwhelming firepower.[12]

However, the conditions changed as information-age technological advancement occurred and the Soviet Union, with its large military force, disintegrated. These factors, coupled with the effects of globalism, have given rise to a relatively new theory on how the U.S. now fights.

individual soldiers can cause strategic problems is at the heart of hypercontrol. To remove the risk of subordinate leaders making, or accidently allowing, their subordinates to make strategic mistakes, constraints are emplaced, observation is ubiquitous, and heuristics such as the strategic corporal are developed to mitigate risk. The reduction of collateral damage and killing without closing with the enemy by employing precision munitions and precision forces, controlling



(Graphic by author)

Figure 2. Factors Determining Method of Control

Military theorist Antulio Echevarria suggests that U.S. forces "shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs ... into strategic successes."[13] He agrees with Russell Weigley and Max Boot that this lack of clear thinking stems from an emphasis on destroying the opponent, rather than taking into consideration the results of tactical victory.[14] In this construct, "control-mania," or a method of command and control that seeks to supersede risk and battlefield error through detailed control, appears to be a major byproduct of the information-age-fueled American way of war. The fact that

narratives, and seeking perfect understanding all fly in the face of the less controlled mission command approach that focuses on individual initiative, trust, and accepting prudent risk. Mission command reinforces the American focus on warfare (operational and tactical victory in battle) rather than war (strategic and political victory) due to the concept being derived from a German operational concept for winning quick battles of annihilation.

At this point, it is instructive to harker back to Leonhard's theory of command and control to understand how information-age technology encourages

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


Figure 3. Conditions Warranting More Detailed Control


practices at odds with mission command. Leaders and staffs now command an amazing array of tools that allow them to visualize the battlefield and the operational environment, which in turn allows them to feel as though they are using information flow to guide decision making. Leaders, in their minds, are not micromanaging the mission; they are making decisions and directing action consistent with what they are capable of understanding.

Thus, technology's proliferation continues to dramatically influence how U.S. commanders exercise command and control. In World War I, trench warfare led to detailed command and control, but in the twenty-first century, technology has had a similar effect, leading to commanders falling too heavily into the detailed control side of the command and control spectrum.[15] It has undercut mission command. The byproduct of technology is faith in the ability to obtain perfect, or near-perfect, information before launching precision weapons to destroy a specific target. Seeking perfect information in order to precisely kill a target in a way that minimizes the chances of collateral damage creates an environment of control-mania, the antithesis of mission command. Army commanders do not accept prudent risk but instead tend to minimize risk by setting stringently exacting conditions before servicing a target or committing forces.

Recommendations

The principles of mission command should not be exclusive to mission command but should be

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(Graphic by author)

Figure 4. Conditions Warranting More Directive Control

principles adhered to in any modern, democratic army. Mutual trust, shared understanding, thinking subordinate leaders who exercise initiative, accepting prudent risk—these are not sacred rights bestowed upon junior leaders by an enlightened commander; rather, these are principles vital to success on the modern battlefield. The speed of the information age demands these principles be intrinsic qualities for any army that wants to succeed. The principles should serve as the foundation of the operations process, the art of command, and the science of control in all the Army does. However, the manner in which commanders lead their organizations and their subordinates cannot be standardized.

Instead, the Army must acknowledge that successful commanders adjust their approach to command methodology by continually assessing a variety of factors to determine how much to tighten or loosen their grip on the reins of control. Commanders must determine their approaches based upon understanding derived from individual assessment of each subordinate and organization. The Army should not dictate one approach (i.e., mission command or command and control) over another. Instead, doctrine should define the art of command and the science of control as occurring in proportional amounts along a continuum, with directive control and detailed control as the bookends (see figure 1, page 52).[16] The decision on the method of control should then rest with the commander, based upon his or her understanding of any number of factors (see figure 2, page 53).

Doctrine should list the types of factors that commanders should consider when determining the method of control they will employ. However, doctrine should articulate that these factors are only examples to

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stimulate thought, not a definitive list. Commanders should assess factors such as the following when determining their method of control:

- degree of mutual trust between leaders in the unit
- degree of situational understanding
- degree of complexity associated with the mission (i.e., is the problem simple, complicated, complex, or chaotic?)
- degree of protection inherent to the organization[17]
- degree of synchronization required for the mission or subordinate missions
- complexity and type of terrain
- self-confidence of the commander
- proficiency of the organization and its subordinate units
- proficiency of subordinate leaders
- proficiency of the staff

Commanders will likely gravitate toward detailed control in areas with low degrees of proficiency or high levels of complexity and complicated problems (see figure 3, page 54). Conversely, commanders will likely slide toward more directive control in areas with moderate to high degrees of proficiency and little complexity or complicated problems (see figure 4, page 55).

Furthermore, commanders must understand that the method of command and control is not static. Commanders must adjust their method of control based upon the continually evolving conditions. Another consideration is that organizations have multiple units. A commander may have a cavalry formation forward developing the situation on the ground, while the maneuver units are conducting a complicated, highly synchronized operation such as a wet-gap crossing. The commander would likely employ directive control with the cavalry formation, while retaining more detailed control for the part of the mission requiring highly synchronized operations. Upon completion of the complicated mission, the commander could revert to directive control.

The primary benefit of this approach is that it formally acknowledges the cognitive process a commander undergoes when thinking about how to command and control operations. Commanders and leaders at all levels conduct inventory of their subordinates and their organization before deciding how to approach commanding each person and unit. Subordinates and units requiring more oversight get more oversight. Conversely, those that can be trusted to operate more independently are often provided more latitude.

Moreover, while addressing the contemporary American way of war, this approach provides flexibility to the commander by not dictating a specific approach for commanding and controlling operations. If the Army adjusts the manner in which doctrine is written and adopts the idea of the directive and detailed control continuum, it will better address the realities of war, pulling doctrine from the theoretical into the tangible.

Notwithstanding, it is useful to observe that either method of command or combination thereof is largely dependent on the quality of soldiers tasked to perform the missions. Gen. George S. Patton Jr. articulated this requirement over seventy years ago when he wrote, "To be a good soldier a man must have discipline, self-respect, pride in his unit and his country, a high sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and his superiors, and self-confidence born of demonstrated proficiency."[18]

Conclusion

In summation, mission command needs to be overhauled. The concept fails to provide specificity and therefore is at conflict with the Army's culture and the new American way of war. The Army must harken back to its own history to define what it wants from each end of the continuum while not forgetting the praxis of the American way of war and the influence of the information age. Doctrine must not dictate one way or one end of the continuum over the other but must describe instead how commanders continually assess themselves, their units, their subordinates, their environment, and the threat or enemy when determining which approach to employ. The approach must be appropriate to each subordinate leader in their organization. By adopting a continuum of control, the Army will develop an approach that is at harmony with the Army's culture and the manner in which it has long preferred to fight. ■

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Notes

1. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2015).

2. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2012), 2-1.

3. Robert Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle* (New York: Presidio Books, 1991), 113.

4. Robert Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1994), 111–19.

5. Ibid.

6. Nathan K. Finney and Jonathan P. Klug, eds., *Mission Command in the 21st Century: Empowering to Win in a Complex World* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Press, 2016); Operations Group, U.S. Army National Training Center, *Training for Decisive Action: Stories of Mission Command* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014); Donald P. Wright, ed., *16 Cases of Mission Command* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013).

7. Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes,* xxii.

8. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Corps Gazette* 83, no. 1 (January 1999).

9. Department of the Army, *Division-Level Communications, 1962-1973* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1982), 40–41.

10. Williamson Murray, "Innovation: Past and Future," in *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, eds. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 308–23.

11. Ibid., 308; Donald E. Vandergriff, "Misinterpretation and Confusion: What is Mission Command and Can the U.S. Army Make it Work?" *The Land Warfare Papers*, no. 94 (June 2013), 2–4.

12. Geoffrey Parker, "The Western Way of War," in *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.

13. Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Toward an American Way of War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), vi.

14. Ibid., v–vi.

15. This process is a mental exercise; the supporting figures are only used to illustrate the process—they are not intended to be prescriptive tools for leaders to assess their situation.


16. Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes,* 114.

17. The assumption is that inherent protection will increase the likelihood of the commander's choosing to be more directive because there is a bit less worry about physical security.

18. George S. Patton Jr., *War as I Knew It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), 335.


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
Mission Command in the 21st Century
Combat Studies Institute, 2016

To view this publication, please visit: http://armypress.dodlive.mil/files/2016/04/mission-command-in-the-21st-century.pdf.



Training for Decisive Action Stories of Mission Command
Combat Studies Institute, 2014

To view this publication, please visit: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/TrainingForDecisiveAction.pdf.



16 Cases of Mission Command
Combat Studies Institute, 2013

To view this publication, please visit: http://usacac.army.mil/Cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/SixteenCasesOfMissionCommand.pdf.

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Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in Ukrainian Antiterrorism Operations

Victor R. Morris

The U.S. Army Europe Joint Multinational Readiness Center's Raptor 14 team supported "Battle Staff Attack the Network/Network Engagement and Company Intelligence Support Team" training for Ukrainian armed forces officers conducting antiterrorism operations September 2015 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center (IPSC) in Yavoriv, Ukraine. The training team determined traditional doctrinal tools for intelligence preparation were inadequate to help Ukrainian intelligence staffs understand their operational environment (OE). Consequently, the team adapted the process in a way that would account for group dynamics and how they influence the behavior of populations relevant to the OE, consistent with a concept called *complex intelligence preparation of the battlefield*, or complex IPB. This experience serves as a case study on how cross-functional staffs and company command teams can improve problem framing, understand relevant issues at all levels, and inform operational planning. Complex IPB can support the Army's doctrinal *intelligence preparation of the battlefield* process and the joint process called *joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment* (JIPOE).

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From IPB to Complex IPB

According to Army Techniques Publication 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, an Army intelligence staff (1) defines the OE, (2) describes environmental effects on operations, (3) evaluates the threat, and (4) determines the threat.[1] The staff uses this four-step process to analyze certain mission variables in the area of interest for a specific operation.[2] The mission variables analyzed are the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations.[3] The goal of Army IPB is to provide Army commanders and staffs the information necessary to develop courses of action and make decisions.[4]

The IPB doctrine states that all four of the mission variables—including civil considerations—and their interactions must be analyzed if the process is to be effective. Staffs must "determine how the interactions of friendly forces, enemy forces, and indigenous populations affect each other."[5] However, in practice, the process tends to emphasize the enemy rather than holistically integrate the civil considerations. For instance, staffs might not adequately consider multigroup interconnectedness, micro decision making, and population behavior evaluation (i.e., human-domain-centric analysis). Thus, if an OE and its dynamics

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A Ukrainian soldier assigned to 1st Battalion, 80th Airmobile Brigade, looks for simulated enemy activity 14 November 2016 during an urban operations training exercise taught by soldiers assigned to 6th Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, as part of the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv, Ukraine. (Photo by Sgt. Jacob Holmes, U.S. Army)

are like a garden, the IPB process described in Army (and Marine Corps) doctrine focuses intelligence analysts on the soil, weeds, and insects, instead of the entire landscape and the interactions that made the plants vulnerable or resilient to harm or imbalance.

Authors Tom Pike and Eddie Brown explain how complex IPB could improve IPB in a March 2016 article in *Small Wars Journal*.[6] According to Pike and Brown, "Using IPB as the nucleus and integrating concepts from complex adaptive systems theory generates Complex IPB."[7] Instead of primarily identifying and evaluating the enemy or the threat, the complex IPB process helps intelligence staffs analyze multiple groups and how they interact and collectively behave. Like the hybrid and dynamic threats it was developed to defeat, complex IPB combines conventional and innovative approaches that emphasize cultural and population factors, perception assessments, and analysis of nonmilitary actors in order to create a more accurate understanding of the OE. Therefore, complex IPB expands the core process to include sociocultural profiling, link and social network analysis, and computational agent-based models. Although complex IPB has not been employed widely enough to validate its effectiveness, it can help staffs develop a more comprehensive picture of the OE than can doctrinal IPB alone.

According to Pike and Brown, "complex IPB is the next-generation of IPB ... [that could] dramatically improve foreign population analysis as well as improve U.S. ability to influence foreign populations."[8] The six steps of complex IPB are—

1. Define the OE.
2. Describe fitness landscape effects.
3. Evaluate the major groups.
4. Evaluate major groups' courses of action.
5. Assess the groups' interaction.
6. Evaluate population behavior.[9]

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What Pike and Brown call a "fitness landscape" is "a population socio-cultural-political-ecosystem," a construct that relates to the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) system and subsystem analysis used in JIPOE.[10] Complex IPB considers individual capabilities that Pike and Brown call "fitness functions," such as profession, education, ethnic group, family connections, and economic need, that influence individuals' decisions in relation to the fitness landscape.[11] Using these constructs, complex IPB can help staffs understand and take into account how individual decisions interact and affect group dynamics.

A Holistic Way to Frame an Operational Environment

Joint doctrine defines an *operational environment* as "a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander."[12] Understanding the OE and defining all of its dynamics are essential to successful intelligence preparation. The OE construct "encompasses physical areas and factors ..., the information environment (which includes cyberspace)," and interconnected systems that can be represented by PMESII.[13]

According to Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, JIPOE consists of four steps intended to ensure joint intelligence staffs include all relevant aspects of an OE in their analysis: (1) define the OE, (2) describe the impact of the OE, (3) evaluate the adversary and other relevant actors, and (4) determine the course of action for the adversary and other relevant actors.[14] The purpose is to help the joint force commander predict the adversary's most likely actions using a holistic view of the OE and "integrating a systems perspective and a geospatial perspective along with the force-specific IPB perspectives."[15]


To distinguish IPB from JIPOE, joint doctrine characterizes the IPB as requiring "micro-analysis ... to support component command operations," adding that "JIPOE and IPB analyses support each other while avoiding a duplication of analytic effort."[16] JP 2-01.3 illustrates the focus of JIPOE with a circular illustration that places a "holistic view of the operational environment" at the center.[17] However, any OE is multidimensional, whether in Army or joint operations, and understanding it requires a holistic and tailored approach to intelligence preparation. Complex IPB suggests the need to integrate ways to perform holistic analysis, similar to the focus of JIPOE. Figure 1 (on page 61) shows the circular JIPOE process model, with complex IPB interpreted similarly.

Factors usually regarded as influencing the strategic level also affect operational and tactical planning. For example, the strategic environment is characterized by a mixture of complex geopolitics and demographics such as population growth, mixed migrations, and urbanization. The relationship among these dynamics is particularly complex due to global connectedness and emerging and disruptive technologies. These phenomena have created an ever-evolving ecosystem of converging principal and hybrid threats such as revanchist states, extremist proto-states (e.g., the Islamic State), collective violent extremist organizations, state supporters, and transnational organized crime networks.

Operations such as foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and law enforcement employ a variety of activities and collaborative efforts in the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence relating to the threat groups and their interactions with relevant populations. All of the aforementioned operations can occur in isolation, or they can be combined with conventional-force offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in Army or joint operational areas.


Complex IPB emphasizes civil considerations, which include population groups and the societal conditions that influence them, when analyzing the OE. The threat and threat supporting groups' ecosystem encompasses interactions affecting the OE; they employ a variety of capabilities, tactics, and weapons. The associated weapons threat can be broken down into three main categories: conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and improvised weapons. Improvised weapons offer the potential to modify and combine conventional and WMD capabilities through nonmilitary means of delivery using readily available and self-manufactured materials and technology, making the use of improvised weapons widespread in irregular warfare. In fact, the use of improvised weapons is widespread in many operational areas, sometimes as modified munitions and weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or improvised chemical or

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Joint Intelligence preparation of the operational environment process

(Graphic from Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 21 May 2014], I-25)



Complex intelligence preparation of the battlefield

(Graphic by Victor R. Morris; steps from Tom Pike and Piotr M. Zagorowski, "Dense Urban Areas: The Case for Complex IPB," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 42, no. 3 [July-September 2016])

Figure 1. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Comparison

biological weapons. The combinations of traditional and irregular capabilities that hybrid threats employ are often facilitated by mutually supporting actors and varying resources. Additional hybrid threat characteristics involve employing proxy forces and conducting high- and low-intensity battlefield operations (ways and means) to reach political objectives (ends).

In a May 2016 article in *Army Magazine*, Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault describe how Russia's involvement in Ukraine illustrates its "new-generation warfare," which "combines both low-end, hidden state involvement with high-end, direct, even braggadocio superpower involvement."[18] According to Karber and Thibeault, Russia's strategy includes political subversion, proxy sanctuary, intervention, coercive deterrence, and negotiated manipulation.[19] To achieve its aims, Russia's military efforts include mixed company and battalion tactical groups with electronic warfare, unmanned aircraft systems, massed fires, armor and heavy-infantry fighting vehicles, and air defense capabilities.[20] In this environment, complex group dynamics interact with military operations.

Complex Interactions in Ukraine

Given the varied and dynamic nature of the hybrid threat, the demographics, and the motivating factors present in the Donbass region of Ukraine, it is clear that a holistic OE analysis, using complex IPB, is needed. With regard to Donbass, the fitness landscape and functions are somewhat disconnected from the rest of Ukraine and from Russia. This separation has left these ecosystems in a state of artificial regulation and physical isolation, in which both internal separatists and outside actors manipulate the region's fitness landscape. In addition to manipulating these dynamics, both separatists and outside actors ineffectively attempt to replicate governance and political structures through elections and appointment of chief

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executives and parliaments within the region using military and nonmilitary means.

While it is true that the region is isolated, it is only isolated to a certain extent; events in Donbass have ripple effects for the populations in that region and also for Ukraine as a whole, for neighboring countries, and for the rest of Europe and the international community. These are the reasons to employ complex IPB, which emphasizes group behavior. Individuals compose a group, and groups compose populations. Populations are represented by some kind of state, protostate, rogue state, or third party. What IPB and JIPOE tend to neglect are ways to understand how these individuals, populations, and states all interact with one another, as well as how relatively small interactions can have significant ripple effects. Complex IPB accommodates this complexity in how it evaluates groups (step 3) and their courses of action (step 4). However, assessing what drives their interactions (step 5) and how individuals and groups make certain decisions or take certain actions (step 6) requires further analysis of the incentives or motivating factors—the fitness landscape effects.

Incentive structures are the conditions within the fitness landscape, or within the PMESII systems, that on a macro level promote cooperation or competition and on a micro level push individuals and groups to make decisions and perform actions.[21] Actions or decisions may be influenced by a central authority figure or made independently by individuals. If many individuals arrive at similar decisions, a bottom-up group phenomenon manifests. This is evident during color revolutions, for instance.

In Donbass, some individuals and ethnic groups support the separatist movement instead of the government in Kiev. Some of the reasons (i.e., the incentives) individuals support the separatists include a general sense of mistrust toward the central government in Kiev, according to political science writer Elise Guiliano's 2015 study "The Origins of Separatism: Popular Grievances in Donetsk and Luhansk."[22] Guiliano reports that a significant minority feel betrayed by the government, which they claim conducted "discriminatory demographic redistribution within Ukraine."[23] Some believe economic policies such as potential European Union membership will hurt their interests, and some are opposed to certain government policies. Therefore, while some share a sense of political and economic loyalty to Russia, the incentives leading individuals to support the separatists vary. Each group or individual may have different motives for their microdecision to support separatists' goals, but the macroresult is considerable support for the separatist movement. Furthermore, as individuals, groups, and states interact, microdecisions can change over time and cause the collective result to shift.

Training the Ukrainian Armed Forces


During the 2015 training in Yavoriv, the training team conducted a process with what amounted to the essential elements of complex IPB, while teaching an introduction to JIPOE lesson that included PMESII system mapping. The practical exercise was directly applied to operations in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in eastern Ukraine in order to understand the separatist movement—including the effort that was known as *Projekt Novorossiya*.[24] Because the focus of this course was intelligence preparation together with system and hybrid network analysis, and because of the complex nature of groups operating inside and outside of Ukraine, it was both appropriate and effective to utilize complex IPB concepts in this context.

The adapted process was more effective than typical intelligence preparation because it not only identified the threat actors and their behaviors but also went a step further to consider the incentive structures that helped create those behaviors and the likely effects of proposed lethal and nonlethal action to support, influence, disrupt, or neutralize targeted behaviors.

The exercise began by identifying actors through adversary evaluation. The usual process was then expanded by first producing a description of fitness landscape effects, and then a graphical evaluation of the major groups influencing political policy and military operations in Ukraine. Major groups' courses of action and group interactions influencing population behavior were also assessed in detail.

Next, the exercise performed complex network modeling that highlighted the sociocultural factors and elements of national power that drove instability, as well as fitness landscape effects and specific incentive structures present. Complex adaptive system emergence characteristics involving decentralized military operations and decision making were also modeled. In

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(Graphic by author)

Figure 2. Ukraine Hybrid Thread Threat Model

fact, network modeling and understanding of the mutually supporting relationships between the perceived threat and threat supporting groups were also developed by the Ukrainian students (see figure 2).

As the intensity of warfare fluctuates, so do the threats and employment of various weapons systems. Therefore, since new technologies are constantly changing and complicating the OE, a more detailed analysis identified specific adversary capabilities, tactics, and courses of action. The analysis went a step further by considering the effects generated from the many possible combinations and permutations of overlapping affiliations that could influence pro-government forces, population behavior, and international assistance efforts.[25] For example, enemy diversion and reconnaissance groups appeared at the lower or tactical end of the model and highlighted dispersed interactions. They were associated with modified conventional weapons and IEDs targeting government forces, civilians, and critical infrastructure. As a note, other capabilities associated with diversion and reconnaissance groups involved artillery correction, marauding, and kidnapping and interrogation. Next, since conventional artillery had accounted for 85 percent of the casualties on both sides of the war in Donbass thus far, it was considered a greater threat than modified weapons and munitions (e.g., mines and grenades) and IEDs during a conflict that has fluctuated from high to low intensity over a prolonged period.[26] Furthermore, the conventional fires warfighting function was enhanced through layered, unmanned aircraft system reconnaissance and forward observation. This strategy was then coupled with preplanned and massed multilaunch rocket systems and cross-border artillery strikes.

The exercise and subsequent discussions highlighted shared-understanding requirements. Moreover, they highlighted fundamentals for network engagement and intelligence preparation, including analysis of the OE, and of basic (measures of centrality) and group social networks and behavior. While the threat model in figure 2

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illustrates sixteen of the various groups inside and outside of the operational area, it does not account for "friendly, neutral, and unknown" actors and groups whose decisions and behaviors affect operations. These actors should also be included in a holistic analysis for appropriate engagement and effects assessment in order to produce the most comprehensive assessment of the OE.

Nevertheless, the participants did assess that the effects of the threat's behavior and the population's behavior would be "a stalemate, with neither the government nor the insurgency gaining ground."[27] More refined analysis, however, would reveal the factors that were influencing the most vulnerable portion of the population who did not fully support the insurgency and felt betrayed and disenfranchised by the legitimate government in Kiev. Thus, on one hand, future assessments would identify additional, interrelated PMESII implications involving military reform, anticorruption, and reconciliation initiatives by the Ukrainian government. On the other hand, continued assessments would identify implications of external defense support and ceasefire special monitoring missions by intergovernmental organizations.

Finally, while understanding how nonmilitary groups influence their OE can help military forces conduct successful operations, complex IPB assessments also reveal that the problems that lead to conflict cannot be solved by military force alone. Current hybrid threats and external influences will continue to exploit vulnerabilities and grievances if they are not acknowledged, holistically reconciled, and politically accommodated by the Kiev government. Therefore, the



A Ukrainian company commander analyzes threat network associations and interactions during company-level intelligence and countering threat networks training 17 September 2015 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv, Ukraine. (Photo by Josh Ryner)

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issue becomes what national and international instruments of power could be enabled apart from military force in order to restore the Donbass region's systems specifically, and Ukraine's identity, ecosystem, and postrevolutionary equilibrium overall.

Conclusion

The complex IPB process expands the doctrinal intelligence preparation processes to include bottom-up intelligence refinement and dynamic human network analysis. Therefore, in operational environments characterized by complex demographics and their various incentive structures, complex IPB provides a much needed comprehensive analysis—not only of these system dynamics but also of their interactions and capabilities on varying levels. Complex IPB, as employed during the Ukrainian forces' 2015 practical exercise, undoubtedly helped the participants achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the OE specifically, and of the antiterrorism operations as a whole.

The Ukraine experience with employment of complex IPB suggests the strong potential for achieving similar results in other operations, such as antiterrorism operations in Africa. Other potential test cases for this process could include operations in the Caucasus and Levant regions in complex urban environments, and in megacities. It is crucial that human and group dynamics fuse with infrastructure and physical environment analysis in order to understand anti-access/area denial hybrid-threat connections and to create the most comprehensive understanding possible of human behaviors that affect operations. *Slava Ukraini, Geroyam Slava* (Glory to Ukraine, Glory to the Heroes) ■

Notes

1. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2014), 1-2. ATP 2-01.3 also is published as Marine Corps Reference Publication 2-3A, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.*
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 1-1. A Marine Corps staff analyzes "the threat and the environment in a specific geographic area."
4. Ibid., 1-2.
5. Ibid.
6. Tom Pike and Eddie Brown, "Complex IPB," *Small Wars Journal* website, 24 March 2016, accessed 5 December 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/complex-ipb. Pike and Brown's model shows similarities to Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, *Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2002), accessed 24 October 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1287.pdf.
7. Pike and Brown, "Complex IPB."
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.; Tom Pike and Piotr M. Zagorowski, "Dense Urban Areas: The Case for Complex IPB," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 42, no. 3 (July-September 2016). Note that in their March 2016 article, Pike and Brown erroneously called the first step of complex IPB "Define the area of operations," but in Pike and Zagorowski's July-September article, they corrected step one to read "Define the operational area." Although published a year after the Raptor 14 team's experience in Ukraine, the concepts in Pike and Brown, and in Pike and Zagorowski, eloquently capture the principles the team used.
10. Pike and Brown, "Complex IPB"; Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 21 May 2014), I-1.
11. Pike and Brown, "Complex IPB."
12. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 11 August 2011), xv–xvi and GL-14.
13. Ibid., xvi.
14. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation*, I-1.
15. Ibid., I-5.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., fig. I-6, p. I-25.
18. Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, "Russia's New-Generation Warfare," *Army Magazine* website, 20 May 2016, accessed 5 December 2016, https://www.ausa.org/articles/russia%E2%80%99s-new-generation-warfare.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Michael Armstrong, *Armstrong's Handbook of Reward Management Practice: Improving Performance through Reward*, 5th ed. (London: Kogan, 2015), describes ways that incentives influence individual decision making, cooperation, and competition.
22. Elise Giuliano, "The Origins of Separatism: Popular Grievances in Donetsk and Luhansk," PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 396, October 2015, accessed 24 October 2016, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm396_Giuliano_Oct2015_0.pdf.
23. Ibid., 2.
24. A Ukrainian officer described *Projekt Novorossiya* as consisting of seven territories and involving the notion that Ukraine is not sovereign and historically belongs to Russia. Novorossiya plans came to fruition first with Crimea and then by the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. The overall goal of the project was to unite Kharkiv, Lugansk, Donestsk, Zaporizhia, Mikolaiv, and Odessa with Transnistria and isolate Ukraine from the Black Sea. Projekt Novorossiya is considered defunct due to lack of popular support.
25. In "Complex IPB," Pike and Brown discuss the potential calculations for the possible effects of different groups.
26. Karber and Thibeault, "Russia's New-Generation Warfare."
27. Pike and Brown, "Complex IPB."

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Army long-range surveillance soldiers and an Air Force joint terminal attack controller perform a high-altitude, low-opening jump during the U.S. Air Force Weapons School's Joint Forcible Entry Exercise 14B on 4 December 2014 over the Nevada Test and Training Range at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. (Photo by Sr. Airman Thomas Spangler, U.S. Air Force)

Operational Surveillance and Reconnaissance Battalion

Capt. Brian Fitzgerald, U.S. Army

Corps and joint task force commanders require persistent, long-duration surveillance assets to report priority intelligence requirements from denied areas. Three assets are suited to these operations: special operations forces (SOF), unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and long-range surveillance (LRS). Commanders have been less inclined to use organic teams from LRS companies, relying more on nonorganic SOF and UASs to collect high-priority information—largely because of the ineffective and outdated organization of

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the Army's LRS companies. Due at least in part to this, the Army announced that all LRS companies will be disbanded—no plan to replace the only operational-level surveillance formation has been announced. However, a no-growth reorganization of the Army's LRS units from separate companies to a consolidated battalion would provide corps commanders more effective, responsive, and predictable organic surveillance assets than nonorganic, ad hoc relationships and technology.

Special Operations Forces

Some conventional commanders may view using SOF teams for surveillance as the easiest and most effective answer to their requirements. The SOF "brand" is trusted, taken at face value, and can deliver impressive results. One of the twelve core activities of SOF is special reconnaissance (SR): "reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces."[1] Using SOF elements for SR absolves the conventional commander from training oversight of high-risk exercises. Operationally, the chance of compromise, injury, and mission failure can lead commanders to prefer using surveillance elements from outside their organization. SOF bring many assets and operational approaches not found in conventional units. These elements should be a part of corps and joint task force commanders' surveillance options.

Ostensibly, all Special Forces (SF) operational detachments-A (SFODs–A) can conduct SR, and most can infiltrate denied areas. Some have standoff airborne insertion capability. Some SFODs–A have waterborne and small-vehicle capability. The ability of every SFOD–A to conduct SR could create the false impression that abundant manned surveillance capability is available to Army forces. In addition to SF, the Ranger Reconnaissance Company (RRC) expanded from a detachment and increased its capabilities far beyond traditional reconnaissance techniques. During a Joint Readiness Training Center rotation in October 2012, an XVIII Airborne Corps deputy corps commander told the author that in the event of a real war, Army commanders likely would use an RRC team to conduct surveillance behind enemy lines rather than an LRS team.[2] Teams from the RRC are extremely proficient in military free-fall parachute insertions and numerous information-collection activities. Their proven results in recent conflicts across the range of military operations indicate that they will continue to be employed at a high operational tempo for the near future. RRC availability to provide dedicated support to conventional operational commanders is uncertain, at best.

Contrary to the perception of abundant manned surveillance capacity, SF already have more missions than resources. In a large-scale conflict, the best SOF SR teams would be aligned with missions of national or strategic priority as they arose. Their employment for those priorities would deprive operational commanders of surveillance assets, as happened in the Falklands Campaign, where British Special Air Service (SAS) teams were promised to the joint commander as an operational reconnaissance resource. They were also dual tasked by the national authority with conducting raids to destroy shore-to-ship missiles. During the campaign, the national authority re-tasked the SAS teams and deprived the joint commander of this asset at critical times.[3]

Each SOF team has many special skills that it must maintain to a high degree of competency. The teams tasked to prioritize SR would likely support SOF missions. It is unlikely they would be available to provide support to conventional forces for long durations, if at all.

While any SF teams can conduct SR, they may operate at a level of expertise far below mission requirements, as deep reconnaissance missions in Operation Desert Storm demonstrated. For example, Charles Lane Toomey writes that Operational Detachment Alpha 555 conducted SR after training in Kuwait before their mission.[4] The team's lack of proficiency in interpreting satellite imagery and finding a suitable hide site, overall surveillance plan, and

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Chief Warrant Officer 2 Dylan Ferguson, a brigade aviation element officer with the 82nd Airborne Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team, launches a Puma unmanned aerial vehicle 25 June 2012 in the Ghazni Province of Afghanistan. Ferguson uses the Puma to conduct aerial reconnaissance for troops on the ground. (Photo by Sgt. Mike MacLeod, U.S. Army)

other shortfalls in surveillance-specific field craft were mitigated by their contingency planning and luck when they were discovered by civilians. While the LRS teams inserted during this campaign were not compromised, the SF teams were compromised in nearly every case–most by "soft" compromise when their hide sites were discovered by civilians. The SF teams' specific training in operational surveillance essentially began when they deployed to Kuwait before the conflict. These teams often do not share common communication architecture with conventional forces, nor are they often equipped with modern surveillance equipment. They may report into proprietary networks that are not compatible with conventional force communications.

Often, SOF elements are not well trained in surveillance; instead, their focus is primarily on direct-action, counterterrorism, or unconventional warfare tasks, among others. For these reasons and others, conventional commanders are likely to have a difficult time determining the level of surveillance expertise in SOF units, potentially leading to employment beyond the teams' true capabilities. The preference to utilize SOF such as SEAL teams over trained conventional reconnaissance is described well in the after-action reports and is illustrated by the SEAL element that was chosen by a conventional commander over a Marine reconnaissance platoon to conduct a surveillance mission in Operation Red Wings in June 2005. Several factors contributed to the tragic outcome, known widely through the book about Marcus Luttrell's survival.[5] The Marine element would have taken a different approach. It had proposed to walk into the objective area, rather than to fast-rope, and to provide its own reaction force, rather than rely on a helicopter-borne element from further away. The Marine element had brought significantly more communication capability than the small SEAL element.

Nowhere in doctrine are SOF required to provide conventional commanders an SR capability.

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Commanders of conventional forces might assume or be misinformed that SR capability exists in theater but discover later that the capability is not available when needed. To structure Army units with such a large gap in reliable operational surveillance units dedicated to this difficult mission seems shortsighted.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems

The proliferation of UASs, the steady improvement in portability of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) feeds, and the increase in sensor capability have been significant during the Global War on Terrorism. Live or near-live full-motion video sets the standard for complete reporting from a surveillance asset. UAVs may interdict targets while providing surveillance, and they present low risk to personnel if compromised. Many UASs also provide increased communication with tactical forces as well. UASs are generally able to communicate with every level of a conventional force, making them extremely responsive and helping create a common operational picture. These attributes make results from UASs more predictable than most other surveillance assets and create the perception of a "plug-and-play" capability. Commanders' reliance on these assets made intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synonymous with UASs for much of the Global War on Terrorism.

However, aerial assets are often limited by weather and station time. Moreover, their use in the near future at the operational tempo commanders grew to expect in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom is not sustainable. Commanders could be faced with a reduction in UAS capacity rather than an increase, according to a 2015 *Washington Post* article.[6] While the clarity of a UAV video feed can be superior to the radio transmission or still photos of a reconnaissance team, it sometimes provides a false sense of complete information when not integrated with other information collection methods. Drone signatures can present risks to operations, and they can be easily targeted by forces with even a moderate level of air defense. A UAV often needs to be queued onto a target by assets on the ground as it has a narrow view of the battlefield and is isolated from the events happening on the ground. UASs should be viewed as a powerful augmentation to ground surveillance units, not a replacement for them. Conventional commanders relying on SOF and UASs need to ensure that weather and higher-priority missions do not constrain their organic information collection capability.



Long-range surveillance (LRS) soldiers from the 18th Airborne Corps LRS company certify on the special patrol infiltration and extraction system at Fort Pickett, Virginia, on 23 September 2012 in preparation for assuming the Global Response Force mission. (Photo by Brian Fitzgerald)

Long-Range Surveillance

LRS companies are organic to corps, are focused solely on surveillance, and should be the corps commander's most-trusted information-collection asset. The companies share the same communication architecture as the command they support. They are designed to provide standoff insertion capability by land, on water, and in the air. An LRS company has a mission-essential task list, which is limited almost exclusively to information collection through surveillance. The LRS teams should be able to provide written reports and still pictures by high frequency or satellite communication from anywhere in the world. The teams are all-weather and can be in position for seventy-two continuous hours without support or up to seven days with deliberate

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U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Eric Zubkus and Australian Defence Force Pvt. James Adams conduct surveillance from behind the mesh net of their hide site 17 July 2011 during Exercise Talisman Sabre at the Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland, Australia. (Photo by Spc. J. P. Lawrence, U.S. Army)

planning. They can adapt to unforeseen changes in terrain and enemy situation. Recent exercises have demonstrated the ability to provide full-motion video over the horizon from dismounted LRS teams, a complementary and often more persistent capability than aerial platforms. Advances in LRS capabilities have surpassed the legacy voice and still-picture reporting and will remain relevant for the future.

However, Army LRS is poorly organized, making each unit's success entirely personality dependent. Techniques and capabilities are neither universal between companies nor predictable over time as leaders come and go. This limits senior leaders' understanding of LRS and makes the companies unreliable. Surveillance and communication equipment is outdated, and support units are fragmented between the companies, limiting training in support of specialized skills like military free-fall and waterborne insertion. Facilities are spread throughout the Army, increasing cost and redundancy. The separate companies do not have a unifying headquarters to ensure standardization of tactics techniques and procedures, competency of leaders, or relevancy of equipment and training.

Since 1986, former LRS commanders such as Lt. Col. Isaac Rademacher and others have advocated the consolidation of LRS units.[7] These commanders identified shortfalls that have not been solved by assigning the LRS companies to military intelligence battalions, cavalry squadrons, or corps headquarters battalions. These shortfalls include a lack of expertise in unit-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures at the battalion and brigade level, lack of adequate support from parachute riggers, and inadequate force structure to support sustained operations. Each commander advocated the establishment of a headquarters above the company level to provide standardization and accountability.

Recommendations

LRS companies are the conventional forces' organic, persistent, and most reliable surveillance capability.

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Disbanding LRS removes the last dedicated operational surveillance formation available to corps and joint task force commanders. To more effectively train and employ these units, pathfinder and LRS companies should be consolidated into an operational surveillance-and-reconnaissance battalion (OSRB). A no-growth reorganization of the separate LRS companies to provide consistent results across the Army is required. Companies within an OSRB would maintain their habitual relationship with the parent corps headquarters, but they would be able to task-organize for purposes based on the mission, the threat, and the friendly situation. A battalion composed of LRS companies would deploy detachments rather than teams; standardize tactics, techniques, and procedures; increase by 30 percent the overall number of LRS teams by reorganizing the communication and surveillance sections; and improve rigger support.

LRS should be employed at the detachment level—an improvement from independent teams. As demonstrated by Operation Red Wings, where the entire burden of tactical mission command was placed on a leader conducting surveillance, in small-unit operations the need is acute for tactical mission command by company-grade and noncommissioned officers separate from the actions at the objective.[8] While many organizations, particularly surveillance units, are designed for employment at the squad- or fire-team level, these units require a mission support site in most cases. This task organization would enable teams to focus on their objectives while the mission support site covered contingencies, long-range communication, and tactical decisions between supporting elements.

While an LRS company is marginally sufficient to train and deploy teams, it is insufficient to do the same for platoon-sized detachments. The Army requires battalion commanders to certify that platoons are prepared for operations. LRS detachments require a battalion headquarters to certify their expertise in sophisticated communication, high-risk infiltration, and surveillance techniques. Having established a qualified battalion, employment of LRS elements should be modified to enable the detachment headquarters' role as a mission support site, better mitigating operational risk

Lack of organic fire support and the reduction of end strength weigh heavily against LRS employment. According to the Force Management System website table of organization, LRS companies were reduced from a 139-person formation to a 100-person formation (30 percent) as the battlefield surveillance brigades disbanded in 2014 and 2015.[9] The reorganization also removed LRS fire support and tactical air-control party support. An OSRB would enable the battalion to harvest positions from the pathfinder companies to form a dedicated liaison officer team to each company, a role currently filled by the communications soldiers and leaders pulled from other detachments within the company. With liaison support, the LRS company should assign the communication soldiers to the surveillance teams. This would add three surveillance teams to each company, for a total of twelve, and increase the communications capability within each team. This would also preclude the requirement to form ad hoc liaison support from surveillance teams. Creating an OSRB would increase the number of surveillance teams available from eighteen to thirty-six across the active component and return fires and tactical-aircraft control-party support to the LRS without an increase in end strength.

Organizing the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course under the battalion headquarters would enable LRS and pathfinder personnel to be properly trained, save money, and ensure the battalion's unique capabilities were maintained to the highest standard. This organization would also provide continuity to the battalion, keeping the units at a high level of proficiency rather than relying on specific personalities to ensure success.

Currently, each LRS company has a nine-rigger detachment that provides direct support for static-line, military free-fall, and airborne resupply operations. This is an insufficient number of riggers to pack the two hundred plus parachutes required to certify a detachment for military free-fall operations. Consolidation of the rigger detachments into a single company in an OSRB would enable a surge to cover intense training cycles instead of requiring jumpers to pack their own parachutes. This consolidation would further reduce the cost of maintaining three separate oxygen rooms, shakeout towers, and parachute storage facilities. Oversight of the military free-fall program would be safer and more effective, providing two levels of qualified headquarters above the rigger detachment (a rigger company and an OSRB headquarters). This battalion headquarters would understand the capabilities and limitations of the systems and the personnel. The OSRB would provide continuity in high-risk

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airborne operations and other tactics, techniques, and procedures, improving safety and capability.

Currently, three pathfinder companies are assigned to combat aviation brigades in the XVIII Airborne Corps. They are typically tasked with downed aircraft recovery team or protective security detachment missions. Because pathfinder and LRS units are similar, the U.S. Army Infantry School merged the mission-essential tasks during previous efforts to form combined LRS and pathfinder units. While pathfinder elements are not capable of operational surveillance missions because they lack sophisticated communication and training, pathfinder platoons do have an extensive reconnaissance capability. Employed as a platoon-sized force, they are well suited to dismounted reconnaissance missions, rapidly securing downed aircraft sites, assisting in the recovery of LRS teams, and providing security in austere environments as part of stability operations. These capabilities would be better employed by consolidating the companies and aligning a pathfinder platoon each to I Corps, III Corps, and XVIII Corps through habitual relationships.

An OSRB is a no-growth proposal to realize fully the information collection contribution LRS and pathfinder elements can provide. By combining these separate companies, shifting redundant resources within these formations to better support this mission, and re-aligning the companies to better train on specialized skills, the Army will gain a more capable conventional force dedicated to supporting operational-level leaders. These elements have progressed far beyond the days of voice and still-picture reports, and can leverage technology and techniques to increase situational awareness and understanding. Mobility improvements have greatly reduced risk and increased responsiveness both during and after insertion. Lightweight global communication and full-motion video increase the reliability and quality of product delivered. Unity of effort across the Army is needed to realize more than temporary and personality-dependent application of these improvements. The Army's decision to disband these companies and save six hundred positions in exchange for the only dedicated surveillance formation is not a good trade. An OSRB would use Army systems and lessons learned to ensure that LRS and pathfinder companies provide the capability that joint and corps commanders require. ■

Notes

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8. Luttrell, *Lone Survivor*, 247. Luttrell documents how his four-man SEAL team relied on standard operating procedures better suited to direct action missions (such as cutting the fast-rope on insertion), minimal communication equipment, and a single co-located team. Ed Darack, "Operation Red Wings: What Really Happened?" *The Marine Corps Gazette* (January 2011): 62, accessed 14 November 2016, https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2011/01/operation-red-wings (subscription required). Darack describes the unused plan of the Marine reconnaissance platoon, which included a larger element and more robust communications.

9. Force Management System website, accessed 16 November 2016, https://fmsweb.army.mil/ (CAC required).

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Soldiers on the 1st Infantry Division staff conduct the daily battle update brief 7 April 2015 at the Mission Training Complex, Fort Riley, Kansas. The brief provides the commanding general with an update on current operations and the combat strength and effectiveness of subordinate units. It marked the start of each day during for the "Big Red One" during its warfighter exercise. (Photo by Master Sgt. Mike Lavigne, 1st Infantry Division PAO)

From Riley to Baku

How an Opportunistic Unit Broke the Crucible

Lt. Col. Jerem G. Swenddal, U.S. Army

Maj. Stacy L. Moore, U.S. Army

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Warfighter exercises (WFXs) are the crucible training events for division headquarters and staffs. With this in mind, the 1st Infantry Division (1ID), the "Big Red One," set out on an eight-month journey culminating in the division successfully executing a near-peer, hybrid-warfare training exercise. The Big Red One would secure the fictional city of Baku and drive the World Class Opposing Force (OPFOR) south of the Kura River back into its territory. Throughout the WFX, the 1ID staff, subordinate units, and unified action partners demonstrated adaptability, innovation, and initiative on a broad scale. In the complex "Decisive Action Training Environment," where units are presented with a highly capable "near-peer competitor in a hybrid threat environment," the 1ID and its partners were able to blunt enemy strengths, mitigate risks to the force and the mission, and rapidly seize upon tactical and operational opportunities whenever they arose.[1] This article describes how the 1ID built a cohesive team, met the vaunted World Class OPFOR in battle, and broke the crucible.

Planning: Before the Crucible

The 1ID is an *opportunistic* unit: It demonstrates the ability to create shared understanding, innovate rapidly, observe and anticipate future enemy actions and events, exercise disciplined initiative, and react quickly to seize upon fleeting opportunities.[2] An opportunistic unit is not epitomized by a few brilliant leaders sprinkled throughout its ranks. Nor is it characterized by a dictatorial, genius commander bending the unit to his or her will. Rather, it is saturated with trained, informed, and empowered leaders who act with disciplined initiative to drive the organization toward a common goal. Opportunistic units exemplify the principles of mission command in training and in combat. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, describes such a unit:

> Commanders provide a clear intent to their forces that guides subordinates' actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative. Subordinates, by understanding the commander's intent and the overall common objective, are then able to adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities.[3]

The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World describes future operating environments as complex, defining a complex environment as one "that is not only unknown, but unknowable and constantly changing."[4] In complex environments, potential enemies will seek to outmatch U.S. military forces asymmetrically and to challenge them across every domain. The *Army Operating Concept* further describes how future operating environments will require "innovative and adaptive leaders and cohesive teams that thrive in conditions of complexity and uncertainty."[5] Both the *Operating Concept* and Army mission-command doctrine agree that in future conflicts, U.S. military units must demonstrate opportunistic behavior in order to defeat their enemies. Their leaders need to commit the time and energy to cultivate critical relationships based on trust, to focus on training and leader development, and to encourage the exercise of disciplined initiative throughout their formations.

In this context, many military units seem to lack enough trained and experienced personnel, specialized technology, and resources to build an opportunistic organization. However, while obstacles clearly exist, they can be overcome—not through technology, but through leaders who develop a unifying vision and utilize the principles of mission command to create lasting cultural change throughout the organization. As the Big Red One headed toward its crucible training event, the division's leaders developed a clear idea of where they needed to go. But, success did not happen overnight.

Big Red One's situation. In August 2015, on the heels of its deployment in support of Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. Central Command's operation against the Islamic State), the Big Red One faced a unique set of challenges. In addition to the perennial problem of personnel turnover after a deployment, the division headquarters struggled to adapt to the Focus Area Review Group II restructuring initiative: the headquarters would reduce by 25 percent but maintain all mission requirements.[6] The division had also just lost one of its three brigade combat teams (BCTs) to Army structure changes. Of the two remaining BCTs, the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), had recently returned from Operation Spartan Shield (conducting regional engagements in southwest Asia) and had been replaced in the Middle East by the division's 2nd ABCT. In addition, the 1st Sustainment Brigade (SB) was not aligned to the division and was deployed in support of U.S. Central Command missions. With the

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2nd ABCT deployed, the 1ID was essentially a one ABCT division, with all of the responsibilities and missions of a fully manned division.

The 1ID Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) was in the midst of the Army Restructuring Initiative, while supporting division training requirements and getting ready for a deployment to Afghanistan. The division also stood up the 1ID Division Artillery (DIVARTY), which would have a major role in the WFX and precious little time to train. The division possessed many talented, hardworking people, but they would need to coalesce into a team across the division, and into unit-level teams, to make the commander's vision for the warfighter a reality.

Commander's intent and risk. A simple and clear commander's intent is the key to disciplined initiative, and it is the basis for transforming "thought into action."[7] A mission statement and commander's intent help integrate and unify tasks during operations. As the 1ID struggled to come to grips with its myriad challenges, division leaders seized upon the upcoming WFX as a venue for focusing effort across the division and post. The WFX is the "culminating event within the Army force generation process" for division headquarters and staffs.[8] Although scheduled for April 2016, nearly eight months away, the exercise served as the center of gravity for the commander's vision, and it would drive all division activities.

Risk is inherent in all Army operations. It was no different for the 1ID. Division leaders recognized they would need the full attention and focus of the staff and subordinate units. The staff had to commit to the work it would take to prepare the division, including numerous repetitions of deliberate planning, rehearsals, and command-post exercises. Deciding to "go all in" on the WFX meant that the division would accept risk to other priorities.

While complete commitment was required for WFX success, risks would need to be articulated early and often during planning. Commands at all levels accepted the risk inherent in committing to a rigorous planning and preparation schedule, and risk was a constant topic of discussion over the months leading up to the WFX. It is important to note that the command knowingly accepted significant risk to other missions. For instance, at the division level, long-range planning virtually ceased so the planners could lead multiple iterations of WFX planning. Subordinate units such as the 1st ABCT sacrificed precious tactical training time to man and train response cells for several command-post exercises, and they risked leadership resiliency due to constant training for both the WFX and upcoming deployments. Commanders analyzed these risks, ultimately deeming them prudent.

The increased preparedness for the WFX and the reciprocal benefits of having highly trained staffs and units outweighed the potential for negative consequences. However, the division had to overcome the second- and third-order effects of their risk decisions for many months following the WFX, including the disruption to ongoing division campaign planning efforts, 1st ABCT preparations for deployment to the National Training Center, and division headquarters deployment preparations and planning.

The warfighter team. Upon establishing a vision and priorities, the division's leaders set about building the WFX team. The 1ID's parallel maxims of "Training and leader development are one word in the First Infantry Division," and "Every training event is a venue for leader development," set the stage for team building. The division commander emphasized strict adherence to doctrinal planning processes, and he personally coached the division staff. Over the ensuing months, the planners gained greater understanding of the commander and his intent, while building mastery of planning processes, decisive action, and offensive tasks.


The 1ID established four battle-staff teams

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under the leadership of the plans (G-5) staff section. The battle staff served as dedicated, cross-functional, operational-planning teams that attacked various aspects of WFX planning, provided solutions to complex problems, and expedited planning processes. Each battle-staff team was composed of eight people, including a School of Advanced Military Studies graduate as a planning team lead, a representative from each warfighting function, and a digital master gunner who would operate the Command Post of the Future and other systems.[9] The cross-functional nature of the teams broke down stovepipes in planning and information flow throughout the division headquarters. Although they were composed of mostly junior officers from each staff section, the battle staff soon became central to the division's WFX preparations.



The 1st Infantry Division "Big Red One" main command post sits outside the Mission Training Complex 9 April 2016 on Fort Riley, Kansas. Division and brigade staffs use the facility to conduct training events such as warfighter exercises in a simulated decisive action training environment. (Photo by Spc. Anna Pongo, 1st Infantry Division PAO)

The division commander owned and drove the operations process.[10] He sought frequent, candid dialogue with the division staff, the battle staff, and subordinate commanders. The planning team received personal coaching from the division's senior leaders, sometimes several times a day, for guidance, and for understanding and visualizing ongoing efforts. The deliberate planning provided a venue for developing junior officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and staff leaders. Regardless of rank, leaders listened to, conversed with, and accepted frank assessments from battle-staff planners. As a result, junior leaders gained confidence, and the team developed innovative solutions to complex problems.

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In addition to creating opportunities for professional growth, the division conducted a robust leader development program. The program included professional readings, doctrinal classes, and professional development sessions with military and civilian leaders, including retired Generals Gordon Sullivan, David Petraeus, and Stanley McChrystal; Lieutenant Generals H. R. McMaster and Gustave Perna; Dr. Emma Sky; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Western Hemisphere Affairs Gonzalvo Gallegos; and others. These sessions provided staff and subordinate units with valuable insights on leadership, mission command, and the current security environment. The final component of the leader development program was a series of warfighting-function clinics, where subject-matter experts presented topics relevant to their areas of expertise. The commanding general, division command sergeant major, deputy commanding generals, division staff primaries, battle staff members, and subordinate brigade and battalion commanders attended these clinics, which included dialogue on doctrine, best practices, and future employment.

The 1ID also built upon the experiences of other units to inform its planning and preparation. Key leaders observed the 1st Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 101st Airborne Division WFXs, and the 1ID received augmentation of experienced intelligence personnel from the 25th Infantry Division. This collaboration with other divisions allowed the 1ID to capitalize on their experiences and begin its training at a high level. The 1ID also ensured that it shared its lessons learned at every step of its WFX preparation. The division commander updated all Active Component and National Guard division commanders after each command-post exercise, providing them the division's after-action reviews (AARs), lessons learned, and best practices. The staff did likewise with their counterparts, effectively creating a large network of experienced leaders throughout the Army to share ideas and increase functional knowledge.

The division carried this information-sharing approach to its interactions with the other units that would be participating in the WFX. The 18th Airborne Corps and the 3rd Infantry Division would serve as the higher command and adjacent units, respectively, in the 1ID's WFX. The 1ID worked closely with these units leading up to the exercise to develop a cohesive plan and rehearse execution. When it came time to execute the WFX, the 1ID staff had already developed solid relationships with their counterparts in these units, participated in planning sessions, and executed a command-post exercise from various distributed mission-command nodes across the Army.

1st ABCT and its battalions provided response cells that replicated the multiple BCTs that would fall under the 1ID during the exercise. They were also part of the team-building process. Battalion commanders and their staffs were included in every stage of planning and participated in three command-post exercises. From the lowest tactical unit response cell to the corps headquarters, the team had already worked together and overcome the kinds of challenges that often detract from mission accomplishment.

Just as critical as building great teammates within the 1ID was building the broader unified action team, including Total Army and institutional Army partners. The 1ID developed a strong partnership with the 35th Infantry Division from the Kansas National Guard, which provided observer/controllers and external evaluation for the division's command-post exercises. The division further integrated critical staff members from its newly established 1ID Main Command Post Operational Detachment from the Nebraska National Guard. These staff members proved crucial for execution of the WFX, and they prepared for the key roles they would fill during the 1ID's upcoming deployment. Just as directed in the *Army Total Force Policy*, 1ID integrated Army Reserve and National Guard forces at the division level, but it did not stop there.[11]

The integration of the 300th SB and the 110th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) further demonstrated the division's commitment to building a total force. These Reserve Component partners were "training units" for the exercise, and they were critical to enabling the division's opportunistic behavior. Realizing that the 300th SB and 110th MEB would have as few as eight days to train before the exercise, the 1ID developed comprehensive liaison officer (LNO) and technical support teams for each unit. These LNO teams were led and staffed by personnel from the 1st SB and the 97th Military Police Battalion, and they were responsible for ensuring that the 300th SB and 110th MEB were fully integrated and able to achieve their training objectives. Months before the exercise, the LNOs traveled to the

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supporting units during their drill weekends, conducted training, planned WFX operations, and executed staff battle drills. Further training on critical mission-command systems ensured these partner units could talk on the same networks, see the same common operating picture, and use the products and standard operating procedures they needed to be successful. The division's deliberate efforts to build a cohesive team were critical to ensuring opportunistic behavior by all teammates throughout the WFX.

Preparation: Command-Post Exercises

The Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) World Class OPFOR benefits greatly from the principle that repetition leads to mastery. Having conducted countless battles upon the same constructive battlefield, the OPFOR has mastered the Decisive Action Training Environment and its fictional Atropian area of operations.

Intensive training. Any unit that hopes to achieve some measure of success against this trained and experienced OPFOR should seek to level the playing field through its own intensive training program. The Big Red One team conducted a staff exercise, a robust WFX academic seminar at Fort Leavenworth, and three multiechelon command-post exercises. Using a deliberate planning process, the division increased the complexity of each subsequent exercise. In this way, it refined systems and increased competency, trust, and shared understanding throughout the organization. The division maximized the capabilities of the Fort Riley home-station Mission Training Center, and it leveraged Total Army and institutional Army partnerships to expand the scope and quality of the division's exercises.

During the WFX academic seminar at Fort Leavenworth, the staff attended the program of instruction during the day and conducted the military decision-making process over lunch and in the evening. The staff essentially deployed from Fort Riley to Fort Leavenworth. In fact, the 1ID took three times more people to the academic seminar than is typical. This minimized distractions and let the unit use the time to its fullest, running key-leader seminars during staff planning that included the BCTs and staff primaries. The seminars allowed the division commander to explain his vision to the staff, and they helped the team to gel as staff sections learned from one another. This first repetition of the planning process for the WFX set the stage for future iterations.

Most division-level headquarters will conduct one or two command-post exercises in preparation for their WFXs. The 1ID conducted three. Each of these events included a deliberate planning process that took the entire staff and subordinate units through all steps of the Army design methodology and the military decision-making process. Each concluded with a combined-arms rehearsal, a fires-and-intelligence rehearsal, and a sustainment rehearsal. Additionally, each command-post exercise included a four- to five-day operation against a thinking OPFOR on the Atropian terrain.

The command-post exercises proved crucial to bringing the final WFX team together and refining systems and processes. The 1ID experimented with and improved all its systems, including the configuration of command posts, the battle rhythm, rehearsal formats, information processing, targeting, and time-constrained planning. Using three command-post exercises allowed the division to address another atrophied skill: command-post displacement, or "jumping." Between the second and third command-post exercises, the division tactical command post (DTAC) jumped five times, and the division main command post (DMAIN) jumped once. Each jump increased the proficiency of the soldiers staffing the command post while significantly deceasing displacement time. The staff revised its processes for battle handoff of mission-command functions between command posts while ensuring situational awareness was maintained. The 1ID made significant revisions to its systems and processes between the second and third command-post exercises, and it was not until the third that the team truly came together and began exhibiting opportunistic behavior.

Simulation operators. Planning, mission command, and command-post operations are only a few of the proficiencies a unit must master to maximize opportunistic behavior. While the WFX does a good job of simulating a real-world decisive-action environment, it is bound by the digital constraints of the computer program called WARSIM (Warfighter's Simulation). The 1ID leadership realized quickly that they needed to train WARSIM operators at every level, and allow them to practice on the system. Officers and NCOs selected as WARSIM operators

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were responsible for maneuvering critical assets and units around the simulated battlefield and engaging enemy formations with direct and indirect fires. They had to move quickly, react to changing circumstances, and employ weapon systems to their full capability. Within the WARSIM program, these are not intuitive tasks; they require detailed understanding of the system's functionality.

The 1ID incorporated the WARSIM and other similar digital simulations into the division's command-post exercises, and subordinate units tracked WARSIM operators by name. In addition to being experts at their "weapon systems," these operators participated in planning and rehearsals, and they clearly understood the unit's mission and commander's intent. Their location within their respective command posts provided them shared understanding of the developing fight, and they were empowered to react quickly to changing circumstances. Trained, informed, and empowered WARSIM operators were a critical component in the division's success.

They knew their systems and processes, they knew their teammates, and they grasped the enemy and operating environment that they would face.

The reason the command was able to empower the WARSIM operators was because the division created and sustained shared understanding. Through a series of deliberate battle-rhythm events, aided by digital products that effectively communicated knowledge and understanding—not just information, leaders and soldiers at all levels understood the mission, the situation, and the commander's intent.

Digital master gunners. In a complex operating environment, units operate over great distances using systems such as Command Post of the Future, Blue Force Tracker, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, and Distributed Common Ground System-Army. These are just a few of the systems that must function together to create an accurate common operating picture that communicates shared understanding across distributed mission-command nodes. However, the highly technical capabilities needed for digital integration are not resident within units. To address this deficiency, the 1ID worked with the Mission Command Center of Excellence to train over seventy mission-command digital master gunners across the division. The master gunners returned to their units and executed digital gunnery tables that developed a high level of proficiency throughout the division. Trained and certified digital master gunners solved countless system-interoperability issues during the command-post exercises and the WFX. Because of their efforts, the 1ID was able to create shared understanding across distributed mission-command nodes on an unprecedented scale.

Learning organizations. Repetitions do not spontaneously result in mastery. Units must be learning organizations, in which leaders at all levels are capable of seeing themselves in a critical light and then adapting their perspectives, systems, and processes to improve the organization's performance. AARs and external evaluations were critical to the 1ID's development as an opportunistic unit. In addition to partnering with the 35th Infantry Division for external evaluation, the Big Red One also drew on the strengths of the institutional Army. With Fort Leavenworth just two hours away, the division benefited from a close working relationship with the School of Advanced Military Studies, and it took advantage of the school's vast depth of academic knowledge and real-world experience. Dr. Alice Butler-Smith provided valuable insights for the 1ID's planning. Faculty members from the School of Advanced Military Studies—PhDs and fellows consisting of former Army battalion commanders, future brigade commanders, and equivalent joint and international partners—served as observer/controllers during the division's third command-post exercise. Their feedback paid dividends during WFX execution.

After the third command-post exercise, the 1ID team looked and felt like a different organization than the one that started its journey eight months before. Leaders at all levels worked with a confidence born of trust and mastery. They knew their systems and processes, they knew their teammates, and they grasped the enemy and operating environment that they would face. Most of all, they understood the plan and the commander's intent. They were ready for any challenge. An opportunistic unit had been born.

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Breaking the Crucible: The Success of an Opportunistic Division in Decisive Action

Throughout its WFX planning and preparation, the 1ID had innovated and adapted to address emergent challenges. Army Techniques Publication 3-91, *Division Operations*, describes how a division, "shapes the operation for subordinate brigades, resources them for their missions, and coordinates, synchronizes and sequences their operations in time and space."[12] While simple in principle, the sheer scope of this definition is daunting. With tens of thousands of soldiers spread out over hundreds of kilometers, the synchronization of units, critical assets, operations, intelligence, and fires appears a near impossible task. Over the course of three command-post exercises, the 1ID adapted its systems to simplify the synchronization process and set conditions for subordinate commanders to exercise disciplined initiative and seize fleeting opportunities.

Many of these adaptations were already considered fundamental operational principles, yet they are often misunderstood or misapplied. Four adaptations in particular stand out for their importance to generating opportunistic behavior. Creating an appropriate task organization and the necessary command-and-support relationship are perhaps the most important adaptations, followed closely by articulating a well-defined operational framework and establishing clear graphic control measures. Combined, these adaptations facilitated the division's opportunistic behavior.

Task organization and command-and-support relationships. Within an ad-hoc formation of multiple unified action partners, assigned and attached brigades, and countless smaller enabling units and assets, two functions that units must get right are task organization and command-and-support relationships. Opportunistic behavior implies that a unit not only sees an opportunity but also can take advantage of it. If critical assets are not available to the unit, it cannot exercise disciplined initiative. In the 1ID, Annex A (Task Organization) of all operation and fragmentary orders detailed units down to the separate-company and critical-asset level. This task organization was refined daily based on changing circumstances. Commanders at all levels provided detailed briefings of their task organization during daily updates, and commanders conducted digital "flyovers" of their formations within the WARSIM program to check that their task organization was correct in the simulated scenario.

Equally important was the emphasis on the doctrinal understanding and implementation of command-and-support relationships. Commanders and staffs conducted significant dialogue to assign units appropriate relationships. This was of substantial importance as the task organization shifted rapidly to meet emerging challenges. To reduce the potential for confusion, planners would often detail the inherent responsibilities associated with each command-and-support relationship as specified tasks in operation and fragmentary orders.

Operational framework. Another adaptation that enabled synchronization throughout the division was the clear and continual articulation of the operational framework's deep, close, and security areas, and main and supporting efforts. This provided subordinate units temporal orientation and prioritization of efforts at all times.[13] Commonly referred to as the "division fight," the headquarters used the operational framework to define how it would enable subordinates for the current fight while setting the conditions for the next fight. The operational framework further assisted the commander by providing a conceptual basis for planners to build branches and sequels to the base plan and anticipate future decision points. While clear articulation of an operational framework is vital to enabling opportunistic behavior, the framework must be continuously reevaluated to ensure its suitability for changing conditions.

Graphic control measures. Well-developed graphic control measures are another key adaptation. They communicate the commander's intent on a map or common operating picture, providing a basis for shared understanding and flexibility throughout the formation. The 1ID staff built robust operational graphics, and duplicated them across all analog and digital platforms. Operational graphics by definition support the overall scheme of maneuver, intelligence, sustainment, and fires, but opportunistic units take graphics a step further. They build graphic control measures, including routes, checkpoints, phase lines, and fire-support coordination measures beyond those required for the selected course of action. They build them to be both internal and external to their areas of operation. For the 1ID, graphics facilitated rapid guidance to subordinate units when unforeseen challenges and opportunities arose.

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Critical and creative thinking about employing assets. Not everything that the 1ID achieved was due to an adaptation of, or refinement to, existing doctrinal principles. The division also applied critical and creative thinking to generate new ideas and learn from past doctrine. Over the course of its training progression for the WFX, the 1ID and its subordinate units experimented with multiple options for employment of key enablers. What emerged was a tension between centralized control and decentralized execution, between control of key assets and flexibility at the tactical edge. On one hand, the division had a broader view of the fight and could provide the most efficient use of key assets such as unmanned aircraft systems and counterfire radars. On the other hand, centralized control of assets such as mobile bridges might give the division positive control of their employment but ultimately would prevent subordinate units from rapidly seizing the initiative.

It is likely there will always be a tension between maintaining centralized control of critical assets and maintaining tempo and combat capability at the lowest tactical levels.

The task organization of key and critical assets should be a deliberate decision based on a larger, iterative discussion and articulation of roles and responsibilities at certain points in the fight between the division and its subordinate units. For the 1ID to conduct offensive tasks as part of decisive action, centralized control of Q37 weapon-locating radars under the DIVARTY allowed for better coverage and forward positioning. As the sole counterfire headquarters in the division, DIVARTY also monitored and recommended positioning of Q36 radars to fill gaps in Q37 coverage. Similarly, based on poor utilization of unmanned aircraft systems during the first two command-post exercises, the division centralized shadow systems under control of the CAB. With a centralized headquarters, the systems were much more responsive to intelligence collection requirements, while maximizing their utilization and capabilities.

In contrast, the division task-organized critical mobile bridging capabilities down to the lead brigades. While the division often lost visibility of this critical enabler, when the lead brigade saw an opportunity to conduct an unopposed water crossing, it was able to rapidly move the bridges to the proper location and seize the initiative. It is likely there will always be a tension between maintaining centralized control of critical assets and maintaining tempo and combat capability at the lowest tactical levels.

An advance guard force. One of the greatest challenges facing any division performing offensive tasks as an element of decisive action is its ability to collect information around the clock and in any weather conditions. In the past, armored cavalry regiments and division cavalry squadrons were able to conduct aggressive reconnaissance against an unknown enemy force, make contact, develop the situation, and protect the main body of the maneuver force. With the loss of a dedicated ground reconnaissance capability at the division level, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations have become almost synonymous with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aircraft systems. In poor weather conditions or a high-threat environment, the division must place BCTs in the lead, often losing critical capabilities and combat power for the decisive operation.

To address this challenge, the 1ID developed an advance-guard capability, which allowed the division to make contact with the smallest elements possible, maintain contact with the enemy, protect the division's main body, and provide the division commander flexibility in how he would mass combat forces. For the WFX, the 1ID took its trail brigade's armored reconnaissance squadron (ARS), attached two additional tank companies along with engineer, air defense artillery, acquisition radar, intelligence, and sustainment assets, and put the ARS under the mission command of the CAB. A direct-support artillery battalion with two rocket batteries in a general support-reinforcing role provided responsive indirect fires as far forward as possible. This allowed the division not only to fight for information and protect the division's main body but also to have a fourth maneuver unit, which provided flexibility in executing the plan. The use of the CAB as a higher headquarters for the advance-guard force provided several additional benefits, including the effective integration of unmanned aircraft systems, the optimization of air-ground operations in the reconnaissance-and-security fight, and the retention

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of combat power in the division's primary echelon for water-crossing operations.

The use of the CAB as a higher headquarters for the advance guard was challenging. Within its organic organization, the CAB staff lacks a robust intelligence-and-fires section, and the CAB does not have organic sustainment systems developed to support a heavily task-organized ARS. Within the 1ID construct, rehearsals were critical to ensuring the ARS and the CAB could work together as an advance guard. Creating a habitual relationship between the ARS and the CAB headquarters early in planning was imperative to mission success.

Multiple command posts. Another innovation developed during planning and preparation was the use of four command posts to control the battlefield. The division employed the doctrinal DMAIN and DTAC, and alternate command posts, including a DIVARTY tactical operations center (TOC). It also pioneered the use of a support-area command post (SACP) to command and control the rear area. The way the division used the DIVARTY TOC yielded significant benefits. When the DMAIN jumped, the DTAC assumed responsibility for the close and deep fights, and the DIVARTY TOC received additional division staff members from the G-2 (intelligence) all-source collection element, the joint air-ground integration cell, and the current operations section. This not only provided a location from which the commanding general could maintain situational awareness, but it also provided the reciprocal benefit of expediting target acquisition and fires prosecution times. The deep fight belonged to the DTAC during the DMAIN jump; however, it proved vital that a contingent from current operations monitored the battle from the alternate command post. While jumping the DMAIN during the WFX, enemy indirect fires significantly degraded the DTAC. Because current operations staff monitored the fight from the DIVARTY TOC, they rapidly assumed control of the battle.

The SACP was crucial in allowing the DMAIN to focus solely on the deep fight. The deputy commanding general for support led the SACP, with constant input from the 110th MEB commander. The SACP maintained rear-area security and allowed supplies and services to flow through the operational area. The SACP staff conducted movement control and managed the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process, while also preventing the irregular threat from influencing the efforts of the rest of the division. Placing the rear area under the command and control of a deputy commanding general with a dedicated command post allowed the 1ID to integrate rear-area operations into the overall battle. The staff of the SACP had full situational awareness and was able to take preemptive action to ensure forward mission success. While this fourth command post required a significant investment in people and resources, it contributed immeasurably to the division's success in the fight.

WFXs are designed to challenge every aspect of a unit, and the 1ID was tested. Both command posts (DMAIN and DTAC) were brought into play as part of the exercise and subject to enemy activity. To execute mission command over extended distances and protect against OPFOR actions, both command posts jumped several times. Further still, the OPFOR employed persistent chemical weapons against the division, a rarely used tactic. With each successive challenge, the division continued to adapt and thrive. Eventually, with the OPFOR's

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strategic objectives thwarted, its tactical reserve defeated, and the remaining combined combat power of two Army divisions prepared to resume the attack, the OPFOR had no option but to withdraw toward its own territory.

Integration, partnership, dialog, and trust. The division's success is less the story of its distinct WFX experiences than the story of building an opportunistic division. In addition to the topics discussed above, several other hard-fought lessons contributed to the 1ID's opportunistic behavior in the WFX.

During WFX execution, a clear commander's intent was the most critical aspect of enabling and integrating disciplined initiative. Building upon lessons learned during previous command-post exercises, the commanding general continuously articulated and emphasized a simple mission statement, an expanded purpose, and key functions that all soldiers throughout the division had to know by heart: tempo, aggressive reconnaissance, fires forward, protection, and partnerships. With this commander's guidance, subordinate commanders could quickly assess risk to the mission and take disciplined initiative.

Partnerships played an important role throughout the exercise. The 1ID partnered early and often with Atropian forces within their area of operations. Units at all echelons reached out to the Atropians, often conducting in excess of twenty engagements a day. At the division level, the commander personally met with Atropian leadership at least once a day, and the Atropian brigade commander participated in 1ID updates and targeting meetings. Through the rigorous partnership activities, the Atropians quickly warmed to the 1ID and began to share intelligence and participate in combat operations alongside the division's forces. Throughout the fight, Atropian forces protected the northern flank of the division, provided rear-area security, and participated in the final attack to seize critical oil fields. Additionally, the Atropians provided significant long-range artillery and air-defense systems that were on par with those of the OPFOR; these were only available due to early command emphasis on partnership building. The same held true for interagency partners. It was crucial to understand each partner's interests and assets. Including all partners in the military decision-making process, rehearsals, updates, and targeting was a best practice.

Commander-to-commander dialogue was critical for enabling opportunistic behavior throughout the division. The division ingrained commander-to-commander dialogue into the battle rhythm, with regular communications during update briefings, commander phone calls, and battlefield circulation. During nightly commander updates, subordinate commanders offered candid assessments of their units' fight and addressed potential opportunities and risks in the coming days. These conversations took place over the distributed mission-command network, and all command posts participated in the discussions. Soldiers at the lowest levels were privy to the highest levels of information and shared understanding. These regular engagements built an atmosphere of trust between the division commander, the deputy commanders, and subordinate commanders.

The division's leaders created an environment of shared trust and understanding in which innovation and adaptation could flourish. They put an emphasis on training repetitions, and thus complex operations became less complicated, because the division had done it all before. Prepared units are opportunistic units. The 1ID dedicated eight precious months of training time, deliberately accepting risk to ensure that the division staff, subordinate units, and all members of the team were ready to fight and win.

Why the Warfighter Exercise Remains the Crucible Training Event for Divisions

It would be easy to fault the 1ID leadership for focusing so much on winning the WFX. However, that point of view would be shortsighted; the global security environment requires leaders that understand how to fight and win through decisive action. Threats posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran make it clear that the Army can ill afford to allow decisive-action skills to atrophy. Offensive tasks against a near-peer enemy are among the most difficult tasks Army forces perform. The challenging decisive-action scenarios at combat training centers and in WFXs are exactly what the Army needs to ensure it stands ready.

Not only did the WFX hone the division staff's decisive-action skills, but it also built the physical network and teams that are vital for future operations. The WFX enhanced the staff's ability to synchronize and employ intelligence, logistics, fires, and other enablers, and these skills translate to any operation. In addition, the exercise provided the challenge the staff needed to hone their

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expertise and to develop the critical and creative thinking skills they will need for any mission. As masters of their craft, they can pass their knowledge on to units in their next assignments and to partner forces.

Opportunistic units are fleeting. The Army personnel assignment process does not reward leaders who take time to build a team capable of sharing understanding and displaying disciplined initiative, adaptability, and innovation. Within thirty days of the conclusion of the 1ID's WFX, the majority of the field-grade and senior company-grade leaders on the staff moved to the brigades to take key developmental positions or moved to other installations. The 1ID used the WFX as a venue for leader development and, in the process, it developed junior leaders who would spread the opportunistic mindset throughout the division and the Army for many years to come.

This meant that the division headquarters had to immediately plan for another intensive training cycle to bring new staff members on board after the summer transition period. Including senior NCOs and junior company-grade officers in the battle-staff teams insulated the division from a wholesale loss of knowledge during personnel turnover, but it remains to be seen if the Sustainable Readiness Model will solve this persistent, Army-wide problem.[14] Thus, it is imperative to take personnel turnover into account when assigning key battle-staff positions. The 1ID spent considerable energy documenting its training for and execution of its WFX. The division staff recorded leadership-development program sessions and cataloged assessments and AARs for the command-post exercises and WFX. Such a complete record should allow new staff members to come on board with a limited amount of turbulence.

Building an opportunistic division is a hard, continuous process. No single exercise, however successful, signals the end of the quest for an innovative, agile, and adaptive unit. The processes described above worked to get a new staff fully engaged and ready for one of the most difficult exercises they would ever face. It trained a group of leaders on the complexity of the decisive-action fight and applied the concept of an opportunistic unit. The experience had a positive effect not only on the division staff but also on the subordinate brigades and sister divisions, as Big Red One alumni moved on to other assignments.

The Big Red One's experiences during the warfighter exercise were consistent with its history. From the unit's inception as part of the American Expeditionary Forces under then Gen. John J. "Black Jack" Pershing during World War I; to its storied exploits in North Africa, Sicily, and on D-Day in France during World War II; to its service in Vietnam under then Maj. Gen. William E. DePuy, who modeled the modern squad after his experiences as the commanding general of the Big Red One; the 1ID provided the model for others to follow. The warfighter exercise gave the First Infantry Division the opportunity to evolve and to continue its legacy of leader development and innovation. ■

Notes

1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation (TR) 350-50-3, *Mission Command Training Program* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 23 June 2014), 10.

2. William Adler, "Training Opportunistic Formations: Leading Transitions for the Brigade Combat Team," *NTC Decisive Action Training Environment Newsletter* 12-19 (September 2012), 93–103. The authors of this article credit William Adler for inspiring their "opportunistic" construct; they adapted Adler's term to their own purposes.

3. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office [GPO], 17 May 2012), 1-4.

4. TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040* w/chg. 1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 31 October 2014), iii.

5. Ibid., 16.

6. Jamie Crawford, "Army Announces Force Reduction of 40,000 Troops," CNN Politics website, 9 July 2015, accessed 7 September 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/09/politics/army-announces-force-reduction-40000-troops/.

7. ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 2-3.

8. TR 350-50-3, *Mission Command Training Program*, 7.

9. The six Army warfighting functions are mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. A digital master gunner is a subject-matter expert on mission-command information systems including the Command Post of the Future command-and-control system.

10. ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, v; ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2012), 1-3–1-7.

11. Secretary of the Army, *Army Directive 2012-08: Army Total Force Policy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Army, 4 September 2012).

12. Army Techniques Publication 3-91, *Division Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 17 October 2014), 1-1.

13. ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 16 May 2012), 1-9.

14. "Army Readiness Guidance," U.S. Army Stand-To! website, 19 May 2016, accessed 8 September 2016, https://www.army.mil/standto/2016-05-19.

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A 1st Infantry Division battle captain uses Command Post of the Future during a division command post exercise 27 January 2016 at Fort Riley, Kansas. (Photo by Master Sgt. Mike Lavigne, 1st Infantry Division PAO)

Building Digital Lethality

Capt. Jonathan Stafford, U.S. Army

The staff's primary means to affect the battlefield is not with an M2 heavy machine gun, M4 carbine, or Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Instead, the staff brings to bear intellectual skills and experience enhanced by a mix of digital systems to aid the commander in the exercise of mission command.

While there are many differences between traditional lethal weapon systems and digital systems, a key distinction is that there has not been a program established for digital systems to take untrained individuals and train them to operate to standard as a crew, section, and unit. To remedy this gap, the Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCoE) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, developed a framework of ten digital training tables. The 1st Infantry Division (1ID) took these tables and created a "digital gunnery" program that led to a drastic increase in the unit's ability to support the commander's exercise of mission command. The plan received strong command emphasis and fostered an environment that encouraged continuous and integrated digital systems use in training to prepare for operations. The training significantly enhanced 1ID's proficiency in mission command

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		Table	Operators	Training outcomes
Digital crew mission command digital master gunner (MCDMG) led	Level 1	I	Basic system skills	Setup, configure, preventive maintenance checks and services; operate; troubleshoot
	Level 2	II	Integration proficiency	Publish and subscribe to Data Dissemination Service
		III	Common operational picture development	Position location information filtering; staff estimates; brigade system collaboration
		IV	Battle management	Track brigade planned operations; react to developing events; execute brigade battle drills; develop storyboards
	Level 3	V	Digital planning	Plan, prepare, and disseminate operation order; collaborative use between echelons; briefings
		VI	Digital crew certification	Executes battle management for current and future operations; validate standard operating procedures (SOPs)
Commander and battle staff MCDMG coordinated		VII	Commander/staff/digital crew (command post) integration	Unify team using collaboration of processes and digital systems
		VIII	Commander/staff/digital crew (command post) battle drills	Assess/reinforce employment of mission command information system (MCIS) suite in operations process and supporting synchronization meetings
		IX	Integrated command post assessment	Team successfully completes training program, evaluation, and certifies digital SOP
	MCVE	X	Command post mission command validation exercise (MCVE)	Sustained operations using authorized modified table of organization and equipment (suite of MCIS) executed through successive shift change iterations.

(Graphic by Col. Patrick Crosby, Mission Command Center of Excellence)

Figure. Ten Digital Training Tables

systems, which led to improved digital lethality and success during Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 16-04.

Each Army commander establishes a mission command system with five elements: personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment.[1] When discussing digital proficiency, most immediately think about mission command information systems (MCISs) such as the Command Post of the Future (CPOF). Though these are a critical component of a commander's mission command system, they are only a small aspect of it. Equally important are the personnel that operate the systems and the networks that transmit the information (social and technical), the standardized processes and procedures that establish the framework for use, and the facilities used for operations. When integrated into a unit's training plan and administered by mission command digital master gunners (MCDMGs), digital gunnery provides the bedrock for certifying a unit in all aspects of mission command systems.

Background

Digital proficiency has a history of emphasis in 1ID. In May 2013, the division published a plan to reorganize its joint operations center and establish Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) CPOF as the primary system used by staff and subordinate units to send reports and conduct briefings. This created an environment in which the unit used CPOF daily.

Over the course of the next year, the 1ID established an entire CPOF network on its NIPRNET.[2] This system significantly improved the division's digital proficiency in garrison, and that directly carried over during Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. military operations against the Islamic State) in October 2014. However, the increased use of CPOF on a daily basis was not enough. Despite a high base proficiency with CPOF, it was clear that the division was not effectively integrating all of its MCISs. Operators of the other systems were working in discrete groups disconnected from each other, where they created specific data

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products for their functions, but they did not validate data integration with other information systems.

This problem was not unique to the 1ID. The Army designed programs to help units synchronize their mission command systems before exercises conducted at a combat training center or those led by the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) at Fort Leavenworth. Of note, the Mission Command Systems Integration Team from the Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications–Tactical provides training to establish command-post (CP) facilities, networks, and digital products in conjunction with an exercise. This program is helpful, but does not provide the tools or a framework to establish and run a unit training program.

To address this Army-wide issue, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) mandated that units use MCDMGs and signal digital master gunners to designate digital crews and lead them through an integrated, three-level training program that ended with a validation exercise:

- Level I: individual skills
- Level II: integration proficiency
- Level III: mission command systems and staff integration
- Mission command validation exercise.[3]

Concurrently, the MCCoE refined its take-home training program created for MCDMG graduates. The MCCoE applied the FORSCOM guidance in its ongoing efforts to produce the digital gunnery tables.

The Training Tables

There are ten tables in the digital training program. Each table builds upon the previous table, starting at the operator level and progressing to the crew, the section, and then to the entire staff (see the figure on page 86).[4] As the tables build upon each other, they gradually incorporate the personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment. The figure illustrates FORSCOM's three levels and mission command validation exercises next to their corresponding tables.

Table I covers the basic system skills required to set up, operate, maintain, and troubleshoot the user's MCIS (i.e., CPOF, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS], Tactical Airspace Integration System [TAIS], and others).

An MCDMG or qualified MCIS operator for other systems may teach a refresher, but the initial training occurs at a local mission training complex or proponent school for each system (such as AFATDS at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, or TAIS at Fort Rucker, Alabama). Prior to integration into a team, this table certifies that personnel can use their information systems at a certain level of proficiency.

Tables II and III are instructor led. During training on these tables, soldiers learn critical skills such as MCIS integration, digital standard operating procedures (SOPs), and common operational picture (COP) development. Here, the personnel begin to work as a crew and learn how to achieve interoperability among systems. For instance, AFATDS operators determine how to validate that their fire support coordination measures transfer correctly from their system to the CPOF. Alternately, the CPOF operator learns how to publish graphics and verify that they are viewable on the other MCISs. Each of the information systems receives similar training.

For these systems to function correctly, the different MCISs require an active network necessitating the MCDMGs to work in close collaboration with their information management or signal officers and their signal digital master gunners. Both tables II and III present opportunities for the unit to teach MCIS operators how to create and share digital products according to their unit's SOPs.

In table IV, battle management, digital crews are responsible for executing, tracking, and managing battle drills, responding to critical events, and synchronizing resources. Next, table V requires digital crews to develop and distribute an operation order on the MCIS.

Tables VI through IX are designed to test, validate, and then certify the unit's SOPs, crews, and CPs with full staff integration. The digital crews provide the necessary relevant information to staff and commanders to make decisions and give guidance.

Finally, the tables culminate with table X. This is the mission command validation exercise that confirms a unit's ability to configure and organize a CP to support mission

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requirements where the staff can coordinate all phases of operations and accomplish all assigned tasks.

1ID's Digital Gunnery: Results and Best Practices

Fort Riley's 1ID embraced the opportunity to work with the MCCoE to test and operationalize the digital gunnery tables. The division commander's goal was to complete all ten tables before WFX 16-04.

The division's knowledge management (KM) section took the lead in this effort; it established a cadre of MCDMGs across the division, synchronized the digital gunnery tables with the division's training schedule, and started conducting the tables in January 2016.

Before starting the tables, the division set out to train enough MCDMGs to efficiently run and manage the training. Working closely with the school, the division identified the right personnel to attend the course. Effective MCDMGs needed the competence to understand the systems and the confidence to lead their sections as they operated those systems. Additionally, they needed to have stability in the unit and represent all warfighting functions. Finally, the selected personnel had to complete training before the unit conducted table I.

Much time was spent determining the proper number and placement of the division's MCDMGs. It was ultimately decided that each section and warfighting function needed one MCDMG per shift and CP. At division level, this meant training twenty-three personnel. Brigades each needed four, with their battalions having two each. Overall, this created a requirement for eighty-seven qualified MCDMGs in the 1ID. The number may seem high, but this investment is critical for building digital lethality.

In addition to training MCDMGs, the Fort Riley Mission Training Complex helped develop an integration module as part of the basic CPOF course. This module introduced students to publishing information from CPOF and subscribing to data from other MCISs to create a holistic COP. Another week of training is under development that will cover four days of systems integration, the digital gunnery process, and a fifth day teaching the division's KM process. The additional MCDMGs and improved CPOF training continue to raise the division's baseline digital proficiency.

Next, the KM section created digital battle rosters broken down by crew. At the division level, each CP had a day and night crew. This gave the division six digital crews: day and night crews for the division main CP, the division tactical CP, and the support area CP. The crews in the division-level CPs were large because the integration of each information system from all the different warfighting functions was necessary to create a synchronized crew. Much like Bradley Fighting Vehicle commanders must train with a driver and gunner, each accomplishing their respective critical tasks for the system as a whole to work, the digital crew must train on and integrate their AFATDS, TAIS, and other information systems. If one of these systems is missing from the crew, the CP becomes ineffective. At a minimum, each crew must have one MCDMG.

Digital crews were presented at brigade quarterly training briefs to highlight their importance and the need for their increased stabilization. Next, the tables were applied to the training calendar in a way that synchronized them with already planned events. The division was preparing for its WFX and had a series of command-post exercises (CPXs) scheduled. Table I consisted of the core systems training completed at the Fort Riley mission training complex. Table II started in January 2016.

Digital gunnery was creatively integrated into other training events. For example, tables II and III occurred as part of the division's joint operations center, and table IV was carried out during CPX 2 between the joint operations center, the mission training complex, and the division tactical CP. Several make-up and retrain events were also included to ensure maximum participation. Table V, the planning table, occurred during orders production for CPX 3. Table VI took place during the CPX 3 communications exercise where each CP had to run through battle drills, COP updates, and briefings. MCDMGs evaluated tables VII and VIII in each CP during CPX 3. The division completed table IX during Warfighter 16-04's mini-exercise and finished with the mission command validation exercise (table X) during the WFX.

The digital tables provided the perfect opportunity to teach 1ID's SOPs, as the MCIS operators learned how to manage battle drills, use tactical chat, send reports, and practice KM. Additionally, the tables went beyond the information systems and allowed for

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integration of the complete mission command system. The digital crews improved significantly at CP setup, which enhanced digital integration and promoted better synchronization across warfighting functions. The main and tactical CPs both saw significant refinement as the training and CPXs progressed. Changes based on these improvements were codified in SOP updates and incorporated into later digital gunnery events and subsequent exercises.

Personnel turnover was a significant issue at the division level, but engaged leadership helped enforce stabilization. For situations where stabilization was not possible, the digital gunnery plan incorporated retraining events after each exercise that provided opportunities to update crews on new SOPs as well as to integrate new members.

Additionally, not all members of the CP that operated an MCIS were able to participate in the training. To combat this shortfall, future iterations of 1ID's digital gunnery program will have a stand-alone training event for leaders that use CPOF but are not necessarily a part of a crew. This event will give individuals like the division chief of staff or the G-3 (operations officer) a refresher on CPOF and CP SOPs to ensure they have the necessary skill set to effectively operate and lead in the CP. This training will take no longer than ninety minutes, but it will give leaders the depth of understanding to execute and improve the unit's digital SOPs.

The investment of sending soldiers to the MCDMG course and spending the time to train on the digital tables significantly improved the unit's ability to support mission command. This digital proficiency translated directly to lethality, as the division was able to maintain synchronization with faster coordination and increased collaboration. All echelons benefited from an increased shared understanding facilitated by digital crew proficiency.

Two events during the WFX clearly showed the impact made by MCDMGs and the digital gunnery tables. First, the training enabled the division to jump (relocate) the main CP twenty-four hours earlier than scheduled. Digital crews were able to transfer portions of the their tasks to the crews in the tactical CP, sustainment area CP, and division artillery CP. MCIS operators ensured their counterparts had the right information and permissions to continue the fight. Personnel in the main CP were then able to disassemble their systems, conduct a tactical movement, and reestablish connectivity within fourteen hours. During, this time, the fight continued as planned, even with the tactical CP losing 50 percent of their personnel in an attack.

Second, the division's ability to rapidly execute branch plans was facilitated by the cohesion of digital crews. The commander quickly published mission orders with effective graphics and other digital products. CPs were able to more rapidly receive, confirm, and then execute these plans thanks to the rapid coordination and collaboration that came with increased digital lethality.

Conclusion

The proficiency necessary to integrate, operate, and maintain today's Army mission command information systems requires command emphasis, continuous use, and a digital sustainment training plan. The digital gunnery tables developed by the MCCoE and operationalized by the 1ID are exactly the type of training program the Army needs. Flexible enough to integrate into the division's already planned schedule, they can be added to a battalion or brigade's training program. The digital gunnery tables—with qualified MCDMGs to lead them—provide the framework for developing digital lethality alongside the physically lethal systems.

CPX 1, completed before the tables, gave the 1ID a baseline and started the digital gunnery process with the goal of creating highly proficient CPs that used digital lethality to dominate during a culminating WFX. The progression from CPX 1 through the exercise was remarkable. Operators went from using their systems in independent but disjointed efforts, to creating specific digital products, to working in collaboration with other functions to create a truly integrated COP.

During the midpoint after-action review, MCTP observers highlighted the hard work the division had done to prepare for the exercise Specifically, they emphasized the use and placement of MCDMGs as something that truly set the conditions for success. The digital gunnery tables created an environment where system operators stopped going to the G-6 (communications and network management) with MCIS questions; instead, they called on their section's MCDMGs, or soldiers who had completed digital gunnery, for assistance. The MCDMGs not only assisted in creating better digital products, but they also freed up the G-6 team to focus on a very robust cyber threat.

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Military Review

WE RECOMMEND



Army Press Primer on Urban Operations

Today, just over one-half of the world's population lives in urban areas. That percentage is expected to increase to 66 percent by 2050. In 1990, there were ten "megacities" of more than ten million inhabitants. By 2014, it rose to twenty-eight. And, by 2040, that number is expected to increase to forty-one.

With this ongoing and dramatic urbanization of the world's population, the U.S. Army is highly likely to find itself continuing to operate in cities. It is imperative that we study and understand the dynamics of operating in urban terrain. We must take the time now to analyze and test the lessons learned from different urban operations to ensure our soldiers and leaders are prepared for the future.

As a starting point, Army Press has compiled a selection of articles from *Military Review*, publications from the Combat Studies Institute, monographs from students at the Command and General Staff College, and other publications. This primer on urban operations should not be viewed as the textbook on the subject, but rather as a starting point for renewed study and conversation.



Access the Army Press Primer on Urban Operations by visiting http://armypress.dodlive.mil/primer-on-urban-operations/

Additional resources are available on the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center website: http://usacac.army.mil/taxonomy/term/32

Of note, this success was achieved with only a small portion of the staff completing the digital gunnery tables. Only sixty soldiers from all warfighting functions were able to complete tables I–X, but their ability to shape the success of the division was remarkable. Future iterations of digital gunnery will be conducted with much greater participation, resulting in an even larger increase in digital proficiency. As MCDMGs and their crews continue to build proficiency, there will be less reliance on field-service representatives for each of the MCISs.

Before the final after-action review, the division commander noted that until then, he had not been a part of a unit that so effectively overcame fighting itself during a WFX but instead focused its efforts on killing the enemy. Well-practiced internal processes, KM, and the efficient use of digital systems enabled this success. From the sustainment cell creating effective movement synchronization boards that streamlined the uncoiling of the division, to the future operations and current operations sections quickly implementing a conditions-based branch plan and mission order to enable the commander to seize the initiative, digital systems operators fully empowered 1ID's leadership.

The digital gunnery tables developed in partnership with the MCCoE and 1ID are extremely useful, especially when integrated into training at all levels. ■

Notes

1. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 17 May 2012), 11–12.

2. 1st Infantry Division's Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) Command Post of the Future (CPOF) concept of operation, dated 24 February 2014, with all supporting and background documentation found on the Intelink website, https://go.intelink.gov/t2Mblqk (CAC required).

3. Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Memorandum for Commanders, Major Subordinate Commands/Units Reporting Directly to FORSCOM, Army National Guard Bureau, Office, Chief Army Reserve and Army Service Component Commands, "FORSCOM Command Training Guidance (CTG)—Fiscal Year 2016," 19 October 2015, accessed 5 May 2016, https://fce.forscom.army.mil/FC-DocMgmt/SiteAssets/Default.aspx (login required).

4. Patrick Crosby, "Mission Command Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training and Strategy" (Leader development presentation to the staff of the 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, 14 December 2015).

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A fatigued trainee rests during a break at the Buddy Movement Course, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 9 August 2006. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall, U.S. Air Force)


Sleep Banking

Improving Fighter Management

Maj. Amy Thompson, U.S. Army
Capt. Brad Jones, U.S. Army
Capt. Jordan Thornburg, U.S. Army

The 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, was selected in 2015 to participate in the "Performance Triad" pilot program led by the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG).[1] The Performance Triad program focuses on our basic biological health needs—sleep, activity, and nutrition—all of which are important for survival, health, performance, safety, and readiness.[2] The goal of the program is to improve the health of the force and optimize human performance. Health is the foundation of readiness, and readiness is the Army's number one priority.[3] The focus of this article is sleep.

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Soldiers of Bulldog Troop, 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment recover in a hasty fighting position 4 September 2009 after a night patrol in the mountains near Sar Howza, Paktika Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew Smith, U.S. Army)

In December 2015, the brigade surgeon was invited to attend the Army Sleep Summit at the OTSG headquarters. A diverse working group of military leaders and top researchers in the field of sleep science attended the summit to discuss the impact of sleep on performance, health, safety, and readiness. Many experts made a compelling case throughout the sleep summit that sleep duration, daytime impairment, and fatigue are significant correlates of diminished cognitive performance, poor physical health, depression, suicide ideation, motor vehicle accidents, and occupational injury. Specifically, leaders discussed *sleep banking* throughout the summit as a way to optimize sleep and enhance performance. Significant findings from research show that sleep can be "banked" in advance of periods of sleep restriction to improve alertness and performance, and that it contributes to faster recovery from fatigue-induced impairments.[4] Sleep banking can be planned, operationalized, and strategically placed before a known period of sleep restriction to create large gains in performance when the stakes are high. Sleep banking before performance could be the difference between winning and losing—or life and death.

The Fatigue of the Force

Sleep benefits the brain. Conversely, sleep loss is characterized by brain deactivation, especially in the brain regions that mediate cognitive performance and alertness. Performance deficits often result from the effects of sleep loss combined with circadian rhythm misalignment.[5] The short-term consequences of sleep loss are attention deficit, slowed reaction time, reduced alertness, impaired problem solving, and reduced motivation.[6]

A 2015 RAND Corporation study reported that 72 percent of service members get less than seven hours of sleep per night, and 23 percent receive less than six.[7] Routinely getting five to six hours per night of sleep is like performing with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent.[8] Less than seven hours of sleep for three or more days correlates to a 20 percent decrease in cognitive performance.[9] In 2014, fatigue was a contributing factor in

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628 Army accidents and 32 deaths.[10] Sleep loss results in deficits that affect performance effectiveness and safety in operational and nonoperational environments.

Sleep is a biological need, and it is critically important for soldier health. The lack of sleep and increasing number of sleep disorders among service members is a major public health concern. In 2014, up to 14 percent of soldiers across the Army were diagnosed with a sleep disorder.[11] Those lacking sufficient sleep are more likely to suffer from chronic diseases such as hypertension, diabetes, depression, obesity, and cancer; they tend to have a higher mortality rate, a lower quality of life, and less overall productivity.[12] Sleep—or the lack thereof—amounts to being a health, safety, and readiness issue. With readiness at stake, we can no longer ignore the fatigue of the force or allow cultural barriers to continue to inhibit improvement of this larger public health issue. In Army organizations, losing is not an option; the cost of poor performance is high, so mitigating the risks associated with sleep loss and fatigue is imperative.

Cultural Barriers

Military culture historically does not place a priority on sleep. This is evident in a well-known Army recruiting slogan: "We get more done by nine o'clock than most people do all day." We know that optimal sleep is critical to mission success. Soldiers and leaders associate poor sleep with impaired reaction time, poor judgment, accidents, and low morale. However, despite mission degradation, a cultural acceptance of suboptimal sleep and a perception that lack of sleep is the "Army way" prevail in the force.[13]

The idea of allowing soldiers to optimize sleep, report to work at 0900, and conduct physical training in the afternoon for a seven- to ten-day period before a training event would be quickly dismissed in many circles in the Army. Yet, high-performing teams are willing to change their cultures if a behavior is no longer productive. Having a supportive command climate in the brigade, one that was open to change, was vital to creating an opportunity for performance enhancement and conducting the sleep banking assessment. Once the command team was briefed on the science behind sleep banking, to include discussion of other studies on sleep and performance such as the Harvard Hospital study, the Stanford men's basketball team sleep extension study, the high schools delayed-start study, and the Harvard Police study, the brigade commander directed one of his subordinate units to support the trial.[14] Then, after gaining "buy in" from the highest level of leadership, the subordinate commanders pushed the initiative to the company and platoon levels.

Operationalizing Sleep Banking

Knowledge of the Performance Triad, the brigade's engagement in the Army Sleep Summit, and a brigade command climate that empowered innovation combined to create momentum toward a sleep-banking initiative. Encouraged by the brigade command team, subordinate-unit leadership deliberately focused on fighter-management improvement by operationalizing sleep banking before gunnery in an infantry unit.

As a trial, 2nd Platoon, Company C (Charlie Company), 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, was chosen to conduct sleep banking before a February 2016 field training exercise (FTX), during which the unit would fire Gunnery Table (GT) VI.[15] During this FTX, soldiers would conduct twenty-four–hour operations, sleeping when possible—many times in a Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV)—and typically would average three to five hours of sleep daily for seven days, depending on leadership roles. The trial would compare GT VI scores from an October 2015 FTX to scores from the February 2016 FTX to determine if sleep banking affected gunnery performance. Additionally, evaluators would receive subjective feedback from the soldiers during the sleep-bank week and during the sleep-restricted period to discover further the effects of sleep banking on performance, health, and wellness. The company commander scheduled time for the brigade medical team to educate the platoon on the science behind sleep and the potential benefits of sleep banking before the FTX.

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In order to allow the platoon to sleep bank effectively, an adjustment to the normal Army duty schedule was required. The platoon normally shows up for work at 0600 before starting 0630 physical training (PT). From 5–14 February 2016, the command agreed to "reverse PT," where the soldiers would show up at 0900 and conduct PT in the afternoon at 1600. This adjustment fell more in line with the natural circadian rhythm of sleep, which is from approximately from 2300 to 0700 (the best hours of sleep are early in the morning when the soldiers are normally getting ready for work).[16] During this sleep-banking time, the soldiers were required to keep a "sleep journal" in which they logged their hours of sleep. Sleep journals showed that for the ten-day period before the FTX, the platoon averaged 8.9 hours of sleep per night, significantly more than the reported average of five to six hours per night before sleep banking.



Gunnery Performance Improvement

The GT VI (crew-level gunnery) scores for 2nd Platoon increased substantially from the October 2015 (no sleep banking) FTX to the February 2016 (sleep banking) FTX. However, many factors were not controlled, including personnel changes, soldier experience levels, crew dynamics, weather, range execution, and maintenance issues. Additionally, the unit had four months of increased training before the latter FTX.

In October 2015, two of the four crews in 2nd Platoon qualified on their first attempt, while two required multiple attempts to meet the minimum qualification requirements (700 of 1,000 points and 7 of 10 passed engagements). Upon completion of the FTX, the overall platoon average score was 756 out of a possible 1,000.

In February 2016, following a weeklong period of sleep banking, all four crews in 2nd Platoon qualified on their first attempt, and the platoon average score increased by 163 points up to 919 out of 1,000 points. In addition to the improved scores, the platoon executed GT VI without safety violations, accidents, or injuries.

Soldier and Leader Feedback and Impact on Health

Upon completion of GT VI, all members of the platoon were questioned on how sleep banking affected their health and performance during gunnery. Subjective feedback from across the platoon was

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The Way Forward with Fighter Management

Charlie Company continued to demonstrate how sleep banking results in improving fighter management. After completion of GT VI and the stellar performance by 2nd Platoon, the company commander strategically implemented sleep banking 5–13 March 2016 for the entire company, the week prior to executing GT XII. The move proved fruitful; all three platoons in Charlie Company qualified on GT XII with an average score of 79 percent. For reference, the Army considers 50 percent the minimum for advancement to company-level collective training.

Once again, the feedback from soldiers and leaders indicated overwhelmingly positive impacts across all aspects of performance, health, safety, and quality of life. The commander reported that sleep banking contributed to increased morale and improved mental health of all soldiers. He noticed increased motivation during afternoon PT and while performing mundane tasks, and he concluded that sleep banking led to an overall better quality of life for his soldiers.



Lt. Col. Ingrid Lim, Office of the Surgeon General Performance Triad staff member, gathers feedback on fatigue, sleep, and performance from the commander and first sergeant of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, Capt. Remington Adams and 1st Sgt. Willie Watson, 15 March 2016 during Table XII gunnery at Fort Riley, Kansas. (Photo by Maj. Amy Thompson, U.S. Army)

Conclusion

Sleep banking for seven to ten days prior to a known period of sleep restriction has a positive impact on performance and health. Reverse PT allows soldiers to optimize sleep and gain two or three more hours because it aligns with the natural circadian rhythm. Commanders and leaders are responsible for implementing deliberate sleep-management strategies and ensuring they are included in mission planning when periods of sleep restriction are anticipated. The benefits are already proven by sleep science and research across other organizations and cannot be overlooked. The Performance Triad has taught us that a commander's emphasis on sleep must equal emphasis on physical fitness if we expect optimal performance.[17] The Army should continue to improve fighter management by operationalizing sleep. Sleep banking improves the health and safety of soldiers and enhances unit readiness. ■

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Notes

1. Tim Hrenchir, "Army 'Triad' Pilot Program Encourages Soldiers to Take Better Care of Themselves," *Topeka Capital-Journal* online, 20 December 2015, accessed 30 September 2016, http://cjonline.com/news/2015-12-20/army-triad-pilot-program-encourages-soldiers-take-better-care-themselves#.

2. Army Medical Department, *Performance Triad: A Leader's Guide and Planner*, Army Medicine website, accessed 30 September 2016, http://armymedicine.mil/Documents/Leaders-Guide_Planner_08_07_2013.pdf.

3. Mark A. Milley, "39th Chief of Staff of the Army Initial Message to the Army," accessed 30 September 2016, https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/leaders/csa/Initial_Message_39th_CSA.pdf.

4. Tracy Rupp et al., "Banking Sleep: Realization of Benefits During Subsequent Sleep Restriction and Recovery," *Sleep* 32, no. 3 (2009): 311–21.

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6. Rupp, "Banking Sleep."

7. Wendy M. Troxel et al., *Sleep in the Military: Promoting Healthy Sleep Among U.S. Servicemembers* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 16.

8. Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), *Health of the Force*, Army Public Health Center (Provisional) Health of the Force Report, November 2015, 11, accessed 30 September 2016, https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/419337.pdf.

9. Ibid., 5.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 2.

12. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), "Sleep and Sleep Disorders," CDC website, accessed 30 September 2016, http://www.cdc.gov/Sleep/index.html.

13. OTSG, *Health of the Force*, 9.

14. Christopher P. Landrigan et al., "Effect of Reducing Interns' Work Hours on Serious Medical Errors in Intensive Care Units," *New England Journal of Medicine* 351 (2004): 1838–48; Cheri D. Mah et al., "The Effects of Sleep Extension on the Athletic Performance of Collegiate Basketball Players," *Sleep* 34, no. 7 (2011): 943–50; Judith A. Owens, Katherine Belon, and Patricia Moss, "Impact of Delaying School Start Time on Adolescent Sleep, Mood, and Behavior," *Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine* 164, no. 7 (2010): 608–14; Shantha M. W. Rajaratnam et al., "Sleep Disorders, Health, Safety in Police Officers," *Journal of American Medical Association* 306, no. 23 (2011): 2567–78.

15. Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) gunnery tables range from table I (crew critical skills) to table XII (platoon qualification). Gunnery table VI is crew qualification, executed by individual BFV crews (in subsequent tables, BFVs operate in teams). Table VI entails engaging moving and stationary targets with all weapon systems (main gun and machine guns) while stationary and moving.

16. Owens, Belon, and Moss, "Impact of Delaying School Start Time."

17. Robert Abrams, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Command Training Guidance, 19 October 2015, cited in OTSG, *Health of the Force*, 6.



Soldiers from Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, 4th Infantry Division, led by their commander, Lt. Col. Brad Wambeke, participate in a four-mile installation run 4 June 2012 on Fort Carson, Colorado. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew Porch, U.S. Army)

Sleep Emphasis on Fort Carson

A sleep experiment similar to 1st Infantry Division's drew praise from Army health officials, according to a story in the Denver Post.[1] In 2014, Fort Carson's leadership changed the standard duty day to allow soldiers to come into work later and conduct physical fitness training at the end of the day instead of first thing in the morning, as is the norm across the Army.

Col. Deydre Teyhen, the Army's assistant deputy chief of staff for public health, cited the Fort Carson program in an interview with Federal News Radio: "Our best example probably is at Fort Carson, where they started reverse-cycle physical training. They do PT at the end of the day instead of in the morning. Not only do they get more sleep, it allowed soldiers to help get the kids ready for school and spend some time with the family before everybody went out the door. It's been a huge success, not only for the families but for the soldiers, because we know that being sleep deprived by four hours decreases your maximum bench press by twenty pounds. If we want to get the most out of unit PT, doing that at a time when they're not sleep deprived is the way to do it. We're seeing pockets of success and I think it's going to continue to grow."[2]

Unfortunately, the program was curtailed due to "epic traffic jams" caused by "about twenty thousand soldiers" conducting physical training on Fort Carson's roads during high-traffic periods for civilian employees.[3]

Notes

1. "Study Credits Fort Carson for Letting Soldiers Sleep In," Denver Post, updated 9 June 2016, accessed 9 November 2016, http://www.denverpost.com/2016/03/20/study-credits-fort-carson-for-letting-soldiers-sleep-in/.

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3. "Study Credits Fort Carson."

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Leadership Innovation in the Reserve Officer Training Corps and the Future of the Force

Col. Andrew Morgado, U.S. Army

Material solutions alone will not provide the decisive edge against the complex array of rapidly adapting threats we face. To answer the challenge of this new paradigm, the Army must invest in its most valuable resource, its people.

—Lt. Gen. Robert B. Brown

The number one priority in the U.S. Army Cadet Command is to produce second lieutenants who contribute to what Lt. Gen. Robert Brown refers to as the Army's "decisive edge" and meet the Army's requirements in an increasingly complex world. The 2014 *U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (AOC) clearly asserts that the operating environment is changing and so must the Army.[1] The Army's Cadet Command produces over 70 percent of the total officer corps through its programs, and it provides fertile ground to grow the Army of tomorrow.[2] This contribution to the force constitutes a significant portion of the leaders who will drive this change in the force. My brigade, one of eight that lead Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs across the country, is responsible for identifying, training, educating, and inspiring these future officers. Each day, we are learning and adapting our approach and methods to produce the leaders who are capable of meeting and overcoming the challenges of tomorrow.

As our operating environment changes, the Army must consider how to adapt its approach in educating and developing the leaders that will guide the institution through this change. The pace and type of change the AOC describes indicate that many of the current training and education models are becoming irrelevant. Times are changing, and college and university ROTC programs must change with the times to stay relevant. Though the Cadet Command program has produced officers for an Army that is the envy of the world, the limitations of the current program are growing more apparent. Understanding what the AOC demands of future leaders must form the foundation for further action to help reduce or eliminate those limitations. Therefore, Cadet Command—with a national presence in over 270 host institutions and over a thousand partnered colleges—is shifting its training strategy from one largely based on post-World War II models, which are narrowly focused on one type of conflict, to one designed to meet more varied challenges reflective of the times.[3]

Army Operating Concept Vision

The AOC suggests future conflict will be characterized by an increased velocity and momentum of human interaction. One of the effects of this new dynamic is that future enemies will seek to leverage these interactions by drawing U.S. forces into more complex urban terrain together with other strategies aimed at generally negating

Army ROTC cadets of the Blue Devil Eagle Battalion welcome the Cadet Command deputy commanding officer, Col. Brian J. Mennes, to Duke University for classroom instruction in officership 3 October 2014 in Durham, North Carolina. During the school year, cadets receive multidisciplinary instruction on leadership, ethics, behavioral sciences, and tactics. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army ROTC)

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the advantages of U.S. technological superiority.[4] Additionally, the nature and type of enemy forces the Army will face is also changing. With greater frequency, the Army will encounter situations where irregular forces, nonstate groups, and criminal organizations will either join conventional forces with similar objectives or act unilaterally to accomplish objectives in this complex terrain.

In order to be successful under these conditions, the AOC asserts that the Army must "develop innovative leaders and optimize human performance."[5] Such innovative leaders must be capable of succeeding in both "high-tech" and "low-tech" environments—and everything in between. The Army's *Human Dimension White Paper* stresses this theme, noting that "the basics" of skills relating to successful conduct of warfare have fundamentally changed. Industrial Age warfare characterized by an emphasis on attaining mass for success is giving way to an emphasis on agility and adaptation.[6] The traditional notion that military leaders must become technical experts in known fields of military science must give way to a broader concept where military leaders possess the capacity to solve a wide array of complex problems with creative solutions derived in part from sources of knowledge outside traditional military studies.

The officer corps of today gained significant experience from years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan that provides some insight into the future conduct of our wars. Our national experience has revealed that the training completed prior to wartime deployments did not adequately prepare military leaders to conduct these wars. In a 2010 study on precommissioning training, Maj. Joseph Albrecht discovered contemporary officers criticized their preparation, arguing it placed too much emphasis on task training.[7] By focusing on technical and tactical preparation, precommissioning training focused on the knowledge and skills required for immediate use on specific, technically oriented tasks vice emphasizing skills needed for longer term, more general application.[8] Over time, the specific skills addressed in precommissioning training lost relevance in the face of real world application and actual experience. Instead of skills training, feedback from deployed junior officers suggests precommissioning should emphasize the metacompetencies of self-awareness and adaptability.[9] In order to address these competencies, long-used Cadet Command models must change.

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
Cadet Command and Historical Tensions

Since the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, Cadet Command has followed a relatively stable model in educating a large portion of the officer corps.[10] Through nearly five decades, Cadet Command emphasized the use of tactical training as the principal vehicle to drive leader development. Cadet training and education operated in parallel to attainment of a baccalaureate education at a cadet's respective college. The passage of the Vitalization Act cemented the distinction between training and education in military science programs on college campuses. The act was a culmination of a struggle that raged between college administrators and military leaders through the 1950s.

The sources of this friction were college administrators and educators who were horrified that Army ROTC training, which emphasized tactical skill training and marching drill led by uniformed officers, was granted the equivalency of a college-level course.[11] Consequently, many colleges through the 1950s and early 1960s established programs that substituted courses taught by civilian professors for the usual courses specified in the military science curriculum. Civilian faculty and ROTC cadre created many of these substitution programs as part of local agreements.

However, objecting to the impact this "civilianization" could have on the officer corps, the Department of Defense pushed through the Vitalization Act to end the substitution practice, among other changes. Military practitioners resisted the substitutions, arguing that skill-and-task training was the essential component of junior officer training. Essentially, military professionals asserted that the ROTC program existed primarily to provide the Army with competent platoon leaders upon commissioning. This short-term perspective won out over the competing perspective

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Harvard University ROTC bayonet drill, ca. 1917–1918. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

that asserted the need for a broader educational emphasis on critical thinking and understanding, self-awareness, and adaptability. Notwithstanding, it drove a permanent wedge between military science programs and educators.[12]

Given the intensive manpower needs of the period together with emerging technological requirements for a possible global war against a conventional Soviet threat, the perspective that emphasized the mass production of junior leaders with practical skills that could be immediately put to use at the platoon level was not without merit. By emphasizing the development of skills within a more technical domain, the Army clearly showed that it valued junior leader professional technical competence over the competing argument for the need to build deep intellectual foundations.

This is a common viewpoint for armies facing an immediate and clearly identified threat.[13] Specific domain knowledge and application are more highly prized when there is clear benefit for application against immediate threats in known conditions. However, the perceived importance of broader education aside from technical military skills proficiency in the face of more uncertain conditions was not entirely lost. The fact that the Army maintained the necessity for attaining a college degree as a prerequisite for earning an officer's commission indicated a view that a broader education was recognized as a valuable component of an officer's long-term preparation and professional development.

ROTC's Evolving Approach

As we enter a new period in the evolution of warfare, it is time to reexamine the issue. In previous debates, the Army recognized that earning a degree displays a requisite level of ambition, determination, and problem-solving skills for a leader.[14] As military theorist Morris Janowicz opined, the U.S. Army has always sought to balance its three perceived roles for officers in American society; namely, those of the heroic leader, military manager, and military technologist.[15]

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1st Lt. Brendan Duke, Fort Carson, Colorado, briefs cadets in the Cadet Leader Course during Center for the Army Profession and Ethic vignettes training 15 June 2016 at Fort Knox, Kentucky. (Photo by Wenqing Yan)

However, employing Janowicz's observation as an instrument of analysis, military science programs appear to have become somewhat dated because they have stayed too narrowly focused on developing the heroic leader by emphasizing above all else mastery of technical and tactical skills. In contrast, Janowicz envisioned a future of war that requires the development of a much more diverse set of skills. This is consonant with the AOC assessment, which supports the view that officer education must address the imbalance highlighted in Janowicz's vision to broaden cadet development in other areas.

A readily available way to measure what Army ROTC values in its officer candidates is through the recent version of the order of merit list (OML) used to designate the basic branch of candidates as they access into the officer corps. Studying the OML is useful as it provides a measure of the desired outcomes for each cadet and how he or she would be placed in the Army's structure. The OML model awards cadets up to a total of one hundred points across three categories—academic, leadership, and fitness. Individual cadet scores across these general categories are used to rank order cadets nationally and then distribute them across basic branches in accordance with the needs of the Army, cadet preferences, and quality distribution.

Formerly, in this model, a cadet's grade point average (GPA) determined 40 percent of the individual score, while performance at the Leadership Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) determined an additional 25 percent. On-campus physical fitness tests, cadre evaluations, and extracurricular activities made up the balance of the score. This model measured academic performance through a non-normalized GPA and on evaluation of cadets over a twenty-eight–day period performing tactically and technically specific tasks. To a large degree, this model indirectly encouraged two behaviors; namely, seek "the grade" over learning on campus, and study for "the test" at LDAC. Both of these behaviors stemmed from

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[redacted] institutional emphasis on valuing short- [redacted] over longer-term learning. [redacted] changing the accessions OML model [redacted] necessarily address the underlying issues [redacted] preparing adaptive leaders, it would realign [redacted] to the desired outcomes. This is the direction that Cadet Command is moving.



Retired Maj. Gen. Burn Loeffke instructs Army ROTC cadets in advanced Spanish language training and medical translation 7 May 2013 at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The training was in preparation for a humanitarian aid mission to Panama in December 2013. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army ROTC)

New Attributes and New Ways

Aligning the Cadet Command leader development and assessment model to what the AOC demands involves a reorientation of the enterprise. It is a change that would move away from rote learning of the familiar toward development of a challenging course that promotes effective problem orientation, critical thinking, and decision making. Using Bloom's educational objectives taxonomy as a reference, cadet education-and-development programs must move beyond just exercises in remembering, understanding, and applying predetermined drills and school solutions toward analyzing, evaluating, and creating in the face of information gaps and uncertainty characteristic of the new security environment.[16]

To achieve this orientation, noted leader-development educator Donald Vandergriff stresses an outcomes-based training-and-education model that emphasizes results over process and procedures.[17] Vandergriff stresses that it is not domain-specific knowledge that wins the day for a leader, but rather a broad experiential base, contextual knowledge, and decisiveness.[18]

The work of social scientist Mark Moyer appears to corroborate these attributes through his analysis of effective leaders on modern battlefields. In his research involving leaders from Iraq and Afghanistan, he notes ten attributes are recurring themes among successful small-unit leaders. These attributes are initiative, flexibility, creativeness, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization.[19] The application of these leadership principles used in applying doctrine or domain knowledge made small units effective.

The two sets of mutually supporting theoretical observations by Vandergriff and Moyer come together in the Asymmetric Warfare Group's (AWG's)

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"21st Century Soldier Competencies," and the Cadet Command applies the AWG approach to its current developmental models. The soldier competencies Cadet Command strives to promote include character and accountability, comprehensive fitness, adaptability and initiative, lifelong learner, teamwork and collaboration, communication and engagement, cultural competence, and tactical and technical competence.[20] Additionally, these skills are being measured in new ways and are reflected differently in the accessions process.

Cadet Command continues the transformation of its education and leader-development approach by applying the concepts noted. In 2016, Cadet Command reconceptualized the OML as an outcomes metrics list, modifying the measurement tool to better reflect the desired outcomes for cadets. The new OML now more objectively measures educational preparedness and de-emphasizes summer camp performance. Though GPA still accounts for 25 percent of the overall score, there is now a broader evaluation employing objective assessments. Cadets must now take two different standardized college education assessment tests (the Collegiate Level Assessment Test and the Miller Analogy Test) that account for 10 percent of their OML score. The command determines an additional 10 percent of the academic score by awarding additional points to cadets pursuing science, technology, engineering, and medical (STEM) degrees.

These new criteria normalize the GPA input and incentivize students to meet the Army's demand for more STEM-educated officers to serve in technically specific fields beginning in their seventh year of service. LDAC evaluations are now no longer part of the accessions score, with campus-based leadership assessments providing the basis for leadership assessment. The new accessions model will also consider extracurricular activities and reward participation in cultural and language programs.

These changes do not remove the importance of summer camps. Beginning in the summer of 2016, all cadets must now complete a Cadet Individual Education and Training (CIET) program (now referred to as the Basic Camp) following their freshman or sophomore year and the Cadet Leader Course (CLC, now referred to as the Advanced Camp) between their junior and senior year. Cadet Command designed these programs to transfer the bulk of domain-specific training to summer periods and focus on more general education goals and leader-development tasks on campus. Certainly, leader education and development continue through CIET and CLC, but they are now within a basic skills and tactical framework and are not measured only on the efficient execution of technical tasks. The sum of these changes signifies a significant shift in emphasis from task-based learning to education-based development and evaluation.

Momentum for Additional Change

Redesign of the accessions model and OML process can only be the beginning. These steps assist with measuring the outputs of the program; inputs, ways, and approaches are equally important. Cadet Command must also more aggressively compete to attract, recruit, and retain young citizens with high levels of demonstrated potential across the academic, athletic, and leadership domains. Also, it must update the way it prepares and resources cadre to educate officer candidates in ways that develop them into the high-quality officers the Army needs.

Cadet Command will take a large step in this direction by formalizing its cadre development program, where it will "educate the educators" from across the active and reserve forces in order to implement these updated approaches. It must also enlist and mobilize its partnered educational institutions to take an active part in producing the desired outcomes for its students; namely, relevant college graduates and journeymen military leaders. The challenges are many, but recognizing and acknowledging the intended ends—a leader capable of understanding and thriving in complexity—and reorienting Cadet Command to achieve these ends are the critical first steps. The command is well on its way.

Challenges

Change is seldom easy and never comfortable. But, if the Army is to meet the demands of the future, its leaders must anticipate and be prepared for change. Cadet Command, as the major contributor to the Army's officer corps, must adapt and change its practices to remain relevant and meet new

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operational realities. As with any process of change, the friction associated with moving in a different direction is also present.

Much of the resistance comes from the perspective that this change presents a major departure from a winning formula. However, the Army cannot afford to let tradition stand in the way of progress. Gen. John W. Vessey, in the forward to the 1997 edition of *Once an Eagle* (the classic allegorical tale of U.S. Army officership), cautioned that tradition, while important to the Army, cannot be taken to extremes where it stunts growth and development. Vessey warned we cannot "worship the ashes" of tradition when former ways have become irrelevant.[21] Sam Damon, the hero of the novel, declared, "The essence of leadership was an unerring ability to winnow the essential from the trivial or extraneous."[22] In preparing our Army for the future, we must stayed focused on the essential. ■

Notes

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Historian Richard E. Killblane interviews 1st Lt. Matthew Beal during Operation Iraqi Freedom 19 March 2007 at Camp Speicher, Tikrit, Iraq. (Photo by David S. Hanselman)

Creating a Resource

Helping U.S. Army Central Establish a Historical Document Collection Program

Michael Yarborough

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Military history is a form of combat power. Writing and reading military history form the foundations for training, esprit de corps, and decision making. The benefits accrue to the Army at every echelon, from individual soldiers to senior leaders. However, in order for the Army to benefit from studying its own history, the basic sources for what happened during combat operations must be collected.

In the summer of 2014, the United States increased military assistance to the Iraqi government to fight the Islamic State (IS). From the beginning, U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) played the principal role in providing American military assistance to Iraq. In mid-August, USARCENT commanding general Lt. Gen. James L. Terry asked the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) for help establishing a historical document collection program to help preserve the command's experiences. In response, CMH temporarily assigned two of its civilian historians (Erik B. Villard and myself) to establish a collection program that we would hand off to a military history detachment (MHD). To accomplish this mission, we worked at USARCENT's forward headquarters in Kuwait from 28 August to 3 October 2014. We also conducted the first field use of the Army military history doctrine that was updated June 2014, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 1-20, *Military History Operations*.[1]

This article summarizes our efforts and discusses some challenges we faced. We hope that our experiences will be helpful to future Army historians, MHDs, and soldiers appointed as unit historians as an additional duty. Given current geopolitical uncertainties and budgetary constraints, it is reasonable to assume that Army historians will again be asked on short notice to help establish a historical collection program for another theater Army providing land component support.

Commanders should also find this article of interest. Document collection programs are needed because during wartime, operational records are considered permanent. Their preservation is a statutory and regulatory command responsibility. A useful resource in this endeavor is the Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 09-22, *Commander's Guide to Operational Records and Data Collection: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.[2]

Based on our experience, we can attest that ATP 1-20 is clearly written and accessible, and it provides the framework for building a document collection program. Our rapid deployment (we had less than two weeks' notice) prevented us from attending standard MHD training. Nevertheless, we easily used ATP 1-20 to guide our efforts. We also benefited from support by CMH, the greater Army historical community, and the USARCENT staff. Finally, familiarity with the Army's organization and structure, ability to function on a staff, and proficiency with the Army's information technology systems helped us achieve our objectives and overcome obstacles.

Our CMH leadership sent us to Kuwait with the mission to help USARCENT record its experiences by collecting documents and establishing procedures for a follow-on MHD. Immediately upon arriving in Kuwait, we met with Terry. He directed us to save USARCENT's key operational documents in order to help record lessons learned, write narrative histories, and facilitate soldier care in the future.[3] In prior assignments with USARCENT, Terry had seen the command expand to meet the requirements of contingencies (Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom), and thus he knew the importance of initiating the preservation of historical documents during the early stages of operations. Now that the fight against IS has become a full-scale operation (Operation Inherent Resolve), and it shows every indication of being a protracted campaign, his early actions have helped ensure the Army's experiences will be preserved for posterity.

We distilled Terry's guidance into four objectives: (1) establish collection procedures, (2) begin collecting documents, (3) establish coordination procedures with key staff, and (4) prepare a transition plan for the MHD.

Accomplishing these objectives also required resolving a number of issues, mostly related to travel, computer and network access, and security. These challenges were part of the friction of operating in a wartime environment, but they would have led to our failure had they not been resolved.

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Background

USARCENT has functioned as the Army service component command for U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) since 1982.[4] Its main headquarters is at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, but a forward headquarters is also maintained in Kuwait. USARCENT's mission is to provide the USCENTCOM combatant commander with land-power options and strategic depth, and to set conditions for improved regional security and stability. The command's efforts help ensure regional access and develop relationships with nations in the region.[5]

During our assignment, USARCENT was coordinating land operations for America's assistance to Iraq's fight against IS. At the time, the command was operating as a joint force land component commander, and later as a coalition forces land component commander. It later formed the nucleus of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, which is currently responsible for leading the coalition against IS.[6]

Since World War II, Army historians and MHDs have deployed in proximity to wartime commands and operations in order to have the best access to leaders and documents. MHDs are separately numbered modified-table-of-organization-and-equipment units that consist of an officer and one or two additional soldiers. They are typically employed at the theater army, Army service component command, corps, and division levels to "carry out directed collection of historical material during combat and contingency operations for later use in writing the official history. They are trained and equipped to gather historical documents and materials, conduct oral interviews, photograph actions and events, and advise supported units on planning and conducting historical operations."[7]

One lesson of previous military history operations is that they cannot be conducted remotely. Thus, our mission necessitated traveling to Kuwait. During our trip, most of USARCENT's principal staff were in Kuwait. This made Kuwait the right place to be because it was where decisions were made and key documents were generated (even though many documents were digitally stored at Shaw Air Force Base).

For our mission, we reported to USARCENT's deputy chief of staff, and we were supported by the secretary of the general staff. Our physical and organizational location, close to the command's senior leadership, was ideal because it helped with gaining access to the staff, resources, and support. Many Army historians know from experience that other arrangements, such as being under the public affairs office, typically reduce the effectiveness of history programs.

Historical Collection versus Records Management

Before continuing, it should be understood that Army historians do not collect official records, but instead copies. Although CMH is responsible for, "collecting, maintaining, and making historical source materials and publications available to the Army," it is not an official records repository, and the documents it holds are considered copies.[8] The same applies to the documents gathered by command historians and MHDs. ATP 1-20 clearly states, "Historians are not records managers and do not perform these duties. Historical documents and materials do not constitute command or unit official records, although they may include copies of records."[9] These copies are used to write official histories, such as the CMH's *U.S. Army in World War II* series (known as "The Green Books"). Today, the Army's Records Management and Declassification Agency is responsible for records management, as governed by Army Regulation 25-400-2, *Army Records Information Management System*.[10]

Unfortunately, the Army's operational records management system is broken. The copies of official records collected by Army historians and MHDs often constitute the only preserved copies of wartime operational records. Soldiers and veterans use these records to write official histories, capture lessons learned, and help substantiate claims for benefits.

The breakdown of the Army's records management program first became apparent in the aftermath of the Gulf War (1990–1991), when researchers investigating unusual illnesses affecting returning soldiers could not locate basic documents listing where units were located on the battlefield. This breakdown stems from the disestablishment of the adjutant general's office in 1986 and the transfer of proponency for records management to the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management and Information Systems Command (ACSIM). Traditionally, the adjutant

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Above, a box contains historical records of the 1st Cavalry Division's 2006–2007 operations in Iraq, which were collected by the deployed 90th Military History Detachment. (Photo by Maj. Glynn Garcia)



Right, the Communications–Electronics Command (CECOM) Historical Collection is located in the Historical Office at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and consists of documents, still photos, films, recordings (audio and video), and miscellaneous outdated media (e.g., floppy disks, safety films, slides, and microfiche). The collection also has a small military history reference library (approximately two thousand volumes). (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army CECOM)

general was responsible for records management, but by the 1980s, the field of information management "saw little distinction between communications and information."[11] As communication became digital, the Army transferred responsibility for managing the data carried on the networks to those running the networks. Unfortunately, information management and records management doctrine proved difficult to integrate. Additionally, the Army eliminated many trained and deployable records managers as a result of Army-wide force structure changes that rebalanced the Army's tooth-to-tail ratio. The records managers who remained became isolated from the units they supported as their activities were consolidated at the corps level and above.

In 1986, the ACSIM inherited an effort to replace *The Army Functional Files System General Provisions* (AR 340-18-1, now obsolete), the Army's paper-based, 1960s-era records management system. The Army Functional Files System had served the Army reasonably well during Vietnam and itself was an update of the War Department Decimal Filing System, which helped preserve records from World War II and the Korean War. Excellent operational records from all three of these conflicts are available at the National Archives. The successor to AR 340-18-1 was AR 24-400-2, *The Modern Army Recordkeeping System (MARKS)* (now obsolete).[12] Unfortunately, MARKS was poorly conceived and only worked well at the Department of the Army and major Army command levels. It did not serve well the needs of field units during combat operations.

As units rapidly redeployed and in some cases inactivated after the Gulf War, the U.S. Army Information Systems Command issued a series of misunderstood and contradictory instructions that directed field units to ignore the guidance in MARKS and submit records directly to it. This confusion led to many operational records from the Gulf War being misfiled, misplaced, or simply never retired. It required

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a massive effort in the 1990s, directed by President Bill Clinton and Congress and led by CMH, to recover the relevant records needed by Gulf War researchers.[13]

The Army's continued transition to digital systems has only compounded and magnified existing records management deficiencies. Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in 2001, many wartime records have been irretrievably lost due to the ease of overwriting electronic documents, units' wiping computer hard drives before returning from deployments, and generally poor records management practices. However, during the Gulf War and operations conducted since 2001, deployed Army historians and MHDs have saved copies of many important records. Today, digital and paper copies of GWOT records are held at CMH. This includes copies of records from Operations Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, Freedom's Sentinel, and Inherent Resolve. The collection is still being accessioned, but the National Archives and Records Administration and the Department of State have already characterized it as a "national treasure." It will eventually be used to help write the Army's official history of the GWOT.[14]

Objectives and Accomplishments

Army doctrine for field history operations is discussed in ATP 1-20, chapter 3, "Organization for Field History Operations." This doctrine includes command history offices at all echelons, and other Army field history organizations such as MHDs. Erik Villard and I deployed as individual historians, with our initial objectives and orders determined by CMH. Once in Kuwait, these were refined based on discussions with USARCENT leadership and the guidance found in ATP 1-20.[15] As previously mentioned, our four objectives were to establish collection procedures, begin collecting documents, establish coordination procedures with key staff, and prepare a transition plan for the MHD.

Establish collection procedures. Establishing collection procedures was our most important goal because it guided all our efforts. This involved writing a collection plan and getting a fragmentary order (FRAGO) published by USARCENT. We wrote the collection plan first since "the collection plan is the heart of any field history plan or order."[16] We based it on discussions with USARCENT's leadership, initial observations, guidance in ATP 1-20, and discussions with CMH. The plan contained a statement of purpose and intent, collection tasks, methods of collection, types of historical documents to be collected, collection priorities, disposition instructions, and the final products owed to USARCENT.

To formally notify the USARCENT staff of our mission, objectives, and requirements (and those of the follow-on MHD), we needed a FRAGO.[17] This could have been done as annex to an operation order, but the USARCENT staff wanted a FRAGO. We drafted the basic order, staffed it for comments, and worked with the command's operations staff officers to get the document formatted and published. Publication took several weeks and required our active participation throughout the staffing process, but it was our single most important achievement because it laid the foundation for our efforts and those of the follow-on MHD.

Immediately upon arriving, we scheduled office calls with USARCENT's leaders, most of whom had deployed to Kuwait. We met not only with Terry but also with the deputy chief of staff and the command's principle staff (e.g., the deputy chief of staff for operations, G-3). The USARCENT deputy chief of staff briefed us on the command's recent activities and provided general guidance for how to go about accomplishing our mission. During the office calls with the other staff, we explained our mission, asked where we could locate the types of records we needed to collect, and outlined our requirements. All members of the USARCENT staff understood the importance of preserving operational records for posterity, and they were supportive. Through these office calls, we rapidly gained situational awareness, refined the collection plan, and made personal connections with individuals who would help open doors for us. The importance of networking and being personable cannot be overstated because otherwise we would have been isolated and ineffective. The office calls were also a productive use of time while waiting for network access. Attending routine meetings and social functions also enabled us to meet the command's staff in more informal setting.[18]

Begin collecting documents. Once we had met USARCENT's leaders, written a collection plan, and gained access to the network (which took about a week), document collecting began in earnest. In total, we collected over seventy gigabytes of digital documents (mostly classified SECRET). This established a baseline

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upon which the MHD continued to collect. Our collection focused on USARCENT's operations against IS, the Afghanistan retrograde, and activities throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. We collected from the command's portal (SharePoint), network shared drive, and e-mail distribution lists. We collected briefing slides, orders (e.g., operation orders, FRAGOS, or execution orders), operational updates, messages, requests for forces, reports, key personnel lists, information papers, after-action reports, maps, and photographs.[19]

Collecting digital documents is a time-consuming, manual process that requires viewing thousands of individual files and deciding whether to add them to the collection. Because we were establishing a baseline collection upon which the follow-on MHDs would continue to build, we spent a lot of time mining USARCENT's SharePoint portal and shared drives for relevant documents and reconstructing their file structure and metadata. Having access to e-mail distribution lists made collection maintenance easier.

To help build the collection and remember where, when, how regularly, and what types of documents to collect, we created a simple matrix in Microsoft Excel. Because the portal and share drive were sprawling, this enabled us to build the collection methodically and avoid duplication. The collection matrix also helped us identify and prioritize locations to revisit as new documents were generated. The table illustrates the basic metadata fields as column headings and sample data for three folders, or locations, listed on separate rows (the actual number would be much higher).

One methodological issue Army historians and MHDs face is whether to maintain documents' original organizational structure or to reorganize them into specific collections. Because collection efforts often gather a large volume of documents in a short amount of time, the methodology needs to be simple and flexible. Therefore, we followed the convention most MHDs use, which is a hybrid approach of maintaining documents' original integrity, but also reorganizing relevant documents together. We organized our collection first by the command generating the document, then by type (e.g., all FRAGOs of a command were grouped together) or by the staff section that produced the document.

Establish coordination procedures. Final disposition of our collection required sending copies to CMH and USARCENT.[20] Standard procedure calls for saving documents on external media (e.g., hard disk drives or DVDs) and mailing these via official mail.[21] Mailing the collection, rather than transferring the data over a network connection, is done for several reasons. First, there is the volume of data. We collected seventy gigabytes in five weeks; the typical MHD collects many times this amount during a nine- or twelve-month deployment. Second, there are technical issues beyond a historian's control: the bandwidth of Army networks is limited, moving data across Army network domains is difficult, and there are infrastructure limitations at CMH. Nevertheless, mailing the data imposed its own difficulties and required close coordination with the command's security manager, information assurance office, and official post office to ensure we complied with security and information assurance requirements.

Prepare a transition plan. Finally, we prepared a transition plan for the 161st Military History Detachment (Georgia Army National Guard). We had hoped to conduct a relief in place in early October 2014, but unforeseen complications meant they did not arrive until January 2015. Therefore,

Folders	Data fields (with sample data)							
	Main section	Sub-section	Sub-subsection	Value (high, medium, or low)	Baseline date	Frequency (daily, weekly, or monthly)	Date last collected	Notes
1	Ops staff	G-3	G-33, products	High	23 Sept 2018	Daily	30 Sept 2018	
2	Ops staff	G-3	G-33, documents	High	18 Sept 2018	Daily	30 Sept 2018	On e-mail distribution
3	Ops staff	G-3	G-33, orders	High	18 Sept 2018	Daily	30 Sept 2018	

(Graphic by author)

Table. Basic Collection Matrix Example

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can fill the role of a military history detachment for a short period. Historians rarely have a chance to witness firsthand history in the making and the creation of the records they use as the foundation of their research. The chance to observe a theater army in action was unique, and we witnessed the skill and professionalism of U.S. Army soldiers, civilians, and contractors. I am proud to have had the privilege of working alongside them to help build a historical record of their accomplishments. ■

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the policy or position of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any agency of the U.S. government.

Notes

1. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 1-20, *Military History Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 9 June 2014).

2. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook No. 09-22, *Commander's Guide to Operational Records and Data Collection: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, March 2009).

3. Collecting operational unit records helps facilitate soldier care by preserving records useful for processing benefits claims or conducting research studies.

4. U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) perpetuates the lineage of Third Army, organized in 1918, which saw extensive combat in Northern Europe during World War II. In 2006, Third Army was redesignated as USARCENT. See "Lineage and Honors; Main Command Post and Operational Command Post Headquarters, United States Army Central," U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) website, 5 April 2011, accessed 2 November 2016, http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/lineages/branches/army/usacentral.htm.

5. "U.S. Army Central/Third Army History," USARCENT website, accessed 27 October 2016, http://www.usarcent.army.mil/About-USARCENT/History/.

6. Joint Publication 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 24 February 2014), x. "The designation of a JFLCC [joint force land component commander] normally occurs when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation and the JFC [joint force commander] determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces." A CFLCC [coalition forces land component commander] performs the same functions, but within a multinational force.

7. ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, 3-4. Additional information on the organization and employment of military history detachments can be found in ATP 1-20, chap. 4, and Army Regulation (AR) 870-5, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 21 September 2007).

8. ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, 1-2.

9. Ibid., 5-7.

10. AR 25-400-2, *The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS)* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2 October 2007). The U.S. Army in World War II series can be found on the CMH website, last modified 27 May 2011, accessed 2 November 2016, http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/usaww2.html.

11. William M. Yarborough, "Undocumented Triumph: Gulf War Operational Records Management," *The Journal of Military History* 76 (October 2013): 1431–32; CALL Handbook No. 09-22 also contains a discussion on the breakdown of Army records management and its manifestation during the Persian Gulf War.

12. AR 25-400-2, *The Modern Army Recordkeeping System (MARKS)* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 15 October 1986, now obsolete). Subsequent editions of AR 25-400-2 were published before it was superseded by ARIMS.

13. For additional information on operational records management during the Gulf War, see Yarborough, "Undocumented Triumph: Gulf War Operational Records Management."

14. U.S. Army Center of Military History, *U.S. Army Center of Military History Strategic Plan, 2015-2019* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 4. CMH has transferred a record copy of the Global War on Terrorism collection to the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency for accessioning to the National Archives and Records Administration.

15. For more information about individual historians and teams, see ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, para. 3-16. Additional guidance relevant to our mission is in ATP 1-20, chaps. 4, 5, and 6.

16. Ibid., 6-5.

17. A fragmentary order is an abbreviated form of an operation order.


18. Raising situational awareness by meeting leaders and attending regular meetings was recommended by ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, and by former Army historians who had been deployed.

19. For a list of the types of documents Army historians collect, see ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, 5-1–5-2.

20. The requirement for military history detachments and field historians to send a copy of their collection to CMH is prescribed in AR 870-5, *Military History*, para. 4-7 c(3), p. 10; see also ATP 1-20, *Military History Operations*, 4-7.

21. Mailing records classified SECRET by official mail is authorized per AR 380-5, *Department of the Army Information Security Program* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 29 September 2000), para. 8-3.

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Capt. Irvin Drummond, U.S. Army, studies at a computer 18 May 2007. (Photo by Chris Sanders, U.S. Army)

Writing
A Way to Maximize Returns on the Army's Investments in Education

Maj. Hassan Kamara, U.S. Army



Have the courage to write, publish, and be heard. Launch your ideas and be an integral part of the conversation. Why? Because it makes our nation and our profession stronger. In the end, no one of us is as smart as all of us thinking together.

—Adm. Jim Stavridis, U.S. Navy, Retired

The dialogue on educating the force tends to focus mostly on making additional investments in education, which is increasingly difficult to do in the contemporary era of budget and workforce reductions. Therefore, this article refocuses the dialogue on a way the U.S. Army can maximize returns on the

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investments it has made in education. Soldier education and training rank high among the Army's priorities despite budget and workforce reductions. The 2015 unveiling of the Army University evidences the service's commitment to invest in soldier education. According to its charter, the Army University "represents a greater investment in our soldiers and civilians through improved education that will increase competence, character and commitment."[1] Typically, people and institutions invest to yield maximum returns, which raises the question: How can the Army maximize returns on its investments in soldier education? In other words, how can the Army better tap into the soldier expertise it is cultivating through sustained investments in education?

An increased emphasis on writing can help the Army effectively utilize the soldier expertise it is cultivating through sustained investments in education. Implementing *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* requires growing competent, innovative, and adaptive leaders consistent with some of the concept's operational tenets.[2] By emphasizing writing, the Army can enhance soldier competence, innovation, and critical thinking—this article highlights how, and it posits ways the Army can get soldiers to write more, and better.

Literature on Writing

There is considerable literature on writing, and a brief examination will help provide context and clarity on ensuing arguments about the utility of writing to the Army. Some works on writing discuss the importance and benefits of writing well, but much of the literature on writing seeks to improve writing skills in some respect.

Clear written communication is important and beneficial. The Army understands the importance of clear written communication and promotes it in manuals. For example, Army Regulation (AR) 25-50, *Preparing and Managing Correspondence,* promotes effective written communication within the ranks. It defines effective Army writing as being "understood by the reader in a single rapid reading and ... free of errors in substance, organization, style, and correctness."[3] Other examples of the Army's appreciation of, and commitment to, effective writing are the now-rescinded AR 600-70, *The Army Writing Program* (1985), and Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-67, *Effective Writing for Army Leaders* (1986). In DA Pam 600-67, then Army Chief of Staff Gen. John A. Wickham Jr. referred to the fateful Charge of the Light Brigade—a failure based partly on unclear written orders—at the 1854 Battle of Balaclava. Wickham stated, "one way to assure ... clear and concise communication is by improving the quality of our writing."[4] This perspective is shared by some in the Army. For example, in his well-written 2011 article in the *Military Review* journal titled "Flight Simulation for the Brain: Why Army Officers Must Write," Maj. Trent Lythgoe echoes the critical importance to the Army, as well as the benefits, of writing well. Lythgoe highlights a link between writing and critical thinking, arguing that "writing, although valuable as a communication medium, is most valuable as a powerful way of thinking."[5]

Among the numerous works that seek to improve writing skills, Henriette Anne Klauser's book *Writing on Both Sides of the Brain* stands out as a key enabler to writers and aspiring writers. Klauser helps writers manage their creative, free-writing tendency vis-à-vis their strong impulse to edit and correct.[6] William Zinsser's *On Writing Well* counts among the salient works about writing improvement. Zinsser tackles common challenges in writing, such as simplicity, style, and techniques—for tenses, grammar, and mechanics.[7] James Kilpatrick's *The Writer's Art* also describes writing techniques, insights, and examples for both professional and aspiring writers.[8] Naveed Saleh's *The Complete Guide to Article Writing: How to Write Successful Articles for Online and Print Markets,* is notable for its emphasis on the importance of research in writing successful articles, and for its insights on excelling at the writing craft in general.[9]

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Adm. James Stavridis, commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, addresses students from the U.S. Naval War College and Senior Enlisted Academy during a visit to the Naval War College 23 October 2012 in Newport, Rhode Island. In a 2008 article in *Proceedings*, Stavridis advocates writing for publication. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Eric Dietrich, U.S. Navy)

Writing as a Means to Improve Soldier Competence

The Army can cultivate and better utilize soldier competence by compelling soldiers to write articles about professional military topics and by including writing on operational matters as part of their daily duties. They should conduct research, think critically, and study. These processes are inherent in professional writing, and are catalysts for developing competent and adaptive soldiers. Naveed Saleh concurs that research is inherent in writing, and he reports, "good writers spend about 80 percent of their time actually writing. Good research helps you determine what's important with respect to the issue being explored and much more."[10] Kate L. Turabian describes the knowledge-enhancing value of research, stating that writing a research report increases one's knowledge on a subject and enhances one's ability to write.[11] So, by compelling soldiers to research and write on aspects of the military profession and also as part of daily operations, the Army can help them build the high level of competence vital to overcoming complex challenges.

Dwight Eisenhower's experience under the command and mentorship of Maj. Gen. Fox Conner is a good example of how an emphasis on writing in daily operations can enhance competence. While they were stationed in Panama during the early 1920s, Conner had his young protégé and operations officer write plans and operation orders on a daily basis, which grew Eisenhower's prowess as an operational planner. In a letter reply to Eisenhower's request for insights to help him prepare for attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Conner wrote,

> You may not know it, but because of your three years' work in Panama, you are far better trained and ready for Leavenworth than anybody I know. You will recall that during your

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> entire service [with me] I required that you write a field order for the operation of the post every day for the years you were there. You became so well acquainted with the technics [sic] and routine of preparing plans and orders for operations that included their logistics, that they will be second nature to you.[12]

Reflecting on his experience with the operational planning exercises at Leavenworth, Eisenhower would later write, "Fox Conner had been correct, we had done this type of war-gaming in Panama."[13]

Writing as a Means to Improve Innovation in the Ranks

In addition to building and utilizing soldier competence and expertise, the Army can promote innovation by emphasizing professional writing. Innovation thrives on discourse, which is greatly enhanced by writing and publishing. In other words, writing promotes the free and rapid exchange of ideas and facts, which helps spawn new and innovative ideas. According to Elizabeth Eisenstein, the "revival of learning" in the Renaissance period in fourteenth-century Italy was spurred by the advent of the printing press and the ability to mass-produce various works of writing.[14]

Historically, soldiers have written as a way to promote professional dialogue and drive innovation and change. The institutional impact of some who have written and published their ideas long ago can still be felt today. According to Edward Cox, in 1910 while serving on the General Staff, Conner "began writing articles for publication in professional military journals" and published an article titled "Field Artillery in Cooperation with the Other Arms," which spawned major changes to field artillery regulations.[15] Similarly, Eisenhower and George S. Patton Jr. challenged the conventional infantry doctrine of their day and inspired professional dialogue by publishing articles in the infantry and cavalry journals on combined arms maneuver and armored warfare.[16]

Writing helps disseminate information and ideas, which promotes institutional learning, adaptation, and innovation. For example, during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, units were able to share operational lessons by providing written feedback from their combat tours to centralized forums such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and in many cases directly to the units replacing them. This exchange and ready access to written lessons spurred innovation and adaptation, especially at the tactical level. In his incisive study of military innovation during the Iraq campaign, James Russell highlights that innovation flowed from the tactical level upward as some units adapted their doctrine, organization, and equipment to campaign-specific conditions.[17] Since units typically rotated to home station after a year, sustained adaptation and innovation during the Iraq campaign was largely made possible by sharing written observations and lessons. The Army's ongoing transformation also depends on sharing lessons, and on learning. Michael Formica concurs by writing that Army transformation would "require the Army to foster a dialogue throughout the organization about the lessons learned."[18]

Writing as a Means to Improve Critical Thinking and Initiative

Winning in the complex contemporary and future operational environments requires better, and more aggressive, thinkers. Challenging and encouraging soldiers to write will help the Army promote critical thinking and initiative in the ranks. Retired Marine Col. Thomas X. Hammes concurs that the Army will need to grow and promote "free-thinking, aggressive, risk-taking" officers to lead the complex wars of the present and future, or the Fourth Generation.[19] In his article on writing, Lythgoe argues, "if the Army wants better thinkers, we should start by educating better writers."[20] Desirae Gieseman concurs by writing that the contemporary Army wants "strategic thinkers," and "a better approach to Army writing will help the Army develop them."[21] Interestingly, critical thinking and initiative are indispensable qualities to mission command—a command philosophy that advocates the practice of empowering subordinates to execute missions within the intent of higher echelons, using disciplined initiative.

To better leverage soldiers' ability to think critically, Army leaders should strongly consider reducing the Army's overreliance on PowerPoint, by opting to have subordinates present information to them in written reports and briefs, as in pre-PowerPoint times. Hammes writes that prior to PowerPoint, Army staffs "prepared succinct two- or three-page summaries of key issues," which involved greater intellectual rigor, and afforded more time for staffers and decision makers to analyze and weigh issues in depth.[22] PowerPoint does not help

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A soldier of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 34th "Red Bull" Infantry Division, deployed in support of Operation New Dawn, writes a letter home 9 October 2012 at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army)

the Army fully realize its investments in soldier education and expertise because it hinders critical thinking. Hammes writes that PowerPoint is "a tool that is the antithesis of thinking ... it is actively hostile to thoughtful decision-making."[23] Lythgoe writes, "it is relatively easy to produce a PowerPoint presentation without clearly understanding the subject matter. We can cut, paste, and rearrange bullet statements to produce the illusion of thinking and understanding."[24] By emphasizing written reports where feasible, in lieu of or complementary to PowerPoint briefs, the Army can compel soldiers to think critically and with greater depth on issues.

How Can the Army Get Soldiers to Write More, and Better?

Writing is a great means for the Army to cultivate and exploit soldier competence, innovation, and critical thinking—but how can the Army get soldiers to write more, and better? Army leaders at all levels can start by requiring their subordinates to craft well-written documents and correspondence as part of their daily unit operations. They can also develop formal requirements and performance-related incentives for soldiers to write professionally. Lythgoe concurs and writes that the Army should "bring good writing back as a visible part of day-to-day Army operations," with leaders demanding subordinates write well in e-mails and other written forms of communication.[25] An increased requirement for well-written documents

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and correspondence in daily administration will help soldiers and leaders think more critically about issues, and become more competent.

Getting soldiers to write more and better in daily operations will again require a shift from the Army's current overreliance on PowerPoint as a tool to present information to decision makers. This is because PowerPoint inherently requires users to compress information irrespective of the complexities involved, which fosters a preoccupation with summarizing data at the expense of careful analysis, logic, and coherence. According to Edward Tufte, a study that compared PowerPoint with other methods for presenting information yielded evidence that "PowerPoint, compared to other common presentation tools, reduces the analytical quality of serious presentations of evidence. This is especially the case for the PowerPoint ready-made templates, which corrupt statistical reasoning, and often weaken verbal and spatial thinking."[26] Interestingly, in his 2015 visit to U.S. Forces in Kuwait, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter was reported to have barred the use of PowerPoint in an effort to "challenge his commanders' thinking."[27]

The Army can get more soldiers to write professionally by creating and formalizing requirements and performance-related incentives for them to write for publication, or in some cases doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures development. Conceptually, emulative of the Army Acquisition Corps' annual requirement for its members to accrue forty continuous learning points per year, the Army could mandate that commissioned and senior noncommissioned officers publish at least one research article every year in a professional publication. This increased emphasis on professional writing would also help the Army maximize returns on its investments in great resources like The Army Press and *Military Review*, and it would promote professional dialogue.

Additionally, the Army could institute written examinations as part of the entrance criteria for officer and noncommissioned officer developmental courses or schools. Douglas Macgregor concurs by writing that as a way to cultivate a habit of professional study early in officers' careers, the Army should institute a written examination for admission to the Command and General Staff College. Macgregor writes that "by publishing the list of required reading and study material, captains would know precisely what areas would be tested and what skills they would need to perform well."[28] At this juncture, it is relevant to highlight that in 2015 the Army implemented and evaluated an initiative in which noncommissioned officers attending the Warrior Leader Course, Advanced Leader Course, Senior Leader Course, Master Leader Course, and Sergeants Major Course were required to write essays that were evaluated by what is known as the Criterion Writing Assessment Tool. This tool helps the Army identify and remedy the writing and communicative challenges of noncommissioned officers.[29]

The Army can also get soldiers to write by encouraging leaders at all echelons to give higher performance evaluations to soldiers who—all other things being equal—demonstrate a higher level of professionalism relative to their peers by undertaking to study, research, and write on aspects of the profession of arms. Promotion boards could be made to award extra points for candidates who have demonstrated commitment to professional and intellectual growth by consistently fulfilling their mandatory annual requirement to publish on a topic of relevance to the profession.

Finally, the Army can inspire soldiers to write by emphasizing reading. One could convincingly argue that the Army has a strong reading tradition—citing the professional reading lists of numerous Army leaders as evidence. However, the existence of professional reading lists, while inspiring and motivational to some, fails to encourage the preponderance of soldiers to read and study the profession on their own time. Leader (command) emphasis is required to get the majority of soldiers to read professionally. Leaders, preferably commanders, should make reading and subsequent discourse a part of their units' periodic professional development seminars. Reading and discourse will inspire soldiers to write, which will vigorously spur professional growth in the Army. According to Lythgoe, "writing, when combined with reading, produces powerful thinking."[30] Some of the most illustrious officers in the Army's history grew professionally through voracious reading, critical thinking, discourse, and writing. While in Panama, Eisenhower not only wrote but also read extensively. Cox writes that Eisenhower and Conner "would read biographies of Civil War generals and spent [sic] hours discussing their decisions together," frequently conversing well into the night.[31] Interestingly, according to Cox, it was also during this time that Conner passed on his experiences and lessons

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from fighting alongside the Allied powers in World War I, and he urged Eisenhower to learn all he could about fighting wars with alliances.[32]

Conclusion

With more soldiers reading, thinking, and writing on its challenges and future, the Army could witness breakthroughs in military thinking and innovation just as the German army (Reichswehr) did a century ago. During the period between World Wars I and II, the German Army was able to reform itself and develop combined arms doctrine in large part because its chief of staff, Hans Von Seeckt, dedicated ten percent of the Officer Corps to studying and writing about World War I. According to Williamson Murray, Hans Von Seeckt tasked over four hundred officers with combat experience (roughly 10 percent of Germany's downsized Officer Corps of four thousand, who were organized into different committees) to study and write about World War I doctrine and tactics, as well as future war; "the result was the extraordinary Army Regulation 487 'Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms.'"[33] This regulation (published from 1921-1923) changed the focus of German doctrine from defensive to offensive maneuver, and it emphasized decentralization and initiative—key tenets of mission command.[34] In his insightful article titled "Read, Think, Write, and Publish," Adm. Jim Stavridis argues that the U.S. military will benefit similarly if more service members study, write, and publish on the myriad of contemporary challenges facing their institutions and the joint force.[35]

The U.S. Army will continue to prioritize and invest in soldier education and training. As the institution seeks and implements innovative ways to educate soldiers, it should also continue to look for ways it can maximize returns on the investments it has made. Emphasizing that soldiers write more and better in their daily operations, as well as professionally, is a way for the Army to maximize returns—in the form of increased soldier competence, innovation, and critical thinking—on its investments in education. ■

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
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Military Review

WE RECOMMEND



Western officials and analysts can improve their understanding of Russian arms control priorities, peacekeeping agendas, military-to-military goals, and perhaps even intent by understanding how Russian military professionals think and express their ideas in writing. With this in mind, Timothy Thomas offers *Thinking like a Russian Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on the Nature of War*.

The first part of Thomas's monograph demonstrates that Russian military writing typically begins by assessing trends in the character of war and then predicting how future conflicts are likely to unfold. The prediction is followed by assessing how the forces and the means to conduct war correlate for each side in a conflict. Russian military writers then examine the forms and methods of potential confrontation. They review historical lessons learned, foreign and domestic, and decision making about the initial period of war, which Russian analysts consider critical to success.

The second part of the monograph investigates four sources of Russian military thinking: official voices in the defense ministry, two groups of theorists who have regularly dominated thinking regarding the nature of war in Russian military publications, and individual and group thought. Interesting topics include emerging trends in armed struggles, bioweapons, indirect and asymmetric actions, futurology, new-generation weapons, military art, strategic deterrence (both nuclear and nonnuclear), and understanding the concept of geopolitical conditioning. A special interest is Russia's new focus on new-type warfare, which appears to be different from new-generation warfare and is championed by Russia's General Staff.

To view this monograph, visit: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Thinking%20Like%20A%20Russian%20Officer_monograph_Thomas%20%28final%29.pdf.

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LETTER TO THE EDITOR


How the Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program Could Become a Catalyst for Leader Development

Col. Kevin McAninch, U.S. Army

Response to Col. Kevin McAninch's "How the Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program Could Become a Catalyst for Leader Development

(*Military Review*, September-October 2016)

Dr. Jon Fallesen

In the September-October 2016 issue of *Military Review*, Col. Kevin McAninch's article on multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) claimed that the Army is not getting as much value from the MSAF program as it could if the program were implemented differently.[1] While I agree that MSAF can realize greater value, there are several aspects of the program that should be clarified.

The program grew into a requirement from the idea of providing Army leaders with development that was uniquely individualized. MSAF was implemented through the initiative process of the Army Leader Development Program from recommendations in the Army Training and Leader Development Panel study.[2] After successful pilots with fourteen units ranging from battalion to corps, the program was directed by the Army and codified in regulations.[3] The 2014 National Defense Authorization Act directed that the secretary of defense use MSAF as the exemplar 360 program and assess expanded implementation across the services.[4] The report stemming from the task was prepared by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and advised all services to use 360-degree assessments for development purposes.[5]

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley comments, "The Commander 360 program ensures leaders receive honest and candid feedback on their performance and leadership effectiveness. Armed with this critical

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formation, they can continue to grow and develop n Army leader."[6] He sees that improving readiness pends on improving leadership.

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) agrees with McAninch that the MSAF program is worth investing the effort to increase its impact. The CAL Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) studies show that a majority of officers rate MSAF effective for making them more aware of their strengths and developmental needs.[7] An even higher percentage of junior and senior NCOs and Army civilian leaders rate it effective.[8] While ratings of value are mostly favorable, attitudes on some criteria are declining or are level, especially among officers who are required to record compliance on their officer evaluation report (OER).

One reason for the ratings trends is that many officers are not using the program as designed:

- Army leaders are required to complete an assessment on themselves and to contribute to the assessments of other leaders. Many leaders are not getting other leaders to participate in their assessments.[9] Without 360-degree feedback from multiple personnel, no 360-degree program will have a strong impact.
- Many leaders are not viewing their feedback report, so they are not receiving any value from their assessment other than the possible intrinsic value of reflecting on their leadership while they complete the self-assessment.[10]
- Many leaders are not discussing their feedback with anyone.[11] They are not making use of MSAF coaches, not seeking coaching from professional military education faculty, and not discussing it with their superior, mentors, or peers. Without coaching, they are not being challenged to treat the feedback as a real indication of their ability nor how to learn to use their strengths to improve themselves.

Implementation cannot be entirely faulted if the program is not used as intended.

McAninch omitted a comparison of MSAF to other Army leader development practices, which would shed additional light on its value. The impact of MSAF on leader development is similar to the impact of other programs like Army-provided distance learning, formal leader development programs within units, and performance counseling.[12] MSAF requires a small amount of time and a fraction of investment compared to these other practices. For every two Army leaders, only one completed an assessment on another leader in the last year, and on average each assessment took twenty minutes or less to complete.[13] Costs are low, and many leaders assessed by MSAF rate it favorably for improving their leadership capabilities and improving their unit or organization. Education, seminars, performance counseling, and assessments and feedback are all desired practices for developing leaders in any organization.

Low to moderate impact ratings of leader development practices may be symptoms of a culture that is not fully vested in improving leadership. A defining aspect of a skill is that it can be improved through development or practice. The Army's 2009 CASAL results revealed that one-fifth of Army leaders believed that leadership ability is what a person is born with and training would not change it, although a considerable majority did believe that leadership is a skill and can be improved.[14] Multiple studies demonstrate that leadership can be treated as a skill and that its development can result in improved leadership performance.[15] For any Army leader development to work, Army leaders must believe it is important and possible to improve.

McAninch recommended four ways to improve the MSAF program. Two of the ways involved compulsory actions, which are contradictory to his point about changing the program to be purely voluntary. A successful 360-degree program requires doing it, understanding the feedback, and taking action on the feedback. Forcing someone to self-develop is not a certain path to improvement. If tracking mandatory compliance through the OER had a negative impact on the perceived value of the program, forcing follow-up would have a similar negative impact.

Another recommendation by McAninch actually has been an original and enduring aspect of the MSAF program. Training coaches, especially faculty as coaches, has always been a part of the MSAF program. The original directive required professional military education faculty, cadre, and staff to provide coaching to assist students in interpreting 360-degree results and planning development action plans for improvement.[16] Counseling students on leadership has been a requirement of faculty since at least 2002.[17] MSAF provides a source of feedback that can help

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faculty to perform this function. CAL furnishes tailored coaching guides for faculty and has conducted professional development programs in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools on MSAF coaching.[18] CAL has increased the number of instructional sessions for TRADOC schools for fiscal year 2017.

McAninch recommended that tools be restructured to support vertical development. This point is at odds with Army doctrine that emphasizes common behaviors across levels and positions. The new OER system does not require different competencies at three different levels of leadership as implied in the article. Instead, the tiered OER presents the same competencies at different levels of detail, which allows higher-ranking raters to use greater discretion in what aspects are emphasized. A central idea of an organization's competency-based framework is to first focus on what is common. This reinforces leaders' identifying with a common purpose and working together to achieve shared understanding and synchronized intent. The vertical aspect of development is achieved with assessors of different ranks assessing leaders of different ranks.

McAninch's article implied that the MSAF questions were modeled after Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) products and the Army did not "grow its own." The Army did develop its own competency model and a unique 360-degree assessment instrument. The Army Research Institute developed and validated the Leadership Requirements Model before it was adopted into Army doctrine.[19] The questions used in the MSAF instruments were developed to tie directly to these Army competencies and were updated when doctrine was updated in 2012. The MSAF questions tie directly to the behaviors described in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*, and Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Leader Development*.[20] The Army Leadership Requirements Model uses ten leadership competencies and thirteen attributes, while CCL's Benchmarks has sixteen leadership competencies and five derailment factors.[21] There are only three competencies with similar titles between the Army Leader Behavior Scale (LBS) 2.0 and CCL's Benchmarks instrument. The LBS 2.0 has fifty-four items, while Benchmarks has 130 items. Only about ten items from Benchmarks have much commonality to the LBS items. CASAL studies continue to show that the Army leadership competencies are valid predictors of outcomes desired in the Army—leader effectiveness, subordinate productivity, team cohesion, and unit ability to perform missions.[22]

A good way to increase the impact of 360-degree assessments lies in the hands of commanders who have the authority to set up and conduct Unit 360 events. Gen. William Wallace, the senior official responsible for leader development at the time of program decision, saw the strength of 360-degree assessments in the context of a crucible training event, where leaders get the full opportunity to exercise leadership and to observe the leadership of others under realistic conditions. The Army's policy writers for MSAF thought that requiring 360-degree assessments in mission rehearsal exercises would be too burdensome for deploying units and instead focused implementation guidance—and eventual compliance reporting for officers—around the individual self-initiated events. Some commanders and other organizational leaders still elect to conduct Unit 360 events.[23] They report great value in the feedback they receive on leadership trends in their units. Compared to self-initiated events, Unit 360-assessed leaders are twice as likely to discuss their feedback with others and to develop an individual development plan, and nine times more likely to get coaching.[24]

CAL's MSAF team continually works on designing improvements to MSAF. One example is based on input received from the field. The MSAF individual feedback reports will be enhanced to show leaders how they are assessed compared to the average for their rank group. The report will also provide ways to develop based on the leader's individualized results. The development actions are already available in chapter 7 of FM 6-22, and the MSAF feedback report will be modified to include the most relevant actions matching a specific leader's results.[25] This will enable leaders to better see what they can do to accelerate their development. The report will also provide more emphasis on how to make immediate use of the feedback, rather than focusing on follow-on actions in an individual leader development plan. For example, if superiors rate the leader more favorably than subordinates, the leader may be too upwardly focused and not attending to what subordinates expect from that leader. This feedback can prompt an immediate change in self-awareness, and it can be acted on without

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creating a development plan. These improvements will help increase the effects of MSAF. Whatever the design features and implementation decisions, the impact of any program ultimately depends on how leaders use it. ■

Notes

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16. The initial directive was ALARACT 124/2008. Guidance was later codified in AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development.*

17. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 350-10, *Institutional Leader Training and Education* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2002).

18. Faculty and advanced coaching guides are available on "Leader Development Tools," Virtual Improvement Center (VIC), MSAF website, https://msaf.army.mil/Home/LeadOn.aspx (CAC required); "Leader Development Resources," CAL website, accessed 1 December 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/cal/ldrdevelopment.

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21. "Benchmarks for Managers: Assessing the Lessons of Experience," Center for Creative Leadership website, accessed 1 December 2016, https://www.ccl.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/benchmarks-for-managers-brochure-center-for-creative-leadership.pdf.

22. The most recently published CASAL report showing a statistically significant relationship between competencies and outcomes is Technical Report 2015-1, *CASAL: Military Leader Findings*, 22.

23. The first guidance came from Secretary of the Army, "Army Directive 2011-16 (Changes to the Army Evaluation Reporting System)," 15 September 2011; the guidance was codified in AR 623-3, *Evaluation Reporting System* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2015); and requires the rater to verify the rated officer has a completed MSAF in accordance with AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development.*

24. Unpublished findings from the 2016 MSAF program evaluation conducted by the CAL, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


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The True Believer

Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements

Eric Hoffer, Harper Perennial, New York, 2010, 192 pages



Lt. Col. Benjamin Buchholz, U.S. Army

Many theories attempt to define and offer solutions for dealing with the brand of radical Islam that fuels Middle Eastern movements such as Daesh.[1] Other attempts have been made to demonstrate that radical Islam is not Islam at all, except in the most superficial or perverted manner. The constant claim in those scenarios is that Islamist ideology not only misrepresents Islam, but it can also be viewed as "a virulent vision all its own, one that its adherents have created by plucking selections from centuries of traditions."[2] However, this argument rarely extends far enough to give the "virulent vision" a name other than *radical*, or *fundamental* Islam, let alone suggest remedies.[3] Common to both of these approaches is the base assumption that the problem of Daesh and al-Qaida should be defined in Islamic terms. An alternative methodology, one that applies the sociology of mass movements rather than the prejudices of religion, removes ipso facto the contentiousness of religious debate and provides insights into—and new methods for countering—these movements' appeal.[4]

As such, Eric Hoffer's study in *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* not only provides a roadmap for analyzing radical Islam as something other than religious heterodoxy but also offers solutions that suggest new approaches to dealing with the many, apparently intractable issues radical Islam presents.[5] The work is broken into four main parts, though two apply most practically to the mass movement of radical Islam: a discussion of why mass movements have appeal and an analysis of the traits most likely to produce converts to a mass movement.[6]

The Appeal of Mass Movements

Two points that apply directly to the rise of Daesh as a mass movement appear in the beginning of *The True Believer*. First, Hoffer states,

> The contribution of the Western democracies to the awakening of the East has been indirect and certainly unintended. They have kindled an enthusiasm of resentment against the West; and it is this anti-Western fervor which is at present rousing the Orient from its stagnation of centuries.[7]

Second, instead of merely blaming discontent for the rise of mass movements, Hoffer digs deeper. He situates

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the rise of mass movements at the intersection of discontent and power, stating,

> For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be intensely discontented yet not destitute, and they must have the feeling that by the possession of some potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique they have access to a source of irresistible power.[8]

Here, the potential effects of the various Arab Spring movements come to mind, albeit stifled or subsumed, with both discontent in a present situation and hope in a doctrine (at that point, democracy) strongly intermixed across the Middle East. Where democracy could not take root, which was nowhere in any of those movements—not in Egypt, not in Yemen, certainly not in Syria or Iraq, nor in the states of the Arabian Gulf—Islamism provided and still provides an alternate source for the inculcation of a sense of "irresistible power."

The individual's craving for that power is Hoffer's next main point. He maintains that, rather than a Western concept of individual self-sufficiency offering a palliative, mass movement "attracts and holds a following not because it can satisfy the desire for self-advancement, but because it can satisfy the passion for self-renunciation."[9] Individualism scares most of the masses, more so with those who have come from a communal mindset, for when they succeed within a Western milieu those "who attain fortune and fame often find it difficult to gain entrance into the exclusive circles of the majority. They are thus made conscious of their foreignness."[10] Those who fail, and have neither individual success nor any longer a sense of communal identity, "see their lives and the present as spoiled beyond remedy and they are ready to waste and wreck both; hence, their recklessness and their will to chaos and anarchy."[11] In the particular case of a deeply tribal and communal society such as those that comprise most of the Middle East, and especially with hope of a transition to democracy waning, Hoffer's statement that "all the advantages brought by the West are ineffectual substitutes for the sheltering and soothing anonymity of communal existence" rings especially true.[12] Mass movements, like those on which Daesh and al-Qaida fuel their respective brands of radical Islam, provide the anonymity of a bygone commune, a purpose into which individual strivings can be melded and forgotten, and a power the subsumed individual can believe irresistible.

Hoffer makes two additional points in this section that are worth mentioning in the context of Islamic radicalism. First, he states that mass movements are a zero-sum proposition, competitive against one another for the raw material of financing and recruitment.[13] This bears out in the ongoing conflict not only in Syria between various splinter Islamist groups that coalesced into a dominant Daesh presence in early 2014, but also in the now apparent struggle in various parts of the world between Daesh and al-Qaida.[14] Second, Hoffer begins his analysis by emphasizing that mass movements are interchangeable with one another. He says, in reference to the West, "In the past, religious movements were the conspicuous vehicles of change. The conservatism of a religion—its orthodoxy—is the inert coagulum of a once highly reactive sap."[15] He continues with other cases, "In modern times, the mass movements involved in the realization of vast and rapid change are revolutionary and nationalist."[16] He cites numerous examples of this interchangeability, and sums up the entire equation by stating,

> Since all mass movements draw their adherents from the same types of humanity and appeal to the same types of mind, it follows: (a) all mass movements are competitive, and the gain of one in adherents is the loss of all the others; (b) all mass movements are interchangeable. ... A religious movement may develop into a social revolution or a nationalist movement; a social revolution, into militant nationalism or a religious movement; a nationalist movement into a social revolution or a religious movement.[17]

It just so happens that the sap flowing now, not soon to coagulate in the Middle East, takes the form of a religious movement, rather than a social

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or nationalist movement. Still, to shift emphasis away from the "religious" aspect and toward the idea of this being a "movement," and to understand that the religious dynamic might just as easily be (or become) social or nationalist, allows a wider range of options for secular engagement with, or against, the phenomenon.

Potential Converts

Hoffer next tackles the definition and categorization of the types of potential converts a mass movement draws upon. The key insight here is that neither the abject poor nor the unified poor present a threat, but that—among others—the newly poor, the creative poor, and a category he calls "misfits" contribute most of the participants to a mass movement's active phase. Hoffer says it "is usually those whose poverty is relatively recent, the 'new poor,' who throb with the ferment of frustration. The memory of better things is as fire in their veins."[18]

It is worth noting here that the driving force behind much of Daesh's military success has been not a religious fervor but the planning, abilities, and impassioned involvement of a number of Saddam Hussein's former military officers.[19] These officers were marginalized due to disbandment of the Iraqi Army after the U.S.-led invasion of 2003. They became poor, yet remembered, and still remember, the power and status conferred through their positions in Hussein's regime. As unreliable and potentially murderous as these individuals might be, at least in terms of participation in a mass movement such as radical Islam, as Hoffer says, they are not a lost cause but rather, "They (the veterans) are receptive to the preaching of a proselytizing movement and yet do not always make staunch converts. For they are not irrevocably estranged from the self; they do not see it as irrevocably spoiled ... the slightest evidence of progress and success reconciles them with the world and their selves."[20]

This last aspect likely contributed to the success of the Anbar Awakening, as Sunni leaders, many of whom were former Baathists, united in the hope of working as part of, rather than against, the new Iraqi government.[21] Even now, leaders of Daesh drawn from among former Iraqi Baathist officials and military personnel do not seem to be irrevocably committed, as one local described Daesh's current *wali*, or leader, in Anbar itself, "I last saw him in 2009. He complained that he was very poor. He is an old friend, so I gave him some money ... He was fixable. If someone had given him a job and a salary, he wouldn't have joined the Islamic State. There are hundreds, thousands like him."[22]

Additionally, in those areas of Syria and Iraq where citizens had been relatively affluent prior to the start of the civil war in 2011, many men turned to Daesh as a means to maintain the livelihood of their families.[23] The need to maintain a livelihood would not be such a motivating impulse if the citizens in these areas had always been abjectly poor, for, as Hoffer says,

> The poor on the borderline of starvation live purposeful lives. To be engaged in a desperate struggle for food and shelter is to be wholly free from a sense of futility. The goals are concrete and immediate. ... What need could they have for "an inspiring super-individual goal which would give meaning and dignity to their lives?" They are immune to the appeal of a mass movement.[24]

Thus, for both the core of former Iraqi government and military veterans participating in radical Islam's mass movements, and for the percentage of men who permit, or even assist this particular mass movement in order that they themselves and their families not become part of the *new poor*, the provision of financial and social lucre, or even hope, may sway significant and influential partisans toward more desirable pursuits.

Another category of potential manpower from Hoffer's work relates specifically to Daesh's recruiting; these are the "bored." Hoffer says of them: "There is perhaps no more reliable indicator of a society's ripeness for a mass movement than the prevalence of unrelieved boredom."[25] The attraction of fighting for Daesh proves powerful in this regard, especially "to the bored, secure, and the uninspired in Western liberal democracies" to whom fighting in this mass movement provides "a thrilling cause and call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends."[26] This segment of the population's needs for excitement and purpose, rather than (or in conjunction with) approaches aimed at interdicting the beginning stages of *religious* radicalization, should be studied.

Finally, one group Hoffer labels as difficult for mass movements to recruit—the unified poor—presents itself as a potential remedy for decreasing Daesh's appeal. The unified poor tend not to join mass movements because, even though they are not wealthy, they have a strong sense of identity and collective self-worth derived from

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that identity.[27] Hoffer goes on to actually prescribe this as a remedy for mass movements, saying that "any arrangement which either discourages atomistic individualism or facilitates self-forgetting or offers chances for action and new beginnings tends to counteract the rise and spread of mass movements."[28] As such, rather than encourage the individualism and democratic sense of self so embedded in a liberal Western worldview (which would be counter to the goal of diffusing a mass movement), actions and programs that instead discourage individualism and encourage small-group cohesion along with opportunity, would reduce the allure of Daesh and other organizations built on these religiously styled mass movement principles.[29] The exact type of promoted small group might vary from place to place and from time to time, depending on local conditions, perhaps attaining from traditional tribal structures, guilds or clubs, family, school, military affiliation, or other sources of identity and advantage.

Conclusion

Hoffer's treatment of mass movements, when applied to radical Islam, approaches the sources of the movement's appeal in a way that does not directly engage with, or condemn, Islam as a religion, therefore falling closer to the sphere of influence that secular Western governments and institutions are structured to effect. Some of Hoffer's solutions and ideas about how best to engage with and diffuse a mass movement can be applied directly to Daesh and al-Qaida, and may yield new approaches and techniques:

The substitution of one mass movement for another. Hoffer states, "this method of stopping one movement by substituting another ... is not always without danger, and it does not usually come cheap."[30] By way of example, he cites pre-World War II Italy and Germany where "practical businessmen acted in an entirely 'logical' manner when they encouraged a Fascist and Nazi movement in order to stop communism. But in doing so, these practical and logical people promoted their own liquidation."[31] Likewise, substituting something like democracy in the Middle East (such as nearly happened during the Arab Spring) could unintentionally destabilize regimes that have been useful partners and important pillars of the global economy. Despite such risk, it is worth noting that the zero-sum nature of mass movements, as claimed by Hoffer, will mean that—if true—any other rising movement, ideally less committed to violence against the Western world, will decrease the resources upon which Daesh and other religiously based movements can draw.

The substitution of tribal or other small group structures for individualism. These alternatives could possibly enhance a locale's ability to stabilize itself and resist proselytization into religiously based mass movements. However, this essentially means encouraging an older, and likely less liberal, way of life. It is, as Hoffer says, an equation where "equality without freedom creates a more stable social pattern than freedom without equality."[32]

The treatment of specific sectors of people from whom mass movements draw their strength. This applies specifically to veterans, formerly successful persons trying not to become newly poor, and the bored. An approach aimed at these target populations may be the most feasible over the short term. Institutions and programs already exist to tackle similar problems.[33] The suggestion here would be to look at those programs and determine whether priorities, messaging strategies, funding sources, and suitable alternatives for hope and financial stability are in place; or if it could be shifted from other approaches that might be wrongly aimed at religious counter-narratives to instead relieve the conditions that conspire to spoil an individual's sense of self-satisfaction.

Emigration. Finally, and perhaps most practically, Hoffer says, "emigration offers some of the things the frustrated hope to find when they join a mass movement, namely, change and a chance for a new beginning."[34] Since mass emigration away from the Levant, North Africa, and Yemen already occurs, legally and illegally, perhaps it would be wise to examine the streams of emigration not just for the potential to help individuals, or to ensure that radicalization—or radicals themselves—do not cross borders, but to also look at the overall situation as a possible panacea for the illness upon which the mass movement of radical Islam feeds. This would mean encouraging emigration, and promoting and facilitating it as a way to relieve pressures fueling mass movements—through some sort of controlled and global mechanism—rather than continuing the current system of temporary camps and temporary solutions. Hoffer maintains that mass movements arise when people see their individual lives to be irremediably spoiled and cannot find a worthwhile purpose in self-advancement.[35] The dedication, devotion, loyalty, and self-surrender that fuel mass movements

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are in essence a desperate clinging to something that might give worth and meaning to futile, spoiled lives.[36] This article repurposes four of Hoffer's ideas to uncouple radical Islam from the engine of its own mass movement: offer a substitute movement (dangerous), encourage small-group cohesion (potentially illiberal), target specific groups of people with financial stability and hope (quick but perhaps not long-lasting), and restructure emigration in a way that offers a release for the masses most at risk (global and long-reaching). ■

Notes

1. Some notable opinions on this can be found in Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 117n3; John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 8; Natana J. DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 228; Sadik J. al-Azm, "Islamic Fundamentalism Reconsidered: A Critical Outline of Problems, Ideas and Approaches," *South Asia Bulletin, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 13, no. 1 and 2 (Spring/Fall 1993), 95–97.

2. Lee Keath and Hamza Hendawi, "How Islamic Is Islamic State Group? Not Very, Experts Say," Associated Press, 2 March 2015, accessed 14 May 2016, https://www.yahoo.com/news/islamic-islamic-state-group-not-very-experts-131121264.html?ref=gs.

3. Hamza Yusuf, who is at the forefront of scholarly Islamic criticism of the Islamic State ideology, suggests linking well (i.e., noncorrupt) representative governance to less marginalization by liberal elites of normative Islamic practices as a potential remedy. The second portion of this approach could work, because normative Islam bolsters rather than detracts from good governance (opposite of the Christian tradition in many ways). However, normative Islam is not particularly conducive to representative governance. See Sina Toossi and Yasmine Taeb, "Prominent Islamic Scholar Refutes Claims of ISIS's Links to Islam," Think Progress online, 5 March 2015, accessed 14 May 2016, http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/03/05/3630340/prominent-islamic-scholar-refutes-claims-isiss-links-islam/.

4. As an added bonus, by looking at the problem set from a nonreligious perspective, secular governments and institutions may be able to obviate the impulse toward joining or supporting such movements *without* those same governments and institutions having to engage in a religious debate they are ill equipped to win.

5. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010).

6. Ibid., xi. Suggestions from the other two portions of Hoffer's topical organization have been incorporated and referenced in this article, but for the sake of brevity and relevance, emphasis has been placed only on the first two sections. The next section covers Hoffer's theory for how mass movements inculcate united action and self-sacrifice; and finally, the last section enumerates the types of leaders necessary at the initial, fanatical, and practical phases of a mass movement's existence.

7. Ibid., 6. While it seems Hoffer intended the Far East (China, Japan) rather than the Middle East as his "Orient," the general sentiment applies perhaps more strongly and presciently to the subject of this paper. This statement delves beyond a superficial "clash of cultures" into a more nuanced point, that Middle Eastern societies do not only envy the West's relative riches, but more regret the loss of prestige from the thousand-plus years where the Middle East was, more than Europe, a center of learning and progressiveness.

8. Ibid., 11.

9. Ibid., 12.

10. Ibid., 51.

11. Ibid., 25.

12. Ibid., 38.

13. Ibid., 17.

14. Associated Press, "Timeline: Daesh's Reign of Terror," Gulf News website, 18 June 2015, accessed 24 October 2016, http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/iraq/timeline-daesh-s-reign-of-terror-1.1537224.

15. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 4.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 17.

18. Ibid., 26.

19. Liz Sly, "The Hidden Hand Behind the Islamic State Militants? Saddam Hussein's," *Washington Post* website, 4 April 2015, accessed 24 April 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html.

20. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 46.

21. Eli Lake, "Meet Iraq's Most Important Man," *New York Sun* website, 3 April 2007, accessed 14 May 2016, http://www.nysun.com/opinion/meet-iraqs-most-important-man/51693/.

22. Sly, "The Hidden Hand Behind the Islamic State Militants."

23. Pamela Engel, "One Reason Why Men Join ISIS Is Not Flattering for the 'Caliphate,'" Business Insider website, 5 October 2015, accessed 24 April 24 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/a-huge-reason-men-join-isis-is-not-flattering-for-the-caliphate-2015-10.

24. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 26.

25. Ibid., 51.

26. Omar Sultan Haque et al., "Why Are Young Westerners Drawn to Terrorist Organizations like ISIS?" *Psychiatric Times* website, 10 September 2015, accessed 24 October 2016, http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/trauma-and-violence/why-are-young-westerners-drawn-terrorist-organizations-isis/page/0/2#sthash.u2lOB3bl.dpuf.

27. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 35.

28. Ibid., 19.

29. Ibid., 63. Here he clarifies further: "The capacity to resist coercion stems partly from the individual's identification with a group."

30. Ibid., 19.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 33.

33. One such organization is the Sawab Center, accessed 24 October 2016, http://www.sawabcenter.org. See also France's "Plan d'action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme," accessed 14 May 2016, http://www.ville.gouv.fr/?plan-d-action-contre-la.

34. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 20.

35. Ibid., 12.

36. Ibid., 16.

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BOOK REVIEWS


ZERO FOOTPRINT
The True Story of a Private Military Contractor's Covert Assignments in Syria, Libya, and the World's Most Dangerous Places

Simon Chase and Ralph Pezzullo,
Mulholland Books, New York, 2016, 320 pages

Zero Footprint examines the evolution of the secretive private security business into a temporary, scalable, deniable private military force, as told by an insider. The name of the book alludes to the level of support and "signature" these operatives are required to maintain while conducting their assignments. The value of the book is its description of the lives that private military contractors (PMCs) lead, the motives for using them, and the effectiveness and value of their service. A real page-turner, the writing is precise, the detail vivid, and the consequences profound.

Zero Footprint is an autobiographical account of a former special boat service member turned PMC, published under the pen name of Simon Chase. It is his tale that is told, with the assistance of coauthor Ralph Pezzullo, an accomplished screenwriter and journalist. The book recounts Chase's training with the elite special boat services and his subsequent entry into the world of private security in 1999, as well as the massive expansion of the military contractor enterprise through the turn of the century.

Unlike many books about the "war on terror," the characters described are often seen less as heroes, and more as mercenaries. In the opening chapters, one discovers the misspent youth of the author, and the series of decisions and circumstances that eventually led him to the U.S. ambassadorial compound in Benghazi. In the telling, the reader begins to understand the sense of purpose and duty that drives many of these men. Brought together on dangerous missions without overt government support, and no recognition, PMCs can only rely on their teammates to watch their backs. To illuminate this, a chapter describes how two principals vying for control of the country wanted their security detachments to fight each other. However, since the community of operators was so tightly knit, the plan became known and the contractors refused to fight. The author relates a tale of what can happen to special operators that end their service to their country early due to unforeseen circumstances and yet wish to continue the high-risk vocation in which they excel.



The book is much more than a first-person account of dangerous missions taking place in far-flung locations; it provides insight of the inner workings and decision-making processes that governments use when employing private military contractors. The work they do at the behest of wealthy people, multinational corporations, and governments requires confidentiality. If publicly revealed, the details of these missions would embarrass or compromise the actions of the principals. As related in the book, an employer who is often an arm of the U.S. government requires a covert asset that cannot be traced back to the employer for a time-sensitive or short-term mission. It becomes clear when reading the book why private military contractors fill that role. Having the same skill sets as our elite operators, they become the go-to-guys when governments who have shrunk their military budgets need available forces. When the threat abates, PMCs can be "let go" with no further financial commitment or political ties, unlike government-run military forces.

The effectiveness of these shadow organizations can be hard to measure. However, the deeds and activities that PMCs conducted in the heady days after 9/11

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cannot be in doubt. From meager beginnings as personnel security detachments, PMCs augmented the conventional forces providing security in war zones. Through PMC actions, U.S. and coalition soldiers are free to pursue the enemy instead of being tied up guarding diplomats, international aid operations, or critical infrastructure. PMCs conduct a wide range of missions from personal security detachments to covert reconnaissance, snatch and grabs, and the dark side of the business such as forced relocation of indigenous peoples, all of which are described in an entertaining way. The wide variety of tasks they are called to perform, and the emotional context that peppers the narrative, will leave you intrigued.

Eric McGraw, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE NEW NUCLEAR DISORDER
Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy

Stephen J. Cimbala, Ashgate Publishing Company, New York, 2015, 254 pages

The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy is well written and easy to read, even if you are not familiar with the jargon or esoteric terms of art in the fields Stephen J. Cimbala covers. The book is a compendium of different ways the nuclear weapons policy problem is changing during the beginning of the twenty-first century. Cimbala examines a specific policy issue with each chapter. Many of the issues overlap to some degree between chapters, providing some continuity, but the issues are largely covered independently by chapter.

Although I cannot represent all the chapters in a short book review, I will touch on some of the more interesting ideas Cimbala brings to light. He does a nice job recounting the essential elements needed during a crisis for two opposing sides (the simplest case) to limit escalation and resolve their differences. Cimbala then points out that, essentially, all the elements he lists for a positive crisis resolution are targets for cyber war. In an actual crisis, the use of information war techniques could make information so untrustworthy that opponents would not reasonably understand one another's positions and therefore could not resolve the crisis without escalation or possibly a nuclear exchange.

The book is not based entirely in theoretical scenarios. A significant portion is devoted to historical events that highlight the ease with which a nuclear crisis could develop. Cimbala uses events like the Able Archer "War Scare" in 1983, a Norwegian scientific rocket launch over Russia in 1995, and Vladimir Putin's operations in Ukraine in 2014 to show how fragile global peace may be.

Cimbala covers other major areas of concern for those who must solve contemporary nuclear policy problems. These include how geography affects deterrence, the potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia, how to end an ongoing nuclear conflict, the likelihood of small regional nuclear wars, culturally based misunderstandings, missile defense technology issues, and the effects of proliferation (potentially positive or negative effects).

The underlying theme is that the way deterrence worked during the Cold War is no longer a valid model for contemporary policy, and new solutions must be developed. Cimbala lays out many thought-provoking problems but does not offer solutions.

The sole criticism I have for this book is the lack of clear explanation for the model being used to predict the results of a nuclear exchange. It is important to understand the assumptions used to determine the survivability of nuclear weapons in the various scenarios he proposes. The reader is left to accept Cimbala's estimates without further explanation. It is a departure from an otherwise highly authoritative and well-documented work.

In summary, this is a very provocative and interesting book. If you have an interest in twenty-first century changes that affect nuclear weapons policy, this book will be very interesting for you, and it will illuminate challenges that are very difficult and are yet to be solved by policy makers worldwide.

Harold A. Laurence, PhD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE ON NAVAL COMMAND

Edited by Thomas J. Cutler, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2015, 194 pages

With the vast number of books on leadership, readers could wonder what subject a new book could cover that others have not

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discussed. Thomas Cutler succeeds by looking at a related but entirely different topic—command. Cutler, the director of professional publishing at the U.S. Naval Institute, is the author of numerous articles and books, including several editions of the *Blue Jackets Manual*. In *The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Command*, he tackles the complex but often neglected subject of command through an anthology of articles selected from different periods, each providing a unique perspective on command.

Naval Command is part of the U.S. Naval Institute's series of "wheel books." Wheel books are an old naval tradition of having books that provide "supplemental information, pragmatic advice, and cogent analysis on topics important to all naval professionals." Cutler's wheel book succeeds admirably in this regard by providing commanders an easy resource of perspectives on the challenges of command. The articles selected in *Naval Command* are from the Naval Institute's vast archives and provide ideas, hard-learned advice, and practical suggestions for any individual whether serving as a commander or as a member of a staff.

Defining leadership as "leading individuals" and command as "leading leaders," the stories and articles contained in *Naval Command* focus on the particular burdens and responsibilities of command at sea. Although Navy culture may be different, the lessons and advice provided are universal in their applicability, and readers from any service will immediately recognize the utility to their own situations.

The articles span many decades and offer insights that will be of interest to a wide audience. Whether shedding light on the balance between authority and responsibility, the different challenges facing wartime and peacetime commanders, or reflecting on the command decisions made during the pivotal battles of the Pacific war, each article's author provides a wealth of advice and lessons learned to military personnel at any level. These lessons are timeless. For example, in Cdr. Robert E. Mumford's article "Get Off My Back, Sir," the author addresses the perceived encroachment of micromanagement in the Navy. Although written in 1977, his concerns and suggestions will resonate and be valuable to commanders today.

The author wanted this book to be useful, and he succeeds in this goal. Although each contributor has a unique writing style, the articles in the book are very readable. Since each chapter is a separate article, readers will find they can read and reflect on the advice in a short time each day. I highly recommend the book to all leaders, especially those going into command, for its thought-provoking lessons and practical advice.

Robert J. Rielly, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

STORMING THE CITY
U.S. Military Performance in Urban Warfare from World War II to Vietnam

Alec Wahlman, University of North Texas Press, Denton, Texas, 2015, 368 pages

The title of this worthwhile book, *Storming the City*, may be misunderstood to mean it is a catalog of twentieth-century U.S. urban warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. Similar misunderstanding abounded regarding John Nagl's *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Despite the title, that book was not about counterinsurgency lessons learned so much as it was about characteristics of adaptive, learning organizations, using two counterinsurgency case studies as contrasting illustrations. So it is here that Alec Wahlman focuses on the two major reasons for U.S. success as seen in four urban warfare case studies. The first reason for success is what he calls *transferable competence*—aggressive tactical initiative to try new things, coupled with rapid proliferation of lessons learned and doctrine. The second is battlefield adaptation. One can argue these same two characteristics contributed to U.S. tactical military successes overall in these wars. However, the urban operational environment most effectively showcases both in action, given city fighting's unique and formidable difficulties.

Wahlman, a veteran analyst of fourteen years at the Institute for Defense Analyses, examines U.S. military ground force performance in taking Aachen (European Theater of Operations in October 1944), Manila (Pacific Theater of Operations in February 1945), Seoul (mobile phase of the Korean War, September 1950), and Hue (Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War, February 1968). Each battle earns its own chapter that begins with a short historical orientation. The analytical treatment then divides into six categories: (1) command, control, and communications; (2) intelligence and reconnaissance; (3) firepower and survivability; (4) mobility and counter

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mobility; (5) logistics; and (6) dealing with the population. Wahlman's comparative matrix at the end of the book suggests that the first case—Aachen—showed the United States at its best across all six categories. There is a relatively declining performance trend in Asia, the worst performance exhibited in the fight for Hue City. The reasons for this are complicated, and the author does good service in disabusing the reader of simplistic notions that U.S. ground forces became less proficient in urban warfare. However, the small sample size of only four cases and mostly qualitative and anecdotal evidence are reasons enough not to infer too much from this matrix.

Not unexpectedly, the comparison ranks the United States consistently high in firepower and survivability as well as in mobility and countermobility capabilities. Also not surprising, the worst relative U.S. performance is in terms of intelligence and reconnaissance. Lastly, the author challenges two common urban conflict misperceptions: (1) an overall numerical 3-to-1 offensive ratio is mandatory, and (2) infantry is the most suitable branch of arms for city fighting.

While not predictive of future U.S. ground force performance, Wahlman's *Storming the City* suggests that intangible characteristics through which units discover, learn, and adapt will matter most, although technological advances in firepower, survivability, mobility, and logistics will certainly matter. If you can only have one urban warfare book in your professional library, make sure this is it.

Col. Eric M. Walters, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Lee, Virginia


TRANSFORMING MILITARY POWER SINCE THE COLD WAR

Britain, France, and the United States, 1991-2012

Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning, and Terry Terriff, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013, 303 pages

Transforming Military Power since the Cold War is a comparative case study by three notable military historians (two European and one Canadian) who offer an illuminating understanding of the military transformation of Britain, France, and the United States beginning after the Cold War. The authors relied on extensive archival research and numerous interviews and official document access. Anyone interested in how an army transforms, and how it responds to challenges in an environment of constrained resources, will benefit from this book.

With the Soviet Union's inevitable demise, the end of the Cold War, and the increase of connectivity through networked computing and precision-guided weapons, Western military forces concentrated their efforts to adapt to new and unknown risks and requirements. The central question the authors sought to answer was how the armies of Britain, France, and the United States would change to meet new strategic imperatives and take advantage of new technologies. Both the process and the overall outcomes of Army transformation were investigated in their research. By seeking to answer predetermined questions, the authors looked at ways to develop findings that would have a general relevance for how militaries innovate. The authors focused on investigating four key elements: interests of the organization, military culture with respect to new ideas, the role of civilian and military leaders, and the feedback generated from operational experience.



The book is divided into five chapters. The first begins with the imperatives and innovations involved with army transformation. The next chapters, in order, focus on the U. S. Army as it concentrated on the promise of information technology and modularization, the British and French armies as they developed networked expeditionary forces, and the development of effects-based operations. Each military chapter considers interests, ideas, individuals, and operational experience, along with how they were all interrelated with respect to army transformation. The final chapter evaluates the overall findings of the preceding case studies and discusses the many implications for the future of Western land power.

Transforming Military Power since the Cold War adds to current scholarly contributions related to military

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innovation by taking into account the unique perspective of the British and French armies. The authors purposefully did not seek to test any type of theory but conveyed an army transformation story highlighting contingencies and complexities, along with politics and personality involvement. They wanted to capture the whole story, and had they added the theory premise, key elements of the story might have been deleted if those elements did not contribute to the consistency of the stated theory.

Joint aspects of innovation are not well balanced in the book although it is well written. The focus weighs more heavily toward the British and French militaries. Topics of interest that stand out include the relative scales of innovation (sustaining and disruptive), the impact of joint institutions on military innovation, and the role of civilian versus military leadership and how they shape military innovation. I highly recommended this work for military professionals and policy makers interested or involved in military innovation and those seeking to understand how armies respond to challenges.


Lt. Col. Stephen Harvey, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

RECKLESS
The Racehorse Who Became a Marine Corps Hero

Tom Clavin, New American Library Caliber, New York, 2014, 308 pages

Warfare, for all its horrors, forges the strongest bond possible between soldiers. The oft-quoted battle speech from Shakespeare's *Henry V* perhaps puts it best, "We few, we happy few, we band of brothers; For he today that sheds his blood with me, Shall be my brother." Since antiquity, soldiers also developed equally strong ties with the dogs, horses, birds, and even elephants that joined them on the battlefield. Tom Clavin's latest book, *Reckless*, relates the story of an unlikely marine—a former South Korean racehorse—and her pivotal role in a U.S. Marines platoon during the final months of the Korean War.

Born with the Hangul name Ah Chim-Hai (Flame of the Morning), she began her career as an award-winning racehorse in the interwar years between the fall of the Axis powers and North Korea's surprise invasion of the south in 1950. Like so many South Korean refugees, Ah-Chim-Hai fled with her owners to the Pusan perimeter, where they eked out a meager living using her as a work-horse, before eventually returning to Seoul in 1952. The horse's return was short-lived as the exigencies of war forced her family to offer her for sale. At the same time, 2nd Lt. Eric Pedersen, a sharp-thinking marine recoilless rifle platoon leader, recognized the critical need for a dedicated pack animal to haul heavy ammunition loads up the steep Korean mountainsides in support of infantry offensive operations. Through fate or chance, Pedersen bought Ah-Chim-Hai, renamed her Reckless, and drafted her into the Marine Corps.



After an abbreviated boot camp (for both horse and handlers), Reckless repeatedly proved her worth on the battlefield until the cease-fire in 1953. Reckless's strength, bravery, and character soon endeared her to the marines she soldiered alongside. During the Battle of Hill 120, for example, Reckless carried some nine thousand pounds of recoilless rifle ammunition about thirty-five miles while also hauling wounded marines to medical care despite being twice wounded herself. The marines loved her and insisted she return in glory to the United States at the end of conflict. By the time of her "retirement," Reckless earned a bevy of awards, including promotion to staff sergeant, two Purple Hearts, the Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, the Korean Service Medal, and two unit citations. Until her passing in 1968, Reckless was a key figure in the official ceremonies at her new home in Camp Pendleton, California. Today, Reckless's service is commemorated by a memorial statue at the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Virginia.

Reckless is much more than another story about the Korean War. The book provides three critical lessons for military leaders at all levels. First, it accurately captures and explains the unique bonds exclusively developed

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among soldiers in combat. Second, Clavin painstakingly describes the duty to return home and care for our wartime animal companions upon the conclusion of their honorable service. This particular lesson was all but forgotten during the Vietnam conflict. If not for the combined efforts of soldiers and nonprofit groups, animals used in Iraq and Afghanistan might have been left behind. The final, and perhaps most important, lesson to be gleaned is the role critical thinking plays in solving complex problems. Pedersen found a successful, if seemingly unorthodox, means to improve his platoon's ability to accomplish the mission. Pedersen's chain of command, up to the commandant of the Marine Corps, not only avoided the pitfall of micromanagement but also gave their full support to his solution. Given the level of unnecessary oversight to the individual soldier level extant in today's military, this is a lesson worth remembering lest we be forced to relearn it.


Lt. Col. Chris Heatherly, U.S. Army,
Pullman, Washington

AMERICANS IN OCCUPIED BELGIUM, 1914–1918
Accounts of the War from Journalists, Tourists, Troops and Medical Staff

Ed Klekowski and Libby Klekowski,
McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers,
Jefferson, North Carolina, 2014, 296 pages

This book surprised me. I had little expectation that a volume titled *Americans in Occupied Belgium, 1914-1918: Accounts of the War from Journalists, Tourists, Troops and Medical Staff* could hold the interest of a serious military professional or student of military history. I expected an eclectic travelogue at best, but the authors delivered a different result. Ed Klekowski is a retired professor of biology from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and he writes with his wife, Libby Klekowski. They openly admit that the book grew out of their visits to a daughter and her husband who live in Louvain, Belgium, but they felt compelled to tell this story. They have produced a worthy historical account.

This book capably sets the experiences of Americans who lived or travelled in Belgium during the Great War in chronological context. Most historians of the western front largely ignore Belgium, except for early German atrocities or the battles of Ypres, and they certainly do not set events in the full context from German invasion until war's end, illuminating the effect of combat on the noncombatants. The Klekowskis do that, and meanwhile they interweave some fascinating tales of personal American experience from a great variety of perspectives. The story of Herbert Hoover's Commission for Relief in Belgium is a principal part of this book. Americans also fought on both sides, Allied and German. Aid workers, ambulance drivers, curious businessmen, nurses, journalists, and adventurers all have a voice in this story.



Ed and Libby Klekowski employ their primary sources in a most adept way, and no pertinent source is wasted. The book is primarily based on the memoirs of those Americans who experienced World War I in Belgium, but it also makes great use of visual records, such as period postcards and photographs, as well as contemporary sources such as newspapers and journals. The Klekowskis have travelled extensively in the region, and their knowledge of place and setting adds much to the tale and is almost scientific in its thoroughness. The book merges the facts of the story with an amplifying visual record.

Americans in Occupied Belgium illuminates the experience of those Americans who were in Belgium when the Germans invaded. One of the protagonists is the head of the American Legation, Brand Whitlock, who remained in Belgium until just before the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917. He was a critical actor in mediating with the occupying Germans and in diplomatically ensuring the welfare of American citizens trapped in or transiting Belgium during the German occupation, sometimes at personal cost. Brand Whitlock was both a model diplomat and a selfless humanitarian.

The Klekowskis' motivation to write the book originated in their visit to the reconstructed library in Louvain, paid for after the war principally by Americans. The inexcusable burning of an entire library of books, including irreplaceable medieval manuscripts during the

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sacking of Louvain, is one of the great human tragedies of the war, and it certainly contributed to Allied propaganda depicting the Germans as beasts and butchers. This volume amply illustrates the pathos of the Louvain and Dinant sacking. Anyone with any doubt as to the atrocities committed by the Germans against the Belgians should read this book for careful illustration, documentation, and increased understanding.


Col. Dean A. Nowowiejski, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE END OF TSARIST RUSSIA
The March to World War I and Revolution
Dominic Lieven, Viking, New York, 2015, 428 pages

Rare are the historical works that provide new perspectives on iconic events in world history. *The End of Tsarist Russia* by Dominic Lieven is one of those works. His book details the strategic imperatives, decisions, and personalities that led tsarist Russia to war and its ultimate demise. He does not settle for a dramatic retelling of the heady days of Revolution in Petrograd, or the final years of the First World War. In fact, those events are covered in the shortest and last chapter of the book. Instead, Lieven studies the geopolitical situation in the years preceding the Armageddon that swept through Europe and the world a little over a hundred years ago. In so doing, he illuminates dangerous parallels with today.

The first myth that Lieven debunks is that of tsarist Russia as an exceptional or irrational actor on the world stage before World War I. On the contrary, Lieven argues that the strategic calculus of Russia resembled that of the other empires of the time. Russia's desires to control the straits of Dardanelle were similar to British designs on the Suez Canal or U.S. control over the Panama Canal. Furthermore, he underlines the imperial dilemma faced by all great powers in the early twentieth century: that a state's greatness depended on its size. However, the greater a state's size, the more vulnerable it was to political disunity. This threatened all empires in an age of rising ethnic nationalism.

Lieven then explains the particular security dynamics of tsarist Russia. These included its defeat by Japan in Manchuria, Pan-Slavic aspirations, a rising Germany, and growing Polish and Ukrainian nationalism. Interestingly, and probably as a result of his access to Russian archives, he spends a large amount of the book describing the various personalities of Russian leaders and bureaucrats who shaped tsarist policy in the years before the war. As a result, the reader is struck by the realization of how important individuals are to the course of history.



One of the book's most ambitious claims is that "as much as anything, World War I turned on the fate of Ukraine." While clearly meant to galvanize the reader and draw parallels with the current security situation in Europe, the book does make a coherent argument on the primacy of the East in World War I. This is an important point for those knowledgeable about the bloody trench warfare of the western front.

This is an authoritative work, with new perspectives, on Russian government policy in the years before World War I. It is well written and particularly relevant in the increasingly fraught geopolitical situation we face today. Those security specialists who seek a greater understanding of historical Russian geostrategic imperatives will benefit from reading this book. However, its in-depth analysis of individual personalities might overwhelm more general readers. Military officers will not find any tactical or operational insights but will benefit from understanding the political context from which war is made.


Maj. Roland Minez, U.S. Army Reserve, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

GALLIPOLI
The Dardanelles Disaster in Soldiers' Words and Photographs
Richard Van Emden and Stephen Chambers, Bloomsbury USA, New York, 2015, 344 pages

This is a collaborative effort between Richard Van Emden, a well-published British author, historian, and filmmaker whose focus has been the

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Great War, and Stephen Chambers, a military historian and author whose focus has been the Gallipoli Campaign. In *Gallipoli*, they use their tremendous knowledge and expertise to bring to light the story of the Gallipoli Campaign as seen through the eyes of the participants of both sides. Source material for this well-researched book includes published and unpublished memoirs, diaries, magazines, museum materials, other Gallipoli books, and a large amount of archived material.



Well written and logical, *Gallipoli* is relatively free of difficult military language and detail, and it does not require a detailed understanding of the campaign or World War I to understand the events relayed by the authors. This book is for World War I enthusiasts, novice and scholar alike, as well as military professionals interested in the impacts of strategic and operational decisions on the men and women who will execute them.

The book's structure is an intricate weave of first-hand accounts connected by the author's narratives in a chronological event sequence. Along with the first-hand accounts, generally from company-grade officers and enlisted soldiers, is a tremendous number of photographs that lend great support to the reader's understanding of the participants. If a picture paints a thousand words, as used in *Gallipoli* they provide the reader the opportunity to view the great panorama on which this campaign unfolds.

While the introduction and first chapter, "Forcing the Straits," provide an effective strategic and operational setting, the focus of this book is tactical. The title, *Gallipoli: The Dardanelles Disaster in Soldiers' Words and Photographs*, identifies the focus as man at war. There are many published strategic and operational analyses of this campaign. *Gallipoli* puts a human face on the execution of the strategic and operational decisions.

The book's organization tries to provide balance between the Turkish and the Allied views, but I felt, if it were available, more Turkish input would be needed for telling the whole story. The difficulties of the soldier in war are not limited to one side. It is one thing to study the campaign through plans, orders, and grand sweeping movements on the battlefield. It is quite another to attempt to see that same campaign through the eyes of the participants. From the Turkish view, the campaign ended with their honor intact but at a cost of nearly three times as many deaths as their adversaries.

If you are interested in examining how the tactical execution of strategic guidance could go terribly wrong, then the Gallipoli Campaign is one for your research.

Lt. Col. Terrance M. Portman, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FORGOTTEN HEROES OF WORLD WAR II

Personal Accounts of Ordinary Soldiers—Land, Sea, and Air

Thomas E. Simmons, Taylor Trade, New York, 2014, 326 pages

Forgotten Heroes of World War II provides the reader with fourteen graphic, personal, emotional, and compelling accounts of the ordinary American soldier, sailor, airman, and marine as each did his job surviving the unimaginable horrors of World War II. Highlighting significant battles in every theater of the war, the book collectively tells the story of the ordinary American man who volunteered to fight for his country and who was thrust into an environment where he witnessed the devastation of war, up close and personal. As soldiers are reluctant to talk about their service in war, the author does an excellent job gaining the confidence of these everyday military heroes as shown with his skillful narration of their stories. In each personal account, the reader is transformed to that air, land, or sea battlefield. Each experience is graphically described, and readers can almost feel as if they were there.

The book is well written, well organized, and interesting to read. It is recommended for undergraduate or graduate studies in leadership, ethics, and history. Although not exclusively for military readers, it provides many examples of ethical dilemmas in war appropriate for military professional development, at any level. Be

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forewarned that it contains graphic detail of the horrors of war, death of close friends, stories of survival at all costs, and extraordinary courage. The book highlights the extraordinary brotherhood of the military at war, where service members are literally fighting for their own survival and that of their brothers on their left and right.

The volume of casualities associated with every battle highlighted in the book is staggering. The number of casualities suffered by the 94th Bomb Group, who took part in the bombing campaign against Germany, was shocking. In all, 163 aircraft and 1,453 airmen were missing, wounded, or killed. During eighty-one days of fighting, Okinawa was secured, but at a cost of 65,000 wounded, dead, or missing; 26 ships sunk and 368 damaged; and 768 aircraft lost. After the infamous Battle of the Bulge, American losses totaled 8,607 dead, 47,139 wounded, and 21,144 missing or captured. Finally, the U.S. Marine 4th Infantry Division suffered 9,098 men dead or wounded in their victory over the Japanese on the island of Iwo Jima. All told, the total amounted to one-half the division's strength.


Simmons does not pull any punches as he dutifully transcribes the vivid memories of these rank-and-file heroes. He graphically describes the intensity, gore, and lethality of war. There is a historical context with every vignette. This allows readers to understand the significance of the battle in relation to the overall success and eventual termination of the war. The human dimension of leadership, personal survival, fear of the unknown, and selfless service is humbling. No doubt, the lingering effects on the individuals are overwhelming.

Col. Michael R. Martinez, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WENDELL FERTIG AND HIS GUERRILLA FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
Fighting the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945

Kent Holmes, McFarland, Jefferson, North Carolina, 2015, 244 pages

Kent Holmes, retired Central Intelligence Agency officer and senior intelligence service member, gives an extensively researched account of an American commander's activities and problems of command in *Wendell Fertig and His Guerrilla Forces in the Philippines: Fighting the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945*. Holmes provides a sequential analysis of Fertig's background, the operational environment, guerilla development, the enemy situation, the guerilla situation, logistics, intelligence, and Fertig's leadership and responsibilities. He does so to evaluate Fertig's leadership, ultimately asserting that Fertig's guerillas were the largest and best-organized guerilla group, provided the best intelligence coverage, and were one of two groups whose major operational capabilities contributed to the liberation of the Philippines. Holmes points out that Fertig was later one of the architects of U.S. Army Special Forces. In addition to the special operations community, this book should appeal to intelligence professionals, Pacific theater aficionados, and anyone who seeks a better understanding of leadership in the complex environments of irregular, hybrid, or guerrilla warfare.



The book's examination spans the gamut from the tactical to the strategic aspects of guerrilla warfare. It contains observations on network dynamics and the challenges of mediating among a complex system of sometimes-rival groups. Interwoven in early chapters are Fertig's principles of guerrilla warfare, which Holmes then lists at the book's end. While the book provides examples of the integration of tactics and operational-level psychological operations, the descriptions of tactical engagements are not extensively detailed. However, there are ample illustrations of unconventional logistics and communications and of the priority of intelligence over direct action in support of conventional operations. Regarding the latter, Holmes expertly conveys the strategic implications of guerrilla activities concerning the naval battles and the Allied counterattack to retake the Philippines. He notes the contribution that Fertig's guerilla intelligence on Mindanao provided to the first battle of the

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Philippine Sea (a.k.a. the "Marianas Turkey Shoot") and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. He likewise considers the missed opportunities that arose because U.S. planners at General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area neglected to include the guerilla movement in Allied intelligence and offensive plans. Although the book addresses both the tactical and strategic levels, it provides the greatest insight at the operational level of guerrilla warfare.

Holmes' thorough research is a valuable resource for special operations planning, for case studies on special operations–conventional forces interdependence, or as part of a larger study of the differences in the evolution of guerrilla movements on the various islands of the Philippines in World War II. The casual reader might find the density of detail cumbersome at times, but researchers will appreciate the meticulous precision, including specific dates, troop numbers, and even packing lists. Despite an academic treatment that seems clinical at times, the book contains indispensable gems of wisdom that practitioners must consider when planning for unconventional or guerrilla warfare contingencies.


Maj. Thomas R. Nypaver,
Texas Army National Guard,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE JEW WHO DEFEATED HITLER
Henry Morgenthau Jr., FDR, and How We Won the War

Peter Moreira, Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York, 2014, 296 pages

In *The Jew Who Defeated Hitler: Henry Morgenthau Jr., FDR, and How We Won the War*, Peter Moreira tells of the contributions Henry Morgenthau Jr. and the United States Treasury Department made toward winning the Second World War. The title of the book is a bit exaggerated because no single person defeated Hitler, but what cannot be denied is the crucial role Morgenthau played in the Allies' winning the war. The defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II was the most expensive human undertaking ever attempted, and Morgenthau, while largely behind the scenes, was the individual who helped finance the war and establish many of the initiatives that helped raise so much money for both the United States and the other allied countries.

Moreira uses a wide selection of primary and secondary sources consisting of previously published books, diary entries, letters, international and domestic financial reports, and Morgenthau's personal papers while secretary of the treasury. Highlights include his descriptions about the multiple war-bond campaigns held in the United States, Morgenthau's involvement in the lend-lease program, the War Refugee Board, and the Bretton Woods Conference. Moreira brings to life Henry Morgenthau Jr. and the important representatives within the Treasury Department in detail and vividly accounts for their efforts in financing World War II. Moreira is also quick to point out some of Morgenthau's flaws, particularly his insecurities and routine jealousy of other important leaders within Franklin D. Roosevelt's cabinet.



The friendship between Morgenthau and Roosevelt is written superbly and makes you appreciate the behind-the-scenes impact that Morgenthau had within American policy and diplomacy during the twelve years he was secretary of the treasury. He showed great leadership and organizational skills and artfully picked the right talent to work in the Treasury Department. Due to the amount of respect and confidence Roosevelt had in Morgenthau, he was often assigned tasks not within his duty description or area of influence, which brought Morgenthau undue stress and criticism among some of his peer competitors wanting the same influence on the president.

The Jew Who Defeated Hitler is tailored toward any reader interested in the economic requirements of defeating the Axis powers in World War II, and it focuses primarily on the strategic level of warfare. This book is recommended to any member of the security community who wants to understand how global finances, economic industries, or coalition partners can greatly hinder or improve successful military operations. Some of the fundamental lessons learned within this book are the

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
importance of peer-to-peer teamwork, leadership, and organization within large bureaucracies.

Maj. Matthew Prescott, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CHURCH OF SPIES
The Pope's Secret War Against Hitler

Mark Riebling, Basic Books, New York, 2015, 384 pages

Mark Riebling has written an extraordinary work of literature in *Church of Spies: The Pope's Secret War Against Hitler.* In this, his second major publication, Riebling does a fantastic job of delivering his thesis that contrary to public opinion, Pope Pius XII was actively engaged in establishing a covert network to work for peace during World War II. An accomplished academic, Riebling worked as a book editor before serving as the editorial director of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research for ten years. Post-9/11, he cofounded and became the director of the Center for Policing Terrorism, which gave him experience in successfully profiling secret groups. Widely considered an expert in intelligence and espionage, his experience allows him to navigate the networks he writes about in *Church of Spies.* Riebling's writing style will capture you quickly. Easy to read, *Church of Spies* primarily follows the actions of Josef Müller, a German Catholic patriot, who acted as the primary liaison between the German regular army intelligence chief and the Vatican.



This book primarily covers the period starting six months before Germany's invasion of Poland and continuing through the end of the war. *Church of Spies* also dives into the history of Bishop Eugenio Pacelli, including how his upbringing as a priest and bishop influenced his actions once he became Pope Pius XII. My one complaint about this book is how Riebling alternates between names—Pacelli and Pius—during the early chapters. I came to the understanding that he did this to help the reader identify the time he was referencing in the pope's life. Pope Pius XII, as politically motivated as he was spiritually, used his experience while leading the Catholic Church during this tragic time to build networks and influence people to plan a regime change in Germany, through assassination if necessary. Müller carried messages between the regular German army and the Vatican. Acting as an agent for the intelligence chief Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, Müller took extreme risks by flying sport planes between Germany and the Vatican.

I highly recommend this book to people who are interested in World War II history or Catholic Church history. It certainly adds to the understanding of Pope Pius XII's actions and leadership of the Catholic Church during this horrific and tragic period in our world's history. Understanding the political sensitivities and the nature of the Nazi Party allowed Pope Pius XII to act and lead in a manner that prevented Adolf Hitler from using the pope's words and deeds as a reason to begin executing Catholics.

Lt. Col. Joe Schotzko, U.S. Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

EISENHOWER'S ARMIES
The American-British Alliance During World War II


Niall Barr, Pegasus Books, New York, 2015, 544 pages

More than seventy years have passed since the alliance of American and British powers saw the eventual downfall of the Axis powers in World War II. In *Eisenhower's Armies,* author Naill Barr traces the Anglo-American relationship that eventually led to the success of the Allied forces in the Second World War. Drawing from a vast array of published and unpublished primary and secondary sources from national archives, museums, letters, lectures, and private collections, Barr is able to provide a unique perspective not only into the plans, operations, and battles but also into the politics

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and personalities that shaped the British-American military collaboration of the time.

Barr, a widely published author, history professor, and senior lecturer at King's College London, presents both sides of the alliance in a well-researched, balanced manner. Having written numerous books on the topic of Anglican war, Barr's latest effort, *Eisenhower's Armies*, takes a more detailed look into not only the strategy and tactics of the two nations during World War II, but the political, social, and historical components that led to their eventual success as an alliance.



Eisenhower's Armies takes the reader chronologically through the American-British military relationship from its inception during the formative years of America as a fledgling nation through one of the most destructive wars in history, full circle back to an uneasy cooperation almost as soon as the battles have past. By highlighting military conflict and cooperation between the two during the early French expansion on the North American continent, the Revolutionary War, and World War I, Barr sets the stage for a greater understanding of the tensions, suspicions, and early difficulties of this on-again, off-again cooperation. Dire circumstances and mutual need between the two countries, however, eventually culminated in the most successful military cooperation of all time.

Barr's insightful account of how the tensions, tactical collaborations, and even advances in technology affected the war gives the reader a comprehensive view of the British-American alliance in the latter part of World War II. He provides a strategic level understanding of the how the situation evolved to bring about America's involvement in the war, how planning and operations were organized, and even how those relationships from across the Atlantic manifested between the soldiers on the battlefield. By outlining various battles, decisions, and tactics agreed upon (and sometimes disagreed upon) by both sides, *Eisenhower's Armies* presents a detailed view of the war and its key players in the context of international politics and policy.

Barr's in-depth understanding of the history, cultures, economics, and military conflict of the time, coupled with his descriptive, engaging writing style, makes the book accessible to a wide audience. Though *Eisenhower's Armies* seldom mentions other allies involved, and Barr narrowly focuses on ground forces rather than providing a comprehensive look at the entire alliance, the account reads as genuine, and the style is engaging throughout. He successfully demonstrates the sometimes-overlooked truth that decisions made and implications realized as a result of the tentative partnership between England and America were often forged in the sitting room rather than the war room.

Barr derives military perceptions from multiple sources concerning the personalities of the military and political leaders of the time. The result is an engaging narrative that gives readers a unique perspective on the inner workings of war. His strategic expertise shines through, and the book presents a social, operational, and even tactical analysis of a successful, albeit controversial, time of cooperation in British-American history.

Maj. Carla Gleason, U.S. Air Force,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BUDDIES
Heartwarming Photos of GIs and Their Dogs in World War II

L. Douglas Keeney, Zenith Press, New York, 2015, 176 pages

All service members at any rank want the same thing: unconditional loyalty and emotional support. The book *Buddies: Heartwarming Photos of GIs and Their Dogs in World War II* by L. Douglas Keeney provides the reader with a view of military members and their loyal animal companions in everyday life during World War II.


Keeney has written more than a dozen books on American history. *Buddies,* which is an addition to the 2001 publication, *Buddies: Men, Dogs and World War II,* allows the reader to feel the emotion of service members and their dogs. Men who have seen the horror of war can relax and gain comfort from their dogs. Some

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of the photos place dogs in whimsical poses, while others show dogs relaxing with the GIs, and still others show dogs recovering from battle wounds.

If a reader is looking for a World War II book on campaigns and national strategy, this is not it. If the reader is looking for a book on military working dogs, or dogs used for policing or explosive detection, this is not it. If the reader is looking for information on mascot pets or purebred dogs that live a pampered life, this is not it. If the reader is looking of a book about mutts and strays that find a GI to take care of them and provide comfort, this is definitely the book.

The book has seven chapters, with five dedicated to the buddies of the Coast Guard, Army, Army Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The two remaining chapters are dedicated to "War's End" and "Humor in the Face of War." Every photo in the book is an official military photo that was researched at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Each photo has a caption, which the author edited to eliminate personal information and needlessly offensive language from the 1940s that is no longer used today. Journalists who were drafted or volunteered for the service wrote many of the captions. The intent of the photos was to keep the public feeling good about the war when times were hard and the news from the front was not always good. The photos let the American public see our soldiers and sailors making the best of some very difficult situations.



Some of these dogs have great combat stories, such as a dog named Cherbourg, who was at Normandy on 6 June 1944 when a tank landing ship landed. He decided it was a good time to get off the beach and run onto the ship. In addition, there is Skippy, a member of a B-17 crew serving in Northwest African theater with bombing runs over Tunisia and Sicily.

This book is not relevant to the study of World War II history or to the current security concerns of the nation. However, it is a very good book for seeing World War II from a different perspective of soldiers and their adopted pets.

Boyd Plessl, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COURAGE, COMPASSION, MARINE
The Unique Story of Jimmie Dyess

Perry Smith, iUniverse, Bloomington, Indiana, 2015, 220 pages

From start to finish, readers sense the pride and passion of the book's author, Maj. Gen. Perry W. Smith, U.S. Air Force, retired, who took ten years to research and write *Courage, Compassion, Marine: The Unique Story of Jimmie Dyess*. The story resonates with the author because Smith is married to Jimmie Dyess's daughter and only child. Together over the years, the Smiths have represented this American hero's extraordinary achievements at multiple and various events around the globe.

The book moves effectively in a chronology beginning with Jimmie Dyess's prewar years, progressing to the Carnegie Medal, the evolution of U.S. Marine Corps, the war in the Pacific, the 4th Marine Division and its role in *Operation Flintlock*, perspectives on the Medal of Honor and courage, and a litany of Dyess's honors and events. However, the book needs a more effective ending as Smith spends too much time discussing the anatomy of courage, which detracts from the book's strengths—Dyess and historical research.

As an Augustan, I reveled in the book's description of "early Augusta"—the city, its citizens, and the attractions that made it the "before Florida" winter playground for wealthy northerners. Here, readers glimpse a young Jimmie Dyess who willingly risked his life to save two drowning strangers and who later would give his life to save marines on the twin islands of Roi Namur. The firsthand accounts by men who served, trained, and fought alongside Dyess capture the man who embodied the character and presence attributes of the Army Leadership Requirements Model.

Smith's book is not only a responsible and personal portrait of Dyess, but also a revealing historical account of the Marine Corps. This account examines the strategic contributions made by five men who influenced Marine

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Corps doctrine, force structure, and training evolutions in the 1930s, and the technological and tactical innovations employed by the Corps (specifically, the 4th Marine Division) in the Pacific during World War II. Examples include massive, sustained air and naval bombardment to weaken dug-in enemy emplacements, fighter planes with air-to-ground rockets against dug-in positions, and underwater demolition teams to reconnoiter defenses and destroy underwater barriers. Readers discover that "in 63 days of combat, the 4th Marine Division (including its subordinate 1/24th Marine Battalion commanded by LTC Jimmie Dyess) saw more close-combat action than any of the six Marine Divisions fighting in the Pacific Theater in WWII, proving the viability of amphibious attack against defended beaches."


Only one American citizen has earned Eagle Scout status, received the Carnegie Medal for civilian heroism, and been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor—Aquilla James "Jimmie" Dyess. A U.S. Navy destroyer and a Georgia highway bear his name, and an award symposium held annually in his honor salutes Americans who, over a lifetime, have made significant contributions to nation, community, and fellow citizens. *Courage, Compassion, Marine: The Unique Story of Jimmie Dyess* belongs on bookshelves alongside more recognizable biographies. I highly recommend this story of a unique and original American with remarkable achievements.

James D. Sharpe Jr., Fort Gordon, Georgia

THE SPEARHEADERS
A Personal History of Darby's Rangers
James J. Altieri, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2014, 318 pages

The Spearheaders: A Personal History of Darby's Rangers by James J. Altieri depicts the exceptional soldiers, tough training, and the attrition of sustained combat operations by Maj. William O. Darby's Rangers, America's first commando unit of World War II. The book is an account from Altieri's personal memoirs and written from an enlisted man's perspective. Altieri would rise through the ranks as an original member with the 1st Ranger Battalion and would eventually become a first sergeant and company commander of Fox Company, 4th Ranger Battalion.

Altieri enlisted on 8 October 1941 and joined the 68th Field Artillery of the First Armored Division. While serving with the First Armored Division in Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland, he volunteered for the 1st Ranger Battalion, which had been activated on 19 June 1942. Altieri was among many soldiers selected from several U.S. units in England who were willing to take the challenge posed by this new unit. He details the rigorous selection process and the realistic commando training received from their British Commando counterparts. The Rangers' realistic combat training in Ireland and Scotland in 1942 resulted in success and the development of new tactics. Altieri sheds detailed light on the Rangers' training in amphibious operations, weapons familiarization, and grueling foot marches—all of which honed them into a fighting force that would achieve success on the battlefields in Algeria, Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy.



Throughout the book looms the personality of William Orlando Darby. An artilleryman, Darby was the first commander of the 1st Ranger Battalion and put his stamp on the unit through his personal involvement in all facets of their training. Always at the front of the most grueling movements, Darby pioneered night raid tactics that brought the Rangers their early and dramatic successes. Darby was ferociously loyal to his Rangers. Alteri relates with pride that Darby twice turned down promotions to remain as the 1st Rangers commander.

The Spearheaders highlights Darby's gift and what distinguished him from other combat leaders of this era—his ability to recruit, organize, and train future Ranger battalions. After the North African Campaign, Darby and his officers and noncommissioned officers chose to seek out prospective Rangers rather than rely on other units to provide volunteers. He and his battalion leadership avoided existing combat units, most of which were either at the front or likely to see combat

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soon, and instead focused on the replacement depots and rear echelon formations in Algeria and Morocco. By April 1943, planners within the War Department gave approval to expand Darby's new Ranger Force to three battalions (1st, 3rd, and 4th battalions) for the campaigns in Sicily and Italy.

By the end of January 1944, Darby's Ranger Force ceased to exist as a fighting force, after the disaster at the battle of Cisterna. Darby's night infiltration attack neutralized a German staging area for an all-out drive to smash American forces in the Cisterna sector but found the 1st and 3rd battalions surrounded and cut off by tanks and numerically superior forces. Darby, with the 4th Battalion as the Reserve, tried desperately to reach the trapped Rangers. Darby's key failure at Cisterna was the lack of good intelligence. The Rangers unknowingly entered an area that had become heavily reinforced by veteran German units from the eastern front. Lightly equipped Rangers without proper support were no match for battle-hardened mechanized German units.

While elementary in style, Altieri presents personal experiences and insight as an original member of Darby's Rangers. *The Spearheaders* is a necessary read for any student of Ranger operations in World War II, as you can study the early formation, training, and employment of this elite force.


Adam J. Carson, Fort Gordon, Georgia

THE REVOLUTION'S LAST MEN
The Soldiers Behind the Photographs

Don N. Hagist, Westholme Publishing, Yardly, Pennsylvania, 2015, 256 pages

Wrinkles on their faces run like ancient rivers across rugged terrain. Eyes of aged men born in the eighteenth century glare at you from 1864 daguerreotype photographs, conveying a seriousness about their past, present, and future. *The Revolution's Last Men: The Soldiers Behind the Photographs,* by Don Hagist, impels the reader to look at the pictures before reading the biographies of these centenarians who were alive during the American Civil War. After soaking in the historic photographs, the reader must understand that this is a book about a book. Specifically, Hagist's book is a genealogical investigation of the facts, or lack thereof, of the Rev. Elias Brewster Hillard's original work, *Last Men of the Revolution.*

In early 1864, the outcome of the American Civil War remained undecided. The earth continued to consume the dead on battlefields, as described in detail by pro-Union newspapers and echoed by the cries of grieving parents and widows. An infant nation was crawling into a fourth year of the cauldron of war, resulting in a wave of apathy among many northerners. Hillard, a prominent minister from Connecticut, saw an opportunity to rally war-weary Unionists when Nelson and Roswell Moore published photographs of the living veterans of the American Revolution. In an attempt to rally the Union, Hillard embarked on a quest to interview these aged veterans and publish their stories along with the Moores's photographs. *Last Men of the Revolution* was completed and published in the same year, receiving accolades and recognition for his patriotic endeavor.



However, Hillard did not have access to pension records, nor did he attempt to validate the veterans' stories. He excluded revolutionary veterans living in southern states as that would be contrary to his motivation to rally northerners. There was also the fact that these veterans were late in years, some literally on their deathbeds when interviewed. In *The Revolution's Last Men,* Hagist conducts an exhaustive examination of the original interviews and subjects them to contemporary genealogical investigative techniques in order to correct, update, or corroborate the veterans' stories. As a result, Hagist brings a historical moment alive by artfully depicting the timeframes, events, and hardships these veterans faced during the American Revolution.

The book contains a foreword by renowned genealogist Maureen Taylor, who explains the efficacy of Hagist's book in correcting and updating portions of Hillard's interviews. Introductions by Hagist and a reprint of Hillard's original preface provide readers a

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roadmap to the importance and relevance of the surviving veterans' biographies. The chapters are dedicated to each of the six surviving veterans and arranged in the following order: Hagist's research and findings, photograph of the veteran, a thought-provoking sketch by Eric H. Schnitzer rendering what the veteran might have looked like as a young soldier, a drawing of the veteran's house at the time of interview, and Hillard's original interview transcript.

Hagist does an excellent job using pension and census records, as well as witness testimonies not available to Hillard, to align the veterans' testimonies with events, actions, locations, and battles they might have experienced. The photographs by themselves are worth the proverbial *thousand words*. His research adequately eliminates elements of exaggeration or failing memories that likely occurred during Hillard's interviews. The reader might find a degree of dynamic equivalency on Hagist's part (i.e., applying the author's sense of what the veteran might have sensed in the American Revolution versus trusting the words or phrases expressed by the veteran) when explaining how revolutionary era soldiers behaved in certain situations. However, Hagist's research does not distract from Hillard's interviews. On the contrary, his research and findings enhance our knowledge of the service these veterans provided during our nation's birth. This book is recommended for anyone that enjoys combining history with genealogical research to validate or enhance research conducted in previous eras.


Brook Allen, Fort Gordon, Georgia

ALL CANADA IN THE HANDS OF THE BRITISH
General Jeffrey Amherst and the 1760 Campaign to Conquer New France

Douglas R. Cubbison,
University of Oklahoma Press,
Norman, Oklahoma, 2014, 283 pages

Douglas Cubbison's exploration of Gen. Jeffrey Amherst recognizes an important fact—that most successful British Army officers seamlessly transitioned from leadership on conventional battlefields to leadership of population-centric style counterinsurgencies. Too often those two activities are posed as antithetical, but *All Canada in the Hands of the British* illustrates campaigns marked by successful command and control and a population-centered strategy. He argues that Amherst's use of three columns placed his force in the best position to defeat the French Army and to control the population.

Much of Cubbison's text focuses on the campaign of Amherst subordinate James Murray. Murray excellently secured the French population: "Murray's progress was slow and deliberate, as he landed strong detachments ashore at every parish (or township), swore the inhabitants to neutrality, and disarmed the Canadian militia, on which the French depended for resistance." Long before great military thinkers and strategists codified military treatises, Cubbison reveals officers who excelled at nested modes of warfare—traditional combat and nonviolent activities.



What is most impressive, however, is Cubbison's integration of illness and disease into the exploration of a well-led military campaign. While it is not a major theme in the book, Cubbison's attention to illness and fatigue is impressive. Scholars like Jared Diamond and Alfred Crosby have made military commanders look like nonfactors, who luckily gained victory solely because of disease, while Cubbison joins authors such as Elizabeth Fenn and John McNeil, who place a higher emphasis on how commanders managed disease. The merger of meticulous campaign analyses written with a mind for operational language, extensive primary source research, and a substantive argument that should influence Seven Years War historiography places Cubbison in a class by himself and makes his book a must read for military professionals. It portrays eighteenth century leaders whose capability as leaders should still impress today's Army.

Joseph Miller, Orono, Maine

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CONQUERORS
How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire
Roger Crowley, Random House, New York, 2015, 400 pages


Crowley has written several books about the wars between Christendom and Islam in the Mediterranean. Here he tells how the Portuguese created their maritime trading empire in the sixteenth century.

Portuguese mariners began exploring the Atlantic and coastal Africa in the 1420s for political, commercial, and religious reasons. Prince Henry, their principal sponsor, harnessed new sailing and shipbuilding techniques to extend Portuguese influence southward. The goal was to chart the African coast and the islands in the Atlantic systematically to search for an ocean route to Asia and break the Muslim-Venetian monopoly of the trade with India, thereby enriching Portugal and destroying Muslim power.

The Portuguese trading empire resembled those formed by the Scythians and Mongols, but their contemporary analogues were the Venetians and the Chinese. By 1510 they were in Goa (India), in 1535 they reached Macau (China), and by 1543, Japan. Their empire encompassed stations in Africa, the Persian Gulf (Aden and Hormuz), Malacca, China, and Japan. They forcibly established trading rights, built trading posts, and depended on local expertise throughout their expansion, using ships and cannon to open trade when negotiations failed. The discovery of open ocean routes to Asia opened the way to the contemporary world beginning with the Portuguese, who were followed by the Spanish, Dutch, English, and French.

Crowley's account shows how commercial goals were accompanied by a crusading impulse. A mixture of religious zeal and commercial opportunism made the Portuguese governor, Alonso de Albuquerque, the protagonist in Crowley's story, realize Portugal could control the silk and spice trade by occupying a few strategic points: Aden, Hormuz, Goa, and Malacca. Goa became the linchpin of the Portuguese trading empire.

The Portuguese followed the Chinese when the Ming engaged in maritime colonialism, controlling the main ports on the major East-West ocean trade networks through force or threats. The Portuguese would also control the port cities and dominate the commerce along the trade routes between them. Neither the Ming, the Portuguese, nor their seventeenth- and eighteenth-century successors sought territorial dominion; they wanted political and economic command of commercial lifelines, nodal points, and networks. By holding ports and trade routes, they controlled trade, which was essential for stability and prosperity.



Crowley judiciously uses the voluminous official correspondence of the leaders and the diaries kept by their subordinates to give this account of five hundred-year-old events dramatic immediacy. The Portuguese accomplishment included changing the genetic makeup of the South Indian population as well as European culinary and cultural habits.

Crowley tries to present a nuanced and fair interpretation of these events; he admires Portuguese bravery and curiosity but emphasizes their cruelty and greed while de-emphasizing the duplicitous tactics of the Indian rulers and Muslim merchants. In this, he mirrors our contemporary belief that the use of force in international relations began with fifteenth-century European colonialism. This premise is false, as violence occurred in world history from its beginnings—everywhere. In fact, the actions of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, and English in Asia were relatively benign compared to the punishment they inflicted on each other in Europe. Discovering an ocean route to India made Portugal the center of a global empire instead of a backward fringe of Europe. In the end, Portugal did not retain its dominant position due to internal and external factors, but that is another story.


This good book has great implications for our contemporary globalized world. Crowley's skill as a writer makes this an enjoyable book to read, too.

Lewis Bernstein, PhD, Woodbridge, Virginia

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Presidents Who Served in the Armed Forces


In 1879, Congress declared George Washington's birthday a federal holiday. It has since become commonly known as Presidents Day and is celebrated annually on the third Monday in February to honor all U.S. presidents. This year we commemorate those presidents who served in our military.



James A. Garfield
Major General, U.S. Army (Volunteers)
1861–1863




Harry S. Truman
Colonel, Army Officer Reserve Corps
1919–1945




Thomas Jefferson
Colonel, Virginia Militia
1770–1779




Jimmy Carter
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy
1946–1953



Abraham Lincoln
Captain, Illinois Militia
1832



William McKinley
Brevet Major, U.S. Army (Volunteers)
1861–1865



George Bush
Lieutenant (junior grade), U.S. Navy
1942–1945



Ulysses S. Grant
General, U.S. Army
1866–1869



Ronald Reagan
Captain, U.S. Army
1942–1945



Millard Fillmore
Major, Union Continentals (home guard)
1861




James Monroe
Major, Continental Army
1775–1778



Dwight D. Eisenhower
General of the Army, U.S. Army
1915–1948, 1951–1952



James Buchanan
Private, Pennsylvania Militia
1814




John Tyler
Captain, Virginia Militia
1812



Richard M. Nixon
Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve
1942–1966

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
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Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

MARCH-APRIL 2017



Singaporean National Values
Tan and Lew, p8

Close Air Support: A Different View
Bartels, Tormey, and Hendrickson, p70

Challenges to Unit Readiness
Morgan and Kim-Delio, p96

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2017 General William E. DePuy

Special Topics Writing Competition


This year's theme: "What needs to be fixed in the Army?"

Articles will be comparatively judged by a panel of senior Army leaders on how well they have clearly identified issues requiring solutions relevant to the Army in general, or to a significant portion of the Army; how effectively detailed and feasible the solutions to the identified problem are; and the level of writing excellence achieved. Writing must be logically developed and well organized, demonstrate professional-level grammar and usage, provide original insights, and be thoroughly researched as manifest in pertinent sources.

Contest closes 14 July 2017

1st Place	$1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place	$750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place	$500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*

For more information on how to submit an entry, please visit:
https://armyupress.army.mil/DePuy-Writing-Competition/.



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Themes and Suggested Topics for Future Editions

Global Challenges

- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- What are the ramifications of increased Russian military presence in the Middle East?
- What are the military implications of China's economic penetration into Latin America, Africa, and broader Asia?
- What must the U.S. military do to prepare for possible contingency operations in the South China Sea?
- What are the security implications of the growing Islamic presence in Europe? Elsewhere in the world?
- What must the Army do to prepare to fight in urban terrain or megacities? What are the ethical challenges to operating in this type of environment?
- What operational and logistical challenges arise from domestic and foreign infrastructure limitations and how can we mitigate them?
- How can we better prepare soldiers to operate against atypical combatants (i.e., nonuniformed or child warriors) and under conditions where noncombatants are difficult to distinguish?



Previous page: Sgt. Allan G. Torres and Pfc. Roman O'Doherty of the California Army National Guard's 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry Regiment, look for survivors during Vigilant Guard 17 on 17 November 2016. Vigilant Guard 17 is an exercise simulating a massive disaster response to a powerful earthquake in Los Angeles, California. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Eddie Siguenza, U.S. Army National Guard)

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The Changing U.S. Army

- Are U.S. Army rotational units as effective as permanently assigned, forward-deployed units?
- Does the Army need designated security force assistance brigades? How should they be organized?
- Have associated units helped or hindered readiness?
- How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?
- How does Army doctrine need to change to incorporate the cyberspace domain?
- Is there a role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?

Sgt. John Arriaga recovers his parachute after participating in an airborne proficiency operation during Exercise Arctic Aurora on 9 June 2016 at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. (Photo by Justin Connaher, U.S. Air Force)



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About the Cover: A U.S. Air Force tactical air control party member (*right*) points at a target in the field to a U.S. Air Force combat controller while participating in close air support training 1 May 2014 during Emerald Warrior 2014 at Hurlburt Field Air Force Base, Florida. (Photo by Senior Airman Colville McFee, U.S. Air Force)

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Mark A. Milley—General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

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Next page: Sniper Spc. James Wanser keeps watch in the early morning hours of 8 September 2011 while his battle buddy catches a few precious minutes of sleep in Paktika Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Spc. Ken Scar, U.S. Army)

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Poem of a Soldier

By 2nd Lt. George Bruner, U.S. Army

You praise the man I was, and curse the man I am.
Depending on which God you love, who I will be may be damned.
Yet still I'll sell my soul for you, I'll save us all from our worst selves,
I know no other love than this, I fear no other hell.

I am what I am, 'cause I was made to be.
I raise the mountains, bring them down, and push the seven seas.
I reap the grapes of wrath, I am the hand that feeds,
I am the brimstone falling from the angel wings.

I damn the damned, and bless the weak.
For the lame walk, and for the mute speak.
The poor and oppressed find their rest in me,
I break the chains and bring forth the free.

The destroyer of worlds, I am become of death.
I am enveloping nights, approaching bayonets.
I am the darkest valley where the sword is whet,
the shadow of death is my silhouette.

I was forged in a fire lit long ago.
Born of a crucible not my own.
Yet by this birthright in man am I mold,
I am strength multiplied by a thousand fold.

I am the photos of loved ones, now nothing but memories.
I am folded flags, torn, tattered and history.
Yet it is I who held high these in Pyrrhic victory,
I am the Idea that we've died for, for all of eternity.

I am the scorching heat, I am the bitter cold.
I am the broken sleep that shakes your soul.
I am the naive youth, and the fearful old,
I am the hell you pray you'll never know.

I am a soldier, and no one asked me to be.
I raised my right hand and said "God, send me!"
I am the man that the boy I was wanted to be,
The incarnate nightmare of my enemies' dreams.

I am the comforting safety we've known at home.
I am the cogs of wars we hope we won't.
Pray you never need me, yet when you do,
I am also the fear which caused you to.

I am the cherubim, and original sin.
I rule the fallen world, and the broken men.
From the depths of the waters to the roaring winds,
I am new beginnings and imminent ends.



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Recruits recite the Singapore Armed Forces pledge during a Basic Military Training graduation parade 12 December 2015 at the Marina Bay Floating Platform in Singapore's city center. The city skyline and the cheering families are visual reminders of what the recruits have sworn to protect. (Photo courtesy of the Singapore Armed Forces)

The Role of the Singapore Armed Forces in Forging National Values, Image, and Identity


Col. Fred Wei-Shi Tan, Singapore Armed Forces

Senior Lt. Col. Psalm B. C. Lew, Singapore Armed Forces

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Nothing creates loyalty and national consciousness more speedily and more thoroughly than participation in defence and membership of the armed forces ... the nation building aspect of defence will be more significant if its participation is spread out over all strata of society. This is possible only with some kind of national service.

—Dr. Goh Keng Swee



The national flag of Singapore reflects that nation's ideals, beliefs, and values. Red stands for universal brotherhood and equality of man. White symbolizes pervading and everlasting purity and virtue. The crescent moon represents a young nation on the ascendant, and the five stars depict Singapore's ideals of democracy, peace, progress, justice, and equality. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons; description from the Singapore National Heritage Board)

Singapore as a young country is unique in many ways. Its geo-strategic position at the crossroads of the world's busiest trade lanes has created a multiethnic and multiracial society, which is still attracting many foreign talents through immigration, bringing with it the challenge of establishing a unique and enduring national identity. The national flag carries a waxing crescent moon to embody the spirit of this young and growing country, and it is widely recognized in Singapore that the work of nationbuilding is never done.

Adding to the challenge of nationbuilding, Singapore's limited size, small population, and lack of natural resources necessitate a unique approach to its defense. It meets its security requirements through the implementation of national service (NS) in the military. Here, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is both the guardian of the country's national interests and sovereignty as well as a national institution that brings together people from all walks of life.[1] As such, there arises an important role for the SAF, through NS, which is to build a common set of beliefs within young Singaporeans that will define the people of Singapore collectively. This role for the SAF is already widely recognized and is echoed in Singaporean popular culture, with national service being the theme of many dramas and movies such as *Ah Boys to Men*, which will be filming its fourth sequel in 2017.[2]

Conscription as a Social Leveler

The practice of conscription in the past five decades has created the "NS citizen soldier"—a unique form of military professionalism where three hundred thousand national servicemen (NSmen) are part of the main fighting force alongside fifty thousand active-duty personnel.[3] The SAF has deliberately integrated active-duty personnel and NSmen. For example, a Singapore infantry brigade comprises a mix of active and NSmen units. The brigade headquarters is also staffed by both active-duty personnel and NSmen.[4]

The SAF has identified the need to sustain Singaporeans' commitment to defense as a key strategic objective. Toward that end, much effort and many resources have been invested into related initiatives such as values inculcation programs in the curriculum of military schools to help young Singaporeans affirm their national loyalty.

The values being inculcated in these programs are by design and top-down driven. They are not the result of a long common historical experience.

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Lew is the primary author for this article.

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The same conscious design applies to development and promotion of Singapore's code of Shared Values.

Singapore Armed Forces and the Continuous Journey of Nationbuilding

Five shared national values to be promulgated among citizens were proposed by a parliamentary committee and then passed by the Parliament of Singapore on 15 January 1991:

- Nation before community and society above self
- Family as the basic unit of society
- Community support and respect for the individual
- Consensus, not conflict
- Racial and religious harmony[5]

The SAF Core Values and Singapore Shared Values are routinely reviewed to ensure their continued relevance. In August 2012, the Singapore government launched Our Singapore Conversation, an initiative involving over 47,000 Singaporeans in over 660 dialogue sessions. Whilst one of the key perspectives was to build a Singapore anchored on values, there continues to be an open question on which of the Shared Values expressed in 1991 should be retained.[6]

Evolving Concepts of Values and Ethics in the Singapore Armed Forces

One of the first SAF manifestos to be published was the 1967 SAF Code of Conduct.[7] Its release coincided with the development of the first generation SAF. The six-line code prescribes a set of rules, standards, and obligations for all SAF servicemen and servicewomen:

1. We always honor our nation. We will do everything to uphold it and nothing to disgrace it.
2. At all times, we must bear in mind that we are the protector of our citizens.
3. We are loyal to the armed forces and we take pride in our unit, our uniform, our discipline, our work, our training, and ourselves.
4. We must be exemplary in our conduct. We respect others, and by our conduct win the respect of others. We are courageous but not reckless.
5. We are devoted to duty but not to ourselves.
6. We guard our weapons as we guard secrets.

When the SAF Code of Conduct was launched, the following declaration was made by Secretary of Defence Goh Keng Swee to clarify its intent:

> Members of the SAF have a unique role; they are not only the ever-vigilant guardian of our nation but are also required to be an example of good citizenship. ... Now therefore, I Goh Keng Swee, on the authority of the Army Board of Singapore hereby prescribe the Code of Conduct for members of the SAF. I prescribe that every member of the SAF shall abide by the Code of Conduct and measure up to the standards embodied therein.[8]

The SAF Code of Conduct was driven by necessity; Singapore was a young nation in 1967 and did not have a professional officer caste. There was an urgent need to use the Code of Conduct to ensure that a sense of dignity and purpose prevailed throughout the SAF as young Singaporeans were conscripted for NS. Yet, at the same time, the declaration also expressed the intent of the country's founding fathers to imprint upon Singapore's NS citizen-soldiers a set of ideals that each enlisted male citizen should have.

Singapore Armed Forces Core Values

In the late 1980s, the military began its transformation from a first to a second-generation SAF. The idea emerged to create a new "institute of excellence" that would eventually serve as the home of the SAF officer corps.[9] In creating this institute, the idea also included identifying a set of SAF core values in order to create a common set of attributes for SAF officers. After a series of rigorous discussions, the SAF Core Values—Loyalty to Country, Leadership, Discipline, Professionalism, Fighting Spirit, Ethics, and Care for Soldiers—were formalized and subsequently promulgated in 1996.[10] In 2013, Safety was added as the newest Core Value. These values were also incorporated into the SAF's Knowledge-Abilities-Qualities (KAQ) model of leadership under "Qualities," along with twelve other qualities of leadership.[11]

With senior leadership's emphasis and Singapore's system of mandatory national service, these values were inculcated in the SAF's officers who passed through the grounds of the SAFTI Military Institute—the home of the SAF officers corps—and then, through the officers, the values eventually were passed on to the soldiers.

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Singaporean soldiers stand with a police patrol on board an underground train. Singaporean national servicemen make meaningful contributions to defense, such as in the enhancement of homeland security operations. (Photo courtesy of the Singapore Armed Forces)

In 2016, as SAFTI Military Institute commemorated its fiftieth anniversary, it was recognized by the prime minister as a key institution of the SAF. It continues to play an important role in Singapore's security, particularly in imbuing the values such as leadership by example and overcoming adversity with courage.[12]

Definitions of the SAF Core Values

Loyalty to Country is best expressed in the Oath of Allegiance every SAF soldier, sailor, and airman takes upon entering service with the SAF.[13] In taking the oath, they become members of the SAF.

Service members demonstrate this Core Value by their duty and their commitment to defend their country and, if need be, sacrifice their lives for their country. This Core Value requires their respect and adherence to the military law and civilian law. It entails their willingness to bear arms in defense of their country until released by lawful authority while putting national interests ahead of personal interests. At its core, these are the fundamental obligations of all members of the SAF.


Leadership in the SAF is neither about the leader as a person, nor is it about the rank and authority that he or she holds. Leadership is the process of influencing people to accomplish the mission, inspire their commitment, and improve their organization. Service members demonstrate this Core Value by influencing people not only through their competence and skills, but also through their personal character of living their values each day. This value entails leading by personal example, presence, and involvement—by embodying the SAF Core Values each day. It involves leading with integrity, taking responsibility, and demonstrating selfless service

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to the Singaporean people, the SAF, and the country. Finally, it involves developing others to achieve their full potential while inspiring them to give their best to serve their country.

Discipline ensures the readiness to respond to emerging threats. It requires an appreciation of the military system and the role the military plays in the defense of the nation. This appreciation allows for the responsible obedience to orders and the timely and accurate execution of assigned tasks. Discipline is instilled through tough training and through mission command.

Service members demonstrate this Core Value by performing their duties to the best of their abilities, even when it is difficult and demanding. This means having the inner strength, self-control, mental stamina, physical toughness, and perseverance to accomplish assigned missions. Lastly, it means respecting established procedures and systems while being flexible and adapting appropriately to change, keeping the higher command's intent in mind at all times.



(Graphic by authors)

Figure 1. The SAF Core Values Inculcation Framework

Professionalism is exhibited through job proficiency and being consistently reliable in every action. Service members demonstrate this Core Value by continuously striving to learn, improve, and excel; by rejecting complacency; by setting high standards for everything they do; by training hard; and by always endeavoring to do their best.

Fighting Spirit is the tenacity and determination to succeed in any undertaking. Service members demonstrate this Core Value by showing aggressiveness and perseverance in training and by having the courage to engage decisively in battle and win. Having a fighting spirit means resolutely overcoming all odds with determination to accomplish the mission and having the mental fortitude to withstand fear and uncertainty while remaining vigilant in routine or mundane tasks.


Ethics is exercising principled conduct and having the moral strength to always do what is right rather than taking the easy way out or giving in to temptations. Service members demonstrate this Core Value by choosing to do what is right with convictions, unyielding even at personal cost; by being upright and trustworthy; and by being honest and accurate in reporting. Service members must have integrity when dealing with others, and they must not misuse their positions or power against anyone. They must think of the consequences before acting and accept responsibility and accountability for their actions.

Care for Soldiers is the genuine concern for the well-being of fellow comrades, their families, and those that service members are pledged to protect. Care goes beyond ensuring safety and providing welfare to support the physical, emotional, and mental wellness and health

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of comrades. It is demonstrated by ensuring they are properly equipped, provided with adequate sustenance, adequately rested, and thoroughly trained to fight and survive in battle. Lastly, care is shown by providing a personal touch and by having respect for one another.

Last, *Safety* is an integral part of training, operations, and mission success. Service members demonstrate this Core Value by conducting proper risk management and by vigilantly adhering to safety standards when performing all tasks. Safety is an individual, team, and command responsibility. Everyone is expected to be a safety advocate, championing safety in his or her own area of work. As members of a team, service members must always look out for one another and take care of each other.



(Graphic by authors)

Figure 2. The SAF Leadership Development Framework

Three Levels of Values Inculcation

To holistically implement values inculcation in the SAF, the SAF Centre for Leadership Development (CLD) has mapped out a three-level values inculcation process: alignment, adherence, and internalization (see figure 1, page 12).

Level 1 (Alignment). Conducted in workshops across all the key SAF route-of-advancement courses, this first level begins with clarification of each individual's personal values through self-reflection and values prioritization. This is followed by individual mapping, or alignment, of personal values to the SAF Core Values.

Level 2 (Adherence). This level focuses on helping leaders "do the right thing" whilst managing their concerns about punishments and conformity. To support the development of SAF leaders, CLD resources include case studies, SAF Core Values software through online learning platforms, and serious games. CLD also advocates character development through participation in sports in all SAFTI Military Institute courses.

Level 3 (Internalization). In this level, SAF leaders learn to internalize and apply the SAF Core Values in context by considering the tensions between the various Core Values to arrive at the *best* course of action. Modules like the "Ethics in Command," "Peace-Keeping Operations Scenario-Based Discussions," and "Storytelling of Personal Experiences" have been included in the curriculum of senior warrant officer courses, advanced-level officer courses, and the Command and Staff Course. Through these ethics modules, SAF leaders begin to reflect on what the SAF Core Values mean to them personally and how they can uphold these values in their daily lives. In doing so, it also prepares these leaders to sustain a values-based leadership culture in the units and military schools that they will eventually go on to lead, ultimately having a positive impact on the Core Values inculcation in young Singaporean conscripts.

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> To deter a potential aggressor, the most powerful national image for a small nation is one of a technologically advanced military coupled with committed, confident soldiers and cohesive units, anchored on a set of values shared by the people they defend.

Values as the Foundation of Leadership

As the military profession in Singapore transforms into a third-generation SAF, CLD has created a framework to help servicemen understand the ethics and values Singapore is striving to inculcate in its population. Since 2003, the SAF Leadership Development Framework (see figure 2, page 13) has guided commander's discussions about leadership in the SAF.[14]

Of the four components of leadership presented in the framework's triangle, Core Values is placed at the bottom because it is the foundation of effective leadership in the SAF. The framework's circle describes the context (i.e., SAF's mission and purpose, the operating environment, and desired outcomes) that shapes how SAF commanders lead and operate.

Whilst there has been no study to examine how many of the twenty thousand enlistees each year have adopted the SAF Core Values as their own, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that the SAF Core Values permeate Singapore's national character because 50 percent of the national population is fulfilling its NS obligation.

Forging Singapore's National Values through National Service

As the SAF Core Values evolve over the years, they recognizably shape the national values through the NSmen, who are both citizens and soldiers. With the NS system, the SAF's values are woven into the country's social fabric. This was only made possible through the many years of effort to engender strong support for NS. Today, for all Singaporeans, NS is considered a rite of passage to adulthood, and it is an undertaking close to the people's hearts.

Beyond the two-year, full-time NS, Singaporean males also serve as NSmen until they are fifty years old, with annual in-camp training and physical fitness requirements.

National service (NS) is also one path for permanent residents (foreign nationals) to becoming accepted as Singaporeans.[15] It is no longer a surprise to see a young man of European descent or first-generation immigrants from Asian countries training alongside Singaporeans in NS. Regardless of background in terms of race, language, religion, or social status, NS in Singapore is a "melting pot" for all to be trained as soldiers, sailors, and airmen with the common goal of defending the country. The shared NS experience of Singapore citizens and permanent residents greatly enhances the social cohesion of Singaporean society. Additionally, those who are beyond the age of enlistment can join the SAF Volunteer Corps. As auxiliary security trooper Philip Von Meyenburg said, they can "join the brotherhood ... of the SAF."[16]

Very few countries in the world share the same sense of military-social integration. The SAF epitomizes the values and belief systems held by its citizens, since the profession is formed by its people. A physical manifestation of the integration of the military service into the Singaporean social fabric is evidenced from the local saying that in every neighborhood and apartment block in Singapore, a few sets of military uniforms will always be seen hanging out to dry, especially on weekends when the soldiers return home.[17]

Therefore, in developing and building every new generation of soldiers, sailors, and airmen with the SAF Core Values, the SAF is building their character and preparing them for life as citizens with a common Singaporean identity. This process is in itself part of the nation-building effort to strengthen and reinforce Singapore's national values in its population.

Forging Singapore's National Image

The values shared by the soldiers and citizens shape Singapore's national image. Here, the SAF's role in projecting the national image is inherent in its mission, which is "to enhance Singapore's peace and security through

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deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor."[18] Deterrence in this case is contingent on the national image of Singapore from the perspective of the global publics. A positive national image of Singapore as an economically, socially, psychologically, and militarily strong country with civil preparedness along the five pillars of total defense creates deterrence and supports diplomacy.[19]

Branding the national image of Singapore is no longer just the mission of the Singapore Tourism Board; branding Singapore is arguably an integral part of the SAF mission.

As it stands, SAF has 350,000 active and national servicemen. This provides Singapore with a unique edge over many countries because, through NS, approximately 10 percent of the country's national population are ambassadors branding the national image regardless of whether they are in or out of their uniforms. Here, there are no elaborate programs or briefings to teach NSmen how to be ambassadors for their country; this is simply achieved through the inculcation of the SAF Core Values that are then overtly put on display in action by active-duty personnel and NSmen during operations that range from local missions such as the protection of key installations to overseas missions such as the support for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Additionally, it is our view that to deter a potential aggressor, the most powerful national image for a small nation is one of a technologically advanced military coupled with committed, confident soldiers and cohesive units, anchored on a set of values shared by the people they defend.



A Singapore national service promotional poster from a previous year. The Singapore Armed Forces celebrates the fiftieth anniversary of national service in 2017.

Forging Singapore's National Identity

Whilst individual values can be inculcated through daily living, and an image built through living out those values, national identity is forged through common experience. Accordingly, the SAF has played an important role in all of Singapore's key national events in the past fifty years. Whilst the SAF actively participates in celebratory events such as the organization of Singapore's Golden Jubilee in 2015, it has more importantly come forward during national crises. For example, the SAF conducted the emergency distribution of face masks during the trans-regional haze in 2014 and when Singapore was affected by severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003. And, in the face of terrorist threats, the SAF has been mounting operations to protect key installations such as the Jurong Island refinery, which supplies a significant percentage of the world's refined petroleum products.[20]

On all these occasions, the SAF has provided generations of conscripts an opportunity to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with fellow Singaporeans during crises, thereby strengthening their identification with Singapore and also helping a heterogeneous population act and feel as one.

Conclusion

Over the last fifty years, the SAF has provided a strong foundation to support Singapore's nation-building progress. As the former prime minister of Singapore, the late Lee Kuan Yew, told SAF officers

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at his last official engagement with them, "Without a strong SAF, there is no economic future, there is no security."[21] Through the SAF's national service system, generations of Singaporean citizens are reminded that "what you cannot defend is not yours."[22] In his preface in the SAF's fiftieth anniversary book, *Our SAF: Giving Strength to Our Nation*, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said, "Indeed, the SAF is the cornerstone of the Singapore Story. It has given us the peace and security to build a home, the strength to forge a cohesive society, and the freedom to pursue our dreams and chart our own destiny."[23] ■

Notes

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1. "Speech by the Minister of Defence, Dr Goh Keng Swee, in Moving the Second Reading of the National Service (Amendment) Bill in the Singapore Parliament on Monday, 13th March, 1967," Singapore Government Press Statement, accessed 20 December 2016, www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/PressR19670313b.pdf.

2. Jack Neo, *Ah Boys to Men* (Singapore: J Team Productions, 2012), DVD.

3. All Singaporean males who reach the age of eighteen are conscripted to render national service (NS) to the country. NS comprises two years of full-time service and at least ten years of NS liability, during which they render service up to a maximum of forty days per year. Upon completing ten years of NS liability, they will enter the Ministry of Defence Reserve. In essence, every male is a national serviceman. Those serving full-time are known as national servicemen, or NSFs, as opposed to national servicemen (NSmen) who serve annually.

4. Tim Huxley, *Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2004), 123–25.

5. *White Paper on Shared Values* (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1991), Call number: RSING 306.095957 SIN.

6. Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information, "Perspectives Arising from Our Singapore Conversation," Our Singapore Conversation website, accessed 20 December 2016, https://www.reach.gov.sg/oursgconversation.

7. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) initially printed the SAF Code of Conduct as little booklets with a red hardcover binding, which the soldiers were supposed to carry in their left breast pocket.

8. The SAF Code of Conduct was launched at a formal parade at the former Singapore Ministry of Interior and Defence on 14 July 1967. The late Dr. Goh Keng Swee, then minister of defence, signed a declaration that is on display at the Army Museum of Singapore.

9. The original institute, the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI), was founded in 1966. The Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute Military Institute (SAFTI MI) was officially opened in 1995; the new institute maintains its lineage from the original.

10. *The SAF Core Values: Our Common Identity* (Singapore: SAFTI MI, 1996).

11. Kim-Yin Chan et al., *Spirit and Systems: Leadership Development for a Third Generation SAF*, Pointer Monograph No. 4 (Singapore: SAFTI MI, 2005), 73, accessed 28 December 2016, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/publications/pointer/monographs/mono4/_jcr_content/imindefPars/0005/file.res/System%26Spirit.pdf.

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14. Kim-Yin Chan et al., *Spirit and Systems*, 17–22.

15. Male permanent residents in Singapore would generally be offered citizenship if they served national service.

16. Chan Lou Er, "First Cohort of SAFVC Volunteers Mark End of Basic Training," *Channel NewsAsia*, 27 June 2015, accessed 20 December 2016, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/first-cohort-of-safvc/1944666.html.

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Antigovernment protesters clash with police 12 March 2014 in Caracas, Venezuela. Supporters and foes of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro took to the streets of Caracas a month after similar rival rallies led to bloodshed in a wave of unrest around the nation. Red-clad sympathizers of Maduro's socialist government held a "march for peace" while opponents wearing white gathered to denounce alleged brutality by security forces during Venezuela's worst political troubles in a decade. (Photo by Carlos Garcia Rawlins, Reuters)

The Venezuelan Crisis
What the United States and the Region Can Do

Gustavo R. Coroncl

Venezuela is a failed state. A humanitarian crisis already exists there and is at imminent risk of becoming a major regional tragedy. For several years, the Venezuelan political, economic, and social situation has been deteriorating under the essentially passive eyes of the United States and most of the Latin American states. Such passivity has served to intensify a crisis that can no longer be ignored. Further delay in regional action to restore democracy and political and social stability in Venezuela would represent an act of collective irresponsibility. This article describes how Venezuela ended up as a failed state and analyzes the potential role the United

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States and the rest of the countries in the region can play in restoring democracy and stability to the country.

1999–2007: From Imperfect Democracy to Dictatorship

In December 1998, Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela. Seven years earlier, in 1992, he had unsuccessfully tried to reach power through a bloody military coup that had been years in the planning. Once in power by electoral means, Chávez rode very efficiently the wave of discontent with the previous administrations in order to dismantle existing democratic institutions and replace them with new ones loyal to him. During the initial period of his presidency, he was given unconditional support by most of the country, which he utilized adroitly to convert Venezuela into a dictatorship. How he succeeded can be summarized as follows:

14 December 1994. After being released from prison, where he was incarcerated as a result of his failed coup d'état, Chávez visited Fidel Castro in Havana. This visit marked the start of Castro's political mentoring of Chávez. His older brother Adan had already converted to Marxism.

6 November 1998. Legislative and state governor elections were held in Venezuela. Candidates endorsed by Chávez obtained eight governorships and eighty-seven seats in Congress, but non-Chávez followers obtained a clear majority, fifteen governorships and 168 seats in Congress.

6 December 1998. Chávez was elected president.

2 February 1999. During his presidential inauguration ceremony, Chávez violated the traditional oath of office. When asked, "Do you swear before God and the fatherland to fulfill the duties of Constitutional President, to obey and promote obedience to our Constitution?" he replied [author's translation], "I swear before God and the Fatherland, before my people and over this moribund constitution, that I will promote the transformations required for the new republic to have a new constitution adequate to the times."[1]

Immediately after his inauguration, he issued a presidential decree to convene a Constituent Assembly that not only would draft a new constitution but also would "transform the state and create a new judicial order based on a different model of government to the existing one."[2]

10 March 1999. To elect the representatives to the Constituent Assembly, the rules for proportional representation of minorities were replaced by Chávez in favor of a winner-take-all type of election. This arbitrary change in the rules made it possible for Chávez to obtain 96 percent of the seats in the assembly with the support of only 30 percent of the registered voters.

April 1999. In a letter to the Supreme Court of Justice, Chávez claimed, "Only the President had exclusive authority over the management of State affairs," and threatened the magistrates with popular retaliation if they did not rule in line with his wishes.[3]

August to September 1999. The Constituent Assembly, under control of Chávez, established its own bylaws, which included supraconstitutional powers. On 8 September, the assembly designated an "Emergency Commission for the Judicial Power" that summarily dismissed all national judges and named provisional replacements, many of whom are still provisional seventeen years later.

22 December 1999. The Constituent Assembly decreed the elimination of all existing public powers: the National Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice, the National Electoral Council, the attorney general, and the general comptroller. A report by the Organization of American States' Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concluded that this measure "weakened the validity of the constitution and prevented the proper constitutional designation of the proper authorities of the Venezuelan powers."[4]

30 December 1999. A new Venezuelan constitution was approved by the Constituent Assembly, written by Chávez's followers and giving him inordinate powers.

25 February 2001. The Inter American Press Association and the Committee to Protect Journalists denounced Chávez for the lack of freedom of expression

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Representatives of the member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) vote to suspend membership of Honduras at a special general assembly 5 July 2009 at the organization's headquarters in Washington, D.C., following the coup d'etat that expelled Honduran President José Manuel Zelaya from power. The OAS voted to readmit Honduras 1 June 2011 after Zelaya was permitted to return from exile. Similar measures could be initiated against Venezuela (although many Caribbean states in the OAS still support Venezuela in exchange for oil subsidies). (Photo courtesy of the Presidency of the Nation of Argentina)

in Venezuela, claiming he was violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.[5]

8 November 2001. The Military High Command made public its support to the Chávez revolution, in violation of the constitution that did not allow political pronouncements by the military.

12 December 2002. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights urgently requested that the Organization of American States (OAS) act against the deterioration of the rule of law in Venezuela.[6]

15 December 2002. In his television program *Alo Presidente*, Chávez instructed military members, governors, and public employees to ignore judicial rulings that would contravene his presidential decrees.

February to March 2003. Chávez fired about eighteen thousand managers and technicians of the state-owned petroleum company who had gone on strike to protest the politicization of the management of the company.

14 May 2004. The Venezuelan National Assembly, by simple majority, which was in violation of the law, revised the structure of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, expanding it from twenty to thirty-two members to guarantee a Chávez majority. Human Rights Watch claimed that this move eliminated the autonomy of the judicial power.[7]

June 2005. The Venezuelan National Assembly changed the rules of the Venezuelan Central Bank, allowing Chávez to use up to $5 billion of the country's international reserves for current government expenditures.

January 2007. By this time Chávez had nationalized telecommunications and power utilities, taken over foreign oil company activities, ended the autonomy of the

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Venezuelan Central Bank, and disbanded all government political parties to form one single party.

2007–2012: Absolute Power Leads to Unprecedented Corruption

By early 2007, total political power was firmly in the hands of Chávez. During this period of increasingly authoritarian rule, the management of Venezuelan national wealth went from unsatisfactory to chaotic. Oil income had been steadily increasing. In 1998, the average price of oil had been $10.57 per barrel; in 2007, it was $64.74 per barrel; and, in 2008, it jumped to $86.48 per barrel, staying at around that level until 2012. During this six-year period, Chávez had access to about $500 billion in oil income, and he utilized this extraordinary windfall to consolidate his political power at home and abroad. By 2009, close to $40 billion had already been distributed by Chávez to foreign governments in order to buy political loyalties.[8] By 2012, the amount of handouts abroad had increased to no less than $150 billion, particularly to Castro's Cuba, since one hundred thousand barrels per day of Venezuelan oil were being sent to Cuba, to be paid back in sports training, medical services, and other services. This arrangement allowed the Castro government to send some fifty thousand Cubans to Venezuela, many of whom went to control strategic areas of Venezuelan public administration, including identification and economic matters. Chávez instituted a system of domestic handouts that put money in the pockets of the poor but did not solve the structural problems of poverty.

I have documented some of the most notable cases of Chávez corruption during this period in two papers.[9] In a summarized version of those papers, I described how Venezuela had been subjected to an unprecedented level of corruption, placing the country among the twelve most corrupt countries in the world in the Perception of Corruption Index prepared every year by Transparency International.[10] The concentration of decision making in a very small government oligarchy inevitably led to a total breakdown of transparency and accountability in the country. Corruption was, arguably, the only component of Chávez's political system that became more democratic since, in contrast with the dictatorships of the past, where the exercise of corruption was the privilege of the few, Chávez allowed his followers to share, in various degrees, the oil income "piñata" that should have been used for the benefit of all Venezuelans. In replacement of the traditional Venezuelan middle class, a new and corrupt *chavista* social class rapidly emerged, made up of government bureaucrats, friendly contractors, relatives, and armed forces officers.

Most corruption was generated in four main areas of government: the presidential palace, the oil enterprise, the military, and the finance ministry.

Presidential Level. At this level, the nature of corruption was mostly political, although significant amounts of cash were kept without control at the presidential palace, to be utilized as necessity dictated.

The presidential palace was the place where violations of the constitution were decided and the president exercised his abuse of power. In the palace, Cubans controlled sensitive intelligence matters, illegal financing of foreign electoral campaigns occurred, bribes of friendly leaders in the hemisphere were allocated, and political strategies were agreed upon with brotherly dictatorships in Cuba, Belarus, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Zimbabwe, and with authoritarian regimes in Argentina, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.

Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). By 2008, PDVSA was no longer a conventional oil company but a "social" company engaged in diverse businesses that ranged from importing and distributing food to building low-quality housing. Contracts without bidding were often assigned to friends of the regime. Kickbacks became customary. The management of the company and the national comptroller systematically ignored PDVSA's scandals, such as the 2010 contracting of the offshore drilling rig Aban Pearl to a ghost company, rampant overpricing in procurement contracts to benefit contractors and company insiders, and the illegal use of the employee's pension fund for speculative purposes. The president of the company, Rafael Ramirez, was also the minister of energy and petroleum, and he systematically diverted PDVSA's funds from the company into the pockets of the executive branch, to be used without accountability. By 2012, PDVSA was deep into debt in spite of high oil prices, since its income was diverted to partisan political activities. Due to lack of proper infrastructure investment, oil production and the condition of plants and equipment had deteriorated significantly, causing refinery accidents and numerous oil spills due to leaking pipelines.[11]

The Defense Ministry and the National Guard. A 2009 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office to the U.S. Congress reported increasing corruption among the Venezuelan military, especially

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the national guard.[12] Corruption, said the report, had reached the ministerial level of the government. In particular, the links of the Venezuelan military and the Colombian terrorist and drug trafficking group known as the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) had been clearly established, as proven by the contents of the laptops belonging to deceased FARC leader Raul Reyes. The U.S. government named three high members of the government as drug kingpins for providing material support to the FARC. Gen. Henry Rangel Silva, Gen. Hugo Carvajal, and former Minister of the Interior Ramon Rodriguez Chacin are still active members of the Venezuelan regime.

Ministry of Finance. The management of Venezuelan finances from 2007 to 2012 was chaotic. Utilizing the mechanisms of dual exchange rates and exchange controls without transparency, finance ministers, officers and friendly bankers and brokers became instant millionaires. Parallel financial funds were established and operated without accountability and received billions of dollars, much of which ended up in the pockets of members of the regime.[13] By eliminating the autonomy of the Venezuelan Central Bank, international reserves were diverted into the hands of the executive branch, in order to be used for current expenditures and for political purposes.

2012–2016: Venezuela Becomes a Failed State

After the death of Chávez in either December 2012 or early 2013 (Venezuelans have never known the exact date or cause of death), former Finance Minister Jorge Giordani denounced the manner in which the huge loans received from China had been largely utilized to finance the Chávez presidential campaign in 2012, when he was already a dying man and clearly incapable of surviving another six-year term as president. Giordani admitted that the electoral victory of Chávez had been obtained thanks to a significant portion of the $60 billion in loans received from China and to the use of inorganic money (paper currency without gold backing) printed by the Venezuelan Central Bank.[14] Although victorious, Chávez was dying, and before leaving Venezuela to be treated in Cuba for the last time, he asked Venezuelans to accept Nicolas Maduro as his replacement. Acting on his wishes, the regime violated electoral regulations in order to designate Maduro as a candidate. His narrow electoral victory over the opposition candidate, Henrique Capriles, was so murky that the United States withheld recognition of the new government. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry demanded a recount.[15] Fearing a massacre of civilians if he took to the streets, Capriles ceased in his claims of fraud, and the United States was left without basis to keep challenging the results of the election.

Under Maduro's presidency (2013 to 2017), Venezuela has been almost totally destroyed. Consider this evidence:

- According to former Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki Moon, Venezuela is in a state of humanitarian crisis, with food and medicine severely restricted and thousands of Venezuelans leaving the country by land, air, and sea.[16]
- Medicine sent to Venezuela by charitable organizations is not allowed to enter the country, or it is confiscated by regime customs agents for their own purposes.[17]
- Inflation is at 500 percent, the highest in the world.[18]
- The national murder rate is at some fifty-eight deaths per one hundred thousand inhabitants, the second highest rate in the world, while the murder rate in Caracas is 119 deaths per one hundred thousand inhabitants.[19]
- Large gangs of armed criminals called "colectivos" control large areas in the capital city of Caracas. In other cities, they are engaged in war with the armed forces.
- In 2015, Venezuela was listed as the ninth most corrupt country in the world by Transparency International.[20]
- Venezuela was rated by the knowledge web-portal globalEDGE as having "the highest-risk political and economic situation and the most difficult business environment. Corporate default is likely."[21]
- PDVSA, the state oil company, has suffered a production drop of about eight hundred thousand barrels per day since 1998.[22] The country needs the price of oil to be at least $80 per barrel to make ends meet, but the price of oil remains much lower than that, and no relief is in sight.
- About a dozen high level members of the government, including ministers, generals of the armed forces, and state governors, have been named by the U.S. government for violating human rights or for engaging in drug trafficking.

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Antigovernment protesters demonstrate 16 March 2014 in Caracas, Venezuela, in part to protest the dominant Cuban influence on the Venezuelan government. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro warned protesters to clear a main square in Caracas or face eviction by security forces. Plaza Altamira, in upscale east Caracas, was the focus of antigovernment protests and violence during six weeks of unrest around Venezuela that killed twenty-eight people. (Photo by Tomas Bravo, Reuters)

- Members of the Venezuelan armed forces at all levels, including those in the National Guard and the Army, are significantly involved in drug trafficking, while the High Military Command is openly backing the unconstitutional government of Maduro. Diosdado Cabello, considered the number two man in the government hierarchy, has been denounced as being the czar of the Venezuelan military drug cartel by a former bodyguard who is currently in the United States as a protected witness.[23]
- Two nephews of Maduro, raised by his wife, Cilia Flores, have been convicted in a New York court of drug trafficking. They were holding Venezuelan diplomatic passports and enjoyed a lifestyle only possible as a privileged member of the Venezuelan regime.
- The Supreme Tribunal of Justice is completely made up of Maduro's followers. The president of the Tribunal, Maikel Moreno, was arrested in 1987 for murder.[24]
- The Supreme Tribunal of Justice has systematically invalidated all activities of the Venezuelan National Assembly, duly elected in December 2015, to the point that opposition lawmakers denounced the actions as "a rupture of the constitutional order" in the country, and the secretary–general of the OAS, Luis Almagro, "threatened to invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which could lead to sanctions being imposed on Venezuela."[25]

These and other components of the current Venezuelan political, economic, and social situation characterize the country as a failed state, defined as "a nation in which the government has lost political authority and control and is unable to fulfill the basic responsibilities of a sovereign state."[26] The only entities still working in an organized manner are the police and

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the armed forces, which are engaged in the repression of Venezuelan citizens.

What Can the United States and the Region Do to Help Venezuela?

Given that Venezuela is a failed state, what can be done to help the country to regain democracy, respect for human rights, and political and economic stability? There is a deeply ingrained tendency in Latin America to refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, mostly because intervention has led in the past to violations of the sovereignty of weaker states at the hands of stronger states. However, since 2011, the OAS has incorporated as a fundamental part of its mission the provisions of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which will allow the OAS to intervene in a country when democracy and the rule of law are seriously threatened.[27] Consequently, the work of the OAS has become very difficult because of these seemingly opposite mindsets: intervening as required by the Inter-American Democratic Charter versus the tendency to adhere to the older, deeply ingrained doctrine of nonintervention.

This apparent contradiction has been skillfully exploited by member countries that oppose intervention in another country for ideological reasons or because of economic interests. This has been the case in Venezuela during the last decade. Countries friendly to the Venezuelan regime's ideology, or countries that have been beneficiaries of the Chávez financial largesse such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Honduras, and some of the English-speaking Caribbean countries, have integrated a bloc in the OAS that has prevented any action against Venezuela. However, the current dramatic economic crisis in Venezuela has contributed to the weakening of this bloc.

The United States and the region at large should be prepared to prevent or to minimize the impact of a political, economic, and social implosion in Venezuela.

What the United States Can Do

In his 2009 inaugural address U.S. President Barack Obama said,

> We reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our founding fathers, ... faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man—a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience sake.[28]

In the case of Venezuela, Obama's promise was not fully kept. U.S. policy toward Venezuela has not been so much guided by principles as by short-term political interests. In the view of the United States, Chávez and Maduro, although dictators, gave Venezuela a degree of stability that kept the country from becoming a regional problem. The Venezuelan regime kept Cuba subsidized, sending significant amounts of oil to the island, which helped prevent a major stampede of Cubans into the United States. For the United States, it seemed preferable to permit sacrificing some degree of political freedom of Venezuelans for the sake of maintaining a precarious balancing act in the Caribbean. However, the extended life given to the Venezuelan regime by this U.S. posture is generating a humanitarian crisis of major proportions that seriously threatens regional stability. A change of policy must no longer be postponed.

Below are fourteen considerations for U.S. policy that would have a positive effect on Venezuela. The United States should—

- discard direct, unilateral military action as a course of action. The price to pay for such a move would be too high in terms of a loss of prestige and a generation of regional resentment. A military intervention in Venezuela could only be considered as a joint regional action decided by the OAS, or even the United Nations, in response to major internal turmoil with loss of life.
- have no doubt that it is dealing with a dictatorship—with a failed state that was able for a long time to mask its true nature under pseudodemocratic pretenses. This is no longer the case.
- no longer promote a dialogue between the Venezuelan opposition, the victims of the dictatorship, and the regime, since such a dialogue has only served to keep the opposition immobilized while the dictatorial regime maintains its grip on power.
- recognize that a change of political regime in Venezuela is urgent and act to make this possible. In particular, it should demand an immediate electoral solution to the Venezuelan crisis, which would allow a new government to be installed.
- vigorously promote the application of the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter to Venezuela,

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working in close connection with the OAS secretary general and with the countries that have already given indications of pursuing this objective. Sanctions against Venezuela could be economic and political, and they could even include the expulsion of Venezuela from the organization.

- place greater focus during investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and Department of Homeland Security on those Venezuelan civil and military members of the regime responsible for violating human rights or engaging in administrative corruption and drug trafficking. Many of those Venezuelans have assets in the United States that are being and should continue to be frozen by the U.S. government. Maximum publicity should be given to these actions since they would give a significant boost to the morale of Venezuelans who are frustrated by the absence of justice in their country.
- publicly warn the Venezuelan regime that abuse and repression of Venezuelan citizens are crimes that the United States does not condone and that are punishable by international law.
- warn Cuba that for the current improvement of relations between the two countries to continue, it should cease intervening in Venezuela. The degree of Cuban intervention in Venezuela has been unparalleled in recent Latin American history, essentially reducing Venezuela to a Cuban political satellite playing the role of a "sugar daddy" to the Castro regime.
- try to persuade China that a change in the Venezuelan political regime would work in its best economic interests. China's continued support of the current regime might create a backlash from future Venezuelan governments that would put their investments in jeopardy. Moreover, the current regime can no longer guarantee the normal development of Chinese investments.
- promote the political and economic isolation of the Venezuelan regime among European and Asian partners.
- take the initiative in planning and coordinating a shared humanitarian response for potentially devastating conditions in Venezuela. It should work with the OAS and, particularly, with the Venezuelan neighbors—Colombia, Brazil, Curaçao, Aruba, and Bonaire—that would be most affected by a massive flood of Venezuelan refugees into their countries. The territorial fragility of the Caribbean islands mentioned above would also merit the attention of the Netherlands, a country having significant historical, economic, and political links with the islands. Such a plan should include provisions for temporary housing, food availability, and medical attention.
- support a plan for financial assistance to a new Venezuelan government, since the Venezuelan national treasury will be found in ruins. Assistance should be a coordinated effort among the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Andean Development Corporation.
- be ready to advise a new democratic Venezuelan government on security matters, which have been highly compromised by the Cuban presence in Venezuela. In particular, urgent help will be needed for police operations and prison administration.
- reestablish close links with the Venezuelan military after a new democratic government is established in Venezuela.

What the Region Can Do

While the United States has the opportunity to positively influence the situation in Venezuela, other countries in the region also can take actions that would be beneficial to Venezuela and the region:

- Twenty-one former presidents of Latin American nations have already taken a proactive attitude toward the Venezuelan situation, calling for immediate release of political prisoners and for an electoral solution to the crisis.[29] There are no valid reasons why incumbent presidents should not do the same, since their countries do not depend on Venezuelan handouts to bolster their economies. Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and many of the other countries in the region could clearly speak up, both individually and within international organizations such as the United Nations, the OAS, the Union of South American Nations, and the Southern Common Market (known as MERCOSUR).
- The countries of the region should unite behind a policy of international isolation against a Venezuelan regime that is no longer defensible as legitimate.
- The countries of the region should intensify action against the Venezuelan regime within MERCOSUR,

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since the grip of the Venezuelan regime on this organization can be more easily neutralized than in the OAS, where Caribbean states still vote for the Venezuelan regime in exchange for oil subsidies.

- MERCOSUR should expel Venezuela.
- Brazil and Argentina should take the initiative in these efforts against the Venezuelan regime. They were clearly the most active supporters of Chávez at the time Lula da Silva (Brazil) and Néstor and Cristina Kirchner (Argentina) were in power, but now those countries have governments of a different nature.

Conclusion

Some of the suggestions made above could be considered naïve in U.S. or regional diplomatic spheres. However, I share Matthew Spalding's views when he says, "An allegiance to principle and a clear recognition of the requirements of international security can be complementary. When rightly understood, they are inseparable—at least, this is what the American Founders thought."[30] The call for principles-driven diplomacy is also contained in Obama's previously cited first inauguration address. This was also the way former President Ronald Reagan, sometimes considered naïve in international matters, saw his job when he met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik in 1986. Reagan used a mixture of principles, idealism, and candor, which found a strong sympathetic response. Reagan's approach is credited with ending a suicidal arms race.

When talking about composer Camille Saint Saens, his colleague Hector Berlioz once said, "This young man knows everything, but he lacks inexperience."[31] This is a piece of advice that U.S. and Latin American policy makers, often intent on sophistication, should always keep in mind. ■

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Supporters of presidential candidate Mauricio Macri of the *Cambiemos* (Change) Party gather at their headquarters 22 November 2015 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Conservative opposition candidate Macri comfortably won Argentina's presidential election after promising business-friendly reforms to spur investment in the country's struggling economy. (Photo by Ivan Alvarado, Reuters)

Argentina at the Crossroads Again

Implications for the United States and for the Region

Dr. R. Evan Ellis

The inauguration of Argentine President Mauricio Macri on 10 December 2015 started a dramatic transformation for the country and its relationship with the region. The incoming president began his work under the most difficult of circumstances, symbolized by the refusal of his predecessor, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, to keep with decorum and publicly hand over the presidential sash. More problematically, her

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outgoing team reportedly provided almost zero transition support, and in some cases, took computer hard drives and otherwise removed or destroyed data needed by the incoming government.[1]

Macri's legislative achievements in his first year in office were remarkable. Although his *Cambiemos* (Change) coalition was a minority in both houses of the *Congreso de la Nación Argentina* (Argentine National Congress), his government passed approximately ninety laws during the period, working with dissident members of the previously in power Peronist Party and using the national government's significant financial contribution to provincial budgets as leverage in influencing their senators.



(Map courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Figure. Major Drug Trafficking Routes through Argentina

During his first year, Macri moved quickly to resolve outstanding debt claims against the country and reestablish its access to international financial markets, to reduce costly subsidies to public utilities, to lower export taxes undermining agricultural and mining output, and to correct other economic distortions. Within that time, he also declared a national emergency and frontally attacked narcotrafficking and rising criminality in the country, redeploying elements of the elite police gendarmerie, giving new life to Argentina's Financial Intelligence Unit, and authorizing the military to protect the nation's airspace against drug flights.

In foreign policy, Macri took significant steps to broaden and reorient the country's international engagement, rebuilding Argentina's relationship with the United States while continuing to do business with extraregional actors such as China and Russia, albeit through a more conservative filter of Argentine laws and institutions. He also sought to diversify those relationships to include expanded engagement with a broader range of actors such as Japan, Korea, and others while taking a critical stance toward Venezuela and other populist-socialist regimes within the hemisphere.

While not by design, Macri's reorientation of Argentina advances the interests of the United States and the region. While his administration's policies and legislative initiatives have been controversial within Argentina and are not beyond reproach, they have launched Argentina on a constructive new path that, if successful, will not only contribute to the development and prosperity of Argentina, but will also strengthen the institutional framework of the region.[2] The outcome of Macri's efforts will almost certainly influence debates in the region

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regarding development policies and foreign engagement. If successful, Argentina could serve as an example for others regarding how a competent bureaucracy—applying technically sensible, market-oriented policies while working to strengthen institutions, transparency, and rule of law—can advance security, prosperity, and development. With respect to foreign policy, Argentina will showcase how the United States treats its friends, even while highlighting a path for how a nation can participate as a dignified, sovereign actor in the international system, benefiting from interactions with a broad range of international players and constructively participating in international institutions.

This article examines the policies of the Macri government with an emphasis on security and defense policies and foreign engagement, including their significance for the United States and the region. It concludes with policy recommendations for how the United States can help Argentina succeed on its promising new path.

Argentina's Fight against Narcotrafficking and Insecurity

During the administrations of Néstor Kirchner and his wife, Cristina Fernández, from 2003 through 2015, Argentina became a significant transit country for cocaine and other drugs originating in Peru and Bolivia, principally destined to supply the European market. Contrary to widespread perception that the principal drug transit problem is narcoflights, most drugs move through Argentina overland or by river (see figure, page 28).[3] Cocaine, for example, is most typically smuggled across the porous land border with Bolivia, where it is accumulated into larger quantities that are periodically shipped south in trucks and other vehicles to Argentina's principal population centers including Cordoba, Rosario, and Buenos Aires. A principal alternative method is to load drugs onto barges on the Paraguay River (generally near the drug-hub Paraguayan city of Pedro Juan Caballero), and then smuggle them down the Paraguay and Parana Rivers (sometimes in combination with contraband commercial products) to major Argentine ports such as Rosario, Campana, or Buenos Aires. The route from the interior of the continent down the Paraguay and Parana Rivers presents particularly significant challenges, since the quantity of commercial barge traffic on the river is enormous, and its status as an international waterway impedes the *Prefectura Naval* (Argentine Coast Guard) from inspecting vessels without probable cause.

At the major Argentine ports, the drugs are smuggled onto container ships and other oceangoing vessels for shipment across the Atlantic to Africa and eventually Europe. Argentine enforcement efforts have also sometimes forced traffickers to use ports further to the south such as Mar de Plata and Bahia Blanca, as well as the Port of Montevideo, where the Uruguayan government has relatively fewer resources monitoring maritime commerce for narcotics.[4]

With time, the flow of drugs through Argentina's major population centers has created an expanding local drug market for products such as low-purity cocaine, highly addictive and lethal alternatives such as "paco" (similar to "crack" cocaine), and, for more affluent consumers, synthetic drugs principally imported from Europe.[5] These drugs have fueled expanding violence and insecurity in the greater Buenos Aires area (*conurbano*) and other major urban centers. Rosario, as a commercial and narcotics hub port, fed by drug flows from the north along both Route 9 and the Parana River, is contested by multiple narcotrafficking groups. The city—and more broadly, the province of Santa Fe in which it is located—has become one of the most dangerous parts of the country.[6]

The drug challenge in Argentina is further complicated by the fractured nature of the criminal landscape. Numerous small groups are involved in different parts of the smuggling and transforming of drugs, and innumerable small gangs play a role in drug distribution and crime in the more troubled neighborhoods of the conurbano. While there are individual Colombian, Mexican, Bolivian, and Peruvian narcotraffickers in the country, the major cartels of the region such as *Sinaloa* and *Jalisco Nuevo Generación* (Mexico) and the *Gulf Clan* (Colombia) have not yet made a meaningful effort to dominate

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and organize the market. Indeed, even external drug *demand* is fractionalized, with a range of actors that includes the Italian mafia and even Serbians.[7]

One of Macri's first major policy actions upon assuming office in December 2015 was to declare a national drug emergency, and through Decree 228, to task the military to support the Ministry of National Security and provincial and local forces in combating the threat.[8] Given that Argentina's 1988 defense law explicitly prohibits the military from engaging in an internal security role, its principal tasking under the decree has been limited to operating radar systems and patrolling the national airspace to deter drug flights in support of "Operation Northern Shield."[9]

Argentina's military has expanded radar coverage against drug flights by increasing the number of operating hours of radar systems positioned in the north and deploying new radar systems (including those produced domestically) to the north of the country, although efforts have been impeded by local governments such as that of Formosa Province, which has moved slowly in building the infrastructure necessary to support the deployment of the new radar systems.[10] The Argentine Air Force also has a small number of aging Pucara, Pampa, and A4 aircraft to use as interceptors, but their age creates maintenance issues that severely restrict their availability.[11] Such challenges notwithstanding, and although the Argentine military has not shot down a single aircraft, the act of deploying these radar systems and interceptor aircraft has contributed to a 20 percent decrease in suspected narcoflights detected during the past year.[12]

The Macri government has not, however, confined the focus of its counterdrug collaboration to the military. To overcome longstanding challenges of communication and coordination between federal and provincial organizations, the Macri government is working to establish a series of five intelligence fusion centers, with the first to begin operating in Jujuy Province in early 2017.[13] With the support of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, it has also established a series of interagency task forces, also focused on the north, with the first established in the province of Salta in late 2016 and one slated to begin functioning in the province of Misiones during the first half of 2017.

The Macri administration is also committed to combatting money laundering. In March 2016, Argentina's Financial Intelligence Unit renewed cooperation with the U.S. Department of Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Cooperation had been suspended by the United States after the Fernández government used U.S. financial intelligence against political opponents.[14] Furthermore, in order to combat the risk of corruption in the security forces generated in the course of their fight against narcotrafficking, the government has implemented new regulations and laws, including one obliging all organizations within the national security ministry to declare their assets, as a vehicle for identifying illicit enrichment.

At the subnational level, the government has established a new high-level police school to increase the capability and standardization of provincial-level police, such as the notoriously corrupt *Bonarense* (of the province of Buenos Aires).[15] And, in order to enhance security in troubled urban areas with limited police resources, the government has deployed elements of the gendarmerie, its elite militarized police, to such neighborhoods, albeit at the cost of drawing them away from other missions such as border security. Indeed, in December 2015, in an effort to make an additional 1,500 gendarmerie available for urban patrolling, the Minister of National Security asked Macri for a decree assigning the military to protect critical infrastructure such as hydroelectric facilities, currently the responsibility of the gendarmerie.[16]

Military Capacity Building

When Macri took office, he inherited a military demoralized by predecessor governments, which had severely limited its budget, publicly ignored it or emphasized its role in the "dirty war" against leftist insurgents during the 1970s, and regularly interfered with its internal system for the promotion of officers.[17] During the Fernández administration, the government moved from a threat-based to a capabilities-based acquisition planning model, removing the military's ability to use external threats to politically argue for its budget, even while not funding the capabilities that the military planned for under the new methodology.

Argentine military budget. By the time Macri took office, procurement and operations spending had become so reduced that 80 percent of the military budget was dedicated to personnel. Argentine Air Force assets had become deteriorated to the point that the military was hard pressed to scramble two aging fighters to intercept

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a small Cessna aircraft that had inadvertently entered restricted airspace during President Barack Obama's visit to the country in March 2016; if the acquisition of new aircraft continues to be delayed, the Argentine armed forces are projected to have no fighter-interceptor capability whatsoever by 2018.[18] Argentina's only icebreaker had been in dry dock awaiting funding for repairs for so long (seven years) that when it was finally ready for sea trials, the channel had filled in with mud and needed to be dredged before the ship could leave the port. The Argentine navy's three submarines had reportedly spent so few days at sea that an analysis by Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-South America argued that Argentina had effectively lost its subsurface capability.[19]

The Macri administration was able to give the military a small budget increase for 2016 and eliminated billets for twenty-three general officers to free up resources for modernization. Yet, the increase in operating costs to support the counternarcotics campaign in the north has diverted resources, forcing the military to restructure acquisitions, including postponing purchasing new interceptor aircraft until at least 2018 (the Korean KA-50 is rumored to be favored as the front-runner) and reducing the acquisition of Beechcraft T-6 Texan trainers from twenty-four to twelve planes.[20]

Argentine land forces. The army is modernizing its *Tanque Argentino Mediano* (main battle tank, or TAM), the core of its armored force, as well as upgrading its domestically developed artillery vehicles and aging U.S. M113 armored personnel carriers.[21] Yet, while it aspires to shift from tracked vehicles to more wheeled vehicles that are better suited for current missions, budget limitations have forced the postponement of the acquisition of 6x6 or 8x8 armored vehicles such as the Chinese VN-1, the Brazilian Guarani, or the (rumored favorite) U.S. Stryker vehicle.

Argentine maritime capabilities. Argentina's resolution of disputes over its defaulted debt has removed the threat that twice manifested itself during the previous administration of Argentine ships being seized in foreign ports based on international legal actions.[22] Nonetheless, Argentina's surface and submarine fleets remain small, with expired munitions, as well as delayed upgrades and service-life extensions for its core surface combatants, its four Meko 360 destroyers and six Meko 140 frigates. The purchase of ocean patrol vessels from China or France has also been postponed, while Argentina's three submarines spent so little time underwater in 2014, that the country is assessed to no longer have a submarine capability.[23] Even the rental of Russian tugboats as part of the nation's campaign to support its bases in the Antarctic had to be abandoned following problems with the bidding.

> "The selection of the Georgia National Guard to work with Argentina in the U.S. State Partnership Program has opened up an array of new cooperation opportunities, including in humanitarian assistance and disaster response, border security, aviation, environmental matters, and preparation for peacekeeping missions."

U.S.–Argentine military relationship. During the Fernández era, Argentine military attaches were not even permitted to talk to their U.S. counterparts without Ministry of Defense approval.[24] The United States was expelled from offices that it once occupied in the Argentine defense ministry, and the assets of a U.S. military training team were seized at the airport. By contrast, since Macri's inauguration, military cooperation has been one of the most fruitful areas in the rapidly expanding U.S.–Argentina relationship.

While new U.S. arms sales to Argentina's military concentrated on the previously mentioned twelve T-6 Texans, it has significantly expanded military-to-military exchanges. Training opportunities now include billets for Argentine officers in the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South facility in Key West, Florida; instructor billets at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation; and student billets at the Naval War College and possibly at the Army War College. Perhaps most significantly, however, the selection of the Georgia National Guard

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Argentine Defense Minister Julio Martínez, U.S. Ambassador Noah Mamet, and Georgia Adjutant General Brig. Gen. Joe Jarrard sign an agreement 13 December 2016 at the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires, forming a partnership between the Argentine military and the Georgia National Guard that enables them to carry out joint activities as part of the U.S. Department of Defense's State Partnership Program. This collaboration allows the Georgia Guard and the Argentinian military forces to train together for disaster preparedness, environmental issues, and other opportunities. (Photo courtesy of the Georgia National Guard)

to work with Argentina in the U.S. State Partnership Program has opened up an array of new cooperation opportunities, including in humanitarian assistance and disaster response, border security, aviation, environmental matters, and preparation for peacekeeping missions.[25]

Argentina's New Foreign Engagement Posture

Macri has reoriented Argentina's foreign policy within the region and with respect to the United States, and he has fostered less ideological, more diverse relationships with extrahemispheric actors. Macri has moved Argentina away from giving a privileged position to anti-U.S. actors in the Western Hemisphere and to U.S. geopolitical rivals beyond it, to a more pragmatic posture that seeks mutually beneficial commercial and political ties with countries such as China and Russia. He has substantially reconstructed Argentina's close relationship with the United States, renewed engagement with traditional international institutions (including renewed access to international capital markets), and pursued relations with a broader group of extraregional actors of all ideological orientations, including Australia, South Korea, and Japan. By contrast to his predecessor, Macri has taken a far more critical stance toward Venezuela and other socialist-populist governments in the region. Macri's unifying theme in all of these engagements has arguably been to expand the nation's options, avoiding an excess of dependency on a single ally or an ideological block such as *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América* (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, or ALBA) that could undermine Argentine sovereignty.

China. Macri began his administration by suspending a broad range of commercial and military projects with Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, while most of the deals with

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Russia were abandoned, Macri ultimately proceeded forward with many of the projects with Chinese companies. This included continuation of a PRC-built and -operated deep space radar in the province of Neuquén (securing a commitment from the Chinese that the facility would not be used for military purposes), as well as construction of two nuclear reactors in the Atucha complex and modernization of the Belgrano Cargas railway system.[26]

Although the president's father, Franco Macri, has been one of the key figures involved in business deals in Argentina with Chinese partners, the elder Macri's ties have arguably not defined his son's outlook, since he developed that part of his business at a stage in his career when his son was involved in other activities, such as running the Boca Juniors soccer team and serving as mayor of Buenos Aires. Yet, Mauricio Macri has experience with China in his own right, having traveled there in July 2014 as mayor of Buenos Aires to promote business between his city and the PRC, then calling China "a great opportunity."[27]

Despite the previously mentioned successes and Macri's experience and receptivity toward China, multiple important projects with PRC-based companies have foundered during his administration. These include construction of a gas pipeline in Cordoba, frozen by a dispute over the supply of the tubing by a Chinese vendor who beat out the local supplier, Techint, on price.[28] It also includes two hydroelectric projects on the Santa Cruz River, halted on environmental grounds by the Argentine Supreme Court.[29] In addition, none of the major weapons sales negotiated by Macri's predecessor have gone forward, including plans to purchase Chinese FC-1 fighters (with some production in Argentina as an offset), armored vehicles such as the Norinco WMZ-551 and VN-1 personnel carriers, Z-9 helicopters, and offshore patrol vessels (the endurance of which was reportedly insufficient for the operational demands of the long Argentine coastline).[30]

Perhaps Macri's biggest fight with the Chinese has been his refusal to formally recognize the PRC as a market economy within the framework of the World Trade Organization. Argentina's production minister Francisco Cabrera stated publicly in December 2016 that the government would not make a definitive declaration, but would instead review Chinese activities on a case-by-case basis, suggesting concern that overtly rejecting China's market status could endanger Chinese investments in the country.[31]

Beyond the PRC, Macri's efforts to broaden Argentina's engagement with Asia include the visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Argentina in November 2016, as well as his meetings with the leaders of South Korea, Australia, and India during the G-20 summit in Hangzhou, China.[32]

Russia. Macri's presidency has contributed to the derailing of multiple military and commercial deals between Argentina and Russia, although he has tried to do so without sending an overtly hostile message. Argentine Defense Minister Julio Martinez and joint chiefs of staff head Bari del Valle Sosa traveled to Russia in the fall of 2016, meeting with defense officials and arms suppliers, yet almost none of the arms contracts discussed at the end of the Fernández administration have gone forward, including purchase of Su-24 Flanker fighters.[33] Even the controversial renting of Russian ships for the nation's Antarctica campaign was canceled in September 2016, and questions have emerged regarding the purchase of three Russian Mi-17 helicopters.[34]

Nor has Russian commercial engagement with Argentina prospered under Macri. In December 2016, plans for construction of the Chihuido hydroelectric facility by the Russian company InterRao were halted over a dispute over the rate of interest for financing the project. Even the Russian-language television channel *Russia Today* was taken off the air in June 2016, in what Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called an "unfriendly act." *Russia Today* later reached an agreement allowing it to continue on the air.[35]

Iran. The Macri government has effectively ended the informal rapprochement with Iran that President Fernández had pursued since her January 2014 meeting with Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro in Havana, Cuba. Indeed, in December 2016, Macri's justice ministry opened an investigation into his predecessor's possible cover-up of Iran's role in terrorist attacks against Jewish targets in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994.[36] Yet, on the commercial front, the January 2016 termination of international sanctions against Iran creates the opportunity for Iran's commerce with Argentina to significantly expand, including the possibility that it could increase direct purchases of Argentine grains and rice.

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A police officer searches a man during an 11 April 2014 drug raid in the "21" slum in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The rising use of drug-trafficking routes through Argentina is also leading to greater drug use within that country, fueling growing violence between gangs battling to control turf and markets. (Photo by Natacha Pisarenko, Associated Press)

Nonstate actors. An estimated two hundred thousand practicing Muslims live in Argentina, and Buenos Aires is the site of the largest mosque in South America (the Saudi Arabia-sponsored King Fahd mosque, affiliated with the Wahhabi sect within Sunni Islam).[37] Yet, the nation takes pride in the relatively peaceful cohabitation of its large Muslim, Jewish, and other communities.

While the Macri administration has not canceled his predecessor's commitment to bring three thousand refugees into the country from Syria, potentially including radicalized Muslims, the onerous screening and placement requirements established by the government have permitted the entry of fewer than ten families, all of whom had applied under the previous government.

Latin America. Macri's presidency has helped to shift the South American region from a center-left pragmatism to a less ideological, center-right one, in which Argentina plays a more active role. Macri has ideological differences with Uruguayan president Tabare Vasquez, including over Venezuela's membership in *Mercado Común del Sur* (Southern Common Market, more commonly known as MERCOSUR). However, Vasquez is a pragmatist, and is reportedly much happier dealing with Macri than with Macri's predecessors such as Néstor Kirchner, who opened a serious dispute with Uruguay in 2005 over the construction of the Botnia paper mill on the border between the two states.

Chilean President Michelle Bachelet has embraced an expanded role for Argentina as an observer of the Pacific Alliance, and a closer relationship between the latter and MERCOSUR—a position that will likely be supported by other Pacific Alliance members as the region looks for new trade integration frameworks to offset the expected U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership under President Donald Trump.[38]

With respect to regional institutions, Macri has de-emphasized the two multilateral groups exclusive of

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the United States of which Argentina was part— *Unión de Naciones Suramericanas* (Union of South American Nations, or UNASUR) and *Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños* (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, or CELAC)—relegating affairs regarding both to the vice presidency. Correspondingly, Macri has increased Argentine support for using the Organization of American States (OAS) to address regional security affairs. However, given the OAS need for consensus among its members to make key decisions, the continuing anti-U.S. orientation of member states such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua will impede meaningful expansion of the role of the OAS in regional security affairs in the near term.

Near-Term Challenges

While the direction that Mauricio Macri is taking Argentina is promising for the United States and the region, the country stands at a dangerous crossroad. During 2016, the president's utility-sector reforms produced politically painful 300 to 400 percent increases in utility prices, significantly affecting the pocketbook of Argentines and small businesses; further increases are expected in 2017.[39]

Despite Macri administration policy and rhetoric that suggested a more business-friendly environment, investors did not return to the country at the rate expected. They were spooked by opposition-supported legislation in December 2016 that threatened to reimpose the mining export tax and the prospect that the Peronist Party could return to the presidency in 2019, either in the form of (sometimes) Macri political ally Sergio Massa or Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, if she is not sentenced to jail.[40]

Amidst significant protests over utility rate hikes and other policies of the Macri administration, the economy contracted by 1.8 percent in 2016. At the end of December, Finance Minister Alfonso Prat-Gay resigned over differences with Macri in his approach, and the government announced the intention to split the ministry.[41] The combination of painful adjustments and a lack of strong evidence that Macri's policies were producing results increases the risk that Argentina's October 2017 legislative elections could go badly for Macri's Cambiemos coalition, undercutting his ability to further pursue his agenda.

Macri is operating in the shadow of the fact that his is only the third non-Peronist government since Argentina's return to democracy in 1983, and the other two ended prematurely. The first, Raul Alfonsin of the Radical Civic Union party, was president during Argentina's transition to democracy from 1983 to 1989; Alfonsin resigned under pressure six months prematurely as part of that transition. The second, Fernando de la Rua, also of the Radical Civic Union, was president from 1999 to 2001; he resigned amidst Argentina's severe 2001 economic crisis.

Recommendations for the United States

Although the Macri administration in Argentina does not seek to unconditionally ally itself with the United States, its support of a free market economy, strong democratic institutions, and transparent, nonideological international engagement are aligned with the interests of the United States and advance prosperity and democracy in the region. The United States has a stake in helping Macri and his government to succeed.

From an economic perspective, the incoming U.S. administration of Donald Trump should begin by openly recognizing the positive direction Argentina has taken and the progress it has made. The United States—through its public and private statements, technical assessments of the U.S. Treasury Department, the resources of the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and U.S. leverage with the Interamerican Development Bank and World Bank—should facilitate Argentina in obtaining the international credit that it needs to make it through such difficult times. Through such actions, the Trump administration should encourage expanded U.S. investment in the country, while the U.S. Congress should consider special legislation incentivizing such investment. Over the long run, the United States should consider granting Argentina special unilateral trade preferences. Pursuant to Argentina's economic stabilization, the United States should support Argentina's candidacy to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in a more forceful fashion than the gesture made by the outgoing Obama administration.[42]

To support Argentina's fight against counternarcotics, the new U.S. administration should fully back expanded cooperation between the U.S. Department of Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and Argentina's Financial Intelligence Unit. It should

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also continue U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency support for the interagency task forces being established in the north of Argentina, and it should provide assistance to Argentina's whole-of-government fight against narcotrafficking and insecurity.

With respect to defense cooperation, the United States should continue to expand engagement, and it should ensure a continued successful linkage between Argentina and the Georgia National Guard through the State Partnership Program. It should also seriously consider offering Argentina access to Foreign Military Financing, reserved for close U.S. friends and allies. Access to this program could be useful for Argentina in the acquisition of defense articles such as the Stryker combat vehicle. It would also demonstrate U.S. support to Argentina and the benefits of working with the United States. The United States should also consider financed billets for Argentine officers at the Army War College and Air University in addition to Argentina's current billet at the Naval War College.



For the United States, the dramatic change in tone in the U.S.–Argentina relationship and the rapid expansion of cooperation with the nation in 2016 was one of the best "good news" foreign engagement stories of the year. Yet, the Macri administration remains worrisomely fragile as it enters 2017. Through modest support for the Argentine government such as the recommendations discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the United States can help Macri succeed and, in the process, advance its own interests, those of Argentina, and those of the region. ■

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Notes

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9. The military has also used its assets to transport personnel in support of the broader drug mission.

10. Off-the-record interview with Argentine security official, December 2016.

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Addressing Behavioral Health Impacts

Balancing Treatment and Mission Readiness

Lt. Col. Christopher Landers, U.S. Army

The 2015 *Army Health of the Force Report* found that 17 percent of the force is medically not ready.[1] This rate includes soldiers with both physical and behavioral health concerns. Despite the significantly different challenges faced by soldiers as compared to their civilian counterparts, soldiers continue to demonstrate amazing resilience. Still, 15 percent (2014 prevalence rate) of the force has been diagnosed with a behavioral health disorder for which they require treatment.[2]

If the Army asked commanders in the field what they think is the greatest challenge to individual soldier fitness in recent years, many might tell the Army it is the seemingly steep rise in behavioral health-related problems, jumping from 9.4 percent diagnosed in 2007 to 15 percent in 2014.[3] In a substantial number of cases, the behavioral health condition leads to an inability, at least partially, of a soldier to perform his or her wartime mission. In 2014, soldiers with behavioral health conditions totaled about eighty thousand hospital admissions and one million medical encounters.[4] That is the equivalent of nearly an entire battalion spending three months in the hospital each year. Not included in that estimate are the thousands of patients who received a duty profile that relieves them from performing their assigned function.

The Mission Readiness Challenge

As economic, political, and global considerations drive the Army ever smaller, the challenge of maintaining combat readiness grows. A smaller force is more vulnerable to become less combat ready due to nonavailable soldiers; the smaller the force the greater the operational impact of nonavailable soldiers.

Therefore, issues associated with behavioral health that may determine the availability of a soldier, including anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and suicidal behavior have a significant and growing impact on unit readiness across the Army. More worrisome than the scale of the problem is the Army's seeming inability to protect and maintain unit readiness while still providing for the treatment needs of soldiers.

Current protocols for treatment and separation, if required, leave very little flexibility for commanders as they try to preserve readiness. Prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of behavioral health problems have received considerable, and well-needed attention, but as the Army has made strides in suicide prevention, it has created another problem: a decrease in the Army's available population for training and deployment. To deal effectively with the challenge of balancing soldier needs with unit readiness, commanders need flexibility in order to effectively treat those who need care in a way that minimizes impact on unit training and operations.

Addressing the Behavioral Health Problem

In the middle of what is now a fifteen-year war effort, the Army recognized a significant gap in its ability to diagnose and effectively treat behavioral health conditions that were resulting in a sharp increase in PTSD

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Staff Sgt. Jerry Majetich holds an emotional Cpl. Charles Dupree, Orlando Warrior Transition Unit, during Operation Proper Exit 16 June 2010 at Contingency Operating Station (COS) Falcon, Iraq. Dupree's unit was attacked in October 2005 in Al Dora. COS Falcon was the wounded warriors' first stop while in Iraq. (Photo by Spc. Jared Eastman, U.S. Army)

depression-related suicides. In response, the Army requested that the National Institute for Mental Health establish a team of researchers to help with the problem. Subsequently, the Army initiated the Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers (STARRS) program in 2009 and reported each year through 2015. Army STARRS investigators looked for factors that helped protect a soldier's mental health as well as those that put a soldier's mental health at risk.[5] The Army STARRS research team designed and implemented five study components to analyze the problem, looking separately at each to better understand the problem and provide constructive recommendations.[6] Over the last few years, the team of researchers has produced more than thirty studies.

Concurrently, the secretary of the Army directed the vice chief of staff to "take a holistic look and identify

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Staff Sgt. Paul Bryant leads a team of service members who are recuperating from injuries in the Wounded Warrior Canoe Regatta 18 August 2013 in Honolulu, Hawaii. (Photo by Mass Communication Spc. 1st Class Daniel Barker, U.S. Navy)

systemic breakdowns or concerns in the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) affecting the diagnosis and evaluation of behavioral health conditions."[7] To accomplish the task, the Army created the Army Task Force on Behavioral Health (ATFBH) in 2012, which conducted a comprehensive review and produced the *Corrective Action Plan* (CAP) to address and rectify identified breakdowns or concerns.[8]

Findings, Results, and Impacts on Readiness

The Army STARRS research project and the CAP served two key purposes. First, the Army STARRS studies sought to help prevent or predict behavioral health problems by identifying potentially at-risk soldiers and factors or conditions that may put more soldiers at risk (or increase the risk for those already identified as at risk).

According to the study, soldiers are at greatest risk if they are male, white, and junior enlisted. Not having graduated high school and recent punishment or demotion are also identified as risk factors. Being previously deployed or currently deployed also places soldiers at higher risk, especially among the female population.

Contrary to popular belief, however, the study identified a marked increase in suicide events and behavioral health disorders among never-deployed soldiers. Those at perhaps greatest risk for suicidal ideation or attempts are those with preenlistment psychiatric diagnoses. About half of all suicide cases (ideation, plans, or attempts) had preenlistment onset.[9] This is not surprising, as across the United States, "the estimated prevalence of any DSM-IV anxiety, mood, behavior, or substance disorder in this sample was 53.1 percent. ... The vast majority of cases (91.6 percent) had onsets that were prior to expected age-of-enlistment if they were in the Army."[10]

The implications of these research results are significant. Effective preenlistment screening could essentially preclude half of Army suicide-related events by preventing those with anxiety, mood, behavior, or substance

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abuse disorders from enlisting. Of course, there are problems with such an undertaking. Though submission of medical records is required for initial screening if the applicant has indicated prior behavioral health treatment, how many are actually disclosing prior treatment? A quick web search reveals hundreds of prospective soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in online forums discussing what they should or should not disclose in order to pass screening. With that in mind, compulsory submission of insurance data and claims may reduce successful attempts at deception. Enhanced psychological screening similar to that undergone by special operations forces would almost certainly help reduce the accession of unsuitable soldiers, but the undertaking would likely be cost- and time-prohibitive on such a large scale.

The CAP focused on treatment. Better access to care (e.g., behavioral health specialists embedded with Army brigade combat teams), better understanding of the problem, and more effective and efficient IDES processes all have served to increase the overall quality of care for affected soldiers. The CAP included "24 findings and 47 recommendations to improve the behavioral health diagnosis and evaluations in the context of IDES."[11]

Some of the important recommendations, now implemented, include: an expanded embedded behavioral health program that aligns providers with deployable brigade-sized units; standardization of diagnosis and evaluation of soldiers with PTSD; streamlined IDES process; revision of Army Regulation (AR) 635-40, *Physical Evaluation for Retention, Retirement, or Separation,* into a single, comprehensive regulation for IDES; developed IDES performance measures that graded speed through the process and quality of care; better education for senior Army leaders on behavioral health-related issues in IDES; better training for behavioral health leadership and administration; better personnel manning related to diagnosis and treatment of behavioral health-related issues; clarification of commanders' legal options for administrative action involving soldiers with a behavioral health condition; revised policy on the surgeon general review of all soldiers pending discharge for personality disorder; and several others.[12]

Though it is difficult to state conclusively, the implementation of the ATFBH CAP and other soldier-led prevention programs are likely to have played a major role in the recent downturn in suicides and nonfatal suicide events. Reduction in suicide events appears to be a clear and unmistakable success. There is little doubt that soldiers are more readily diagnosed, more expertly treated and, unfortunately, more often deemed nonavailable (at least temporarily).

Overall, the Army's response to the behavioral health crisis has been generally along two lines of effort. First, to diagnose and treat those with conditions related to military service for whom medical retirement is appropriate. Second, to screen out soldiers who cannot adapt to military life due to preexisting behavioral health conditions. The current system seems to focus more significantly on the former and may not be ideally suited to handle the latter.[13]

Recommendations to Mitigate Impacts to Unit Readiness

Above all, the Army should not change how it now identifies, diagnoses, and cares for its soldiers who suffer from behavioral health conditions that require treatment. The Army has made great strides in prevention, diagnosis, and treatment in recent years. The unintended consequence is that an increase in prevalence has caused a corresponding decrease in unit readiness. Eighty thousand hospital days per year is hard to absorb for an Army whose number one priority is readiness.[14]

While prevention and treatment have been the appropriate focus, more attention must be paid to maintaining unit readiness at the tactical level. Every nonavailable soldier has a significant and growing negative impact on readiness as the Army shrinks while commitments grow. Some additional actions to assist commanders in maintaining readiness are worth consideration.

First, increase the Army's commitment to and utilization of Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) for soldiers whose behavioral health condition prevents them from serving in a productive capacity. Existing at most major installations,

> A WTU closely resembles a "line" Army unit, with professional cadre

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A SIMILAR VIEWPOINT



Cpl. Kyle Click, a dog handler with 3rd Platoon, Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, and a native of Grand Rapids, Michigan, shares a moment with Windy, an improvised-explosive-device detection dog, while waiting to resume a security patrol 27 February 2012 in Garmsir District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Cpl. Reece Lodder, U.S. Marine Corps)

A Call for Research on the Impact of Dogs Deployed in Units to Reduce Posttraumatic Stress

Rebecca Segal

There is evidence that dogs should be deployed in forward-operating units to reduce the incidence and severity of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD is a major medical concern for the U.S. military, yet current therapies are of limited effectiveness, and they do not begin until weeks after a stressful event.[1] The body's response to stress actually begins on day zero and, if severe, is referred to as an *acute stress*

In a related story, "A Call for Research on the Impact of Dogs Deployed in Units to Reduce Posttraumatic Stress," Rebecca Segal espouses deploying support or service dogs to combat theaters to help speed diagnosis and treatment of individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder. Like Lt. Col. Landers, Segal recognizes the significant negative effects that mental health issues such as posttraumatic stress can have on unit readiness. Segal stresses that the costs of this affliction in lost productivity, health care, and unit cohesion make this pet therapy initiative an imperative.

For online access to Segal's "A Call for Research on the Impact of Dogs Deployed in Units to Reduce Posttraumatic Stress" in the November-December 2016 issue of *Military Review*, visit: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20161231_art015.pdf.

and integrated Army processes that build on the Army's strength of unit cohesion and teamwork so that wounded soldiers can focus on healing before transitioning back to Army or civilian status. Within a WTU, wounded, ill, and injured soldiers work with their Triad of Care—primary care manager (normally a physician), nurse case manager, and squad leader—who coordinate their care with other clinical and non-clinical professionals.[15]

Soldiers in WTUs are solely focused on recovery in preparation for a return to service or transition to civilian life.

Many soldiers assigned to WTUs are concurrently enrolled in the IDES process. In IDES, injured and ill soldiers receive treatment and evaluation to either return the soldier to service or render an "unfit" determination and process the soldier for transition. Like those who are physically unfit, most (there are exceptions) soldiers to be separated for being unfit due to a behavioral health condition must complete the IDES process, with a goal of 295 days from start to finish.[16]

Assigning a soldier to a WTU as early as possible in the evaluation process allows the soldier to continue appropriate treatment while simultaneously helping to sustain unit readiness through the replacement process. Currently, most soldiers enrolled in the IDES process for separation remain assigned to the unit as a nonavailable soldier, with obvious impacts to readiness. A challenge faced by commanders is that AR 40-58, *Warrior Care and Transition Program*, expressly prohibits admission to WTUs for the purpose of maintaining unit readiness through acquisitions. Further, admission for psychological conditions must be of a severity that the soldier poses a *substantial* risk to self or others if the soldier remains in the unit.[17] Few soldiers in treatment meet this threshold (at least initially), though many receive duty-limiting profiles that are detrimental to readiness. As a result, it is not uncommon for a battalion-sized unit to have dozens of soldiers in IDES pending separation—all nonavailable for the entire 295 days (assuming the IDES timeline goal is met).

Second, the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) should follow through with an important CAP recommendation: a statutory revision of DOD Instruction 1332.38, *Physical Disability Evaluation*, and AR 635-200, *Active Duty Enlisted Administrative*

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Spc. Gerrick Cole, Sgt. Michael Harris, and Lt. Col. Zabrina Seay-Maynard practice playing the guitar in the Sounds of Acoustic Recovery (SOAR) program at the Dale Wayrynen Recreation Center, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. SOAR is an eight-week program that allows wounded soldiers to learn the basics of guitar or piano, or receive voice lessons at a beginner or intermediate level. SOAR provides therapy to help soldiers remain strong and recover from injuries in preparation for the next phase of their lives. (Photo by Lori Brenae Perkins, *Fort Campbell Courier*)

Separations, to allow up to 365 days for detection of a preexisting behavioral health condition in soldiers who have not deployed.[18] Currently, the preexisting behavioral health condition must be identified within the first 180 days, after which, discovery requires enrollment in IDES for separation. As the CAP states,

> Preexisting BH [behavioral health] conditions often do not manifest in the structured and regimented periods of initial entry training. Allowing detection up to 365 days allows more time to detect an illness.[19]

This change would allow for a separation under chapter 5-11 (separation of personnel who did not meet procurement medical fitness standards) through a soldier's first six months at their first unit. This is especially important as over 75 percent of never-deployed soldiers who have a diagnosed disorder reported a preenlistment age of onset.[20] Not only do three-quarters of diagnosed disorders begin before enlistment, but they are also more powerful predictors of severe role impairment than disorders with post-enlistment onset.[21] The pursuit of a separation under chapter 5-11 via the medical evaluation board should not be construed as a denial of care. Since the CAP recommends that a soldier separated under chapter 5-11 between 181 and 365 days remain eligible for an honorable characterization of service, full VA benefits apply.


The data certainly suggests that limiting accessions of those with pre-enlistment mental disorders could help minimize the problems that materialize later in service, but diagnosis is difficult since symptoms are usually minor in adolescence and too mild to cause rejection from military service.[22] Even if the prospective soldier is aware of a disqualifying diagnosis, he or she is not always going to disclose it since doing so is self-limiting.

Lastly, the Army should consider extending chapter 11, "Entry Level Performance and Conduct," to

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WE RECOMMEND



Article

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Suicides in the U.S. Military: Birth Cohort Vulnerability and the All-Volunteer Force

James Griffith[1] and Craig J. Bryan[1]

Abstract

This paper builds a case for examining suicide in the U.S. military relative to broad societal context, specifically, the unique experiences of birth cohorts relating to processes described by Durkheim's theory of suicide. In more recent birth cohorts, suicide rates have increased among teenagers and young adults. In addition, suicide rates of age intervals at a given time period have been reliably predicted by the size of the birth cohort and the percentage of nonmarital births—supposed indicators of Durkheim's diminished social integration and behavioral regulation. Consequences of these trends are likely more evident in the U.S. military due to having proportionally more individuals known to be at risk for suicide, that is, young males who are from nontraditional households. The all-volunteer force compared to draft force has fewer applicants to select, and proportionally more of applicants are accepted for military service. Consequently, more recruits having varied conditions now than before, perhaps including greater vulnerability to suicide, serve in the U.S. military. These points are further elaborated with supporting evidence, concluding with a call for new directions in suicide research, practice, and policy.

Keywords

military suicides, birth cohort, social integration, all-volunteer force

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Among the most challenging and puzzling issues the U.S. Army has faced among combat veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 has been the unusually high number of suicides as compared to the number of such incidents associated with previous wars. In "Suicides in the U.S. Military: Birth Cohort Vulnerability and the All-Volunteer Force," originally published in Armed Forces & Society in 2015, authors James Griffith and Craig J. Bryan provide original research from which they develop unique and persuasive explanations for the underlying causes of the unusually high number of suicides occurring among veterans of the U.S. Army. In conjunction, they recommend mitigating solutions aimed at lowering the number of suicides.

To access their paper, visit: http://afs.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/11/16/0095327X15614552.full.pdf+html.

365 days. Like chapter 5-11, separation under chapter 11 (often referred to as a "failure to adapt" chapter) is limited to the first 180 days of service, essentially covering initial entry training only. Relevant to this recommendation, this separation policy applies to soldiers who "cannot or will not adapt socially or emotionally to military life, or have demonstrated character and behavior characteristics not compatible with satisfactory continued service."[23]

Limiting this separation policy to 180 days is overly restrictive if commanders are really measuring a soldier's ability to adapt to military life. Like the previous recommendation regarding chapter 5-11, the regimented nature of initial enlistment training does not adequately replicate "military life," therefore successful adaptation to initial entry training does not equate to successful adaptation to the Army. The day-to-day stressors of looming deployments, field training, personal relationships, family concerns, financial management, and others are far different from the relatively straightforward life while in initial enlistment training. One could argue that a soldier has not really begun to experience military life until he or she arrives and is inculcated into his or her new unit. Only then, confronted with the aforementioned challenges, can the Army measure his or her adaptability. The impact of this recommendation lies in the fact that a statistically significant proportion of soldiers who experience a behavioral health incident (or seek treatment) report that the catalyst is the simple fact that they are in the Army and no longer wish to be. Simply put, they have not adapted and are not likely to.

The danger, of course, is in deception. Like all health treatment programs, the systems and protocols the Army uses to diagnose and treat behavioral health problems are subject to manipulation. One could argue that a soldier who no longer wishes to serve, the allure of a speedy separation may lead him or her to manipulative behavior in order to get out of the Army. The concern certainly has merit, but there are few alternatives. In the absence of a quick separation, the soldier in question may join the twenty thousand (36 percent) newly accessed soldiers who do not complete their first term, often leaving the service after a lengthy separation for misbehavior or failure to perform.[24] Still worse, he or she may develop a legitimate behavioral health condition that results in roughly 295 days enrolled in IDES and potential long-term disability. The expeditious nature of this separation may outweigh the risk of manipulation by a handful of malingerers.

The Army's response to the behavioral health problem, suicide specifically, has been laudable. The time, resources, and people committed to the effort have created an environment

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largely absent the stigma normally assumed to be attached when seeking help. Treatment is readily available and widely relied upon. On the Army's larger installations, behavioral health professionals see several thousand unique patients annually, the vast majority of whom are treated without the knowledge of their chain of command and continue to serve effectively. Increased awareness and ample resources naturally lead to a higher prevalence of behavioral health disorder diagnoses. It is unlikely that there are more people in need of treatment; more probable is that more are being identified as needing care. The result is a sharp increase in the number of nonavailable soldiers due to behavioral health conditions.

In a fiscally constrained Army, balancing treatment and maintenance of combat readiness becomes more critical. The tools exist to identify, diagnose, and treat the soldier. Now, commanders need tools to better manage the nonavailable soldiers and maintain mission preparedness. To be clear, the recommendations set forth here are not an attempt to limit care or overrule the recommendations of behavioral health specialists in the interest of commanders' concerns. In fact, they are the result of commanders working in collaboration with embedded behavioral health and medical staff to better balance the two lines of effort in addressing the Army's behavioral health issues.

The ability to promptly reassign all soldiers enrolled in IDES to WTUs and expeditiously separate soldiers under chapters 5-11 and 11 within the first full year of service may provide the necessary means for commanders to maintain mission readiness. Adverse effects of a growing nonavailable population are exacerbated in a downsizing force, which causes each case to have a unique impact. Moreover, nonavailable soldiers unable to perform their wartime function are collectively a distinct and distracting burden—one that draws leaders' attention from their wartime mission and the fully ready soldiers performing it. With a large and growing population of nonavailables in the Army, most commanders have made a simple observation: accomplishing the mission with fewer soldiers is easier than accomplishing it with nonavailable soldiers. ■

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Fixing the Army's Feeding System

We Can, and Should, Do Better

Maj. Joel M. Machak, U.S. Army

Chow halls, messes, galleys, and dining facilities (DFACs) are a ubiquitous part of military culture, regardless of service affiliation. Their history and evolution can be traced back as far as our military itself. From far-flung outposts to the garrisons that resemble cities, these facilities have served our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines for generations. Unlike other aspects of the military, garrison feeding programs have changed very little over time, rendering the current model less capable to address current soldier feeding requirements.[1] That is why it is time for a paradigm shift in how the Army approaches garrison feeding programs.

Garrison DFAC operations cost the Army hundreds of millions of dollars each year, and countless soldier man-hours on a system that continues to lose money.[2] The primary purpose of DFACs is to provide nutritious

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Spc. Stanley Jean, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, and Pvt. Antonio Fonville, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, serve breakfast to hungry soldiers waiting in line at the 4th Brigade Combat Team Dining Facility 12 February 2013 at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. (Photo by Sgt. Kimberly K. Menzies, U.S. Army)

meals to enlisted service members who hold meal cards as part of their overall compensation package, but with an increased variety of meal choices in the private markets in close proximity to bases, coupled with increasingly limited access to DFACs, it is easy to see why utilization rates continue to decline.[3] A prime example of this problem can be seen in the recent closure of the Eagle's Nest Dining Facility at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Less than a year after completing a $6 million renovation, this facility closed, primarily due to low utilization.[4] This example is not exceptional. In the coming years, the Army plans to close or consolidate one in three dining facilities based on low-utilization rates.[5] While consolidations and closures address unnecessary overspending on underutilized facilities, the underlying issues of limited access and increased competition from the private sector remain.

One of the major underlying causes of declining utilization rates in our DFACs is limited access to the facilities. According to a 2015 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, junior enlisted members—the target customers for DFACs—indicated that limited access to DFACs often sways their decision regarding where to eat their meals.[6] Issues such as extended or irregular work schedules, distance to the facility, time spent in line, parking availability, or hours of operation negatively impact their ability to utilize their meal entitlements at a DFAC. Often, the easiest meal solution is to purchase a meal from a private vendor, either on or off post. When this happens, the soldier essentially pays for that meal twice: once with the actual rendering of payment for that meal, and again in an unused entitlement.

Consider those times when installations close DFACs, or temporarily consolidate them during the holiday season. The meal card holders who remain in the

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barracks are afforded the opportunity to walk to a predesignated bus stop and take a bus to the DFAC, only at designated times, and then return to the barracks on the bus after consuming a meal. These soldiers must repeat this process each time they wish to consume a meal with their meal card under the current construct. Because of the inconvenience involved, meal card holders tend to opt for a more convenient solution, which means paying out of pocket. This then contributes to reduced DFAC utilization and perpetuates the issues of closing and consolidating these facilities. It is unrealistic to think that the current model of garrison, soldier-run dining facilities can continue to meet the requirements of the populations they are intended to support.

Campus-Style Concept

Because of the issues of increasingly limited access to DFACs and the ever-present availability of private options, soldiers often choose to consume meals away from their local DFAC. As a result, in order to optimize use of meal cards for their intended purpose of feeding soldiers, the Army should consider adopting a campus-style concept in which meal cards are accepted at any place that sells food on the installation. Colleges and universities across the country have successfully managed to meet the needs of their students and faculty by providing a wider variety of feeding program options, to include allowing students to use their meal plans at private food vendors located on campus. In fact, in 2012, the Joint Culinary Center of Excellence (JCCoE) conducted a holistic review of the Army's food service program and determined that the Army could benefit from such a model.[7]

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According to the 2011 GAO report, the Air Force has run a pilot test on the campus-dining concept with promising, though as yet tentative, results.[8] Col. Marc D. Piccolo, then commander of the U.S. Air Force Services Activity, asserted that the outcome of this practice has been a more efficient use of the meal card entitlements by service members, significantly increasing the number of meals served to meal card holders.[9] The JCCoE "Holistic Review of Army Food Service" examined the Air Force's pilot Food Transformation Initiative in 2012 and determined that these changes resulted in a 15.2 percent increase in utilization of services, and a 67.3 percent increase in patronage by enlisted meal card holders.[10] By adopting the Air Force approach, which reflects the best practices of colleges and universities, the Army could implement a similar campus-style solution where soldiers could use their meal cards to purchase meals not only at their local DFAC, but also clubs, restaurants paid for out of nonappropriated funds, or even exchange food courts. However, in order to effectively employ this concept, the Army would need to fully transition from the paper DD Form 714 meal card to a common access card-based meal card system and determine the best method to ensure these vendors have the capability to recoup funds from the meal cards.

Under such a campus-style concept, the current meal pricing framework could remain in effect. Let us say it costs a soldier $5.55 to eat lunch in a dining facility. Under the campus-style concept, a meal card holder would have $5.55 to spend on lunch at any restaurant on post. If the amount of food ordered costs more than the allotted amount for that meal period, the soldier would then pay the difference out of pocket.

With this, the Army could potentially divest itself of unit-managed DFACs, with a high potential for cost savings as a result.[11] In other words, the Army could remove the military occupational specialty 92G (food service specialist) soldiers from the DFACs and invite private companies to run feeding programs for profit. Certainly there are private companies who would be very interested in earning a portion, if not most of, an installation's collective meal entitlements. Such private companies would be responsible for all food acquisition, inventory management, marketing, packaging, personnel, and facility management. However, much like colleges and universities, meal pricing should be aligned with entitlements, or meal plans.

It is important to point out that the Army is taking measures aimed at increasing the utilization of its DFACs. Some of these measures include modifying hours, introducing grab-and-go kiosks and food trucks, expanding meal choices options, referring to Army cooks as chefs, and remodeling existing facilities in order to appeal to

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Spc. Luke Wilson, Spc. Michelle Santiago-Lopez, Spc. Kallan Clements, and Staff Sgt. Raymond King from the Wiesbaden Strong Teams Cafe Dining Facility prepare meals from a mobile kitchen trailer to feed soldiers at Wackernheim Regional Range Facility 30 March 2016 in Wackernheim, Germany. (Photo by Dee Crawford, U.S. Army)

soldiers. The effectiveness of these efforts and investments remains to be seen. The challenge that remains is competition with commercial restaurants, in other words, the impact of profit motive on effective provision for soldier dining. Restaurants are motivated by one thing—profit, whereas DFACs, and the soldiers who run them, are not.

Additionally, restaurants can make changes more rapidly to their services in an effort to increase profit, and are unencumbered by the oftentimes thick bureaucracy of the military. Perhaps the Army could approach garrison feeding like a business and leverage the expanded, campus-style concept in its favor in order to help ensure that soldiers are making "healthier" choices if allowed to use their meal card at an on-post restaurant.

Meal plans. As an alternative to, or in conjunction with, the campus-style concept outlined above, the Army could adopt a meal plan concept. The Army meal-card program in its current state is both inconsistently applied and needlessly bureaucratic. The Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, *Special Military Pay/Personnel Programs and Operating Procedures,* requires single soldiers residing in the barracks be issued a meal card and receive rations from government mess facilities.[12] The accountability and record keeping pertaining to these cards can be complicated at best, or an opportunity for fraud at the worst. To complicate matters, commanders may authorize soldiers to receive full basic allowance for subsistence entitlements based on unique mission requirements or special dietary needs. The management and tracking of this is one of many corollary burdens placed on commanders.

Soldiers who work nonstandard hours may be unable to get a meal at a DFAC during normal operating hours. To mitigate this problem, there should be options for soldiers to adopt a meal plan that best fits their work

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Soldiers, civilians, family members, and visitors dine at the Fort Hood Army and Air Force Exchange Service's (AAFES) Mega Food Court 30 September 2015 at Fort Hood, Texas. (Photo courtesy of AAFES)

schedule, and then change that meal plan as their duty hours change. College meal plans offer this sort of flexibility through a wide range of meal plans. For example, let us say that a soldier can only feasibly consume two meals a day during the week and all three meals on weekends. Should this soldier have to give up the entire amount of the basic allowance for subsistence entitlement in exchange for a meal card, even though he or she only consumes 76 percent of his or her meals in a DFAC? Or, could there be a meal plan option that allows that soldier to consume a predetermined number of meals per week and give them the remainder of the entitlement to spend on food elsewhere? By integrating a meal plan concept, soldiers could potentially alter their meal plans online in much the same way as they can set allotments, or change their Thrift Savings Plan contributions.

Consolidated field feeding company. If any of the aforementioned practices were adopted, and soldier-run DFACs were significantly reduced or eliminated, the manning levels of 92G soldiers required to support the Army's feeding programs would be most likely reduced. However, the requirement for the Army to feed itself in times of conflict and training would not disappear. In 2015, Combined Arms Support Command unveiled a consolidated field feeding company concept, where 92G soldiers are consolidated in a single company within sustainment brigades rather than spread across brigade combat teams and functional brigades.[13] The idea is that, as required, units can request a field feeding capability to support training or operational requirements much like they do with regard to transportation, laundry and bath, and other combat service support functions. Employing this concept could potentially eliminate the impact such training and operational events have on unit-managed DFACs.

This concept as currently portrayed, leaves the Army in the garrison feeding business since the 92G soldiers must still run day-to-day operations at DFACs. Additionally, the Army is still in the costly business of purchasing food and operating under-utilized facilities. The dollar figures do not even begin to

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capture the opportunity costs involved with all of the other minutiae associated with garrison feeding.

What about the 92G soldiers? If nonappropriation of the DFACs were to occur, as described in the campus-style concept, these soldiers would be free of the obligation to operate and manage these facilities and could focus on their core competencies: field feeding together with basic soldier skills, in support of the Army's larger mission, to fight and win our nation's wars. Currently, commanders who have 92G soldiers in their formations are often forced to make special accommodations in order for these soldiers to meet basic soldier readiness requirements such as command maintenance, weapons qualification, mandatory Army Regulation 350-1 training, and the Army Physical Fitness Test due to the narrow window of hours these soldiers are available to train as a result of their food preparation duties.

By contrast, in a nonunit-managed DFAC model of garrison feeding, soldier-skill training could be more effectively managed since 92G duties would be more predictable as activities are aligned with unit field-duty requirements. However, such a circumstance might also risk downsizing if 92Gs were not fully used in direct support of food preparation to support troops in the field. Clearly, the Army would have to reassess the optimal end strength requirement for this specialty based on the new mission set requirements. In this scenario, there is again a wide range of options to consider, from reduction in active component numbers to Military Occupational Specialty consolidation.

Implementing even a portion of the proposals discussed above would be a difficult endeavor involving a myriad of stakeholders across the Department of Defense and private industry. Additionally, the current culture and attitudes pertaining to how the Army views its relationship with DFACs would have to change. The changes recommended here are in line with those made in a recent article by retired Lt. Gen. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, calling for "long-term institutional support missions" to "be civilianized or contracted to free up both military and civil service manpower."[14]

Joint base situations present another set of concerns, such as disparity in garrison food service from one service to the next. However, ideally, our sister services would work with the Army toward interoperability, mitigating disparity between services on a joint base. In other words, an airman, marine, or sailor should be able to partake in Army garrison feeding programs the same way that a soldier can; and vice versa with regard to entering non-Army food service facilities. To that end, garrison commanders would still maintain some measure of oversight responsibility for the privatized facilities.

The time and effort involved in such a monumental change would be tremendous, but worthwhile. By fundamentally altering the Army's Food Service Program, the Army could focus better on core competencies that allow us to focus on our mission: fight and win our nation's wars, while potentially saving hundreds of millions of dollars each year in the process. ■

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Members of the Peshmerga's Zeravani Force advance toward the front in a convoy 14 August 2016 near the Mosul Dam in Iraq. (Photo courtesy of Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs)

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of the Islamic State

Lessons for U.S. Forces

Matthew F. Cancian

Trucks packed with explosives and guided by sacrificial drivers, fields of simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and chlorine gas: these tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are familiar to those who have studied or participated in the American counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan (collectively, the "9/11 Wars"). Now, however, they are being adapted and practiced on a massive scale along the

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seven-hundred-kilometer-long front line between the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Islamic State (IS).

The advancement of TTP used by IS indicates that it is a learning organization that has studied and incorporated lessons from the experience of other insurgents who have fought against the United States. Like any military, IS members are eager to learn from the experiences of others. In response, learning about IS's TTP is essential for U.S. forces if we are going to win the current fight, as others writing for *Military Review* have exhorted us to do.[1] Just as IS has learned from previous nonstate armed groups, other groups can learn and adapt from its TTP. Consequently, U.S. operators would do well to learn about IS's TTP and adapt accordingly for our next confrontation with nonstate armed groups.

I had the opportunity to visit the Kurdistan Region to conduct research three times in 2015 and 2016, staying a few weeks each time. On each occasion, I was able to speak with senior security officials in the Kurdistan Regional Government to gain the perspective of strategic military leaders on the threats they faced before I traveled to the front. On two of the occasions, I visited one unit west of Kirkuk, commanded by Dr. Kemal Kirkuki, and I was thus able to observe some progress on that front. On my last trip, in the summer of 2016, I stayed with the elite Zeravani commando battalion near the Mosul Dam. The Kurds have a keen sense of hospitality, and they were willing for me stay in their patrol bases, discuss their experiences, and observe them on the front.[2]

This article, based on that field research, aims to begin a more rigorous analysis than what is available from media reports. Previous articles on defeating Islamic jihadism, such as Allen B. West's "The Future of Warfare against Islamic Jihadism: Engaging and Defeating Nonstate, Nonuniformed, Unlawful Enemy Combatants," have focused on strategic imperatives; this article primarily focuses on the tactical level.[3] It investigates the principal TTP in IS's conflict in Northern Iraq and makes several recommendations on countering specific TTP for future U.S. commanders who will fight in the Middle East against IS or any group that will have learned from IS. It concludes that the United States should establish a combined lessons-learned team with the Peshmerga to systematically investigate the TTP of IS, the effectiveness of Kurdish responses to them, and how U.S. forces might best respond in future conflicts.

Learning among Militaries

The literature on learning among militaries indicates they tend to learn more during wartime, and that learning is quicker in response to strategic exigencies rather than in response to organizational factors.[4] Being a group at war, with many strategic pressures, IS fits the bill of an organization likely to be highly adaptable. The forerunner of IS, al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), was nearly extinguished after the Sunni Awakening and the U.S. surge in 2006, which subjected remaining al-Qaida members to high pressure to innovate or be eliminated. The lessons it learned from al-Qaida, combined with the free availability of information about the TTP of other insurgents on the Internet, meant that IS possessed the means and the motivation to adopt new TTP.

Militaries can generate new ideas within themselves, or they can borrow ideas from other organizations. As an example of the latter, Frank Hoffman has written about the learning process for U.S. submarine action in the Pacific, where U.S. "wolf pack" tactics were copied from their use by the Germans in the Atlantic and implemented through an initially top-down process in the U.S. Navy.[5] While many members of IS were members of AQI, they adopted TTP from other insurgent groups, in a manner similar to how U.S. submariners in the Pacific learned from the experiences of the German U-boats.

Many aspects of IS are opaque to outsiders. Generally, IS seems to have a decentralized command structure where tactical learning is left to the discretion of local emirs who draw on the lessons of their past experiences and from their peers, rather than a top-down doctrinal learning format. Previous work on IS's TTP attempted to see them as adaptations of the tactics of the Baathist regime of Iraq under Saddam Hussein because many IS members were formerly officials in that regime. This analysis was unsatisfactory because, though IS does seem to have a penchant for

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firepower similar to the old Iraqi army, there are many differences in terms of intelligence collection, force ratios, and guerrilla tactics.[6]

As a result, IS's TTP should be viewed as an eclectic mix of learned TTP that mostly draw from those used by insurgents during the 9/11 Wars, rather than as an evolution of Baathist military TTP. This conclusion is logical, given the high numbers of IS fighters who participated in the campaigns against the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the similarity of IS's TTP to those employed by other anti-American insurgents.

Improvised Explosive Devices: Quantity Has a Quality if Its Own

The rise of IED use in the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan is well known. From primitive beginnings using widely available military-grade explosives, IED usage evolved over the course of the 9/11 Wars to include a variety of sophisticated triggering mechanisms and employment strategies. The result was that IED attacks caused roughly half of the total U.S. casualties during these wars.[7] The evolution of IED tactics over the course of the war was an excellent example of the interactive nature of Carl von Clausewitz's conception of war (*Zweikampf*, or a duel).[8] When insurgents employed cell phones and radios to remotely detonate IEDs, the coalition developed sophisticated methods of electronic jamming. When the coalition employed mine rollers to detonate pressure-plate IEDs in front of the vehicles, insurgents began to offset the charge from the triggering device (or to delay detonation) to ensure that the detonation would still damage vehicles. For all of the asymmetry in resources between America and the insurgents, the simple fact is that while we could mitigate the IED threat, it remained the most effective single technique that insurgents could employ.[9] The effectiveness of IEDs against U.S. forces meant that they were a highly visible technique for IS to borrow.

Today in Iraq, IS tends to employ large numbers of small, unsophisticated, victim-initiated IEDs made with homemade explosives in order to limit the mobility of the Peshmerga forces and to raise the strategic costs of offensive action. Devices tend to have a small amount of explosives in the main charge, sufficient only to wound or kill a single combatant on foot. IS's IEDs tend not to be daisy-chained together; there is only one main charge for each triggering mechanism. The low-charge, victim-initiated devices are also employed in choke points such as doors and in conjunction with items that the Peshmerga will be tempted to tamper with, reminiscent of the booby traps used by the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War.[10] Over the course of the war, the Kurdish Peshmerga engineering team has defused over eleven thousand IEDs.[11] It should be borne in mind that this is a specialized unit, and the number does not account for all of the IEDs recovered by the maneuver units of the Peshmerga. Some of these IEDs are arranged in dense fields organized along expected axes of advance for any Peshmerga offensive; over twenty tons of IEDs were recovered during a recent offensive in the village of Bashir in southern Kirkuk.[12]

To avoid these IED fields, the Peshmerga try to launch attacks on IS strong points from unexpected locations that are less likely to be mined. The wide-open terrain and long length of the front line mean that it is impossible for both sides to constantly surveil the entire front. While this causes problems for the Peshmerga when IS launches infiltration attacks, it also seems to allow the Peshmerga to advance on IS's fortified towns from unexpected directions. This is an important lesson for the future for tactical decision makers; attacking from an unexpected and unobserved direction is even more important in an IED dense environment.

Conventional militaries emphasize the need for observation of minefields, coordinating the use of direct and indirect fires onto a minefield to prevent the enemy from demining the area. In contrast, IS tends to have a "throw it out and see if it sticks" approach to the employment of IEDs. Some IED fields are positioned so they will impede the Peshmerga and fix them inside a kill zone, but many more are employed where IS could not reasonably expect to observe them. This lack of tactical sophistication means that for the volume of effort IS fighters put into their IEDs, they accrue relatively little tactical advantage. Nevertheless, this strategy is logical given that conflict is between two more or less conventional forces that both hold territory. In this context, it makes little sense to tie up personnel watching and eventually triggering complex command-detonated IEDs. In the case of a conventional attack by the Peshmerga, IS needs all available personnel employing small-arms and crew-served weapons to fight. Tying up manpower by observing command-detonated IEDs is simply not feasible for IS.

By contrast, insurgents fighting the United States during the 9/11 Wars could afford to spend their manpower watching large, command-detonated IEDs, waiting

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Peshmerga forces assemble prior to an assault 14 August 2016 near Kirkuk, Iraq. (Photo courtesy of Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs)

for an American to get close, because they did not have to spend manpower holding ground in a conventional fight at the same time. More complicated main charges, such as explosively formed projectiles, are similarly unnecessary given how uncommon armored vehicles are in the Peshmerga. Complicated anti–explosive-ordnance-disposal (anti–EOD) techniques, such as rigging IEDs to trigger when tampered with, were also not reported. These TTP might be used by IS, particularly in other areas of operation where IS functions more as an insurgency and a terrorist group than as a conventional military, but they were not prevalent in any of the areas I visited.

IS employs IEDs to reduce the tempo of the Peshmerga's operations by forcing the Peshmerga to sweep for IEDs and by inflicting casualties that increase the strategic costs of operations. At the beginning of the war, the Peshmerga possessed almost no capability to deal with IEDs on this scale. Today, there are specialized engineering detachments; knowledge of IEDs and the TTP required to defeat them have spread via word of mouth and formal training, held by either the Peshmerga itself or by coalition partners. Some units that I visited, however, still did not even have metal detectors, despite the units having led offensive operations against IS. Even with proper equipment against simple IEDs, no IED detection and removal effort will have a 100 percent success rate. Thus, the IEDs have two chances to inflict damage—first, on the maneuver unit, and second, on the EOD unit clearing IEDs.

Rather than increasing the probability of success or the number of casualties per device, IS bets on simply increasing the number of devices in the hope that some will be undetected and triggered, and that of those that are detected, some will still inflict casualties. Even if there is only a 0.1 percent chance that an EOD unit will trigger a simple device when defusing it, eventually a Peshmerga EOD unit will be unlucky and hit that 0.1 percent, thereby reducing a highly skilled and much needed asset. While this strategy does not have decisive tactical effects, it does slow down operations and inflict casualties.

These TTP have many similarities to Taliban TTP in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. In Sangin, Afghanistan, the Taliban invested significant resources into putting out a high volume of relatively unsophisticated antipersonnel

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IEDs. This tactic was successful in limiting the operational mobility of British forces, who were effectively hemmed in to the district center by IEDs. When marines took over in 2010, operational mobility was restored only at the cost of significant casualties.[13]

Similar to the current use of IEDs by IS, operations that would have enhanced friendly control of the area were impeded by the knowledge that any effort would have to navigate a mine field. Strategically, it is hard to say what the specific impact of the marine casualties in Helmand was, but it is generally agreed that democracies are less likely to continue wars in the face of casualties.[14] Again, it is unclear exactly how IS came to adopt the tactics of mass IEDs; however, given the links of IS to Afghanistan and the similarity to TTP employed there, it is reasonable to assume that IS did not reinvent this tactic but rather adopted it from the Taliban's experience.[15] It is similarly reasonable to assume that future enemies will have learned from IS experiences. U.S. forces in the future must be trained and prepared to deal with IEDs in all forms, and in particular with the way that IS employs them; developing a joint doctrine on countering IEDs will be essential, as has been argued elsewhere.[16]

Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices

Up-armored with rusted metal plates and grills, the trucks that IS launches against the Peshmerga look like they belong more to a *Mad Max* movie than to the supposed technologically dominated battlefield of the twenty-first century. Yet, up-armored, "suicide vehicle-borne IEDs" (car or truck bombs whose drivers expect to die in the explosion, known as SVBIEDs) play an important role as IS's analog to the precision-guided cruise missile; they provide IS with the ability to (somewhat) accurately target enemy positions with high explosives, using an expendable human as their targeting hardware instead of sophisticated silicon chips. Any heavy vehicle can be

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Kurdish Peshmerga forces observe Islamic State positions 29 May 2016 near Kirkuk, Iraq. (Photo courtesy of Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs)

used as a base on which to build. Some SVBIEDs are based on high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles or mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles that were captured from the Iraqi Army; others are based on civilian vehicles ranging from pickup trucks to dump trucks. Almost all SVBIEDs are equipped with improvised armor to improve their survivability until they reach their target. This armor is mainly sheets of metal attached to the vehicle to protect it from small-arms and medium machine-gun fire, while grills are hung at a distance from the body of the vehicle in order to prematurely detonate rocket-propelled grenades. Most SVBIEDs also have a narrower field of view than normal for the driver, which is a trade-off that attempts to mitigate this weak point in the armor shielding. Additionally, the windshield is normally replaced by bullet-resistant glass to further protect the driver.

The size and maneuverability of IS's SVBIEDs have varied as the Peshmerga TTP have evolved. The Peshmerga in the Mosul Dam area reported that SVBIEDs gradually grew in size, culminating in a few attacks by dump trucks that had been up-armored and packed with homemade explosives. However, the vehicles were so cumbersome and slow that a simple response was suggested: get out of the way! These monstrous SVBIEDs had gone so far to the extreme of survivability and lethality that they had sacrificed almost all of their maneuverability. The Peshmerga could simply relocate to areas that were inaccessible to wheeled SVBIEDs. Moreover, when SVBIEDs got caught on an obstacle or terrain feature, they would detonate themselves, usually far enough from any Peshmerga forces to prevent any harm to them.

Additionally, the French-made MILAN antitank missile began to appear in the Peshmerga's arsenal, courtesy

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of the German armed forces. MILAN missiles are now prized commodities among the Peshmerga as they can defeat any of IS's improvised armor. However, there are currently only sixty launchers for almost seven hundred kilometers of front line. Even with very strategic placement along IS's likely axes of advance, there are simply not enough MILANs to adequately protect the Peshmerga.[17]

The next iteration of the Clausewitzean Zweikampf has been for IS to deploy several up-armored pickup trucks in place of one massive SVBIED. This generates more targets than the overstretched MILAN gunners can handle, with a maneuverability that means the Peshmerga cannot avoid them.



The Islamic State uses trucks such as the one shown above, captured near Kirkuk, Iraq, in 2015, as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices driven by suicide bombers. The vehicles are fitted with improvised armor to protect the trucks and their drivers until detonation. Note the grills intended to defeat rocket-propelled grenades. (Photo courtesy of Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs)

IS's ability to integrate SVBIEDs with conventional attacks has been very inconsistent. IS units frequently launch SVBIEDs without any sort of follow-on action, even in sectors where they had previously displayed enough tactical sophistication to link direct-fire attacks with SVBIEDs. In its capture of Ramadi, for example, IS integrated the use of bulldozers to remove obstacles, SVBIEDs to destroy Iraqi troop barracks, and small-arms fire to overwhelm the defenders.[18] In some instances, IS has similarly integrated a maneuver element with SVBIED attacks against the Peshmerga in order to generate truly horrible damage.

I passed through one mostly destroyed village where IS had used an eight- to nine-ton truck against the Peshmerga positions after the Peshmerga had concentrated to repel a conventional small-arms attack by IS. In this case, the explosives were highly effective. This level of sophistication, however, seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Even in the same area of the Mosul Dam as the well-coordinated attack cited above, there has only been one other time when SVBIED and conventional attacks were similarly coordinated. The evidence suggests that IS lacks the midlevel military commanders capable of consistently coordinating effects. IS's TTP are therefore reliant on methods that do not expose their knowledgeable cadre to danger.

We should expect our future enemies to have learned from the TTP that IS currently employs. During the 9/11 Wars, U.S. troops adapted to this threat by hardening bases with Hesco barriers, employing serpentine obstacles at the entrances, and training service members to identify and neutralize potential SVBIEDs before they could get close enough to patrols to do damage. Al-Qaida then attempted to use dump trucks full of explosives against marines to counter coalition security measures, prefiguring later IS tactics.[19]

IS's experience in using up-armored SVBIEDs to resist small arms will need to be considered. I predict that, at some point in the next decade, U.S. service members will be killed by an up-armored SVBIED that cannot be stopped with small arms. Much has been made of the fact that the guards of the Marine Corps barracks who were attacked 23 October 1983 in Beirut, Lebanon, did not have ammunition in their weapons to stop the SVBIED.[20] However, small arms would have been irrelevant in the case of a heavily up-armored vehicle. Only the possession of antitank weapons at the lowest level can prevent U.S. service members from becoming the victims of up-armored SVBIEDs. An obvious solution would be to provide U.S. ground forces with light antitank weapons organic to the squad and at all vehicle checkpoints.

Chemical Attacks

Seeming to revel in the barbarity of their tactics, IS forces regularly employ chemical weapons against the Peshmerga and occasionally against civilians. Mustard and chlorine gases are delivered against targets via mortars or rockets. While some of these munitions might be military grade, captured from either Iraqi or Syrian stockpiles, many of them are improvised. In the

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Mosul Dam area, chemical attacks were initially very disturbing to the Peshmerga, whether they were mustard or chlorine (differentiated by the fighters there as "yellow" or "white" smoke). Mustard gas, in particular, is a powerful vesicant, and it has caused several Peshmerga to lose their vision for days.

However disturbing those initial attacks were, the chemical attacks of IS are not particularly effective against the Peshmerga who have been trained and who are properly equipped. Most of the Peshmerga are now equipped with gas masks that they carry everywhere. Even without masks, the Peshmerga quickly figured out that moving to higher ground and breathing through a wet cloth were effective countermeasures.

Furthermore, IS's chemical attacks were not well coordinated with maneuver elements, meaning that they rarely had a significant tactical impact. According to a senior official at the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, the ministry knew of no cases where a chemical attack had killed a Peshmerga, although many hundreds had been wounded and had to be removed from the front lines.[21] This is entirely consistent with the literature on chemical weapon use in World War I: non–nerve-agent gas attacks can cause many casualties to the unprepared but rarely cause fatalities to prepared soldiers.[22] The number of chemical attacks seems to have tapered off in recent months. Yet, while the Peshmerga attributed this to IS stockpiling chemical weapons for the defense of Mosul, the decrease could be ascribed to the disruption of IS's chemical weapons cell, including the capture of the cell's leader, Sleiman Daoud al-Afari, in Tel Afar, Iraq, in February 2016.[23]

IS's chemical weapons have had operational impacts out of proportion with their tactical effects. When IS launched chemical weapons from the occupied town of Bashir at civilian targets in the Iraqi–government-controlled village of Taza, residents marched and demanded that the government attack the launch sites to prevent further attacks.[24] In response, the government-sponsored Hashd al-Shaabi militia launched several disastrous attacks, being beaten back by IS and incurring many casualties and several prisoners.[25]

The employment of chemical weapons by IS builds on AQI's TTP; AQI used chlorine gas tanks in Iraq to attack coalition forces and Iraqi civilians. From 2006 to 2007, fifteen attacks caused many Iraqi civilian casualties, although many of the fatalities were likely due to the paired explosives rather than the gas itself.[26] IS's use of mortars and rockets as a delivery system indicates an evolutionary advance on AQI's TTP although IS's chemicals seem to be similarly unable to produce fatalities on prepared soldiers.

U.S. planners of future operations should plan to encounter chemical attacks, and they should know the attacks will have a strategic impact on public opinion, even if their tactical impact is minimal. Basic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training for our service members would adequately prepare them for the improvised, unsophisticated attacks that our opponents might learn from IS. Local allies and civilian populations we might be protecting will likely react strongly to even these rudimentary chemical attacks. Local allied forces should be given some modicum of training in preparation, and they should prepare an information operations campaign to inform civilian populations about defensive measures and to assuage fears. Otherwise, it is possible that the use of chemical weapons will create a tension within the local community that manifests itself in distrust of local allies and U.S. forces.

Suicide Vests and Counterintelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IS equips many of its fighters with suicide vests, an innovation that might be troublesome to an unprepared U.S. force. In the past, vests of explosives were made for jihadists whose sole mission was a "martyrdom operation"; they were conceived of as separate from the insurgents who would use small arms against U.S. forces and allies. Now, these two categories have merged. While employment seems to vary from area to area based on the judgment of the local IS emir, in most areas, from 40 to 60 percent of fighters will wear suicide vests.[27] This practice is not limited only to the foreign fighters but also is common among the local Sunni Arabs (comprising the majority of IS fighters). IS fighters will also frequently take off their vests, delay their discharge, and throw them as improvised grenades. Americans who are unfamiliar with this tactic of widespread suicide-vest use may suffer casualties, particularly if they adhere to normal techniques of "dead-checking" enemy combatants.[28]

IS uses a variety of TTP to counter coalition intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Some techniques, such as coating technicals (improvised fighting vehicles) with aluminum foil or mud to try to defeat heat imaging from the air, are likely to be ineffective. Others,

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such as the widespread use of tunnel systems, might be effective. Other authors have already pointed to the similarity in TTP between IS and the Palestinian group Hamas in this respect; U.S. military planners would do well to consider countermeasures for these TTP in advance.[29] Finally, IS will employ suicide soldiers who wait in elaborate "hides" until a high-value target gets close; the Kurds lost a brigadier general to this tactic during the recent liberation of villages in the Khazir region.[30]

Conclusion

IS is a protean organization, taking different forms in different areas in order to move toward its apocalyptic vision. Using Robert Shultz's classification of terrorists, insurgents, and militias, it is clear that IS possesses the characteristics of all three.[31] Even just considering its conventional battle tactics against the Peshmerga, IS has exhibited a varied repertoire of TTP that have been seen before in different conflict zones, and which we will undoubtedly see again in the same and other theaters. It would be foolish to not aggregate accounts of these tactics and weigh future responses to them.

To accomplish this, the United States should commission a combined lessons-learned team with the Peshmerga. For a small cost, a combined U.S. and Kurdish team could visit several sections of the front line and interview key leaders to gain a holistic understanding of the enemy's TTP and the responses that have been the most effective against them. Such an effort would benefit both the United States and its allies.

For the doctrine-poor Peshmerga, these results could have an immediate impact if they were distilled into an easily understood pamphlet and then widely distributed. While there are some professional Peshmerga units and a growing level of training thanks to the coalition against IS, many Kurdish best practices are still spread by word of mouth rather than by a formal system of doctrinal promulgation. A combined lessons-learned team could therefore have an immediate impact on the fight against IS by helping the Peshmerga to adapt to IS's TTP and by giving Peshmerga forces a leg up in their current tactical Zweikampf.

For the U.S. defense establishment, a lessons-learned team would expose us to TTP that we possibly will encounter in the future, allowing us to learn relatively painlessly. Whether we believe that the current operating environment is uniquely complex, or that complexity has always been a hallmark of warfare, we need to lean forward in the process of military adaptation or else risk serious setbacks.[32] The Beirut barracks bombing was a painful lesson in the need to harden our outposts abroad against SVBIEDs. Now, those lessons have been partially eclipsed by IS's evolution of SVBIEDs to have armor against small-arms attacks. Rather than waiting for these TTP, or any other of IS's TTP, to cause U.S. losses, we should advance our learning process. With up-armored SVBIEDs, chemical weapons, and widespread suicide vests, the TTP of IS will be on the battlefields of tomorrow, and we would ignore them at our peril. ■

Notes

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More than forty graduates make their way to the stage to receive degrees ranging from associate to doctoral during the Fort Rucker Army Education Center graduation ceremony 13 May 2016 at the post theater, Fort Rucker, Alabama. (Photo by Nathan Pfau, *Army Flier*)

The Importance of a Long-Term Self-Development Concept to Army Officers



Col. Dean A. Nowowiejski, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired

Many active-duty Army officers struggle to achieve self-development goals related to their profession. Many also retire without a clear plan for transition into their second career, or without having achieved their most ambitious academic goals. They struggle over the course of their careers to complete advanced degrees, make coherent sense of their professional development opportunities, or achieve their full

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intellectual potential. The course of their careers is instead littered with discrete opportunities: a sequence of professional military education (PME) courses at intervals of years, certificates of completion for military training, some books read, and a master's degree attained during PME, while always having answered the call of successive assignments with their demanding time requirements. Officers generally arrive at the end of their careers in better academic condition, but many fall short of what they would have liked. They are highly educated, but not with the credentials they had aspired to acquire, perhaps not with that prestigious master's degree or that elusive doctorate.

The Army leader development model is clear. It has three domains: institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development.[1] The first two domains are sound and interrelated. Institutional training and operational assignments both come under the close management of Human Resources Command. I will describe the Officer Education System, which provides institutional training, later in this discussion. Operational assignments come regularly for active-duty Army officers from their assignment officer at Human Resources Command and by design fulfill the goals of that leader development domain.

Department of Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-3, *Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, describes that entire process of making operational assignments.[2] It is an enigma that consumes the emotions and time of Army officers and their families throughout their careers. For those who remain engaged, the professional development objectives outlined for each branch and specialty are often met. Assignments come, and the body of operational experience grows. Some might argue that the progression of assignments for some officers does not fully equip them for the high-level goals of the Officer Education System, but that is not a debate for this analysis. Instead, I will focus on that elusive professional development pillar—self-development—because it is simply underappreciated.

The most cynical readers likely will say this domain of leader development is almost nonexistent for most officers, but my observation is that the majority make a reasonable attempt to stay current in their branch or specialty and with global events, within the limits of time demands from work and home. But, do they achieve the objectives of self-development as outlined in the Army's policy and doctrinal authorities?

Self-development surely cannot be happenstance, without intentionality, plan, or long-term objectives; there must be a clear vision and purpose. Self-development requires a conscious personal strategy, clearly defined goals, and from those, a long-term self-development plan. Just like officers plot their assignments, promotion points, children's graduation dates, and key life milestones onto a time line, they should conceive of what self-development they will accomplish over the course of their careers.

In this article, I will establish some simple concepts to help active-duty Army officers conceive their self-development goals and conceptualize how they will reach those goals. First, I will describe the current facts regarding academic education and self-development. Then, I will argue for a broader concept of self-development. Self-development can help to capitalize in new ways on opportunities now missed over the course of a career. This argument will highlight integrated Army educational and broadening opportunities. I will conclude with some specific considerations to enhance lifelong learning.

The Need for Improved Continuity in Officer Educational Focus

Before I turn to the potential of self-development, let us look at the current state of officer education. This long-standing system has basic and advanced leader courses, intermediate level education (ILE), and senior service college. In many respects, this process is progressive but discontinuous in time and substance. Advanced education is focused on tactical-level, branch, and internal-to-brigade

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considerations. ILE completes tactical education, and it begins the process of operational and strategic education. Senior service college educates in strategy. Though officers spend many years in school, the focus changes as their careers need change.

There are fairly long gaps of years between an advanced course and ILE, and between ILE and senior service college. These gaps must be filled by self-development to form anything resembling a continuous process of learning over the career of an officer.



Maj. Mike Nicholson, U.S. Army, works on an online master of communication degree course offered by the University of Southern California (USC) Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, while serving in Afghanistan. On 17 May 2013, Nicholson and forty-six other students became the first graduates of the USC Annenberg online program. (Photo courtesy of USC Annenberg)

In truth, the episodic nature of PME means that individual focus on education is also intermittent. Most officers make a valiant attempt at self-development, but they face difficulties in overcoming the obstacles of time demands and higher priorities in duty assignments. Intellectual skills, particularly deep reading and scholarly writing, often atrophy between PME experiences. What should be a progressively and continuously developed ability to write and communicate persuasively often waits for the next PME chance.

Communication skills are at a premium for senior U.S. joint leaders. They must demonstrate high-level personal diplomacy and the ability to solve complex, even intractable, problems. They require personal staff members who can similarly think, write, and communicate. Their staffs must be led by officers who can provide the conceptual support required by Army leader development, built on "sufficiently broad education and experience to operate across the spectrum of conflict."[3] Army officers must strive to develop and refine writing skills as they move forward through their careers. The intervals of time between formal military education opportunities make this hard to do.

The Concept of Self-Development

This policy statement from DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management,* makes clear the demanding standards expected of officer self-development:

> The profession of arms requires comprehensive self-study and training. Leaders must commit to a lifetime of professional and personal growth to stay at the cutting edge of their profession. ... Self-development is the key aspect of individual officer qualification that solidifies the Army leader development process.[4]

The self-development domain is critical to the entire leader-development process. It requires that

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active-duty officers think carefully about their approach. The main points of this article are derived from close analysis of several pertinent Human Resources Command policy documents on the subjects of officer professional development and education and slating for command.[5] Those points also depend on the guidance given to recent selection boards for the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel, the ranks for which active officers qualify as they move toward retirement. All of these documents work within the officer education and professional development systems now dependent on the key component of self-development.

Self-development, as conceptually defined by this policy guidance, depends on a "*lifetime of professional and personal growth* [emphasis added] to stay at the cutting edge of their profession."[6] Self-development depends on lifelong learning. The demands of high-level thinking and writing are too high to be achieved only in short episodes of institutional education. Lifelong learning is instead a marathon component of each officer's professional development, critical to the entire process, but most effective when consistently practiced throughout an officer's career to hone writing, reading, and thinking skills.

The introductory discussion established the long gaps in formal officer education, which are normally filled with operational assignments granting critical experience to the officer. Sometimes, maybe once or twice in a career, an officer is afforded the opportunity for a broadening assignment. Broadening assignments are incorporated into the formal Officer Personnel Management System; they are defined as "purposeful expansion of a leader's capabilities and understanding provided through opportunities internal and external to the Army."[7]

Having received new emphasis during the tenure of former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno, Army policy states that broadening assignments have the deep purpose of developing "a continuum of leadership capability ... which bridges diverse environments and organizational cultures."[8] Odierno saw the need for Army officers who were more accomplished and comfortable operating in complex and sometimes uncertain joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments. Operational environments worldwide have grown so interconnected and so complex as to require a higher-order, whole-of-government approach that demands Army officers who are educated to operate outside the Army itself.[9]

Broadening thus supports an expanded concept of what is required for officers to learn. It offers critical information but is a unique and infrequent opportunity. Lifelong learning as the method of self-development is still required over the continuum of an officer's career. Self-development fits into the gaps and smooths the edges between PME and broadening assignments.

What type of self-development meets the lifelong needs of our best officers? Their needs demand a solution that operates over time and provides continuous development. Their needs demand constant intellectual growth. They include broad reading and the ability to accomplish original research. They also include a continuous refinement of writing ability, publication in professional journals, and potentially, a thesis, dissertation, or book. Published work is the key to the reputation of soldier scholars and the quality of professional dialogue. The demands of lifelong learning include these higher-order goals and objectives. Yet, most officers never achieve the plateau of publication or an advanced degree. How can they change this pattern?

For both scientists and social scientists, the ability to conduct research is a required intellectual skill. This ability is first developed as an undergraduate. Some officers barely return to it during a master's degree program, particularly those which do not require a research project or thesis. But, original research is at the heart of the best advanced-degree programs. The ability to construct an original research plan, to establish either an experimental or a research hypothesis, and then to follow it to valid conclusions distinguishes senior academics. Publication of the findings further marks those in the world of academe.

Officers should look to accomplish primary source or original research and writing as part of their intellectual development and personal progress toward advanced degree attainment or publication. There are opportunities to coherently advance this goal over the course of a career, but again, many officers never envision them, as they are separated by years and by operational experience. What if officers could integrate their opportunities for research into a more tightly knit fabric?

The Opportunities of a Career, Sometimes Neglected

The vision of the Officer Personnel Management System is to grow and develop adaptive leaders. Adaptive leaders are "sufficiently broad in education and

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experience to operate across the spectrum of conflict, and ... culturally astute and able to use this awareness and understanding of foreign environments to innovate in mission execution."[10] The professional development opportunities provided by the Army to an officer alongside his or her self-development should work to fulfill this vision of developing an adaptive leader.

This development begins with undergraduate education—in all of its diversity—during which the initial habits of academic discipline—the ability to research and to write—are established and language and cultural education are introduced. Most officers gain their only foreign language understanding in secondary school or during undergraduate years as a degree requirement. This undergraduate language education is the foundation on which later graduate or Defense Language Institute foreign language education is built. It also is a window into other cultures.

One of the critical considerations for any officer's long-term development is whether to apply for and accept the service obligation of funded graduate education accomplished for the needs of the Army. The debate about whether this time away from operational assignments is worth it is too large for the confines of this article. The point here is that the Army affords officers the opportunity to earn advanced degrees, both masters and doctorates, and this opportunity needs to be carefully considered in the plan an officer develops for his or her own professional education.

If this opportunity is taken, it provides both for increased foreign language capability and cultural awareness—priorities indicated by the professional development vision—and for in-depth primary research and writing. This opportunity to research and write needs to be incorporated into the lifelong approach already established as necessary.

Throughout the time line of an officer's career, the Army offers fellowships that afford additional broadening and research opportunities. These can come prior to ILE or senior service college, and they need to be considered in the panoply of options afforded to officers. They become particularly important if one views them as part of a continuum spanning from undergraduate education through the stages of PME and funded graduate education, with a holistic progression through all of these stages. If one were to conduct original research and writing on constant subjects of inquiry throughout these stages in continuous fashion, it could be very powerful.

Another way the Army has provided an opportunity for officers to progress in their education is to create a program to gain a doctor of philosophy degree through the School of Advanced Military Studies' Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program. This program will provide the Army with leaders capable and educated in strategic thought, who gain all the advantages of completing original research and writing a dissertation. This program seems to be the pinnacle of broadening opportunities afforded by the Army.

Taking advantage of these career-broadening opportunities for education often takes moral courage to confront the rigors of time lines and military anti-intellectualism. It takes a conscious judgment as to when the time exists to apply for, compete for, and succeed at a funded graduate opportunity or fellowship. The best officers are always needed by their commanders and their branches to meet the incessant requirements of the operational Army, and they must fight to go to funded graduate school or compete for a fellowship. This takes the courage to see the chance and decide to take it—often against the advice of a mentor who did not take that path or did not have the same opportunities. The decision also works against peer pressure, which resists academic and intellectual achievement. It takes great confidence in one's potential and a vision for possibility to opt for graduate school or a fellowship.

The highest and most current guidance, as fulfilled by the Officer Personnel Management System vision above, makes clear the need for high-level intellectual development and broadening. Through advanced education, research and writing, and active and continuous self-development, officers can fulfill the vision by developing the special abilities required to solve complex global problems requiring language, interagency, and cultural awareness skills.

Achieving a Solution for a Lifelong Self-Development Plan

So, how does an officer tie all these considerations together into a coherent personal self-development concept? One of the primary elements must be for officers to look forward over the course of their careers and conceptualize how all of these components fit together. How can they integrate the course of their desired sequence

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Graduates of the 2016 Command and General Staff College Art of War Scholars program (*from left*) Maj. Zach Alessi-Friedlander, U.S. Army; Maj. Bishane Whitmore, U.S. Air Force; Maj. Roland Minez, U.S. Army; Maj. John Zdeb, U.S. Army; Maj. Ian Brandon, New Zealand Army; and Lt. Brian Juskiewicz, U.S. Navy, celebrate their accomplishments with Dr. Wendell C. King, dean of academics, 10 June 2016 as they transition to a program of self-development after leaving Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (Photo courtesy of author)

of PME with the objectives they achieve in their self-development plan? The beginning point is interest. What subject of original research piques their interest? Which one might be a potential subject for career investigation? Which subject would merit continuous personal investigation in the research opportunities afforded at the various PME institutions, such as the master of military art and science thesis at the Command and General Staff Officers' Course or the monograph at the School of Advanced Military Studies? A carefully selected topic could carry forward to be continued as a strategic research paper at the Army War College, or it could be pursued in individual research efforts during a senior service college fellowship.

Instead of taking these research opportunities discretely, they should be viewed as a continuum. With a determined topic of interest, intentionality, and diligence, Army officers can build academic expertise over the course of time, taking advantage of career research and writing opportunities. Instead of several incoherent PME writing requirements, by wise choice and a forward view, officers can build the components of a book or a dissertation by incorporating their research together over time.

Establishing such a research and writing trajectory can also take into account the deliberate development of expertise to be used in retirement. The ideal solution is to use terminal assignments to finalize *bona fides* for retirement employment and to position oneself geographically or by subject expertise for the transition. This foresight can align professional success along the way. With this in mind, there are several key questions officers should consider early in their careers:

In what area of the world do I want to specialize? The Department of Defense organizes the world geographically by combatant command. Each command is complex enough that one officer cannot know everything.

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The *Army Self-Development Handbook* draws on lessons from the field, from educational and leadership research, and from applicable Army regulations and doctrine to provide state-of-the-art guidance on designing and implementing a program of self-development. This handbook can help individual soldiers reach the highest levels of professionalism. For online access, visit: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/Materials/CAL_SelfDevHandbook.pdf.

Focused reading and research by region allows individuals to build regional expertise in support of Army rotational unit objectives, and to build the regional knowledge most useful as senior officers in the combatant commands.

What specific cultural expertise is appropriate given that regional focus? The Army professional development vision clearly states that cultural expertise is an important professional development objective. Cultural expertise enables the regional expertise required by leaders of Army rotational units. The promotion board guidance for recent major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel boards all listed the characteristic of being "able to understand the socio-economic environment and [to be] *culturally astute* [emphasis added] in order to successfully operate in complex, uncertain environments" among the key characteristics required by strategic leadership.[11] The lieutenant colonel board also included prescriptive language guiding the board to not penalize officers engaged in civilian education or fellowships, in keeping with this article's emphasis on the importance of outside education.[12]

What foreign language ability aligns with this regional and cultural expertise? Ideally, this language ability began during secondary school or while an undergraduate, but officers can choose a language ability to develop while at graduate school or during self-development or resident education from the Defense Language Institute. Ultimately, joint task force commanders with language ability in the region to which they deploy are best suited to integrate with multinational teams.

What area of operational expertise aligns with this regional, cultural, and language ability that will establish the officer as a resident expert in a senior staff at an Army service component or regional combatant command? Will the officer develop expertise as a cyber, electronic warfare, force protection, fires, or logistics specialist, among others? This expertise is what is expected of lieutenant colonels as senior leaders on service component or joint staffs, and lieutenant colonel is the expected rank at which officers retire or decide to pursue further senior leadership.

Officers are encouraged to begin with the end in mind. Officers currently on active duty must realize that the day comes for all to retire, whether as a major or a general. We all reach the end of the road for our active military career. Too often, we arrive at that point without any clear concept or preparation for what comes next. The optimum solution would be to be in a geographic location or position of experience in our last duty posting to make a natural transition into what will be our second career. The optimum solution would be to honestly

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evaluate what we wanted to do when military retirement was reached and to use our educational opportunities, self-development plan, and operational experience to work toward that perceived occupation. The wise choice of research and writing topics over the course of a career ensures continuity and achieves published writing useful in the retirement transition. The same need applies to those who separate short of retirement—for the transition to be seamless and continuous, especially with a final assignment, and to leave the service with expertise in doing what an officer loves to do and is best educated to do.

Obviously, this is not a solution that will work for everyone or in all situations. Not all officers will be able to envision a research topic that will enthrall them or connect to contiguous opportunities over time, but even if they see increased coherence, the conceptualization is worth it. New visions will emerge over time. Much of this potential achievement revolves around intentionality and diligence by the officer concerned. Some of this potential achievement revolves around raw talent and honest self-reflection. But, the skills of honesty, reflection, and intentionality required by this expanded professional self-development concept, integrating all Army educational and broadening opportunities over a career, will be amply demonstrated by our most forward-looking officers. ■

Notes

1. Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 3 December 2014), 5–6.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 9.

4. Ibid., 6.

5. In addition to the references cited in these notes, the following primary sources from Human Resources Command (HRC) were consulted: Chief of Staff, Memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff, "Fiscal Year 2016 Centralized Selection List (CSL) Command and Key Billet Slating Guidance," 26 June 2014, accessed 20 December 2016, https://www.hrc.army.mil/Site/Protect/Assets/Directorate/OPMD/FY16%20CSA%20SLATING%20GUIDANCE.pdf (CAC required); Chief of Staff, Memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff, "Fiscal Year 2017 Centralized Selection List Command and Key Billet Slating Guidance," 10 September 2015, accessed 20 December 2016, https://www.hrc.army.mil/Site/Protect/Assets/Directorate/OPMD/FY17%20CSA%20CSL%20Slating%20Guidance%20-%20Approved%2010%20SEP%2015.pdf (CAC required); U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Senior Service College/Fellowship/Foreign Service School Information, Academic Year 2016-2017, accessed 20 December 2016, https://www.hrc.army.mil/Site/Protect/Assets/Directorate/OPMD/AY16-17_SSC_Catalog.pdf (CAC required). Information provided in this catalog gives a brief description and pertinent facts regarding each senior service college opportunity, to include fellowships and foreign schools; U.S. Army HRC, MILPER Message 16-101, "FY 16 Army Competitive Category (ACC) Intermediate Level Education Selection Board and Process for Submitting Intermediate Level Education Resident Attendance Preferences," 6 April 2016 (CAC required); MILPER Message 16-114, "FY 17 U.S. Army Human Resources Command Senior Professor of Military Science (PMS) Centralized Selection Board," 19 April 2016 (CAC required).

6. DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 6.

7. Ibid., 12.

8. Ibid.


9. For a comprehensive sense of the broad spectrum of broadening opportunities available through the Army, see the Officer Personnel Management Directorate Broadening Opportunities Program Catalog, updated 5 August 2015, accessed 9 January 2017, https://www.hrc.army.mil/bop.

10. DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 9.

11. Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for President and Promotion and Selection Board Members, "Fiscal Year 2015 (FY15) Major (MAJ), Army, Operations (OPS), Operations Support (OS), and Force Sustainment (FS) Promotion and Selection Boards (PSBs), 13 March 2015, 3, accessed 23 December 2016, https://www.hrc.army.mil/Site/Protect/Assets/Directorate/TAGD/FY15%20Major,%20Army%20Competitive%20Category,%20Promotion%20Selection%20Board.pdf (CAC required); Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for President and Selection Board Members, "Promotion List for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC), Operations (OPS), Operations Support (OS) and Force Sustainment (FS), Promotion Selection Boards (PSB), 22 October 2015, 3–4, accessed 23 December 2016, https://www.hrc.army.mil/Site/Protect/Assets/Directorate/TAGD/1.%20FY16%20Lieutenant%20Colonel,%20Army%20Competitive%20Categories,%20Promotion%20Selection%20Board.pdf (CAC required); Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for President and Selection Board Members, "Promotion Lists for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Colonel (COL), Operations (OPS), Operations Support (OS) and Force Sustainment (FS) Promotion Selection Boards (PSB)," 9 March 2015, 3, accessed 23 December 2016, https://www.hrc.army.mil/Site/Protect/Assets/Directorate/TAGD/FY15%20Colonel,%20Army%20Competitive%20Category,%20Promotion%20Selection%20Board.pdf (CAC required).

12. Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for President and Selection Board Members, "Promotion List for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, Lieutenant Colonel," 4.

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Soldiers from the 1st Armored Division's 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team out of Fort Bliss, Texas, look on as an F-16 Fighting Falcon executes a show of force 12 June 2015 in the skies over the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, during a Green Flag 15-08 training exercise. An aircraft executing a low pass over a conflict zone can act as a deterrent to potential enemy combatants. (Photo by Senior Airman Joshua Kleinholz, U.S. Air Force)

Multidomain Operations and Close Air Support

A Fresh Perspective

Lt. Col. Clay Bartels, U.S. Air Force
Maj. Tim Tormey, U.S. Marine Corps
Dr. Jon Hendrickson

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Tightening budgets have reignited long-simmering debates on the roles and missions of airpower. The Air Force remains persistent in its recommendation to retire the A-10 aircraft (sometimes called the Warthog). Though there are developmental issues with the A-10's notional replacement, Lockheed-Martin's F-35, mounting fiscal pressures keep the Air Force from changing its plans. As a result, some have even proposed that the Army procure and operate its own fixed-wing ground attack aircraft.[1] In the increasingly complex and contested future operating environment, the optimal warfighting approach for the American military must be centered on multidomain operations. Any parochial service decision would be dangerous and foolhardy. Examining close air support (CAS) in conjunction with other overlapping missions that occur in the intersection of the land and air domains effectively demonstrates the necessity of multidomain operations. Further, multidomain thinking in the CAS arena allows the U.S. military to better understand how to maximize the flexibility and capability airpower provides when applying multirole platforms such as the F-35.

Since the codification of the joint force with the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the United States uses the combined joint task force (CJTF) structure with coalition partners to conduct warfare. This construct and underlying doctrine were first employed during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. However, the Army often sees itself as the force that exists to win the nation's wars and seeks self-reliance as a service capability.[2] In reality, a CJTF conducts operations reporting to a geographic combatant commander (a joint billet) who reports to the president and secretary of defense.[3] No service fights alone, yet each often thinks and plans individually. This problem of insular planning occurred repeatedly in the twentieth century, in operations from Guadalcanal to Vietnam.[4]

Behind this insulated thinking is a lack of trust that the Air Force will be present to support the ground scheme of maneuver. This fear highlights an important concern but lacks supporting empirical evidence. Transferring to the Army a single-mission platform such as the A-10 or incorporating a fiscally responsible existing solution like the Beechcraft AT-6 to support the doctrinally defined roles of our services only furthers service stovepiping.[5] This arrangement will not defeat the next adversary, particularly in the current and projected fiscally constrained and contested operating environment. In order to achieve the required level of service cooperation demanded by a multidomain approach, the foundation must be mutual trust. The first step toward achieving increased trust is a common understanding of multidomain operations.

The Multidomain Approach to Warfighting

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, joint operational approaches have proven themselves in combat. For the most part, Goldwater-Nichols has achieved many of its objectives. However, work remains, especially when considering the rapidly changing global operational environment. Further, the joint task force doctrinal structure used over the past fifteen years to promote joint capability has actually driven home incorrect habits of mind that are detrimental in the evolving operational environment. In particular, these habits drive the service components to think about their respective operating areas as if in a vacuum. These concerns reportedly led

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
Maj. Tim Tormey, U.S. Marine Corps, is an MV-22 pilot assigned as an exchange instructor at the Air Command and Staff College, Department of Joint Warfighting. He is a United States Naval Academy graduate and holds an MA from the Marine Command and Staff College. He has had several Marine expeditionary unit deployments and has gained significant experience in assault support integration.

Dr. Jon Hendrickson is a professor of security studies at the Air Command and Staff College. He holds a PhD in military history from Ohio State University, and he has published works on naval history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

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then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey to ask in November 2011 what would come after joint, initiating a discussion that continues to this day.[6] What comes next is the best joint force solution to this problem: a multidomain approach.[7]

The essence of multidomain operations is to think about military problem solving in a nonlinear way and to conduct operations focused on achieving objectives rather than on maintaining distinct component lanes. Traditional thinking that rigidly aligns domains and components (land with the Army, maritime with the Navy, and air with the Air Force) will not be effective in the future. The complexity of current and future operations requires breaking this pattern of thought in order to more seamlessly integrate the unique capabilities of each component to create the effects required to meet tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Multidomain operations will also allow U.S. military forces to leverage the potential of new, emerging domains, such as space and cyber. These domains are integral to modern warfighting, yet there is no cyber force component commander in charge of "cyber" at the joint task force level, where we primarily conduct major military operations. The component lens is not sufficient in this environment because operations are too complex.



(Graphic by Maj. Tim Tormey)

Figure 1. Multidomain Concept


Multidomain operations strive to achieve unity of command or unity of effort through conceptual unity of thought. Operations occurring in the land domain must consider effects in and through the air, maritime, cyber, and space domains, and vice versa (see figure 1). This noncomponent way of thinking minimizes friendly vulnerabilities and provides an effective way to find adversary vulnerabilities for exploitation in and from multiple domains. As efforts to counter U.S. advantages continue, the American military is attempting to disaggregate command and control and push decision making to the lowest level possible due to the requirement for a much faster decision cycle.[8] Because of this, a multidomain approach must be used.

A historical example from World War II illustrates the importance of multidomain operations. On 7 August 1942, American forces landed on the Pacific island of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands chain. After they established control over the island's airfield, which they christened Henderson Airfield, the focus of the campaign shifted from preventing or forcing a landing on the island to sustaining and reinforcing the U.S. forces already on Guadalcanal. Both major bases in the area—Rabaul for Japan, and Espirutu Santo for the United States—were about 560 miles from the island. While this may seem like a battle fought in the maritime domain, both sides used a variety of multidomain efforts to try to force and keep open the access routes to Guadalcanal.

For the Americans, these operations focused on stopping the Japanese convoys ferrying troops and supplies from Rabaul to Guadalcanal. Air operations from Henderson Airfield entered the maritime domain, forcing Japanese transports to move at night within the

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American air umbrella, which made navigation and cargo handling more difficult. Air forces also supported efforts in the land domain to expand and protect the Henderson Airfield perimeter from Japanese attacks. American naval forces crossed into the land domain, offering naval gunfire support to land forces, harassing Japanese land forces with bombardments, and interdicting supplies as they moved to, and around, the island of Guadalcanal. Naval forces also entered the air domain by using carrier-based aircraft to attack Japanese aircraft carriers intent on raiding Henderson Airfield, as well as interdicting Japanese efforts to bombard the island by sea. Land forces influenced the maritime fight through coast watchers who provided intelligence on Japanese movements by sea and air, as well as providing security to Henderson Airfield from Japanese land attack and artillery bombardment.



(Graphic by Maj. Tim Tormey)

Figure 2. Air/Land Domain Intersection


The Japanese did not miss out on multidomain opportunities either. Japanese air forces in Rabaul threatened American ships at sea, limiting the areas in which the U.S. Navy could operate safely. They also raided U.S. land positions on the island. Japanese naval forces supported land operations by escorting transports to the island and by sinking several American ships that attempted to blockade the island. They intruded into the air domain by bombarding Henderson Airfield from the sea. Japanese land forces made several attempts to close Henderson Airfield by assault, which would have given the Japanese control of the air over the island to allow movement of supplies by sea. In the end, the ability of U.S. and Allied forces to coordinate their multidomain activities allowed them to enjoy the synergistic benefits of working across domains. The Japanese were less successful in their ability to bring land, air, and sea together into a cohesive operation, and they eventually lost Guadalcanal and other islands as a result.[9]

Maximizing Airpower Effects in the Land Domain

Within the broader context of multidomain operations, analyzing airpower effects in the land domain illustrates the value of contemporary force employment that has evolved beyond joint constructs. The intersection of the air and land domains encompasses a myriad of mission sets, to include air mobility; space; cyber; personnel recovery; fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and many others (see figure 2). The CAS mission primarily falls under the joint function of fires and is just one small piece of the broader picture that includes protection, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, and sustainment.[10]

Establishing air superiority is the first and most important effect that airpower provides for the land domain and overall joint force. Contemporary airpower theorist Phil Meilinger writes, "whoever controls the air generally controls the surface."[11] In a more nuanced version of the same thought, Colin Gray posits, "control of the air is the fundamental enabler for all of airpower's many contributions to strategic effect."[12] U.S. forces are accustomed to having unfettered access to the air, but potential adversaries are becoming capable of creating an environment where the joint force will not have uncontested

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An F-35A Lightning II joint strike fighter completes the first in-flight launch of an AIM-120 missile 5 June 2013 over the U.S. Navy's Point Mugu Sea Range near Oxnard, California. (Photo courtesy of the F-35 Program Office)

freedom of maneuver.[13] Furthermore, active opposition to and increased competition against force projection capabilities are occurring.[14] An acceptable level of air domain control is a prerequisite to enable the ground scheme of maneuver.

Once access to the land domain is achieved, precision fires are an essential element for achieving a joint force commander's maneuver objectives. Joint airpower assets have the capability to directly attack an enemy's center of gravity.[15] No matter the operational or strategic nature of a center of gravity, airpower can affect it because of airpower's inherent flexibility. If the center of gravity is enemy leadership, it can be attacked through strategic strike. If the center of gravity is an enemy naval task force, airpower can combine with naval assets, such as surface ships and submarines, to destroy it. If the center of gravity is an enemy land formation, air and land assets can work to destroy it. In addition, air power's flexibility makes it easier to attack soft targets to achieve follow-on effects in other domains, such as attacking enemy command-and-control facilities to hamper enemy coordination against maneuvers by land and sea forces.

Operation Anaconda, which occurred in March 2002 in Afghanistan, illustrates the advantage of applying multidomain thought (or the disadvantage of not applying it), particularly in terms of operational planning. The ground commander, Army Maj. Gen. Franklin L. Hagenbeck, paid insufficient attention to air planning to such an extent that the combined force air component commander and the combined air operations center were not involved in the planning process at all; they only became aware of the impending operation when the operation order was issued on 20 February.[16] The Taliban provided much more resistance than expected, and a pitched battle occurred with a furious and urgent call for CAS. The major CAS effort began slowly. However as the battle progressed, CAS rapidly improved and ultimately became the "key to winning the battle."[17] Had the planners in Anaconda leveraged a multidomain perspective, effects from other domains could have been integrated from the very start of the operation. Even if their planning resulted in a ground-centric

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operation, a multidomain thought process could have ensured the other components were engaged.

In addition to fires, other emerging mission areas should also be considered an integral part of operations to achieve effects in the land domain. Remotely piloted aircraft that provide persistent full-motion video can deliver or direct effective battlefield fires. Airborne ISR and mobility also closely integrate operations in the air domain for effects on the surface; these areas more accurately fall under CAS when considering the word "support."

Thus, an understanding of operations and the synergy created by the land and air domains needs to expand. Airpower is inherently flexible. In order to maximize effects from the air on the land domain, multirole aircraft such as the F-35 are necessary. As an operating environment becomes increasingly contested and degraded, survivable platforms must be employed across the spectrum, from the low-intensity CAS mission to global strike. Basing our force structure solely on the current threat environment would be a mistake because the United States must have capabilities beyond those effective only in a permissive environment. The flexibility of airpower is a true force multiplier in multidomain operations—a must-have for the U.S. joint force.

Understanding Joint Fires and Close Air Support

The first hurdle toward understanding the role of CAS in multidomain operations is agreeing on an adequate definition of CAS. All involved, from the infantryman to the airman, must arrive at a corporate definition so CAS is common language and not an ambiguous concept. Joint doctrine defines CAS as "an air action by manned or unmanned fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."[18] Under the air-land domain integration umbrella, Derek O'Malley and Andrew Hill recommend five CAS characteristics: CAS should be close so it can be persistent, precise and rapid so it can kill enemies and avoid fratricide, versatile so it can operate in various contexts, scalable so it can use the right amount of firepower for the situation, and integrated with land forces so the air forces can promptly share useful information with the warfighters on the ground.[19]

To achieve a common understanding, a cultural paradigm shift is necessary. Specifically, the land component's thinking and associated lexicon regarding CAS need adjustment. The traditional Army view of CAS has morphed from a maneuver support function to "air cover as a preventive measure with the expectation of enemy contact," according to Mike Benitez.[20] In "How Afghanistan Distorted Close Air Support and Why it Matters," he describes how this view of CAS emerged "after years of fighting asymmetric, low-intensity, guerrilla warfare."[21] CAS as viewed through this protection lens is narrow. CAS should instead be viewed from the fires perspective and not under the protection category of the joint functions. Hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces have been and will continue to be the exception to the most efficient use of aviation-delivered fires. While airplanes overhead provide a psychological safety net in the event of a miscalculation on the battlefield, the same can be said of any type of precision fires available organically to the land force. Changing this paradigm overcomes a cultural barrier, opening the aperture and allowing alternative, effective, and safe fires.

In this paradigm, the first priority for the ground component is organic to the Army. It includes precision-guided artillery fire, rotary-wing CAS, and even GPS-guided mortars. Nonorganic fires can come from an array of current Air Force or Navy delivery vehicles (e.g., A-10, AC-130W, B-1, B-52, F-15E, F-16 Block 40/50, F-18, F-22, MQ-1, MQ-9, and F-35), many of which have all the desirable attributes of a CAS platform. These types of fires all provide the desired result and do so with the precision required in dangerous close environments.

A consistent impediment to effective multidomain operations and joint fires has been coordination of responsibility and authority. The early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom clearly demonstrate several doctrinal flaws that a capable adversary could exploit. The fundamental problem was that the speed and complexity of the situation outpaced the capability of the coalition forces to effectively command, control, and integrate air and land domain forces. Doctrinally, deconfliction of responsibility for fires is accomplished by various fire support coordination measures in specific areas of operation, usually controlled by the joint force land component commander.[22] In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the joint force land component commander delegated fire support coordination line authority to the Army's V Corps, which would often

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place the fire support coordination line up to one hundred kilometers from the forward edge of troops.[23] In 2003, this definition of the "deep" area forced the combined force air component commander and the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) [3ID(M)] into a cumbersome coordination process that often shut down both surface and airpower fires.[24] The division's after action report states, "the argument seems to be that CFACC [the combined force air component commander] would not adequately address V Corps targeting requirements; 3ID(M) violently disagrees ... 3ID(M) believes CFACC is better prepared to engage targets to effectively shape the battlefield."[25]

The lesson in Operation Iraqi Freedom's "race to Baghdad" is not whether the land component or the air component should have had higher authority in delineating targets. Instead, the joint force needs to address the cause of these operational seams to ensure a future adversary does not exploit them. In spite of the implementation of the joint air component coordination element after the lessons of Operation Anaconda, air-ground integration still has room to improve.[26] The multidomain concept provides a helpful lens toward achieving an increasingly integrated and highly agile approach to warfighting. Maneuver in the land domain and maneuver in the air domain should be viewed as equal partners and mutually enabling functions. As a starting point, the term CAS by definition is misleading because it implies a relationship dominated by the ground force.[27] RAND proposes the term "close air attack" as a more accurate way to communicate the partnership between air and ground forces.[28] Trust is fundamental to ensuring this relationship is functional and multidomain thought is institutionalized.

In addition to a habit of thought, a more flexible fire support coordination command-and-control structure is also needed. Using the principles of mission command, operational agility and integration are increased by pushing decision making down to the lowest level. The Marine Corps already uses a concept that delineates an area between CAS and the fire support coordination line and the battlefield coordination line, for the purpose of allowing Marine air-ground task force aviation to "attack surface targets without approval of a GCE [ground combat element] commander, in whose area the targets may be located."[29] The battlefield coordination line provides an intermediary coordination measure between CAS and deep operations, which allows better exploitation of targets and integration of air and land power. Another solution is to keep the fire support coordination line as close to the forward line of troops as possible. Flexibility in command and control will require changes from both the air and land components to match the current operational context. Finally, battlefield decision making below the component level is required to successfully operate in a contested and degraded air and land environment, especially if air domain superiority falls somewhere on the continuum between localized air superiority and air parity.[30] The joint air operations center, a monolith of centralized control, must delegate decision making and authority to a lower level tightly integrated with land domain operations.[31] A coordinated, domain-focused command-and-control architecture will greatly improve joint force decision making and enable the level of operational agility future threats require.

Furthermore, recent operations provide opportunities to more accurately define CAS. If close air attack is used as a more precise term, then the joint force can begin to view this mission as integrated, domain-based fires. Traditional CAS synchronizes ground and air element resources for a ground-based objective—exactly the way organic Army aviation integrates with its ground forces—in close proximity to and with a regular working relationship that permits increased levels of both situational awareness and effectiveness. However, other missions outside the traditional definition of "danger close" have been conducted under the CAS umbrella, usually because a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) is clearing the fires. The trend from Kosovo to Operation Enduring Freedom moves away from traditional infantry and armor air support, to a special-operations-forces-heavy integration with precision air that is "far different from traditional notions of CAS, ... a novel concept that touched the heart of the always sensitive special operations forces—conventional Army relationship."[32] Today, in Operation Inherent Resolve, aircraft are executing these close air attack missions while the JTAC and ground commander are far from the coordinated fires. They can do so effectively because of technology such as satellite radio, full-motion video, and video downlink. The same precision necessary in CAS is necessary in prosecuting these low-collateral damage, high-value targets.

Thus, our understanding of the doctrinal term CAS needs to expand. Close air attack fires have moved past well-understood concepts first developed in the world

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wars, and comprehending this shift is essential to multidomain operations. *CAS is truly platform immaterial.* The most appropriate delivery vehicle should vary based on specific mission parameters and the operational and tactical situation. A wide variety of platform options has the required level of persistence and precision to achieve the desired effects on the battlefield. Applying multidomain thought also illuminates friction areas in coordinating fires using the fire support coordination line for the deep and close ground schemes of maneuver. In order to ensure this does not continue, both the Army and the Air Force need to increase the agility of their respective command-and-control systems to delegate decision making to a lower level. Examining the Air Force specifically and the CAS mission provides deeper understanding of the integration between the land and air domains.


A Closer Look at Air Force Close Air Support

CAS, under any definition, is much more than a platform. The hardware component is a small portion of the overall investment the Air Force has made in championing today's CAS fight. To determine the level to which the Air Force has demonstrated its commitment to CAS, any evaluation must analyze three essential elements, with no special consideration given to platform. First, one must consider the emphasis and resources dedicated to training. Second, one must look closely at doctrine and ideas. Finally, one must examine operational examples that show the commitment of the Air Force to CAS as seen in contemporary operations.

Certainly, the largest investment in CAS comes in the training realm, both for the pilot and the weapons controller on the ground calling in the strike. The controller is the final clearinghouse for weapons release and is in possession of the clearest picture of friendly positions in relation to the enemy. Both combat controller and tactical air control party airmen graduate from the Special Tactical Training Squadron (STTS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida. In 2007, the STTS graduated roughly forty students, and that number has now more than tripled to its current annual throughput of 144 students.[33] Today's students will also earn their advanced JTAC certification from the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course in Yuma, Arizona. In 2009, the Air Force purchased the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course facility from the United States Army Special Operations Command and now also trains all Army JTACs. The Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt funds that training in Yuma at about $4 million per year to cover the CAS assets required to certify each JTAC.[34]

MilitaryReview

A DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT



U.S. Marines watch as Marine Corps F4U Corsairs provide effective close air support 6 December 1950 in the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir, Korea. One aircraft can be seen flying through the smoke billowing from a successful napalm bomb strike on a Communist Chinese position.

Precedent and Rationale for an Army Fixed-Wing Ground Attack Aircraft

Maj. John Q. Bolton, U.S. Army

2 May-June 2016 MILITARY REVIEW

Maj. John Q. Bolton offers a different point of view on close air support in "Precedent and Rationale for an Army Fixed-Wing Ground Attack Aircraft." The Army aviator argues that the U.S. Air Force considers close air support a high-risk, low-payoff mission, and the Army needs to take over this mission with its own organic fixed-wing aircraft.

For online access to Bolton's "Precedent and Rationale for an Army Fixed-Wing Ground Attack Aircraft" in the May-June 2016 issue of *Military Review*, visit: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160630_art014.pdf.

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Does this institutional investment provide what the average infantrymen need when they call for CAS? Arguably, they "want," from either experience or legend, the A-10 screaming in low with its seven-barrel, 30-mm Gatling gun roaring and its large payload wreaking havoc and destruction on the battlefield. The psychological effect on the enemy observing this cannot be discounted. But if precisely killing the enemy while avoiding fratricide is the required effect, then the platform delivering the effect is irrelevant. The F-35 is indeed capable in the CAS mission area, and it will have improved capacity over time. However, while the F-35 is conducting a deeper strike at a critical enemy center of gravity, the Air Force has numerous other platforms that will deliver the desired outcomes.

The B-1 Lancer is just one of those CAS-capable platforms that carries the largest payload of any guided or unguided weapon in the entire Air Force inventory.[35] The B-1 can carry an assortment of GPS and laser-guided five hundred- and two thousand-pound bombs and in quantities every JTAC desires. In a show of Air Force commitment to the CAS mission, a 2009 account of soldiers pinned down at Outpost Keating in Nuristan, Afghanistan, clearly demonstrates this reality. "Bone 21," the call sign of the B-1, was diverted from routine patrolling to Outpost Keating, 1,300 miles from its base of origination in Qatar. With a limited understanding of the gravity of the situation on the ground at Outpost Keating, Air Force controllers redirected "Bone 21" at supersonic speeds, to provide plentiful danger close fires to the soldiers in dire threat of being overrun by an estimated three hundred Taliban fighters.[36] This is one of many examples of the level of Air Force commitment to the infantryman.

The Air Force is fully committed to and invested in the CAS mission in support of the joint warfighting environment. The Air Force has institutionalized the battlefield airman and the JTAC construct, which will not go away.[37] Gen. Larry Welsh, the previous Air Force chief of staff, pointed out in 2016 that over the last seven years, the Air Force flew on average twenty thousand CAS sorties a year, providing a needed function to the joint combatant commander.[38] Gen. Herbert Carlisle, air combat commander, recently stated, "We are using almost every platform we have to do CAS."[39] Senior leader statements and organizational decisions by the Air Force clearly indicate that support for the land component in general and the CAS mission in particular will be an enduring high-priority mission for the service in the future.

Where Do We Go from Here?

Contentious arguments about retiring a specific airframe clearly indicate a lack of trust between some in the Army and Air Force. The Air Force certainly has contributed to this cultural mistrust. In the drawdown after Desert Storm, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. Merrill McPeak conducted a loud campaign that offended the other services, going to the point of saying that Desert Storm was "the first time in history that a fielded army has been defeated by airpower."[40] This kind of rhetoric does not tend to move institutions toward cooperative solutions. Then Army Secretary John McHugh accurately summarized the issue when he stated, "What the soldier wants to see and what the command structure in the U.S. Army wants to happen (is placing) explosive ordnance on enemy positions ... in a timely and effective manner regardless of platform."[41] If budget dollars were abundant and politics a nonplayer, the A-10 and larger CAS issue would have quietly been resolved. Since that is not reality, however, the services need to cooperate and speak with a single voice under the multidomain construct.

At the tactical level, there are legitimate cultural implications concerning the A-10 retirement. A strength of any single mission platform is that the community becomes extraordinarily good at what they do. As opposed to the "jack of all trades, master of none" philosophy, the A-10 is extraordinary at the CAS mission. It is understandable that the ground component feels slighted when the symbol of CAS is being retired. Furthermore, it is imperative that the Air Force capture the expertise, training, and relationships that are championed by the A-10 community. As more flexible aircraft like the F-35 come online and take on the CAS mission, the Air Force must transfer the CAS tradecraft.

The services must trust that they will continue to support each other, and they need to communicate this. Multidomain thinking should lead the dialogue, which is not simply joint but a step along the way toward true synergy from mere deconfliction. With a better and common understanding of what CAS truly is, the joint force can move toward more agile command and control and greatly improve effects in and through the intersection of the land and air domains. Airpower and land power have been and will continue to be dominant warfighting options for the Nation as a part of the joint force—multidomain integration will only make them stronger. ■

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Notes

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2. David E. Johnson, *Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 195–97.

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14. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication, 2016), 7 and 32.

15. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, January 2017), III-4.

16. Richard Kugler, *Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study in Adaptation in Battle* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2007), 13. Also, a detailed viewpoint of the failures in joint operational planning can be found in Richard B. Andres and Jeffery B. Hukill, "Anaconda: A Flawed Joint Planning Process," *Joint Force Quarterly* 47 (4th Quarter, 2007): 135–40, accessed 1 February 2017, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-47.pdf.

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29. JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*, A-4.

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31. The joint air operations center and centralized command and control of air assets have been an ongoing debate since World War II. Air Force Core Doctrine Volume 1, *Basic Doctrine*, (Montgomery, AL: The Curtis E. LeMay Center, 27 February 2015), chap. 5, "The Tenets of Airpower," accessed 19 January 2017, https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=V1-D80-Tenets-of-Airpower.pdf. Air Force doctrine states, "execution should be decentralized within a command and control architecture that exploits the ability of front-line decision makers … to make on-scene decisions during complex, rapidly unfolding operations." Clint Hinote further expands the discussion arguing that that level of centralized control and decentralized execution should vary with the character of the conflict, but the basics of the concept are still sound. Hinote, *Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution: A Catchphrase in Crisis* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Research Institute, 2009), accessed 19 January 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA550460.

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33. Maj. Donnie Seablom, interview by authors, 1 July 2016. Seablom has eight years' experience in the mission support field for special tactics and has significant expertise and involvement in the Air Force training program for battlefield airmen. Additionally, confirmation was received via personal interview on 14 July 2016 by Canadian Maj. Josh Klemen, who is a qualified joint terminal attack controller and teaches an elective on close air support at the Air Command and Staff College.

34. Seablom, interview.

35. Clinton Romesha, *Red Platoon: A True Story of American Valor* (New York: Dutton, 2016), 285.

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37. Air Force Policy Directive 10-35, "Battlefield Airmen," 4 February 2005 (certified current 23 March 2009), accessed 18 January 2017, http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afpd10-35/afpd10-35.pdf.

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An embedded expeditionary cyber team performs surveillance and reconnaissance of various local networks 10 August 2016 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. The team is part of a pilot program known as Cyber Support to Corps and Below, developed to provide maneuver commanders with an improved situational awareness of the information environment and tools to shape that environment. (Photo by David Vergun, Army News Service)

"More Quaint and Subtle Ways to Kill"

The Operations Process in Future War

Maj. Wesley Moerbe, U.S. Army

He hath at will / More quaint and subtle ways to kill
— James Shirley, "The Last Conqueror"

On 13 September 1862, at a recently vacated Confederate bivouac site, a Union soldier noticed an envelope left behind by the previous encampment. The soldier opened it and found that,

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in addition to a few damp cigars, he had discovered Special Order 191, signed by Robert E. Lee's assistant adjutant. As a result, the whole of Lee's operational plans for the upcoming campaign fell into Maj. Gen. George McClellan's lap.[1] Although famously timid in the field, McClellan managed to close with Lee and fought him to a bloody stalemate at Antietam on 17 September, ending the Army of Northern Virginia's first gambit into Maryland.[2]

Few of us have had to face an enemy who, unknown to us, gained partial or complete access to our plans or planning process, but our reliance upon information technology renews old battlefield challenges of planning and executing operations with reliable secrecy. Our adversaries' diligent search for asymmetric advantage leads them—almost inevitably—to our dependency upon networked and interconnected systems.[3] The problem now goes beyond throwing cyberpunches to communication disruption. The heavy use of networks for collaborative planning and decision-making processes also means our operations process itself can be attacked through the mission command system. Therefore, it is plausible that we could suffer our own Special Order 191 crisis.

Precisely such a contingency unfolded during 3rd Infantry Division's Warfighter Exercise in October 2016. Cyberwar ceased to be a future problem. The contest for supremacy in the cyber domain became an urgent and personal tactical challenge for the staff.

The lessons learned from these developments demand integration into our training and preparation for future conflict. I propose that solutions have little to do with technology and quite a bit to do with how we visualize and think about the operations process and mission command as a system in future war.

The Operations Process and Mission Command Systems Unplugged

Before proceeding further, the doctrinal and theoretical basis of U.S. Army decision making deserves exploration. In the simplest terms, the command of our country's land forces requires iteration between thought and action—a cycle of acting, reacting, learning, and adapting.[4] It is easy to take for granted, but how our headquarters makes abstract thought into something tangible carries immense importance. To better understand this, we must first disentangle ideas and processes from the physical objects that support collaboration or enhance thinking.

Use of Language

Imprecise language can infect how we think about decision making and command of our forces. In his pithy style, S. L. A. Marshall explains that in our profession, "if a word comes to mean too many things, it misses fire at the critical point."[5] In this case, he spoke of communications, and opined that it had become a military catchall, meaning so many things that it "quite frequently means nothing."[6]

Concepts embedded in both the mission command system and the operations process suffer a similar loss of clarity today. The Army relies upon the operations process and its activities—plan, prepare, execute, and assess—as cognitive scaffolding throughout operations. This means that as the chosen framework for the exercise of mission command, commanders and their staffs use the operations process to consider what they must do to solve tactical and operational problems.[7] The *how* of this framework manifests as the mission command system, those components of a unit headquarters that most would recognize. The mission command system consists of people, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities.[8] Thus, some components are tangible and others theoretical.

In keeping with mission command philosophy, this system adapts to the commander, his or her staff, and the environment.[9] To do so, the relationships among these components conform to personalities, the nature of the conflict, and the environment. Like many systems, if overly dependent upon any one component, it becomes vulnerable because it is unable to "absorb disturbances" and remain functional.[10]


The components of mission command systems include the abstract and the tactile, with little distinction made between the two. This helps explain how

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some might mistakenly blend the two aspects of mission command systems. But, the mistake is more than semantic. The use of a physical object to facilitate intellectual effort must not cause one to believe the physical object is a requirement for cognitive processes. If staff members conflate product, process, and tools, they hamper their ability to react to an attack against the mission command system. A logical and inevitable consequence of such conflation is the paralysis of a headquarters' decision making upon the loss of networks or automations capability. Our staffs must realize that wires, laptops, and servers are only meant to assist human thought in operations, and that intelligent planning neither begins nor ends with such enablers.

During my own service in a division-level staff, I found that organizational leaders (myself included) have an impulse to optimize our mission command system for stability environments with an uncontested cyber domain. It has taken discipline and the experience of general officers to expunge such habits. Carl von Clausewitz warned that a certain method or routine can "easily outlive the situation that gave rise to it; for conditions change imperceptibly."[11] I suspect that habits developed over nearly fifteen years of stability operations have created unrealistic expectations based on unexamined or dated assumptions. The most dangerous of these assumptions could be that networks and information systems remain relatively free from enemy interference. However, the evidence indicates that adversaries'



A member of an expeditionary cyber team provides cover for fellow cyber operators who are getting into camouflaged and concealed positions to perform surveillance and reconnaissance 10 August 2016 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by David Vergun, Army News Service)

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intentions and capabilities will require our readiness to reconfigure our mission command systems frequently due to enemy action. Adversaries believe, as do some Western analysts, that networks and information systems present such a vulnerability.[12]

The Decline of Information Security

Conrad Crane opens his article "The Lure of Strike" by saying, "there are two approaches to war, asymmetric and stupid."[13] With this aphorism in mind, lingering a moment on the operating concepts of our most capable adversaries is worthwhile.

Open-source documents and recent history show a pattern that both Russian and Chinese militaries try to blend traditional and nontraditional methods of warfare to undermine consensus that a state of war actually exists, creating ambiguity in the nature of the conflict itself. Moreover, they emphasize a complementary array of cross-domain operations intended to attack U.S. vulnerabilities at minimal costs to themselves. It follows that cyber conflict figures largely into both these states' operating concepts.[14]

The now widely referenced work, *Unrestricted Warfare*, looks to the combination of a number of nontraditional forms of warfare to gain advantage over the United States, singling out technology addiction in particular as having disproportionate effect upon Western forces.[15] *Unrestricted Warfare* stresses asymmetry and synergistic effects, and lambasts U.S. military doctrine as overly kinetic and missing the broader potential of information warfare. Written in 1999 without the endorsement of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), this volume represents the theories of two Chinese colonels. That said, unmistakably similar patterns of logic connect *Unrestricted Warfare* to the more authoritative *The Science of Military Strategy*.[16] Western analysis of this official PLA document notes that the Chinese have prioritized preparedness for operating with degraded or collapsed networks, and suggests that they could inflict the same against the United States.[17] A 2015 RAND study assessed that the PLA publications and exercises now enjoin a first strike against enemy computer systems and networks with a mind to "control the flow of information" to and among the enemy.[18]

In Russian doctrine, the holistic approach emphasizes information war and the use of nonkinetic means to shape the battlefield for the physical combat. The Russians call this *bespredel*, and it echoes the concepts that underpin *Unrestricted Warfare*.[19]

Russia's recent belligerence offers evidence of its perspective on cyberwar. During its 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russian hackers deliberately targeted military digital communications, delaying order distribution and sowing confusion among decision makers.[20] This approach, the combination of traditional and nontraditional forms of conflict, integrates the full spectrum of offensive capabilities to create ambiguity.

More recently, operations in Ukraine demonstrated an even more refined execution of gray war and, like earlier conflicts, paralyzed Ukraine's military response by shattering its decision-making cycle through information control.[21] Russian sources, both official and unofficial, place a premium on information isolation.[22]

Understandably, U.S. policy makers and security specialists fix their attention on the possible threats that these doctrines have for the homeland. Certainly, we would prefer to avoid serious disruptions to life in the homeland, but in a major conflict these are inevitable to some extent. In fact, John Arquilla, a noted RAND theorist, criticizes fears over cyberattacks against the homeland as overwrought, citing the resiliency of civilian populations against strategic bombing campaigns in the Second World War.[23] After all, bugs can be patched, financial institutions can rebound, and order can be restored to a major city suffering from cyberattacks against infrastructure.

However, a nation's operational and tactical formations in the midst of an active conflict have little time to recover from a collapse of information networks. Timely decision making will not wait for a trouble-ticket to be processed. In our present age, strategic thinkers must concern themselves with cyber conflict for sure, but we must also consider the resilience of operational and tactical formations against what John Arquilla calls a "bitskrieg."[24]

In a revealing chapter of *Dark Territory*, Fred Kaplan describes how U.S. forces in concert with interagency partners executed a startlingly effective campaign behind the curtain of the Iraq surge conducted by Gen. David A. Petraeus. Less publicized than the counterinsurgency efforts, but just as important, were the efforts of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's targeting operations, which effectively

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pierced the insurgent network's mission command system and wreaked havoc on their operations process from within. Joint Special Operations Command led enemy forces into ambushes with false information and isolated cells by severing the links between them.[25] Despite the strength and resilience of networked organizations, in this case, enemy forces lost the initiative entirely. Later, Petraeus singled out McChrystal's operations as a critical component of the overall strategy, noting that he had swept "senior and mid-level leaders" from the battlefield, the results of which allowed time and space for the population-centric strategy to work.[26]

Of note, the enemies McChrystal defeated used commercially available tools and Internet capabilities, and while one might suppose that private networks established by state militaries to be more secure, this may not be so for long. The United States now reports it has the capability to access wireless tactical networks like our own.[27] Now imagine if the enemy, rather than McChrystal, had such capabilities. Imagine that an adversary had breached our own mission command system. Indeed, it seems unwise to suppose future enemies will not possess such a capability based on these developments and the findings of a 2013 cybersecurity review panel.[28]

The automations networks of U.S. Army headquarters organizations now form the backbone of our collective brain. In *The Scientific Way of Warfare,* Antoine Bousquet lands squarely on the problem this creates. In our enthusiasm for the potential of networks and information, he warns that we become "utterly dependent" on such capabilities.[29] In essence, the tools by which we collaborate and make decisions in our tactical headquarters have created a fatal vulnerability by merging product and process.

Consider how the Army now conducts the operations process in a division headquarters. The staff forms into working groups or planning teams, often dispersed via the network. Even if they convene in person, the staff captures each step of the planning process in a digital medium of some kind. Briefings to the commander may take place around an analog map, but nearly all orders dissemination occurs through digital media. As operations progress, fragmentary orders go out by e-mail, annexes get posted to portals, and dozens of other supporting products get posted in various digital commons.

Given the risk of concentrating the entire staff and commanders of a division at a single targetable location, even rehearsals may take place not around a terrain model but with leaders huddled around monitors in their headquarters tents. In each case, a capable adversary might plausibly penetrate the operations process.

Once inside our cyberperimeter, the possibilities are as diverse as they are unsettling. An enemy could choose to disrupt planning and executing by shutting down the network, or it could covertly capture plans from within the network and adapt its own operations to increase the odds of success. Worse still, the enemy could develop the ability to corrupt our mission command system by altering or planting false data or information into our network. Considering that both China's and Russia's operating concepts revolve around creating ambiguity, challenging the clarity of planning operations is a likely pursuit of their operations.

As we have already seen, these are not hypothetical capabilities—the technology already exists to realize those ends. The point is not that we ought to live in fear that all our plans are known to the enemy but rather that we cannot assume the impenetrability of our networks or the absolute secrecy of our decision making. This provokes the question, what are the prospects of victory without our accustomed informational advantages?

Preparing for Information Dystopia

Sobering as these possibilities may be, we need not panic. Divining the operating concept behind the threat clarifies our problem. To prepare for potential wars to come requires developing and strengthening two divergent competencies: resilience in our information networks and, simultaneously, the ability to plan, prepare, execute, and assess "in the dark" in the event networks are disabled or fatally compromised.

During the 3rd Infantry Division's October 2016 Warfighter Exercise, even after the enemy gained access to our networks and enjoyed the ability to adapt its scheme of maneuver to defeat our own, the division succeeded. We met with success not through any act of prescience but rather through a plan that permitted subordinate brigade combat teams the flexibility to respond to battlefield circumstances. Let us unpack the

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Sgts. 1st Class Richard Miller (*left*) and Brian Rowcotsky of the U.S. Army Cyber Protection Brigade discuss the response to a simulated cyber attack on the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, with Staff Sgt. Frederick Roquemore (*standing*), a cyber network defender with the 1/82nd, during the unit's rotation 6 November 2015 at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. (Photo by Bill Roche)

possibility of mitigating these developments regarding network integrity.

Coming to grips with the penetrable operations process requires, above all, that the mind be made ready for a new norm. The idea that it could happen should not be a far-off possibility. From Robert E. Lee's saddle, the hazard of an intercepted order, though not necessarily common, was a known possibility. Telegraph wires could be cut or tapped by either side, and couriers killed or captured.[30] Neither the Federal nor the Confederate armies possessed a decisive advantage in information security. The simple recognition of this condition meant that all commanders needed to be mindful of indicators that their plans were known to the enemy, or that their own orders had failed to reach subordinates.

That does not mean we should eschew the multiplicative power of our networked systems but rather train to avoid dependency upon them. The mind can grow accustomed, perhaps addicted, to clarity or certainty that can be artificial or temporary. In *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War*, Gen. Robert H. Scales describes the unfulfilled hunger for precision intelligence and unfailing communications that many commanders had grown dependent upon during their service in Europe.[31] How fascinating that when weather and distance induced lapses in communication, the intent-based orders of Maj. Gen. Frederick M. Franks Jr. allowed the Seventh Corps to continue planning and executing by "grease pencil and acetate."[32]

With such historical precedents in mind, a severe cyberattack or network collapse must become an anticipated event—as likely as indirect fire in the security

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area. Furthermore, the cognitive and procedural adjustment from network-enabled planning to pure analog will not happen of its own accord but requires that leaders act and staff reorganize.

Transition from a computer network-centric to a traditional hand-driven process calls for different responsibilities, outputs, and communication media. The physical act of planning and executing relies upon different agents. Agility, in part, will be the speed at which a staff can reorient on an analog process and then back to a full network-enabled capability without loss of potency.

Those who design exercises and training bear the responsibility of placing stress on these processes. Training the operations process "unplugged," as it were, helps the members of the staff survive this turbulence and retain staff cohesion and functionality. They can better understand the difference between product and process while supporting the commander's decision making. In sum, when buffeted by unreliable networks, we may fall back on sound training, but training and warfighting must proceed from a sturdy and tested operating philosophy—in our case, mission command.

We may be comforted that our forebears successfully coped with the uncertain information environment long before us. During Napoleon's 1809 Danube Campaign, Napoleon's Army of the Danube, and the Army of Italy, under his stepson, Eugene, advanced on Vienna on two distinct axes separated by the Italian Alps. A weeklong ride kept both commanders in the dark as to the success or failure of the other. Eugene blundered into his first engagements but rediscovered his confidence and dealt Archduke John a decisive defeat.[33] He then fought his way into Austria to join Napoleon's forces against Archduke Charles based on little more than an operational approach described to him by dispatches from his commander before departing.[34] I propose that rather than greater information security or dominance, our endeavors must engender a more authentic exercise of mission command.

During our division exercise, I overheard the wry remark by a senior officer, "I know the enemy doesn't know what we're going to do because I don't know what we're going to do." The comment frames a final point worth considering. If the enemy penetrates our mission command system, detailed operational and deception plans become liabilities. The wider the commander's range of options, the more difficult to counter them. Deception has value, but for tactical and operational headquarters, returns may not merit large investment. Retired Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de Czege echoes this sentiment in describing a personal epiphany as a brigade commander at the National Training Center: "Creating ambiguity is a lot more important than trying to create deception."[35] Creating ambiguity does not imply not planning but rather means avoiding patterns and keeping every option available for the longest possible time. In practical terms, this manifests as the use of decision-point tactics. Decision-point tactics respect Helmuth von Moltke's dictum that "one does well to order no more than is absolutely necessary" while putting to good use the planning capacity of the staff.[36]

Concluding Thoughts: Peace with Uncertainty

Martin van Creveld's study *Command in War* delves into the nature of the operations process and finds the American "pathology of information" during the Vietnam War nearly enough to "make one despair of human reason."[37] His critique stings but rings true. Then and now, technological capabilities seduce us into dependency on a fickle mistress. The "quest for certainty," he assures us, is an errant one, and the weight of evidence supports his claim.[38]

Our decision-making processes must prostrate themselves to uncertainty rather than attempt to abolish it. The pursuit of ambiguity and confusion forms the logic of our adversaries' military response to U.S. superiority in traditional warfighting. The Chinese and Russian operating concepts put cross-domain operations at their core and scale from the strategic to the tactical. Cybercombat figures largely into their all-encompassing vision of warfare, and the capability to penetrate military networks already exists. The cognitive aspect of the operations process need not change, but we must prepare for the likelihood that our digital couriers may be intercepted or worse. Columnist Sebastian Bae captures the essence of our times, asserting that victory will go to "those who effectively leverage information to confuse, deceive, and control the adversary."[39] The discovery of Special Order 191 may or may not have changed the course of

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the American Civil War, but the potential seems clear even to amateur historians. We would do well to heed the spirit of our own times and prepare our staffs and commanders for a contested information environment where even our decision-making process may not remain hidden from the enemy. ■

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Screenshot from Kaspersky Lab Cyberthreat Real-Time Map




Screenshot from Norse Corp Live Cyber-Attack Map

For real-time visibility into global cyberattacks and cyberthreats, check out these sources.

Kaspersky Lab's interactive cyberthreat real-time map at:
https://cybermap.kaspersky.com/#

Norse Corp's Live, global cyberattack map at:
http://map.norsecorp.com/#/

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Maj. Andrew Miller (*center*) works with fellow U.S. Army Command and General Staff College students Maj. Brent Adams, U.S. Army; Lt. Cmdr. J.J. Murawski, U.S. Navy; and Senior Capt. Rik Van Hoecke, Belgian army, 26 September 2015 to identify conditions necessary for innovation. (Photo by Maj. Karen Daigle, U.S. Army)

Treading the Way of Ignorance



Officer Education and Critical Thought

1st Lt. James Tollefson, Alaska Army National Guard

In order to arrive at what you do not know
You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance.
—"East Coker," T. S. Eliot

On 25 November 1950, a Chinese army numbering in the hundreds of thousands unexpectedly emerged from the forbidding mountains of North Korea and crashed into the U.S. Eighth Army. Chinese soldiery, fired by revolutionary zeal and hardened by twenty years of constant conflict, flowed around U.S. units in the broken terrain like a human tide.[1] U.S. forces, strung out "from hell to breakfast," as one corps commander put it, found themselves isolated in individual companies and battered until they broke and fled south.[2] In ensuing days, the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division was beaten, broken, and forced to retreat down a six-mile corridor of fire and death that earned the sobering appellation "the Gauntlet."

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As U.S. forces retrograded toward Seoul, strident voices in the United States demanded to know what had happened. How had the mighty U.S. Army, that muscular organization that had crushed two aspiring world empires within the last decade, taken such a blow from a rabble of lightly armed peasant soldiers? How could an army three hundred thousand strong mass against U.S. forces *and achieve complete surprise*?

The answer, as it turned out, was that the political and military logics of the war were in conflict. The Truman administration wished to keep the war limited and, accordingly, desired to avoid Chinese involvement. Meanwhile, Gen. Douglas MacArthur insisted that the Chinese would not dare intervene, and that, if they did, massive U.S. airpower would crush them.[3] He was less forthcoming about the intelligence coming from his front-line units, which increasingly indicated a massive Chinese presence in North Korea.[4] MacArthur seems to have even welcomed the prospect of all-out war against Communist China.[5] Whether the Chinese intervened or not was almost beside the point—if they did, their regime could be toppled; if they did not, Korea would be unified. Either outcome was a U.S.—and for MacArthur, a personal—victory.[6]

Despite this difference of perspective, Truman initially chose to allow MacArthur to act as he wished. Consequently, MacArthur moved north, his lead elements advancing all the way to the Chinese border. The Chinese responded with overwhelming force. Ultimately, the government allowed MacArthur "to bring purely military thinking into matters that remained in essence political" and thereby invited disaster.[7]

In Vietnam, American commanders again brought military decision-making logic to bear against a foe that focused on, and won, the decisive political conflict.[8] Today, as we survey the results of fifteen years of fruitless conflict—a resurgent Taliban, a divided Iraq, a triumphalist Islamic State, brutal sectarian violence, and terrorism—we must ask ourselves if perhaps we have once again inappropriately applied military thinking to political problems.

The challenges we face today clearly do not bend to military logic alone. Today's challenges are inherently multilogical, demanding a nuanced understanding of many competing viewpoints. They can only be addressed by leaders willing to discard worn-out solutions and freely engage with the world as they find it, as it really is. Yet from the earliest days of military service, we train our young leaders to think monologically—in a simple, linear fashion. We train them to win decisively as lieutenants and captains while preparing them to flounder as generals. We focus on tactical victory while fatalistically hoping for strategic success.

Weak-Sense Critical Thought, Military Training, and Tactical Victory

We can define monological or "weak-sense" critical thinking as what we learn to do to solve specific problems. It is technical reason that solves problems systematically by understanding the workings of a discrete and bounded system, such as a car engine. Such are vocational thinking skills, necessary to accomplish specific tasks with excellence. Where problems are well structured or well understood, they can be fruitfully addressed by monological thinking.

At present, the training young officers receive teaches and rewards monological thought. This is entirely appropriate. It is time to act when the shooting starts, after all, and to do so decisively. Therefore, young leaders are conditioned to kill, react to contact, maneuver their units, cross-level supplies and ammunition, evacuate their casualties, report to higher headquarters, plan for the offense and defense, and control direct and indirect fires. Critical thought is required in the planning of raids, ambushes, defenses, logistical resupplies, air movements, and patrols, but the standards of success and failure are clearly defined. One considers the opponent's point of view from within the context of one's own: "If I was the enemy, with the materiel that the enemy is templated to possess, what would I do and how would I do it?" Then the young leader drafts a plan to meet his or her opponent's imagined courses of action. Always the bias is to act, and the tools to enable this action are simple, decisive, monological tactics.

Leaving platoon leadership, young officers receive their first thorough exposure to doctrine at the career course.

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1st Lt. Elyse Ping Medvigy calls for fire 22 August 2014 during an artillery shoot south of Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. Medvigy, a fire support officer assigned to the 4th Infantry Division's Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, is the first female company fire support officer to serve in an infantry brigade combat team supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Whitney Houston, U.S. Army)

Here they receive the U.S. Army's accumulated wisdom on offense, defense, stability operations, and defense support to civil authorities. They learn to create detailed plans that strictly accord with this doctrine. No one claims that this doctrine is inerrant. Yet adherence to it provides valuable consistency "on which decision makers higher in the chain can depend."[9] In the messy reality of war, doctrine saves time, allowing leaders to make decisions in advance of events. Good doctrine "simply overwhelms minor variations and unexpected reactions."[10] It may sometimes fail, but in aggregate it enables tactical units to communicate their plans to one another, synchronize their efforts, and achieve crushing victories against their adversaries. Though many company grade officers chafe against it, most act within it. Doctrine provides context for tactics. It is the frame that informs our professional responsibilities.

Doctrine demands that we accept our lessons in warfare on the authority of others. We can partake vicariously in the wartime experiences of our predecessors through documentaries and books, but without actual combat experience, we cannot personally verify the truth of what we are taught. To the extent that we do have such opportunities during deployments or training events, we often see only enough to convince us of the overall validity of our training without putting most of it to the test. We are like J. B. Bury's primitive man who learned from his elders that the neighboring hills held both bears and evil spirits and who, upon seeing a bear, concluded that evil spirits must also be real.[11] Likewise, we are taught both ambushes and counterinsurgency doctrine; receiving a "Go" on an ambush training lane, we assume the efficacy of counterinsurgency doctrine. Coming from the same source, we assume each equally valid. Young officers have little ability to weigh and validate the relative merits of the many things they must learn. So they simply learn the lessons well and accept their value on the authority of the instructors. Newly minted experts at ambushes, young officers assume the efficacy of counterinsurgency to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, a people they

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An Afghan soldier briefs a combined force at a sand table representing East Afghanistan during a combined arms rehearsal 3 March 2014 at Forward Operating Base Thunder, Paktia Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Pfc. Nikayla Shodeen, U.S. Army)

do not understand. Like new lieutenants, we all come to accept our doctrine by faith supported by a paucity of (often irrelevant) experiences.

We receive our young officers from a school and university system that consistently produces poor reasoners, and then attempt to make them experts in a very specific monological discipline of tactical problem solving. We give them all the "right" answers and launch them into the fray.[12] One result is that we set lifetime habits of thought and reinforce them at each level of the Officer Education System. Each program teaches adherence to doctrine, conformity in terminology and language, and a specific interpretation of world events and their significance to the United States. Although opportunities abound at the higher levels of the Officer Education System for officers to learn the reflective disciplines of multilogical "strong-sense" critical thought, most fail to make the transition.[13] Perhaps this is because Army promotions actively penalize officers that demonstrate conceptual ability.[14] Perhaps it is the inevitable outcome of a military culture that shuns quality writing in favor of PowerPoint slides and e-mail.[15] Perhaps many officers simply fail to realize that such a transition is necessary. Whatever the reason, we produce legions of doctrinal technicians but very few independent thinkers.

Strong-Sense Critical Thought, Intellectual Freedom, and the Way of Ignorance

Multilogical, "strong-sense" critical thought is "the ability to think accurately and fairmindedly within opposing points of view and contradictory frames of reference."[16] Multilogical problems are those that can be approached from many different perspectives and understood by means of widely divergent ideologies. To truly understand them requires a suspension of inborn ethno- and ego-centricity and a willingness to reason from within others' understanding of the world. It requires us to calmly consider that our terrorists are another's freedom fighters; that what we perceive as naked aggression may to another be the fulfillment of national destiny; that our liberty may be

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another's godless hedonism. It requires us to commit the ultimate ideological heresy—to admit that our national self-interest and cultural values are no more intrinsically worthwhile than anyone else's. Yet in the midst of this apostasy, we must remain capable of fighting faithfully for those same national interests and values.

The difficulties inherent in this are immense. To enjoy such intellectual freedom means quietly discarding the philosophy underpinning the *National Security Strategy*, which loudly proclaims that "American values are reflective of the universal values we champion all around the world," thereby declaring our country the world's arbiter of moral justice and freedom.[17] This egocentric commitment to value projection "defies rational explanation beyond an excessive belief in the universality of our own model of democracy."[18] More importantly, it blinds us to reality as much of the world's population currently experiences it. Yet, as leaders of our nation's Army, we have an obligation to implement this very policy.

And so, we find ourselves faced with the central dilemma of intellectual freedom in the military. To be truly free is to unfetter the mind and seek truth for its own sake. Yet, we serve a profession that requires significant ideological commitment. We are trained from commissioning to stand, rifle in hand, on behalf of the national interest. Our first loyalty is to the Constitution, the flag, the people from whom we come and to whom we will return. We cannot abandon this commitment—and cannot even responsibly question it. It is a fundamental prerequisite of our profession that we be willing to fight and kill for our nation, and in so doing violently impose our national will and national values on other peoples around the world. Yet the intellectual freedom we require to engage the world today demands that we reason from the perspective of our opponents *as though we shared their beliefs*. Even in the absence of the strong monological tendencies of military training, this would pose a significant obstacle to developing truly independent, multilogical thinkers in our ranks.

Somehow we must learn how to hold these opposing ideas in our minds, navigating fluently the inherent tension between them, and enter into true multilogical freedom of thought. Then, having attained a sort of professional enlightenment, we must discover how to teach this insight to generations of young officers to come. It is no mistake if this sounds vaguely spiritual in nature. This is not a battle for behavioral scientists, statisticians, or psychologists. It is a challenge instead for the reflective, experienced, senior military leaders within our ranks. This is a job for soldier-philosophers with the courage to challenge the assumptions upon which they have built decades-long careers.

Of course, not all the demands of succeeding in our current operating environment require such deep introspective challenges to the nature of our profession. Often, we need only step back from a situation where our training and experience are demonstrably ineffective and have the courage to try a novel, nondoctrinal, creative solution. Yet the basic challenge is the same. The uncritical self-assurance that informs our *National Security Strategy* and our oath of commissioning also pervades our battle drills and doctrine. It is the assumption that we already have all, or most, of the right answers, and success is merely a matter of effective implementation. It is only when we consciously affirm that we do not know everything and when we assume an attitude of intellectual humility, that we begin to attain true critical thought—even wisdom.

Essayist Wendell Berry, writing of the verse that forms the epigraph to this paper, describes this humility as the "way of ignorance."[19] It is living in the constant conscious affirmation of our unknowing, our inability to know everything that we ought to know. It is the mindset of the person who does not lightly accept harm, who does not casually "destroy a village in order to save it, ... destroy freedom in order to save it, ... destroy the world in order to live in it."[20] It is understanding the limits of our own experience and training. For, as T. S. Eliot writes,

> *There is, it seems to us,*
> *At best, only a limited value*
> *In the knowledge derived from experience.*
> *The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies,*
> *For the pattern is new in every moment*
> *And every moment is a new and shocking*
> *Valuation of all we have been.*[21]

It is all very well, of course, to espouse the virtues of some lofty philosophy of critical thought. These words reach out as vague accusations of our current system's failures. The burden of proof is immediately on the reader either to affirm or refute these allegations. Intuitively, we know that there is much to cherish in our military institutions, regardless of their inevitable shortcomings or defects. So, the vignette that follows is offered as compelling evidence that the attributes of intellectual humility and critical thinking here endorsed are already present

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in today's Army. What we need is perhaps not so much a revolutionary reappraisal of our training and officer education system as a frank discussion of the need for intellectual humility and candor throughout our ranks. As that discussion occurs, it behooves us to teach our young leaders the intellectual humility and open-minded critical thinking skills that will allow them to win on the battlefields of tomorrow.

Strong-Sense Critical Thought in Action: Defeating the RKG-3 in Iraq, 2008 to 2009

Lt. Col. John Richardson commanded a cavalry squadron in Iraq in 2008 to 2009. Prior to deployment, his unit mastered the Army's extant counter-improvised explosive device (IED) tactics. In theater they quickly discovered that the local insurgent forces had exchanged IEDs for the RKG-3, a Soviet-era antitank hand grenade. Counter-IED tactics were of no avail against this new threat. RKG-3 casualties began to mount. Richardson, who "had trained for seventeen years to prepare himself to be a leader in this situation, to use good judgment and make decisive, ethical, and tactically sound decisions in a time of crisis," immediately directed a number of "technical solutions based on previous personal combat actions and years of experience."[22] Reasoning from within his own personal experience and extensive tactical training, he took decisive action to defeat a threat he did not understand. Nevertheless, his unit continued to take casualties from RKG-3 attacks. His monological response to the threat failed.

RKG-3/RGK-3M



RKG-3EM



The RKG (*Ruchnaya Kumulyativnaya Granata*) is a Russian-made handheld shaped-charge grenade developed in the 1950s to defeat armor plating. One version of the RKG features a small, spring-loaded parachute that enables the RKG to attack the top of armored vehicles where armor is often thinnest. This parachute stabilizes the grenade in descent to ensure that the charge makes contact with the armor at a 90-degree angle. Other versions of the RKG do not have a parachute and are simply thrown against the sides of passing vehicles. It became a favored weapon of Iraqi insurgents operating in urban environments because individuals could throw them then quickly disappear among the civilian population. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Fortunately, Richardson, instead of accepting RKG-3 casualties as the inevitable cost of doing business, decided to try another approach. He assembled a small group of soldiers who he believed had "developed innovative training in the past, ... showed a propensity for taking prudent risk, ... invented new tactics or new equipment configurations, ... and ... demonstrated an ability to transfer knowledge," and he tasked them to provide him with a solution.[23] This they did. By the end of the deployment, Richardson's unit had eliminated the RKG-3 threat and destroyed the insurgent network behind it. Richardson realized, and acted to overcome, the deficiencies of his training and experience. He demonstrated intellectual humility and enabled multilogical, strong-sense critical thought in his subordinates. In so doing, he defeated the main threat in his area of operations, doubtless saved some of his soldiers' lives, and proved that even a hardened career combat arms officer can walk the "way of ignorance."

Ultimately we can each say with assurance that all we know of the future is that it is coming. What it will look like, and what demands it will place upon us, is impossible to foresee. We cannot train for a threat we have not imagined any more than we can speak a language we have not heard. We cannot know what we do not know. But we can certainly inculcate the habits of humble, multilogical critical thought that will enable today's platoon leaders to be tomorrow's adaptive battalion commanders. For in combat as in life,

The only wisdom we can hope to acquire
Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless.[24] ■

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How to Hinder Unit Readiness

Lt. Col. James Morgan, U.S. Army
Lt. Col. Soo Kim-Delio, U.S. Army, MD

The Army's top priority is readiness, but maintaining a force that is ready to deploy units at any time—while taking care of soldiers physically, mentally, and in their careers—is a precarious balance. Human resource and medical fitness practices make units' deployment preparation unnecessarily difficult, as those practices did for the 13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (13th ESC) in 2014 when it prepared to deploy to Kuwait. After receiving orders in January 2014, the 13th ESC managed to deploy in December at just 71 percent of mandated strength. The unit struggled to overcome issues common to the Army's personnel and medical systems practices that hinder operating units' readiness. To help units overcome these challenges, the institutional Army, sometimes called the generating force, needs to think like the operating force. The institution must focus on how to help each operational unit prepare as a whole for deployment.



13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) unit shoulder patch

The 13th ESC's analysis of its deployment preparation showed how certain systemic medical and personnel practices beyond the unit's control impeded its preparation. It found deficiencies in medical and personnel practices that the Army could remedy to more efficiently provide deployable soldiers to units. This article encapsulates those challenges and highlights medical and personnel aspects that play a pivotal role in a soldier's deployment availability. This article also offers solutions—where possible. It aims to help units conduct predeployment strength management and to help the Army improve strength management practices.

Policy recommendations include that the Army Human Resources Command (HRC) open the Distribution Conference (where unit vacancies are validated and prioritized for filling) to higher headquarters at the general officer level, to fully coordinate current and future deployments with the operating force. This collaboration could help human resource administrators to think like

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Staff Sgt. Adrian Haley, 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Support Operations, discusses a training objective with a Kuwaiti army officer and others during a logistics tabletop training exercise 12 April 2015 at the Kuwait Ministry of Defense Logistic Operations Command Center. After overcoming significant readiness challenges during its predeployment period, the unit successfully conducted Kazma II, the first logistics and sustainment training exercise between the two partner militaries. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Jason Thompson, U.S. Army)

operators. The Army should ensure medical support personnel with experience in operational medicine are available to truly assess soldiers' deployable status prior to assigning them to deploying units. Human resource professionals should improve coordination at the unit, installation, and HRC levels to fine-tune and support deployment needs. In addition, it is time to make the Army's medical fitness standards established in Army Regulation (AR) 40-501, *Standards of Medical Fitness*, align with its deployment standards.[1] Moreover, units need help with processes for the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) and the Warrior Care and Transition Unit.[2]

13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command Deployment Preparation

In January 2014, the 13th ESC, based at Fort Hood, Texas, received its deployment orders for a nine-month temporary change-of-station mission to Kuwait at full modified-table-of-organization-and-equipment (MTOE) strength of 262 personnel. The unit's mission was to serve as the operational command post of the 1st Sustainment Command (Theater), providing mission command for sustainment to all U.S. and coalition forces serving in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility.

The 1st Sustainment Command (Theater) main command post is based at Fort Knox, Kentucky (formerly at Fort Bragg, North Carolina). The command sources its operational command post in Kuwait with an ESC to conduct logistics operations in theater. During its deployment, the 13th ESC provided 80 percent of the personnel needed for 1st Sustainment Command's operational command post in Kuwait, and 20 percent came from the 1st Sustainment Command's headquarters.

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As the 13th ESC began its deployment preparation, numerous events hindered its ability to deploy at required strength:

- an officer separation board;
- an enhanced selective early retirement board;
- a Qualitative Service Program board;
- a Qualitative Management Program board;
- Fort Hood's deployment of forces in support of United States Africa Command, and to Korea, and to Ukraine;
- the October 2014 redeployment of the Multinational Forces and Observers Provisional Battalion headquarters, internally sourced several months earlier by the 13th ESC;
- the 13th ESC's deployment of the headquarters and three battalion headquarters from 4th Sustainment Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, in support of Operation Resolute Support;
- the reestablishment of logistical support to the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command–Iraq and the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve; and
- the Afghanistan theater transition from Operation Resolute Support to Operation Freedom's Sentinel.

Deployment personnel strength management is a complicated, multifaceted moving target that often reflects the greater needs of the Army above the requirements of a single unit. There is a certain amount of flexibility built into the system to allow for the expansion and retraction of total strength to prepare a unit to deploy. Despite this flexibility, however, the ESC would have needed HRC to adopt a unit-focused approach to provide quality replacements as well as a much needed revision to the USCENTCOM deployment policy medical fitness standards specified in the document known as Modification Twelve, or MOD 12.[3] These changes probably could have helped the unit to acquire the soldiers it needed for deployment despite hindrances from the Army's medical and personnel systems.


The 13th ESC personnel readiness goal before deployment was to set the 13th ESC team and achieve a 90 percent deployable personnel strength ninety days prior to the latest arrival date. The unit was expected to receive gains during its deployment, with the final goal of attaining a greater than 95 percent deployable strength by the latest arrival date. The 13th ESC identified the required backfills on the unit's "mission-essential requirements list" and provided them to HRC in March 2014. The organization conducted video teleconferences with officers attending the intermediate-level education course at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and followed up with by-name requests. It continually tried to get as many soldiers deployable as possible and to move nondeployable soldiers to other assignments so the organization could receive qualified replacements.

The 13th ESC coordinated with the 1st Sustainment Command (Theater) on the deployment unit-manning roster in April 2014. Coordination was ongoing through mission command training and then through the 2014 predeployment site survey (see figure, page 99). The 13th ESC also conducted a pre–soldier readiness processing (pre-SRP) event from 9 to 11 September 2014, before final SRP in October, to identify remaining medical or administrative issues. Shortages and concerns were reported to 1st Sustainment Command (Theater), to III Corps, and to HRC through the monthly Unit Status Reports. Even with these efforts, the unit could only muster a 71 percent deployable rate by December 2014.

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(Graphic by James Morgan)

Figure. Road to War

The many factors that directly affected the unit's numbers throughout the deployment included availability of quality (deployable) inbounds, retirements, resignations, individual medical needs, soldiers twice not selected for promotion, separation board results, and Fort Hood logistical responsibilities. The quality-of-fills data in table 1 (page 100) highlight nondeployable rate and status categories the organization contended with from April 2013 to November 2014 as it tried to fill the ranks for deployment.[4]

For the 13th ESC, from April 2013 to November 2014, the percentage of nondeployable inbounds for staff sergeant (E–6) to colonel (O–6) was nearly 20 percent. Thirty-one of 417 inbounds (about 7 percent) of the ESC's inbounds received medical profiles within the first sixty days of assignment to the ESC. Nineteen received medical profiles that required less than thirty days to recover, while seven received medical profiles that would require thirty days or more recovery time. Five soldiers arrived while on a medical profile from their previous units—three on medical profiles requiring thirty days or more to recover and two on medical profiles that require thirty days or less to recover. Ten had a history of profiles that ended just before their permanent change of station (PCS), which could be an indicator that they may have a more permanent medical condition. Subsequently, twelve were referred to medical evaluation boards (MEBs) for separation. In addition to medical nonavailabilities, the unit continued to receive soldiers with dwell time (mandated recovery time) built up from a previous deployment, which made them nondeployable. The return of the Task Force Sinai support battalion in December 2014—sourced from 13th ESC nine months prior—created a situation where the 13th ESC had a significant dwell population of fifty-four soldiers who would require nine months at home station before being deployed again.

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The quality of fills due to separation and promotion boards played a role. During 2014, the 13th ESC experienced both a high separation board rate and a low promotion selection rate when compared to Army-wide statistics. Of course, unit fills typically consist of a range of quality; however, there generally should be a balance within a few percentage points of the Army-wide promotion selection averages. The 13th ESC board data are shown in table 2 (page 101).

The 13th ESC became, in effect, a quasi-holding unit for officer transitions, which counted against its deployable numbers and overall personnel readiness plan. The unit received a majority of officers who were selected for separation with a limited number of officers promoted. Some were already in the unit and some were on PCS orders to the unit, while others were III Corps–directed intrapost transfers from other units as those units were deploying.

Table 1. Nondeployable Rate of Inbound Personnel for the 13th ESC and the 4th Sustainment Brigade, April 2013 to November 2014

Types of nondeployable status	Nondeployable rate of 417 inbound personnel as a percentage*	Numbers of nondeployable inbound personnel
Scheduled for retirement or resignation	3%	14
Arrived with dwell time	2%	9
Referred to medical evaluation board	3%	12
Received long-term 3B** profiles first year assigned	11%	46
Total inbounds nondeployable	**19%**	**81**

* Includes E-6 (staff sergeant) to O-6 (colonel). Percentages are approximate.

** Individual medical readiness category for a medical condition that cannot be resolved within 30 days.

(Table by James Morgan)

An additional contributing factor was the need to source a sustainment brigade headquarters and three sustainment battalions to deploy to Kuwait. The 4th Sustainment Brigade lost three majors and five captains projected to deploy due to the fiscal year 2014 Officer Separation Board. The unit mitigated shortfalls through internal reorganization efforts. The 13th ESC headquarters moved two majors needed for the deployment down to fill the 4th Sustainment Brigade, thus increasing deployment manning concerns. Of the thirteen 90A (logistics) major positions, four would be filled by 90A captains.

During the 13th ESC's July 2014 predeployment site survey, the 13th ESC conducted a video teleconference with the HRC Office of Personnel Management Division, the 13th ESC account manager, and the III Corps G-1 (assistant chief of staff, personnel) to discuss possible solutions, including potential ways to reach 90 percent deployable strength for the 13th ESC Headquarters and the 4th Sustainment Brigade. To achieve this, one brigade and three battalion headquarters needed to be filled at rates of 119 percent to 148 percent over strength. Even with this effort, due to low-quality inbounds, separation boards, and medical issues, the 13th ESC deployed at 71 percent of the required deployment strength instead of 90 percent, with 45 percent of its total population nondeployable (see table 3, page 102).[5]

The Effect of Medical Factors on Deployable Status

Why did the 13th ESC need to get filled to such a high rate in order to deploy at 71 percent versus the 90 percent it was trying to achieve? The main contributing factors were the unit's lack of medical assets to examine soldiers early, the medical readiness of soldiers in general, and the various medical processes

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Table 2. Boards in 2014 as Quality-of-Fill Indicators

Board	Quantity	13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command Army board selection rates	Overall Army board selection rates
Identified as high risk for separation	10 majors and 8 captains	N/A	N/A
Separation board for major	6 majors	17%	6.5%
Separation board for captain	9 captains	20%	11.7%
Centralized selection list command/key billet for lieutenant colonel	1 selected, 2 alternates, 3 not selected	N/A	N/A
Promotion to lieutenant colonel	1 selected	33% (3 not selected twice and 2 not selected once)	63%
Promotion to major	3 selected	38% (2 not selected twice and 5 not selected once)	65%
Promotion to chief warrant officer 5	0 Selected	0% (2 not selected twice and 3 not selected once)	18%
Promotion to chief warrant officer 4	0 Selected	0% (1 not selected)	65%
Promotion to chief warrant officer 3	3 Selected	50% (4 not selected twice and 3 not selected once)	68%

Note: Figures are rounded.

(Table by James Morgan)

and procedures that inadvertently limited the number of deployable soldiers in a unit.

One issue facing the 13th ESC concerning personnel medical readiness was not having the expertise on hand to examine medical readiness issues and advise the commander early on. A typical ESC's surgeon cell is staffed by a 68W noncommissioned officer (combat medic, sergeant first class, E–7) and a 70B Medical Service Corps officer (health services administration) but no medical providers. The noncommissioned officer and Medical Service Corps officer work in an administrative capacity and do not provide clinical decision making. The 13th ESC was authorized a medical provider, and one arrived in July 2014, approximately four months before deployment. It had been four years since the organization had a permanently assigned surgeon. The position normally was staffed by an Army Professional Filler System (PROFIS) assignment and only during deployments. The 13th ESC's only other medical providers before June 2014 were those assigned to the 4th Sustainment Brigade—a physician, a physician assistant, and seven medics. With the 4th Sustainment Brigade deploying four months before the ESC, few medical resources remained.

To exacerbate the situation further, the recent realignment of sustainment brigades to divisions has extremely limited an ESC's ability to influence medical readiness; any logistics battalions assigned to an ESC have no medical assets. Typical maneuver battalions, on the other hand, have an assigned active-duty physician or physician assistant and medics.

Like many providers filling 60A surgeon positions (operational medicine), the ESC surgeon was a subspecialist in pediatric allergy with only prior PROFIS assignments and no experience as a staff officer. During the initial two months, the surgeon attended required training, including the Brigade Surgeon Course and the Tactical Combat Casualty Care Course. During the two-week Brigade Surgeon Course, the unit surgeon received only one hour of instruction each on eProfile, IDES, and the medical protection system; all these systems play an integral role in the medical readiness of soldiers. Many health professionals have limited experience with these programs or others, such as Periodic Health Assessments and Post-Deployment Health Risk Assessment programs, which all influence the medical readiness of soldiers. Health professionals need familiarity with them.

With limited medical assets before deployment, the 13th ESC relied on the only system available for medical readiness—the troop medical clinic, where soldiers assigned to the unit, including the battalions, see civilian providers. These providers may have many years of civilian experience but often do not have military experience. In addition, they have no formal

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Table 3. Comparison of Soldiers Assigned with Soldiers Deployable from May to December 2014

13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC)

Month	Number authorized	Number assigned	Percentage assigned	Number available to deploy	Percentage available to deploy	Number not deployable	Percentage not deployable	MTOE* deployable
August	262	288	110%	178	62%	110	38%	178/68%
September	262	290	111%	211	73%	79	27%	211/80%
October	262	311	119%	205	66%	106	34%	205/78%
November	262	314	120%	202	64%	102	36%	202/77%
December	262	339	129%	185	55%	154	45%	185/71%

4th Sustainment Brigade (SB)/Special Troop Battalion (STB)

Month	Number authorized	Number assigned	Percentage assigned	Number available to deploy	Percentage available to deploy	Number not deployable	Percentage not deployable	Actual deployed
July	262	318	121%	235	74%	83	26%	-
August	262	354	135%	283	80%	71	20%	-
September	262	387	148%	289	75%	98	25%	186/92%

553rd Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB)

Month	Number authorized	Number assigned	Percentage assigned	Number available to deploy	Percentage available to deploy	Number not deployable	Percentage not deployable	Actual deployed
May	69	61	84%	58	95%	3	5%	-
June	69	70	99%	68	97%	2	3%	-
July	69	144	141%	97	67%	47	33%	67/97%

49th Movement Control Battalion (MCB)

Month	Number authorized	Number assigned	Percentage assigned	Number available to deploy	Percentage available to deploy	Number not deployable	Percentage not deployable	Actual deployed
May	54	83	106%	57	69%	26	31%	-
June	54	83	124%	67	81%	16	19%	-
July	54	80	119%	64	80%	16	20%	54/100%

Units were filled at 119% to 148% strength to deploy at 92% or greater:
- 4th SB headquarters/4th STB authorized 262, assigned 387, assigned 148%, deployed 186 (92% of force tracking number [FTN]), nondeployable 25%
- 553rd CSSB authorized 69, assigned 144, assigned 141%, deployed 67 (97% of FTN), nondeployable 33%
- 49th MCB authorized 54, assigned 80, assigned 119%, deployed 54, (100%), nondeployable 20%

*Modified table of organization and equipment

(Table by James Morgan)

connection to the units and the command. There are no opportunities for the providers to review their practice—such as by conducting profile review boards or unit readiness reviews—in light of the effect on the individual soldiers or the units. For example, a soldier who was on a temporary profile was seen for knee pain, and the provider gave a P2 (walking) profile after only four visits over several months. The soldier or the provider might not realize that the soldier's ability to attend schools or be promoted could be affected.

Some would say that it is not the provider's place to counsel a soldier on his or her promotion potential, and that medical professionals should treat disease regardless of rank. However, military providers provide options that take into consideration future implications in a soldier's career. Often, civilian medical providers make decisions that inadvertently result in a nondeployable soldier. Essentially, they take away a commander's ability to decide if a soldier should deploy. This occurs for many reasons even as providers are

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trying to do the best job they can for patient care, but the situation often hampers the readiness of units.

One reason this occurs is due to how hospitals and clinics are evaluated and funded. Patient comments—positive or negative—often determine how a provider is evaluated. A hospital receives a portion of its funding based on the results of surveys (the Joint Outpatient Experience Survey replaced the Army Provider Level Satisfaction Survey in 2016). If survey results were negative, the hospital could potentially not receive additional funding. This might lead providers to cater to patient requests to gain positive survey results. It also could lead providers to liberally provide multiday restriction-to-quarters slips or profiles with strict duty restrictions, which would hurt a unit's morale and discipline, as physical training is an integral part of *esprit de corps*. Of particular concern is what are commonly referred to as "0900 work call" profiles (profiles that specify the start of the duty day) or those that specify an eight-hour duty day, usually due to health professionals prescribing psychiatric medication or other potentially debilitating drugs.

The Office of the Surgeon General addresses profiles and duty-hour restrictions in the "Behavioral Health Profiling Standardization Policy," which acknowledges, "Significant variability exists throughout the Army when medical providers communicate duty hour limitations."[6] Profiles prevent soldiers who could be considered fit for duty from deploying, so other soldiers have to perform their tasks because the formation does not receive replacements.

Soldier Readiness Processing Challenges

The 13th ESC conducted pre–SRP in September 2014, but due to the short period from the surgeon's arrival, mandatory training, and the deployment of the 4th Sustainment Brigade in October 2014, the medical providers had little opportunity to screen medical records. In fact, the previous SRP had been conducted nearly four years earlier, in December 2012, but the SRP for the pending deployment could not be scheduled before orders arrived. The headquarters company commander was told by the operations advisor during SRP that the unit could not go through processing without orders, even with the deployment pending.

The three months before deployment was a time of high operational tempo and not ideal for initial medical readiness processing. The result was delays in determining the deployment medical readiness of personnel due to required evaluations that then necessitated additional time-consuming tests and examinations. The local medical treatment facilities were cooperative and generally able to schedule initial appointments within seventy-two hours, but processing radiologic studies, labs, and off-post consultations often could not be accelerated. At the time of the initial SRP, Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics testing and behavioral health reevaluation from the 2 April 2014 Fort Hood shooting were also scheduled.[7] These were in addition to a validation exercise, transfer of authority with a replacement unit coming to manage sustainment on Fort Hood, ranges, family time, and block leave.

Preferably, SRP should be scheduled no more than 120 days before the expected deployment date, which the 13th ESC accomplished in the September 2014 pre–SRP. The intent of the initial SRP is to help soldiers address medical concerns not previously addressed by their primary care manager so units can resolve issues or find replacements. However, 120 days may not give units enough time to obtain deployable replacements.

Several factors contribute to a growing medical class of personnel within the Army who are nondeployable. They take up valid and critical slots but cannot deploy, leaving units no recourse to gain deployable personnel. Troop medical clinic providers not well versed in deployment criteria may be treating soldiers to the standard of care, but they may not address stricter requirements to deploy, such as medical subspecialist clearances. Conducting SRP can assist—an example is a soldier with a small asymptomatic hernia who declined surgery. Based on MOD 12 guidelines, at a minimum, a soldier could not deploy without a USCENTCOM waiver, which would be determined by a surgical consultation, evaluation, and clearance—all which can take months to achieve.[8] In the meantime, a soldier's deployment status would be questionable and perhaps denied, resulting in the need for a replacement.

Another issue facing the 13th ESC's readiness came from conflicting regulatory guidance. Soldiers are screened for deployment eligibility based on multiple criteria, including AR 40-501 and MOD 12, as well as various U.S. Medical Command (USMEDCOM) requirements. These requirements are not always complementary. For example, a soldier can meet retention

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criteria based on AR 40-501 but not meet MOD 12 deployment criteria. In addition, a soldier can meet both retention and MOD 12 criteria but not be deployable based on a USMEDCOM directive. For instance, the 13th ESC had a soldier with a history of systemic reactions to a bee sting whose allergy was confirmed by testing. He met retention criteria and in principle could deploy with a waiver for an EpiPen, but based on venom immunotherapy recommendations from the Office of the Surgeon General, the soldier needed allergy shots for three years.[9] Immunotherapy is not approved in deployed situations and is denied at the local combat support hospital, so the soldier would be nondeployable for three years. This soldier otherwise met retention standards and did not qualify for an MEB. The unit needed a replacement.

Seeing the increase of nondeployable soldiers within the 13th ESC, III Corps tried reorganizing personnel in a short amount of time to assist the unit, but due to other deployments and required specialties, the capability was minimal. HRC would need four to six months to reassign a replacement from across the Army. By 23 October 2014, 21 percent of the 224 soldiers scheduled to deploy had delays in their SRP due to medical clearance issues. By 4 December 2014, eleven of the fifteen late deployers were due to medical delays, including needs for medical stabilization for ninety days, CPAP (continuance positive airway pressure) therapy compliance downloads, and follow-up evaluations. Of the 339 soldiers assigned to the 13th ESC by December, 185 deployed, putting the unit at 71 percent of MTOE strength.[10]

To increase the number of deployable soldiers, the 13th ESC conducted monthly reviews of the status and treatment of soldiers who did not deploy. The reviews included examining the status of USCENTCOM waiver approvals; new profiles; changes to medical conditions, including if soldiers met their medical retention decision point (MRDP); and IDES criteria. The monthly meetings were attended by the 13th ESC commanding general, headquarters commander, rear detachment commander, G-1 (both forward and rear), surgeon (both forward and rear), and rear detachment chief of staff. With follow-up from the rear detachment command surgeon, by 15 January 2015, the 13th ESC had twenty-three soldiers in the IDES process versus twelve before the September 2014 SRP.

At least one soldier, who claimed he was deployable and was released from the MEB process, was then put on another temporary nondeployable profile within a week for another medical issue that did not allow him to clear SRP. Even though he continued to be nondeployable by MOD 12 standards, he was not eligible for the MEB. When the MEB states a service member is fit for duty, and the unit does not want to change the nondeployable soldier's duty station, the soldier provides little value to the unit during its deployment. Also, of similar concern are soldiers who undergo IDES and are found fit for duty but with limitations in deployment. This includes soldiers with medical conditions requiring frequent lab follow-up, those on medications that cannot be used in austere environments, or those who cannot tolerate long periods on combat rations. These soldiers then carry a "V" code on their profile that continues to count against the command as a 3B profile, in addition to holding a position in a deploying unit that must now be accounted for by others.

One of the most difficult situations that was noted during monthly reviews was soldiers with behavioral health issues. Several soldiers said they felt they were being punished for seeking care and being on behavioral health or sleep medication, which required a waiver that was subsequently denied. With so many senior soldiers with numerous deployments and combat experience, it is not uncommon that they have a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and receive medications. In December 2012, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs reported that nearly 30 percent of veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan whom it treated had PTSD.[11]

As a command, the 13th ESC strongly encourages its soldiers to seek appropriate behavioral health care. The command does not want to foster the impression that doing so negatively impacts the careers of otherwise functional soldiers. If soldiers felt ready to deploy, we, as medical providers and human resource administrators, advocated strongly for approval of waivers that would allow them to deploy. We, of course, understand the risks associated with these issues and the safety and care that must be balanced with such risks. We accepted waiver results but supported those soldiers who wanted waivers for their conditions and said they felt capable of deploying despite continued treatment. During the deployment, of soldiers who returned due to medical issues (including MOD 12 failure and medical evacuation) from December 2014 to April 2015, four were for, or included, behavioral health issues; this was about 36 percent of those medically released from theater. Of

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those, only one had a MOD 12 behavioral health waiver before arrival. Therefore, most issues arose for the first time during the 13th ESC's deployment.

A waiver decision should be made with input from the command and consideration of a unit's deployment location and assets. As in our experience, with treatment received in theater, fewer soldiers returned due to behavioral health conditions than for orthopedic issues.

Another concern regarding behavioral health waivers is that soldiers would follow up with their off-post behavioral-health provider about the inability to deploy due to their medications. Civilian providers who have a limited understanding of deployment medical requirements would then—at a soldier's misinformed request—discontinue or modify medications if symptoms allowed, thinking the soldier could deploy. Based on MOD 12, a soldier then would become nondeployable for up to ninety days from that medication change. If the circumstance was noted at the soldier's revalidation SRP, then the best-case scenario would be deployment up to three months after the rest of the unit.

Sleep apnea also proved to be a confusing diagnosis during SRP. Some soldiers with mild obstructive sleep apnea who did not need a sleep study by the MOD 12 guidelines were referred to the sleep clinic for such and had waivers sent. The MOD 12 guidelines were not entirely clear, as a waiver was not required for mild obstructive sleep apnea, but soldiers using CPAP therapy still would need a compliance download. If soldiers did not meet the minimum criteria on their thirty-day download and settings were adjusted, they would need another thirty-day compliance download and so on until they were stabilized.

Orthopedic issues and their associated pain conditions are another common medical condition found in soldiers of all career lengths. These caused issues both before and during the 13th ESC's deployment. The most commonly found conditions were back and knee issues. Soldiers given narcotic pain medications for chronic pain required a MOD 12 waiver, which was generally disapproved if they were on narcotic pain medications in the prior six months. Soldiers may have chronic orthopedic conditions that flare and require an increase in pain medications. They can continue to take and pass their Army physical fitness tests and do not carry a nondeployable profile, making them retainable, but they are not deployable.

In addition, treatment plans and available resources while deployed can be confusing for both soldiers and providers. In theater, injections are routinely performed for joints but not for spine. Injections are only intermittently available if the medical support unit happens to receive a provider credentialed to provide this procedure.

Two soldiers with chronic back pain were sent home after only six weeks due to back pain not treatable in theater at the time. About three months after they departed, an anesthesia provider credentialed in pain management who could provide spinal injections arrived. While receiving treatment of injections every three to six months, soldiers are able to participate in physical training and do not have any deployment-limiting restrictions on their profile, but they cannot deploy.

Issues faced by the 13th ESC in trying to get personnel medically fit to deploy were the result of several factors, including health professionals not fully understanding the ramification of their treatment or of Army medical systems and procedures, patient-provided information, and conflicting medical regulations. For the latter, a holistic, integrated review and alignment of combatant-command-specific deployment criteria and AR 40-501 would best serve both soldiers and units. This is certainly an area that needs clarification as it affects a soldier's career and should not be left to interpretation.

There are too many cases when soldiers cannot deploy due to a declined waiver but do not require a profile, or their profiles do not qualify them for an MEB based on AR 40-501. When soldiers are found nondeployable due to a declined waiver and are then allowed a PCS, the process begins again with the following unit. As requirements are different for those on PCS versus deploying to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, the inconsistencies in MOD 12 entry criteria should be addressed. To illustrate, a soldier just returned from a twelve-month tour to Bahrain, Dubai, or Kuwait could be declined a waiver months later without any changes to the individual's medical conditions during a nine-month rotation.

As for those who cannot deploy, the MRDP to enter an MEB is not a well-known published system for those outside of operational medicine; it is neither uniform nor consistent. This creates confusion for

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providers with different interpretations or thresholds for MRDP, or confusion between the MEB clinic and the primary care manager. In some situations, readiness and retention depend on the soldier's length of service. This is apparent in our junior soldiers with few years in service. A young lieutenant with only three years of service is unlikely to complete a full twenty years if the lieutenant has already been on profile for greater than 180 days for foot, knee, or back pain without a clearly delineated cause that can be resolved.

While changes to eProfile pending at the time this article was written were aimed at improving command visibility of profiles and medical issues, and at continuing to allow overrides for some, getting soldiers on profile who cannot deploy into an MEB or the Warrior Care and Transition Unit continues to be challenging. The changes in readiness processes, as reported thus far, appear aimed at visibility and tracking, and not at resolving the disposition of soldiers with chronic medical conditions who are not deployable but do not meet MRDP.

Conclusion

In summary, soldier medical readiness continues to be of concern. For the shift to a smaller and more agile force, it is imperative that adjustments be made in how units manage assets and in how the Army manages its personnel.

Some of the circumstances we encountered were unique to the 13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, but sustainment units throughout the Army have shared similar challenges. The Army is at a critical point, with the decrease in total strength after over a decade at war and the unpredictability of the force's part in global security efforts. Therefore, taking care of soldiers physically, mentally, and professionally while keeping units prepared for deployment is a precarious balance. The 13th ESC successfully deployed and completed its missions and tasks. The concerns and recommendations offered here are intended as a starting point for meaningful discussion and dialogue as the Army leans forward and remains ready. ■

Notes

1. At the time of the 13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command's preparation for deployment, medical fitness standards were governed by Army Regulation (AR) 40-501, *Standards of Medical Fitness*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 14 December 2007, with Rapid Action Revision 2011), now obsolete. A revision was published 22 December 2016 although it did not address the issues discussed in this paper.

2. Refer to the Warrior Care and Transition Unit website for more information about the unit and the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES), accessed 23 January 2017, http://wct.army.mil/.

3. United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), "Amplification of the Minimal Standards of Fitness for Deployment to the USCENTCOM AOR [Area of Responsibility] to Accompany MOD [Modification] Twelve to USCENTCOM Individual Protection and Individual–Unit Deployment Policy," December 2013, PPG-Tab A, p. 7, accessed 30 January 2017, https://www.cpms.osd.mil/.

4. James Morgan, table 1, comparison of arrival dates with medical history and administrative coding in Army human resource systems data queried from the Electronic Military Personnel Office (also known as Datastore) 4 December 2014 and compared with December 2014 Medical Protection System (MEDPROS).

5. James Morgan, table 3, data pulled on the first working day of the month May 2014 through December 2014 from the Electronic Military Personnel Office (eMILPO), MEDPROS, and the Total Officer Personnel Management Information System II (TOPMIS II). Information was compiled and submitted the 15th of each month May 2014 to December 2014 as part of the Unit Status Report.

6. Office of the Surgeon General/U.S. Medical Command (OTSG/USMEDCOM), Policy Memo 15-045, "Behavioral Health Profiling Standardization Policy," 6 August 2015, 2.

7. Eyder Peralta, "Shooting at Fort Hood Leaves 4 Dead, 16 Injured," NPR [National Public Radio] online, 2 April 2014, accessed 25 January 2017, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/04/02/298401578/fort-hood-goes-on-lockdown-after-reports-of-shooting.

8. USCENTCOM, "Amplification of the Minimal Standards of Fitness for Deployment to the USCENTCOM AOR; to Accompany MOD Twelve to USCENTCOM Individual Protection and Individual–Unit Deployment Policy," 2013, accessed 30 January 2017, https://www.cpms.osd.mil/.

9. OTSG/USMEDCOM, Policy Memo 13-008, "Stinging Insect Allergy Induction, Retention, and Readiness Policy."

10. Morgan, compiled 4 December 2014 as part of the Unit Status Report using data pulled on 1 December 2014 from eMILPO, MEDPROS, and TOPMIS II.

11. Epidemiology Program, Post-Deployment Health Group, Office of Public Health, Veteran's Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs, *Report on VA Facility Specific Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation New Dawn (OND) Veterans Coded with Potential PTSD [Posttraumatic Stress Disorder]—Revised: Cumulative from 1st Qtr 2002 through 3rd Qtr FY 2012 (October 1, 2001–June 30, 2012)*, (Washington, DC: Department of Veterans Affairs, December 2012), accessed 25 January 2017, http://www.publichealth.va.gov/docs/epidemiology/ptsd-report-fy2012-qtr3.pdf.

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Sgt. Maj. of the Army Daniel A. Dailey jokes with 2nd Cavalry Regiment soldiers 9 September 2015 as he presents them with command excellence coins during a visit to Rose Barracks in Vilseck, Germany. Dailey remains popular with troops because he listens to their concerns and acts to resolve them. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Jennifer Bunn, U.S. Army)

The Essence of Leadership
Trustworthiness

Sara VanderClute

I have never been a military officer, but like many military family members, I have been aware of and influenced by several leaders during and since my husband's decades of Army service. He retired in 1988, so it is as civilians, living near Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that we have been observing military leaders over the past few decades. Some have become famous, some infamous. Each has reinforced my belief that among leadership's many facets—enthusiasm, fairness, competence, selflessness—the essence of leadership is trustworthiness based on integrity.

The Army leaders at Fort Bragg are well integrated into the civilian community, whether they reside on post or off. The local chamber of commerce

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includes a military affairs committee, and military leaders socialize within the civilian community. They keep local political leaders informed of developments in the Department of Defense that might affect local municipalities. These military leaders are the neighbors, the customers, the fellow churchgoers, and the friends of local residents. They are esteemed as being the very best of our nation's military forces, and they are greatly admired for their personal accomplishments and sacrifices in serving our country. Most of all, local residents can trust them to be honest and straightforward.

> "You know you're a good leader when people follow you [even if only] out of curiosity."
> -Gen. Colin Powell, U.S. Army, retired

There is no single template for the personality of a leader. While my husband served, we knew some Army leaders who were quiet, wryly humorous, and intellectual, and others who were dynamic, volatile, and endowed with a colorful vocabulary. Some were crusty, old-style, old-school soldiers. Others were lightyears ahead of their contemporaries in perceiving how the future would develop. In the era during which my husband served, transitions were taking place that included more opportunities for female soldiers and more overt considerations of military families' needs. Some leaders embraced these changes; others held the belief that if the Army wanted you to have a family, it would have issued you one.

I learned during my stint as an active-duty Army wife that excellent Army leadership was not necessarily tied to rank or position, and that lesson has been confirmed in my post-Army life. Sometimes, the most effective leader of a group is not the nominal leader. Moreover, in the Army and the military in general, excellent leaders exist in units as small as a team or a platoon. Some few ascend to serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where they help lead the Nation by advising the president on matters military. Others serve in cabinet-level leadership positions following their military careers.

The same traits that characterize excellent military leaders apply in civilian life. Many veterans, of both the officer corps and enlisted ranks, have achieved notable careers in business or politics after leaving military service. Enthusiasm, fairness, competence, and selflessness continue to exist in people who take their leadership into civilian careers and communities—and so does integrity. Business, politics, the medical and legal professions, and nonprofit agencies across the United States have benefited from the leadership of former service members.


The past two decades have reminded us from time to time that military leaders are human beings. They are vulnerable to the same weaknesses and temptations that have afflicted humanity throughout history. We see the headlines trumpeting the ignominious fall of a respected general officer. In the past twenty years, more than one high-ranking military officer has acknowledged or been convicted of offenses ranging from the vague "conduct unbecoming an officer" to serious crimes of fraud, bribery, sexual assault, bigamy, and adultery (a chargeable offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice).

In a military community, the failings of even a little-known leader can make it to the front pages of the local newspaper. Occasionally, local news becomes national news. My initial reaction is disappointment that a seemingly proven leader has misplaced his moral compass and lost his way. Then, I find myself sympathizing with that leader's family, who are exposed to as much scrutiny and criticism as the offender. However, since I am far from perfect myself, I avoid being judgmental.

Nonetheless, I realize that grievous errors in a leader's judgment are as corrosive to trust as acid to iron. People will not support a leader they do not trust. They can doubt, disagree with, or strongly disagree with a leader; they can even dislike a leader, but if people trust the leader to do the right thing in any circumstance—even at a high personal price—people will follow.

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Retired Army Gen. Colin Powell once recounted a lesson he had learned long ago from a sergeant at Fort Benning's Infantry School: "You know you're a good leader when people follow you [even if only] out of curiosity."[1] Powell, who retired from the Army in 1993, is a leader I admire. If he makes a mistake, he acknowledges it. He has effectively displayed integrity through his military career and into government service and the for-profit and nonprofit worlds, so people trust him.



Retired Gen. Colin Powell addresses leaders from all components at the first Army Profession Annual Symposium 30 July 2014 at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Mikki L. Sprenkle, U.S. Army)

Trustworthiness is valuable not only to peers and subordinates but also to those whom leaders serve; this principle applies to military leaders in particular. Everyone who ranks below, above, or equal to a leader must trust the leader's integrity. For example, any president would want to know that his or her military advisers were "speaking truth to power" instead of merely mouthing perceived political correctness. Any battalion commander or platoon leader would need to trust the integrity of other same-level leaders. Honoring one's oaths matters, whether testifying in a courtroom or leading soldiers onto a battlefield.

I have observed and learned from many military and civilian leaders. In the years since my husband retired, my career in the civilian world has taken me from newsrooms to boardrooms and from management positions to community volunteer posts. I have served on the local school board and as chairperson of the library board of trustees. I say this not to tout my leadership credentials but to frame my perspective. Most leaders I observed did the right thing regardless of personal cost. That is integrity. That is what makes a leader trustworthy.

A few military leaders—or perhaps several—in the past two decades have disappointed their forces, the American public, and their own personal aspirations by committing headline-grabbing transgressions. Their falls from grace provide cautionary tales—for better or worse, they are role models. Some observers merely learn not to get caught doing something wrong. The majority learn a more difficult lesson—not to do something they know is wrong. Those who succumb to flattery, avarice, greed, or lust are regrettable aberrations. Measured against the thousands who have lived up to their various oaths in serving, there is no comparison.

Most military leaders are honorable people who can be trusted to adhere to their oaths, the law, and the standards of ethical conduct. They can be trusted with the lives of soldiers and the defense of freedom. They quietly go about fulfilling their duties in one of the most demanding and dangerous professions in the

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Spc. Ryan Grant and Spc. Jeffrey Morrero with the 65th Military Police Company bag toys for Sgt. 1st Class Catherine Reese and Staff Sgt. Jessica Taylor, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), 2 December 2015, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The toys were donated for the 18th Annual Randy Oler Memorial Operation Toy Drop at Fort Bragg and were subsequently distributed to children in need throughout the region. Events such as the toy drop keep soldiers and leaders at Fort Bragg well integrated into the surrounding civilian communities. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Joseph Bicchieri, U.S. Army)

world. They tend to their soldiers, their families, and their own integrity. Their names do not appear often in the headlines, but you will find many of them listed in the currently serving, killed in action, wounded, or retired rolls. Here in North Carolina, many can be found in the pages of the local telephone directory.

As the decades continue to roll by, each era will see service members ascend to leadership. No matter their personality or their personal style, the memorable leaders—the ones who inspire a few service members or an entire nation—will be the ones whose effectiveness rests on their integrity. They will be the leaders who always do the right thing for their soldiers, their families, and their own legacy. ■

Note


1. Colin Powell, "View from the Top" lecture series (speech, Stanford University Black Business Students Association and the Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA, 16 November 2005).

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Enhanced Interrogation

Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America

James E. Mitchell and Bill Harlow, Penguin Random House, New York, 2016, 309 pages



John G. Breen, PhD

By the early 1950s, Americans had learned that we were not the only country capable of inflicting atomic and, later, thermonuclear annihilation on perceived enemies. The United States was, at the time, rightly terrorized by a seemingly implacable adversary, the Soviet Union. At the direction of successive presidents, the newly created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responded with decades of covert action, both abroad and at home. Programs included the opening of U.S. mail, the surveillance of American journalists, and the penetration of U.S. college student groups. They included foreign assassination plots (including research, development, and fielding of chemical and biological assassination agents). Human experimentation programs included the testing of LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) and other drugs on witting and unwitting subjects, all in a poorly conceived and implemented effort to learn how best to interrogate defectors, detainees, and other players in the ongoing Cold War.[1]

One of those players was Yuri Nosenko, a KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennо Bezopasnosti*, or Committee for State Security) officer who defected in the early 1960s. When CIA officials became concerned that some of his information did not quite add up, they responded by imprisoning him for nearly four years in a dedicated black site built on a secret base inside the United States.[2] When he did not seemingly respond to traditional interrogation, agency officers, including doctors, set out to try to pressure and eventually break him psychologically.[3] He was subjected to solitary confinement in poor conditions and other "coercive techniques" such as extended interrogations, sensory deprivation, and, possibly, mind-altering drugs—one or more of four drugs administered seventeen times.[4] Nosenko was released in 1969 after the CIA's Office of Security determined he was a legitimate defector after all. The CIA ended up paying Nosenko a sizeable financial settlement and later hiring him as a consultant.

These misguided efforts were revealed only after congressional hearings forced their exposure in 1975, which led to the establishment of dedicated Senate and House committees that still provide key legislative oversight to CIA covert action programs

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and other intelligence activities. After reviewing an in-house damage assessment of the Nosenko incarceration, and after revelations about CIA drug testing on human subjects, Director Stansfield Turner (1977 to 1981) wrote in his memoirs that he "realized how far dedicated but unsupervised people could go wrong in the name of doing good intelligence work."[5]

Fast-forward to the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001. Once again, Americans were terrorized by another ruthless enemy, al-Qaida. As before, the CIA was tasked by the president to utilize covert action to eliminate this potential threat. (Remember that then CIA Director George Tenet reportedly briefed the president on a realistic, albeit short-lived, stream of threat reporting that al-Qaida may have gained access to a nuclear weapon and had smuggled it into the United States.[6]) One aspect of this overarching counterterrorism effort was a presidentially mandated Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDI) covert action program. It was designed to snatch key al-Qaida operatives off the worldwide battlefield, place them into CIA-managed prisons, and potentially allow for collecting imminent threat information as well as vital strategic intelligence and tactically relevant terrorist-personality targeting information.

These efforts are the subject of James Mitchell and Bill Harlow's *Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America*. Mitchell was one of at least two civilian contract psychologists hired by the CIA to adapt their knowledge of the U.S. military's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) program, employing SERE-based techniques to break through al-Qaida detainee resistance to traditional interrogation. Harlow was formerly a spokesperson for the CIA and has subsequently coauthored several books with retired CIA officials previously involved with the RDI program, now wanting to tell their side of the story. Though the subtitle actively suggests the reader will gain some insight into the thinking and motivation of terrorists, there is little in *Enhanced Interrogation* to warrant this enthusiasm.

The book comes across as a self-serving rehash of well-worn arguments about the value of waterboarding and other enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), as well as lengthy complaints about the unfair scrutiny on Mitchell and his business partner, fellow psychologist John Bruce Jessen. Its publication comes at a propitious time though, as both Jessen and Mitchell face a civil lawsuit from former detainees claiming to have been tortured at their hands; *Enhanced Interrogation* is not likely to bolster their defense. It does, however, make one think long and hard about the national security challenges we face going forward and the missed opportunities of the past.

Many commentators have focused on the effectiveness of EITs, specifically, waterboarding. I have previously written about the ethical and moral challenges associated with the CIA's RDI program.[7] Unfortunately, I do not offer there or here any black-and-white answers; I doubt those exist. Mitchell, for his part, suggests, as have several of his contemporaries, that his actions were for the greater good, that the ends justified the means, and that the worse offense would be to *not* use EITs to protect Americans.[8] The direct challenge to this is that one might claim that almost any action, however cruel, was necessary, as it resulted in or it was anticipated to result in a "good" outcome.

In fairness, perhaps there are moments when a brutal act becomes necessary or even mandatory, for example in an extreme emergency like a loved one put into imminent harm's way. Intelligence that al-Qaida might have smuggled a nuclear weapon into the United States might also reasonably be called an extreme emergency. But after that stream of intelligence quickly dried up, by his own account, Mitchell continued waterboarding Abu Zubaydah, even in the several days after it should have been obvious Zubaydah had no imminent threat information, and many months after he was first captured and interrogated:

> Because of concerns about the next wave of attacks, the early interrogations always started with a focus on attacks inside the United States and for the first few days remained there. But Headquarters started sending intelligence requirements that, though still related to attacks on the U.S. homeland, focused on locational information for al-Qa'ida operatives in general, their leadership structure and their capabilities. ... As Abu Zubaydah began to offer up information that the targeters and analysts on-site judged valuable and wanted more of, we asked for permission to stop using EITs, especially the waterboard. To our surprise, however, headquarters ordered us to continue waterboarding him.[9]

According to Mitchell, there were headquarters officers who, despite his objections, insisted that Zubaydah's waterboarding should not only continue, but also extend to a full thirty days.[10] From his retelling, the RDI effort seemed eventually to become much more of a strategic

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intelligence-gathering operation, pursuing lead information to target the next layer or generation of al-Qaida operatives. It is here where the once possibly coherent moral arguments about extreme emergency and the use of EITs such as waterboarding appear to fall apart. Mitchell seems to understand this, as he notes that by 2004, "Bruce and I decided that short of extraordinary circumstances (a nearly certain indication of a nuclear device in an American city, for example) and additional assurances from the CIA and the DOJ [Department of Justice] that we wouldn't be embroiled in legal difficulties later, we were not going to waterboard any more detainees."[11]

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the book is that it seems to reveal a program of human experimentation reminiscent of the CIA's failed Cold War LSD and coercive interrogation efforts. If true, such a program would have required building up an interrogation skill set through relevant experience—and that is, essentially, how the RDI program was rolled out. *Enhanced Interrogation* details a human trial-and-error research methodology spanning several years, employing a menu of EITs against detainees to figure out what worked best.

Mitchell takes great pains to detail for the reader his obviously extensive experience with SERE, the identification of resistance techniques employed by detainees, and the techniques that he suspected, but could not really know, would be most useful for the interrogation of al-Qaida prisoners. He appears to be arguing that his SERE experience gave him a significant interrogation skill set. But critics of this assertion might point out that the service members taking part in SERE do so of their own volition, know it's a training exercise, and can step out at any moment. The intelligence they may or may not possess also may be largely irrelevant, as the techniques they are subjected to seem designed to test and fortify the military student's resistance, not necessarily at all to extract the kind of useful information the CIA needed to defeat al-Qaida. And, as the book details, at some point the RDI effort mutated from extracting information about imminent threats to the collection of the much more culturally complex and nuanced intelligence required for targeting individual terrorists on a battlefield that might range from eastern Pakistan to a metropolitan area in Asia or, for that matter, Western Europe.

The CIA and its interrogators had no empirical evidence on which to base an assessment of the true effectiveness of EITs in obtaining this sort of actionable intelligence. If you remember, some headquarters managers wanted Zubaydah to be waterboarded for thirty days, even though to Mitchell it seemed pointless. Well, according to Mitchell, this misunderstanding was due to an assessment he provided before the RDI program began—that a full thirty days would be needed to ensure a detainee "either didn't have the information or was going to take it to the grave."[12] He claims that this was a misunderstanding due to the later provision of waterboarding as an approved technique, but corporate lack of experience with interrogation appears to have contributed to the prolonged and seemingly pointless waterboarding of Zubaydah.

Before the program commenced, Mitchell and Jessen provided a list of EITs that could be applied.[13] The approved list contained ten techniques—adapting behavioral psychology to interrogate a prisoner—"to condition [detainees] to experience fear and emotional discomfort when they thought about being deceitful."[14] The waterboarding of Zubaydah in 2002 provided Mitchell and the CIA experimental evidence they could use on future detainees to, perhaps, more effectively induce this conditioning. For example, Mitchell found that pouring water for the legally allowed twenty to forty seconds was too long; when this was attempted on Zubaydah, he could not clear the fluid without Mitchell's intervention and Zubaydah's subsequent vomiting, potentially complicating the conditioning process. As he notes, the legally allowed waterboarding parameters could have caused permanent damage to the detainee—"I didn't think it was safe to take full advantage of the length of time Justice Department guidance would have allowed us to pour water on the cloth or to use as much water as was permitted."[15]

In 2006, after President Bush revealed the existence of the RDI program to the public, midlevel CIA officers studying the issue asked interrogators to provide a pared-down list of EITs for future use. Interrogators believed they understood what techniques worked or did not work, and they agreed that only two of the originally approved techniques were needed after all. Those were "walling" (roughly pushing an individual up and against a specially designed wall) and sleep deprivation:

> The others, though occasionally useful, were not critical, and some such as nudity, slaps, facial holds, dietary manipulation, and cramped confinement, Bruce and I now believed were unnecessary. ... We had learned over the preceding years that the EITs the midlevel managers intended to retain did not lend themselves to the conditioning process as reliably as walling did.[16]

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So, was all of this human-research-based pain and suffering worth it? Were EITs ultimately a useful tool in the global war on terror? By the conclusion of *Enhanced Interrogation*, Mitchell seems to call for the reestablishment of a CIA RDI program for future terrorist detainees, quite specifically now those "with knowledge that could prevent an impending catastrophic terror attack."[17] But, he calls for *not* using EITs in this new program. This is not because he feels the techniques are ineffective, but, predictably, because he feels he and others involved with the RDI program received poor treatment.

The problem is that the mismanaged RDI program may indeed have limited the CIA's future options (at least with regard to interrogation) to effectively thwart even truly imminent, extreme emergency-type threats. A program of amateurish human experimentation with likely legal but certainly barbaric techniques has left few opportunities to extract threat information quickly from resistant detainees. Facing an enemy ruthlessly intent on ending an American way of life, what happens when we really do have a ticking time-bomb scenario?

That takes us to 2017 and a new presidential administration. Could the CIA ever waterboard a detainee again? History suggests that on many levels, this would be a very bad idea. Since its inception in 1947, the CIA has sought ways to manipulate individuals using drugs and various coercive and noncoercive techniques. Drugs and coercion always seem to backfire, with long-lasting and significant unintended consequences that negatively impact the CIA's ability to focus on what it does best—the clandestine recruitment and handling of spies who steal secrets. That is to say, what the CIA does best is to obtain the real intelligence that provides strategic insight into the plans and intentions of our enemies, from terrorists to near-peer adversaries. One cannot know but might reasonably suspect that if the CIA had not been focused on the coercive extraction of supposedly strategic intelligence from detainees, not to mention the subsequent public pillorying, it might have been more effective in training and using clandestine case officers to recruit operatives to penetrate al-Qaida, providing the CIA with the network and locational information it needed without the ethical and moral minefield of EITs.

It turns out there was no nuclear weapon smuggled into the United States after all, and it took the United States almost a decade after the initiation of the RDI program to locate and kill Osama bin Laden. Soon after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence published its *Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program* in 2014, CIA Director John Brennan said, "the Agency takes no position on whether intelligence obtained from detainees who were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques could have been obtained through other means or from other individuals. The answer to this question is and will forever remain unknowable."[18] ■

Notes

1. John Prados, *The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2014); John Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control: The Secret History of the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).
2. Prados, *The Family Jewels*, 117–18; Stansfield Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 44.
3. Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy*, 44–45.
4. Prados, *The Family Jewels*, 118–19; Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy*, 45.
5. Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy*, 45.
6. George Tenet, "CIA Interrogation of al Qa'ida Terrorists: The Rest of the Story," in *Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Senate Intelligence Committee's Study of Its Detention and Interrogation Program*, ed. Bill Harlow (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 2.
7. John Breen, "The Ethics of Espionage and Covert Action: The CIA's Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program as a Case Study," *InterAgency Journal* 7, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 71–80.
8. James E. Mitchell and Bill Harlow, *Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America* (New York: Penguin Random House), 49.
9. Ibid., 72–73.
10. Ibid., 74.
11. Ibid., 249.
12. Ibid., 74.
13. Ibid., 52.
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15. Ibid., 69.
16. Ibid., 235.
17. Ibid., 296.
18. John Brennan, Memorandum for the Honorable Diane Feinstein and the Honorable Saxby Chambliss, "CIA Comments on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program," 8 December 2014, 3, accessed 1 January 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/CIAs_June2013_Response_to_the_SSCI_Study_on_the_Former_Detention_and_Interrogation_Program.pdf.

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


Army University Press Primer on Urban Operations

Today, just over one-half of the world's population lives in urban areas. That percentage is expected to increase to [illegible] percent by 2050. In 1990, there were ten "megacities" of more than ten million inhabitants. By 2014, it rose to twenty-eight. And, by 2040, that number is expected to increase to forty-one.

With this ongoing and dramatic urbanization of the world's population, the U.S. Army is highly likely to find itself continuing to operate in cities. It is imperative that we study and understand the dynamics of operating in urban terrain. We must take the time now to analyze and test the lessons learned from different urban operations to ensure our soldiers and leaders are prepared for the future.


As a starting point, Army University Press has compiled a selection of articles from *Military Review*, publications from the Combat Studies Institute, monographs from students at the Command and General Staff College, and other publications. This primer on urban operations should not be viewed as the textbook on the subject, but rather as a starting point for renewed study and conversation.



Access the Army University Press Primer on Urban Operations by visiting https://armyupress.army.mil/Online-Publications/Primer-on-Urban-Operations/.

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CALL FOR PAPERS



The *Journal of Military Learning* (JML) is a peer-reviewed semi annual publication that seeks to support the military's effort to improve education and training for the U.S. Army and the overall profession of arms. The JML invites practitioners, researchers, academics, and military professionals to submit manuscripts that address the issues and challenges of adult education and training, such as education technology, adult learning models and theory, distance learning, training development, and other subjects relevant to the field. Book reviews of published relevant works are also encouraged.

Our inaugural edition of the JML will be published online by Army University Press in May 2017.

We are now accepting manuscripts for the October 2017 edition. Manuscripts should be submitted to usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.army-press@mail.mil by 30 June 2017. Submissions should be between 3,500 and 5,000 words and supported by research, evident through the citation of sources. We are particularly interested in articles addressing competency-based education, the theme of this year's Army University education symposium to be held in June 2017.

For detailed author submission guidelines, visit the JML page on the Army University Press website at https://armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Journal-of-Military-Learning/.

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
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German ambassador to Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt, instructing him to propose a secret military alliance between Germany and Mexico in the event that the United States entered the war. The message read,

> *We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States of America is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. Please call the President's attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace. Signed, ZIMMERMANN.*

Mexico declined the alliance. However, the revelation of the telegram to the American public, coupled with the damage to U.S. ships from Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare, drove the United States to unite with the Allies and declare war on Germany. ■



President Woodrow Wilson asks Congress to declare war on Germany 2 April 1917, causing the United States to enter World War I. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

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
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Greetings!

For the past nine months I have had the distinct privilege of serving as the director of Army University Press and the editor in chief of *Military Review*. While here, I have had the honor of working with an amazing team of professionals whose energy, passion, and pride inspire me daily. Thank you Bill, Jeff, Desirae, Beth, Arin, Linda, and Amanda.

The entire Army University Press team is purpose-driven and always focused on advancing the ideas and insights leaders need to lead and succeed. They engage us in exploring ideas, thinking critically, and engaging creatively. They support our writing and participation in professional discourse. And, they keep us abreast of emerging factors impacting the global security environment and the future of war. The diverse content and exceptional quality of every edition of *Military Review* reflects these ambitions.

This edition of *Military Review* distinguishes itself by featuring several articles discussing concepts and issues that are increasingly salient features of the operational environment—features that doctrine does not ordinarily fully address, or, more often, seldom considers at all: the use of nontraditional weapons, including lawfare, autonomous weapon systems, and gender equality.

The lawfare article establishes the framework and highlights the increasing confluence of public opinion, international law, and politics on operations. The article on autonomous weapons discusses the pros and cons of their employment, challenges to limiting and defining autonomous weapons, and policy recommendations regarding these controversial systems. Additionally, two articles address the issue of gender inequality, promoting gender equality as a factor in shaping regional security and overall political stability, and as a determinant in peacemaking.

In a featured article, Anthony Cordesman provides a biting critique on the deficiencies of stability operations doctrine, especially as it pertains to Syria in the aftermath of any upcoming peace accord. We selected the remaining articles to expand the reader's view of the evolving operational environment and provide ideas to confront the challenges associated with change.

In addition to *Military Review*, I encourage you to tap into all of the publication platforms and educational services Army University Press offers to support individual and institutional development. Our books, handbooks, journals, primers, exclusive online multimedia content, and discussion forums are available anytime at http://www.armyupress.army.mil/. The easiest way to keep up with our expanding content is though our social media, so check us out on Facebook and Twitter.

Beyond just reading and staying informed, start contributing to the body of professional military knowledge. Research, explore, and write about topics that interest you, and submit your articles and manuscripts for publication. We have multiple publishing platforms, to include *Military Review*, the *Journal of Military Learning*, and the *NCO Journal*. We also sponsor the Future Warfare Writing Program, the NCO Writing Competition, and the DePuy Writing Competition. Our newest venue is "Extended Battlefield: Future of War," a forum that publishes original articles about the future of war and houses a reference library of articles, papers, and news to keep you up-to-date on the ideas informing the multidomain battle concept.

This has been an exciting time to serve with Army University Press and *Military Review* as we transition toward multimedia publishing, enabled by our new website and heightened social media interaction. This transition is only possible because of the opportunities created by Army University, the industrious and innovative staff of Army University Press, and the continued support of our loyal readers and contributors. Thank you!

I have sincerely enjoyed every moment serving as the director of Army University Press and editor in chief of *Military Review*. I look forward to remaining engaged in the professional discourse you lead, enjoying the increasingly diverse content and leader development resources you offer, and appreciating the valuable service you provide our Army. ■



Last Call!

2017 General William E. DePuy

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This year's theme: "What needs to be fixed in the Army?"

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1st Place	$1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place	$750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place	$500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*

For more information on how to submit an entry, please visit:
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Themes and Suggested Topics for Future Editions

Global Challenges

- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- What are the ramifications of increased Russian military presence in the Middle East?
- What are the military implications of China's economic penetration into Latin America, Africa, and broader Asia?
- What must the U.S. military do to prepare for possible contingency operations in the South China Sea?
- What are the security implications of the growing Islamic presence in Europe? Elsewhere in the world?
- What must the Army do to prepare to fight in urban terrain or megacities? What are the ethical challenges to operating in this type of environment?
- What operational and logistical challenges arise from domestic and foreign infrastructure limitations and how can we mitigate them?
- How can we better prepare soldiers to operate against atypical combatants (i.e., nonuniformed or child warriors) and under conditions where noncombatants are difficult to distinguish?

The Changing U.S. Army

- Are U.S. Army rotational units as effective as permanently assigned, forward-deployed units?
- Does the Army need designated security force assistance brigades? How should they be organized?
- Is there a role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?
- How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?
- How does Army doctrine need to change to incorporate the cyberspace domain?
- Have associated units helped or hindered readiness?

Previous pages: Iraqi security forces soldiers pause for a photo 25 February 2017 during react-to-enemy-contact training at Camp Taji, Iraq. The soldiers attended a Junior Leaders Course led by coalition forces designed to enhance basic combat skills in support of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, the global coalition to defeat Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. (Photo by Spc. Christopher Brecht, U.S. Army)

Pvt. 1st Class Rafael Mendez uses a training Javelin 13 February 2016 to simulate hitting a target at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Spc. Josephine Carlson, U.S. Army)

Next page: Paratroopers from 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, leave Malemute Drop Zone 22 November 2016 after conducting an airborne insertion and M119 howitzer live-fire training at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. (Photo by Alejandro Pena, U.S. Air Force)

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

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Mary Caprioli, PhD
Chad F. Emmett, PhD

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About the Cover: Thousands of desperate residents flood a destroyed main street January 2014 in Damascus, Syria, to meet aid workers from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The UNRWA was able to complete its first humanitarian food distribution in Yarmouk Camp there after almost six months of siege. (Photo courtesy of UNRWA)

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The Army derives significant benefits from sending officers abroad to be educated in regions where they can then be assigned to serve. The author opines that graduate-level education at foreign staff colleges provides officers with an intimate understanding of partner states' military organizations and capabilities. (Honorable Mention, 2016 DePuy Writing Contest)

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Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

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Lessons Learned from the First Forward-Deployed THAAD Battery

Lt. Col. Jonathan C. Stafford, U.S. Army

In response to North Korean threats, the military deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the island of Guam in 2013. The author provides lessons learned from that deployment to help the Army better plan for future THAAD deployments.

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American Intelligence in the Age of Terror

Maj. Charles J. Scheck, U.S. Army

The author critiques a book by Michael V. Hayden, a retired four-star general who became director of the National Security Agency and, later, of the Central Intelligence Agency. The book provides a candid narrative on the intelligence community and Hayden's thoughts on those two organizations.

Next page: Pvt. Logan Lopez, a cavalry scout assigned to 1st Squadron, 33rd Cavalry, 101st Airborne Division, participates in fire phobia training 23 October 2016 during a mission rehearsal exercise for Kosovo Force at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. (Photo by Spc. Adeline Witherspoon, U.S. Army)

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Sgt. Kyle Hale of 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, contains an unruly crowd 10 June 2008 to protect a man who was nearly trampled outside the Al Rasheed Bank in the Jamila market in the Shiite enclave of Sadr City, Baghdad, Iraq. (Photo by Petros Giannakouris, Associated Press)

Lawfare 101
A Primer

Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr., U.S. Air Force, Retired

For many commanders and other military leaders, the role of law in twenty-first century conflicts is a source of frustration. Some think it is "handcuffing" them in a way that is inhibiting combat success.[1] For others, law is another "tool that is used by the enemies of the West."[2] For at least one key ally, Great Britain, law seems to be injecting counterproductive hesitancy into operational environments.[3] All of these interpretations have elements of truth, but at the same time they are not quite accurate in providing

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an understanding of what might be called the role of *lawfare* in today's military conflicts.

Law has become central to twenty-first century conflicts. Today's wars are waged in what Joel Trachtman calls a "law-rich environment, with an abundance of legal rules and legal fora."[4] This is the result of many factors outside of the military context, including the impact of internationalized economics. Still, as the Global Policy Forum points out, globalization "is changing the contours of law and creating new global legal institutions and norms."[5]

As with many other aspects of modern life, trends in the economic sphere impact warfighting, and this includes how law interacts with armed conflict. Many senior leaders have come to recognize this reality. Retired Marine Corps Gen. James L. Jones, a former NATO commander and U.S. national security advisor, observed several years ago that the nature of war had changed. "It's become very legalistic and very complex," he said, adding that now "you have to have a lawyer or a dozen."[6]

Technology has also revolutionized the impact of law on war, as its many manifestations add to war's complexity. Sorting out the implications of technology for warfighting requires an advanced appreciation for the norms that do—or should—govern it. Retired Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal recently observed that "technology has only made law more relevant to the battlefield."[7] He believes that "no true understanding of the exercise of U.S. military power can be attained without a solid appreciation of how the law shapes military missions and their outcomes."[8]

The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the concept of what has come to be known as lawfare. This essay also aims to provide some practical context for nonlawyer leaders to think about lawfare, as well as some considerations for how to prepare to operate against an enemy seeking to capitalize on this phenomenon of contemporary conflicts.[9]

What is Lawfare?

The term lawfare has existed for some time, but its modern usage first appeared in a paper this author wrote for Harvard's Kennedy School in 2001.[10] Lawfare represents an effort to provide military and other nonlawyer audiences an easily understood "bumper sticker" phrasing for how belligerents, and particularly those unable to challenge America's high-tech military capabilities, are attempting to use law as a form of "asymmetric" warfare.[11]

Over time, the definition has evolved, but today it is best understood as the use of law as a means of accomplishing what might otherwise require the application of traditional military force. It is something of an example of what Chinese strategist Sun Tzu might say is the "supreme excellence" of war, which aims to subdue "the enemy's resistance without fighting."[12] Most often, however, it will only be one part of a larger strategy that could likely involve kinetic (lethal) and other traditional military capabilities.

More importantly, lawfare is ideologically neutral. Indeed, it is helpful to think of it as a weapon that can be used for good or evil, depending upon who is wielding it and for what reasons. As Trachtman says, "Lawfare can substitute for warfare where it provides a means to compel specified behavior with fewer costs than kinetic warfare, or even in cases where kinetic warfare would be ineffective."[13] That is a truth that is equally applicable to America's enemies as it is to the United States itself.

How Has the United States Used Lawfare?

There are many examples of how law can be used to peacefully substitute for other military methodologies. For example, during the early part of Operation Enduring Freedom, commercial satellite imagery of areas in Afghanistan became available on the open market. Although there may have been a number of ways to stop such extremely valuable data from falling into hostile hands, a legal "weapon"—a contract—was used to buy up the imagery. Doing so prevented

Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr., U.S. Air Force, retired, served thirty-four years on active duty before retiring in 2010 as the Air Force's deputy judge advocate general. His assignments included tours in Europe and Korea, and he deployed for operations in Africa and the Middle East. He is a graduate of St. Joseph's University and Villanova University School of Law and is a distinguished graduate of the National War College. He is the executive director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University School of Law. He blogs on *LAWFIRE*, https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/

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> They are using the law in order to turn respect for the law in the United States and other democratic countries into a vulnerability.

"the pictures from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda."[14]

Law plays a very significant role in counterinsurgency operations. Although the term lawfare is not used, Field Manual 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, is replete with how law is a key element of the comprehensive approach that success in such conflicts requires.[15] In particular, it makes the point that "establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state in counterinsurgency."[16] As Gen. David H. Petraeus has pointed out, it is unlikely that a counterinsurgency effort will succeed absent a form of lawfare that brings about the rule of law in the target state instead of relying solely on killing or capturing the insurgent force.[17]

There are further legal means that can impact military capabilities rather directly. For example, sanctions crippled the Iraqi air force to the point where fewer than one-third of its aircraft were flyable when the coalition invaded in 2003.[18] The operational impact is obvious: Iraqi jets were grounded just as effectively as if they were shot down. Sanctions are also seen as having slowed Russia's military buildup. Kyle Mizokami reported in 2016 that international sanctions (along with falling oil prices) were adversely affecting the economy, which, in turn, frustrated Russia's efforts to rebuild its military.[19]

There has been an array of approaches for using law to undermine adversaries, approaches that can be put under the aegis of lawfare. For example, Juan Zarate, a former Treasury Department official, describes a range of legal initiatives his agency used to disrupt and deny terrorists, in particular the financial resources they needed.[20] In addition, even private litigation is working to deny access to the banking and social media platforms terrorists increasingly rely upon.[21]

How Does the Adversary Use Lawfare?

Many hostile nonstate actors use lawfare as a mainstay of their strategy for confronting high-tech militaries. To be clear, they are using the law in order to turn respect for the law in the United States and other democratic countries into a vulnerability. For example, they might seek to exploit real or imagined reports of civilian casualties in the hopes that fear of causing more of the same will result in a constrained use of certain military technologies (e.g., airpower) by rule-of-law countries like the United States.

The after effects of the bombing of the Al Firdos bunker during the 1991 Gulf War presaged much of what we see today. Although believed to be a military command-and-control center, it was actually being used as a shelter for the families of high-level Iraqi officials. When pictures of dead and injured civilians were broadcast worldwide, they "accomplished what the Iraqi air defenses could not: downtown Baghdad was to be attacked sparingly, if at all."[22]

Ironically, nothing violative of the law of war had occurred, but perceptions of the same had the operational effect of a sophisticated air defense system.[23] Many adversaries have "gone to school" on this event as an example of a low-tech means to counter high-tech systems. Obviously, perceptions do matter. Michael Riesman and Chris T. Antoniou insist,

> In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if people *believe* that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way. [italics added][24]

Accordingly, after witnessing what the Al Firdos bombing raid accomplished, some adversaries seek to exploit such incidents when they occur, but others seek to orchestrate them in order to get the benefit of the restraint that might follow. For example, the Islamic State "uses civilians as human shields to claim that the U.S.-led coalition is targeting innocent people during the strikes."[25]

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Syrian Army officers and their families who support President Bashar al-Assad are locked in "human shield" cages by a rebel group called "Army of Islam" 31 October 2015 in the Damascus suburb of Douma, Syria. The group claimed the human shields would protect Douma's civilians from airstrikes led by Russian and Syrian air forces. (Photo by Balkis Press/Sipa USA via Associated Press)

In fact, most U.S. adversaries actually see our political culture's respect for the law as a "center of gravity" to be exploited. William Eckhardt observes,

> Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands compliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans as illegal and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the law of war. Our vulnerability here is what philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz would term our "center of gravity."[26]

Incidents of illegality markedly advance an enemy's lawfare strategy. The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal that occurred during the Iraq War is a classic illustration.[27] It is significant that Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, then commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (commander of coalition ground forces in Iraq), used traditional military language in assessing the impact of the explosion of criminality at Abu Ghraib by terming it "clearly a defeat" because its *effect* was indistinguishable from that imposed by traditional military setbacks.[28] Elsewhere, as reported by Joseph Berger in the *New York Times*, Petraeus, then head of U.S. Central Command, had explained during an interview how violations of the law impact what happens on the battlefield:

> "Whenever we have, perhaps, taken expedient measures, they have turned around and bitten us in the backside," [Petraeus] said. Whenever Americans have used methods that violated the Geneva Conventions or the standards of the International Committee of the Red Cross, he said: "We end up paying the price for it ultimately. Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are nonbiodegradable. They don't go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick."[29]

The situation is even more aggravated in an era of proliferated sports cameras, cell phones, and similar

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devices able to record and transmit images worldwide in real or near-real time. A forty-second video of marines urinating on the bodies of dead Taliban that went "viral" was, according Afghan leaders, a "recruitment tool for the Taliban."[30] This is exactly the kind of avoidable illegality that lawfare-oriented adversaries readily exploit.

The point is that today each troop in the field is, indeed, a "strategic corporal." Gen. Charles C. Krulak, former commandant of the Marine Corps, said in 1999 that "the individual marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well."[31] Today, the exposure of lawfulness or unlawfulness of individuals, superempowered by technology, is able to have an operational or strategic impact.

Chinese and Russian Lawfare

It is a mistake to think that lawfare is something only utilized by technology-vulnerable nonstate actors. Countries with formidable military capabilities do employ lawfare, but differently. China, for example, has an extremely sophisticated "legal warfare" doctrine, which designates such strategies as one of their "three warfares."[32] According to Dean Cheng, the "People's Liberation Army are approaching lawfare from a different perspective: as an offensive weapon capable of hamstringing opponents and seizing the political initiative."[33]

Quoting Chinese sources, Cheng says, "Legal warfare, at its most basic, involves 'arguing that one's own side is obeying the law, criticizing the other side for violating the law, and making arguments for one's own side in cases where there are also violations of the law.'"[34] Current events suggest that China seems to be executing its lawfare strategy. Indeed, some observers see this strategy as the main thrust of their expansion into the South China Sea.[35]

Additionally, today, Russia is often viewed as a preeminent practitioner of what has been called "hybrid war," of which lawfare is an element. In Army parlance, the term "hybrid threat" captures "the seemingly increased complexity of operations, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional elements of conflict."[36] It combines "traditional forces governed by law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act with no restrictions on violence or target selection."[37]

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr. says he tries to stay away from "hybrid" terminology. Rather, he considers it "a competition with an adversary that has a military dimension, but the adversary knows exactly what the threshold is for us to take decisive military action." Consequently, he says "they operate below that level," and are able to "continue to advance their interests and we lose competitive advantage."[38]

Legal experts say that Russia's form of hybrid warfare explicitly seeks to blur legal lines in order to exploit the uncertainty that results.[39] They posit that the "inherent complexity, ambiguity, and the attributable character of hybrid warfare create not only new security but also legal challenges," especially for these "who adhere to international law within good faith and the commonly agreed frameworks established under and governed by the principles of the rule of law."[40] Plainly, this is a form of lawfare and something long a part of Russia's arsenal.[41]

Responding at the Tactical Level: The Commander's Responsibilities

Quite obviously, many of the challenges and opportunities presented by lawfare in its many manifestations arise mostly at the strategic and operational levels of conflict. This does not, however, mean that other aspects of lawfare are of no importance to those at the tactical level. This is relevant with respect to denying the enemy the opportunity to employ lawfare techniques to exploit or orchestrate acts that create the fact or perception of lawlessness that will undermine or even prevent mission success.

Most commanders and tactical-level leaders understand that they have a wide variety of responsibilities in the legal arena, particularly with respect to discipline. The Army's *2015 Commander's Legal Handbook* counsels that in many instances,

> The purpose of your actions should be to preserve the legal situation until you can consult with your servicing Judge Advocate. However, like most aspects of your command responsibilities, you can fail if you just wait for things to come to you. You need to be proactive in preventing problems before they occur.[42]

In terms of operations, being proactive with respect to the challenge of lawfare includes what I call "legal preparation of the battlespace."

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Legal Preparation of the Battlespace

Commanders are familiar with the concept of intelligence preparation of the battlefield but need to add *legal* preparation of the battlespace to their "to-do" list.[43] This means systematically analyzing the legal dimensions of a particular mission and its context, and determining their potential effect on operations. It then becomes incumbent on commanders—at every level—to take whatever actions they can to enhance positive effects of the law on the operation, and to eliminate or mitigate potential adverse impacts.


Key to this effort would be utilization of the supporting judge advocate generals (JAGs). Like other services, the Army JAG Corps has established an explicit practice area to "provide legal advice to commanders and their staffers on domestic, foreign, and international laws that influence military operations."[44]

Recently, Maj. Dan Maurer, an Army JAG, advised his fellow uniformed lawyers about the need to understand their advisory role vis-à-vis the commander and other decision makers. Although not addressing lawfare specifically, his advice nevertheless has application: "Decision-makers need to be fully confident and fully aware of not only *what* you think, but *why* you think it, and *how* their particular decisions will affect *others* beyond the slim consequences of the immediate battle drill."[45]

Most commanders would likely agree with Maurer, but how can they ensure that their legal advisor is capable of giving them that sort of insight? Part of the answer is easy, in that commanders will likely be supported by a JAG with strong legal skills. Getting an appointment as a JAG officer is extremely competitive these days, and law students and lawyers who aspire for a commission must be among the very best.[46] However, legal acumen is only part of the process.

The finest lawyer cannot be effective if he or she does not fully understand the client's business and needs. In the military setting, this means a deep understanding of the mission, capabilities, and mindset of the supported unit. Much of this falls upon the JAG to develop, but commanders can facilitate the process by reaching out to their supporting legal officer. This means ensuring that the JAG visits the unit frequently and acquires a familiarity with its soldiers,

INTEGRATING LAWFARE AND WARFARE



INTEGRATING LAWFARE AND WARFARE

JOEL P. TRACHTMAN*

Abstract: Current military campaigns are not waged solely on the physical battlefield, but in multiple other arenas. One such arena is lawfare: legal activity that supports, undermines, or substitutes for other types of warfare. In today's law-rich environment, with an abundance of legal rules and legal fora, strategists must explore the full scope of possible legal argumentation. Lawfare can substitute for warfare where it provides a means to compel specified behavior with fewer costs than kinetic warfare, or even in cases where kinetic warfare would be ineffective. As a result, lawfare can be strategically integrated into military command structures to bring about desired outcomes.

INTRODUCTION

Both kinetic warfare and legal disputes are forms of contestation.[1] Contestation can be physical or symbolic.[2] Legal arguments or claims are one type of symbolic contestation.[3] Other types of symbolic contestation may be based on historical justification, moral philosophy, or religious doctrine.[4] Symbolic contestation may be used alongside or in place of physical contestation.[5] Although we may plan strategy around geographically defined contested arenas like the South China Sea, the Crimea, or Syria, we may also consider functionally defined arenas such as the cyber or biological arenas.[6] Arenas for contestation may be geographic or functional, physical, or symbol-

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* Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. This essay is based on a speech given at the Naval War College Current Strategy Forum in June 2015.
[1] See Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War 1, 3 (2016); Timothy Hoyt, Book of a Washington Word, BLOG (Nov. 20, 2002, 6:43 PM), http://www.dictionaryofwashingtonwords.com/2002/11/book_of_a_washington_word.html [https://perma.cc/A4AD-DMWP]; see Kittrie, supra note 1, at 6–7.
[2] See id.
[3] See Orna Ben-Naftali, Religious Norms of Conflict or Normative Re-Framing, in RELIGION, VIOLENCE, AND VIOLENCE AND PEACE 1, 11 (Emon Tor Ram & Anver I. Emon eds., 2015).
[4] See Kittrie, supra note 1, at 6–7.
[5] See Peter Dombrow, China's Non-Claims: "Three Mistakes," Against Interests, HIST. (Jan. 3, 2016), http://historyforgrowth.com/2016/01/03/chinas-non-claims-three-mistakes-against-interests [https://perma.cc/HSB8-XXXX]; see, e.g., Kittrie, supra note 1, at 10–11, 15–16, and accompanying text.

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Joel P. Trachtman, in his article "Integrating Lawfare and Warfare," writes that lawfare can be integrated into a military command structure strategically if one wants to bring about desired outcomes. He recommends areas in which an integrated legal component may improve strategic and tactical outcomes:

a. Identify disputes in which legal resolution is unlikely in order to predict more accurately the context for kinetic disputes.

b. Join in the planning of new weapons systems and adaptation of existing weapons systems in order to maximize effectiveness given legal restraints.

c. Anticipate challenges to rules of engagement and target policies and identify methods to maximize effectiveness despite potential challenges.

d. Identify circumstances where opponents are creating legal facts on the ground that may give them an advantage in future conflicts, such as the Chinese South China Sea operations.

e. Identify circumstances in which it may be attractive to create legal facts on the ground for advantage.

f. Identify circumstances in which opponents are seeking to create international legal rules or modify or apply existing international legal rules that will restrict use of weapons in which your forces have an advantage.

g. Propose international legal rules or modify or apply existing international legal rules that will restrict use of weapons in which your forces are at a disadvantage.

h. Identify competitors' efforts to block your access to materiel and formulate legal responses.

i. Identify competitors' needs for materiel and seek to block access within applicable law.

Source: Joel P. Trachtman, "Integrating Lawfare and Warfare," *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 39, no. 2 (2016): 267 and 281, accessed 20 March 2017.

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equipment, and methods of operation. This must be accomplished in garrison because it is extremely difficult to do on the fly or once deployed.

Success, Maurer tells us, is "measured by *the relationship itself* between the advisor and principal decision maker."[47] He offers these questions for introspection by both the legal advisor and the decision maker:

> Is [the relationship] characterized by trust? Is it deep? Is it candid? Does it forgive errors and accept nuance and a bit of chaos? Is it built to allow for the *time* to be *all* of these things, or is it nothing more than a twice-monthly status report?[48]

None of this, of course, obviates the responsibility of the supporting legal advisor and others in his or her functional chain of supervision to engage in a wide-ranging professional, and often highly technical, legal analysis, and to prepare a supporting legal plan that spans all levels of war as is necessary to effectively wage lawfare and, conversely, defend against it.[49]

Educate the Troops about Lawfare

Beyond securing the right legal advisor, it is important to have the troops understand the "why" about lawfare. The most obvious part of this process for tactical-level units is ensuring the troops understand that battlespace discipline is more than a matter of personal character and accountability; it directly relates, as discussed earlier, to operational success.

Consequently, commanders and other leaders need to explain the importance of denying adversaries incidents of real or perceived misconduct that can be exploited. This part of the legal preparation of the battlefield must begin long before the unit arrives in the battlespace. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in *Chappell v. Wallace*,

> The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex, with no time for debate or reflection.[50]

Yet at the same time, twenty-first century commanders need to appreciate that today's troops are not automatons (and we should not want them to be). According to the 2016 Deloitte Millennial Survey, personal values have the greatest influence on millennials' decision making.[51] This means they need to have a keen understanding of how a task fits with their personal values or ethics.[52] Richard Schragger points out that "law allows our troops to engage in forceful, violent acts with relatively little hesitation or moral qualms."[53] Law can, he says, create a "well-defined legal space within which individual soldiers can act without resorting to their own personal moral codes."[54]

Absent a firm grounding in the importance of law and its moral underpinnings, personal moral codes can take a dark turn under the enormous stress of combat. The late historian Stephen Ambrose observed that it is a "universal aspect of war" that when you put young troops "in a foreign country with weapons in their hands, sometimes terrible things happen that you wish had never happened."[55] More recently, William Langewiesche has reported on just how combat can catastrophically distort the judgment of otherwise good soldiers.[56] This and other case studies need to be carefully examined by leaders, JAGs, and troops alike.

Clearly, to deny adversaries an effective lawfare strategy, troops must be trained on the law of war and its incorporation into the rules of engagement. Leaders, however, need to be wary of self-imposed restraints, because they can work to benefit adversaries. For example, the announcement by NATO first and later by the United States of the rules of engagement that require a "near certainty" of zero civilian casualties creates the perception of illegality when such casualties inevitably occur, even though international law does not require zero civilian casualties but merely that they need not be excessive in relation to the concrete and directed military advantage anticipated.[57]

Such publicly announced restraints invite adversaries to do exactly what the law does not want them to do: embed themselves among civilians in order to protect themselves from an air attack more effectively than any air defense might be able to do. Indeed, there is a real risk that overly restrictive rules of engagement may, paradoxically, endanger civilians because the failure to conduct a strike may save some civilians in the near term, but over time, the enemy who escapes an attack may go on to wreak more havoc on innocents, which would not have been the case if the attack had gone forward and the enemy had been neutralized.[58]

All of this suggests that the complexities of modern battlefields, and in particular the implications of

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lawfare and counter-lawfare techniques, make solutions very fact-dependent. A sophisticated understanding of the legal "terrain" is essential and will require a real intellectual investment by military leaders and their forces if they are to be prepared to succeed.

The legal machinations of Russians waging hybrid war are not necessarily the same as China's legal warfare in the South China Sea or the Islamic State's ruthless exploitation of human shields to ward off high-tech weaponry. Each approach is a related but differing application of lawfare. Only by a discriminate and detailed analysis of these various lawfare strategies will U.S. forces be able to anticipate and blunt an adversary's use of lawfare.

Concluding Observations

There is yet much work to do. In his book on lawfare, Orde Kittrie makes the astute observation that "despite the term having been coined by a U.S. government official, the U.S. government has only sporadically engaged with the concept of lawfare."[59] He goes on to lament that the United States has "no lawfare strategy or doctrine, and no office or interagency mechanism that systematically develops or coordinates U.S. offensive lawfare or U.S. defenses against lawfare."[60]

Although enumerating all of the techniques to counter adversary lawfare strategies is beyond the scope of this article, I hope that, together with other experts, a start is underway. Fortunately, some useful work has been done with respect to specific challenges. For example, Stefan Halper's 2013 paper—prepared for the Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessments—provides useful ideas not only for the specific situation it addresses (China's actions in the South China Sea) but also with real application to other lawfare situations.[61] Trachtman has also done some valuable work that will help develop thinking about lawfare.[62]

Furthermore, in a recent article in NATO's *Three Swords Magazine*, U.S. Army Lt. Col. John Moore notes that while the alliance has no formal definition or doctrine, the concept has been discussed in papers and at conferences.[63] Given the rise especially of Russia's employment of hybrid war with its lawfare element, he believes it is urgent that NATO coalesce its already extant thinking about lawfareand express it in a formal doctrine in order to facilitate the alliance's ability to defend itself against lawfare techniques, as well as to use the concept proactively.[64]

In the meantime, commanders and leaders at all levels need to include law and lawfare into their planning process and operational conduct, even in the absence of formal doctrine. The fact is that lawfare is not a passing phenomenon; it is intrinsic to current conflicts and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. The best leaders will ensure that they and their troops will be prepared to meet this challenge. ■

Notes

1. Shawn Snow, "It's Time to Remove Lawyers from the War Room," *Military Times* website, 14 May 2016, accessed 7 March 2017, http://www.militarytimes.com/story/opinion/2016/05/14/time-remove-lawyers-war-room/84233792/.

2. Brooke Goldstein, as quoted by Steve Herman, "'Lawfare' Could Become Trump Tool against Adversaries," Voice of America website, 24 January 2017, accessed 7 March 2017, http://www.voanews.com/a/lawfare-possible-trump-tool-against-adversaries/3690167.html.

3. Con Coughlin, "Legal Action against Soldiers 'Could Undermine Britain on the Battlefield' Warns Chief of General Staff," *The Telegraph* website, 29 January 2016, accessed 7 March 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/12130929/Legal-action-against-soldiers-could-undermine-Britain-on-the-battlefield-warns-chief-of-general-staff.html. The chief of the British General Staff said last year in reaction to more than 1,500 lawsuits filed against British forces, "If our soldiers are forever worrying that they might be sued because the piece of equipment that they're using is not the best piece of equipment in the world, then that is clearly a potential risk to the freedom of action which we need to encourage in order to be able to beat our opponent."

4. Joel P. Trachtman, "Integrating Lawfare and Warfare," *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review* 39, no. 2 (2016): 267, accessed 7 March 2017, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol39/iss2/3.

5. "Globalization of Law," Global Policy Forum website, accessed 7 March 2017, https://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/globalization-of-law.html.

6. Lyric Wallwork Winik, "A Marine's Toughest Mission (Gen. James L. Jones)," *Parade Magazine*, 19 January 2003.

7. Stanley A. McChrystal, foreword to *U.S. Military Operations: Law, Policy, and Practice*, by eds. Geoffrey S. Corn, Rachel E. VanLandingham, and Shane R. Reeves (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), xi.

8. Ibid., xii.


9. See Charles J. Dunlap Jr., "Lawfare," in *National Security Law*, 3rd ed. (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2015), accessed 7 March 2017, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3408/. The author has discussed lawfare in previous writings, and some of the discussion here is drawn from them.

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Military Review

WE RECOMMEND

For those who would like to know more about lawfare, *Military Review* recommends two articles by retired U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr.



COMMENTARY

Lawfare Today:
A Perspective

BY MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., USAF

Lawfare is a concept that is ever more frequently discussed in government, academic, and media circles. Regrettably, that discussion is not as informed as it might be. The purpose of this commentary is to clarify what lawfare means by discussing how it originated, how it is being used by opposing sides in modern conflicts, and what some of the challenges are as we look ahead. Although I've tinkered with the definition over the years, I now define "lawfare" as the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.[1] As such, I view law in this context much the same as a weapon. It is a means that can be used for good or bad purposes.

I started using "lawfare" in speeches and writings[2] beginning in the late 1990s because I wanted a "bumper sticker" term easily understood by a variety of audiences to describe how law was altering warfare. At that point, I had the hubris to think I invented the term; actually, it had been used a couple of times previously in a completely different context starting in the mid-1970s.[3] I needed something to describe what I and others saw as a new relationship between law and war. General James L. Jones, then the commander of NATO, famously observed in a *Parade* magazine article:

> It used to be a simple thing to fight a battle…In a perfect world, a general would get up and say, "Follow me, men," and everybody would say, "Aye, sir" and run off. But that's not the world anymore, …[now] you have to have a lawyer or a dozen. It's become very legalistic and very complex.[4]


The reasons for this phenomenon are several, but I think they are largely

Major General Dunlap is the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Air Force. His biography is available at http://www.af.mil/Bios/BiographyDisplay.aspx?BioID=5293. This commentary is based on a speech presented to the American Bar Association's 17th Annual Review of the Field of National Security Law Conference, November 18, 2007. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author alone, and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense.

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Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo and Daria P. Wollschlaeger (Editors)

XII

Lawfare Today . . . and Tomorrow

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.*

A principal strategic tactic of the Taliban . . . is either provoking or exploiting civilian casualties.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates[1]

I. Introduction

Although he does not use the term "lawfare," Secretary Gates' observation reflects what is in reality one of the most common iterations of lawfare in today's conflicts. Specifically, the Taliban are aiming to achieve a particular military effect, that is, the neutralization of US and allied technical superiority, especially with respect to airpower. To do so they are, as Secretary Gates indicates, creating the perception of violations of one of the fundamental norms of the law of armed conflict (LOAC), that is, the distinction between combatants and civilians.

While "provoking or exploiting civilian casualties" is clearly a type of lawfare, it is by no means its only form. Although the definition has evolved somewhat since its modern interpretation was introduced in 2001,[2] today I define it as "the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve a warfighting objective."[3]

As such, it is ideologically neutral, that is, it is best conceptualized much as a weapon that can be wielded by either side in a belligerency. In fact, many uses of legal "weapons" and methodologies avoid the need to resort to physical violence

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The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

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To view this article, visit: http://stockton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=ils.

10. Dunlap, "Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts" (paper presentation, Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference, Washington, DC, 29 November 2001), accessed 7 March 2017, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6193&context=faculty_scholarship; "About Lawfare: A Brief History of the Term and the Site," Lawfare (blog), accessed 7 March 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/about-lawfare-brief-history-term-and-site. According to the Lawfare blog, the term "lawfare" came into its modern usage with the presentation of Dunlap's essay, "Law and Military Interventions."

11. *DOD [Department of Defense] Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, s.v. "asymmetric," last modified February 2017, 21, accessed 15 March 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf. "In military operations the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, capabilities, and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses."

12. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Lionel Giles (Norwalk, CT: Puppet Press, 1910), 46.

13. Trachtman, "Integrating Lawfare and Warfare," 267.

14. Bijal P. Trivedi, "U.S. Buys up Afghanistan Images from Top Satellite," National Geographic website, 25 October 2001, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/10/1025_TVikonos.html.

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The Heart of the Matter

The Security of Women, The Security of States

Valerie M. Hudson, PhD
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Mary Caprioli, PhD
Chad F. Emmett, PhD



Civilian refugees, the majority of whom are women and children, arrive at the village of Putumatalan in Puthukkudiyirippu, northern Sri Lanka, 22 April 2009 after fleeing an area still controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the "No Fire Zone." Thousands more refugees surged out of Sri Lanka's war zone while soldiers and Tamil Tiger rebels fought the apparent endgame of Asia's longest-running war despite calls to protect those still trapped. (Photo by Stringer, Reuters)

What are the roots of conflict and insecurity for states? Some scholars argue that civilizational differences, defined by ethnicity, language, and religion, are the primary underlying catalysts for conflict and insecurity.[1] Others have spoken of the importance of differentiating between democratic and nondemocratic regime types in explaining conflict in the modern international system.[2] Still others assert that poverty, exacerbated by resource scarcity in a context of unequal access, is at the heart of conflict and insecurity at both micro and macro levels of analysis.[3]

In this article, we argue that there is another more fundamental, and perhaps more powerful, explanatory factor than those conventionally suggested that must be considered when examining issues of state security and conflict: the treatment of females within society. We have come to that conclusion through exhaustive research, both qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Unfortunately, the supporting statistical analyses and descriptions of methodology are too expansive and perhaps a little esoteric to be presented here for this relatively short article,

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and so we present here the major key findings of our conclusions. For those who have interest in seeing a concise treatment of the data analyses in significantly more detail with accompanying graphic outlays, these can be found in our book, *Sex and World Peace*.

At first glance, our argument seems hardly intuitive. How could the treatment of women possibly be linked to matters of high politics such as war and national security? For some, the two realms seem not to inhabit the same conceptual space. For others, the linkage between treatment of women and security is obvious. For example, in 2006, Secretary–General of the United Nations Kofi Annan opined, "The world is starting to grasp that there is no policy more effective in promoting development, health, and education than the empowerment of women and girls. And I would venture that no policy is more important in preventing conflict, or in achieving reconciliation after a conflict has ended."[4]

In this article, we wish to examine Annan's assertion focusing on the question, Is there a significant linkage between the security of women and the security of states?

When a coauthor of this article raised that question in a departmental research meeting, the answer was swift and certain: "No." The prevailing opinion was that violence wrought by the great military conflicts of the twentieth century was proof that security scholars would do best by focusing on larger issues such as democracy and democratization, poverty and wealth, ideology and national identity. Along a scale of "blood spilt and lives lost" as the proper location of concern for security studies, colleagues queried, "why would one ever choose to look at women?"[5]

Taken aback by such professed certainty that we were on the wrong course, it took some time for us to articulate an answer. On examining the issue of what "the security of the state" really means, how would one account for the death toll among Indian women as a result of female infanticide and sex-selective abortion from 1980 to the present if not in the category of such a death toll being a genuine "security issue?" The number of females deaths involved is almost forty times the death toll from all of India's wars since and including its bloody struggle for independence. This fact alone would suggest broad adverse security implications for the stability and economic well-being of the state.

Consequently, we reasoned, it would be instructive to consider the scale upon which women die from sex-selective causes inquiring into the implications such had for state security. Using overall sex ratios as a crude marker for a host of causes of death by virtue of being female, we found ourselves contemplating the results shown in the figure (page 21) in comparison with the great slaughters of the twentieth century.[6]

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Moreover, because the death tolls for the wars and conflicts listed above include deaths of women as both civilians and combatants, we thought it not to be an exaggeration to suggest that the majority of "blood spilt and lives lost" over the last century has been, in the first place, mainly those of females.

Unfortunately, when thinking of war and peace and national security, many people confine their vision to a picture of a uniformed soldier—male—lying dead on the field of battle, gendering these important issues male. In contrast, perhaps a fresh vision, such as that offered in the figure, should turn the thoughts of those deeply thinking about national and global security to the girl baby drowned in a nearby stream, or to the charred body of a young bride assassinated in a "kitchen fire" of her in-laws' making. To pose the question more conceptually, might there be more to inquire about than simply the effect of war on women—*might the security of women in fact affect the security of states?*

Extensive research has shown that there is a strong rationale for asserting a relationship between the security of women and the security of states.[7] Sexual difference serves as a critical model for the societal treatment of difference between and among individuals and collectivities. A long tradition in social psychology has found three basic differences that individuals notice immediately when they encounter a new person almost from infancy: age, sex, and race.[8] Although there is some preliminary evidence that recognition of racial differences can be "erased" when such differences are crossed with coalitional status, no one has shown a similar disabling of sex recognition.[9] Indeed, the psychologist Alice Eagly asserts, "Gender stereotypes trump race stereotypes in every social science test."[10] In this way, sex,


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Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, PhD, is an emeritus professor of psychology and was the last director of the Women's Research Institute at Brigham Young University. Previously, she served twenty-five years as a professor and department chair in the graduate school of Fordham University at Lincoln Center in New York City. Her research publications and papers in human motivation and emotion earned her the Fellow status in both the American Psychological Association in 1984 and the Association for Psychological Science in 1987. Her publications address intergenerational domestic violence, the impact of witnessing violence, and the design of techniques to increase peacefulness. She has also published a global anthology of poetry by women, revealing their experiences with violence and their resilient visions of peace.

Mary Caprioli, PhD, is an associate professor of political science and director of international studies program at the University of Minnesota Duluth. She has researched the role of gendered structural inequality on political conflict and violence. Caprioli pioneered a new line of scholarly inquiry between the security of women and the national and international behavior of states and confirmed the link using quantitative methodology. Her research focuses broadly on conflict and security studies, including inter- and intrastate violence, and specifically on assessing the role of gendered structural inequality in predicting violence.

Chad F. Emmett, PhD, is an associate professor of geography at Brigham Young University. He holds a PhD in geography from the University of Chicago. He specializes in political geography and the geography of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. He speaks Arabic and Indonesian, and he has traveled and researched widely in both regions. His first book, *Beyond the Basilica: Christians and Muslims in Nazareth,* looks at Christian-Muslim relations in Israel's largest Arab city. He is also a professor at DePaul University. He has been associated with the WomanStats project from its inception.

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(A)
Death Toll V

Brazil (1.1 million)
Russo-Japanese War (13 million)
Balkans (.14 million)
German East Africa (.18 million)
Libya (.13 million)
Grecco-Turkish War (.25 million)
Spanish Civil War (.47 million)
Abyssinia (.4 million)
Russo-Finish (.15 million)
Greek Civil War (.16 million)
Tito (.2 million)
First Indochina War (.4 million)
Colombia (.2 million)
Indian partition (.5 million)
Romania (.15 million)
Burma/Myanmar (.13 million)
Algeria (.7 million)
Guatemala (.2 million)
Indonesia (.4 million)
Uganda (.6 million)
Angola (.6 million)
East Timor (.2 million)
Lebanon (.15 million)
Iraq (.7 million)
Liberia (.15 million)
Bosnia (.18 million)
Somalia (.4 million)
Israel/Arab (.07 million)
Angola (.08 million)
Sierra Leone (.08 million)

(B)
Death Toll IV

Tibet (.6 million)
Mexican Revolution (1 million)
Ethiopia (1.4 million)
Nigeria (1 million)
Mozambique (1 million)
Sudan (1.9 million)

(C)
Death Toll III

Pre-PRC 20th century China (4 million)
Congo, 20th century (3.8 million)
Vietnam (3.5 million)
Korea (2.8 million)
Afghanistan (1.8 million)
Khmer Rouge, Cambodia (1.65 million)
Estimated Armenian genocide (1.5 million)
Russian Civil War (1.4 million)
Rwanda/Burundi (1.35 million)
Bangladesh (1.25 million)
Iran/Iraq War (1 million)

(Adapted from a graphic in *Sex and World Peace*)

Figure. Comparison of Conflict Deaths in the Twentieth Century and Deaths Resulting from Devaluation of Female Life at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century

like age, becomes a basic category of identification and a profound marker of difference.[11]

Sex and age categorizations play variant roles in society. Everyone will someday move into another age group; in general, with exceptions, this kind of change does not occur with regard to sex groupings. Sex difference is arguably the primary formative fixed difference experienced in human society,[12] and sexual reproduction is the strongest evolutionary driver of human social arrangements.[13]

Concurring with these insights from psychological and evolutionary research, French philosopher Sylviane Agacinski reflects, "It is always the difference of the sexes that serves as a model for all other differences, and the male/female hierarchy that is taken as a metaphor for all inter-ethnic hierarchies."[14] Consequently, societally based differences in status beliefs about the sexes, reflected in practices, customs, and law, may well have important political consequences, including consequences for nation-state security policy and for conflict and cooperation within and between nation-states.

Utilizing the theoretical framework that we call the "women and peace thesis," linking how women are

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treated with how their nation-states behave, we first surveyed the existing empirical literature linking the situation of women to the situation of states, and then conducted an initial empirical investigation of the framework's propositions using diverse existing data bases that had compiled a wide variety of statistical information related to the situation of women and the situation and behavior of states. Our findings, detailed in *Sex and World Peace*, showed strong, significant relationships in the direction predicted.[15]

Literature Review of Existing Empirical Findings: Women and the State

There is a substantial literature linking the treatment of women to important state-level variables. Scholarly attention to the link between women and the state arguably began in the field of development. As early as 1970, Ester Boserup argued that omission of gender aspects of development led to project failure. Since her pioneering work, we have seen waves of successive research concerning the role of women in economic development and quality of life.[16] The empirical literature in this field has contributed to the establishment of strong cross-national linkages between gender variables and economic variables, including GDP per capita, global competitiveness ranking, and economic growth rates.[17] State-level health variables, especially child survival/mortality and malnutrition, are also significantly correlated to female status and education.[18]

Such previous research helps us understand the significant negative correlation between indices of corruption and indices of women's social and economic rights.[19] This implies that expansion of women's rights thus offer an added economic benefit: decreases in political corruption due to greater equity of female empowerment in society overall appear to support an increase in investment and growth. In other words, increasing gender equity promotes economic growth.[20]

The linkages between the situation and status of women, on the one hand, and economic and health variables on the other have paved the way for research on political variables also. Of special note is that initial research in this area suggests that the priorities and perspectives of a government appear to change as women become more visible and audible within its ranks. Previous research studies show that the more women there are in government, the greater the attention given to social welfare, legal protection, and transparency in government and business.[21] For example, in one survey, 80 percent of respondents said that women's participation restores trust in government.[22]

All in all, then, many in the world are beginning to recognize that the status of women often substantially influences important political aspects of the states in which they live. This recognition, in turn, has already led in many cases to innovative policy initiatives to capitalize on these insights.[23]

Despite the impressive array of empirical findings, when one turns to questions of women and national security defined in a more traditional sense, there are theoretical reasons for believing that the security and behavior of a state are linked to the situation and security of its women. This suggests specific lines of research inquiry: Does the evidence support this proposition? And, if so, what is the form of that linkage?

There are two primary strands of inquiry that have brought this linkage into sharper focus: academic theory and policy exposition. A strong foundation in the rich theoretical literature of feminist security studies emphasizes the relationship between women's status and international relations.[24] In addition to academic endeavors, noteworthy is the formal articulation of the need to include women in peace negotiations as codified in the 2000 UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the 2008 recognition in UN Security Council Resolution 1820 of the need to punish those who commit rape in conflict, a broader intergovernmental organization (IGO)/non-governmental organization (NGO) advocacy program called Women, Peace, and Security, which has resulted in stronger gender mainstreaming in areas such as UN peacekeeping operations, and a new Gender Architecture (GEAR) for the United Nations, which resulted in the creation of UN Women in July 2010.[25]

Using in-depth ethnographic case studies, processtracing, and poststructuralist discourse analysis, researchers have penned many fine empirical works in feminist security studies.[26] Below we survey more quantitative work.

In a recent empirical analysis of Muslim societies, M. Steven Fish finds that predominantly Muslim nations do not disproportionately suffer from political violence, but they do disproportionately suffer from authoritarian rule.[27] He explores why Islam

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Burying Babies in China, illustration in *Wesleyan Juvenile Offering* (London: Wesleyan Mission House, March 1865), 40. Female infanticide is a major cause of concern in several nations such as China and India. It has been argued that the "low status" in which women are viewed in patriarchal societies creates a bias against females. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

appears to disfavor democracy, and after controlling for many variables, including economic development, economic growth, ethnic fractionalism, and others, he finds that indicators related to the subordination of women, including literacy rate gap and sex ratio, account for a substantial proportion of the relationship between Islam and authoritarianism. He hypothesizes that the oppression of females—one of the earliest social acts observed by all in the society—provides the template for other types of oppression, including authoritarianism, in Islamic nation-states. Treatment of women, then, may affect societal propensity to adopt a particular governance system, such as authoritarianism or democracy.

Another primary question of interest is how the treatment of women at the domestic level has an impact on state behavior internationally. This question is important to show the linkage between gender and security because it shows those with decision-making power that the treatment of women has far-reaching practical consequences well beyond that of the abstract objective of obtaining social justice. A body of conventional empirical work spearheaded by Mary Caprioli links measures of domestic gender inequality to state-level variables concerning conflict and security, with statistically significant results. The clear implication is that the international system may be more or less secure depending upon the situation of women within its units.

Caprioli uses three measures of gender equality—political equality (percentage of women in parliament and number of years of suffrage), economic equality (percentage of women in the labor force), and social equality (fertility rate)—to show that states with higher levels of social, economic, and political gender equality are less likely to rely on military force to settle international disputes.[28] In other words, Caprioli found that higher levels of gender equality make a state less likely to threaten, display, or use force, or go to war once involved in an interstate dispute. Therefore, Caprioli argues, foreign policy aimed at

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Rebecca is training at a vocational center in South Sudan on 3 August 2011 to become the first female mason in her community. The center, supported by Oxfam—an international confederation of charitable organizations focused on human rights and the alleviation of global poverty—is helping women branch out into careers that were not previously open to them such as masons, mechanics, and electricians. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

creating peace should focus on improving the status of women as a means to that end.

Elsewhere, Caprioli and Mark Boyer examined the impact of gender equality on a state's behavior during international crises, which is a situation in which there is a high probability of violence. They wanted to explore whether gender equality has an impact on state behavior when violence is highly likely. Their research revealed that states exhibiting high levels of gender equality measured by the percentage of women in parliament also exhibit lower levels of violence in international crises and disputes.[29] Examining aggregate data over a fifty-year period (1954–1994), they found a statistically significant relationship between level of violence in crisis and the percentage of female leaders in positions of authority.

In general, they discovered that states with higher levels of political gender equality are less likely to have minor clashes, serious clashes, or war in the high-stakes environment of international crisis. The research by Caprioli and Boyer also finds that gender equality has an effect on a state's foreign policy behavior in terms of decreasing violence during international crises.

Such data collection and analysis strongly suggest that gender equality matters when states are involved in interstate disputes and when they are involved in international crises. Caprioli extends this literature and finds a similar relationship associated with state escalation of violence. States with the highest levels of gender equality display statistically significant lower levels of aggression in interstate disputes by being less likely to use force first.[30] So states with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to throw the first punch, and even when attacked they are less likely to escalate the use of violence.

Virtually the same pattern was found with respect to intrastate incidents of conflict.[31] Caprioli

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also studied the impact of gender equality on domestic conflict. She found that states with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to experience domestic conflict. M. Steven Fish has commented, "[T]he repressiveness and unquestioned dominance ... of the male in relations between men and women replicate themselves in broader society, creating a culture of domination, intolerance, and dependency in social and political life."[32] This suggests that while it is surely not the only important factor, the promotion of better treatment for women would help ensure greater social justice and peace, and would help prevent domestic conflict within a nation.

In an attempt to examine domestic human rights abuses as a whole, Caprioli and Peter Trumbore created a measure capturing gender inequality, ethnic inequality, and political repression. They found that states characterized by norms of gender and ethnic inequality as well as human rights abuses are more likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes, and in violent interstate disputes, to be the aggressors during international disputes, and to rely on force when involved in an international dispute.[33]

David Sobek and his coauthors confirm Caprioli and Trumbore's findings that domestic norms centered on equality and respect for human rights reduce international conflict.[34] Elsewhere, lessons from gaming scenarios also appear to demonstrate that norms of inequality and violence at the domestic level, including between the sexes, may help "replicate" violence at the international level.[35]

In sum, this body of empirical work demonstrates that the promotion of gender equality goes far beyond the sometimes abstract issue of promoting social justice for its own sake and has important practical consequences for international security.

Furthermore, it strongly suggests that, in fact, international security cannot be attained without gender equality. The status of women, it seems, is a main societal taproot of international security.

Indeed, perhaps Samuel Huntington's reflections on the clash of civilizations between nations would be better viewed as a clash between gender civilizations, with treatment of women being an important marker of civilizational divide.[36]

In support of such a conceptual revision, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, though not researching nation-state behavior per se, examined psychological attitudes toward women across "civilizations" defined more traditionally in terms of religion or ethnicity. They found that contrary to popular impression, beliefs about democracy and other political values are not very different between, say, Islamic and Christian cultures. Beliefs about gender equality, however, differ markedly, which they take to be evidence that conceptualization of culture, or the nation-state, or civilization must be redefined to include a gender component. Furthermore, they find strong associations between psychological attitudes about women and indicators such as the percentage of women elected to the national legistature.[37]

Country-Specific Data on Women, or the Lack Thereof

As scholars and politicians have begun to recognize the importance of the relationship of the status of women to political and economic stability as well as to peace, indices on gender equality have likewise assumed greater importance. Despite the many differing cultural conceptions of women and women's lives, certain underlying aspects of their lives can be universally assessed to determine the security and status of a woman in her society, and that status may, justifiably, be compared cross-nationally. According to Martha Nussbaum, observable variables such as highly abnormal sex ratios in favor of males, or restrictions that deny girls the legal right or the access to education, can be applied cross-nationally to determine gender status beliefs as they directly relate to the status of women and national security.[38] We apply the same logic to create cross-national scales capturing various aspects of women's security as a prelude to investigating hypotheses derived from the "women-and-peace thesis."

Formulating Effective Research Methodology to Test Our Hypothesis

To create scales for comparative analysis, one needs reliable data to analyze. Fortunately, several useful compilations of statistical information concerning women using different indices have already been compiled, which we used to conduct statistical comparison and analysis. Among these are the UN's Woman's Indicators and Statistics Database (WISTAT; approximately seventy-six statistics), GenderStats (twenty-one

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statistics), and the World Economic Forum's Gender Gap Project (thirty-three statistics).

Beyond single statistical measures, some laudatory attempts have also been made to create multivariable indices of women's status. Two of these indices, developed in 1995, are the United Nations Development Programme's Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and Gender Development Index (GDI). The new GII (Gender Inequality Index), replaces both GDI and GEM, but still shares some of its predecessor's problems. In addition to GEM and GDI, the CIRI Human Rights Dataset has also developed three indices of women's rights.[39]

The Gender Gap Index (GGI) of the World Economic Forum (WEF) is the most ambitious project to date in efforts to more fully capture the situation of women. The WEF has developed eight scales. The coding for four of the scales is obscure (paternal versus maternal authority, polygamy, female genital mutilation, and the existence of laws punishing violence against women). The coding for the other four scales, however—economic participation and opportunity (five statistics), educational attainment (four statistics), political empowerment (three statistics), and health and survival (two statistics)—contains the usual half dozen statistics, as cited above, plus variants; for example, educational attainment looks at gaps not only in female-to-male literacy but also in enrollment figures at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. All of the scales evidence a persistent reliance on easily qualified information, to the exclusion of qualitative information that could provide a more nuanced view of the situation of women. The United Nations Economic Commission of Africa's AGDI (African Gender and Development Index) comes much closer to our ideal of multifactorial, qualitative-plus-quantitative measures used as the foundation for a richer scaling of the cross-national status of women, but it was scaled for only twelve sub-Saharan African nations.[40]

Researchers seeking to study the impact of gender inequality on state security and behavior are thus faced with a serious challenge. There are approximately six to ten variables concerning women that are easily quantified and that form the basis for most analysis of the situation of women in the world today. But in order to advance a research agenda that might definitively link the security of women to the security of states, it became clear to us that scholars must develop more robust capabilities to expand beyond the confines of the most easily obtainable information, and incorporate not only statistics but also more detailed qualitative information.

We recognized that the empirical research agenda we wished to advance, then, required creation of the means by which it could effectively be pursued. To address this need, we created the WomanStats Database, which began compiling data on more than 320 variables concerning the security and situation of women for 175 states, and currently contains more than 220,000 data points.[41] Additional data points are added every day.

Realizing that discrepancies often exist among rhetoric, law, and practice, we sought data on three aspects of each phenomenon in which we were interested—law, practice/custom, and statistical information. This approach now allows researchers to access useful and reliable data regardless of their preferred method of inquiry, whether quantitative or qualitative. Quantitatively oriented researchers can find statistics on the prevalence of particular practices as readily as qualitatively oriented researchers can locate narrative information on the experiences and lives of women. We are thus able to provide a richer data source for researchers who are dissatisfied with relatively superficial indicators, and to empower researchers to create their own indices.

For example, when examining the phenomenon of domestic violence, we collect data not only on the incidence of domestic violence and laws concerning domestic violence but also on custom and practice concerning domestic violence. For example, is domestic violence generally reported? Why or why not? What is the level of societal support for victims of domestic violence, such as the existence of shelters and hotlines? How is fault decided in legal cases concerning domestic violence? What is the range of punishment for this offense? Is violence sometimes sanctioned by the culture, such as in cases of "disobedience" by a wife or daughter? Are there regional, religious, or ethnic differences in the incidence of domestic violence within the society? Are there other barriers to the enforcement of the law, such as low arrest and/or conviction rates? In the WomanStats Database, there are seven variables on domestic violence alone; eleven on rape; fifteen on marriage practice, and so on.[42]

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Results

Methodology that compared and contrasted the analyses of several different data bases provided striking evidence to support our hypothesis. A brief summary of our findings are noted below.[43]


The Physical Security of Women. The first cluster of hypotheses inquired as to whether there was a statistically significant relationship between our measures of the physical security of women (PSOW) and three dependent variables: GPI (the Global Peace Index), SOCIC (States of Concern Index), and RN (Relations with Nations Index). The observable relationships for this first cluster of hypotheses are highly statistically significant. We found that the physical security of women, whether that is measured including or excluding the enactment of son preference through female infanticide and sex-selective abortion, is strongly associated with the peacefulness of the state, the degree to which the state is of concern to the international community, and the quality of relations between the state and its neighbors.

Inequity in Family Law and Polygyny. The second cluster of hypotheses inquired into the relationship among family law, the security of women, and the security of the state operationalized as above (GPI, SOCIC, RN). On analyzing how family law, as in the practices dealing with matters such as marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance, and other intimate family issues, might well act as a markers describing to what extent a society has been able to mitigate the evolutionary male dominance hierarchy.[44]

Whereas inequitable family law favoring males was for the most part universal until the twentieth century, we see now in the twenty-first century a real spectrum of family law systems. Systems range from almost completely equitable, de jure if not de facto, to being virtually intact from a millennium ago.

Additionally, we placed special focus on studying the effects of polygyny (multiple wives) in this analysis. Though preliminary, results from our research appear to provide strong evidence that polygyny has a very adverse impact on the security of the state.

This conclusion is also widely supported by previous research. Anthropologists have noted the inherent instability and violence of societies where polygyny is prevalent. As Robert Wright puts it, "Extreme polygyny often goes hand in hand with extreme political hierarchy, and reaches its zenith under the most despotic regimes."[45] Laura Betzig, in an intriguing



WomanStats Database

The WomanStats Database is a nation-by-nation database on women that is used for academic research as well as to inform policy formation (the latter includes its use by both the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and various agencies of the United Nations). The database provides a platform from which many different types of research questions concerning women can be addressed. The project's principal research contributors shape their research agendas according to their disciplinary backgrounds and research interests.

The core researcher contributors and coders primarily explore the relationship between the situation and security of women, and the dynamics among security, stability, and behavior of the state. They address such questions as:

- Are states with greater levels of violence against women less peaceful, of greater concern to the international community, and on worse terms with neighboring states?
- Is the degree to which a state is discrepant in its enforcement of laws protecting women related to the degree to which the state is noncompliant with international norms, treaties, and obligations?
- Is the degree of inequity in family law related to the stability of the state?
- Are states with prevalent polygyny also states with higher levels of violence against women?
- Is the Islamic world monolithic in its treatment of women, or are there notable differences in the treatment of women, as measured by various indices?
- Is there a relationship between the degree to which a society is structured on patrilineality and its health, wealth, governance, demographic, and conflict status?

The WomanStats Project data bank has been used as a primary source for a wide variety of published empirical research work linking the security of women to the security of states. Such published research has appeared in *International Security*, the *American Political Science Review*, the *Journal of Peace Research*, *Political Psychology*, and *Politics and Gender*.

For access to the database, or for more information, the website can be accessed at: http://www.womanstats.org/.

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empirical study of 186 societies, found the correlation between polygyny and despotism to be statistically significant.[46] Anthropologists have also found significant correlation between polygyny and the amount of warfare in which societies engage.[47] Boone even suggests that polygynous societies are more likely to engage in expansionist warfare as a means of distracting low-status males who may be left without mates.[48]

Discrepancy between State Law and Societal Practice Concerning Women. Our analysis appeared to support the hypothesis that if a state is indifferent about enforcing laws that protect the women in its society, it is also less likely to be compliant with international norms to which it has committed. We can examine this question by examining the association between the discrepancy between state law and societal practice concerning women variable on the one hand, and the SOCIC scale on the other. A comparison of quantitative data in this area shows that the results are statistically very strong and quite significant. This supports the observation that if a state does not care about its women, it also tends not to care about the international commitments it has made.[49]



Evidence suggests that the greater role women have in governance, the more stable and peaceful a society is likely to be. Moreover, peace operations require greater cooperation and synergy between uniformed and nonuniformed personnel, many of whom can be expected to be women, in the aftermath of instability involving violence. (Photo courtesy of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes [ACCORD])

Research Conclusions

Our research findings indicate conventional empirical warrant for hypotheses linking the security of women and the security of states. There is a strong and statistically significant relationship between the physical security of women and three measures capturing the relative peacefulness of states. Furthermore, in comparative testing with other conventional explanatory factors assumed to be related to such measures of state security-factors, including level of democracy, level of wealth, and prevalence of Islamic civilization—the physical security of women explains more of the variance in the same three measures of state security in both bivariate and multivariate analysis. In addition, we can show that other practices indicating a low level of security for women, whether that be prevalent polygyny, inequitable family law and practice favoring men, or a high level of discrepancy between state law and societal practice concerning women, are also associated with lower levels of state peacefulness in a strong and significant manner.

This is not to say that gender equality is the only important factor to consider or to address. But what would be possible to say is that inattention to gender inequality is not likely to produce sustainable results in

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peace or security. In her TEDWomen speech in 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, "The United States has made empowering women and girls a cornerstone of our foreign policy because women's equality is not just a moral issue, it's not just a humanitarian issue, it is not just a fairness issue. It is a security issue, it is a prosperity issue, and it is a peace issue .... [I]t's in the vital interests of the United States of America." On the basis of our own and others' research findings, we would agree with this assessment.[50] We hasten to add that much more in the way of empirical analysis must be undertaken before these results can be considered authoritative; nevertheless, even in preliminary form, these are challenging and provocative results.

What Is Security?

The results described above lead us to ask anew, what constitutes security? And how is security to be obtained?

We assert that the evidence strongly suggests that any account of security that does not include consideration of violence against women as a key metric is an impoverished account of security. We find a strong and significant relationship between the physical security of women and the peacefulness of states. We also assert that when evolutionary forces predisposing to violent patriarchy are not checked through the use of cultural selection and social learning to ameliorate sexual inequality, dysfunctional templates of violence and control diffuse throughout society and are manifested in state security and behavior.

Combining our present results with those of previous research efforts, not only do we fail to falsify that theoretical assertion by using conventional aggregate statistical hypothesis-testing methodologies, but we find greater empirical warrant for that assertion than for several well-established alternative hypotheses.[51]

Based on our findings, we can now envision new research questions for security studies, which are possible to raise only if the linkage between the security of women and the security of states is taken seriously. For example, terrorism is a topic that may profit from a gender analysis: Does polygamy lead to marriage market dislocations, which also heighten the allure of the terrorism among young adult males with no hope of eventually marrying?[52] Does the subjected status of women feed into the development of terrorist groups offering a promise of greater equality to women, such as we see in Sri Lanka and Nepal?

Similarly, security demographics is a nascent subfield that, we argue, must incorporate gender lenses: for example, is enactment of son preference through female infanticide and sex-selective abortion a predisposing factor for state instability and bellicosity?[53]

And what would Huntington's map look like if we re-drew it along the lines of differences in the security of women instead of relatively abstracts notions of supposed blocs having common cultural affinity? Would we see a new type or definition of "civilization" by looking at that map, and would it give us greater leverage on questions of identity, conflict and security than Huntington's original map? For example, are alliance patterns better understood as associated with membership in the same "gender civilization"? Is the recently noted ability of populations to increase their happiness set point over time linked to the improving security of women in those nations?[54] And, what ramifications will that have for state behavior? In the subfield of foreign policy analysis, are there identifiable differences in processes and outcomes of foreign policy decision making in nations with higher levels of gender equality? Does the average psychological profile and foreign policy orientation of national leaders differ between countries with higher versus lower levels of security for women?

What Are States For?

If security is the aim of the state, our results suggest that to both understand and promote national and international security, the situation and treatment of women cannot be overlooked. States that have improved the status of women are, as a rule, demonstrably healthier, wealthier, less corrupt, more democratic, more secure, and more powerful on the world stage in the early twenty-first century. It is almost as if fortune smiles most broadly on those states where women are most secure. We do not believe this is a coincidence.

We therefore assert that questions regarding the influence of gender equality on state security will not subside in importance, but rather will grow in importance over time as the global population expands and competition for resources increases. We see in the current international system the rise to great power status of states in which the security of women is severely compromised. We cannot

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help but think of the rise of India and China, where almost a hundred million women are missing from the population as a result of sex-selective abortion, high suicide rates among young women, and other symptoms of a profound lack of security for women. We take this to mean that the true clash of civilizations in the future may not, in fact, be along the lines envisioned by Huntington but along the fault lines between civilizations that treat women as equal members of the human species and civilizations that cannot or will not do so. Furthermore, we expect to see much more prevalent conflict between and within nations of that second group.

From Theory to Action

Though the mores regarding the treatment of women are written deeply in the culture of each society, they are amenable to change. Women have recently received the rights to vote and stand for office in countries where they have not had those rights before; UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, and others have changed peacekeeping and conflict resolution practices on the ground; stricter enforcement of laws against sex-selective abortion is making a dent in abnormal birth sex ratios in some countries. There is no reason to shrug helplessly if we identify the insecurity of women as an important factor in state insecurity and conflict. To the contrary, the recognition that the security of women affects the security of states offers policymakers an inestimably valuable policy agenda in the quest for greater peace and stability in the international system overall.

In the view of Potts and Hayden, "[O]ne way to reduce the risk of violence is to empower women and maximize their role in society. This is perhaps the most profound insight to come from taking an evolutionary perspective on war: empowering women reduces the risk of violent conflict. Far from being what some regard as merely a politically correct notion of feminist philosophy, women's role in reducing the risk of war is borne out by rigorous study and historical experience ... [C]ontemporary Western nations have a great opportunity to make the world more secure and reduce terrorism by doing everything they can to empower women who live in countries where they currently enjoy few choices and wield little or no political power ... Overseas, the US preaches democracy and free markets, but is slow to challenge the traditional restraints so cruelly heaped on women in many developing countries—restraints that keep women from participating as equals in political and economic life."[55]

The "So What" for the Military

Turning to practical relevance of the above findings to the U.S. military, we conclude by offering the observation that in a world where the senior military leadership is currently exhorting armed forces personnel to prepare for "complex operations," an appreciation for the ofttimes overlooked or unrecognized dynamic of sexual inequality in operational areas should be an indispensable point of consideration in the future.

First, in almost any future contingency that we can envision in which the United States will be involved, the U.S. military will likely be the prime conduit of national humanitarian values used to instill stability in the rebuild phase of operations. We assert that vigorous steps to promote women's equality among populations as a part of such stability operations should henceforth be permanently recognized as a key component for establishing viable stability in both war torn nations as well as those that are often categorized as developing nations. Consequently, we strongly recommend the need to incorporate into military doctrine and training a formal requirement to promote women's empowerment in appropriate ways among populations as a prime objective when engaged in such operations as well as during peacetime training engagements with foreign militaries of countries that suffer from the effects of extreme inequality between men and women.

Second, our military's understanding of the environment in which they operate is incomplete without gender lenses. Seeing how brideprice and polygyny create conditions under which rebel groups can much more easily recruit is to see more of what is happening—and that has strategic and operational implications. Seeing that mothers often are the first to know when their sons are being radicalized, know where not to let their children play because of danger from hidden ordinance, and also preserve key evidence of the massacre of their loved ones, is to understand that what is happening with women is integrally related to military objectives. Seeing that one's own female soldiers are often perceived as a "third gender" in patrilineal clan cultures, and can defuse honor-based conflict that would otherwise occur in male-male encounters,

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has tactical significance. Seeing that one cannot stabilize a community until women feel safe enough to weave that community's life through their daily chores assuring food, water, and fuel for families is to develop deeper insight into stability operations. Being gender-aware means being smarter in a military sense.


However, as implied in the first point above, it is vital that women's empowerment should not just be seen as a means to more successful military operations—which it is—but must also be seen as an end, as one of the very benchmarks of military success. The women of Iraq would assert that in setting back the cause of women through its military intervention, the U.S. set back its own military objectives in that land, paving the way for even more egregious threat and instability. It is time for greater embrace of realism in military thinking—a realism that acknowledges the very real linkage between the security of women and the security of their nations.

Much blood and treasure have been spent on the export of democracy or free-market capitalism in the pursuit of less conflictual international relations, with less success than hoped for. Research strongly suggests the export of norms of greater gender equality will prove a more promising and effective strategy.[56] Such norms of gender equality would include not only demands for high levels of physical security for women, but also strong promotion of equity under the law (especially family law), as well as parity in the councils of national decision making. ■

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Military Review

WE RECOMMEND



Sex & World Peace

Columbia University Press, 2012

Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett

This multidisciplinary book examines the issue of unequal gender treatment as a factor having decisive influence on world security and, by extension, the operational environment. It incorporates perspectives from scholars in political science, cultural geography, and psychology. Of particular note, it provides a detailed micro-analysis of the play of gender issues in Islamic nations.

The underlying thesis of the book is that the treatment of women is an often unperceived, but key, component of international affairs and a "red flag" that can be correlated to the relative stability of societies as it relates to conditions conducive to violence. The authors argue that degrees of gender inequality in society can be correlated to the degree of proclivity for violence, human exploitation, and societal instability overall. They argue further that such norms of violence have an impact proportionally on everything from population growth to economics and regime type.

The authors break from Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington (who asserted that future conflicts could be predicted based on cultural and religious divides) and assert from research offered that the battle lines of future conflict are better forecast by comparative analysis of gender inequality that cuts across cultural and religious divides (e.g., the more states are fraught with gender inequality, the more likely such will default to violence as a means of solving both domestic issues and international crises). The authors go on to assert that security studies now and in the future, to be reliable, must account for issues related to gender equality to fully address and make more complete and understandable the dynamics of state and systems of international security at all levels.

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Notes

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5. While it is obvious that states are composed of people, and about half of those people are women, this "human security" perspective is actually relatively new to security studies, which traditionally have treated the state as an abstraction instead of a group of human beings. That is why the gentleman who asked this question could regard it as entirely coherent.

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Injured Syrian women arrive at a field hospital 15 August 2012 after an air strike hit their homes in the town of Azaz on the outskirts of Aleppo, Syria. (Photo by Khalil Hamra, Associated Press)

Coping with Noncombatant Women in the Battlespace



Incorporating United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 into the Operational Environment

Master Sgt. Vince Lowery, U.S. Army

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Editor's note: This article is the second place winner of the 2016 NCO Journal *writing contest. It is an abridged version of the original, which was previously published online in the* NCO Journal.

When soldiers prepare to deploy to a conflict zone, it is logical for them to learn as much as possible about the area in which they will be operating. The enemy already has the home-field advantage; it is only appropriate to mitigate that advantage by learning as much as one can about the land and the people who live there. Additionally, it is important to learn more about the growing power of nonstate groups, the mounting importance of multinational organizations, and the shifting cast of allies and partner nations that may become involved in operations for their own purposes, and how each adds complexity to, and affects, operational environments.

To our Army's disadvantage, it must remain adaptable to fight across the geographical spectrum, which means it is compelled to train generically when there is no known specific threat or target. Therefore, there will be a shortage of time to train on specific geographical areas and focus on familiarizing the force with specific cultures as unexpected contingencies arise. However, even in the face of so many unknowns, experience has shown that there are constants that can be expected to emerge as factors during most foreseeable operations. These can be anticipated and our forces should prepare to deal with them. Among these are constants that were not fully recognized until comparatively recently.

Among such previously underappreciated constants is the influence noncombatant women living in the operational area have on the success or failure of operations. Experience has shown that knowing what a host-nation's population (young or old, majority or minority, male or female) really wants for their own state or country is key to gaining an understanding of a society. When factors of ethnicity, race, or gender are considered and included during the planning process, the outcome of the mission can be greatly affected.[1]

Master Sgt. Vince Lowery, U.S. Army, serves as the I Corps G-9 (civil affairs) operations NCO with an additional duty to serve as the corps gender advisor. Lowery has served in a variety of Ranger, airborne, and civil affairs assignments.

With the above in context, over the last seventeen years of continuous U.S. involvement in both conflict as well as preconflict stabilization missions, a growing body of knowledge gleaned from both practical experience as well as organized research is revealing that the final success of stability operations is largely dependent on the ultimate status of women in the battlespace. It appears that the better women are cared for during stability operations, and the more they are included in the governing institutions of a society in the aftermath of conflict, the more likely the success of stabilization.[2] In contrast, the less the welfare and concerns of women are incorporated into planned stability actions, the less probability of success.

Knowledge regarding the dynamics such factors ultimately play in operational planning can assist in the efforts by U.S. forces to prevent societies from becoming failed states and can enhance the ability of those societies to transition into prosperous nations that can be governed and can protect themselves against new threats.

Therefore, a major consideration during operational planning is mitigating the lack of attention paid to vulnerable populations such as women and children, who typically make up over half of a society's population. Historically, militaries have neglected to include factors related to vulnerable populations during the planning, execution, and assessment of operations. Research by the United Nations (UN) has shown that most militaries tend to think these issues are not to be discussed until after the fighting has ceased.[3] However, critical analysis of past stabilizations appears to highlight that this line of thought is not logical for future conflict prevention or operational mission success.

Therefore, in stark contrast to previous planning methodology, the considerable effect vulnerable populations, of which women make up a large part, can have on the fight should be planned for and monitored during the entire campaign. A way of looking at these types of operational concerns, which has been gaining salience due to their contributions to successful mission execution, is the incorporation into planning of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS).

A Brief History of UNSCR 1325

In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325, formally recognizing how conflict affects women and children differently than men.[4]

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The United Nations (UN) Security Council votes unanimously to adopt Resolution 1325 on 31 October 2000 at the UN headquarters in New York City, urging an enhanced role for women in preventing conflict, promoting peace, and assisting in postconflict reconstruction within UN operations. Resolution 1325 calls on all actors involved to adopt a gender perspective when negotiating and implementing peace agreements and further calls on all parties to armed conflict to fully respect international law applicable to the human rights of women and girls as civilians and as refugees. (Photo by Milton Grant, UN)

It is a legal framework that addresses not only the inordinate impact of war on women but also the pivotal role women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace. Some of the key actions it calls for include

- increased representation of women in decision-making processes related to conflict resolution, peace, and security;
- better protection of women under international human-rights law during armed conflict;
- special attention to women's welfare and roles in pursuit of postwar justice and disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of refugees; and
- encouragement of member states to significantly increase their support of initiatives that integrate women during peace, protect women during conflict, and provide gender-sensitive training.

In 2011, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13595, "Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security."[5] The national action plan represents "ongoing government-wide efforts to leverage U.S. diplomatic, defense, and development resources to improve the participation of women in peace and conflict prevention processes, protect women and girls from gender-based violence, and help ensure that women have full and equal access to relief and recovery resources."[6]

In August 2013, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for rule of law and detainee policy, in coordination with the Joint Staff's deputy director for partnership strategy in the Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy, created an implementation guide directing all organizational entities within the Department of Defense

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A Palestinian woman argues with an Israeli border policeman 4 September 2015 during a protest against Jewish settlements in the West Bank village of Nabi Saleh near the Palestinian city of Ramallah. (Photo by Mohamad Torokman, Reuters)

to incorporate the concepts into their programs and policies.[7] Though this guide is currently under revision to align with an updated national action plan, it nevertheless is useful in providing the spirit and intent of the guidance that will be forthcoming.

At present, soldiers, particularly those serving at brigade level or below, may think the concept of considering a gender perspective and integrating it into the planning, execution, and assessment of all operations is outside of what they need to know in order to fight the war on the ground; or that it is above their level of concern and meant only for planners at the strategic or political level. However, the increasingly strategic nature of the operational battlespace, which has resulted from globalization of social media, now makes it imperative for all soldiers, and especially NCOs and junior officers who have the most intimate and first-hand contact with people in the operational area, to become far more familiar with and sensitive to how the social dynamics stemming from the treatment of women affect ultimate success of missions. Therefore, since NCOs and junior officers lead patrols that feed information through their reporting to the overall intelligence picture, the culture of operational planning must change together with the elements of key information, which must be adapted to include observations relative to the evolving status of women in the operational area.

Additionally, field grade officers and senior NCOs analyzing the data collected need to become equally familiar with and far more sophisticated in understanding how female concerns and treatment affect stability operations to ensure that the troops going on patrols are gathering the right information from all relevant sources. Without a necessary change in such collection and understanding, too often troops will continue using the same methodologies for developing sources of information as the previous unit, which may not be depicting an accurate intelligence picture of what

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is actually happening. While methods for developing trained sources may be a proven technique to serve a specific end, this technique may not tap the intelligence-rich observations and opinions of the average person on the street, including observations from vulnerable populations, with whom soldiers have contact as part of the broader intelligence effort. As a result, the intelligence picture developed only from trained sources has a real chance of being skewed, highly biased, and just dramatically incomplete.

This could be analogized as an investigator trying to gather information from witnesses of a crime. No two witnesses will have the same statement on what occurred because all of their perspectives are different. Their life experiences and their socially constructed upbringing will influence how they interpret what they saw. No matter how many times an investigator goes back to a particular witness for information, it will most likely alter little from the initial statement. It would be foolish to think that civilians encountered in conflict areas would be different than any other witnesses.

Additionally, with a somewhat changed focus on certain aspects of intelligence collections as they relate to direct contact with and collection on vulnerable populations, it needs to be highlighted that NCOs will play an ever-increasing role in the staff process at all organizational levels because decisions and actions at higher echelons cannot be executed successfully unless they are supported by the NCOs collecting information and executing actions at the tactical and operational levels.

Introducing WPS to the Force

In an effort to introduce planning emphasis related to vulnerable populations into the I Corps planning culture, new intelligence and analytical techniques were included in Exercise Talisman Saber 2015 (TS 15), a biennial combined training activity designed to train Australian and U.S. military forces in planning and conducting combined task force operations. TS 15 was the first combined, joint-level exercise in which U.S. Pacific Command, more specifically I Corps, was required to integrate gender perspectives supporting UNSCR 1325. Australia's designation of WPS integration as the exercise's third training objective was the drive behind the inclusion.

In April 2015 (three months prior to the exercise), I Corps identified a three-person team to support the accomplishment of the WPS training objective. The assistant chief of staff (G-9) identified a male civil affairs senior NCO to serve as I Corps's internal representative and provide continuity for the program. The NCO assisted a female civilian contractor (a gender expert) who acted as the primary gender advisor to the I Corps commander.[8] The third member of the team was a female Army Reserve civil affairs field grade officer with several years of experience in the field of gender studies.

The I Corps commander, during his initial remarks for academics week, mentioned the importance of WPS for mission success and spoke of the need to incorporate UNSCR 1325 guidance on WPS during the exercise. Though the majority of the soldiers that would support the exercise heard those comments, the guidance had little impact as most of them were ignorant as to what it was or how to apply the concepts. This became evident the following week during the ramp-up exercise (RAMPEX). The team's primary observation was that the majority of I Corps's soldiers (with exception of the primary exercise planning staff) were completely unaware of UNSCR 1325, gender mainstreaming, or their roles in the exercise. This was despite having a block of instruction a week prior on the topic by the civilian contractor.[9]

Key Lessons Learned

To ensure any training is successful, standards must be upheld. One of those is enforcing accountability, especially when training on a new concept in military planning and operations. One of the primary responsibilities of an NCO or an officer is to uphold and enforce accountability. It should have been the primary staff officers (colonels) and their sergeants major at the corps level that ensured their soldiers grasped the basic concepts of gender considerations and the incorporation of UNSCR 1325.

Additionally, new concepts like incorporating a gender perspective must have the support of the entire command team. Without leader emphasis from the commanding general down to the team leader, there is little chance units will take incorporating the concept of gender perspective as an effective planning consideration.

Further observations made during the RAMPEX showed there was a considerable amount of confusion about, and resistance to, incorporating WPS from staff members. The heaviest resistance to inclusion came from those with less understanding of the subject, which correlated with those who were comfortable with the way

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they were already conducting their planning and operations. Those few who did grasp the concept of incorporation of a gender perspective were inclined to include it in their operations and were willing to ask for additional information on how they could better incorporate it.

A successful effort during the RAMPEX was the creation of a standard operating procedure for when soldiers would be exposed to human rights violations, specifically, human trafficking and sexually based gender violence. This product, termed "Soldier's Card," was later utilized by one of the major subordinate commands during the exercise. The unit was confronted with a situation in which young children were being smuggled out of the country for slavery under the guise that their uncle was transporting them to their family in a dislocated citizen camp. Because the soldiers took the time to read the standard operating procedure, which gave them a tool for identifying what that situation could look like, the unit was able to recognize what was really going on, detain the human trafficker, and reunite the children with their parents.

WPS in the exercise. During the two to three days leading up to the start of the exercise, the WPS team prioritized incorporating gender into current operations as well as mentoring subordinate gender focal points at the division level.[10] Once the exercise started, the time-intensive demands of the battle rhythm left no dedicated time to continue training the force. From an after-action review perspective, the team should have dedicated time to educate personnel during the exercise through informal opportunities, possibly training individuals or sections during short breaks or creating short learning points and cycling them through with other posted morale, welfare, and recreational advertisements and announcements on television screens that were in the break rooms. In addition, training on UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming should have been set up or directed for those who did not attend the classroom training, such as the liaison officers and soldiers from the major subordinate commands, many of whom were not even aware that there was a WPS training objective.

The team's general assessment during the middle of the exercise was that the majority of the I Corps staff were still uneducated on the concept of WPS. This was exacerbated by neglecting to ensure soldiers participating in the exercise conducted a twenty- to sixty-minute familiarization course on Joint Knowledge Online—as the operation order instructed in its coordinating instructions. Ensuring course participation would have given the entire force a basic understanding of what WPS was and why the unit was incorporating UNSCR 1325 into their mission.

Different divisions, different mindsets. Under I Corps, the designated combined forces land component command (CFLCC), there were two assigned infantry divisions that displayed markedly different levels of proficiency in the incorporation of UNSCR 1325. The first did very little in regards to WPS inclusion. It was evident through e-mail conversations that they were not going to place any priority on implementation of WPS. The task for inclusion was assigned to a female Australian officer who was given little guidance and no means to effectively communicate with the I Corps team. Not only did they fail to incorporate WPS but they also failed at training personnel in their force to establish continuity for future operations and exercises like TS 17, where the division will act as the CFLCC.

The other division followed through on what was expected by the Department of Defense as per the implementation guide. This division appointed a gender field advisor who read the CFLCC gender annex, utilized it as a guide, and established necessary reports, systems, and guidance for subordinate units, which led to incorporating gender mainstreaming effectively in the division.

The first division is a U.S. Army (active-duty) infantry division. It is my observation that they have been institutionalized with decades of carrying out military planning methodology, ensnared in a monotonous routine of executing the same operations year after year. They continually train for the same exercises, which utilize the same planning materials that their predecessors used. All their objectives are based off the same training guidance that faintly changed from the previous year. Their training cannot be based off a specific mission; it must be spread over the wide gamut of missions as they must be able to respond to threats anywhere in the world. They stick to their routine because it works, and they choose not to change because the fear of new concepts pulls them out of their comfort zone. This is no different from many other infantry units in today's Army.

The other division, an Army National Guard infantry division, did not plan using the same mindset as the active-duty division. My observations are that the National Guard is a conglomerate of professionally trained soldiers who are also civilians. Their training is also directed

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A Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighter helps civilian refugees, including large numbers of women and children, who were evacuated by the SDF from an Islamic State-controlled neighborhood of Manbij 12 August 2016 in Aleppo Governorate, Syria. The SDF said the Islamic State was using civilians as human shields. (Photo by Rodi Said, Reuters)

through training guidance and a mission-essential task list like that of their active-duty counterparts, but their time for training is extremely limited, giving them a different set of priorities. From my observations, the focus of their training was toward their certification to be a deployable unit and succeeding in the training objectives established for TS 15 that would certify them to deploy. Of course, one of those training objectives was the incorporation of WPS.

Even though environments differ for all soldiers, in general, I believe the active-duty military mindset is different from that of someone who spends the majority of his or her professional career working in the civilian sector. It is my observation that soldiers with civilian business-world interaction can be more adaptable and accepting of change. Civilian businesses have to adapt to ever-changing climates and demographics to continue to remain successful, and many civilian employees have learned to think "big picture" with broader perspectives so they can remain competitive in a tight economy, whereas active-duty leaders keep their lower-enlisted soldiers focused narrowly on a few tasks to accomplish the mission.

The guard unit personnel were able to understand how incorporating the concept of a gender perspective would enable them to have greater success because it incorporated a broader perspective in the analysis of the conflict. Doing so gave them greater operational understanding of their environment. They did not push back or reject the concept as their sister division did, but rather they accepted it and used it to their advantage for mission success.

Leadership endorsement for WPS incorporation was also emphasized repeatedly by the Guard command team, with their division's chief of staff emphasizing to the soldiers to think about how WPS ties into operations and how the second- and third-order effects would affect the success of the mission. He also tied

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together intelligence, manpower, planning, logistics, personnel management, and all other aspects of the fight, showing that all elements have their part to play in mission success. He used an all-inclusive approach and challenged his soldiers to do the same.

A common philosophical aphorism of unknown origin states, "wisdom, if obtained, only comes after much experience and much reflection." Something military leaders must never forget is that their ability to show their subordinates the bigger picture by providing them with purpose, direction, and motivation is imperative to the success of the mission. In my twenty-three years of military experience, I have found that soldiers' attitudes have always been a direct reflection of the type of leadership they receive. If their leadership gives the impression that something is not important, soldiers will follow that lead. As with the differences in the two divisions, you could certainly tell which command supported it and which one did not.

Post-exercise survey. On the final day of the exercise, one-hundred and twenty anonymous surveys were distributed through all CFLCC staff sections; one-hundred and two were returned. The results confirmed many of the points made through this article. The main point it confirmed was that most leaders placed little to no emphasis on UNSCR 1325 or incorporating the concept of a gender perspective into the exercise despite it being a training objective and emphasized by the commanding general.

The following comments are some responses to the question, "What is the main thought that comes to mind when you hear WPS?" They reflect how leadership values became represented in the thoughts and attitudes of subordinates. In order of frequency, responders said,

- WPS is a woman's issue;
- WPS is about protecting women's rights;
- WPS does not apply to me or my job; and
- WPS is another staff function that is a duplication of effort.

All of these are false assumptions and could have been easily dispelled had the persons making them attended the academics training or taken the online training course.

Another pertinent response set was the answers to "What did you wish you had learned about WPS that could have been useful (during the exercise)?" Soldiers expressed that they wanted

- to have received information and training along with expectations from leadership;
- to know impacts to targeting;
- to see how WPS applies at the operational and tactical levels; and
- to understand how operational implementation shapes strategic efforts.

These comments indicate that soldiers have a desire to learn about this new concept. Soldiers need their NCOs to learn new concepts, like WPS, that will benefit their long-term efforts in operations. They also need to hear from their officers the importance of these concepts and how these concepts are tied into the larger picture of mission success. Most of all, these soldiers want their leaders to take the time to teach them.

The "So What"

The growing power of nonstate groups, the mounting importance of multinational organizations, and the shifting cast of allies and partner nations are adding complexity to operational environments. For years, the military has ignored the effects that vulnerable populations such as women and children have as active agents in combat and how they contribute to mitigating conflict. Military history and experience have repeatedly shown that unfamiliarity with the local culture and society can result in a failure to anticipate challenges and an inability to accomplish national objectives. Yet, military leaders continue to focus the majority of their efforts on "kinetic" warfighting capabilities and continue to presume conflicts are exclusively male oriented, perpetuating the notion that peace is solely delivered through the efforts of those same males who are doing the fighting.

With the recent constraints on resources, it is more important than ever to have soldiers with specific training and awareness of UNSCR 1325 who are able to embed the concept of a gender perspective into every staff section to provide different perspectives that can positively affect the outcome of a conflict. If certain considerations are not taken into account, a population's trust can be lost, turning those who we are there to help against us. Losing the trust of the population can mean a greater resistance postconflict and a drawn-out transition phase to peace and stability operations. Our forces cannot

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handle another drawn-out campaign that will continue to stretch our resources and our manpower thin.

Studies continue to show that WPS implementation and incorporating the concept of gender perspective save time, money, and lives.[11] Integrating WPS also adds a level of realism to training exercises and enhances the exercise of mission command during training by enabling leaders to deal with a wider range of circumstances that have real-world implications.

NCOs and officers owe it to their soldiers to enable them with the ability to understand the big picture. They must take the time to grow their soldiers into the leaders of the future and not merely use them as implements to fight with today. ■

Notes

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1, "Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure," 8 August 2012, accessed 28 February 2017, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_04/20150414_20120808_NU_Bi-SCD_40-11.pdf. According to NATO, gender refers to the social attributes associated with being male and female learned through socialization and determines a person's position and value in a given context. This refers to the relationships between women and men, and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and between men. These attributes, opportunities, and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. Gender does not equate to woman. Sex is the classification of people as male or female. At birth, infants are assigned a sex based on a combination of bodily characteristics, including chromosomes, hormones, internal reproductive organs, and genitalia.

2. Valerie M. Hudson et al., "The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States," chap. 4 in *Sex and World Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

3. Radhika Coomaraswamy, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations [UN] Security Council Resolution 1325* (UN Women, 2015), accessed 28 February 2017, http://wps.unwomen.org/~/media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-1325-2015.pdf.

4. UN Security Council, Resolution 1325 (2000) [on Women, Peace, and Security], 31 October 2000, accessed 2 March 2017, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf.

5. Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, 76 C.F.R. 80,205 (19 December 2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-12-23/pdf/2011-33089.pdf. President Barack Obama called for the creation of a national action plan (NAP) on women, peace, and security (WPS). NAP describes the U.S. government's course of action to accomplish the following five principles:

First, the engagement and protection of women as agents of peace and stability are central to United States efforts to promote security, prevent, respond to, and resolve conflict, and rebuild societies.

Second, by building on the goals for gender integration described in the *U.S. National Security Strategy* and the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, the U.S. efforts on WPS complement and enhance existing initiatives to advance gender equality and women's empowerment, ensure respect for human rights, and address the needs of vulnerable populations in crisis and conflict environments.

Third, in executing this policy, the United States is guided by the principle of inclusion, seeking out the views and participation of a wide variety of stakeholders—women and girls; men and boys; and members of marginalized groups, including youth, ethnic, racial, or religious minorities; persons with disabilities; displaced persons and indigenous peoples; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals; and people from all socioeconomic strata.

Fourth, in order to maximize the impact of the NAP, the United States seeks to ensure that activities in support of WPS are coordinated among all relevant departments and agencies of the government, integrated into relevant U.S. foreign policy initiatives, and enhanced by engagement with international partners.

Finally, U.S. government agencies are accountable for the implementation of the policies and initiatives endorsed in the NAP.

6. United States Agency of International Development, "United States Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally: 2016 Update," June 2016, accessed 2 March 2017, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258703.pdf.

7. Anne Witkowsky, "Integrating Gender Perspectives within the Department of Defense," *PRISM* 6, no. 1 (2016): 34.

8. The role of gender advisor (GENAD) is the official program of record for all activities to include plans, training, and exercises concerning WPS, gender equality, and gender mainstreaming. It is the responsibility of the GENAD to provide a conduit for WPS implementation in policies, plans, and activities.

9. Gender and UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, October 2005), 1–4, accessed 14 April 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/gender_brochure.pdf; see also Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF), CWINF Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming (Brussels: NATO, June 2007), accessed 14 April 2017, http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/cwinf_guidance.pdf. Gender mainstreaming is defined as a strategy to achieve gender equality by assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies, and programs in all areas and at all levels, in order to assure that the concerns and experiences of women and men are taken into account in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic, and societal spheres. This will lead to women and men benefiting equally. Gender mainstreaming in this context represents the process to recognize and incorporate the role gender plays in relation to NATO's various operational missions. Gender mainstreaming does not focus solely on women, but the benefits of mainstreaming practices recognize women's disadvantaged position in various communities.

10. Gender focal point (GFP) is a dual-hatted position that supports the commander in implementing directives and procedures with gender perspective. The GFP maintains functional dialogue with the GENAD but reports within the chain of command. The GFP at the tactical level ensures that gender perspective is fully integrated into the daily tasks of the operation. These activities could include, but are not limited to, patrolling, enabling the provision of humanitarian aid, search procedures, assisting national security forces, assessing the different security risks of men and women in monitoring and evaluation activities, and providing gender training for NATO personnel.

11. UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary–General on Women and Peace and Security" (New York: UN, 16 September 2015), accessed 28 February 2017, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20Secretary%20General%20on%20women%20and%20peace%20and%20security.pdf; Natalia Zakharova, *Women and Peace and Security: Guidelines for National Implementation* (New York: UN Women, 2012), accessed 28 February 2017, http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/en/02BPlanonWomenandPeaceandSecurity.pdf; Hudson et al., "The Heart of the Matter."

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An army engineer from the Russian International Mine Action Center disarms a booby trap 3 February 2017 in a residence in Aleppo, Syria. (Photo courtesy of Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation)

Stability Operations in Syria

The Need for a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs

Anthony H. Cordesman

In an ideal world, the U.S. military would only have a military role. But, in practice, no one gets to fight the wars they want, and this is especially true today. The United States is deeply involved in wars that can only be won at the civil-military level, and where coming to grips with the deep internal divisions and tensions of the host country, and the pressures from outside states, are critical. Unless the United States adapts to this reality, it can easily lose the war at the civil level even when it wins at the military level. This is especially true in the case of the "failed states" where the United States is now fighting. The United States

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either has to hope for a near-miraculous improvement in the governance and capability of host-country partners, or focus on successful civil-military operations as being as important for success as combat.

So far, the United States has failed to recognize the sheer scale of the civil problems it faces in conducting military operations. It has failed to understand that it needs to carry out a revolution in civil-military affairs if it is to be successful in fighting failed-state wars that involve major counterinsurgency campaigns and reliance on host-country forces. The U.S. military role in Syria is a key case in point, and it illustrates all too clearly that any military effort to avoid dealing with the full consequences of the civil side of war can be a recipe for failure.

A Lack of Meaningful Directives and Doctrine

Part of the problem is that this is an area for which there is neither meaningful guidance nor doctrine. Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, is so vague as to be meaningless.[1] It defines stability operations as "an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief."[2]

The policy sections of Instruction 3000.05 call for virtually every activity imaginable without setting meaningful priorities or goals:

> a. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. The Department of Defense shall be prepared to:
>
> (1) Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. The magnitude of stability operations missions may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale, long-duration.
>
> (2) Support stability operations activities led by other U.S. Government departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "U.S. Government agencies"), foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations, or when otherwise directed.
>
> (3) Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the Department will operate within U.S. Government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities.
>
> b. The Department shall have the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations activities to fulfill DOD Component responsibilities under national and international law. Capabilities shall be compatible, through interoperable and complementary solutions, to those of other U.S. Government agencies and foreign governments and security forces to ensure that, when directed, the Department can:
>
> (1) Establish civil security and civil control.
>
> (2) Restore or provide essential services.
>
> (3) Repair critical infrastructure.
>
> (4) Provide humanitarian assistance.
>
> c. Integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations. The Department shall:
>
> (1) Support the stability operations planning efforts of other U.S. Government agencies.
>
> (2) Collaborate with other U.S. Government agencies and with foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector firms as appropriate to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations.
>
> (3) Continue to support the development, implementation, and operations of

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civil-military teams and related efforts aimed at unity of effort in rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing local governance structures; fostering security, economic stability, and development; and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

d. The Department shall assist other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international governmental organizations in planning and executing reconstruction and stabilization efforts, to include:

(1) Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society.

(2) Rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces.

(3) Strengthening governance and the rule of law.

(4) Fostering economic stability and development.

e. The DoD Components shall explicitly address and integrate stability operations-related concepts and capabilities across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and applicable exercises, strategies, and plans.[3]

The revised U.S. Army field manual on stability operations—Field Manual 3-07, *Stability*—provides much better general guidance, but it tacitly assumes that the host-country government is competent and willing to carry out all necessary reforms.[4] It ignores the lessons of the Vietnam conflict, the campaigns in Afghanistan from 2001 to date, and the campaigns in Iraq from 2003 to the present. It ignores virtually all of the realities of dealing with real-world host-country governments, and what past and current conflicts have revealed about the problems in simply calling for a whole-of-government approach. As for the overlapping guidance in DOD Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, it is even more vague, general, and decoupled from the wars the United States is now fighting.[5]

While the United States did attempt something approaching nation building in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014 and in Iraq between 2004 and 2011, few argue that these efforts produced effective civil-military coordination, and both largely failed. If anything, these failures have led the United States to try to both minimize the role of U.S. ground forces in failed-state wars and restrict stability operations to a minimum. The very term "nation building" is now one the United States seeks to avoid. In practice, stability operations are still being generally treated as only a passing phase in warfare. The key goal for military forces is to defeat the enemy, and dealing with civilians now occurs largely at the tactical level and consists largely of humanitarian relief.

> "... the grand strategic goal of warfighting is never just to produce a favorable military outcome or to defeat the enemy. It is to win as lasting a victory as possible in political, economic, and security terms."

This is a fundamentally unrealistic approach to modern U.S. military operations. It ignores the real-world nature of the wars in Vietnam, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria—the case study that is the focus of this analysis. It also ignores just how often the U.S. military is forced to engage in stability and civil-military operations. As a Defense Science Board study, *Transition to and from Hostilities*, pointed out in 2004, "Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has conducted new stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months."[6] More importantly, the report revealed that the cost of these operations far outstrips the cost of major combat operations in both human resources and treasure.[7]

Like far too many cases in the past, it also ignores the fact that grand strategy can only succeed if the United States not only terminates a conflict successfully but also creates conditions that provide lasting security and stability. All wars have an end, and the grand strategic goal of warfighting is never just to produce a favorable military outcome or to defeat the enemy. It is to win as lasting a victory as possible in political, economic, and security terms. The kind of thinking that led the Office of

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the secretary of defense to take a far more serious look at stability operations in its *Biennial Assessment of Stability Operations Capabilities* in 2012 is even more critical today, and cases like Syria illustrate the point.[8]

Conventional Wars Never Have a Conventional Ending

America's military history provides a vital prelude to any case study of issues related to stability operations. Throughout American history, this aspect of war has presented major and lasting problems—even when wars were fought on territory in or nearby U.S. territory, even when they used tactics and strategy focused on conventional warfare, and even when the United States won decisive victories at the tactical and strategic levels.

The American colonies had no clear plan for peace when the United States won independence. Virtually every war with Native Americans ended in an unstable peace and unintended tragedy for Native Americans. The United States fought the Mexican-American War in an era of "manifest destiny," but with no clear plan for its outcome, and Mexican Americans suffered for decades as a result. There was no plan for victory at the end of the Civil War, and the result was Reconstruction and nearly a century of racism.

The Spanish-American War was the first major U.S. military adventure distant from U.S. territory, but a victorious United States had no victory plan for Cuba. It subsequently annexed the Philippines almost by accident and then had to fight a counterinsurgency campaign against native Filipinos. And, in its next military conflict, the U.S. failure to create a stable end to World War I played a key role in causing World War II.

The United States ended World War II without any clear plan for its aftermath in either Europe or Japan. The initial U.S. efforts to enforce a rapidly improvised version of the Morgenthau Plan to limit the future role of Germany—and U.S. failure to focus on recovery and refugees—helped create a crisis that was only alleviated by the Marshall Plan and U.S. acceptance of the need to provide aid because of the advent of the Cold War.

The United States did improvise an effective occupation effort in Japan after World War II, but economic recovery and political stability came as much from the flood of U.S. spending triggered by the Korean War as from U.S. plans. Fortunately, the United States did provide aid to South Korea, but again because the war did not really end and aid was clearly critical.

Since that time, U.S. failures to develop a stable civil sector in Vietnam were ultimately as critical as the weaknesses in South Vietnamese forces. The United States first avoided dealing with the civil aftermath of the war with Iraq in 1991, then invaded without any civil and conflict termination plans in 2003. It indulged in nation building in Iraq from 2004 to 2011, and it now fights the Islamic State (IS) in both Iraq and Syria without any meaningful plan for what happen after IS's defeat. The United States carried out similar operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. As reports by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank make all too clear, most of the U.S. nation-building effort has been no more successful than in Iraq, and the United States again has no clear plans for the future.[9]

The Challenge of "Failed State" Wars

These lessons are particularly important now that the United States is committed to a series of wars, like that in Syria, which are anything but conventional. The United

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States is now fighting what are largely counterinsurgency campaigns, although they are sometimes labeled as fights against terrorism. It is fighting major campaigns—mixing airpower with train, advise, and assist units; Special Forces; and other small land-combat elements in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. At the same time, the United States is playing a limited role in other conflicts in Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

In all of these wars, the failures of the host countries to meet their people's needs in governance, development, and security—and their gross corruption and incompetence—are as much a threat as the enemy. They are all wars against an enemy with a hostile ideology—violent Islamic extremism—and the fight for hearts and mind is critical. They are all wars where outside powers like Iran and Turkey play a major role, where U.S. local and regional strategic partners are critical, and where combinations of rival ethnic, sectarian, and tribal groups compete for power, often to the point of near or actual civil war.

In practical terms, however, they are wars where the United States now lets the immediate tactical situation dominate, where there is no clear strategy for military victory, and where there is no grand strategy for full conflict termination or for postconflict stability and security. In these conflicts, the United States has largely turned away from any form of nation building. The limited U.S. military presence on the ground is not backed by major aid efforts or by a forward-deployed civilian presence, and the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are no longer involved in civil-military operations. In one key case—Afghanistan—only a limited counterterrorism force plays a forward-combat role. In Iraq, the ground presence is deliberately limited and focused on tactical support. And in Syria, the United States relies on small detachments of Special Forces to support Syrian Kurdish and "moderate" Arab rebel forces, while other U.S. and allied forces train small elements in countries such as Jordan and Iraq.

As a result, stability operations either do not exist or are narrowly focused on specific regions and small tactical areas of operation, and failed host governments are left to act on their own. There is no clear civil effort to bring lasting stability, and outside states such as Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Pakistan play a more active civil-military role. If anything, the official U.S. posture toward the host governments in Afghanistan and Iraq is largely one of constantly claiming civil progress that is exaggerated or does not exist, or one of ignoring the full range of civil problems—effectively a strategy based on hope and denial.

Syria: The Worst Test Case?

It is an open question as to whether Syria is the worst test case in either strategic or humanitarian terms. In many ways, Syria is only of marginal strategic interest to the United States as long as it is not the center of some extremist "caliphate" and no longer exports terrorism. Afghanistan may only have limited strategic importance in absolute terms, but it has become a symbol of U.S. capability, and it too presents fewer host-country problems. Yemen has even less strategic importance than Syria unless it becomes a threat to maritime shipping or far more of a threat to Saudi Arabia and Oman. Even so, the situation in Yemen has deteriorated to the point where it rivals Syria as a humanitarian disaster.

Syria, however, cannot be decoupled from the war in Iraq. Iraq's civil-military and host-country problems are not as severe as in the other wars the United States is now fighting, but Iraq is a major oil power that shares a border with Iran, and it has far more strategic importance to the United States. It is also hard to see how the United States can help Iraq achieve lasting stability unless Syria is stable. An unstable Syria also threatens allied and friendly states such as Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, and Syrian instability presents a serious risk that any defeat of IS elsewhere will simply lead to a new violent Islamist extremist movement in eastern Syria that could become a major threat to the interests of the United States and its allies.

More broadly, U.S. policy in Syria is widely seen as a failure and a sign of growing American weakness in the Middle East. U.S. diplomacy has so far failed to counter or balance Russian influence and has become a sideshow to other efforts to negotiate a cease-fire. While the United States plays a military role in the fight against IS in Syria, it conspicuously has failed to create effective, unified, and moderate Arab rebel forces.

The United States has avoided committing large ground forces to Syria and has avoided becoming involved in a serious air war with pro-Bashar al-Assad forces. However, this has come at the cost of far more decisive Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah military intervention, and Turkish intervention as much against America's Syrian Kurdish allies as against IS. The United States also may not have any clear civil-military program in Syria, but it has become one of the largest single aid donors,

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spending some $6 billion on humanitarian aid.[10] It has effectively committed itself to open-ended humanitarian aid without any clear prospect of creating a state where that aid can go to help recovery and reconstruction.

Syria is Deeply Divided, and Syria's Neighbors Present Further Critical Challenges

Syria is a grim study in just how important the civil dimension of war can be, and in just how difficult the challenge of stability operations (and nation building) can be in tactical, strategic, and grand strategic terms. Many argue that the United States could have intervened decisively early in the Syrian crisis and civil war, done so at acceptable risk, done so at much lower cost, and done so before Syria became a humanitarian disaster and before some three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand Syrian civilians were killed in the fighting. There are no reliable estimates of the seriously injured, but the numbers may well be higher.

USAID estimates provide all too clear a picture of Syrian suffering at a civil level and highlight one aspect of the challenge of conducting stability operations. USAID estimates that there are 13.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria in a country with a total remaining population of around 22 million. There are 6.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria, and U.S. aid is now critical to some 4 million people each month.[11]

No one has a full count of the number Syrian refugees outside Syria because many have stopped registering. Syrian refugees are, however, putting a far greater burden on neighboring states than on Europe or the token numbers that the United States may or may not admit. There are at least 4.8 million Syrian refugees in neighboring states: 2.7 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, 656,400 Syrian refugees in Jordan, and 225,500 Syrian refugees in Iraq.[12]

The situation inside Syria is already critical and is growing steadily worse. The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned at the end of 2016,

> Over half of the population has been forced from their homes, and many people have been displaced multiple times. Children and youth comprise more than half of the displaced, as well as half of those in need of humanitarian assistance. Parties to the conflict act with impunity, committing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
>
> Among conflict-affected communities, life-threatening needs continue to grow. Neighboring countries have restricted the admission of people fleeing Syria, leaving hundreds of thousands of people stranded in deplorable conditions on their borders. In some cases, these populations are beyond the reach of humanitarian actors.
>
> Civilians living in thirteen besieged locations, 643,780 people in need of humanitarian assistance are denied their basic rights, including freedom of movement and access to adequate food, water, and health care. Frequent denial of entry of humanitarian assistance into these areas and blockage of urgent medical evacuations result in civilian deaths and suffering. 3.9 million people in need live in hard-to-reach areas that humanitarian actors are unable to reach in a sustained manner through available modalities.[13]

In the absence of a political solution to the conflict, intense and widespread hostilities are likely to persist in 2017. After nearly six years of senseless and brutal conflict, the outrage at what is occurring in Syria and what is being perpetrated against the Syrian people must be maintained. Now is the time for advocacy and now is the time for the various parties to come together and bring an end to the conflict in Syria.

U.S. Stability and Civil-Military Operations for Whom and for What

"Might have beens" are always studies in irrelevance. What these facts on the ground make all too clear is that today's Syria is a steadily worsening and divided mess. The United States now seems to lack options for either security or stability, and the U.S. ability to link some kind of meaningful military operation to effective civil-military operations, conflict termination, and reconstruction and recovery is dubious at best.

Syria's problems go far beyond its humanitarian crises and simply trying to defeat one key enemy. Even if IS is largely defeated, large numbers of IS fighters are certain to escape and disperse, and Syria will still present

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extraordinarily difficult security and stability problems. Any broader cease-fire is likely to either collapse under the pressure of warring factions or see new power struggles in a divided Syria between elements of the Assad regime, the main Arab rebel factions that include large numbers of Islamist extremists, and the U.S.-backed Syrian Kurds.

The pro-Assad forces seem likely to win in the more populated areas in western Syria. Aleppo has fallen, and pro-Assad or Syrian Arab Republic forces dominate the populated areas of Western Syria with varying degrees of Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah support and influence. Regime and allied forces have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of atrocities, civilian casualties, and collateral damage. At best, they can control and repress, but cannot bring lasting stability and unity.

No one can predict what will happen in eastern Syria or near the border with Iraq. While the Syrian Arab Republic forces try to preserve the image of unity in dealing with the outside world, there are serious divisions within them, and significant numbers of the current population are IDPs who have moved to obtain security and not because of any loyalty to the regime.

Eastern Syria is divided into competing and sometimes warring rebel, sectarian, and ethnic factions: the more secular and moderate Arab rebel factions in the Free Syrian Army, the relatively more moderate Arab Islamist factions, and the largely Arab Islamist extremist factions in the Army of Conquest. There are also largely Kurdish forces in the Rojava region of northern Syria, along with the so-called Syrian Defense Forces. These forces predominantly consist of personnel from the *Yekîneyên Parastina Gel* (YPG, or the Kurdish People's Protection Units). Estimates of their size range from forty thousand to seventy thousand fighters. While largely Kurdish, some estimates put the number of Arabs, Turkmens, Armenians, Assyrians, and other minorities as high as 40 percent of the fighters.

For all the talk of a "unified" Free Syrian Army, the Arab rebel movements are now deeply divided, and include large Islamic extremist elements such as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, Fatah al-Islam, and Jordanian Salafi-jihadists. Many experts believe such extremist groups dominate the number of Arab fighters.

At the same time, the U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish fighters pursue their own ethnic goals and territorial ambitions, with ties to the *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* (PKK, or the Kurdistan Worker's Party) in Turkey, and ties to the Kurds in Iraq. The key element in the Syrian Kurdish rebel force—the YPG—has proven to be the only effective rebel element in fighting IS. The YPG is the key U.S.-backed element in Syria—albeit with a strangely dysfunctional libertarian ideology that attempts to combine socialism with the views of social anarchists.

This has vastly complicated U.S. coordination with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government in Turkey, which sees the YPG as an ally to the PKK and a threat to Turkey. As Syria continued to deteriorate, Turkey became steadily more involved on a military level because of its own civil war with the Kurds within its own borders. Turkey desires to create a security zone in Syria on its southern border and wants to keep Syria's Kurds in the west divided from the Kurds in the east. Additionally, Erdoğan is using the war to help take a central role in governing Turkey by expanding his role as president to authoritarian levels.

So far, Ankara has been forced to temper its ambitions in the face of stiff resistance from IS fighters near al-Bab and from entrenched Kurdish forces in Manbij—two towns that are critical to the control of Aleppo Province and crucial for any future group operations against Raqqa, IS's de facto capital. No one, however, can predict whether the Kurds will find some way to work with Arab Syrian rebels, the Turks, or other factions; how much U.S. civil and military aid they get and where; and how any stability and other civil aid will be provided. As of February 2017, the United States had made increases in the support it was providing by air, Special Forces, and other select combat elements, but it still had not decided on the military options for providing the Syrian Kurds and associated Arab forces with the weapons and support they needed to move on Raqqa.

All of these forces divide Syria along both military and civil fault lines. Virtually any form of victory against one faction tends to empower to remaining factions and lead to new forms of conflict. As for U.S. strategy, it was in a total state of flux at the time this analysis was written in early February. The Trump administration has made it clear that it does not endorse the military plans to strengthen U.S.-supported rebels forces in Syria formed under the Obama administration, but it has not announced plans of its own. It did issue a presidential memorandum calling for a *Plan to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*.[14] This memorandum, however, makes no mention of any form of stability operations, any aspect

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Thousands of desperate residents flood a destroyed main street January 2014 in Damascus, Syria, to meet aid workers from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The UNRWA was able to complete its first humanitarian food distribution in Yarmouk Camp there after almost six months of siege. (Photo courtesy of UNRWA)

of a civil campaign and effort to coordinate civil-military operations, or the need for resolve. Rather than deal with stability operations, or civil-military affairs, the U.S. strategy called for in the text of the memorandum seems to be one of "we'll fight IS until we leave, and please don't bother us with the end result."

More broadly, the United States has never announced any plan or effort to use humanitarian aid and civil-military programs to try to stabilize the areas under Syrian Kurdish control and the rest of the border area near Iraq, find some modus vivendi between Syrian Kurd and Arab, and find a modus vivendi between Syria's Kurds and Turkey. At least as of February, the Trump administration—like the Obama administration before it—has also failed to provide any indication of what it meant by talking about "safe zones," although the new president has said on television that he "will absolutely do safe zones in Syria" for refugees fleeing violence in their country, devastated by years of civil war.[15]

So far, the United States has never come to grips with the real-world civil-military problems in choosing locations for those safe zones and defining who such zones would protect. The Trump administration has not detailed how the sites could be secured in the air and on the ground; what kind of civilian facilities would be provided; how they would be resupplied; and what their structure and capacity structure could be in terms of the water, power, other infrastructure, education, and medical services needed by hundreds of thousands to millions of civilians.

What is all too clear, however, is that there are virtually no services, surplus housing, infrastructure, and the other essentials of stability operations anywhere in eastern Syria after more than a half decade of war. It is equally clear that almost any choice involves alienating some faction, possible attacks by the Assad regime, and possible attacks by Turkey, divided Kurdish factions,

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or hostile Arab rebel factions. There are all too many threats, both in the air and on the ground.

Leaving Syria's Neighbors and its Border with Iraq without Either a Military or Civil Strategy

This vacuum in civil-military and stability operations goes much further than Syria. Syria's other neighbors are forced to focus on their own security and stability. Israel must shape its own security and guard against a sweep of threats from undergoverned or destabilized spaces, which include IS-linked Salafi-Jihadi threats in Egypt's Sinai, potential instability tied to Hezbollah along the UN Blue Line with Lebanon, and threats on the Golan Heights from both Hezbollah and Iran's Quds Force on the one hand and al-Qaida-affiliated groups on the other.

Lebanon and Jordan face similar challenges from potentially ungoverned and undergoverned spaces along their borders with Syria, and both—with U.S. and Western support—have responded by significantly expanding and reshaping their militaries' border security and deterrence forces. Given their limited topography, smaller populations, and relatively weaker economies, Lebanon and Jordan also bear a disproportionately larger burden tied to the number of Syrian refugees.

The most critical problem from the viewpoint of classic stability operations, however, is that Iraq has an open and vulnerable border with Syria. It has its own Kurdish problems and has a deep division between its Sunni and Shiite populations. Even if the United States can avoid stability operations and a civil-military effort in most of Syria, it cannot defeat IS's physical "caliphate" and ensure that no combination of other violent Islamist extremists that replace it could successfully challenge other neighboring states, or export terrorism, unless it takes such action.

In order to secure Iraq, the United States has to have a civil-military strategy for both eastern Syria and the border area with Iraq and Jordan. This strategy must ensure the defeat of IS in Syria as well as in Iraq, and it must make certain that the liberation of eastern Syria and western Iraq does not create a bloc of Sunni Arabs hostile to Syrian and Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi central government. Such a strategy has to deal with civil stability and not simply with military security.

As of February 2017, the United States had not developed effective Arab rebel forces to defeat IS in Syria and had not given the Rojava, Syrian Defense Forces, or YPG the same mix of weapons, forward advisors, and combat support necessary to defeat IS in its Syrian capital in Raqqa. Neither the Obama nor the Trump administration has ever made any unclassified statement of its overall strategy or plans for stability operations for dealing with the Iraqi border area and eastern Syria when—*and if*—IS is defeated, and the Obama administration left office without resolving any of the tension between Turkey and Syria's Kurds.

The United States can solve part of this narrow "stability" problem by sustaining the present levels of aid to Iraq and by ensuring that Jordan and Lebanon can secure their borders with Syria. It must, however, work actively with the Iraqi central government to persuade it to provide the aid, support, political equity, and security to Iraqi Sunnis that will give them reason to be loyal to the Iraqi central government.

The United States may well have to broker some form of Syrian Kurdish security zone in Northeastern Syria that will give its Kurds and allied minorities the resources they need to preserve near-autonomy, and it may have to broker an arrangement with Turkey where it can accept that the Syrian Kurds will not actively back the PKK in the ongoing Turkish conflict. It may also have to work with Jordan and the Arab Gulf states to provide aid and resources to Arab Sunnis in the far east of Syria to limit Islamic extremist influence. This, however, is far easier to propose than to implement, and it is a further warning that successful operations in failed-state wars need both an integrated civil-military strategy and a civil effort that looks beyond the military dimension, humanitarian aid, and purely local and ephemeral stability operations.

The Ultimate Stability Challenge: Recovery and Reconstruction

It is far from clear how long the United States can avoid looking at the far more serious problem of recovery and reconstruction in Syria, both in terms of any broad form of conflict termination and creating any kind of lasting "victory." As bad as the civil, governance, economic, and justice sectors are in Afghanistan and Iraq, Syria is truly a failed state in

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terms of governance, economics, and every aspect of recovery and reconstruction.

Estimates of the cost of reconstruction are highly uncertain, but estimates by World Vision and Frontier Economics have risen to over $275 billion today and indicate that the total could be over $1 trillion if the civil war drags on to 2020.[16] To put these kinds of figures in additional perspective, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that Syria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped by 70 percent between 2010 and 2016; it was only $24.6 billion in 2014 at the official exchange rate, and was only $55.8 billion in 2015, even in purchasing power parity terms. And, no one can begin to estimate what it will take to deal with what may well be a deeply divided country, to reduce corruption and misgovernment to workable levels, and to establish any stable pattern of income distribution and reconstruction efforts.[17]

The UN's Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) published a far more detailed study in November 2016, titled *Survey of Economic and Social Developments in the Arab Region, 2015-2016.* This study addressed the cost of the political upheavals and fighting in the Middle East and North Africa region that begin in 2011 and provided the following summary description of the longer-term cost of recovery and reconstruction in Syria.

> Now in its sixth year, the Syrian civil war has led to one of the most severe humanitarian crises of the new millennium. The international community has failed to end the conflict or provide adequate aid. Recent estimates put the total death toll at 470,000.[i] The country's population has decreased by one fifth, due to casualties and emigration. The war has been accompanied by atrocities, the rise of the so-called "Islamic State," a regional and global refugee crisis, and external intervention that has only fueled hostilities.
>
> The conflict has left a once middle-income economy in ruins. Various studies have been conducted on the impact of the war on the economy. However, official data have been scant since the war began and account only for activities in areas controlled by the Government. Data on other regions are more difficult to gather.

In this study, we make use of the most recent estimates of economic losses and look at potential post-war projections.

1. Pre-conflict situation and trajectory

According to the Government's Eleventh Five-year Plan, GDP stood at $60.2 billion in 2010 and was set to grow steadily in the years to 2015 [Source: "Post-Conflict Challenges for the Macroeconomic Policies for Syria," National Agenda for the Future of Syria (NAFS) (Beirut: ESCWA, 2016)]. Under the plan, public investment was to rise from SYP [Syrian Pound] 309 billion to SYP 514 billion between 2011 and 2015, with major investments in public administration, transportation, water and electricity. In practice, those plans have been stripped back and funds have been diverted to military expenditure.

2. Impact of the conflict

According to NAFS estimations, the Syrian conflict has caused losses of $259 billion since 2011, including $169 billion from lost GDP as compared with pre-conflict projections, and $89.9 billion from accumulated physical capital loss. The Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) says that overall GDP loss has been three times the size of the country's GDP in 2010.[ii] The degree of destruction has increased over time, and ramped-up bombing campaigns since late 2015 have begun targeting infrastructure and economically vital sectors such as energy, which had previously been largely immune. This will further diminish the productive capital stock left at the end of the war.

Building and industry have borne the brunt of destruction. Output of manufacturing, a key subsector for job and income creation and an indicator of economic transformation, now stands at one third of its 2010 level.

Despite farming losses, favorable weather, and the shift to smallholder agriculture during the conflict lifted agriculture's share of GDP from 17.4 percent before the crisis to 28.7 percent in 2015. That has been matched by a fall in the GDP share of other sectors, particularly mining (an 11.6 percentage point

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Syrian troops and pro-government gunmen walk inside the destroyed Umayyad Mosque 13 December 2016 in Aleppo, Syria. (Photo courtesy of Syrian Arab News Agency)

drop) and internal trade (a 4.5 percentage point drop).[iii] Other subsectors, including tourism and utilities, have also been adversely affected.

Public and private sector consumption and investment continue to slide. Public consumption dropped by nearly one third from 2014 to 2015, and household consumption has fallen as consumer price index (CPI) inflation has risen.[iv] "Semi-public" consumption (that is, consumption in areas beyond the Government's control) represented 13.2 percent of GDP in 2015. For example, the so-called "Islamic State" controls three quarters of oil production.

Unemployment rose from 15 percent in 2011 to 48 percent in 2014. Some three million Syrians, responsible for 12.2 million dependent family members, have lost their jobs during the course of the conflict.[v] More than 80 percent of the Syrian population were living below the poverty line at the end of 2015, as opposed to 28 percent in 2010.[vi] Areas with the highest poverty rates include Al-Raqqa, Idlib, Deir El Zor, Homs and the rural area around Damascus, all of which have witnessed some of the most brutal and prolonged battles of the conflict so far. The deep descent into poverty has been fueled by rising unemployment, the loss of property and assets by large numbers of IDPs and sharp cuts in food and fuel subsidies.

The continuing economic destruction will translate into a new lower level and trajectory for the Syrian economy, with greater dependence on imports and aid. Debt, unemployment, inflation and other negative indicators are all worsening, and any gains in terms of remittances and informal trade are vastly offset by the physical losses and opportunity costs of the war. So, although theory posits that countries in long-term conflict may adjust

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to the economic consequences, the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic is worsening every year according to most economic indicators.

The conflict has triggered an unprecedented refugee crisis. The plight of refugees has been documented but global humanitarian assistance and legal allowances for displaced persons remain inadequate. Under an agreement reached in London between European and Arab partners in February 2016, it was decided to open markets for manufactured goods, such as textiles, from Jordan because of the refugee burden that country is bearing.[vii] According to the ILO, 28 percent of Syrian refugees in Jordan had work in early 2014. Unemployment in that country had, however, soared from 14.5 percent in March 2011 to 22 percent in 2014.[18]

The study goes on to describe the high cost of the war to Syria's neighbors and the impact of its refugee issues on their economies. It then summarizes the key conclusions of an economic model for reconstruction that assumes a full and immediate solution to the conflict, national unity, and massive outside investment and aid.

> The NAFS scenario for rebuilding the economy of the Syrian Arab Republic, supposing that hostilities will end in 2016, uses a financial programming model to calculate what will be needed to return the country's GDP to its 2010 level by 2025.
>
> ... Under the scenario, a minimum public investment of $183.5 billion will be needed to rebuild the country. This equals the sum of cumulative capital loss during the conflict and the investments intended under the 2011 five-year plan, and will boost growth through multiplier effects and stimulate private investment.
>
> ... Reconstruction could be divided into two phases ... a peacebuilding phase (2016–2018), with a focus on basic needs, ending violence and initiating economic recovery, and a State-building phase (2019–2025), expanding investments to productive sectors and activities, with sectoral allocations presumably based on the five-year plan. The process will require major and expanding investment, particularly from the private sector. Success will depend greatly on the sources and reliability of, and conditions attached to, the available financing options.
>
> An alternative exercise utilizes a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, based on the assumption that hostilities end in 2016 and implementation of Eleventh National Development Plan, with a focus on rebuilding destroyed capital and restoring public investment.[viii]
>
> This yields interesting projections, including a steady increase in GDP similar to the NAFS calculations, but with a spike of 40.6 percent GDP growth in 2016 due to the immediate infusion of capital and assistance, before it levels off to an average of between 11 and 15 percent. Capital stock would grow at its pre-crisis rate to reach 2011 levels by 2017 in an optimistic projection. Public investment would spike in 2016 and continue to grow as well, triggering private sector investment. Exports would increase slowly, reaching a value of 20 percent of GDP by 2020, while imports would boom at 57 percent of GDP in 2016, later stabilizing at 43 percent. In the absence of grants, the public deficit and debt would increase to 50 and 200 percent of GDP respectively. This highlights the importance of tapping into a broad range of alternative financing options. With so many Syrians displaced externally, remittances will play an important role in rebuilding as many of those who find work will remain abroad and continue to work and send money home.
>
> Post-conflict macroeconomic policy will have to go beyond stabilization and tackle problems resulting from the loss of physical and human capital, brain drain, deep political and geographical divisions, as well as factoring in peacebuilding. The approach to post-war reconstruction in Lebanon offers some cautionary lessons. The economic policies and political arrangements arrived at, although they helped the country to emerge from conflict, did not prove sustainable in the longer term.[19]

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The IMF has issued a series of assessments of the impact of Syrian conflict and the problems it creates for reconstruction. One such assessment was issued in June 2016, and it joins the UN study in warning just how serious the recovery and reconstruction challenge is, although the IMF study seems less optimistic than the UN ESCWA study about the speed with which recovery is possible:

> **The conflict has set the country back decades in terms of economic, social, and human development.** Syria's GDP today is less than half of what it was before the war started. Inflation is high double digits, and there has been a large depreciation of the exchange rate. International reserves have been depleted to finance large fiscal and current account deficits, while public debt has more than doubled. Syria's people are struggling with the devastating effects of the conflict, including widespread unemployment and poverty, homelessness, food and medicine shortages, and destruction of public services and infrastructure. The situation for those who have stayed in Syria is dire: half of the population is displaced, the social fabric is torn, many children are no longer schooled, access to medicine, food and clean water is limited, and many people of all ages are traumatized by the war.
>
> **Rebuilding the country will be a complex and monumental task.** Reconstructing damaged physical infrastructure will require substantial international support and prioritization. Rebuilding Syria's human capital and social cohesion will be an even greater and lasting challenge. Considerable resources will need to go to rebuilding the lives of internally displaced people, and to encouraging the return and reintegration of refugees along with reducing the divisions and tensions between various sectarian communities. Far-reaching economic reforms will be needed to create stability, growth, and job prospects. The immediate focus would need to be on urgent humanitarian assistance, restoring macroeconomic stability and rebuilding institutional capacity to implement cohesive and meaningful reforms. In the medium term, the reform agenda could include diversifying the economy, creating jobs for the young and displaced, tackling environmental issues, and addressing long-standing issues such as the regional disparities in income and greater political and social inclusion.[20]

The following are key points in the IMF study:

> **Many factors will determine the extent and speed of rebuilding the country.** Most importantly, the timeframe and success of any reconstruction will hinge on when and how the conflict is resolved. This, in turn, will shape the scope and pace of political and economic reforms. And it will determine how much external assistance is forthcoming, including whether Syria will be able to attract private investment. It will be critical to establish quick wins, including in the energy sector and agriculture, as well as in labor intensive industries such as textile or food processing, which could become drivers of growth.
>
> **The recovery will likely take a long time.** The literature on post-conflict recovery shows that a longer-lasting conflict will have a more negative impact on the economy and institutions, and prolong the recovery.[ix] For instance, it took Lebanon, which experienced 16 years of conflict, 20 years to catch up to the real GDP level it enjoyed before the war, while it took Kuwait, which endured two years of conflict, seven years to regain its pre-war GDP level. Given the unprecedented scale of devastation, it may be difficult to compare Syria with other post conflict cases. That said, if we hypothetically assume that for Syria the post-conflict rebuilding period will begin in 2018 and the economy grows at its trend rate of about 4 1/2 percent, *it would take the country about 20 years to reach its pre-war real GDP level.*[x] Achieving a higher growth rate would allow the country to achieve a faster recovery.[xi] This assumes that the country can quickly restore its production capacity and human capital levels and remains intact as a sovereign territory. *Any break-up of the country would affect potential*

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growth and might require creating new institutions and governance structures.

Rebuilding damaged physical infrastructure will be a monumental task, with reconstruction cost estimates in the range of $100 to $200 billion. SCPR estimates that the destruction of physical infrastructure between 2011 and 2014 amounted to US$72–75 billion, equivalent to about 120 percent of 2010 GDP. *The Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources estimated in early 2015 that the conflict has cost the oil industry alone US$27 billion from the destruction of wells, pipelines, and refineries.*[xii] Similarly, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) suggests that it will take years for Syrian's domestic energy system to return to its pre-conflict operating status, even after the conflict subsides.[xiii] With the escalation of the conflict since the second half of 2015, the rebuilding estimates are likely to be much higher. More recently, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) estimated that Syria would require about $180 to $200 billion—three times the 2010 GDP.[xiv]

Syria will also have to grapple with deep-rooted socioeconomic challenges. The extreme rise in mass poverty, destruction of health and education services, and large-scale displacement of Syrians will pose huge challenges. Syria's population has shrunk by 20–30 percent, with 50 percent of the population internally displaced, destroyed homes, and many highly skilled workers and entrepreneurs having left the country. Moreover, the currently *low school enrollment rate of children will negatively impact the country's potential output for years to come.* SCPR estimated in 2014 that the loss of years of schooling by children represents a human capital deficit of $5 billion in education investment. A recent United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) report placed the loss in human capital at $10.5 billion from the loss of education of Syrian children and youth.[xv] Many children have been born into conflict and exposed to violence, and studies show that exposure to violent conflicts has long-term effects on generations to come. Therefore, considerable resources will need to go to rebuilding the lives of internally displaced people, and to encouraging the return and reintegration of refugees. Further, the conflict has exacerbated existing, and created new, divisions and tensions between various sectarian communities across the country that will need to be addressed in a meaningful way to promote social and political cohesion.[21]

The IMF study focuses on the IMF's mission, and fiscal reform and stability as the path to recovery and reconstruction. It notes that there are serious problems in getting the data needed for even an assessment, and its reform suggestions give priority to fiscal issues over political needs and conflict resolution. At the same time, the study makes it make it clear that there is a very real political and human dimension:

> **The post-conflict reconstruction efforts should seek to address regional disparities in income and social inclusion.** Poverty and extreme poverty, according to SCPR, have worsened further with the conflict, and are highest in governorates that have been most affected by the conflict and that were historically the poorest in the country. Addressing the underpinnings of these disparities should be central to any policy package intended to bring about peace and prosperity. Innovative approaches will be required to improve the provision of public services, including reconstruction of damaged water pipelines, farm irrigation and drainage, roads, schools and hospitals, employment prospects, and access to finance at the regional levels. Institutional and governance arrangements should be considered to give local authorities greater controls over service delivery, including greater forms of fiscal decentralization.[xvi] However, for fiscal decentralization to work, certain critical governance

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
conditions will need to be in place, including ensuring local authorities are held accountable and resources are spent in a transparent manner. Therefore, any decentralization efforts have to take into account Syria's new governance model, as well as the state of its institutions.

Rebuilding public institutions and improving governance will be key. This includes making fiscal policy and fiscal management effective, fair, and transparent; developing the rule of law and judiciary independence; and re-establishing and strengthening the capacity for monetary operations and banking supervision, and reforming the bank regulatory framework, including the anti-money laundry and combating terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime.[xvii] These efforts would help address governance issues that plagued the country prior to the start of the conflict and contributed to regional and income disparities, and that likely have further deteriorated. They would also help facilitate the re-integration of the domestic financial system into the global economy, lower transaction costs, and reduce the size of the informal sector. Lessons from other post conflict countries show that framing an overall consistent technical assistance strategy at the outset of the post-conflict phase and securing donor coordination are critical for successful implementation of economic and institutional reforms.[22]

The World Bank has also addressed the challenge of Syrian recovery and reconstruction. Its work also highlights the sheer scale of the recovery and reconstruction effort that will be needed, and an October 2016 update of its work highlights and updates its assessments of several important issues:

> The conflict has had severe macroeconomic implications. Real GDP contracted sharply in 2012–15, including some 12 percent in 2015. After increasing by nearly 90 percent in 2013, inflation eased but remained high at nearly 30 percent in 2014–15. The severe decline in oil receipts since the second half of 2012 and disruptions of trade due to the conflict has put pressure on the balance of payments and the exchange rate. Revenues from oil exports decreased from US$4.7 billion in 2011 to an estimated US$0.14 billion in 2015 as most of Syria's oil fields are outside government control. The current account deficit reached 19 percent of GDP in 2014 but declined markedly to 8 percent of GDP in 2015. International reserves declined from US$20 billion at end-2010 to US$1.1 billion at end-2015, while the Syrian pound depreciated from 47 pounds per USD in 2010 to 517 pounds per USD at end-August 2016. The overall fiscal deficit increased sharply, reaching 20 percent of GDP in 2015, with revenues falling to an all-time low of below 7 percent of GDP during 2014–15 due to a collapse of oil and tax revenues. In response, the government cut spending, including on wages and salaries, but this was not enough to offset the fall in revenues and higher military spending.
>
> Macroeconomic and poverty projections are complicated by the uncertainty about the duration and severity of the conflict. Nevertheless, real GDP is estimated to continue to contract in 2016 by around 4 percent on account of a worsening of the conflict in key centers of economic activity such as Aleppo and as oil and gas production and non-oil economic activity continue to suffer from the conflict. Inflation is likely to remain very high at around 25 percent in 2016, because of continued ex-change rate depreciation, trade disruptions, and shortages. Current account and fiscal deficits are also projected to remain large, broadly around the levels of 2015. Medium-term macroeconomic prospects hinge on containing the war and finding a political resolution to the conflict, and rebuilding the damaged infrastructure and social capital.
>
> The key challenges are clearly to end the conflict and restore basic public services along with other measures to address the humanitarian crisis.[23]

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Funding figures are as of 13 July 2016. All international figures are according to the United Nation's Financial Tracking Service and based on international commitments during the current calendar year, while U.S. Government (USG) figures are according to the USG and reflect the most recent USG commitments based on the fiscal year, which began on 1 October 2015.

(Graphic courtesy of USAID, 13 July 2016, https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria/fy16/fs04)

Figure. Humanitarian Aid to Syria by Donor in 2016

As horrifying as the potential human cost of failing to address these issues would be, the practical costs in dollars of any recovery and reconstruction effort to put Syria back on the path to recovery after any successful conflict resolution would present a massive potential drain on global international aid for a country with otherwise limited strategic importance to the United States.

Such an effort would also force outside powers to go far beyond some narrow definition of stability operations and fully address the issue of nation building. Moreover, the previous studies only deal with the current size of the problem. As long as the fighting and large-scale instability persist, Syria will continue to deteriorate, and the suffering of the Syrian people will increase. Here again, it is critical to understand that short-term goals do not solve any key problems. A cease-fire is not a substitute for peace, nor a base for recovery and reconstruction.

Syria may lack a meaningful stable base for recovery and reconstruction even *if* the Assad regime and rebels can agree on halting the fighting; *if* the Assad government, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and key factions including Hezbollah can agree on their respective roles in western Syria; and *if* the different Arab rebel factions and Kurds can agree on areas of control, some form of federation, or some form of independence in eastern Syria. None of these options necessarily creates an effective structure of governance or economy, deals with the refugee and IDP problem, or offers any clear path to recovery and a return to development.

This leaves the United States with very limited grand strategic options to deal with the most important single challenge in stability operations. One U.S. option is to try to dodge the issue of creating some form of stability operations that can create a basis for postconflict recovery and reconstruction entirely by taking the position that Russian, Iranian, and Turkish military interventions in Syria create responsibility by these countries for taking the lead in aid, recovery, and reconstruction. This option reflects real-world U.S. strategic priorities.

This option also reflects the reality that the de facto division of the country and survival of the Assad regime—whose past record of governance, development, and corruption led to the upheavals that began in 2011—make effective reform and reconstruction dubious prospects at best. From a humanitarian viewpoint, however, the crisis in Syria is so great that there is a strong moral and ethical case for intervention regardless of U.S. strategic priorities. However, from a practical, or "realist," viewpoint, that argument only applies if some form of intervention can clearly work, if there is enough governance and stability to ensure that aid is used effectively, and if intervention and aid help all of Syria's people—not just some faction or sectarian and ethnic group.

At the same time, the United States cannot ignore the real-world problems of trying to support lasting conflict resolution and nation building. Throwing good money at bad leaders will not serve either strategic or humanitarian interests, and aiding

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some factions or excluding others does not lay the groundwork for stability and lasting peace. The Assad regime is, and always has been, a bad government. The World Bank governance indicators reflect a long history of incompetence by the government of the Syrian Arab Republic (the Assad regime) in all six measures of governance and show its capabilities have crashed to the bottom of the world since 2011.[24]

The World Bank's six measures include *voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.*[25] All six focus on practical governance and not on more idealistic values such as human rights and democracy. About the most that can be said for the Assad regime is that the World Bank has rated Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen as near the bottom of world performance as Syria during the entire period from 1996 to 2015, regardless of changes in regime during this period and U.S. aid and nation-building efforts.[26] A look at CIA, UN, IMF, Arab Human Development, and World Bank economic development and governance reports over the period from 2000 to 2016 for Syria—and for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen—reveals the same broad patterns. "Failed-state wars" is not an exaggeration: host governments really can be as much of a threat as the enemy, insurgencies do have major material as well as ideological causes,

Table 1. International Aid to Syrian Organizations Affiliated with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (UN OCHA) Humanitarian Response Plan

Donor	Funding in U.S. dollars	Percent of grand total	Outstanding pledges in U.S. dollars
Germany	$668,699,404	24.7%	0
United States	$667,796,939	24.6%	0
European Commission	$460,817,260	17.0%	0
Private (individuals and organizations)	$159,943,972	5.9%	0
United Kingdom	$146,816,366	5.4%	0
Japan	$123,948,997	4.6%	0
Norway	$99,471,536	3.7%	0
Canada	$96,540,841	3.6%	0
France	$56,177,713	2.1%	0
Netherlands	$49,544,386	1.8%	0
Belgium	$23,787,424	0.9%	0
Denmark	$16,947,713	0.6%	0
Sweden	$16,567,712	0.6%	0
Various (details not yet provided)	$15,234,762	0.6%	0
Kuwait	$12,960,000	0.5%	0
Australia	$10,697,441	0.4%	0
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	$10,370,450	0.4%	0
Qatar	$8,884,204	0.3%	0
Switzerland	$8,802,973	0.3%	0
Carry-over (donors not specified)	$8,310,359	0.3%	0
Italy	$7,791,023	0.3%	0
Spain	$7,761,021	0.3%	0
Finland	$7,712,171	0.3%	0
Saudi Arabia	$7,458,732	0.3%	0
Allocation of unearmarked funds by UN agencies	$6,704,827	0.2%	0
Others	$12,605,153	0.5%	$1,000,000
Grand total in U.S. dollars: $2,712,353,379		**100.0%**	**$1,000,000**

(Table based on information from the Financial Tracking Service, UN OCHA, 28 February 2017, http://fts.unocha.org)

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Table 2. International Aid to Syrian Organizations Not Affiliated with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (UN OCHA) Humanitarian Response Plan

Donor	Funding in U.S. dollars	Percent of grand total	Outstanding pledges in U.S. dollars
United States	$394,391,920	20.2%	$1,000,000
Germany	$150,163,001	7.7%	0
United Kingdom	$145,043,639	7.4%	0
United Arab Emirates	$132,030,024	6.8%	0
Norway	$74,804,112	3.8%	0
Kuwait	$62,102,444	3.2%	$11,937,556
Switzerland	$29,293,101	1.5%	0
Denmark	$19,987,473	1.0%	0
Japan	$19,795,445	1.0%	0
Austria	$16,381,737	0.8%	0
Sweden	$13,537,380	0.7%	0
Netherlands	$13,157,895	0.7%	0
European Commission	$10,120,070	0.5%	0
France	$8,907,892	0.5%	0
Saudi Arabia	$7,459,516	0.4%	$1,000,000
Australia	$6,540,592	0.3%	0
Luxembourg	$6,177,034	0.3%	0
Italy	$5,957,833	0.3%	$16,296,248
Ireland	$5,868,622	0.3%	0
Finland	$4,703,947	0.2%	0
Canada	$4,166,749	0.2%	$1,500,000
Poland	$3,783,769	0.2%	0
Hungary	$3,282,276	0.2%	0
Qatar	$2,664,681	0.1%	0
Czech Republic	$1,606,475	0.1%	0
Spain	$1,592,416	0.1%	0
Belgium	$557,414	0.0%	0
Belarus	$522,000	0.0%	0
Estonia	$430,547	0.0%	0
New Zealand	$302,527	0.0%	0
Liechtenstein	$150,263	0.0%	0
Romania	$72,464	0.0%	0
Slovenia	$71,182	0.0%	0
Korea	0	0.0%	6,200,000
Others	$802,319,300	41.2%	0
Grand total in U.S. dollars: $1,947,945,740		**100.0%**	**$37,933,804**

(Table based on information from the Financial Tracking Service, UN OCHA, 28 February 2017, http://fts.unocha.org)

and the civil dimensions of war really are critical.

As a result, the United States has two more positive real-world options for this far broader aspect of stability operations. One is to concentrate solely on the more limited kinds of humanitarian aid that pass through international hands and help ordinary Syrians regardless of their location, faction, sect, or ethnic background, and to press other states to provide such aid as well.

As has been noted earlier, USAID reports that the United States had allocated some $6 billion in such aid as of January 2016, and the figure (page 59) shows that there are many other donors.[27] The USAID report is further backed up by the data provided by OCHA as depicted in tables 1 (page 60) and 2.[28] Providing such aid through bodies such as the UN's OCHA, the International Syria Support Group Humanitarian Assistance Task Force, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, and the UN World Food Programme bypasses both the Syrian government and rebel factions and can achieve significant humanitarian goals.

Such humanitarian aid does not meet more lasting needs such as recovery and development, but it is far from clear that there is a credible option for such

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action. In contrast, there are many different countries providing direct humanitarian aid to Syria and to Syrian refugees. The figure (page 59) does make it clear that the U.S. share of such aid is likely to be relatively large, and any contributions by Russia and Iran may be slow to come if ever. Such choice does not tie the United States to what may be "mission impossible" for years to come or make the United States seem responsible for a Syria that will not or cannot help itself.

A second, and more positive, option reflects both the real-world limits of outside nation-building efforts that became all too clear in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the real-world limits imposed by U.S. politics and public willingness to repeat the immense cost and waste that occurred in both countries. The U.S. public and Congress might accept a major U.S. contribution to the equivalent of an international Marshall Plan—a plan in which other states paid a very substantial part of the cost, clear conditions were laid down for allocating the money with clearly defined auditing and measures of effectiveness, and the administration and support were accomplished by a competent international body with real integrity like the IMF or the World Bank.[29]

Although the U.S. government has already shown it lacks both the will and the competence to implement such a plan, as was the case with the original Marshall Plan, even putting such an option on the table could have a powerful effect in bringing civil stability and creating some incentive for a real peace. The plan could also be offered to other conflict states with funding awarded on a competitive basis.

One thing is all too clear, however, from both a Syrian case study and the related lessons of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. Revolutions in military affairs are not a substitute for revolutions in civil-military affairs. Being the best warfighter in the world is not enough. Neither is treating stability operations and civil-military affairs as a sideshow. Grand strategy means shaping the way in which wars end and their aftermath, not simply defeating the enemy. ■

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Sgt. 1st Class Hussain Dad (*left*) with the 201st Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps watches a fellow ANA soldier review targeted frequencies on the Wolfhound's signal scanning device 25 January 2014 during Afghanistan's first Wolfhound fielding and training at Forward Operating Base Gamberi, Laghman Province, Afghanistan. The Wolfhound allows 201st ANA Corps soldiers to hear and locate the enemy's radio transmissions. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class E. L. Craig, U.S. Army)

The State of Afghanistan's Intelligence Enterprise

Maj. Gen. Robert P. Walters Jr., U.S. Army
Col. Loren G. Traugutt, U.S. Army

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It is October 2016. The Taliban has been pressing hard for several weeks to take the provincial capital of Uruzgan. North of Kandahar, it has been attacking Afghan National Police (ANP) checkpoints and police stations, killing police and innocent civilians, and looting supplies and equipment from overrun or abandoned buildings. On an early morning in late October, a group of Taliban insurgents takes respite in an isolated compound of several buildings. Haphazardly occupying a single fighting position over the last few days, the insurgents take advantage of the brief pause.[1]

Unbeknownst to this band of insurgents, an Afghan PC-12 reconnaissance plane has been loitering high above for several hours, keeping a close eye on them and relaying every detail back to a nearby Afghan National Army (ANA) commander on the ground. The PC-12 pilot reaffirms to the commander that the Taliban insurgents remain entrenched in the compound below and that there is a complete absence of civilians.

Suddenly, an Afghan A-29 Super Tucano attack aircraft descends from the cloudless sky, lining up its attack run on the unsuspecting insurgents. The detonation of two MK81 bombs ends the lives of those insurgents hiding out in the northernmost building of the compound. Once the realization of what has just happened settles in, the remaining Taliban insurgents make the fateful mistake of rushing to the only fortified fighting position in the compound. The PC-12 pilot is talking directly to the pilot of the attack aircraft, giving him instant feedback on the A-29's first attack run, and now lining him up for a second and final run. As the last insurgent reaches the final fighting position he will ever occupy, the A-29 pilot releases his remaining MK81 bomb.

Precise airstrikes such as these do not happen by chance; they are complex operations that are the result of a deliberate targeting process that relies on an ever-growing and robust Afghan intelligence structure. It is a process that requires the mentoring and assistance of a dedicated group of U.S. and coalition trainers and advisors. More importantly, there is a committed group of Afghans who are willing and able to adapt to an ever-changing environment, both militarily and politically. Maj. Gen. Abdul Manan Farahi, the ANA general staff chief of intelligence (GSG2), who is responsible for all of the ANA's intelligence structure, often states, "Where you have good partners, you will have success."[2] As the coalition and Afghanistan continue to partner, the Afghans will continue to demonstrate many successes.

Afghan Intelligence Systems

The description of the A-29 air strike is representative of the numerous success stories attributed to the Afghan intelligence structure and the targeting process that supports it. Several intelligence systems within the Afghan military play a significant role in that success, underscoring the importance of these systems within an intelligence architecture.

National Information Management System. The system with the largest contribution to Afghan intelligence success is the National Information Management System (NIMS). Similar to the U.S. Army's Distributed Common Ground System, the NIMS allows military units across Afghanistan to share real-time intelligence and provides decision makers the ability to make informed and time-sensitive decisions.

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Col. Loren G. Traugutt, U.S. Army, is the deputy director for the Intelligence Train, Advise, Assist Directorate on the combined joint intelligence staff, Resolute Support mission, Kabul, Afghanistan. He has over twenty-two years' experience as an infantry and intelligence officer, with both conventional and special operations experience, including deployments to Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He holds a BS from Kansas State University, an MBA from the University of Phoenix, and an MS of strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is also a War College graduate (NATO Defense College fellowship).

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The initial version of the NIMS provided only basic information-sharing capabilities; analytical tools and targeting-specific modules were almost nonexistent. As Afghan intelligence officers struggled to develop a complex and transparent targeting process, they realized the initial limitations of the system. Working closely with their coalition advisors, several modifications were brainstormed and developed in July 2016. In less than two months, the requested modifications were incorporated, resulting in an enhanced Afghanistan-wide targeting process. Nearly every facet of the process was streamlined and simplified.

PC-12 reconnaissance aircraft. In the "find" phase of the F3EAD targeting process (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate), a key Afghan intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) asset enters the scene.[3] The PC-12 is a single-engine, turboprop, manned aircraft that provides the Afghans with a dedicated ISR platform capable of both real-time full-motion video (FMV) and communications intelligence. It was fielded to the Afghan Special Mission Wing (Afghanistan's day/night, air assault, and ISR aviation special mission unit) in early 2014.

The PC-12 played a critical role in the A-29 airstrike narrative above. The real-time FMV capability confirmed the existence and precise location of the Taliban compound in the target package for Afghan national-level approval. The PC-12 maintained a persistent eye on its target while concurrently confirming the absence of civilians within collateral-damage range. The PC-12 pilot communicated directly with the pilot of the A-29, ensuring the pilot's situational awareness of the target area.

The PC-12 is a critical asset in both the "exploit" and "analyze" targeting phases, collecting real-time battle-damage assessment that can be fed directly to an A-29 pilot and an Afghan commander on the ground. This information feeds the decision-making cycle of the pilot and commander on whether to conduct follow-on strikes. A final and more thorough strike assessment is also conducted by intelligence analysts at the national level based on the PC-12's video, which is linked into the NIMS.

ScanEagle. Afghanistan's first and only unmanned aircraft system (UAS) provides a real-time FMV capability in direct support of corps-level operations; the ScanEagle UAS has the potential to tremendously enhance the Afghan's ability to conduct successful targeting across the battlefield.

Two ScanEagle systems are currently in operation in Afghanistan, with six additional systems scheduled to be fully operational by 2019. The first ScanEagle system in operation is a U.S. government-owned and contractor-operated (GOCO) system used solely for ANA training. The second ScanEagle system, also a GOCO system, became the first to be operated primarily by trained Afghan operators upon the graduation of the first class of Afghan students from ScanEagle training in November 2016. As such, the system is a perfect example of the success of coalition fielding, training, and advising with the ANA.

Wolfhound. Another ISR system having positive effects on the battlefield for the Afghans is the Wolfhound, a low-level voice intercept system. The successful employment of the Wolfhound highlights both the quality work of our U.S. and coalition advisors and the adaptability of our Afghan partners to learn and adjust to a new way of operating.

Afghan units initially opted most often to employ the Wolfhounds in a purely defensive posture, keeping each system of three direction-finding (DF) radios in a static position. The Wolfhound system is effective to a small degree in this defensive posture; however, it was apparent to advisors that the Wolfhounds were not being used to the system's full potential. In discussions between a U.S. intelligence advisor and his Afghan counterpart, the deputy G-2 (intelligence officer) of an ANA unit, the deputy G-2 expressed his struggle with his ANA soldiers continually coming under attack while trying to clear a critical route between two remote ANA bases in Uruzgan.[4] He knew his soldiers would receive contact from the mountainous high ground in northern Kandahar, but they could never determine where along the route the enemy attacks would occur until it was too late.

The U.S. advisor realized the ANA soldiers were not deploying the Wolfhound systems to their maximum potential. A simple dialog on how radio DF and triangulation work led to an immediate change in how the ANA deployed their Wolfhound systems during route-clearing operations. The deputy G-2 organized training sessions and rehearsals, preparing the soldiers to not only triangulate enemy positions but to also then quickly call for indirect fire onto those locations. Less than two weeks later, during a continuation of their critical route-clearing

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A ScanEagle image taken 31 October 2016 in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. (Image courtesy of authors)



A PC-12 image taken 5 November 2016 in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. (Image courtesy of authors)

mission to Tarin Kot, these soldiers once again made contact with local Taliban insurgents firing from several spots on the surrounding high ground. Executing the battle drill they rehearsed numerous times the previous week, this unit was able to obtain precise locations of the enemy insurgents, call for both D-30 artillery and 82 mm mortar indirect fire, and neutralize each of the enemy positions. Furthermore, the updated technique allowed the ANA corps to later identify and arrest an Afghan police officer who was informing the Taliban on the locations of the ANA patrols. The dedication and persistence of U.S. advisors to advise and assist, and the willingness of their Afghan counterparts to learn and adapt epitomizes the advisor-counterpart relationship.


Persistent Surveillance System. Providing a tremendous ISR capability for the Afghans at numerous locations across Afghanistan, the Persistent Surveillance System consists of both aerostat balloons and Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) towers. Currently, six ANA aerostat balloons and twenty-two RAID towers are in operation across Afghanistan. These systems provide persistent ISR coverage for force protection, intelligence generation, patrol overwatch, countering improvised explosive devices, and countering indirect fire. In October 2015 in Zabul Province, an ANA 205th Corps' RAID tower operator identified over twenty-five Taliban insurgents and six motorcycles preparing for an attack. Through coordination with the supporting ANA artillery unit, the Afghans used indirect fire to effectively disperse the insurgent group and prevent their attack on the local city.

In another incident in January 2016, following an insurgent rocket attack near the Italian embassy inside the Kabul Green Zone, an Afghan-operated aerostat in Kabul was able coordinate with coalition aerostat operators to identify the origin of the rocket launch. This effort enabled Afghan police to quickly converge on the site and recover several unfired rockets that would have otherwise been launched at coalition bases later.

Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System. A final key intelligence asset worth mentioning is the ANA GSG2's Preliminary Credibility

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Assessment Screening System (PCASS) program. This polygraph program ensures Afghans are properly screened prior to assuming sensitive positions throughout the ANA and Afghanistan government. Initiated in late 2012 due to the unacceptably high rate of "green-on-blue" incidents, the PCASS program is credited with a significant reduction of insider threats. Between December 2012 and June 2016, the Afghans have conducted over thirty thousand PCASS exams, resulting in over four hundred Afghans being removed from positions of proximity to coalition forces.[5] During this timeframe, several insurgent infiltration cells were also disrupted, making it possible for U.S. and coalition advisors to continue the mission of advising Afghans while concurrently ensuring the integrity of the Afghan targeting process.



Afghan National Army students receive National Incident Management System training February 2017 at the National Military Command Center in Kabul, Afghanistan. (Photo by Muhammad Aslam, Afghanistan Development and Registry Services)

National Information Management System (NIMS)

- Secure, modular, web-based intelligence operations reporting database
- Similar to the U.S. Army's distributed common ground systems-army
- Locally developed
- Afghan-requested modifications (July 2016) included:
  - video feedback component
  - target pack serial number tracking mechanism
  - tool to link intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requests to specific target packs
  - digital authority approval from national leaders, significantly expediting targeting process

The Afghan Targeting Process

Even the most capable ISR systems require the right people in the right organizations to maintain, manage, and operate them. In the past two years, the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense has established important intelligence organizations and structures in order to manage and fuse intelligence across the country. The most important organization in Afghanistan's national targeting processes is the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC), the all-source, intelligence fusion center. Organized under the ANA GSG2, the NMIC's focus is primarily on counterinsurgency, providing analytical capability in support of targeting operations for both special operations and conventional forces. The NMIC is critical for the targeting process of strategic strikes involving the A-29 aircraft.

The Afghan targeting process begins with the submission of a target request originating at a tactical unit from one of the several ANA corps. The request passes through the NIMS to the NMIC Targeting Section.



An Afghan National Army aerostat balloon prepares to deploy 28 January 2015 at the Afghan Intelligence Training Center in Sia Sang, Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy of Combat Information Center, New Kabul Compound, Afghanistan)

Persistent Stare System (PSS)

- Six aerostat blimps
  - day/night, electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) cameras
  - Afghan operated
  - two additional aerostats to be fielded by fiscal year 2019
- Twenty Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment towers
  - Star SAFIRE III EO/IR camera
  - Afghan operated
  - two additional towers to be fielded in fiscal year 2017

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The NMIC targeting staff conducts a thorough review of the information in the request to ensure there is a viable target for execution.

The targeting staff then develops a target package that includes, but is not limited to, the locations of civilian population and infrastructure, antiaircraft weapon systems, and friendly forces within the target area; friendly force frequencies, call signs, and mobile numbers; data-mining of recent intelligence reporting within the NIMS; and geospatial imagery content. The Current Intelligence Section provides recent and relevant intelligence updates and the Geospatial Section provides the imagery to create a full and robust all-source product.

Once the target package is developed, it is included for consideration on the agenda of the daily GSG2-led Target Working Group meeting. The NMIC targeting chief chairs the meeting, bringing together representatives of agencies from across the Afghan government, including the office of the ANA general staff chief of operations (GSG3), the National Threat Intelligence Center, the Ministry of Interior, and the National Directorate of Security. This daily meeting is an excellent example of the intelligence sharing and intragovernment teamwork that is occurring in Afghanistan to ensure the success of complex operations like targeting.

Target packages that meet the stringent criteria of the Target Working Group proceed to the ANA Targeting Board, where the collateral damage estimate level is determined. If the collateral damage estimate is at an acceptable level, the GSG3, the chief of general staff, or the minister of defense then approves the target package for A-29 execution.

Finally, the Mission Planning Cell, manned by experienced and dedicated Afghan officers, conducts an additional review of the entire target package and coordinates ISR support. Nearly every A-29 mission includes pre- and poststrike ISR support by a PC-12 or a ScanEagle.

The entire targeting process can be conducted in less than twenty-four hours; this is made possible by the NIMS targeting module and the proven abilities of



An Afghan National Army soldier conducting training on the Wolfhound system 14 February 2017 at Camp Commando, Afghanistan. (Photo by Capt. Lindsay Gaylord, U.S. Army)

Wolfhound

- Enhanced low-level voice intercept
- Dismounted, backpack system
- Detects, identifies, and direction finds VHF or UHF push-to-talk
- One Wolfhound system consisting of three nodes
- All six Afghan National Army corps fully fielded



A ScanEagle prepares for launch 14 April 2016 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Lt. Charity Edgar, U.S. Navy)

ScanEagle Unmanned Aircraft System

- Electro-optical/infrared/full-motion video capability directly supporting Afghan National Army ground commanders
- Fielding started April 2016
- One government-owned contractor-operated system dedicated to training Afghan soldiers
- One Afghan operated system in Helmand Province
- Six more systems to be fielded by fiscal year 2019

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A member of the Afghan Air Force guides an A-29 Super Tucano 15 January 2016 at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan. The aircraft was added to the Afghan Air Force's inventory in the spring of 2016. Designed to operate in high temperatures and in extremely rugged terrain, the A-29 Super Tucano is a highly maneuverable fourth-generation weapons system capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Nathan Lipscomb, U.S. Air Force)

the Afghans who own the targeting process. The NIMS targeting module allows complete transparency of target requests countrywide and eases tracking target requests. The module standardizes targeting-related forms and allows for operations-intelligence integration and synchronization with Afghan organizations external to the Ministry of Defense.

Tangible Results

The successes of the ANA's intelligence structure mentioned above are significant, especially when compared to its status from a mere two years ago. In 2014, none of the ISR systems mentioned above existed in the ANA. ANA units then were conducting military operations under a more robust presence of coalition forces, and all the supporting ISR assets were owned and operated by the coalition. Today, the story is different, with a much more capable and better-equipped Afghan military on the cusp of being self-sufficient.

Tangible results abound, such as with the NIMS modifications. From September through November 2016, almost two hundred target requests were submitted through the NIMS, resulting in sixty-five A-29 strikes across every ANA corps.[6] And, in early 2016, the first ScanEagle system was fielded to directly support ANA operations in Helmand Province, although it was U.S. owned and operated. Since then, the first class of Afghan students has graduated from the ScanEagle School and now operates that ScanEagle system in support of military operations.

Just as significant as having these systems is having personnel trained to operate and sustain them. The ANA now conducts training for selected soldiers on how to use both the aerostat and the RAID tower at the Intelligence Training Center in Kabul. Afghan soldiers perform their own maintenance on the

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Wolfhound systems, and the ANA recently contracted an Afghan company to provide field-service representatives to maintain all these systems used by ANA corps throughout Afghanistan.

The corps commanders across the ANA recognize and appreciate just how far the intelligence apparatus has come. During a recent Afghan Corps Commanders Conference (held at the Ministry of Defense in November 2016), the current state of Afghan intelligence was highly praised, and the consensus was that intelligence was indeed driving operations throughout Afghanistan.[7]

The Future

Novelist Louis L'Amour said, "Nobody got anywhere in this world by simply being content," and neither the coalition advisors nor their Afghan counterparts are yet content.[8] As far as we have come in the past two years, great things await us in the years to come. The deliberate targeting process described above continues to be refined and honed, ensuring the right enemy targets are hit in a timely manner without civilian casualties. The next step is already being undertaken, as the ANA general staffs work on a formal dynamic targeting process utilizing F3EAD, which will greatly expand the Afghan targeting process by allowing moving targets to be engaged, enhancing its effects against the Taliban.

Finally, within the next two years, the ANA will procure two more aerostats and two more RAID towers. They will also field six more ScanEagle systems, giving each ANA corps its own organic unmanned aerial ISR system. These ScanEagle systems will be operated and maintained by the Afghans and will give each corps the ability do what they currently rely solely on the PC-12 to do.

In the not so distant future, it will be an Afghan-operated ScanEagle providing the "find" and "fix" phases of a dynamic targeting opportunity. It will be an Afghan pilot sitting at the ground control station in Uruzgan, maintaining persistent observation from high above. A team of Afghan soldiers helping to operate the ScanEagle will vector in the highly reliable A-29 strike aircraft. The target this time might be Taliban insurgents fleeing the battlefield in pickup trucks. The A-29 will come swooping down to deal yet another lethal blow to the enemy insurgency, delivering a small but important victory to a dedicated Afghan military force and the coalition advisors who advise them, and providing yet another concrete example of how capable the Afghan intelligence enterprise has become. ■

Notes

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2. Abdul Manan Farahi (Afghan National Army general staff chief of intelligence), interview by Loren Traugutt, 5 November 2016, Ministry of Defense, Kabul, Afghanistan.

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5. Micah Reel (GSG2 strategic counterintelligence mentor, Headquarters, Resolute Support), interview by Loren Traugutt, 14 December 2016, Kabul, Afghanistan.

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Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems

Amitai Etzioni, PhD

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Autonomous weapons systems and military robots are progressing from science fiction movies to designers' drawing boards, to engineering laboratories, and to the battlefield. These machines have prompted a debate among military planners, roboticists, and ethicists about the development and deployment of weapons that can perform increasingly advanced functions, including targeting and application of force, with little or no human oversight.

Some military experts hold that autonomous weapons systems not only confer significant strategic and tactical advantages in the battleground but also that they are preferable on moral grounds to the use of human combatants. In contrast, critics hold that these weapons should be curbed, if not banned altogether, for a variety of moral and legal reasons. This article first reviews arguments by those who favor autonomous weapons systems and then by those who oppose them. Next, it discusses challenges to limiting and defining autonomous weapons. Finally, it closes with a policy recommendation.

Arguments in Support of Autonomous Weapons Systems

Support for autonomous weapons systems falls into two general categories. Some members of the defense community advocate autonomous weapons because of military advantages. Other supporters emphasize moral justifications for using them.

Military advantages. Those who call for further development and deployment of autonomous weapons systems generally point to several military advantages. First, autonomous weapons systems act as a force multiplier. That is, fewer warfighters are needed for a given mission, and the efficacy of each warfighter is greater. Next, advocates credit autonomous weapons systems with expanding the battlefield, allowing combat to reach into areas that were previously inaccessible. Finally, autonomous weapons systems can reduce casualties by removing human warfighters from dangerous missions.[1]

The Department of Defense's *Unmanned Systems Roadmap: 2007-2032* provides additional reasons for pursuing autonomous weapons systems. These include that robots are better suited than humans for "'dull, dirty, or dangerous' missions."[2] An example of a dull mission is long-duration sorties. An example of a dirty mission is one that exposes humans to potentially harmful radiological material. An example of a dangerous mission is explosive ordnance disposal. Maj. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, U.S. Navy, adds, "[lethal autonomous robots] have the unique potential to operate at a tempo faster than humans can possibly achieve and to lethally strike even when communications links have been severed."[3]

In addition, the long-term savings that could be achieved through fielding an army of military robots have been highlighted. In a 2013 article published in *The Fiscal Times*, David Francis cites Department of Defense figures showing that "each soldier in Afghanistan costs the Pentagon roughly $850,000 per year."[4] Some estimate the cost per year to be even higher. Conversely, according to Francis, "the TALON robot—a small rover that can be outfitted with weapons, costs $230,000."[5]

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As autonomous weapons systems move from concept to reality, military planners, roboticists, and ethicists debate the advantages, disadvantages, and morality of their use in current and future operating environments. (Image by Peggy Frierson)

According to *Defense News*, Gen. Robert Cone, former commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, suggested at the 2014 Army Aviation Symposium that by relying more on "support robots," the Army eventually could reduce the size of a brigade from four thousand to three thousand soldiers without a concomitant reduction in effectiveness.[6]

Air Force Maj. Jason S. DeSon, writing in the *Air Force Law Review*, notes the potential advantages of autonomous aerial weapons systems.[7] According to DeSon, the physical strain of high-G maneuvers and the intense mental concentration and situational awareness required of fighter pilots make them very prone to fatigue and exhaustion; robot pilots, on the other hand would not be subject to these physiological and mental constraints. Moreover, fully autonomous planes could be programmed to take genuinely random and unpredictable action that could confuse an opponent. More striking still, Air Force Capt. Michael Byrnes predicts that a single unmanned aerial vehicle with machine-controlled maneuvering and accuracy could, "with a few hundred rounds of ammunition and sufficient fuel reserves," take out an entire fleet of aircraft, presumably one with human pilots.[8]

In 2012, a report by the Defense Science Board, in support of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, identified "six key areas in which advances in autonomy would

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have significant benefit to [an] unmanned system: perception, planning, learning, human-robot interaction, natural language understanding, and multiagent coordination."[9] *Perception*, or perceptual processing, refers to sensors and sensing. Sensors include hardware, and sensing includes software.[10]

Next, according to the Defense Science Board, *planning* refers to "computing a sequence or partial order of actions that ... [achieve] a desired state."[11] The process relies on effective processes and "algorithms needed to make decisions about action (provide autonomy) in situations in which humans are not in the environment (e.g., space, the ocean)."[12] Then, *learning* refers to how machines can collect and process large amounts of data into knowledge. The report asserts that research has shown machines process data into knowledge more effectively than people do.[13] It gives the example of machine learning for autonomous navigation in land vehicles and robots.[14]

Human-robot interaction refers to "how people work or play with robots."[15] Robots are quite different from other computers or tools because they are "physically situated agents," and human users interact with them in distinct ways.[16] Research on interaction needs to span a number of domains well beyond engineering, including psychology, cognitive science, and communications, among others.

"*Natural language processing* concerns ... systems that can communicate with people using ordinary human languages."[17] Moreover, "natural language is the most normal and intuitive way for humans to instruct autonomous systems; it allows them to provide diverse, high-level goals and strategies rather than detailed teleoperation."[18] Hence, further development of the ability of autonomous weapons systems to respond to commands in a natural language is necessary.

Finally, the Defense Science Board uses the term *multiagent coordination* for circumstances in which a task is distributed among "multiple robots, software agents, or humans."[19] Tasks could be centrally planned or coordinated through interactions of the agents. This sort of coordination goes beyond mere cooperation because "it assumes that the agents have a cognitive understanding of each other's capabilities, can monitor progress towards the goal, and engage in more human-like teamwork."[20]

Moral justifications. Several military experts and roboticists have argued that autonomous weapons systems should not only be regarded as morally acceptable but also that they would in fact be ethically preferable to human fighters. For example, roboticist Ronald C. Arkin believes autonomous robots in the future will be able to act more "humanely" on the battlefield for a number of reasons, including that they do not need to be programmed with a self-preservation instinct, potentially eliminating the need for a "shoot-first, ask questions later" attitude.[21] The judgments of autonomous weapons systems will not be clouded by emotions such as fear or hysteria, and the systems will be able to process much more incoming sensory information than humans without discarding or distorting it to fit preconceived notions. Finally, per Arkin, in teams comprised of human and robot soldiers, the robots could be more relied upon to report ethical infractions they observed than would a team of humans who might close ranks.[22]

Lt. Col. Douglas A. Pryer, U.S. Army, asserts there might be ethical advantages to removing humans from high-stress combat zones in favor of robots. He points to neuroscience research that suggests the neural circuits responsible for conscious self-control can shut down when overloaded with stress, leading to sexual assaults and other crimes that soldiers would otherwise be less likely to commit. However, Pryer sets aside the question of whether or not waging war via robots is ethical in the abstract. Instead, he suggests that because it sparks so much moral outrage among the populations from whom the United States most needs support, robot warfare has serious strategic disadvantages, and it fuels the cycle of perpetual warfare.[23]

Arguments Opposed to Autonomous Weapons Systems

While some support autonomous weapons systems with moral arguments, others base their opposition on moral grounds. Still others assert that moral arguments against autonomous weapons systems are misguided.

Opposition on moral grounds. In July 2015, an open letter calling for a ban on autonomous weapons was released at an international joint conference on artificial intelligence. The letter warns, "Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology has reached a point where the deployment of such systems is—practically if not legally—feasible within years, not decades, and the stakes are high: autonomous weapons have been described as the third revolution in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms."[24] The letter also notes that AI has the potential to benefit humanity, but that if a military AI arms race ensues, AI's reputation

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could be tarnished, and a public backlash might curtail future benefits of AI. The letter has an impressive list of signatories, including Elon Musk (inventor and founder of Tesla), Steve Wozniak (cofounder of Apple), physicist Stephen Hawking (University of Cambridge), and Noam Chomsky (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), among others. Over three thousand AI and robotics researchers have also signed the letter. The open letter simply calls for "a ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control."[25]

We note in passing that it is often unclear whether a weapon is offensive or defensive. Thus, many assume that an effective missile defense shield is strictly defensive, but it can be extremely destabilizing if it allows one nation to launch a nuclear strike against another without fear of retaliation.

In April 2013, the United Nations (UN) special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions presented a report to the UN Human Rights Council. The report recommended that member states should declare and implement moratoria on the testing, production, transfer, and deployment of lethal autonomous robotics (LARs) until an internationally agreed upon framework for LARs has been established.[26]

That same year, a group of engineers, AI and robotics experts, and other scientists and researchers from thirty-seven countries issued the "Scientists' Call to Ban Autonomous Lethal Robots." The statement notes the lack of scientific evidence that robots could, in the future, have "the functionality required for accurate target identification, situational awareness, or decisions regarding the proportional use of force."[27] Hence, they may cause a high level of collateral damage. The statement ends by insisting that "decisions about the application of violent force must not be delegated to machines."[28]

Indeed, the delegation of life-or-death decision making to nonhuman agents is a recurring concern of those who oppose autonomous weapons systems. The most obvious manifestation of this concern relates to systems that are capable of choosing their own targets. Thus, highly regarded computer scientist Noel Sharkey has called for a ban on "lethal autonomous targeting" because it violates the Principle of Distinction, considered one of the most important rules of armed conflict—autonomous weapons systems will find it very hard to determine who is a civilian and who is a combatant, which is difficult even for humans.[29] Allowing AI to make decisions about targeting will most likely result in civilian casualties and unacceptable collateral damage.

Another major concern is the problem of accountability when autonomous weapons systems are deployed. Ethicist Robert Sparrow highlights this ethical issue by noting that a fundamental condition of international humanitarian law, or *jus in bello*, requires that some person must be held responsible for civilian deaths. Any weapon or other means of war that makes it impossible to identify responsibility for the casualties it causes does not meet the requirements of jus in bello, and, therefore, should not be employed in war.[30]

This issue arises because AI-equipped machines make decisions on their own, so it is difficult to determine whether a flawed decision is due to flaws in the program or in the autonomous deliberations of the AI-equipped (so-called smart) machines. The nature of this problem was highlighted when a driverless car violated the speed limits by moving too slowly on a highway, and it was unclear to whom the ticket should be issued.[31] In situations where a human being makes the decision to use force against a target, there is a clear chain of accountability, stretching from whoever actually "pulled the trigger" to the commander who gave the order. In the case of autonomous weapons systems, no such clarity exists. It is unclear who or what are to be blamed or held liable.

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What Sharkey, Sparrow and the signatories of the open letter propose could be labeled "upstream regulation," that is, a proposal for setting limits on the development of autonomous weapons systems technology and drawing red lines that future technological developments should not be allowed to cross. This kind of upstream approach tries to foresee the direction of technological development and preempt the dangers such developments would pose. Others prefer "downstream regulation," which takes a wait-and-see approach by developing regulations as new advances occur. Legal scholars Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, who advocate this approach, argue that regulation will have to emerge along with the technology because they believe that morality will coevolve with technological development.[32]

Thus, arguments about the irreplaceability of human conscience and moral judgment may have to be revisited.[33] In addition, they suggest that as humans become more accustomed to machines performing functions with life-or-death implications or consequences (such as driving cars or performing surgeries), humans will most likely become more comfortable with AI technology's incorporation into weaponry. Thus, Anderson and Waxman propose what might be considered a communitarian solution by suggesting that the United States should work on developing norms and principles (rather than binding legal rules) guiding and constraining research and development—and eventual deployment—of autonomous weapons systems. Those norms could help establish expectations about legally or ethically appropriate conduct. Anderson and Waxman write,

> To be successful, the United States government would have to resist two extreme instincts. It would have to resist its own instincts to hunker down behind secrecy and avoid discussing and defending even guiding principles. It would also have to refuse to cede the moral high ground to critics of autonomous lethal systems, opponents demanding some grand international treaty or multilateral regime to regulate or even prohibit them.[34]

Counterarguments. In response, some argue against any attempt to apply to robots the language of morality that applies to human agents. Military ethicist George Lucas Jr. points out, for example, that robots cannot feel anger or a desire to "get even" by seeking retaliation for harm done to their compatriots.[35] Lucas holds that the debate thus far has been obfuscated by the confusion of machine autonomy with moral autonomy. The Roomba vacuum cleaner and Patriot missile "are both 'autonomous' in that they perform their assigned missions, including encountering and responding to obstacles, problems, and unforeseen circumstances with minimal human oversight," but not in the sense that they can change or abort their mission if they have "moral objections."[36] Lucas thus holds that the primary concern of engineers and designers developing autonomous weapons systems should not be *ethics* but rather *safety* and *reliability*, which means taking due care to address the possible risks of malfunctions, mistakes, or misuse that autonomous weapons systems will present. We note, though, that safety is of course a moral value as well.

Lt. Col. Shane R. Reeves and Maj. William J. Johnson, judge advocates in the U.S. Army, note that there are battlefields absent of civilians, such as underwater and space, where autonomous weapons could reduce the possibility of suffering and death by eliminating the need for combatants.[37] We note that this valid observation does not agitate against a ban in other, in effect most, battlefields.

Michael N. Schmitt of the Naval War College makes a distinction between weapons that are illegal per se and the unlawful use of otherwise legal weapons. For example, a rifle is not prohibited under international law, but using it to shoot civilians would constitute an unlawful use. On the other hand, some weapons (e.g., biological weapons) are unlawful per se, even when used only against combatants. Thus, Schmitt grants that some autonomous weapons systems might contravene international law, but "it is categorically not the case that all such systems will do so."[38] Thus, even an autonomous system that is incapable of distinguishing between civilians and combatants should not necessarily be unlawful per se, as autonomous weapons systems could be used in situations where no civilians were present, such as against tank formations in the desert or against warships. Such a system could be *used* unlawfully, though, if it were employed in contexts where civilians were present. We assert that some limitations on such weapons should be called for.

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Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, move forward toward simulated opposing forces with a multipurpose unmanned tactical transport 22 July 2016 during the Pacific Manned-Unmanned Initiative at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher Hubenthal, U.S. Air Force)

In their review of the debate, legal scholars Gregory Noone and Diana Noone conclude that everyone is in agreement that any autonomous weapons system would have to comply with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and thus be able to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. They write, "No academic or practitioner is stating anything to the contrary; therefore, this part of any argument from either side must be ignored as a red herring. Simply put, no one would agree to any weapon that ignores LOAC obligations."[39]

Limits on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Definitions of Autonomy

The international community has agreed to limits on mines and chemical and biological weapons, but an agreement on limiting autonomous weapons systems would meet numerous challenges. One challenge is the lack of consensus on how to define the autonomy of weapons systems, even among members of the Department of Defense. A standard definition that accounts for levels of autonomy could help guide an incremental approach to proposing limits.


Limits on autonomous weapons systems. We take it for granted that no nation would agree to forswear the use of autonomous weapons systems unless its adversaries would do the same. At first blush, it may seem that it is not beyond the realm of possibility to obtain an international agreement to ban autonomous weapons systems or at least some kinds of them.

Many bans exist in one category or another of weapons, and they have been quite well honored and enforced. These include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (known as the Ottawa Treaty, which became international law in 1999); the Chemical Weapons Convention (ratified in 1997); and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

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Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (known as the Biological Weapons Convention, adopted in 1975). The record of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (adopted in 1970) is more complicated, but it is credited with having stopped several nations from developing nuclear arms and causing at least one to give them up.

Some advocates of a ban on autonomous weapons systems seek to ban not merely production and deployment but also research, development, and testing of these machines. This may well be impossible as autonomous weapons systems can be developed and tested in small workshops and do not leave a trail. Nor could one rely on satellites for inspection data for the same reasons. We hence assume that if such a ban were possible, it would mainly focus on deployment and mass production.



The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy, published March 2017 by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, describes how the Army intends to integrate new technologies into future organizations to help ensure overmatch against increasingly capable enemies. Five capability objectives are to increase situational awareness, lighten soldiers' workloads, sustain the force, facilitate movement and maneuver, and protect the force. To view the strategy, visit https://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/RAS_Strategy.pdf.

Even so, such a ban would face considerable difficulties. While it is possible to determine what is a chemical weapon and what is not (despite some disagreements at the margin, for example, about law enforcement use of irritant chemical weapons), and to clearly define nuclear arms or land mines, autonomous weapons systems come with very different levels of autonomy.[40] A ban on all autonomous weapons would require foregoing many modern weapons already mass produced and deployed.

Definitions of autonomy. Different definitions have been attached to the word "autonomy" in different Department of Defense documents, and the resulting concepts suggest rather different views on the future of robotic warfare. One definition, used by the Defense Science Board, views autonomy merely as high-end automation: "a capability (or a set of capabilities) that enables a particular action of a system to be automatic or, within programmed boundaries, 'self-governing.'"[41] According to this definition, already existing capabilities, such as autopilot used in aircrafts, could qualify as autonomous.

Another definition, used in the *Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036*, suggests a qualitatively different view of autonomy: "an autonomous system is able to make a decision based on a set of rules and/or limitations. It is able to determine what information is important in making a decision."[42] In this view, autonomous systems are less predictable than merely automated ones, as the AI not only is performing a specified action but also is making decisions and thus potentially taking an action that a human did not order. A human is still responsible for programming the behavior of the autonomous system, and the actions the system takes would have to be consistent with the laws and strategies provided by humans. However, no individual action would be completely predictable or preprogrammed.

It is easy to find still other definitions of autonomy. The International Committee of the Red Cross defines autonomous weapons as those able to "independently select and attack targets, i.e., with autonomy in the 'critical functions' of acquiring, tracking, selecting and attacking targets."[43]

A 2012 Human Rights Watch report by Bonnie Docherty, *Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots*, defines three categories of autonomy. Based on the kind of human involvement, the categories are human-in-the-loop, human-on-the-loop, and human-out-of-the-loop weapons.[44]

"Human-*in-the*-loop weapons [are] robots that can select targets and deliver force only with a human command."[45] Numerous examples of the first type already are in use. For example, Israel's Iron Dome system detects incoming rockets, predicts their trajectory, and then sends

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this information to a human soldier who decides whether to launch an interceptor rocket.[46]

"Human-*on-the*-loop weapons [are] robots that can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots' actions."[47] An example mentioned by Docherty includes the SGR-A1 built by Samsung, a sentry robot used along the Korean Demilitarized Zone. It uses a low-light camera and pattern-recognition software to detect intruders and then issues a verbal warning. If the intruder does not surrender, the robot has a machine gun that can be fired remotely by a soldier the robot has alerted, or by the robot itself if it is in fully automatic mode.[48]

The United States also deploys human-on-the-loop weapons systems. For example, the MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System has been used on Navy ships since the 1980s, and it is capable of detecting, evaluating, tracking, engaging, and using force against antiship missiles and high-speed aircraft threats without any human commands.[49] The Center for a New American Security published a white paper that estimated as of 2015 at least thirty countries have deployed or are developing human-supervised systems.[50]

"Human-*out-of*-the-loop weapons [are] robots capable of selecting targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction."[51] This kind of autonomous weapons system is the source of much concern about "killing machines." Military strategist Thomas K. Adams warned that, in the future, humans would be reduced to making only initial policy decisions about war, and they would have mere symbolic authority over automated systems.[52] In the Human Rights Watch report, Docherty warns, "By eliminating human involvement in the decision to use lethal force in armed conflict, fully autonomous weapons would undermine other, nonlegal protections for civilians."[53] For example, a repressive dictator could deploy emotionless robots to kill and instill fear among a population without having to worry about soldiers who might empathize with their victims (who might be neighbors, acquaintances, or even family members) and then turn against the dictator.

For the purposes of this paper, we take autonomy to mean a machine has the ability to make decisions based on information gathered by the machine and to act on the basis of its own deliberations, beyond the instructions and parameters its producers, programmers, and users provided to the machine.

A Way to Initiate an International Agreement Limiting Autonomous Weapons

We find it hard to imagine nations agreeing to return to a world in which weapons had no measure of autonomy. On the contrary, development in AI leads one to expect that more and more machines and instruments of all kinds will become more autonomous. Bombers and fighter aircraft having no human pilot seem inevitable. Although it is true that any level of autonomy entails, by definition, some loss of human control, this genie has left the bottle and we see no way to put it back again.

Where to begin. The most promising way to proceed is to determine whether one can obtain an international agreement to ban *fully autonomous* weapons with missions that *cannot be aborted* and that cannot be recalled once they are launched. If they malfunction and target civilian centers, there is no way to stop them. Like unexploded landmines placed without marks, these weapons will continue to kill even after the sides settle their difference and sue for peace.

One may argue that gaining such an agreement should not be arduous because no rational policy maker will favor such a weapon. Indeed, the Pentagon has directed that "autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force."[54]

Why to begin. However, one should note that human-out-of-the-loop arms are very effective in reinforcing a red line. Declaration by representatives of one nation that if another nation engages in a certain kind of hostile behavior, swift and severe retaliation will follow, are open to misinterpretation by the other side, even if backed up with deployment of troops or other military assets.

Leaders, drawing on considerable historical experience, may bet that they be able to cross the red line and be spared because of one reason or another. Hence, arms without a human in the loop make for much more credible red lines. (This is a form of the "precommitment strategy" discussed by Thomas Schelling in *Arms and Influence*, in which one party limits its own

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options by obligating itself to retaliate, thus making its deterrence more credible.)[55]

We suggest that nations might be willing to forgo this advantage of fully autonomous arms in order to gain the assurance that once hostilities ceased, they could avoid becoming entangled in new rounds of fighting because some bombers were still running loose and attacking the other side, or because some bombers might malfunction and attack civilian centers. Finally, if a ban on fully autonomous weapons were agreed upon and means of verification were developed, one could aspire to move toward limiting weapons with a high but not full measure of autonomy. ■

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Office of the Secretary of Defense Logistics Program fellows visit the bridge of the USNS *Gilliland* 28 October 2015 during a tour of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) ship. Shown from left to right are Stanley McMillian, Lt. Col. Ed Hogan (*kneeling*), Bryan Jerkatis, Donald Gillespie, Art Clark (MSC Surge Sealift Program Readiness Officer), USNS *Gilliland*'s Master Keith Finnerty, and Renee Hubbard. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy)

The Office of the Secretary of Defense Logistics Fellows Program

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Logistics Fellows Program is open to field-grade officer (O4 to O5) and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian logisticians (GS-13 to GS-14). According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, which administers the program, the one-year fellowship is a developmental assignment that fosters learning, growth, and experiential opportunities.

Fellows participate in policy formulation and department-wide oversight responsibilities. They tour public- and private-sector logistics organizations to learn how they conduct operations and to observe industry best practices. They gain insight into legislative processes through visits to Congress, and they attend national-level forums and engage in collaborative efforts with industry partners. Fellows can observe and interact with appointed and career senior executives and flag officers, including one-on-one meetings with senior logistics leaders in the military departments, joint staff, OSD, and other agencies. They can gain a deeper understanding of the OSD perspective and how it affects the DOD enterprise. More information about the program and how to apply can be found at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/lmr/fellows_program.html.

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Wes Coleman (*left*), a construction manager for Fluor Corporation, reports on the progress of a new Ebola treatment unit to Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky, the commander of Joint Forces Command–United Assistance, and Sam Sells (*background*), the military liaison for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), during Operation United Assistance 2 December 2014 in Ganta, Liberia. United Assistance is a Department of Defense operation to provide logistics, training, and engineering support to USAID-led efforts to contain the Ebola virus outbreak in Liberia. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Brien Vorhees, U.S. Army)

New Logistics Ideas for a Complex World

Col. James Kennedy, U.S. Army, Retired
Lt. Col. Kris Hughes, U.S. Army

The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World describes the anticipated challenges the Army might face in the future.[1] It explains that the Army does not know the time, place, or enemy it will face, and it identifies the operational challenges the Army must anticipate to win. In order to meet those challenges, the U.S. Army's centers of excellence are busy identifying capability gaps; determining doctrine, organization,

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training, materiel, leadership education, personnel, facilities, and policy solutions; and updating functional concepts to evolve the current force into the Army described in *Force 2025 and Beyond*.[2] The "AirLand Battle" or "Full-Spectrum Operations" experience of our senior leaders and the forward operating base and counterinsurgency experience of our midgrade leaders served us well during the Cold War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[3] However, in our unknown and unknowable future, we will need to change some of our paradigms. It is our intent to highlight five recommendations to drive discussion at the Sustainment Center of Excellence and with senior leaders that may help our sustainment force be more responsive and agile for soldiers and commanders:

- Create a joint logistics staff officer career track.
- Create a specific military occupational specialty (MOS) for operational contract support officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in lieu of additional skill identifiers.
- Provide an annex in a doctrine publication that includes a template statement of work that can be easily modified.
- Create "homestead" units in which the majority of special skill logistical personnel can be retained to maintain their skill sets.
- Provide rapid access to the Army working capital funds for Army contracting officers.

Joint Logistics Staff Officer

Joint assignments provide Army officers the opportunity to develop the skills and knowledge necessary to be successful when planning and executing joint operations. The skills and knowledge they gain include using the joint planning process, integrating Army-centric capabilities into joint operations, and gaining an understanding of the capabilities and cultures of the other services.[4] However, once their joint assignments are complete, officers that are now experienced and joint qualified return to an Army organization, creating a joint-billet vacancy that a non-joint-qualified officer must fill. While the Army will benefit from having a joint-qualified officer back in its ranks, the joint community will have to wait for a new officer to develop the required skills to be fully proficient in his or her duties. In a future where joint operations will be more prevalent, does this continual loss of experience make sense? What if instead of rotating officers in and out of joint billets, we allow a certain percentage of logistics officers to follow a joint officer career path?

Once officers reach the rank of major, complete their key developmental assignments, and are eligible for joint assignments, they could be given the option to follow a joint career path. While these officers would still compete for branch command assignments to ensure they are competitive for promotion, all their future assignments would be joint. There are many advantages to this option. By allowing a certain number of logistics officers to follow a joint career path, the joint community will retain their joint experience. Upon entering a new joint assignment, these officers will not have the same basic joint-operations knowledge gaps that non-joint-qualified officers often have, so they will more efficiently and quickly contribute to the mission. The officers will bring new perspectives and insights from previous joint assignments, and they will also have an understanding of how the other services work and how to best integrate Army capabilities into joint operations. Gaining an understanding of service cultures is one of the most

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difficult perspectives for a joint officer to develop. It is impossible to teach; this understanding must come from experience, which takes time.

Another advantage of this option is the savings in both temporary duty and permanent change of station (PCS) costs. Maintaining joint-qualified officers in joint assignments means there will be a reduced requirement to send officers to the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, to attend the ten-week Joint and Combined Warfighting School. The school is necessary for an officer to receive Joint Professional Military Education Phase II certification, which is a requirement to receive the Joint Qualified Officer additional skill identifier (3L). Additionally, by having officers on a joint career path, the duration of their assignments can be extended past the traditional three years, reducing PCS costs and mission degradation caused by personnel transitions.

A major drawback to this option is the potential loss of an officer's Army-specific knowledge due to serving exclusively in joint billets, but there are a number of ways to mitigate this. Officers on a joint career track can participate in Army conferences and events, or serve in an observer coach/trainer assignment with the Mission Command Training Program in their specialty area of expertise. They can maintain their Army-specific proficiency by receiving newsletters from their functional branches or from organizations such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned. And, they can follow Army organizations such as Army Materiel Command or the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on social media or on the organizations' websites.

Maintaining Army-specific knowledge is not a new challenge for Army personnel. Many officers spend time in broadening assignments where they have little contact with the Army. Foreign area officers are a good example of officers that must maintain their Army proficiency despite being stationed away from Army forces, and the Acquisition Branch has a "regreening" program to help its officers retain currency.

As previously mentioned, the Army benefits from having joint-qualified officers in its ranks, but the amount of joint-qualified officers serving in Army organizations would decrease if officers choose to follow a joint career track. Despite this reduction, the Army would still have some officers rotating between joint and Army assignments, and with more efficient communication between service staffs, the Army would not lose the benefits of having joint-qualified personnel in its ranks.

Finally, there may be some concern about a non-joint career track officer's potential to earn the rank of general officer as joint qualification is a requirement. However, if an officer demonstrates the potential to be a general officer, he or she can still be assigned to an enterprise-level joint billet to receive joint qualification, but not remain in the joint community permanently.

Operational Contract Support Officer and Noncommissioned Officer

The first two operational contract support (OCS) principles identified in Joint Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*, are, "Contracted support can be a significant force multiplier ...," and "Most joint operations will include contracted support."[5] Leaders and soldiers today can attest to the tremendous benefits contracted support brings to the fight to support mission accomplishment, especially in protracted operations or in an expeditionary environment where the number of military "boots on the ground" is limited.

Operation United Assistance, the U.S. government response to combating the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa in 2015, is an excellent recent example of how the U.S. Army and U.S. Africa Command quickly harnessed the capabilities of commercial companies and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contractors to execute planning, construction, and sustainment, which played a huge role in the success of the mission. Yet, the Department of Defense inspector general's report from October 2015 clearly stated that the Army provided insufficient supervision and training to contracting officer representatives (CORs) during the mission.[6]

Having an adequate supply of well-trained and experienced CORs is an excellent mitigation for contracting shortfalls, but with force reductions, we need to look at solutions that do not require growing the force. The current system of COR oversight is not working and needs an adjustment. To rectify this, we recommend the creation of a secondary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 51O, for OCS officers and NCOs, with the Sustainment Center of Excellence as the proponent.[7] This MOS is not meant to be a replacement for the 3C additional skill identifier (ASI), which is awarded to personnel who qualify to plan for contractor integration at the operational and

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tactical levels. Instead, this MOS could be awarded after attending a short course at Fort Lee, Virginia, or the Contracting Center of Excellence in Huntsville, Alabama, to certify the selectees in their new secondary MOS. Our rationale for an MOS instead of an ASI is that an MOS fills a primary duty, while the ASI is often considered as an additional duty.

Currently, brigade combat teams have a 3C ASI OCS planner authorized for the assistant S-4 (logistics officer). In addition to planning, this person manages OCS as an additional duty, but often without appropriate training. Adding a new member to the brigade staff—a 51O officer—to focus on OCS execution and management during an operation would reduce the workload on the OCS planner. When not deployed, these officers would continue to work in units in both the operating and generating force in their primary MOS. When needed, however, they could be tasked by the Department of the Army or pulled from other locations in the command to deploy with a unit.

The 51O officer and NCO could be placed on a unit's table of organization (TOE) or augmentation table of distribution and allowances (TDA) at the O-6 headquarters level, but not filled unless deployed, similar to the Professional Officer Filler Information System concept for medical personnel.[8] Once deployed, the primary duty description of this officer or NCO would be to oversee and manage the CORs, to teach and coach the CORs in the performance of their duties, and to perform other additional duties as assigned. A prequalification for the MOS would be that the soldier must have successfully performed duties as a COR for a year. The benefit of the prequalification is that a unit will receive a staff officer with skills and experience in management of contractors, OCS, and CORs.

One incentive for someone to volunteer for this second MOS might be his or her desire to build on their experience in contracting and COR management. Another incentive might be an individual's desire to contribute to the operation. Additionally, OCS is a very marketable skill after departing service, so individuals having this secondary MOS could benefit after their military service. The Army could also offer incentive pay or some other bonus to soldiers who serve in these positions. There would be no need for career progression in the MOS because it is a secondary MOS only.

The Army potentially would need to have up to one hundred personnel with this secondary MOS to meet rotational demands in high-utilization areas, or as few as twenty-five in normal contingency operations. This would not result in growth for the Army since this is a secondary MOS for TOEs and TDAs and not a primary MOS requiring a modified table of organization and equipment (a permanent) space. The position could also be filled by a civilian who is trained and experienced, depending on the mission.

The Army's automated force-structure management programs would require adjustments to ensure this MOS requirement was recognized as secondary and would not result in an increase in total strength. This automated system change would require funding, but the future cost avoidances from better management associated with the new MOS would pay back the upfront cost. Two major benefits to the Army would be increased efficiency in supervision and fewer cases of waste or abuse because better qualified leaders would be managing OCS from within the brigade staff as their primary duty.

Performance Work Statement in Doctrine

Defining the requirements is the first thing that must be done before starting a contract, but the Army does not always get the requirements right for many understandable reasons. Requirements identification is not an easy task, so many times Army leaders turn to past statements of work or other historical documents for their starting points. However, this leads to another challenge: finding past statements of work. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its Contingency Acquisition Support Model have performance work statement (PWS) templates on the contingency contracting website, these may not meet all situations.[9] Additionally, professional military training does not address these tools, so officers on the ground need a reference.

We propose including an annex in current doctrine publications that provides a template statement of work that can be easily modified. For example, in Army Techniques Publication 4-41, *Army Field Feeding and Class I Operations*, an annex could be included with a template PWS for contracting for field feeding services.[10] This type of PWS could be included in other functional doctrine manuals to ensure more thorough and efficient requirements development. While each

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PWS needs to be analyzed to meet the needs of the specific mission, providing a template PWS as an annex for functional doctrine may ensure a unit captures certain general requirements. Additionally, requesting units will have an easy-to-reference guide to ensure a more effective contract. This template will reduce the burden on contracting offices, ensure critical requirements are not missed, reduce the amount of time requesting units spend on developing the PWS, and make the contracting process more responsive. And, since the expertise to ensure all requirements are included may not be available to assist with writing the PWS, these templates could ensure critical requirements are not left out. Additionally, a class on drafting PWS could be added to unit professional development programs and taught by the local contracting office.

There are some requirements and standards that should not be overlooked in a PWS, but often are. The PWS template should include

- the acceptable number of hours a contractor is allowed to work and if the hours of work are continuous or can be broken up over a twenty-four-hour period;
- government-furnished equipment; the accountability, readiness reporting, and maintenance of that equipment; and the specific use for the equipment to prevent misuse;
- means of accounting for contract personnel to include reporting times;
- required reports and deliverables to include submission time, formats, and means of transmission;
- inspection requirements to include the purpose for the inspection and how the inspection will be conducted;
- requirements for specific materials and processes; and
- life support made available to contractors such as housing, food service, medical care, and other available services.

By ensuring these requirements and standards are included in each PWS, the contractor will be more efficient, saving time and money, and the contract management will be more effective because the support will be better planned.

Another method to develop effective PWS development skills in Army leaders is to reinstate the PWS Development Course at the Army Logistics University, or increase the COR Course and the current OCS Planner (3C ASI) Course to include PWS development. This would ensure more officers are educated in proper requirements development and in adding the Contingency Acquisition Support Model information into PWSs as appropriate.

Homestead Units

Given the planning limitation that we do not often know where or when we will be deploying, there are certain functional units that the Army may need in the opening days or weeks of an operation. We propose reassessing the idea of "homestead" units, where the majority of personnel can be retained in a unit to maintain unique skill sets. Reserve component units, in practice, already do this to a large extent, but these units take months to mobilize. One unit that might fit this concept is the 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary), whose mission is to provide port, terminal, and watercraft operations, including logistics over-the-shore operations. This is the only unit of its kind in the active-duty structure. With the current concerns about enemy anti-access/area denial capabilities and the lack of advance knowledge of seaport, airport, and initial staging base locations, it makes sense to have our only expeditionary transportation Army asset as proficient, trained, and experienced as possible.

In a homestead unit, subordinate-unit captains and junior NCOs would be identified and retained as majors and senior NCOs on the brigade staff. Some might even stay in the unit as lieutenant colonels and sergeants major. Officers and NCOs could move in and out of the unit while the majority of senior leaders homestead in the unit. For example, once a captain completed company command, if he or she performed well, the brigade commander could designate the officer for return as a major after a generating force assignment for broadening and career progression.

Advantages created by homestead units include a decrease in PCS costs and the development of a core cadre with increased experience in unit-specific techniques, tactics, procedures, and operations. And, even if a new brigade commander or command sergeant major is not from the homesteading population, the staff that supports the new leadership would be very experienced. Another benefit for the homesteaders would be a more stabilized family environment. Spouses could

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Soldiers with the 331st Transportation Company connect the final section of the Trident Pier causeway 15 April 2013 in Pohang, South Korea, during the Combined Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (CJLOTS) military exercise. CJLOTS was a ten-day training event intended to improve logistics interoperability, communication, and cooperation between the United States and South Korea. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

get long-term work, soldiers could benefit from home ownership, and children could remain in the same schools for longer periods. Finally, to make training, support, and readiness more effective, all the homestead units could be collocated on one base.

A downside to homesteading would be the potential for complacency and a lack of new ideas and perspectives, conditions that are generally overcome through varied personnel assignments. However, since these types of units would be highly specialized, the only perspectives in the Army regarding their respective specializations would come from within the units themselves. This would only apply to non-brigade-combat-team active-component units. Some possible units to study include a quartermaster pipeline terminal operating company, an inland cargo transfer company, a movement control battalion, a field services company, and maybe one combat sustainment support battalion.

Access to the Army Working Capital Funds

The Army Operating Concept defines "set the theater" as "actions taken to establish and maintain the conditions necessary to seize the initiative and retain freedom of action."[11] One constraint that continually slows an Army contracting officer's ability to set the theater is the lack of immediate access to funds. The Army's cumbersome financial system does not support rapid acquisition in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief or immediate contingency environments. During Operation United Assistance, Army Contracting Command personnel could not procure needed supplies and services for days after arrival because they had to wait for appropriate funding to be released to U.S. Army Africa and then allocated to them for use through the General Fund Enterprise Business System.[12] However, the Defense Logistics Agency

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(DLA) deployed contingency contracting personnel from their Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) who were able to write contracts immediately off the plane. Why? Because DLA has a process to authorize the JCASO contracting officer access to the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF) for immediate needs with the intent of reimbursing the DWCF once the authorized mission funds are released. While this was the first time JCASO's expeditionary contracting officers executed using DLA's DCWF, it proved to be a great success.

Under the provisions of Title 10, the secretary of defense may establish working capital funds to finance inventories of supplies, and industrial-type activities that provide common services, such as repair, manufacturing, or remanufacturing.[13] A large portion of the Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) is managed by activities under Army Materiel Command. However, under the current rules, the Army cannot authorize subordinate elements to allocate AWCF money for emergent activities like Operation United Assistance in the manner executed by DLA. Thus, the Army should review and amend its policy to authorize Army Materiel Command to provide a limited amount of AWCF to the appropriate Army service component command to ensure Army Contracting Command contracting officers can respond swiftly to immediate life-support and setting-the-theater requirements, especially in humanitarian and disaster response operations.

Conclusion

The recommendations mentioned above provide innovative approaches to achieving success when the Army does not know the time, place, or enemy it will be facing. By maintaining experience in our joint staff officers, enhancing our contract capability with the development of an OCS officer and NCO secondary MOS, creating efficiency by including template PWSs in doctrine, increasing proficiency in functional units through homesteading, and providing immediate access to funds through AWCF, the Army can more easily seize the initiative. Through the consideration of these proposed concepts, the Army can ensure it is responsive and adaptive, and ready to address the challenges of the unknowns and win in a complex world. ■

Notes

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Boat crewmen with Maritime Safety and Security Team Los Angeles–Long Beach conduct tactical boat maneuvers 31 July 2012 during an exercise in San Pedro, California. The exercise was designed to test the unit's ability to protect a ship docked at a pier as well as underway using four Coast Guard small boats. (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Adam Eggers, U.S. Coast Guard)

An Underutilized Counterinsurgency Asset

The U.S. Coast Guard

Daniel E. Ward

Low-intensity conflict and insurgency are not only the most prevalent emerging threats globally but they are also those most likely to shape the world construct over the next decade and beyond. As one considers how to deal with such conflicts, it should be highlighted that many of the world's unstable areas most likely to be affected by insurgency are located in coastal nations. Consequently, the extensive experience of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in conducting littoral missions, coupled with that service's duality as both a military and a law-enforcement force, should make the USCG a logical choice as a key component of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, its capabilities in that capacity have been seriously underappreciated and underutilized.

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Maritime Enforcement Specialist 3rd Class Jorge Lopez-Centellas, a U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachment member, conducts escort training with Cameroon sailors aboard USNS *Spearhead* 29 February 2016 in the Atlantic Ocean. (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Amanda A. Dunford, U.S. Navy)

COIN operations require a full spectrum of forces to address the numerous aspects associated with battling an insurgency and supporting a host-nation (HN) government in its efforts to achieve security and stability. The four military branches residing in the Department of Defense (DOD) have an entrenched role in COIN, both in academic and operational constructs. However, a vital asset is often overlooked: using the USCG during a COIN operation to complement DOD forces.

COIN involves employing elements of "soft power" (persuasion without force or coercion), engaging with HN personnel, and building security forces suited for missions that often include law enforcement and border control. The USCG habitually performs in these areas as it conducts its primary missions. Additionally, the USCG has a history of overseas engagements in which its unique capabilities—those not found within other branches of the military—were leveraged. Examples include port security and management of navigation aids in Iraq, instruction in countersmuggling and fisheries enforcement measures in Latin America and Africa, and liaison with partner nations whose maritime missions are more closely aligned with the USCG than the U.S. Navy. For these reasons, the USCG should be brought more closely into the "COIN fold," thereby increasing its operational tempo with regard to supporting nations against insurgents, as deemed necessary by U.S. government policy.

This is already occurring at some levels, but at a rate that, basically, amounts to window dressing. The USCG is often underutilized, in part because of misperceptions about its deployability and its blue-water capabilities, as well as inherent "inside-the-box" thinking on the part of strategic leadership that does not allow consideration of the smallest armed service as a COIN asset. Simple security principles dictate that we should address threats at a distance, vice allowing them to come into the homeland. Hence, we should push our borders out, and in this case, our coasts. By leveraging the USCG as a COIN asset, we can effectively enable partner nations to exert more

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control over their own waters, create linkages between U.S. and HN military services, and gain information on the operational capacity and capabilities of our partners. Elements of COIN strategy have specific applicability to USCG mission sets, and there are particular areas in which the USCG is better suited than the DOD for such tasking. This includes securing maritime borders, meshing of law enforcement and defense functions within a single service, and building relationships with the populace from a constabulary vice defense posture.

Martin N. Murphy noted in *Proceedings* that today, "maritime insurgency presents a far greater challenge to world naval forces than random acts of terrorism at sea."[1] This challenge must be addressed, not simply through direct action, but by building, supporting, and establishing capable maritime security forces—a mission ready-made for the USCG. In large part, this is because the USCG's duality as a military and law enforcement organization gives it unique capabilities and insights not readily available within the DOD components. When assessing tools needed for COIN, one must recognize that

> in a country seriously threatened by insurgency ... the simple two-tiered (police and military) model to which the United States is accustomed will not work. Instead, there is a need for sophisticated paramilitary internal-security forces organized, trained, and equipped to function either as police or as combat units, or as a hybrid of the two in tricky circumstances.[2]

Essentially, this defines the USCG.

Foundations and Doctrine

Within the scope of COIN, stability operations are a critical foundational function. Stability operations include

> various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.[3]

Stability operations are primarily where USCG forces can serve to augment existing constructs. The long-term overarching objective for COIN is that a country and its governing bodies will provide stability and security as well as effective governance to the population. As noted by Heather Gregg, "a counterinsurgency campaign requires the creation of a functioning state, a government that can stand on its own, provide for its citizens, and promote regional and international stability."[4]

So, why is the USCG not already a major player in COIN? Operations such as maritime patrol, law enforcement, fisheries regulations, and port control are integral to many developing nations' security and stability. However, even though the USCG is mentioned or theoretically conceptualized with foreign internal defense (FID), it is often underutilized or not considered at all. At issue is the ability to see how the USCG can be an asset when compared with its larger, more overtly military cousins. When thinking about low-intensity conflict, "U.S. preparation for maritime small wars is stuck between two longtime tendencies," one being a preference "to focus on big conventional wars" and the other a dismissal of the "maritime domain as a matter of little strategic importance" when planning for low-intensity conflict.[5] Hence, if the environment is not given its due regard, one of the best tools for the job is not at the forefront of leadership's thinking.

Many authors, in the analysis of current COIN operations, have noted that "while the military has been an unparalleled expeditionary warfighter, our diplomatic, information, economic, and governance efforts have failed to fulfill stability operations."[6] This does not negatively reflect on the military personnel who put their lives at risk every day on such operations. However, instead of expecting forces trained primarily for close combat to conduct stability operations, maybe forces already geared for a similar mission should be employed.

The USCG is especially experienced in the control of maritime, coastal, and riverine environments, which are key for COIN success. Examples of such COIN environments include the struggle for control over waterways in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, which "were key pathways for the movement of insurgent supplies and personnel." Similarly, control over

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A Coast Guard Cutter *Stratton* boarding team investigates a self-propelled semisubmersible interdicted 19 July 2015 in international waters off the coast of Central America. The *Stratton*'s crew recovered more than six tons of cocaine from the forty-foot vessel. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class LaNola Stone, U.S. Coast Guard)

waterways is integral to counterinsurgency in Iraq, where "movement of arms and IEDs along the country's estuaries and rivers" is a basic insurgent technique.[7]

COIN becomes even more complicated in other areas where "piracy flourishes ... with poorly guarded ports and underpaid security personnel."[8] The factor of piracy could be greatly alleviated through applying USCG expertise in the establishment of functional patrol forces.

In an overarching analysis, David Sterman points out that "we will continue to see maritime insurgent networks and maritime counterinsurgent forces play important roles in irregular warfare."[9] If that is the case, we need better application of COIN tools to address this issue, many of which are intrinsic to the USCG, where there is already a foundation upon which to build, both empirically and academically. For example, USCG units that are operationally tasked with deployed law enforcement and security missions "also conduct a significant amount of FID by training foreign forces and operating with them in a 'technical assistance' capacity."[10] And, within governing documents such as Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, the DOD already notes that "the ability to handle evolving scenarios as a federal law enforcement agency or an armed force is a unique characteristic of the USCG" as the USCG acts as a "maritime constabulary force."[11] This capability gives the USCG inherent knowledge, skills, and abilities not found or not exercised as a primary function within the other branches of the military.

There are several factors that illustrate the necessity of using USCG assets vice reliance on DOD units. For example, the U.S. Navy's blue-water focus does not align with the majority of the world's maritime forces, but working alongside those HN forces realistically falls more in line with the USCG's littoral footprint; USCG mission sets are more closely associated and share commonality with many foreign maritime forces.

To a large extent, stability operations and FID are forms of constabulary activities aimed at establishing

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domestic order, security, and effective governance. Chapter 12 of *Small Wars Manual, U.S. Marine Corps (1940)* describes the need for a "constabulary" force that is "the national-defense force of the country concerned and also performs police duties and civil functions," meaning this organization is three-fold in military, law enforcement, and regulatory functions.[12] While this system may be somewhat foreign to the other branches of the U.S. military, these three areas basically describe the architectural concept behind the composition and structure of the USCG. And, while this model may not be the norm from a purely U.S. military perspective, the USCG structure can serve as a foundational model for many emerging nations, especially with those trying to coordinate and present a united front against an insurgency. So, to train a constabulary force, we should use our own to set the example and do the training.

We see that "despite the clear potential for insurgents and terrorists to use the maritime space, the issue has received scant attention. For example, the Navy's new *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* calls for a forward naval presence, but says little about the maritime small wars such forces might encounter."[13] Yet, we do not have to reinvent the wheel, because the basic doctrinal literature, such as JP 3-22, acknowledges that in consideration of COIN assets, "a common constabulary and multimission nature promotes instant understanding and interoperability and makes USCG a valued partner for many naval and maritime forces."[14]

But, this simple statement is not enough. What can we demonstrate as a "platform for understanding" in order to show that the unique nature of USCG operations make this service aptly suited for stability operations? One argument is that

> USSOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] has never had a maritime equivalent to the Army Special Forces [SF] and Civil Affairs teams that build ground force capacity overseas and carry out the increasingly decisive work in the civil–military realm. The maritime forces that can best perform such missions exist today in the U.S. Coast Guard.[15]

This is substantiated, because "while the U.S. Navy is arguably the world's only global maritime superpower," and a handful of other nations have substantial blue-water fleets, the "maritime forces—navies, coast guards, maritime police, etc. [of the rest of the world]—most closely resemble the U.S. Coast Guard."[16] As a result, because of the nature of most foreign maritime forces, they "can best identify with the Coast Guard, rather than the U.S. Navy."[17]

DOD doctrine found in JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency,* denotes potential maritime civil-affairs skill sets to include "maritime law; marine fisheries and resource management; port administration and port operations; maritime interagency coordination; port/waterborne security; customs and logistics; port/intercoastal surveys; and control of maritime immigration," which are core missions of the USCG, not the U.S. Navy.[18] These tasks, coupled with the additional responsibility of training HN forces to perform these tasks, are jobs that would arguably be better performed by those who are responsible for the same missions in their domestic capacity defending the United States.

Though it is true that a small USCG footprint already exists behind the scenes, it should be greatly expanded. Overseas training such as that provided by the USCG's International Training Division is currently performed outside the scope of the COIN realm as stand-alone operations or often as a task subordinated under another construct, such as counternarcotics. The capability exists, but we must bring it into the COIN fold.

History, Hot Spots, and Obstacles

USCG forces have performed missions in nonpermissive environments, have engaged in combat, and have built a significant legacy of filling unique gaps and niches during DOD operations, so there is little reason not to embrace USCG capabilities when considering ongoing and future COIN matters. For example, training a HN coast guard should be assigned to the USCG as a primary task in COIN operations. This would include training HN forces, guiding the creation of command and control and administrative infrastructure, and mentoring through support of local operations.

In the author's experience as a riverine advisor to HN forces in Peru and Bolivia from 2000 to 2003, the unique ability of USCG personnel to bridge the gap between traditional military roles and law enforcement served as an enormous advantage when establishing and working with similar constabulary-type forces. In addition, the USCG's culture of being a small force that often had to "do more with less" while being seconded to other DOD components created, in an ironic way, a shared sense of

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commonality between HN personnel and USCG advisors that was often a solid basis for long-term engagement. Also, the USCG culture of flexibility played a large role in allowing the teams with which the author deployed to focus on HN tactics, procedures, and technology, vice trying to push U.S. concepts upon HN forces that could not sustain the same resources as the United States or that would be limited due to localized restrictions on performing as "photocopies" of U.S. forces.

Essentially, "in much the same way as SF work with indigenous ground forces to shape the foreign security environment, Coast Guard special-purpose forces have long-term relationships with the maritime police and other counterdrug forces of Latin America," which has created a cadre of capabilities that can be exploited in other areas of the world.[19]

Context

Since the inception of the USCG as the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790, its units have actively participated in many of our nation's conflicts. This is an important note, as some may question using USCG forces as a COIN asset, thinking the USCG is simply a domestic law enforcement organization. However, this is clearly not the case. In Vietnam, "the U.S. Navy requested Coast Guard assistance ... because it then lacked a brown water capability," and in July 1965, "the first elements of Task Force 115, Operation Market Time ... arrived for combat duty," which included coastal interdiction, gunfire support, and raiding missions.[20] From the First Gulf War until the present, USCG assets such as law enforcement detachments, port security units, and patrol boats and cutters have actively addressed "U.S. Central Command's requirements for unique Coast Guard capabilities in the Northern Arabian Gulf."[21]

So, in addition to its honorable history of participation in the nation's conflicts, there is a modern basis for USCG operations in combat zones, not simply in permissive environments. When this experience is coupled with the maritime strategy in the aforementioned U.S. Navy's *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, which notes specific USCG tasking in the Pacific and Middle East to include "work with regional partners and navies using joint and combined patrols, ship-rider exchanges, and multinational exercises" and building "partner nation capacity for maritime governance," one must wonder why the USCG is not already being more heavily used for long-term stability operations within the overall COIN and FID constructs.[22] Whether it is risk aversion from USCG leadership, a lack of general recognition of USCG capabilities from senior DOD leadership, or both, the result is that the United States is not fully using a valuable resource. This degrades the ability to optimally support and develop HN maritime forces and at the same time places DOD forces into roles for which they are not ideally suited.

As it is established that the USCG can effectively serve as a COIN asset for incidents and conflict in the maritime arena, we must next decide if threats in this realm are actually relevant and warrant further U.S. attention using the USCG in these deployed theaters. In truth, there are numerous examples of areas in which, if the United States became involved, COIN would be the leading principle of engagement, and the USCG would be a necessary part of the team.

For example, in Asia, insurgent capability in the maritime arena was demonstrated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who "formed a naval subgroup, the Sea Tigers ... to perform the vital task of smuggling supplies" that later "expanded its operations and began targeting the Sri Lankan Navy."[23] Others such as Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayyaf group have employed maritime assets in Southeast Asia to "escape across international boundaries and smuggle weapons to their target countries."[24] Elsewhere, in Indonesia, the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (Free Aceh Movement, or GAM) displayed insurgent maritime prowess by using "small boats to bring in supplies by ship and transport[ing] members out of Aceh by sea."[25] And, in Africa, forces of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta "occupied" areas "by rebels with machine-gun equipped speedboats" and at one time "reduced Nigeria's oil production by a quarter."[26]

To illustrate another area where COIN might be applied, in 2008, the Mumbai attackers "came by sea, sailing from Karachi on a Pakistani cargo vessel," and then "hijacked an Indian fishing trawler."[27] This attack, in particular, "highlighted India's inability to effectively monitor its coastline—a condition that is common to many littoral states in both the developing and the developed world."[28] Other hot spots that could potentially warrant coastal intervention

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The crew of a U.S. Coast Guard twenty-five-foot transportable port security boat pauses 3 May 2003 during a patrol of the Khawr 'Abd Allah near Umm Qasr, Iraq. Crewmembers from *PSU 311* include Machinist Mate 3rd Class David Slifka on the .50 caliber machinegun, coxswain Port Securityman 2nd Class Keith Caires, and M-60 machinegunner Boatswain Mate 3rd Class Robert Shaw. (Photo by Public Affairs Specialist 1st Class John Gaffney, U.S. Coast Guard)

include Somalia, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Ivory Coast.

To counter insurgent use of sea and littoral areas, HN forces need an effective maritime presence—in effect, a functional, coastal patrol force. Even when larger conventional naval forces are dedicated to such conflicts, the results can be ineffective in addressing root issues because these forces are not geared for these operations. Off the Somalia coast, where piracy has become a maritime security matter, the *Global Policy Forum* noted in 2012 that if the United Nations Security Council "were really acting for Somalia's ... wellbeing, it would have acted long ago to halt illegal fishing and dumping by speedily setting up a coast guard that could halt these crimes." However, even though the "secretary-general proposed ... that the naval forces should take on the task of patrolling Somalia's coasts against illegal fishing and dumping ... why should a heavily-armed and hugely expensive naval force do this work, when a lightly armed coast guard would serve the purpose much better?"[29] This analysis hits the proverbial nail on the head. All tools are not created equal. It is necessary to choose the right one for the job.

Murphy's article in *Proceedings* acknowledged that while "naval forces have supported counterinsurgency campaigns around the world for the past fifty years," most, including U.S. naval forces, have not "had to confront an insurgence presence on water or projected from the coast," and this is exacerbated by the fact that "major navies are torn between the demands of possible major conflict against a near-peer competitor and the messy, ambiguous small wars for which their ships and operational methods are ill-suited."[30]

However, even with such logical arguments, many still dismiss the USCG. In 2008, the RAND Corporation published its study *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, which highlighted coastal security

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requirements that included "training and provision of patrol craft, radar, communications, and other equipment"; "augmenting local patrol with advanced maritime surveillance"; and "performing 'blue water' maritime patrol and intercept function."[31] All of these are *primary* functions of the USCG, to include blue-water patrols. The same study noted an "increasingly important" need for "'green-water' (near-coastal) and 'brown-water' (riverine) security capabilities" and recognized "securing a coastline, territorial waters, harbors and ports, and rivers is difficult and expensive."[32] However, the same analysis concluded that the U.S. Navy "does not have the numbers of assets to provide coastal security everywhere that there could be insurgent activity ... nor can the U.S. Coast Guard fill this need, given its domestic mission."[33] To be blunt, members of the study are either expressing ignorance of the capabilities and real-world missions of the USCG, or their views are influenced by a "cultural" dismissal of the USCG's ability to forward deploy.

Conclusion

Understanding how to use a tool does not always translate into the proper use or even actual implementation of that tool. Herein rests the obstacle that must be overcome in order to better and more effectively employ the Coast Guard within the COIN construct. Doctrine exists, and similar operations and training with HN partners are already ongoing to a limited extent. Therefore, the need is to augment usage. Additional forces in select areas would allow for better supplementation to COIN missions, but the skill sets and abilities are largely already in place.


In its doctrinal publications, the DOD makes statements such as "the USCG possesses broad authorities across the spectrum of military, law enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence activities in support of FID."[34] However, this is countered by observations from the field such as "the United States does not have a national-level police force providing an expeditionary, sustainable, professional civilian law enforcement capability for use in a deployed environment."[35]

Consequently, current military culture and doctrine do not mesh because perception, even within the USCG, is a limiting factor. The same 2008 RAND study that dismissed USCG capabilities also states that any assessment of COIN options necessitates "the assignment of responsibility for core COIN capabilities to those departments that possess the most relevant competencies."[36] In order to make this a reality for the USCG, not only must we overcome a lack of external acknowledgment but also within the service, leaders must "drop old prejudices and inhibitions, and ... allow such forces to operate, train, and develop their capabilities beyond the constraints of conventional imaginations."[37]

So, our analysis comes full circle to the doctrine upon which much of our COIN operations are based. Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, contains a snippet that readily tells commanders that "the Coast Guard may also be of value, since its coastal patrol, fisheries oversight, and port security missions correlate with the responsibilities of navies in developing countries."[38] Thus, we must take the next step and more fully integrate the USCG beyond simple engagements toward robust COIN support, in the form of stability operations focused toward coastal development of HN forces and the overall security and "winning of the populace," which would empirically bring more strength to a COIN commander's table. A key avenue of approach is for the USCG to be more forward leaning and proactive in seeking out missions in which it can offer its unique skill sets to the DOD vice being reactive to requests. Another element is education of joint services in the capabilities of the USCG, *as they can apply to COIN*. Lastly, the USCG and the DOD should actively work to give the USCG a seat at the "COIN table" before engagements occur, so as to better design, plan, and coordinate for the future.

The USCG has a wealth of capabilities that are directly linked to stability operations and missions, such as those within the civil affairs realm, with a particular emphasis on maritime, coastal, and riverine environments. These skill sets do not reside elsewhere in any DOD service or any other government agency. The USCG has experience and history operating as a proven combat force, integrated into DOD operations throughout the globe. And, the USCG has and does perform overseas HN training and infrastructure development with numerous foreign partners. The premise is not to argue that the USCG should be out front in conventional, large-scale maritime combat operations, nor that the USCG could replace or supplant the direct action and offensive capabilities of special operations forces. Since COIN is

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The eighty-two-foot U.S. Coast Guard Cutter *Point Comfort* inspects a fishing junk 8 November 1965 at Dương Đông, Vietnam. (Photo by Photographer's Mate Chief Petty Officer Frank Borzage, U.S. Coast Guard)

based upon the "winning of the populace" by establishing functional HN security forces, creating sustainable government services, and providing stability, the USCG, in its uniquely dual civil–military and law enforcement role, is a tool that is currently wasted by not being more actively used in COIN operations. ■

The views presented are the author's and do not represent the U.S. government, his employer, or an official position.

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
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
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Maj. Robert Bonham receives a master's degree of military science 17 June 2014 from Kuwait's Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Salem Abdulaziz Al-Sabah at the Mubarak Al Abdullah Joint Command and Staff College in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Bonham attended the college as a participant in the U.S. Army's Schools of Other Nations program. (Photo by Sgt. Tracy R. Myers, U.S. Army Central)

Strategic Scholars

Educating Army Leaders at Foreign Staff Colleges



Maj. Christopher Gin, U.S. Army

Education is the most reliable strategic investment that the Army can make in the face of an uncertain future.

—The Army University White Paper

The U.S. Army's officer professional military education system underscores the organization's investment in its people. Scholarships are available to four-year universities and military academies, civilian graduate schools, and a plethora of other educational opportunities during a typical officer's twenty-year career. Why does the Department of Defense choose to spend millions of dollars to educate officers beyond the training required for managing violence in warfare? The answer, perhaps, lies in the Army's role in American foreign policy and national security—the Army supports

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U.S. Army Maj. Michael Kendall (*end left*) and fellow German Staff College students stand in front of the Brandenburg Gate 22 September 2015 in Berlin, Germany. The Military Academy of the German Armed Forces, *Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr*, was established in 1957 and relocated to Hamburg in 1958. (Photo by Maj. Chris Heukers, Royal Netherlands Army)

national strategic goals, and its senior officers must function as strategic leaders. One way of growing strategic leaders who operate effectively in a complex world and give their best military advice to civilian leaders is through a more deliberate investment in Army officers' worldly education.

This paper is a summarized version of the author's School of Advanced Military Studies monograph and investigates an important aspect of the current officer education system: the attendance of U.S. Army officers at foreign military staff colleges.[1] Increasing the number of Army officers sent to foreign staff colleges would add significant value to the Army by increasing the number of strategic leaders who have the knowledge and experience to contextualize complex international systems with clarity and meaning for their organizations.[2]

Since the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Army's forward presence has kept it at the tip of U.S. diplomacy, both as a security guarantor at global fault lines and as the physical manifestation of U.S. might and interests. For example, for nearly seventy years on the Korean peninsula, U.S. forces have stood as a deterrent to North Korean aggression and as a committed ally to the Republic of Korea. As a testament to the importance of strategic alliances, the U.S. Army 2nd Infantry Division, headquartered north of Seoul, is the only combined division in the U.S. Army where U.S. and Republic of Korea staffs are integrated throughout the headquarters. In Europe, as Gen. Mark A. Milley explained during his 2015 confirmation hearing, U.S. forces in coordination with NATO continue to bolster Europe's defense amid fears of a resurgent Russia.[3] As the international commitments of the United States grow and threats arise, it is essential that Army leaders are comfortable operating in the world beyond America's borders. Since nearly all Army officers are graduates of American universities, it can be reasonably

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assumed some find themselves living abroad for the first time when on an operational deployment. Once abroad, they are forced to simultaneously experience the stress of a real-world mission and the anxiety of cultural dissonance.

The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, published in October 2014, emphasizes the complex world in which the Army is one of many actors.[4] As the Army's operations are global, it derives significant benefits from deliberately sending officers abroad to be educated in regions where they can then be assigned to serve. Specifically, graduate-level education at foreign staff colleges provides officers with an intimate understanding of partner states' military organizations and capabilities. More important, such an experience sheds light on the "fear, honor, and interests" of others, which are more easily ascertained through significant interaction.[5]

Senior leaders depend on their subordinates to draw clarity from unclear information and help direct organizational action in an efficacious manner.[6] Foreign staff college graduates are a valuable information conduit. In international environments, they can collectively contribute a high degree of what Harvard Business School professor Tarun Khanna calls *contextual intelligence*: "the ability to understand the limits of our knowledge and to adapt that knowledge to an environment different from the one in which it was developed."[7] The value of foreign staff college graduates' experience will be reflected in the way they can articulate meaning in a complex, adaptive world to their subordinates, leaders, and organizations.

Echoes from the Past

From 1936 to 1938, then Capt. Albert C. Wedemeyer studied the military theory taught at the German Staff College, the *Kriegsakademie*, in Berlin. His experience far from American shores, at the heart of what would become Nazi Germany's army, and among German peers and instructors, presumably left an indelible impression on Wedemeyer. It would underpin his understanding of how Nazi Germany would conduct operations in World War II. What he learned about the German army's preference for a war of movement, as opposed to the trench warfare experience in the First World War, informed senior American leaders. It also added to Wedemeyer's credibility as one of few American officers who possessed contextual intelligence that could be applied directly against Nazi Germany.[8]

Though Wedemeyer's education at the Kriegsakademie preceded the entry of the United States into World War II, the likelihood of future hostilities must have been apparent to the young American officer during his time as a student. In addition to improving his mastery of German, he took every opportunity to gather information for a comprehensive report he would later write on the modern German army.[9] Most important, his report, and the interviews Army leaders sought with him upon his return to the United States, showed that his contextual intelligence about Nazi Germany helped inform American strategy in ways both meaningful and efficacious in pursuit of ultimate victory. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson acknowledged the direct value of Wedemeyer's foreign staff college education on America's war plans to defeat Germany:

> [Wedemeyer] was a student at the German Staff School from 1936 to 1938 and has furnished our Staff with much valuable information about German methods. I have found that among certain gossips in Washington such a connection is enough to make a man suspected but without such first-hand information as to what the Germans are doing we should be badly off indeed.[10]

Chief of the War Plans Division Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall took a particular interest in Wedemeyer's final report from his foreign staff college experience, and he ordered Wedemeyer to serve on his staff and help write the Victory Program for Nazi Germany's defeat.[11] Wedemeyer's experience illustrates the value that foreign staff college education had on a notable strategic leader. It serves as an example of how foreign military schooling can contribute to success during military operations against potential future enemies, or in a concerted effort with allies, within

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The Victory Plan
An Intellectual Tour de Force

Army downsizing planners face an intellectual challenge, as did World War II planners charged with rapid upsizing.[1] Overcoming planning challenges depends on strategic thought.

In *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941*, published in 1989, historian Charles E. Kirkpatrick writes of the World War II mobilization plan developed by then Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer: "Very few staff papers have ever had its prescience, its impact, or its far-reaching consequences," and "in only fourteen pages [*The Victory Plan of 1941*] lays out the strategic objectives of the United States in the event of war, states American strategic military requirements for such a war, and develops and outlines the force structure."[2] Maj. Christopher Gin points out in "Strategic Scholars: Educating Army Leaders at Foreign Staff Colleges," this issue of *Military Review*, that professional military study in Germany enhanced Wedemeyer's strategic perspective.



Gen. Albert Coady Wedemeyer (1897–1989), U.S. Army, served primarily in Asia during World War II. (Photo courtesy of U.S. War Department)

According to Kirkpatrick, with whom Wedemeyer collaborated in the 1980s, "Quantitative issues often preoccupy modern planners who try to figure the number of divisions, types and quantities of weapons, training, and deployment … . In fact, [these] are almost always variables that depend upon the social, political, military, and technological contexts of the day. Rather, therefore, than seeking numerical answers to constantly evolving questions, the modern planner must devise a rational approach to solving a problem that has endless and conflicting variables. …

"The prevailing political and military conditions decisively affect the possible choices open to the planner. … Any military plan, to be effective, must relate to attainable national objectives. … Mobilization planning cannot be considered distinct from operational and logistical planning, for all three must be components of any comprehensive strategic plan."[3]

The *New York Times* reported that in 1987, a few years before retired Gen. Wedemeyer died, British military historian John Keegan called him "one of the most intellectual and farsighted military minds America has ever produced."[4] Kirkpatrick describes Wedemeyer's plan as an "intellectual tour de force."[5]

Notes

1. Michelle Tan, "Army Lays Out Plan to Cut 40,000 Soldiers," *Army Times* website, 9 July 2015, accessed 17 January 2017, https://www.armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/07/09/army-outlines-40000-cuts/29923339/, summarizes downsizing plans begun in 2012.

2. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1992), 13–15, accessed 17 January 2017, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/093/93-10/CMH_Pub_93-10.pdf; app. A shows "The Army Portion of the Victory Plan."

3. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 2.

4. John Keegan, quoted in "Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, 92, Noted Military Planner for U.S.," *New York Times* Obituaries, 20 December 1989, accessed 12 January 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/obituaries/gen-albert-c-wedemeyer-92-noted-military-planner-for-us.html.

5. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 1.

complex environments described in *The Army Operating Concept*.[12]

The Education of a Strategic Leader

Like many Army senior officers entrusted with the highest responsibilities for the Nation's defense, Wedemeyer was a product of his studies. The foundation for his critical service and contribution to the Allied cause was his attendance at the Kriegsakademie from 1936 to 1938.[13] His experience in Berlin among America's future enemies, and the report he wrote upon his return, provided the basis of his credibility, intellect, and leadership potential that senior officers identified as rare but important traits, which they needed to create a winning strategy.

His time at the Kriegsakademie allowed him the first-hand opportunity to make note of German capabilities and doctrine that would have otherwise been known through conjecture, intelligence estimates, or second-hand information sources. He later told aspiring planners, "The strategic planner notes the capabilities of other nations and makes a comparative appraisal of his own available resources, and thus evolves flexible plans for the attainment of national objectives."[14] Because he was able to build a working subject-matter expertise on the enemy from his experiences at their staff college, he was able to contribute to the strategic planning process better than his peers. Were it not for this unique opportunity,

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and the knowledge manifested in Wedemeyer's report, it is unlikely that Marshall would have hand-selected Wedemeyer in 1939 for such a high position on the War Plans Division staff. Wedemeyer's insights went beyond just manning and equipment; they spoke to the soul of the enemy he had come to know.

In today's foreign staff college exchange programs, U.S. Army officers may interact with military students from countries with whom the United States does not have an official exchange program. Regardless of the potential for relationships to shift, a good understanding of partners is always important. Interaction at staff colleges offers an opportunity for soft-power influence, and it may even provide placement and access to information that future Army leaders may otherwise not have access to in such a personal way.[15] The value of the education is manifested in those graduates who draw on their experiences to make significant contributions during their careers.

Reflective Practitioners

This article draws from the results of the author's online, cross-sectional survey of Army officers who attended foreign staff colleges since 2005.[16] The purpose was to assess whether the staff college exchange program adds value to the Army. A key finding was that 95 percent of survey respondents reported their participation in the Schools of Other Nations program, the umbrella organization that administers overseas professional military education, provided value to the Army. The survey used content analysis to capture the value of their experiences in the context of when they attended the schools, and how those experiences affected their contributions to the Army in the following years.[17]

Results of the Survey

Out of the 176 foreign staff college graduates identified, ninety-four initially started the survey, with eighty-two completing it in varying amounts of detail to five objective demographics questions and seven open-ended questions.[18] The eighty-two officers who submitted completed surveys are referred to as "respondents" throughout this paper and are the only data the author draws from. Several comments from graduates of different Army commissioning year groups indicate those who applied for foreign staff college did so at a time when U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) attendance was open to all majors, as opposed to a board-selected group, thus creating a waiting list for attendance at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Unaffectionately referred to as the "no major left behind" years, many applicants to foreign staff colleges perceived CGSC to lack the prestige and rigor of a highly selective foreign staff college. When asked about why they chose a foreign staff college instead of CGSC, two common themes were a competitive educational opportunity not offered to everyone and a measured consideration for future career impact, as illustrated in the following comment:

> I elected to go to a foreign staff college for two reasons. The first reason was to be able to do something different during my career. I have not wanted to do the same thing as everyone else in the Army, but want to have unique experiences that most people in the United States are not able to experience. The second reason was the timing of when my branch manager had scheduled me to the U.S. ILE [intermediate-level education]. By attending a foreign school, I was able to attend a qualifying ILE, graduate from SAMS [School of Advanced Military Studies], complete a utilization tour, and complete a key development job prior to the primary selection board for lieutenant colonel.[19]

Another response highlights the same themes:

> Part of the decision included an awareness that potentially I would miss out on a portion of the standard education or even relationship building that my peers were receiving and had the opportunity to make at Leavenworth. However, when General Petraeus briefed my cohorts who were slated to attend foreign staff colleges, he mentioned that we would be well-postured and he discussed the "decathlete" concept of well-rounded leaders, and finished by communicating the idea that no one set path leads to success. Ultimately, I felt that the opportunity to attend a foreign staff college was simply an opportunity that my peers did not recognize or were even afraid to embark on.[20]

Eighty-six percent of respondents reported being moderately or very proficient in the host nation's language of instruction prior to attending their respective foreign staff colleges.[21] Furthermore, 89 percent received fewer than three months of formal language

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training prior to attending school.[22] Only two respondents said they were inadequately prepared to participate in class due to language limitations, indicating that the Schools of Other Nations screening criteria for language requirements prior to attending a foreign staff college are generally effective.[23]

Analyzing Value

Three of the twelve survey questions asked respondents to reflect on positive and negative aspects of their experience, and then comment on whether or not the experience added value to the Army. Unsurprisingly, 27 percent of open-ended negative comments centered on the opportunity cost of not interacting with U.S. Army peers.[24] While many enjoyed representing the Army abroad, some lamented their inability to expand their organizational network at CGSC. A typical response was, "I was not able to develop contacts within my peer group. I also missed out on opportunities to interview with unit chiefs of staff and Human Resource Command during their visits to Fort Leavenworth."[25] However, no comment explicitly stated in hindsight that the military student would give up the foreign staff college experience to attend CGSC, but two did advocate officers being allowed to complete both.[26]

Despite some frustrations, a majority of respondents found their experiences increased their value as staff officers. When asked what value the Army gained from sending them to a foreign staff college, most lauded the soft power they felt they were able to exert on host-country nationals, as well as other international students from less friendly nations such as China, Russia, Iran, and Syria. One respondent wrote, "Relationship building was invaluable. Putting a face to the U.S. Army often changed the host [nation's] foreign students' thoughts and perspectives on who we are as a military and as a people."[27] Fifty-nine percent of respondents regarded their foreign network of professionals as a valuable takeaway and believed they could leverage those relationships in future operations.[28]

A second positive theme from the survey was the contextual intelligence that an officer could later contribute to his or her future roles. Eighty-three percent of those surveyed indicated an increase in strategic thinking or regional expertise based on their experience.[29] One officer stated that the Army gained "an officer with a broader operational and strategic perspective who can rapidly build a multinational team and work in a complex, multinational environment."[30] Another wrote that he became "a more capable officer with more robust analytical skills and knowledge to enable [engagement] at the highest levels of operational and strategy roles."[31] Most comments like this centered on feeling better prepared for the future and more confident in their ability to operate "without U.S. infrastructure ... in an international environment."[32]

Of eighty-two respondents, 95 percent agreed that the Schools of Other Nations program added value to the Army.[33] This feedback is useful to evaluate the program holistically in a way that the Army as an institution does not seem to capture at the moment. One poignant comment stated, "This, like many programs, is on cruise control and not being used properly as an element of soft power or influence."[34] Another mentioned, "There was no feedback loop. After training concluded an [after action review] could have been required; lessons learned could have been harvested. Organizational and personal profiles could have been developed or updated."[35] By capturing a segment of reflections from ten years of experience, this research provides analysis that can lead to better optimization and higher-value returns to the Army.

Preparing for a Complex Future

Throughout his life, Albert Wedemeyer continued to reflect on his career of service, and he keenly identified persistent problems with how Americans approached strategy. Biographer Keith E. Eiler conducted an interview with Wedemeyer in 1982, in which this insightful exchange regarding strategic thinking occurred:

> [Eiler:] General, as you look back on the history of your time, what thoughts predominate? ... What can or should be done?
>
> [Wedemeyer:] Americans simply must become more forehanded and consistent in the way we manage our public affairs. As populations grow and the struggle for space and resources becomes more intense, a lot of heat is generated. We can't afford simply to sit back, let events take their course, and jump in with a military solution when a crisis gets out of hand. There are so many ways in which the course of events can be influenced without the use or threat of force. Economic, diplomatic, cultural, psychological, and other means are available in limitless variety. If all these "instruments of

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> The foreign staff college education experience develops both soft-power leverage and the contextual intelligence that strategic leaders need to be effective in a complex world.

national policy" are employed in a timely, coordinated, and imaginative way, in accordance with a reasonably steady game plan, there is good reason to hope for progress toward a better world without the scourge of war.
[Eiler:] I guess you are saying that we should all become strategists—in the broader sense of that term?
[Wedemeyer:] Precisely![36]

The general's decree strikes to the heart of the critical need for the right education for strategic leaders in the military. Wedemeyer, a man of common career beginnings, became more than the product of his own experience through a personal commitment to education, but that was only half of the equation the Army needed to reap the value he offered. The more important half was the Army's institutional commitment to growing strategic thinkers when it first established the educational exchange program, and then it selected Wedemeyer as the best candidate to attend. There was no prescient way for the Army to know the eventual return for sending Wedemeyer abroad, but by sending him, and then a stream of exchange officers annually to many countries, the Army maintained a strategic foothold—not through technology and firepower but through the contextual intelligence its officers gained while being educated abroad.[37]

The officer surveys conducted for this paper attest to the value of foreign staff college education. The soft-power leverage and contextual intelligence graduates gained, in most cases, readily translated into job placement and effectiveness. The topic of officer education to meet the Army's strategic challenges remains relevant and subject to debate. For example, in "The Centurion Mindset and the Army's Strategic Leader Paradigm," Jason Warren discusses the importance of improving how the Army manages the intellectual development of its leaders.[38] The foreign staff college education program offers an intellectual line of effort that can link the self-reflective centurions of today to the strategic masterminds the Army will need them to be in the future.

The Way Ahead

The foreign staff college education experience develops both soft-power leverage and the contextual intelligence that strategic leaders need to be effective in a complex world. Currently, the program is suboptimized because it has not expanded into areas where weighted national security interests lie. Of note, in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines do not offer staff college education to their army officers, though their officers routinely attend CGSC at Fort Leavenworth. These countries represent three out of four U.S. security treaty allies in USPACOM, with Japan being the fourth. In Europe, there is also a noticeable dearth of opportunities in former Soviet Bloc states, though more substantial opportunities exist in Western Europe. There are currently fewer than ten participants in most other combatant commands, with none at schools in countries included in U.S. Africa Command. While any major program changes necessitate coordination, funding, and agreement beyond the scope of this paper, it may be worthwhile to explore how a future program that could garner more value for the Army might look. Based on the key findings of the survey responses, the following recommendations suggest a way ahead.

Recommendation 1: The program should better align with foreseeable threats in light of *The Army Operating Concept*, specifically in Asia and Eastern Europe. The onus is on the theater armies to use their existing soft power with partnered nations to host more numerous and frequent Army staff college students. This thrust should be accompanied with cogent narrative about the benefits for reciprocal education for professional officer populations, centered on shared national security interests that include alliances, interoperability of forces, and potential enemies.

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Recommendation 2: The resident CGSC course should be a prerequisite for attendance at a foreign staff college. This would ensure that Army officers have already been competitively selected for professional education based on their performance and promotion potential. It would also provide a one-year, standardized education in American doctrine prior to being sent abroad. Selected officers at CGSC would still have the opportunity to form a network of peers that many in the survey mentioned they missed out on by attending only a foreign staff college.

Recommendation 3: The Army should consider making the program automatically available to the top 10 percent of each graduating CGSC class, roughly one hundred students per year. An order-of-merit list at CGSC is already an annual endeavor and could easily identify the top contenders for the program, but potential to represent the heart and intellect of the U.S. Army abroad may be more readily apparent in person than on the Officer Record Brief electronic resume. A final selection committee comprised of Schools of Other Nations representatives, CGSC instructors, and representatives from the different combatant commands could conduct in-person interviews to assess the best-suited officers for each school and region.

Recommendation 4: Organizational leaders must control the internal, strategic narrative. Senior leader support will be necessary to reassure selected officers that their broadened education is truly valued and that their professional timelines would be bolstered, rather than adversely affected, should they be selected to attend a foreign staff college. The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) at the School of Advanced Military Studies is heralded as a worthwhile year of education for those selected to attend precisely because of the incentivized value it adds to both the individual and the organization. AMSP students are competitively selected, so they are seen as the elite of CGSC. They typically forego immediate key developmental positions for a year of education, followed by a year of utilization. Their fears for promotion potential are assuaged by the value the institution places on the experience, which is echoed in the rhetoric of senior commanders, and reflected in the data of AMSP graduates who are selected for battalion command in greater percentage than their nongraduate peers.[39] In order for the Schools of Other Nations program to reach its potential, it must appreciate that perceptions of the program's value affect both the quality of the applicant pool and the future effectiveness of its graduates.

The Army consistently states that producing adaptive, broadly educated officers is a strategic priority.[40] Foreign staff college education, deliberately arranged around the world in common purpose, increases the probability of strategically adept leaders who can guide the organization in a complex world. It also makes those military leaders better prepared for contextualizing the national security effects of military options to civilian leaders. ■

Notes

Epigraph. "The Army University White Paper: Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex World" (U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015).

1. Christopher Gin, *Soldiers, Scholars, Diplomats: Educating Strategic Leaders at Foreign Staff Colleges* (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies [SAMS] Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2016).

2. Foreign staff colleges are defined and limited in this study to those schools in other nations that train midcareer, field-grade officers for further service, and are not to be combined with national war colleges that typically educate more senior officers.

3. Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing to Consider the Nomination of General Mark A. Milley, USA, to be Chief of Staff of the Army*, 114th Cong. (Washington, DC, 21 July 2015), 31, accessed 4 January 2017, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-64%20-%207-21-15.pdf.

4. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2014).

5. Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, ed. Robert B. Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 43.

6. Gen. David G. Perkins, "Army Operating Concept: Delivering the Future," *Army Magazine*, October 2014, 68, accessed 4 January 2017, http://www1.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2014/Documents/11November14/Perkins_GRBook2014.pdf. According to Perkins, commander of TRADOC, Army priorities include "optimizing soldier and team performance" and "developing adaptive and innovative leaders and institutions to understand and operate in complex environments."

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7. Tarun Khanna, "A Case for Contextual Intelligence," *Management International Review* 55, no. 2 (April 2015): 181–90. See also Khanna, "Contextual Intelligence," *Harvard Business Review* 92, no. 5 (September 2014): 58–68.

8. "Captain Wedemeyer Report on the Kriegsakademie," 11 July 1938, Albert C. Wedemeyer Papers, box 6, folder 35, page 12, Hoover Institution Archives.

9. Ibid., page 68.

10. "Henry L. Stimson letter to President Roosevelt," 2 March 1942, Albert C. Wedemeyer Papers, box 71, folder 6, Hoover Institution Archives. Stimson also said of Wedemeyer, "Colonel Wedemeyer is one of the very best officers we have in the General Staff. He is the right hand man of the Chief of the War Plans Division and has the confidence of everybody from Marshall down," underlining the effectiveness of an educated but relatively junior officer.

11. "Memorandum to Colonel Eiler," 9 April 1985, Albert C. Wedemeyer Papers, box 6, folder 35, Hoover Institution Archives; preface page to "Captain Wedemeyer Report on the Kriegsakademie," 11 July 1938, Hoover Institution Archives.

12. TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040.*

13. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1992), 13–15, accessed 17 January 2017, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/093/93-10/CMH_Pub_93-10.pdf; app. A shows "The Army Portion of the Victory Plan."

14. "U.S. Postwar Strategy," speech to the National War College, 17 February 1949, Albert C. Wedemeyer Papers, box 8, folder 5, page 5, Hoover Institution Archives.

15. Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power and Higher Education," *Educause Review* (January 2005): 34. Nye defines his concept of "soft power" as "The ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments." All of the author's references to soft power in this paper adopt Nye's definition.

16. Christopher Gin, "Foreign Staff College Graduate Survey," online questionnaire, conducted January to February 2016, as reported in Gin, *Soldiers, Scholars Diplomats: Educating Strategic Leaders at Foreign Staff Colleges.* This survey was conducted as part of the author's SAMS monograph research. U.S. Army Human Resources Command provided contact information for officers who attended a foreign staff college between 2005 and 2015. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College provided quality assurance and quality control for the survey, assisted in its distribution via email, and received the results. Per the statement of consent for participation in the survey, the participants remain anonymous. Per Arlene Fink, *How to Conduct Surveys: A Step-by-Step Guide,* 4th ed. (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2009), 66–67, in a cross-sectional survey, data are collected at one time.

17. Fink, *How to Conduct Surveys,* 89, defines content analysis as "a method of analyzing qualitative data for the purpose of drawing inferences about the meaning of recorded information such as the open-ended responses and comments made by survey respondents."

18. Gin, "Foreign Staff College Graduate Survey." See R. M. Groves, "Experiments in Producing Nonresponse Bias," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70, no. 5 (2006): 720–36, as quoted in Floyd J. Fowler, *Survey Research Methods,* 4th ed. (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2009), 177. For this survey, only a 53 percent response rate of the sample population was made available for contact. Although error due to nonresponse can be large, the amount of error is not highly correlated with the response rate. Therefore, it is hard to say when a response rate is too low to be of use. The author concedes a credibility concession with a seemingly high nonresponse rate, but feels this compromise does not essentially detract from the value of the survey responses.

19. Gin, "Foreign Staff College Graduate Survey."

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Keith Eiler, "The Man Who Planned the Victory," *Hoover Digest* 4 (30 October 2001), accessed 5 January 2017, http://www.hoover.org/research/man-who-planned-victory. Eiler's original interview notes are available in the Inventory of the Keith E. Eiler Papers, 1880-2003, box 1, folder 4, pages 44–45, "Interview by Keith E. Eiler with General A. C. Wedemeyer draft of 29 November 1982," Hoover Institution Archives.

37. Jörg Muth, *Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II* (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2011), 305. Several other American officers also attended the Kriegsakademie in the same period as Wedemeyer, and also produced reports of their experience.

38. Jason W. Warren, "The Centurion Mindset and the Army's Strategic Leader Paradigm," *Parameters* 45, no 3. (2015): 27–38. The "centurion mindset," embodied in Gen. Creighton Abrams, discounts the tradition of great American generals who were broadly experienced and educated.

39. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, "SAMS Overview," PowerPoint presentation, 3 August 2015, slide 6, accessed 4 February 2016, https://partis.leavenworth.army.mil/student/SitePages/Home.aspx. Data under the heading "US Army Command Selection Analysis & Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) Graduates," show that from 2012 to 2014, AMSP graduates were selected for the primary command select list at a 17 percent, 16 percent, and 10 percent higher frequency than their peers without AMSP, respectively. AMSP Army active alumni also include three generals, eight lieutenant generals, twelve major generals, and fifteen brigadier generals. The concluding message is that attending AMSP does not hurt its graduates' careers.

40. David G. Perkins, *Strategic Business Plan for the Army University* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 2015).

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U.S. Army soldiers from the Alpha Battery, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment, launch the first of two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands 10 September 2013 during a successful intercept test. The test was conducted by the Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Test Agency, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and U.S. Pacific Command. The test, designated Flight Test Operational-01, stressed the ability of the THAAD weapon systems to function as part of a layered defense architecture to defeat two near-simultaneous ballistic missile targets. (Photo courtesy of Missile Defense Agency)

How to Build an Armadillo

Lessons Learned from the First Forward-Deployed THAAD Battery

Lt. Col. Jonathan C. Stafford, U.S. Army

In the spring of 2013, the U.S. government faced a provocation cycle from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which, for the first time, involved a direct and viable threat to the U.S. territory of Guam.[1] In response to this threat, the military deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the island. THAAD is the Army's newest and most advanced missile defense system, and it has proven itself to be an effective deterrent to North Korean aggression. Since its first operational deployment, many important lessons have been learned that military leaders should use to plan for future deployments of the THAAD system.

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Background

The DPRK has executed repeated provocation cycles over the decades that have caused various types of military responses. Historically, these provocations focused on conventional military actions against its rival, the Republic of Korea. However, since his December 2011 assumption of leadership, DPRK ruler Kim Jong-un has used his country's growing arsenal of ballistic missiles as his preferred choice for provocation cycles. During the eighteen-year rule of his father, Kim Jong-il, there were eighteen missile tests. In comparison, during Kim Jong-un's four-year reign there have been twenty-five missile tests.[2]

Though most of the U.S. homeland is out of range of North Korea's current ballistic missile inventory, the U.S. territory of Guam is located approximately two thousand miles from the DPRK. Possibly believing they had identified a potential U.S. vulnerability, DPRK military officials made repeated threats against Guam as part of their spring 2013 provocation cycle. The distance between Guam and the DPRK puts the island's 161,000 U.S. citizens within the range of the DPRK's ballistic missiles.[3] The threats of a North Korean missile attack were taken very seriously on Guam as air-raid and shelter-in-place drills were conducted on the island.[4] Furthermore, Guam's governor, Eddie Calvo, appealed directly to then Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to deploy missile defenses to defend the island.[5]

In response, the U.S. military initially deployed an Aegis ship equipped with SM-3 missiles to defend Guam.[6] However, due to the persistent North Korean ballistic missile threat to the island, a sustainable long-term alternative was needed. Fortunately for Pentagon planners, the THAAD system had just received a conditional material release for two batteries and a transition of operations to the Army in February 2012.[7]

Subsequently, in March 2013, a decision was made by the National Command Authority to deploy a THAAD battery to Guam to protect the homeland of the United States from an immediate and emergent threat of a missile attack from North Korea.[8] In early April 2013, the secretary of defense directed the Army to deploy the 4th Air Defense Artillery Unit, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (A/4) THAAD battery out of Fort Bliss, Texas, to Guam. The A/4 THAAD battery was placed under the command of the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), headquartered in Hawaii. The A/4 THAAD battery assumed the defense of Guam mission on an expeditionary basis on 25 April 2013. The deployment had special historic significance since the soldiers were the first active-duty air defenders to deploy to Guam since World War II.[9]

Since this first operational deployment of THAAD, the Army has fielded a total of five batteries, with four already rotated to conduct the defense of Guam mission. The fifth THAAD battery became a permanently stationed unit on Guam in 2016.[10] In the next two years, two additional THAAD batteries will bring the fielded total to seven.[11] These additional batteries have provided military planners the capacity to support deployments to areas in need of the system's unique capabilities. Additionally, it has been announced that South Korea was designated as the next location for a forward-stationed THAAD battery.[12]

Notwithstanding the deployment of these batteries, as other adversaries continue to advance their ballistic missile capabilities, the demand for THAAD will only increase. This demand means military planners need to learn the special requirements to deploy a THAAD battery now, rather than waiting until a decision to deploy is made. A study of the first operational deployment of THAAD to Guam is the best place to begin learning these planning requirements. The most salient lessons learned are noted below.

Command and Control/Coordination of Support

First, the command and control infrastructure for the unit needs to be developed before any decision is made to deploy a THAAD battery. The first part of developing command and control is building the organizational command structure. For the THAAD battery on Guam, a headquarters element called Task Force Talon was established. The task force was composed of personnel from the 94th AAMDC in Hawaii. The Task Force Talon staff was composed of six noncommissioned officers, five staff officers, a sergeant major, and a lieutenant colonel who commands the unit. Most of the personnel conduct one-year temporary change-of-station tours to Guam from Hawaii. The task force headquarters executes all the functions expected of a battalion staff, such as processing personnel actions, providing intelligence support, planning operations, and coordinating logistics.

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U.S. Army Pacific commander Gen. Vincent Brooks speaks with soldiers of the 4th Air Defense Artillery Unit, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (A/4) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 18 August 2013 about personnel and operational issues during his visit to the unit at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The A/4 THAAD deployed to Guam in April 2013 as a part of the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command Task Force Talon Mission. (Photo by Angela Kershner, U.S. Army Pacific PAO)

The headquarters staff also serves as the organization that integrates THAAD operations with the Air Force's 36th Wing on Andersen Air Force Base and with Joint Region Marianas, which has executive-level installation management responsibilities on Guam. Integration of the battery with the 36th Wing and Joint Region Marianas has been extremely important because those organizations provide the majority of the logistical support for the task force, such as with lodging, dining facility support, medical services, and bulk fuel. All this support required the signing of various inter-service support agreements that were developed by the Task Force Talon headquarters. The task force headquarters also conducted coordination with outside organizations such as the Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life-Cycle Management Command, that provide external support to the THAAD battery.

Preparation for Visitor Protocol

Another somewhat unusual, but important, function of the Task Force Talon staff that needs to be considered in THAAD battery deployment planning is support arrangements for distinguished visitors to the site. The high-profile mission of Task Force Talon has made it a key location for senior leaders to visit. Past visitors have included the governor of Guam, congressional delegations, news media, senior Department of Defense leaders, and foreign dignitaries.[13] Without support from the Task Force Talon staff, the captain that commands the THAAD battery and the headquarters platoon personnel would have to execute all the protocol missions associated with distinguished visitors, a function for which they lack the experience and personnel to properly conduct. Most importantly, diverting assets for protocol purposes with higher headquarters' support would take away from the battery's main focus, which is executing its real-world defense of Guam mission.

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This is why it is imperative that as soon as the intent to deploy a THAAD battery is confirmed, the higher headquarters be identified as well. In the case of Task Force Talon, the 94th AAMDC personnel directorate (G-1) immediately requested a derivative unit identification code to establish a higher headquarters on Guam. It is important to execute this request as soon as possible since the process takes time to complete. For example, Task Force Talon was on the ground on Guam and operating before the task force was officially recognized with a derivative unit identification code because of the rapid deployment of the THAAD battery. The Task Force Talon commander did not officially assume command until the derivative unit identification code was received.

Communications Architecture

The next part of command and control involves developing an adequate communications architecture to support THAAD battery operations. It is critical for THAAD battery operators to be able to communicate with the greater missile defense network established in the Indo–Asia–Pacific region to coordinate fires properly. Being located on an existing Air Force base allowed terrestrial communications lines for external communications connectivity to be run to the THAAD battery's location. However, for such an important real-world mission the THAAD battery required a redundant communications capability. The deployment of a Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T) system and its accompanying squad of soldiers from the 307th Signal Battalion out of Hawaii provided this redundancy for "Site Armadillo." The SMART-T is a Humvee-mounted extremely high-frequency satellite terminal that provides robust, jam-resistant communications in support of the THAAD battery.[14]

Considering the increasing cyber and electronic warfare threats to military communications, the SMART-T is a critical capability that ensures the THAAD battery is always able to communicate with the greater missile defense network in the Indo–Asia–Pacific region. For future deployments of THAAD, military planners will need to determine provisions for redundant and secure communications for the THAAD battery.

Site Requirements

When THAAD was designated to deploy to Guam, one of the most obvious issues military planners had to determine was where to put the THAAD battery. The proper placement of a THAAD battery is critical to ensuring it is located in a position that provides the highest probability of intercepting enemy tactical ballistic missiles. For Guam, the enemy tactical ballistic missile threat to the island was coming from the northwest, where the DPRK is located. Fortunately, northwest Guam was largely unoccupied since it is home to an abandoned airfield. The airfield, known as Northwest Field, was constructed after the military recaptured Guam from the occupying Imperial Japanese military in July 1944.[15] Now, seventy-two years later, the historic runways of Northwest Field have become the perfect location for deploying a THAAD battery.

The most complex piece of equipment to plan site requirements around is the THAAD battery's AN/TPY-2 radar.[16] The radar is considered the world's most powerful ground-mobile X-band radar. The radar antenna is also what gives the THAAD location on Guam the name Site Armadillo. When the AN/TPY-2 radar antenna is in a stowed configuration, it looks like the hard surface of an armadillo's shell.

This powerful radar requires a very firm surface for transport and emplacement. The low ground clearance and sensitive equipment inside the radar require that a solid road be used during transport. This means that a thorough reconnaissance of the roads identified for transport needs to be completed prior to the deployment. The perfect THAAD site is of no use if the radar cannot be safely transported to the location due to poor road conditions.

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Once at its final destination, the THAAD radar needs to be emplaced on a firm surface in order to acquire objects hundreds of miles above the Earth's surface. For example, the radar would not be able to accurately track these objects if it was sitting on a soft surface and slowly sinking into the mud. The seven-decade-old runway tarmac on Northwest Field proved to be a suitable surface to emplace the THAAD radar.

Besides planning for a firm surface, an additional consideration is that safe keep-out zones for personnel and aircraft need to be maintained around the radar. The powerful radiation from the AN/TPY-2 radar could have negative effects on people's health and could damage aircraft if safe keep-out zones are not enforced. The Army Techniques Publication 3-01.91, *Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Techniques* manual, lists the features of safe keep-out zones. These zones range from one hundred meters for troops up to 5,500 meters for aircraft carrying munitions.[17]

In keeping with this guide, due to the flight operations of nearby Andersen Air Force Base and Guam's Won Pat International Airport, a temporary flight restriction was established around Northwest Field along with other safety measures to ensure no aircraft flew within the radar's safe keep-out zone.[18] Additionally, the THAAD launcher also was given a back blast safety keep-out zone that was a three-hundred-meter semicircle around the rear of the launcher and eight hundred meters in front of it. For the THAAD battery on Guam, HESCO barriers and razor wire were constructed to enforce the safe keep-out zones for personnel and equipment. Maintaining and enforcing such keep-out zones will be a critical planning requirement for any future THAAD deployments.

Radio Frequency Clearance and Management

Besides being a safety consideration, the powerful X-band radar, along with other emitters from the THAAD battery, requires frequency clearance. Without proper frequency clearance and management, a THAAD battery has the possibility of interfering with the operation of other civilian and government frequencies used in the area. Due to THAAD operating in a remote area of Guam, frequency clearance was able to be properly coordinated with few issues. However, future deployments of THAAD could require it to emplace in or around more urbanized areas. The more urbanized a THAAD operating location is, the more challenging the frequency clearance process will be.

Proper Grounding of Equipment

The brains of the THAAD radar is the THAAD fire control and communications (TFCC). The unit's soldiers operate the TFCC from shelters, which are located in four specialized light medium tactical vehicles. The TFCC, THAAD radar, and launchers all require appropriate grounding.

Proper grounding of the equipment ended up being an issue initially for THAAD on Guam because of the coral rock directly below the surface. The coral rock was difficult to penetrate with grounding rods and did not provide the recommended grounding for the equipment. The installation of a grounding grid for the TFCC and the THAAD radar and the construction of launcher pads with appropriate grounding within the concrete resolved these issues on Site Armadillo. Future THAAD sites will need to conduct surveys of the site's soil to determine if it meets the recommended grounding requirements for THAAD equipment.

Power Source

A final site consideration is determining the need for a long-term power source. The THAAD battery was originally designed to conduct short-term deployments in support of the warfighter and then redeploy back to its home station. However, for THAAD on Guam, the mission became an enduring one due to the persistent missile threat from North Korea. One result was that the tactical generators on Site Armadillo had to run twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. This heavy usage meant extra maintenance had to be conducted to keep the generators operational. The maintenance became challenging because the THAAD battery was assigned only one generator mechanic. Also, the maintenance challenges only increased when additional generators were needed to power the site security cameras, communications equipment, and life-support trailers.

To reduce the generator maintenance burden, Task Force Talon was able to acquire a Mobile Electric Power 810A generator to power Site Armadillo from a single power source. This prime power source allowed all the tactical generators on the site to be powered down and

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The first elements of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system arrive in the Republic of Korea (ROK) 6 March 2017. U.S. Forces Korea continues its progress in fulfilling the ROK–U.S. Alliance decision to install the THAAD system on the Korean Peninsula as a defensive measure in response to ongoing provocative North Korean missile tests. (Photo courtesy of 7th Air Force PAO)

serviced after two years of near continuous use. It also had the side benefit of improving the quality of life on Site Armadillo due to the decrease in generator noise.

However, relying on tactical generators should not be regarded as a permanent solution. As part of the planning process for future THAAD deployments, a plan for long-term power generation to sustain a THAAD site will need to be developed. Depending on tactical generators for long-term operations is not a sustainable course of action. Prime power generators or, if available, commercial power, are options that should be explored for the long-term power needs of future THAAD sites.

Environmental Considerations

Due to the remote nature of Site Armadillo and the availability of the abandoned runways, the site considerations were easily resolved for the deployment of THAAD to Guam. However, some things that would prove to be far more challenging were the environmental considerations.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that all branches of the government give proper consideration to the environment prior to undertaking any major federal action.[19] Since Guam is a U.S. territory, the Department of Defense had to comply with the NEPA guidelines as part of any THAAD permanent stationing action on Guam.

This required the Department of Defense to conduct an environmental assessment (EA) to document the environmental impacts associated with the operation of a permanently stationed THAAD battery on Guam. The EA is an extremely detailed document that looks at air quality, noise pollution, water resources, biological resources, cultural resources, hazardous materials, socioeconomic impacts, and a host of other factors that are part of any stationing action.[20] If the EA determines that the permanent

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stationing of THAAD will not have significant environmental impacts, a finding of no significant impact will be issued. A finding of no significant impact is a document that presents the reasons why the EA concluded that there are no significant environmental impacts for the project.

Along with complying with NEPA requirements, THAAD on Guam had to comply with local environmental regulations. For example, the previously mentioned installation of a grounding grid required a well-drilling permit from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency.[21] The THAAD radar has grounding rods for the radar that are nine feet long (in three three-foot sections) and one-half inch in diameter.[22] Due to the coral rock below the surface, a drill was required to install the grounding rods. In order to drill the grounding rods into the ground, the local vendor had to secure a well-drilling permit from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency that cost the task force thousands of dollars to purchase.

Community Relations

Another environmental consideration is the impact on-site noise will have on local communities. The THAAD radar is powered by two powerful prime power units that can generate noise in excess of the eighty-five-decibel level, which can cause hearing damage with prolonged exposure.[23] Fortunately, the isolation of Site Armadillo prevented any noise issues with the local community. However, at a forward-based radar site that uses the AN/TPY-2 in Kyoga-Misaki, Japan, noise pollution has been a serious point of contention between the Army and the local community.

The issue was contentious enough that then Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani made a visit to the U.S. base at Kyoga-Misaki in December 2015 as part of a public relations campaign to show the local community that all efforts were being made to reduce noise.[24] The installation of muffling devices and sound barriers eliminated most of the low-frequency noise on Kyoga-Misaki. These measures, together with future announced plans to hook up the site to commercial power to fully eliminate noise pollution, have done much to allay community concerns. For future THAAD sites, military planners need to determine if the noise from the prime power units will have an adverse impact on local communities and develop ways to reduce it, like at Kyoga-Misaki.

Though most of the environmental considerations mentioned resulted from compliance with NEPA due to the location being on U.S. soil and under its jurisdiction, future THAAD deployments will likely be to areas external to the United States, which would fall outside the jurisdiction of the NEPA. However, planners will still be required to identify any potential environmental regulations that will need to be complied with before a THAAD deployment. Likewise, a campaign to educate the public about THAAD will also be needed. For example, due to negative media coverage about the possible environmental impacts of THAAD in South Korea, various political figures have come out against the deployment.[25]

On Guam, Task Force Talon has been able to avoid such criticism by proactively engaging the public and the island's political leadership about the deployment of the THAAD system. The task force leadership conducted a series of town halls in local villages to educate and receive feedback from the public about the permanent stationing of THAAD.[26] The task force also participated in major local events, sponsored schools, and hosted site visits for local dignitaries to strengthen bonds between the task force and the local community. These bonds built trust with the local community and the island's political leadership to support the permanency of THAAD on Guam.[27]

Security Requirements

After working out if a location can support a THAAD battery, the next thing planners need to consider is how to secure the potential site. Due to the unique nature of THAAD being a strategic asset, for security, it falls under Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Instruction (SI) 538-02 (classified), *Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) System Security Level (SSL) Designation*. Inside SI 538-2 it clearly identifies physical security requirements such as the fencing, lighting, and sensors needed to secure a THAAD site. The original expeditionary deployment of THAAD caused the site to be secured with nonpermanent physical security features such as concertina wire and wooden guard towers. The reason more rugged physical security structures could not be built on Site Armadillo initially was because of the pending

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environmental assessment. Once the EA is complete, permanent fencing, concrete guard towers, and other physical security enhancements can be constructed.

The expeditionary physical security infrastructure became a major concern when Typhoon Dolphin hit Guam in May 2015 and destroyed some of the temporary security infrastructure.[28] Powerful storms are a regular occurrence on Guam, which makes building permanent infrastructure for a long-term presence on the island a priority. For future THAAD sites, military planners will need to complete an assessment to determine what permanent physical security enhancements are required by the STRATCOM instruction and then develop a course of action to properly secure the site.

The STRATCOM instruction also identifies the amount of personnel needed to secure a THAAD site. Since a THAAD battery does not have enough personnel to conduct its missile defense mission and still comply with the SI 538-2 security requirements, it has to be augmented with a security force (SECFOR).

To comply with the instruction's security requirements, U.S. Army Pacific deploys a SECFOR company on a four-to six-month rotation to Guam to defend Site Armadillo.[29] The SECFOR units supporting this task have ranged from military police to artillerymen, engineers, and infantrymen. Future deployments of THAAD will require a SECFOR, and the size of the element will depend on the security infrastructure in place around the site. More personnel are needed to secure an expeditionary site compared to a permanent site.

Once a SECFOR unit is established, the security personnel will need to be well trained in the escalation of force. In all operations, the starting point for engagement criteria is the standing rules of engagement (SROE) and standing rules for the use of force (SRUF). The definitions for these terms are found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/ Standing Rules for the Use of Force*, which explains the distinct difference between SROE and SRUF.[30]

The SROE from the CJCSI 3121.01B provide the inherent right of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment. The SROE are designed to provide a common template for development and implementation of rules of engagement for the full range of military operations, from peacekeeping to war, when outside the territory of the United States. Within the U.S. territory, the SROE apply only to air and maritime homeland defense missions. Included in the SROE are SRUF, which apply to land-based homeland defense missions within the territory of the United States. This means the SROE apply only to the air defense personnel regarding use of their THAAD weapon system, and the SRUF apply to the SECFOR personnel.

The distinction between the two caused some initial delays in understanding the SROE for THAAD and the escalation of force authorized for the SECFOR personnel when the unit first deployed to Guam. For future THAAD sites, planners will need to closely work with the legal community and confirm that the correct kill chain for THAAD is written into the deployment order. Additionally, planners will need to develop an internal standard operating procedure that clearly depicts what escalation of force measures are appropriate, how they are used, and when the use of deadly force is authorized for the SECFOR unit.

Conclusion

As adversaries continue to build and proliferate their ballistic missile capabilities, the demand for THAAD will only increase. In order to meet the demand, military planners must become familiar with some of the complexities involved with deploying a THAAD battery. Deploying a THAAD battery requires some unique planning considerations when compared to other more common air defense systems such as the Patriot system. The first operational deployment of THAAD to Site Armadillo on Guam provided many important operational lessons to better plan for future THAAD deployments. Not all planning considerations for THAAD can be described in this paper due to security classification reasons, but planning for the command and control, site requirements, environmental considerations, and security for a THAAD site is where planners need to start in order build their own "armadillo." ■

Editor's note: *An earlier version of this article was previously published as a* Military Review *online exclusive 10 March 2017.*

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
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REVIEW ESSAY



Playing to the Edge

American Intelligence in the Age of Terror

Michael V. Hayden, Penguin, New York, 2016, 452 pages

Maj. Charles J. Scheck, U.S. Army

Support for the intelligence community swings like a pendulum. Michael V. Hayden, in his book *Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror*, reflects such swings by openly describing the ups and downs of his career in that community with candor and splendid prose. The memoir is detailed enough to engross a Beltway insider and is engaging enough to invite in the average American. The title, *Playing to the Edge*, references athletes playing so close to the line they get chalk dust on their cleats. This is a metaphor Hayden uses to demonstrate and defend his use of every tool and authority within legitimate bounds, including this book. A retired four-star general, Hayden retells stories with the utmost competence and humility. He gives clarity to the extremely complex issues he faced in his career. Focusing on his impact at the National Security Agency (NSA) and on his leadership at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during a tumultuous time allows for a brief review of his career, including how his intelligence affected the fight against al-Qaida and what landmark decisions were made during his tenure.

Beginning in 1999, Hayden's mission as he took over the NSA was to "shake things up"; he certainly accomplished that goal. The NSA, the primary objective of which is to track electronic data during transmission, lost 30 percent of its operating budget in the 1990s. During that same period, Hayden reports that the global telecommunications revolution was in full swing: the number of mobile cell phones increased from 16 million to 741 million, Internet users increased from 4 million to 361 million, and international telephone traffic grew from 38 billion minutes to over 100 billion minutes. Upon taking the reins, Hayden was confronted with two conflicting challenges: the first was antiquated technology that threatened operational deafness in less than a decade, and the second was the leaden bureaucracy that was driven by the fear of omnipotence within the organization itself. Hayden took on both issues with strength and poise, but his role in history was solidified on the fateful day of 11 September 2001.


The NSA admitted it had no prior knowledge of the attacks, but, under Hayden, the pendulum started to swing. As Hayden states, it is easy to judge intelligence agencies for not doing enough in times of crisis and for overstepping their bounds when we as a nation feel safe. In a telling moment two days after 9/11, while speaking to an anxious workforce, he issued several reminders. The first was that the balance between security and liberty was fragile, but that our country was formed on the notion that liberty demands priority. The second was that in that moment of America's call for justice, "more than three hundred million Americans wish they had your job."

In the weeks, months, and years to follow, Hayden

Maj. Charles J. Scheck, U.S. Army, graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 2016. He is currently assigned to the 1st Space Brigade at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.

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CALL FOR PAPERS



The *Journal of Military Learning* (*JML*) is a peer-reviewed semiannual publication that seeks to support the military's effort to improve education and training for the U.S. Army and the overall profession of arms. The *JML* invites practitioners, researchers, academics, and military professionals to submit manuscripts that address the issues and challenges of adult education and training, such as education technology, adult learning models and theory, distance learning, training development, and other subjects relevant to the field. Book reviews of published relevant works are also encouraged.

To view the inaugural edition of the *JML* now available online, visit Army University Press at http://armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Journal-of-Military-Learning/.

We are now accepting manuscripts for the October 2017 edition. Manuscripts should be submitted to usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.army-press@mail.mil by 30 June 2017. Submissions should be between 3,500 and 5,000 words and supported by research, evident through the citation of sources. We are particularly interested in articles addressing competency-based education, the theme of this year's Army University education symposium to be held in June 2017.

For detailed author submission guidelines, visit the *JML* page on the Army University Press website at http://armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Journal-of-Military-Learning/.

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would push the envelope to get every last bit of intelligence the letter of the law would allow. He spoke clearly on Stellarwind—the push to gather intelligence inside the United States originating from or heading to foreign sources—an effort fully supported and encouraged by President George W. Bush. That intelligence was a powerful tool, and hopefully, history will allow a far more definitive look at how much that single action leveraged our intelligence community once more information is eventually declassified and released.

In a war where the enemy was extremely hard to find yet relatively easy to eliminate, Hayden made another, but less public, contribution at the NSA to bring intelligence to the front lines. He made clear to his teams that they were not a supporting element but rather a dynamic fighting force. Their intelligence became real time, and the NSA built systems based on customer needs and individual rules of engagement. Retelling a conversation with the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, where he was being asked for more intelligence, Hayden said, "Charlie, let me give you another way of thinking about this. You give me a little action, and I'll give you a lot more intelligence." In other words, operational moves force the enemy to move and communicate, allowing for intelligence that is much more complete, and making for a successful working arrangement with organizations such as U.S. Special Operations Command.

While Hayden's goal was to shake up the NSA, in contrast, he asserts, his mission at the CIA was to settle things down. The CIA was in shambles after failing to uncover the 9/11 plot, fumbling over the lack of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, and folding under the public pressure due to its use of enhanced interrogation techniques. Hayden very humbly admits failure in the lack of information regarding the 9/11 plot and in simply "getting it wrong" in terms of WMD. He did not accept the passing of the blame to the White House on that issue and was very eager to take responsibility first at the NSA and again at the CIA. Interrogation techniques, however, proved to be a challenge, where public opinion and the ever-critical press once again stunted his efforts.

Hayden worked to build consensus on the CIA's new program by laying out ground rules for who was held, where and for how long they were held, and what techniques were used for their interrogations. With the utmost respect for the decisions that were made just after 9/11, Hayden admits that it was easier for him at that time to take tactics off the table because the American people had forgotten the fear they felt in the days following 9/11. He also was quick to defend his interrogators, whom he described as performing their jobs out

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of a "sense of duty, not enthusiasm." Eventually, new guidelines were set, leaving six of the thirteen enhanced interrogation techniques in place. Hayden candidly gave his opinion to summarize this decision: "America (not just CIA) was largely out of the detention and interrogation business. We had finally succeeded in making it so legally difficult and so politically dangerous to grab and hold someone that we would simply default to the kill switch to take terrorists off the battlefield."

The unfortunate truth is that most of Hayden's decisions had little to do with keeping America safe and much to do with keeping Americans appeased. Handling the press and the politics associated with these huge issues was a never-ending task. His opinion of the press, which was often unfavorable, is delivered respectfully but honestly. In reference to the battle between the government's responsibility to keep secrets and the public's right to know, Hayden offers up a quote from David Ignatius: "We journalists usually try to argue that we have carefully weighed the pros and cons and believe that the public benefits of disclosure outweigh potential harm. The problem is that we aren't fully qualified to make those judgments."

Hayden's career was littered with such decisions. The months in 2006 leading up to "The Surge" in Iraq were no different. Hayden declared that "we had created tactical successes but without strategic effect," and he admittedly wrestled with which action would cause the least harm, pulling troops out or keeping them in. He spoke at great length about the struggles in the Maliki government and the reasons it ultimately failed despite Bush's dedication to its cause. Ironically, as in most of his recounts, the declaration of success or failure was not as important as defining the circumstances surrounding the decision and the intentions of the decision makers.

Overall, *Playing to the Edge* provides the consumer with an excellent background on the intelligence community and a candid version of some of the toughest decisions made post-9/11. The book does not boast about the accomplishments of the CIA, the NSA, or of Michael Hayden but rather aims to generate public support by authoritatively informing readers. It was unfortunate that this book had to be written, but in general, the intelligence community should be able to protect their agents and fellow residents under a veil of secrecy and not divulge information that is potentially harmful to future endeavors. Hayden states in the book, "Secrecy in a democracy is not a grant of power, but a grant of trust." In my opinion, Hayden goes a great distance to earn that trust—perhaps even too far. ■



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The U.S. Army is a learning organization, and it is constantly adapting to the technological, military, and strategic conditions of our times. Occasionally, conditions shift to the extent that the character of war changes and we must invest significant intellectual energy to reimagine how we fight. This is such a time.

As AirLand Battle shaped the force of the 1980s and beyond, the critical analysis and creative thinking we apply today toward developing a new operational approach will drive our Army's organization, doctrine, training, equipment, and posture for decades to come. It is incumbent upon us, the practitioners of the profession of arms, to apply our knowledge and experience to this challenging task.

To participate in the professional discourse,

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- identify vital questions and problems, and envision potential solutions;
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We encourage ideas from all viewpoints—military and civilian; private to general officer; company to theater army; tactical, operational, and strategic; land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains; operational warfighting functions; institutional force management, development, and acquisition functions; Active and Reserve Components; Army and other service; and joint, interagency, and multinational.

Access our forum, Extended Battlefield: The Future of War, by visiting http://armyupress.army.mil/Online-Publications/Extended-Battlefield/.

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Spc. Hilda I. Clayton

May 21, 1991 to July 2, 2013

Spc. Hilda I. Clayton, a visual information specialist assigned to the 55th Signal Company (Combat Camera), was killed while photographing a live-fire training exercise 2 July 2013 in Laghman Province, Afghanistan. Clayton and four Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers died when a mortar tube accidentally exploded during an ANA mortar validation exercise being supported by U.S. Army trainers. She was attached to the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, based at Forward Operating Base Gamberi in eastern Afghanistan.

At the critical juncture of the war, when it was necessary for the ANA to increasingly assume responsibility for military actions, the story was not in the fighting but in the partnership that was necessary between U.S. and Afghan forces to stabilize the Afghan nation. One of the Afghan soldiers killed was a photojournalist that Clayton had partnered with to train in photojournalism. Not only did Clayton help document activities aimed at shaping and strengthening the partnership but she also shared in the risk by participating in the effort.

Combat Camera soldiers are trained to take still and video imagery in any environment. Their primary mission is to accompany combat soldiers wherever deployed to document the history of combat operations. Clayton's death symbolizes how female soldiers are increasingly exposed to hazardous situations in training and in combat on par with their male counterparts.

Clayton's service and sacrifice were recognized during memorial ceremonies at Forward Operating Base Gamberi on 8 July 2013 and at the Defense Information School (DINFOS), Fort Meade, Maryland, on 13 December 2013. At Fort Meade, Clayton's name was added to the DINFOS Hall of Heroes.

Combat Camera further honored Clayton by naming the award for the winner of its annual best combat camera competition after her. ■



A mortar tube accidentally explodes 2 July 2013 during an Afghan National Army (ANA) live-fire training exercise in Laghman Province, Afghanistan. The accident killed U.S. Army Spc. Hilda I. Clayton and four ANA soldiers. *Above:* The photo taken by one of the Afghan soldiers at the moment of the explosion. *Background:* The photo was simultaneously taken by Spc. Clayton.

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Spc. Hilda I. Clayton, 22, was the first combat documentation and production specialist to be killed in Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)



The Spc. Hilda I. Clayton Best Combat Camera (COMCAM) Competition, designed to challenge joint service combat camera personnel, is named for Clayton, who died in Afghanistan 2 July 2013. The Best COMCAM Competition consist of five days of events to test competitors on their physical and technical skills.

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Military Review

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Mark A. Milley—General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army



Cover photo: A U.S. Army paratrooper assigned to Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 377th Parachute Field Artillery Regiment, Task Force Spartan Steel conducts rear security while on patrol 7 April 2012 near Forward Operating Base Salerno, Afghanistan. (Photo by Spc. Eric-James Estrada, U.S. Army)

Next page: A U.S. Army paratrooper participates in the Best Squad Competition on 23 May 2017 as part of "All American" Week at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The week celebrated the 82nd Airborne Division with events for the division's soldiers and veterans. (Photo by Sgt. Jesse Leger, U.S. Army)

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Dr. Donald Wright



Greetings!

As the deputy director of the Army University Press, I am sometimes required to perform the duties of interim editor in chief of *Military Review*. This is one of those times. Lt. Col. Erica Cameron, our former director, has been called away on an operational assignment, leaving me to fill the gap between her departure and the arrival of Col. Katherine Guttormsen, the next director of our journal, who is also fulfilling an operational assignment.

Although Lt. Col. Cameron was only with us for a year, she oversaw huge changes in the Army University Press. As a strategic planner, she brought a very different mindset to our organization that will positively affect the way we do business for a long time. On behalf of all of us at *Military Review*, I'd like to thank Lt. Col. Cameron for her leadership and friendship.

This issue of *Military Review* covers a wide range of topics. There are several insightful articles concerning countries with significant potential impacts on the United States: Russia, Venezuela, Japan, and North Korea. And, in the first in a series of three articles, TRADOC commander Gen. David Perkins discusses the multi-domain battle concept. We also have an interesting comparison of the U.S. Army Stryker medium-force concept and Soviet motorized rifle equipment and organization, and we have the winning submission to the 2016 Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition with a discussion on "helicopter" commanders.


Finally, in our last issue, we ran a tribute to Spc. Hilda Clayton on our inside back cover. Clayton, an Army photojournalist, was killed during a training accident in Afghanistan. The story and Clayton's photograph struck a nerve; major print, television, and online media outlets picked up the story, many expounded on it, and all provided tremendously positive coverage that was viewed by millions. Thanks to all the journalists who covered the story with the respect and consideration due to one of our fallen soldiers.

Thank you also to all our readers and contributors for supporting the Army University Press and its flagship publication, *Military Review*. Find us online at http://www.armyupress.army.mil/, like us on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/ArmyUniversityPress/, and follow us on Twitter @ArmyUPress. ■



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Themes and Suggested Topics



Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group conduct Zodiac maritime operations training 1 November 2016 at Torii Station, Okinawa, Japan. Nearly twenty special operations support soldiers, many new to the Special Forces unit, completed the fourteen-day, biannual Special Forces Basic Combat Course-Support. Per regulation, the soldiers—from cooks to drivers, intelligence to signal—are required to complete the uncompromising course prior to deployment or every two years.

During the two-week trial, soldiers revisited basic tasks like marksmanship, communications, and troop-leading procedures while tackling more advanced concepts like the Zodiac training shown here, all-terrain vehicle driver training, and tactical combat casualty care. (Photo by Richard L Rzepka, U.S. Army Garrison Okinawa)

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The Changing U.S. Army

- Are U.S. Army rotational units as effective as permanently assigned, forward-deployed units?
- Does the Army need designated security force assistance brigades? How should they be organized?
- Is there a role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?
- How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?
- How does Army doctrine need to change to incorporate the cyberspace domain?
- Have associated units helped or hindered readiness?



Global Challenges

- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- What are the ramifications of increased Russian military presence in the Middle East?
- What are the military implications of China's economic penetration into Latin America, Africa, and broader Asia?
- What must the U.S. military do to prepare for possible contingency operations in the South China Sea?
- What are the security implications of the growing Islamic presence in Europe? Elsewhere in the world?
- What must the Army do to prepare to fight in urban terrain or megacities? What are the ethical challenges to operating in this type of environment?
- What operational and logistical challenges arise from domestic and foreign infrastructure limitations and how can we mitigate them?
- How can we better prepare soldiers to operate against atypical combatants (i.e., nonuniformed or child warriors) and under conditions where noncombatants are difficult to distinguish?

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Multi-Domain Battle
Driving Change to Win in the Future

Gen. David G. Perkins, U.S. Army

This is the first of three articles discussing the impact of multi-domain battle through the lens of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. This article frames the ideas taking shape for how land forces might conduct future operations under the multi-domain battle concept being developed by the Army Capabilities and Integration Center. In recognition of the centennial of American Expeditionary Forces entering World War I, the articles will incorporate relevant historical observations and lessons to help drive home the new and differentiate it from the old.

"Perhaps we are losing too many men," is not the way to start a conversation about changing doctrine.[1] Army Gen. John J. Pershing penned these words in August 1918 after American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) sustained more than sixty thousand casualties over about four months.[2]

When the United States entered World War I in the spring of 1917, Pershing firmly believed the Germans would be driven from the trenches and defeated in the open by self-reliant infantry employing a doctrine of *open warfare*.[3] Open warfare doctrine imagined infantry brigades maneuvering outside the trenches that had immobilized the war months after it began in 1914. Instead of stationary fighting from trenches, U.S. brigades supposedly would employ speed and mobility to inflict decisive defeats on the Germans. Though Pershing coined the phrase open warfare, the ideas were consistent with prewar doctrine—heavily influenced by German military thought—that minimized the use of artillery and machine guns.

However, casualties suffered by German and Allied forces starting in 1914 forced the combatants to realize that the lethality of rapidly firing artillery, machine guns, mortars—and later, gas, tanks, and aircraft—made tactics such as those advocated by Pershing's open warfare doctrine almost suicidal. European armies, confronting unsustainable casualties, had to adapt and develop new doctrine and tactics after a stalemate settled in.


Facing his own unsustainable list of casualties, Pershing directed his General Headquarters to conduct a doctrinal review.[4] What little change came was too late; over half of U.S. casualties in World War I happened in late 1918 during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.[5] Despite the talk of change, open warfare persisted as leaders such as Pershing maligned Allied tactics and doctrine while continuing to create extraordinarily aggressive and optimistic attack plans.[6] They underestimated the importance of heavy firepower and their control, communication, and coordination.[7]

The approaching centenary of the end of World War I provides a moment to reflect on how land forces should adapt to changing operational environments. Despite the heroism of the AEF in 1917 and 1918, it is clear that the Army did not adapt its doctrine for the operational conditions that existed on the Western Front before the United States entered the war. The United States had an opportunity to observe and learn from European experience. Instead, the Army persisted with doctrine that had already been found wanting. The United States now faces a comparable moment. Operational environments are changing rapidly. However, when called to fight, the Army cannot afford the price paid in blood during World War I. This time, the Army must understand the changes as they occur and anticipate how they will affect operations. Doctrine must evolve before the Army faces potential enemies, not after. We must learn from careful study and analysis so we will not have to learn from bitter experience.

Changes to How the Army Will Fight

When the Nation calls upon the Army to fight and win its next war, the operational environment will be unlike the circumstances of our recent experiences. It will be defined by an enemy who will challenge our ability to

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This graphical representation is one of the first to depict the inherent integration and convergence of the future multi-domain battlefield. The scenario here shows joint forces achieving cross-domain synergy by applying the multi-domain battle concept. (Graphic by author)

maintain freedom of maneuver and superiority across the air, cyberspace, land, maritime, and space domains and the electromagnetic spectrum. As U.S. forces arrive on the battlefield with high-tech and expensive precision-guidance missiles, enemies may counter with innovative and effective responses costing pennies on the dollar. To counter our state-of-the-art communications network, they may hack in, disrupt, and deny our assurances through a well-organized group of experts hitting targets purposefully selected with intelligence and acting in accord with a larger maneuver plan—all executed from outside the area of operations. The Army Capabilities and Integration Center is developing the multi-domain battle concept to help prepare the Army for these possible future battlefields, in which current American strengths could become future weaknesses, and domains of present dominance could become areas of violent struggle.

Doctrine describes how the Army conducts and trains for operations today with the capabilities it already has. Conversely, *concepts* describe how the Army may operate in the mid- to far-term future based on anticipated future operational environments. When published in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command pamphlets, concepts guide the study, experimentation, and evaluation of new solutions for doctrine and for organization, training, materiel, personnel, and facilities (the

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force domains, together known as DOTMLPF). When validated, concepts lead to changes within the force domains, including doctrine.

Change is never easy, especially in large organizations. The Total Army is a massive enterprise of over 1,030,000 soldiers plus thousands of Army civilians spread across the globe in a wide variety of operations and readiness stages.[8] To change the Army and to prepare it for future operations is not as simple as rewording the Army's doctrine and purchasing new equipment. Due to its size, the Army will change on a scale beyond that imaginable by almost every Fortune 500 company. That change requires the Army to develop an operational concept based on a thorough campaign of learning that will guide changes across the entire force.

In *Forging the Sword—Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army*, Benjamin M. Jensen explains that doctrinal change takes hold through shock and competition or through cultural self-selection.[9] Change from shock and competition is change by force, from failure or from observing others' failures. Armies that fail before changing may not have the luxury of keeping their preferred organizational structures; they must quickly adapt to the immediate realities of what will work in their current fight. With failure, an army is forced to adapt immediately or to continue to fail and even lose. Among many examples, Pershing's failures in doctrine reverberate this truth—U.S. forces were victorious in the end but after too many lives lost.

Change from cultural self-selection, however, is proactive change. It is change by choice, made by anticipating problems and evolving to prevent failure. In proactive change, leaders have the time and opportunity to focus change reflective of their cultural and organizational strengths.[10] The best historical example of change by choice is the AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s.

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AirLand Battle as a Model for Change

In contrast to the bloody learning by experience that the AEF endured in World War I, the development of AirLand Battle offers a better model for change. The genesis of AirLand Battle came from observing Israel's devastating lack of readiness at the start of the October War in 1973 (also called the Yom Kippur War or the Ramadan War), when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in the Sinai Peninsula. Since 1967, a confident Israel had considered itself ready to repeat its decisive victory over an Arab coalition in the Six-Day War. In 1973, however, the Arab armies advanced quickly, and Israeli forces suffered heavy casualties before their eventual victory. With the Arabs supplied by the Soviet Union and the Israelis supplied by the United States, the conflict pitted Soviet and American capabilities against each other in combat.[11] The U.S. Army's ability to observe and learn from Israel's mistakes allowed it to change proactively and to build on strengths unique to it and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Army leaders in 1973 understood that the Army was a force ready to fight counterinsurgency in Vietnam, not major combat on the plains of Central Europe. They understood that their likely operational environments had changed and that the Army needed to change to keep pace. Over the course of more than eight years, AirLand Battle was developed in an ongoing process, first as a concept, and ultimately as doctrine, in the 1982 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*.

Of the many takeaways from AirLand Battle, three offer value regarding multi-domain battle. The first is the introduction of *operational art*, as it is known today, and the *battlefield framework*.[12] The framework gave Army commanders a clear visualization of their battlefield, codified as *deep*, *close*, and *rear* areas. The second was *decentralized execution*, requiring commanders to continuously monitor their sector for possibilities to exploit—a precursor to mission command.[13] Third, *integrated battle*, a term coined by Douglas Skinner, was the idea of maneuver, synchronization, and firepower being integrated in execution on the battlefield.[14] While not specifically defined in FM 100-5, integrated battle as an idea permeates the document. Integrated support of all arms and services is critical in *close operations*, to include integration of airpower for attacking the enemy in echelon.[15]

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The fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact ended the threat that AirLand Battle was intended to counter. Instead, in 1991, Operation Desert Storm offered a chance to fully validate AirLand Battle as doctrine. In executing the seemingly impossible left hook, Army Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf relied heavily on planners who had graduated from the School of Advanced Military Studies versed in maneuver warfare and operational art. Decentralized execution combined with combined arms maneuver had been honed to a knife's edge through constant rotations and exercises at combat training centers. That tactical superiority became clear to the world during the one-hundred-hour ground war. Operation Desert Storm was AirLand Battle's debutante ball, and it proved that an effective process adjusts the doctrine before the next battle.

> "...the United States is reaching the end of a period in which it can make change by choice, without having taken severe losses. The Army must evolve and change."

The Multi-Domain Battle Concept for the Future

In developing the multi-domain battle concept, the Army seeks to follow the path successfully blazed by the developers of AirLand Battle. It intends to avoid the sort of bloody, traumatic learning that the AEF experienced in 1918. Multi-domain battle is a concept driven by proactive choice and informed by the threat of failure. It is an evolution of the Army operating concept, detailing a response to our observations of developments in the South China Sea, Russian New Generation Warfare, and continued challenges in the Middle East. It is an acknowledgment that the United States is reaching the end of a period in which it can make change by choice, without having taken severe losses. The Army must evolve and change.

Concept development gives us the opportunity to define complex problems, develop a framework to better understand those problems, and then break those complex problems into smaller, more detailed, and solvable problems through real-world scenarios. They give us the opportunity to fully develop the what, why, and how of change. They force us to change.

For the multi-domain battle concept to eventually succeed as doctrine, and in the other force domains, the first step is to clearly understand the potential operational environments it is meant to address. The 2017 white paper "Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century" defines the central problem this way: "U.S. ground combat forces, operating as part of ... joint, interorganizational, and multinational teams, are currently not sufficiently trained, organized, equipped, or postured to deter or defeat capable peer enemies to win in future war."[16] Whereas in AirLand Battle, the terrain, politics, and enemy were known, today, multiple adversaries of varying and growing capabilities are actively achieving their objectives under the threshold of armed conflict. Military action in response to our adversaries' actions faces a variety of complex problems. Adversaries may threaten the costs of a highly lethal battlefield, limit access to critical domains, challenge the ability to maintain superiority in air and maritime domains, and attempt to deny access into the theater.

Drawing from these complex and interrelated problems, the multi-domain battle concept will ultimately detail these problems to a level that solutions can be developed, applied, tested, and evaluated. Critical to achieving this level of detail is the establishment of a battlefield framework. A battlefield framework is a cognitive tool used to help commanders exercise mission command. The right battlefield framework allows commanders to clearly visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources. As operational environments change, previous frameworks will prove inadequate to these tasks. Reimagining the battlefield framework is essential to multi-domain battle's success.

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close, deep maneuver, and deep fires areas with sustainment, fires, maneuver support, and mission command capabilities.

- An operational support area holds the central point, key capabilities, and sustainment of joint forces. An operational support area provides the location of critical joint force mission command, sustainment, and fires and strike capabilities.
- A strategic support area stretches from the homeland, along deployment lines of communication, to the initial point of entry. In detail, a strategic support area encompasses home ports and stations, strategic sea and air lines of communication, and homeland communications. Traversing through, and operating within, the strategic support area will undoubtedly require acute cross-combatant command coordination.

It is important that even virtual locations are tied to physical locations within this framework. Space, cyberspace, and information are often cited as exclusive virtual domains or dimensions, but that attribution is inaccurate. Achieving a physical effect requires a physical location of a delivery mechanism, supporting points to facilitate delivery, and the point of the intended effect.

Additionally, across the levels of war and throughout all operational phases, virtual capabilities are positioned in physical space according to their level of employment. For example, an organized group of hackers operating in a deep fires area may use proxy servers of another deep fires area, outside the theater of operations, to deliver effects against a specific unit holding key terrain in the close area. The hackers may do this by targeting their enemies' dependents in the homeland. These effects could be lethal, utilizing social media and open source imagery to select targets on the unit's more vulnerable home-base and community, or they could be nonlethal, such as emptying bank accounts. Through either approach, the targeted unit would become distracted, thus opening a window of opportunity for the enemy to exploit.

Through this battlefield framework, problems identified in "Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century" go from broad strokes to detailed problems we can solve. These problems are conceived along the battlefield framework against specific adversarial capabilities. Through this approach, whether we are dealing with the lethality of the battlefield or refining capabilities to mitigate weaknesses in our command and control networks, the battlefield framework provides a basis to develop depth of understanding so that DOTMLPF solutions can begin to take shape.

Multi-Domain Battle—A Descendant or Fundamentally Unique?

The question now is whether the battlefield framework has expanded the battlefield, compressed it, or both. While the proposed framework has expanded far beyond AirLand Battle doctrine, it appears to have actually compressed the battlefield. In the draft framework, however, the vastness of space and cyberspace—along with the far-ranging effects of information operations, electronic warfare, and even some conventional weapons—ensures that the battlefield is limitless. From home station to the close area, there is the potential to be engaged instantaneously with long-range fires, cyberspace, space, electronic warfare, and information. If the battlefield truly is compressed, it will drastically change how and why DOTMLPF solutions are sought.

Multi-domain battle, as a concept, and the expansion of the battlefield both draw on a resurgence of past ideas. The battlefield framework brings back a construct similar to deep, close, and rear—the standing operational concept for the U.S. Army until it was replaced in 2001 with full-spectrum operations, only to return with publication of Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations*, ten years later.[17] There is also a clear focus on the operational level of war and the idea of Skinner's integrated battle. Last, multi-domain battle's genesis comes partly from Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work's call for an AirLand Battle 2.0 as a means to operationalize the third offset strategy (initiated November 2014 by then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel).[18] While multi-domain battle is a descendant of AirLand Battle, every step of its evolutionary process is designed to confront prevailing challenges by developing solutions that are both new and different.

The prevailing challenges facing the U.S. military today demonstrate a battlefield that is being compressed. In the geographically massive framework of multi-domain battle, planning for the inability to assure communications and domain superiority would be an entirely new focus, although the threat is not entirely new in

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war. From this perspective, multi-domain battle evolves as something informed by the past but set to take on circumstances new and far different from those U.S. land forces faced generations ago.

Beyond just the framework, integrating space and cyberspace domains and the electromagnetic spectrum for how Army units and joint forces will fight is something the Department of Defense is just now beginning to understand. Multi-domain battle reintroduces the idea that converged cross-domain capabilities across DOTMLPF are an absolute prerequisite for success; this is how the concept frames integration. Finally, because of the role of new technology, from artificial intelligence to robotics, multi-domain battle accounts for how the character of warfare on the future battlefield will be different. However, as a concept, multi-domain battle draws back from science fiction and looks to the specific capabilities that will be required to win in the future fight.

The Army—along with all the services—has a clear window of opportunity. The security environment is evolving and will continue to change quickly. Our challenges may extend beyond the immediate adversaries on whom we focus. However, by focusing on how to respond to our adversaries' capabilities, the concepts and subsequent doctrine we create will continue to improve our DOTMLPF capabilities in a converged and integrated fashion across warfighting functions, and, hopefully, across joint forces so we can arrive on the future battlefield with convergence and integration—one step further, one step faster, than our enemy. Victory starts here. ■

Notes

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Congratulations on your retirement!



Ms. Desirae Gieseman is retiring after serving as an Army civilian on Fort Leavenworth for more than fifteen years. During that span she worked in the International Military Student Division of the Command and General Staff College, the Center for Army Tactics, and the Army Doctrine Proponency Division of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate. She culminated her career with *Military Review*, where she gained a well-deserved reputation as a consummate editor, writer, and mentor. Her uncompromising standards of excellence in writing significantly enhanced the quality of twenty-two issues of our journal. We will miss Desirae both personally and professionally, and we wish her good luck and happiness in all her future endeavors.

Maj. Steven Miller is retiring after serving as the operations officer for the Army University Press. Formerly a field artillery officer, he served two combat tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. With a master's degree in English and experience as an English instructor at West Point and as a public affairs officer, Steven contributed immeasurably to the editing and production of *Military Review*. He was also instrumental in making our challenging transition to a subordinate organization of the Army University Press as smooth and painless as possible. We will miss his professionalism, candor, and humor. We wish him the best of luck as he transitions to the civilian world.



ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS

Curbing the "Helicopter Commander"



Overcoming Risk Aversion and Fostering Disciplined Initiative in the U.S. Army

Maj. Lynn Marie Breckenridge, PhD

Mission command is an approach to decentralized leadership that emphasizes the exercise of local initiative to accomplish tasks within the framework of a commander's guidance and intent. Mission command is guided by several principles, including "exercising disciplined initiative" and "accepting prudent risk."[1] The former is ordered of the subordinate leader, while the latter is required of the senior leader. A delicate relationship exists between the two variables, one that is rarely discussed in detail. Without the senior leader's willingness to accept prudent risk, the junior leader will never feel empowered to exercise disciplined initiative. Conversely, if the junior leader does not exhibit competence to exercise disciplined initiative, the senior leader will assess the level of risk as too high to allow the junior leader freedom of action.


In some cases, the commander's low assessment of the junior leader's level of proficiency may be accurate, and a certain degree of oversight and professional development must occur before mission command can be successful. However, there are several factors that might lead a commander to abandon mission command and opt for micromanagement as a leadership style. These interrelated factors include a "zero defect" work environment, risk aversion, poor leader development, and lack of mutual trust in a cohesive team.

Army leadership doctrine describes six principles for successful mission command: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander's intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk.[2] A recent *Military Review* article by Robert Scaife and Packard Mills suggested other factors that must be present in order for mission command to be successful: trust, initiative, dialogue, and freedom of action within intent.[3] In addition, by tracing mission command back to its German origins in *Auftragstaktik* (mission-type tactics), it is apparent that certain factors have always been recognized as crucial to its success: obedience, proficiency, independence of action, and self-esteem.[4] However, despite all these "recipes for success," commanders continue to find difficulty with decentralized leadership. One area of particular trouble for leaders is the ability to let subordinates struggle and fail before finding their own way.

Most Army leaders agree that, in theory, subordinates must be allowed to learn from failure if they are to become agile and adaptive leaders who can execute complex tasks in unfamiliar and uncertain environments.[5] Putting

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theory into practice is an altogether different thing. Indeed, commanders are not alone in their hesitancy to let their subordinates fail. A large body of literature suggests that American culture has shifted toward risk aversion. This is particularly evidenced by what has been coined as "helicopter parenting." Like micromanaging commanders, helicopter parents lack faith in their children's ability to solve problems on their own, and they allow risk aversion to govern their parenting style. Their moniker comes from their tendency to hover above their children, waiting to swoop in at the first sign of trouble. It is the postulate of this essay that the U.S. Army is experiencing an era of "helicopter commanders," brought on by improved communication technology and a perception of increased stakes. They behave in similar ways as helicopter parents, hovering above subordinates, ready to offer increased direction at every turn.



The term "helicopter commander" might appear tongue-in-cheek, but the problem is of serious concern. Over time, the result of helicopter commanding is less competent leaders who are less prone to initiative-taking and are incapable of agile and adaptive leadership. Helicopter commanding is often done with good intentions, but it is a disservice to the U.S. Army and the Nation we serve.

Conceptualizing micromanagement as helicopter commanding serves as a way to examine the factors that impact the execution of mission command, highlight similarities from psychological research in the field of helicopter parenting, and suggest how commanders might apply this knowledge to develop more agile, adaptive leaders.

The Need for Mission Command

In July 2015, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Daniel Allyn stood before an Association of the United States Army conference and highlighted the current operational status of the U.S. Army: over 140,000 Total Force soldiers forward-stationed or deployed in over 150 locations around the world. Many of these committed soldiers operate in small units led by entrusted professionals in decentralized command structures. With our force so dispersed, he noted, mission command is more important than ever. Allyn went on to recognize that current operations "place an enormous premium on the quality, breadth and depth of our leader development efforts at every echelon."[6] Military leaders will have to continually evolve and diversify to meet these challenges to the Nation's defense, and will have to do it with fewer personnel and limited resources due to the drawdown of forces.

The Parallel between the Zero Defect Army and Twenty-First Century Parenting

It must be noted that while the challenges posed by the emerging complex operating environment make mission command more important than ever, a resurgent zero defect mentality poses a threat to the Army's ability to embrace mission command.[7] We are experiencing the second era of the "zero defect Army." The first occurred from the end of the Cold War in 1989 until combat operations began in 2001. Several

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articles have been published about the deleterious effects it had on officers' ability to exercise decentralized command. Characteristically, when downsizing has occurred, commanders have engaged in certain thought processes and actions, both overt and suggestive, in an attempt to ensure that there are absolutely no defects, mistakes, or flaws under their leadership. As a result, decisions have been centralized at a higher level than they needed to be, and leaders minimized or overshadowed subordinates' control.[8]

In 1997, in an effort to change the "zero defects" cultural mindset, the Army began masking all junior officer evaluation reports in their official military personnel files once they were promoted to the rank of captain or chief warrant officer three. Masking junior officers' ratings conveyed the message that junior officers are expected to take risks, and that senior leaders are more forgiving of failures during those learning years.[9]



Cadet Douglas MacArthur and his mother, Mary Pinkney Hardy MacArthur, pose for a photo at West Point in 1899, the year he entered the military academy. To ensure her son's dedication to his studies, his mother took up a two-year residence in the West Point Hotel so she could personally monitor her son's activities. (Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress)

However, in 2015, the Army began reinstating those reports—evidence of a return to the zero-defect Army.[10] With the ultimate reduction of more than 189,000 personnel, leaders are feeling the same scrutiny that was present during the previous drawdown of forces.[11] They perceive that any "strike" (in terms of a visible failure by self or subordinate) may be enough to end their careers. After more than a decade at war, most successful leaders are comfortable operating with unparalleled authority, flexibility, and resources. However, as we transition from combat operations to garrison administration, the Army faces additional oversight from external stakeholders, including Congress and veterans' organizations. Leaders are increasingly criticized regarding their use of resources, and they are expected to be more attentive to the health, welfare, physical, and mental well-being of soldiers.[12] The confluence of these factors is causing leaders to reconsider whether to allow junior leaders flexibility, or to micromanage and constrain them to avoid failure.

While the zero-defect Army drives officers' fear of not "making the cut," helicopter parenting is driven by *fear of not doing enough*. Helicopter parents fear that something catastrophic will happen if they do not take every possible precaution to keep their children safe and to ensure their success. Much like micromanaging commanders, they lack the faith that their children have the ability to keep themselves safe and to find their own way to success.

Influenced by media programs designed to create awareness for missing children and criminals at large, and sentiments that American children were falling behind academically, "baby boomers" were the first generation recognized for their helicopter parenting, but they certainly were not the first parents to hover. In 1899, Gen. Douglas MacArthur's mother moved to West Point with him. She lived in a nearby hotel overlooking the school, and watched him through a telescope to make sure that he was studying.[13] Like present-day commanders, parents feel pressure to be highly involved, overly directive, aware of, and accountable for every move their children make. Commanders fear Army Regulation 15-6 investigations for allowing a second lieutenant to act independently; parents fear Child Protective Services inquiries if they allow their nine-year-old to go to the playground alone.[14] It is a trend that begs intervention.

Considering that MacArthur finished first in his class at West Point, one could argue that high levels of parental involvement can be beneficial.[15] In the common

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(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

The View from 5,000 Feet Up Is Always Perfect

terminology of the Army, helicopter parenting *gets results*. However, these are just short-term gains. By robbing children or subordinates of the opportunity to try new things and fail, parents and commanders ruin the chance of developing a crucial psychological trait, self-efficacy. Albert Bandura described self-efficacy as the belief in one's own capabilities to organize and execute actions required to manage and achieve desired situations, a necessary trait for an Army leader.[16]

Though there is a paucity of documented evidence to prove the detrimental effects of micromanaging Army leaders, there is substantial evidence that this is true in helicopter parenting. Studies have found that students with helicopter parents were less open to new ideas or ways of behaving, and were more anxious, vulnerable, self-conscious, and depressed.[17] Helicopter-parented students were excellent at test-taking and concrete assignments but became anxious when it came to independent decision making and projects that did not involve specific instructions.[18] It is easy to understand how similar results could be disastrous in the military.

Mission Command from History to Current Context

The roots of today's mission command philosophy can be traced back to at least 1806. Prussian officers began to rethink their approach to command after observing Napoleon's ability to achieve a high-operational tempo through rapid communication of orders and intent, tolerance for initiative by junior officers, and a shared understanding of basic doctrine.[19] From its beginnings, Prussian officers had difficulty with the concept of enabling junior leaders to have greater freedom in making decisions. Through rigorous, strenuous debate and the advisement of Helmuth von Moltke the

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Sgt. 1st Class Darren Toedt (*center*) yells out commands 12 June 2015 as his platoon consolidates and reorganizes following an attack live-fire exercise at Fort Hunter Liggett, California. Toedt is a platoon sergeant assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 160th Infantry Regiment. Professional development can only happen when soldiers and their officers are given the freedom and authority to make decisions during training events like this that may result in honest mistakes without the prejudice of a "zero defect" command environment. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)

Elder, "bounded initiative" was developed. Central to the philosophy was the belief that mistakes were preferable to hesitancy, and that the commander's role was only to steer bold action in the right direction.[20] Notably, Moltke's bounded initiative and its successor, Auftragstaktik, assumed a significant investment in the development of junior officers so there could be faith that they would act appropriately when given only basic orders.

Bounded initiative required an assumption that has recently been called into question in popular psychology literature. All forms of decentralized command are based on the premise that young officers can and will take the initiative, given the right tools. However, recent studies have suggested that many young adults from the "millennial" generation are having difficulty with taking initiative, possibly as a result of helicopter parenting. Many employers have raised concerns that adults born between approximately 1980 and 2000 have more difficulty with independence and initiative taking than do previous generations.[21] Given that approximately 57 percent of active-duty Army officers and 86 percent of enlisted members are millennials, this assertion is of significant concern.[22]

By virtue of joining the military, service members disprove many of the millennial stereotypes, which include aimlessness in career choices, prolonged transition to adulthood, and increased need for emotional and tangible support from parents.[23] However, anecdotally, commanders' complaints about junior leaders are often similar to what is characteristic of over-parented millennials: ambivalence; high expectations in terms of guidance, "hand-holding," and explanation; and a lack of problem solving and initiative. Research has shown that when a child is used to being given the answers, when they are never forced to struggle, they grow to be less engaged, less autonomous, less confident, and less independent.[24]

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Consider the over-parented millennial recruited into the military and placed in a leadership position: he or she exhibits the qualities listed above, and therefore does not gain the confidence in his or her commander. The commander does not trust the junior leader's decision-making skills, and therefore does not empower him or her to exercise disciplined initiative. By hovering above the junior leader, refusing to allow failure to occur, the commander denies the subordinate the opportunity to grow into a confident, agile, adaptive leader. The cycle needs to be broken.

What Needs to Change

To overcome the tendency to helicopter command, commanders must learn to be less risk averse, emphasize professional development of their subordinates, and foster an atmosphere of trust in a cohesive team.

Risk aversion. In his essay about the first era of the zero defect Army, Lt. Col. Robert Kissel defined risk avoidance as the result of centralized command, when "the subordinate, realizing or perceiving a cost (penalty) for making a mistake, avoids risk taking by either doing nothing or deliberately abdicating the majority of his decisions to his superior."[25] Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, cautions commanders to avoid this, stating that "learning comes from experiencing both success and failure. An environment that allows subordinate leaders to make honest—as opposed to repeated or careless—mistakes without prejudice is essential to leader development and personal growth."[26]

One of the Army leadership competencies is "lead by example."[27] Risk-averse senior leaders produce risk-averse junior leaders. Parenting research supports this. Having risk-averse parents was a significant predictor of risk-averse children, and children reported that their biggest fear in making mistakes was their parent's response.[28]

Assuming that this is also often the case for officers, there is an important conjecture that could be made: by responding harshly to risk taking or mistakes, a commander teaches junior officers to make decisions based on the probability of the commander's negative response, not on the probability of a success or by assessment of benefit to the organization. A junior leader with a risk-averse commander is likely to avoid action simply because of the possibility that the commander will not like the action.

Professional development. Leaders who micromanage to get immediate results rather than professionally develop subordinate leaders are doing so at the long-term expense of our Army and our nation. Every leader is responsible for the professional development of his or her subordinate leaders. Leader development is an investment; it requires time and resources but can pay out exponentially in the long term. When a subordinate leader is trained, proficient, and trustworthy, the commander is able to delegate authority and responsibility, thereby allowing for more efficient execution of mission orders.

ADP 7-0 states that "growth occurs when subordinates are provided opportunities to overcome obstacles and make difficult decisions. They improve their ability to adapt through exposure to—and the intuition gained from—multiple, complex, and unexpected situations in challenging, unfamiliar, and uncomfortable conditions."[29] This is consistent with parenting research literature. However, there is more to be learned from challenging, unexpected situations: initiative taking. Commanders should be aware that the current generation of officers may be lacking in initiative-taking skills and incorporate challenges that foster initiative into any professional development program.

Adolescent psychology expert Reed Larson suggests that in order for an adolescent to learn initiative, three elements must be present: intrinsic motivation, in association with concerted engagement in the environment, over time.[30] Larson believes that in order to learn initiative, adolescents must exert "constructive attention on a field of action involving the types of constraints, rules, challenge, and complexity that characterize external reality."[31] He indicates that despite

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its name, initiative is more than just the ability to start an action. It involves a temporal arc of effort that will likely include setbacks, reevaluations, and adjustment of strategy. Students must be taught that initiative is "the cumulative effort over time to achieve a goal" without being deterred by obstacles.[32] Leaders should strive to incorporate these principles in a professional development program, both expressly and in practice.

Lack of trust in a cohesive team. In order for subordinates to feel comfortable showing disciplined initiative and taking prudent risks, they must trust that the commander will show support and respond in predictable, reasonable ways. In order for commanders to assume risk and empower initiative, they must trust their subordinates.

Charles Allen and William Braun suggest that there are four components of trust: credibility of competence, benevolence of motives, integrity with the sense of common and greater good, and predictability of behavior.[33] When commanders engage subordinates in high-quality professional development, they simultaneously create a cohesive team based on these components. Scaife and Mills suggest that units must have a "foundation of confidence, trust, and dialogue, through a robust professional development program."[34]

Helicopter commanding is a way of managing lack of trust, and reciprocally, it is not necessary once trust is built. Commanders must consciously make a decision to trust, and to foster trust amongst their subordinates. Mission command cannot exist without it.[35]

Further, adolescent studies indicate that there is a positive correlation between autonomy giving, parent-child communication, and adolescent's trust in parents, and a negative correlation between parental control and adolescent's trust in parents.[36] If this also applies to command team relationships, it would suggest that commanders who allow their subordinates freedom of action and engage in dialog with them have better trust relationships, and that commanders who micromanage have poor trust relationships. While causation cannot be proven, it appears that open dialogue, trust, and willingness to allow initiative are all significant, interrelated factors in establishing positive relationships.

Conclusion

Given current force reductions, leaders are more likely to be risk averse and engage in helicopter commanding as an alternative to mission command. Leaders must strive to develop trust with their subordinates in order to foster disciplined initiative and prudent risk taking. By incorporating research about overcoming helicopter parenting, leaders can improve upon their professional development programs. Leader development should be challenging, complex, and realistic, and should allow subordinates opportunities to fail and overcome obstacles without intervention. Doing so is crucial to the development of agile, adaptive, competent leaders. ■

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
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People look for food in garbage dumped outside a looted supermarket 21 April 2017 in the El Valle neighborhood of Caracas, Venezuela, after demonstrations against the government of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. (Photo by Ronaldo Schemidt, Agence France-Presse)

The Collapse of Venezuela and Its Impact on the Region

Dr. R. Evan Ellis

In May 2017, as the number killed during protests against the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela climbed toward 40, and with more than 130 injured and over 1,300 arrests, many in the United States and the region asked, "How much longer could it go on?"[1] In addition to the crisis within Venezuela, the collapse of its economy and the escalating criminal and political violence have also

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produced a massive outflow of refugees to neighboring Colombia and Brazil, to the nearby Caribbean islands of Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba, and Curaçao, and to other locales throughout the region. In total, an estimated 1.5 million of Venezuela's 32 million people have left the country since the government of Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999.[2] Venezuela's neighbors watch the unfolding drama not only with concern for the Venezuelan people but also from the perspective of how that crisis could affect them as it deepens and possibly becomes more violent.[3]

The situation in Venezuela is often mistakenly diagnosed as principally a political or economic crisis.[4] It is better understood as a criminal act without precedent in Latin America: the capture and systematic looting of a state, achieved by first capturing its institutions through mass mobilization and bureaucratic machinations, then increasing control of the state through military force, as the criminal nature of the act and its consequences become apparent to the nation's citizens. Former Venezuelan government officials have suggested that as much as $300 billion may have been diverted over the last decade from national coffers to private accounts through the currency control system alone.[5]

The crisis in Venezuela is a problem for the country and the region that neither international law nor existing multilateral institutions are well equipped to handle. For neighboring states, politically acceptable alternatives appear to be few. For example, it is unlikely that the United States, or organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States (OAS), will choose to physically intervene or be able to act in a manner sufficiently impactful to alter the current trajectory of Venezuela toward a broader and more violent internal crisis. Yet, both the United States and multilateral institutions do have plausible alternatives and may yet have the ability to play a decisive role in managing the consequences of that crisis for the region without direct intervention.

The Situation in Venezuela

It is difficult to anticipate when or how the Maduro regime in Venezuela will collapse, yet it is clear that its current course is both economically and politically unsustainable. In economic terms, destructive government policies, including expropriations, price controls, and currency controls, in combination with rampant corruption and mismanagement in government enterprises, have progressively eliminated the capacity of the Venezuelan economy to produce even the most basic goods required by the people of the country to survive. Additionally, declining petroleum output, high production costs, debt service obligations, an accumulation of adverse legal judgments from past expropriations, and increasing reluctance of creditors (even politically supportive China and Russia) to lend new money are shutting off Venezuela's access to hard currency to buy goods from abroad, even though international oil prices have recently trended upward.[6]

Defaulting on the loan obligations of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (Venezuela's state-owned oil company, PDVSA) to use the hard currency to import more goods (to ease political pressures) would trigger legal consequences that could bring about the seizure of the company's assets, even oil shipments abroad, aggravating the regime's liquidity crisis in a way that could endanger its ability to maintain power.[7] The Venezuelan government has thus engaged in an increasingly desperate series of delays, legal actions, and fund shifting to make bond payments, while making a minimum quantity of foreign currency available to state organs and friends of the regime for the purpose of importing goods to maintain the support of the military and other key regime support groups.[8]

These measures have included drawing down remaining international reserves (largely in gold), continuing to expropriate companies such as General Motors, rolling over bond payments, mortgaging assets such as the petroleum refiner and distributor CITGO, seeking new loans from state partners such as China and trusted companies such as Rosneft,

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and filing creative legal actions to delay decisions and awards against the government.[9] Yet, little new credit is coming in, and the government is running out of assets to mortgage and legal options to postpone payments.

Venezuela is unable to produce needed goods domestically and lacks the cash to import them. The result, as increasingly evidenced in reports coming out of Venezuela, is ever greater scarcity of everything from food and medicine to toilet paper. Store shelves are empty, and people are spending significant portions of their day seeking food and other necessities.[10] Seventy-two percent of Venezuelans report having lost weight in the past year because of such shortages.[11] As *Wall Street Journal* reporter John Forero put it, "Venezuela is starving."[12]

The Maduro government has attempted to address the political implications of such shortages by appointing the military to distribute scarce food.[13] As a result, the system mainly channels the little available food to those who support the regime while also ensuring the military both has reliable access to food for itself as well as opportunities for earning money by selling food on the black market.[14]

With respect to political dynamics, the maneuvers adopted by the Maduro regime have demonstrated its determination to maintain power at any cost and its unwillingness to pursue a sincere political compromise or a constitutional solution that could result in its loss of power. A string of events and U.S. government actions in recent years against leaders in the current Venezuelan regime has highlighted that there are likely solid criminal cases against a significant number of persons in that government, thus signaling to them that a loss of political power could lead to their extradition and imprisonment in the United States. Indicative events include the July 2014 arrest of former Venezuelan security chief Hugo Carbajal when he left the country to become his country's ambassador to Aruba, the November 2015 arrest in Haiti (and subsequent conviction on narcotrafficking charges) of Maduro's nephews, and the U.S. Treasury Department's February 2017 designation of Venezuelan Vice President Tareck El Aissami as a foreign narcotrafficking kingpin.[15]

Reflecting such incentives to maintain power, Maduro and his fellow Chavista elites have violated Venezuela's constitutional order in increasingly egregious ways, demonstrating that a resolution of Venezuela's political and economic crisis through democratic processes is increasingly improbable. Key actions in this regard include dubious rulings by the pro-Maduro National Electoral Council and the Venezuelan Supreme Court

- preventing the opposition from using the supermajority it won in December 2015 elections (by blocking the seating of three opposition congressmen, giving pro-Maduro legislators two-thirds of the chamber);
- blocking a constitutionally stipulated recall referendum against the president;
- stripping the opposition-dominated congress of budgetary and other authority;
- ruling unconstitutional virtually all of the initiatives passed by that congress;
- postponing state and local elections; and
- eliminating key opposition leaders, including jailing Leopoldo López and disqualifying Henrique Capriles.

The Maduro regime has further begun a process of "renewing" the nation's political parties, likely designed to disqualify parties and leaders hostile to the regime if currently delayed local elections or future presidential elections are held.[16] Its boldest step to date, however, was its May 2017 initiative to form a constituent assembly and rewrite the constitution, a process almost certain to eliminate the elected opposition-dominated parliament.[17]

If such actions demonstrate the unwillingness of the Maduro regime to respect constitutional processes and limits that could lead to their loss of power, the Venezuelan military has equally demonstrated its unwillingness to intervene to restore the democratic order or to avert a further economic and political meltdown in the country. While Venezuela's armed forces have traditionally acted as guarantors of the nation's constitutional order, during the eighteen years of rule by populist leader Hugo Chávez and his successor, Maduro, the military has been politicized and heavily indoctrinated with pro-regime ideology. In addition, virtually the entire cadre of its senior leaders has been replaced by regime loyalists.

Further decreasing the likelihood that the armed forces would act to restore Venezuela's constitutional order, the military leadership (and particularly the National Guard) has become too deeply involved in drug trafficking, contraband, and other illicit activities to risk allowing or bringing about such change.[18] Furthermore, the regime has embedded Cuban intelligence and counterintelligence agents throughout the military to keep an eye out for defectors.[19]

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Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro (*right*) and Vice President Tareck El Aissami shake hands 14 February 2017 during a meeting with governors in Caracas, Venezuela. El Aissami is heavily involved in drug trafficking and has been widely reported to be providing material and financial support to terrorist groups in the Middle East, including Hezbollah and Hamas. He would assume the Venezuelan presidency under the current Venezuelan constitution if Maduro were forced from office before scheduled elections in October 2018. (Photo courtesy of Venezuelan Government/Miraflores Palace handout)

While the United States has been highly critical of the actions of the Maduro regime, it has not, to date, indicated a disposition to move beyond the imposition of economic sanctions.[20] And, while the OAS under Secretary Luis Almagro has strongly denounced the interruption of the democratic order in Venezuela, the organization principally functions on consensus, and the block of left-leaning anti-U.S. governments represented by the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our Americas (ALBA) continues to oppose any anti-Venezuela action by the OAS.[21] Venezuela's fellow ALBA countries may not agree with Maduro's decisions in governing Venezuela, but, arguably, they do not find it in their strategic interest for the OAS (in which the United States is an important actor) to condemn Venezuela or play a significant role in the region's politics in general. Even if the OAS were to expel Venezuela from the organization for violation of its democratic charter, the Maduro regime already gave its notice in April of its intention to leave the body.[22]

Similarly, while the United Nations Security Council, in theory, could authorize an intervention in Venezuela, permanent members Russia and China would likely veto such action, insofar as each has significant business interests in the country, as well as strategic interest in the persistence of a Venezuelan regime that actively resists the expansion of U.S. influence in the region.[23]

Adding to Venezuela's problems, the probability that violence will escalate is increased by the government's creation and deployment throughout the country of *collectivos*, relatively undisciplined armed bands of civilians, to enforce its will. This will ensure a high cost in lives of Venezuela's own military or of a foreign military if anyone attempts to change the regime by force.

Potential Scenarios for Venezuela

The plausible scenarios for Venezuela (all negative) loosely fall into three groups, based on assumptions regarding which side prevails and whether violence is sustained or dissipates: (1) resistance burnout and consolidation of the criminal state, (2) escalating violence resolved by imposition of a pseudodemocratic compromise regime, and (3) prolonged criminality, repression, and insurgency.

Resistance burnout and consolidation of the criminal state. In this scenario, the military and the government maintain cohesion, and there is no foreign intervention. Eventually, through the regime's control of resources and brutal repression (including violence by the collectivos), the majority of civil resistance is

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suppressed or flees the country. Millions depart the country as economic or political refugees, or to escape the criminal violence. With the diminishing of resistance, the regime consolidates its totalitarian order, probably imposing a new constitution and legislative body. Following the imposition of stability, Maduro is killed or pressured to step down, and power passes to a new leader, similarly committed to the populist ideology and the criminal enterprise, but with more rational economic policies and improved managerial capabilities.

With some stability and improved leadership, key anti-United States statist investors such as the Chinese and the Russians begin loaning new money to the regime, further expanding their access to Venezuela's oil resources. New credit from these allies, possibly assisted by rising petroleum prices, supports further consolidation of power by the regime.

Escalating violence resolved by imposition of a compromise regime. In this scenario, violence increases significantly over that manifested in May 2017, possibly involving sporadic major confrontations between collectivos and Venezuelans identifying with the opposition and demanding the restoration of the previous constitutional order. Armed, self-interested groups are involved on all sides.

Violence exceeds the ability of Venezuela's National Guard to control; the regular military, already reluctant to participate in the repression of civilians, is deployed but refuses to act, possibly with some units dissolving or declaring themselves loyal to the opposition. Key extrahemispheric players, including the Chinese and the Russians, make a tacit agreement with the opposition in return for guarantees of the protection of their businesses and other interests in the country. Maduro and other key regime leaders are killed or leave the country, while others cut a deal for a power transition, with the support of key military leaders, in return for limited immunity and protection from extraditions.

Prolonged criminality, repression, and insurgency. In this scenario, like the prior one, violence increases significantly, and the regular military splinters or is too unreliable to be employed. Some key figures possibly flee the country. By contrast to the previous scenario, however, a deal involving a power transition cannot be achieved. Key external players such as Russia and China maintain a "wait-and-see" posture. Protest-based violence, including selective attacks against protesters by collectivos, deteriorates into broader, bloodier efforts by pro-regime forces to intimidate or silence regime opponents through large-scale violence, sparking reprisals by anti-Maduro groups, and occasionally drawing the National Guard and regular military forces into the conflict.

Continuing violence, including possible sabotage of oil installations and other government assets, leads to a broad economic collapse and the highest outflow of refugees of the three contemplated scenarios. In this scenario, major foreign actors, including China, would likely coordinate to evacuate their workers. Depending on the risk posed to Russian, Chinese, and other oil installations, United Nations Security Council agreement to a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission could be possible, presuming that Chavista forces would see permitting such deployments as advantageous, or would no longer be able to block them.

There is no inherent limit to the deepening of suffering, violence, and criminality that could occur. Indeed, the economic plight and abuses by the regimes in Zimbabwe and North Korea serve as reminders of how much a people can suffer at the hands of a totalitarian regime that pursues irrational policies but is determined to maintain itself in power with the acquiescence of its military.

Implications for Venezuela's Neighbors

Each scenario discussed implies an expansion of the already significant outflow of refugees to neighboring Colombia and Brazil, nearby Caribbean islands such as Aruba, Curaçao, and Trinidad and Tobago, and the rest of the region, as well as the export of arms and broader impacts on the criminal and political landscape.

Colombia. Historically, people and goods have always moved relatively freely across the Venezuela-Colombia border; the mother of Maduro was born in Colombia, and possibly the president himself was as well.[24] Nonetheless, the influx of Venezuelans into Cúcuta and other Colombian border towns has created some resentment among Colombians. Some perceive the new arrivals as competing with them for jobs, particularly in the informal sector, and some believe the refugees have undermined security.[25]

In 2016 alone, over 150,000 people entered Colombia from Venezuela.[26] Some enter on a temporary basis to earn money in the informal or illicit economy and purchase goods not available in their

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Venezuelan National Guard soldiers stand on a highway 3 May 2017 overlooking an antigovernment march trying to make its way to the National Assembly in Caracas, Venezuela. More than a hundred Venezuelan protesters were detained and put before military tribunals that week, a sudden upsurge in the use of a practice that legal activists say violates the constitution, which limits military courts to "offenses of a military nature." (Photo by Fernando Llano, Associated Press)

home country, while others choose to remain indefinitely.[27] The Colombian border town of Cúcuta has been the focus of this movement, with significant increases in the population of Venezuelans in the city, including those who work in the informal sector as prostitutes and street vendors, and in other activities. A portion of those crossing the border from Venezuela into Colombia are actually Colombians by birth who had immigrated to Venezuela years or decades prior in search of economic opportunity or to escape violence.

Colombia's major cities such as Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali have also registered significant increases in Venezuelans.[28] However, because two major roads from Venezuela's capital, Caracas, converge on the Colombian border near Cúcuta, an expanded flow of migrants from a deteriorating situation in Venezuela would probably concentrate there and, to a lesser extent, to the north in La Guajira department, including the town of Riohacha, and Valledupar in Cesar department. Nonetheless, some of those leaving Venezuela will also enter Colombia at more southerly points, including Arauca, Puerto Carreño, and Inírida, where controls are weaker.

Of those who initially migrated to Venezuela from Colombia, many now returning are expected to settle in the border region, since they have family or other contacts in the region.[29] Of those arriving from cities on Venezuela's Caribbean coast, such as Caracas, Puerto Cabello, Maracay, and Valencia, many will likely migrate toward Colombia's own Caribbean coast, to cities such as Maicao, Barranquilla, and Sincelejo, where the climate and culture are familiar. By contrast, Venezuelans coming from more rural areas to the south of the nation's principal mountain range will likely gravitate toward cities in the interior of Colombia on the other side of its flatlands, such as Villavicencio and Bogotá.

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(Map courtesy of Google Maps)

Venezuela and Neighboring Countries

Other migration routes notwithstanding, the focus of migration on Cúcuta and La Guajira raises particular concerns for Colombia since the area, particularly Catatumbo and other parts of the province of Norte de Santander, is a hotbed of criminal and terrorist activity, with Colombia's notorious Gulf Clan and the National Liberation Army (ELN) vying to fill in areas being vacated by the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC).[30] In this complex dynamic, the newly arriving immigrants are both potential victims of and recruits for those organizations. Indeed, given the established history of cross-border smuggling, Colombian security officials believe that some people crossing the border are moving drugs and contraband, among other illicit activities.

Further to the south, in border towns such as Arica, Puerto Carreño, and Inírida, although the current and expected volume of immigration from Venezuela is less of a problem, the area is the center of the illicit mining for coltan, a strategic mineral used in a wide array of advanced batteries and electronics products.

In addition to the potentially destabilizing impact of refugee flows on both the Colombian economy and centers of organized crime in the country, Colombian security experts worry that some of Venezuela's collectivos and other groups will sell their FN FAL (light automatic) rifles and other military equipment to help maintain themselves, flooding contested criminal areas such as Catatumbo with arms as well as people in economic need.[31]

As the Venezuelan crisis deepens and the flow of refugees grows, de facto encampments are likely to form, particularly around Cúcuta. It will be in the interest of Colombia to formally manage such camps to alleviate suffering and to prevent them from becoming centers of criminal recruitment and victimization, given the challenging environment of the zone.

In preparation for a refugee crisis, the Colombian government has an established system, the "national entity for the management of the risk of disasters," that was used when Venezuela expelled more than six thousand Colombians from the country in August 2015.[32] Nonetheless, security experts in Colombia are concerned

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that the resource requirements and the complexity of a massive flood of refugees from Venezuela would likely overwhelm the system's capacity.[33]

For Colombia, such challenges come at a time in which its military's resources for operations and maintenance are declining significantly, while the government is searching for the resources to fund the substantial obligations that it incurred in the agreement that it signed with the FARC in November 2016. Colombia must also deal with the upsurge of criminal and other violence between the ELN and criminal bands as the FARC demobilizes and withdraws from its former territory.[34]

Beyond outflows of people and guns, as the position of the Maduro leadership in Venezuela becomes more uncertain, Colombian security and defense professionals also worry that Venezuela could seek to provoke a war; this would serve to divert the attention of the Venezuelan people and the international community as well as maintain the unity of the Venezuelan military.[35] Indeed, Venezuela has a long history of aggressive posturing toward Colombia, including territorial claims over La Guajira and substantial parts of Colombia's eastern plains in Venezuela's 1999 constitution.[36] In March 2008, then President Chávez called to move ten Venezuelan armored brigades to the Colombian border in response to Colombia's signing of a base status agreement with the United States.[37] It further conducted a war game that year, Guaicaipuro, focused on a preemptive Venezuelan invasion of the Guajira. More recently, provocative Venezuelan actions include its conduct of a nationwide mobilization exercise, Zamora 200; its deployment of a small military force across the Arauca River into Colombia in March 2017; and the increasingly bellicose rhetoric of the Maduro regime toward Colombia, calling the nation a "failed state."[38]

Brazil and Guyana. While Colombia has, to date, borne the brunt of the spillover effects of the Venezuela crisis, Venezuelans have also crossed into the Brazilian state of Roraima. On one weekend in June 2016 alone, an estimated 150,000 Venezuelans crossed into Brazil, although only a portion stayed, while others came to purchase food and other goods.[39] In May 2017, the mayor of the Brazilian city of Manaus declared an emergency after more than 350 Venezuelan refugees appeared on its streets, while more Venezuelan refugees have also been seen in the provincial capital of Boa Vista.[40]

With respect to Venezuela's other neighbor, Guyana, although the two countries share a land border, the relative lack of infrastructure connecting the two across Guyana's Essequibo region and the lack of population in the area has limited the migration of Venezuelans to Guyana to date. As with Colombia, however, Guyanese worry that in a moment of crisis, the Maduro regime could provoke a military crisis with Guyana as a diversionary tactic, based on a historical dispute over the Essequibo region. The Maduro regime attempted to resurrect the dispute in September 2015, just months after ExxonMobil discovered significant oil deposits off the coast of the disputed area.[41]

Island nations. In addition to the countries that share a land border with Venezuela, instability in the country is affecting its neighbors in the Caribbean. Venezuelans looking to obtain supplies or to escape economic and other hardship in the country are crossing the relatively narrow expanse of Caribbean water to the nearby islands of Aruba, Curaçao, and Trinidad and Tobago.[42] In Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuelans reportedly take a ferry or hire local boats to cross the seven kilometers of water separating the two countries in order to buy goods in Trinidadian stores. In some cases, they bring guns from Venezuela to trade for food and other basic goods. And, the interchange between Venezuela and its island neighbors, exacerbated by the combination of sheer economic need and the breakdown of law and order, has also contributed to piracy off its coast.[43]

In Trinidad and Tobago, as in the La Guajira region on the Caribbean coast of Colombia, an additional risk is created by the possible migration of persons with ties to radical Islamic groups such as Hezbollah. During recent years, Iran reportedly used Venezuela as a point of entry for its Qods forces (religious paramilitary agents), while Venezuelan authorities sold government-issued passports to refugees from Syria and other parts of the Middle East.[44] While there has been little evidence of the outflow of such migrants to date, the established Muslim communities in Trinidad and Tobago and La Guajira make both a logical destination if the crisis in Venezuela deepens. Given that Trinidad and Tobago is already a leading source on a per capita basis for foreign fighters to the Middle East, migration from Venezuela of those affiliated with radical Islamic groups would have a potentially radicalizing and destabilizing effect on the Islamic communities in those areas.[45]

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Recommendations for the United States

Despite the systemic looting of Venezuela by the Maduro regime, U.S. intervention in Venezuela would be strategically unwise. While such action could topple Venezuela's Bolivarian socialist government, it would reinforce the historic perception of the United States in the region as interventionist, sowing distrust and other anti-U.S. sentiment. In addition, in the short-term, it would leave behind an economically decimated, highly corrupted and politically polarized state. Following intervention, the United States would face the dilemma of allowing the newly "liberated" but broken Venezuelan state to continue as a source of criminality and instability in the region or engaging in the lengthy, expensive effort of trying to rebuild the country. In the process, as in the Middle East, the U.S. presence in Venezuela would likely become the focal point for rallying anti-U.S. sentiment, and U.S. forces in Venezuela would present a tempting target for the Chavista "resistance" and leftist terrorist groups posturing as resistors of the "yanqui invasion."

While it would be unwise for the United States to intervene in Venezuela and unrealistic for the international community to do so, both nonetheless have an important role in shaping the evolution of the situation in a positive direction, and in managing the consequences of the crisis in Venezuela on its neighbors. With respect to Venezuela itself, the United States should give the fullest support possible to the OAS, currently under Secretary Almagro, in condemning the departure from the democratic order established by Venezuela's constitution, and it should support the OAS and other multilateral and bilateral efforts pressuring the Chavista elite to restore that order. Also, it is imperative that the United States continue to highlight publicly the illegitimacy of the Maduro regime as a criminal elite that has, through administrative machinations, stolen control of the resource-rich state from its people, and which is increasingly relying on the force of arms to continue looting the state with an eye to making good a "getaway" with the money.

As part of such efforts, the United States must lead the international community in isolating the Chavista leadership through individually targeted economic sanctions, cooperating with other players in the international community to deny the Chavistas sanctuary in other countries after their rule. The U.S. State Department, Treasury Department, and other appropriate organizations should particularly focus on the legal and financial arenas, supporting Venezuela's National Assembly as it invalidates contracts made by the Chavista elite outside the constitutional order. This approach may have only limited short-term impacts in Venezuela itself, but it may help change the calculations of key Maduro regime benefactors such as China and Russia, convincing them that their best strategy for securing their oil holdings and other interests in the country is by working through the constitutionally legitimate National Assembly rather than the executive branch, whose operation outside the constitution leaves its commitments of Venezuelan resources to others without legal validity.

Beyond addressing the crisis in Venezuela itself, the United States should actively work with the country's neighbors to prevent the byproducts of the crisis, including the outflow of refugees and arms, from destabilizing the region. Venezuela's neighbor, Colombia, confronts the double challenge of being the country most impacted by the flow of Venezuelan refugees and arms (and possible military provocations), while dealing with the enormous resource and internal security challenges arising from its government's peace agreement with the FARC. While the Colombians take pride in their own capabilities, they will need more (and different) support from the United States, not less, in the months ahead.

In the short term, the United States should coordinate with Colombia, as well as Aruba, Curaçao, Trinidad and Tobago, and other states, in conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other nongovernmental organizations, to support the needs of the refugees. It should collaborate with the governments of the region to provide logistics, intelligence, and other support as permitted by national laws to help protect those refugees from victimization and criminal recruitment, as well as to monitor who is coming in, where they are going, and how they are affecting the local criminal environment. Particularly in Colombia, the United States should consider increased intelligence, training, and material support to police, prosecutors, and special military units combatting organized crime, which will likely expand through the refugee and arms flows.

In the unlikely, but not inconceivable, event that the Maduro administration attempts to provoke a military conflict with Colombia or Guyana, the United States should be prepared to provide military and other support to defend the territorial sovereignty of each. However, it

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Venezuelan citizens holding signs that read *Primero Justicia*, or Justice First, fill the streets of Maracaibo, Venezuela, 6 September 2016, demanding the recall of President Nicolás Maduro. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

should avoid direct military intervention in Venezuelan territory aside from possible selective removal of offensive capabilities being used against Venezuela's neighbors, such as combat aircraft and helicopters in their bases, or forward-deployed armored vehicles.

As the United States supports the countries of the region in their response to the Venezuelan crisis, it should, wherever possible, work through the OAS and other multilateral institutions of the Inter-American System, including a coordinated response to the handling of refugees.[46] The United States should also look for ways to leverage the events of the Conference of American Armies, of which it is head during the current two-year cycle, as a vehicle for such coordination in military affairs.[47] Finally, the United States should be prepared to work with the United Nations to deploy a peacekeeping or peace enforcement force into the region when the evolution of the crisis and the positions of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council make such action feasible.

Conclusion

The crisis in Venezuela is a tragedy with grave implications for its neighbors and the region. Yet, in that tragedy, there is also opportunity for the United States to strengthen its relationship with countries in the region by tangibly demonstrating its commitment to work with them to mitigate the effects of the crisis. It is also an opportunity to do so in a way that strengthens the OAS and Inter-American System (in whose functionality the United States has a strategic interest) as the principal multilateral vehicle for addressing regional security issues.

The Venezuela crisis may be the first opportunity of the Trump administration to define its vision for democracy, security, and good governance in the region, and to demonstrate its commitment to the partner nations with which the United States shares the Western Hemisphere. Given U.S. connectedness to the region through geography, commerce, and family ties, doing so is critical not only for the Trump administration and Venezuela's neighbors but also for the United States and the region as a whole. ■

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Staff conversations, which included General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov (*second from left*) and then General-Lieutenant Andrey Valerievich Kartapolov (*second from right*) were held 15 July 2015 at the Russian Ministry of Defense in Moscow with representatives of the Republic of Korea. The writings and published speeches by both men are widely regarded as reflecting dominant strategic concepts guiding development of the Russian military. (Photo courtesy of the Russian Ministry of Defense)

The Evolving Nature of Russia's Way of War

Lt. Col. Timothy Thomas, U.S. Army, Retired

This article discusses the three Russian military articles about which most Western military analysts specializing in Russia have focused their attention over the past four years. Unlike other analyses of those articles, this one offers a different perspective in that it compares them side by side, examining the text of the original versions and not merely the press reports about them. New graphs and tables included in the original versions are named, and a few are discussed further, and one is included here. This article is intended to do four things in particular. First, it demonstrates that five elements of Russian military thought continue to dominate

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the descriptions of conflict by military experts. Second, it demonstrates the Russian General Staff's preference for the term "new-type" warfare over the term "new-generation warfare" (NGW) and the near total absence of the latter from Russian publications since 2013. Third, it highlights that there are also indications in the articles that Russia may have in mind yet another way to describe the contemporary way of war still in development. Lastly, the absence of the Russian military's use of the term "hybrid" to describe its way of war is noteworthy.

Description of the Articles

For the past four years, Westerners have treated three articles in the Russian military press as the loci of contemporary Russian military thought. They are the transcript of General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov's early 2013 speech at the Academy of Military Science, retired General-Lieutenant S. A. Bogdanov and Reserve Colonel S. G. Chekinov's article in late 2013 in *Military Thought*, and the transcript of then General-Lieutenant (now Colonel-General) Andrey V. Kartapolov's early 2015 speech at the Academy of Military Science.

In these articles, Gerasimov discusses tendencies and new forms and methods of fighting; Bogdanov and Chekinov cover what they term "new-generation warfare," an expression that has not appeared in Russian military publications ever since; and Kartapolov examines what is termed "new-type warfare" (NTW).

Of interest is that Western explanations of these articles have been incisive but also sometimes incorrect—incisive in that many of the main issues are highlighted but incorrect in that they offer no context or access to the original articles, which has conveyed some inaccuracies that have clouded accurate analysis. For example, the title of Gerasimov's 2013 speech is "Basic Tendencies in the Development of Forms and Methods of Employing Armed Forces and Current Tasks of Military Science Regarding their Improvement" and not "The Value of Foresight," which indicates that most analysts did not have access to the original article but rather read only how it was titled and stated in Russia's *Journal of the Military-Industrial Complex* (*VPK*). The focus of this article is actually trends in warfare, and forms and methods of confronting them.

In addition—for Gerasimov and Kartapolov's articles in particular—there were several graphs or tables that went with their speeches that were published in the *Journal of the Academy of Military Science* that do not appear to have been analyzed in discussions outside or inside of Russia thus far. Though only one graph is included in this article, each graph or table added much to one's understanding of their speeches.

This paper will briefly examine the contents of these three works and will focus on the messages of each author when applied within the context of Russian military thought. It is important to keep in mind (as reflected in these three documents) that Russian military thought, in the opinion of this author, consists of five basic elements: trends in war's changing character, forecasting, strategy and the correlation of forces along strategic axes, forms and methods of the means of struggle, and the use of past lessons.[1] Each author's discussion tends to emphasize many of these elements of military thought.

Finally, Russian military authors indicate that its military conducts NTW and not hybrid war. While no specific article is used to make this point, it is worth noting that Russia's military makes the opposite assertion, that the west is using hybrid tactics against Russia (see discussion of the Kartapolov article below). For example, with regard to hybrid war, a Russian military journal article in 2015 stated the following:

> "Hybrid warfare (*gibridnaya voyna*)," then, is not exactly the right term and is slightly at odds with the glossary used in this country's military science. Essentially, these actions can be regarded as a form of confrontation between countries or, in a narrow sense, as a form in which

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forces and capabilities are used to assure national security.[2]


Further, Russian President Vladimir Putin (on 30 May 2017) stated in an interview with *Le Figaro* newspaper,

> There is no need to escalate anything, no need to think up mythical Russian threats, hybrid wars, and so on. These are your own fancy, and then you scare yourselves, and based on that formulate a policy prospect. Such a policy has no prospects.[3]

Gerasimov in Early 2013

General Staff Chief Gerasimov's speech, transcribed and published in an article in *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)* in 2013, is about trends, forms (which are military organizations), and methods (which include weapons and types of military art) for use by Russia's armed forces.[4] He begins his discussion with some of the trends he observed in war's changing character. These trends include the assertions that

- wars are no longer declared,
- "color revolutions" (mass popular demonstrations conducted in conjunction with other popular efforts to undermine national governing institutions) can occur quickly;
- new-type wars are like regular wars (his mention of NTW precedes Kartapolov's by two years, and Gerasimov never used the NGW term in any of his five annual speeches at the Academy of Military Science); and
- nonmilitary methods at times are more effective than military ones.



The 2013 issue of the *Journal of the Academy of Military Science* in which Valery V. Gerasimov's article "Principal Trends in the Development of the Forms and Methods of Employing Armed Forces and Current Tasks of Military Science Regarding their Improvement" was published (page 24). (Image courtesy of the author)

Gerasimov first asserts that a combination of nonmilitary methods, including the protest potential of the population, covert military measures, information operations, and special forces' activities, are being implemented by some nations to control conflict. (Ironically, the formula he describes is reminiscent of Russia's own activities associated with the annexation of Crimea.) He also notes that peacekeeping and what he terms "crisis regulation" operations can sometimes be used as open military employment of forces to achieve specific goals.[5]

Second, Gerasimov lists a set of developments that appear to describe how an actual contemporary war would be fought. He asserts that the principal tactic within this set of developments is noncontact or remote engagement, since information technology has greatly reduced the spatial and temporal distances between opponents. As a consequence, he notes, operational pauses are disappearing. He then describes how the levels of war and fighting (strategy, operations, tactics; offense and defense) have leveled off due to the existence of information technologies. Third, he specifies that the use of joint mobile forces operating in a reconnaissance and information environment is growing. Fourth, he describes the efficacy of no-fly zones, blockades, and the use of private military companies, observing that they are being used more often. Fifth, he describes the types of asymmetric methods of confronting an opponent that are under development. To further progress in these areas, Gerasimov requests during his speech that the Academy of Military Science help in developing new forms and methods of asymmetric use.

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Finally, he asserts that the use of precision-guided munitions, robotics, unmanned aerial vehicles, and weapons based on new physical principles will be the new main methods for engaging an enemy.[6]


Next, Gerasimov reviews and describes the forms and methods of fighting that Soviet forces used in Afghanistan, to include a table in the article listing them. He states that "a very important set of issues is associated with improving the forms and methods of employing force groupings." And, in accordance with the title of the article, he goes on to describe a number of forms and methods needed by Russia's military, such as those used for implementation outside of Russia's borders; for Russia's aerospace forces; and for rescue, humanitarian, special, evacuations, and other operations. Gerasimov also notes that forms (no mention of methods) are also needed for strategic operations and peacekeeping.[7]

This description of forms and methods is augmented with an assessment of how to improve Russia's territorial defense concept. In furtherance of this objective, Gerasimov indicates that he is seeking a way to integrate civilian and military infrastructures so that, in case of conflict, everyone would fight in defense of Russia's territory. This must be accomplished, Gerasimov then notes, with the cooperation of the state's power structures and other state structures. One consequence of this need is the development of new ways to support decision making.[8]

In light of his comments naming territorial defense as a specified need, subsequent progress seems to have been made toward achieving this objective, since it appears that Russia's National Defense Management Center (NDMC), during the Kavkaz–2016 exercise, accomplished the goal of improving territorial defense by taking charge of integrating military and civilian structures. Additionally, the NDMC, which was the focus of Gerasimov's 2015 academy speech, reportedly also has instituted modeling and simulations to improve decision-making capabilities and has begun teaching civilians integration techniques with the military.

Gerasimov concludes his speech noting that changes in the nature of conflict require new support systems and new forms and methods for employing the means of struggle. He states that Russia must not copy foreign experience. Rather than follow, the requirement is to "outrun" adversaries and be in a leading position with regard to these means. To date, with its focus on developing new weapons of all types, from hypersonic to quantum, Russia's Defense Ministry appears to be closely adhering to this advice. Further, he asserts that forecasting the types of war into which Russia could be drawn was very important. He closes by citing Alexander Svechin's comments on strategic thought from years ago that "each conflict has a logic all its own." He concludes by stating that he is counting on the Academy of Military Science to study various ways to approach different types of conflict and support his efforts in this regard.[9]

Gerasimov's speech includes several diagrams or tables. One diagram highlighted the use of nonmilitary methods being used by a 4:1 ratio over military methods. There are three diagrams that focused on forms and methods of conflict (traditional, new, and those used in Afghanistan). Finally, there is a list of the principal tasks of military science, a diagram of U.S. robotics, and a list of ways to use Russia's Armed Forces outside of Russia's borders.[10]



Military Review

WE RECOMMEND

For more detailed discussion of the intellectual and cultural environment within which Russian officer thinking is shaped, see Timothy Thomas's monograph "Thinking like a Russian Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on the Nature of War" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, April 2016) by visiting http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Thinking%20Like%20A%20Russian%20Officer_monograph_Thomas%20(final).pdf.

Chekinov and Bogdanov in Late 2013

In the conclusion to their article in issue 10 of *Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought)* in 2013, retired General-Lieutenant S. A. Bogdanov and Reserve Colonel S. G. Chekinov state that "information superiority and

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anticipatory operations will be the main ingredients of success in new-generation wars."[11] To understand this point of view, it is important to backtrack in the article and focus on what supporting evidence the authors offer for these two items.

A key assertion they make is that forecasting is perhaps a better way to understand "anticipatory operations." The Russian translation actually is "the first to see will be the first to start decisive actions."[12] With regard to information superiority, the authors make two key points in their paper. The first point is that "no goal will be achieved in future wars unless one belligerent gains information superiority over the other."[13] Therefore, it will be necessary to obtain superiority in regard to information technology since new weapons have greater killing power, range, accuracy, and speed. Superior information technologies are needed to provide the intelligence, reconnaissance, control, communications, and information warfare capabilities with greater potential.[14] Such weapons have "altered significantly the patterns of manpower employment and the conduct of military operations."[15] This requires a focus on new-generation weaponry in particular, such as robotics, unmanned aerial vehicles, quantum computing, precision-guided munitions, reconnaissance-strike complexes, and electronic warfare capabilities.[16] These weapons are the result of technologies that both integrate capabilities at nanosecond speed and offer capabilities never before anticipated.[17] For example, robotics can conduct reconnaissance, coordinate combat operations of different branches, repair weapons, build defenses, destroy enemy hardware, clear mines, and deactivate contaminated areas.[18]



The 2013 issue of *Military Thought (#10)* in which retired General-Lieutenant S. A. Bogdanov and Reserve Colonel S. G. Chekinov's article "On the Character and Content of Wars of a New Generation" was published (page 13). (Image courtesy of the author)

The second point the authors make is the need to establish what they refer to as "information and psychological warfare" superiority. This refers to control over information pressure that can be exerted against an adversary through the media, nongovernmental organizations, foreign grants, religious organizations, propaganda, and disinformation designed to stoke chaos in a society.[19] Meanwhile, Russia will attempt to defend itself from similar threats and create a favorable setting for armed forces operations by countering the information-psychological warfare it believes is being waged against it through nonmilitary and deterrence means. Nonmilitary means include information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, economic, and others. Deterrence measures also include a demonstration of force readiness, a warning about the immediate use of the nuclear option, and the preparation and conduct of an information operation to mislead the enemy about Russia's readiness to fight.[20]

The authors' discussion of the forecasting aspect of NGW's ingredients for success is equally, if not more, interesting, since it focuses on the importance of the opening and closing periods of conflict, the identification of targets that ensure success, and the employment of measures that will ensure victory. The opening period of war (the authors had earlier written on the initial period of war) is forecasted as pivotal. They assert that it will include a targeted information operation, an electronic warfare operation, an aerospace operation, continuous air force harassment, the use of high-precision weapons launched from various platforms, long-range artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles. The closing period will be used to roll over or annihilate remaining units, primarily through the use of ground troops.[21]

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Targets that must be identified in the forecasting process and subsequently neutralized are critical government and military control centers, key military-industrial complex facilities, and the opposing armed force's management system. Also of vital importance is the prevention of an orderly deployment of an opponent's forces. Victory is assured if an opponent's political and economic system is made ungovernable, its population demoralized, and its key military-industrial complexes destroyed or damaged beyond repair, according to the authors.[22]

The other key aspect of this article is a focus on the trends in the changing character of war that Russia sees developing, not the forecasted nature of how to defeat these trends as the opening and closing period forecasts suggest. Here three such trends are noted. First, the principal tactic of NGW is stated to be remote engagement, since information technology has greatly reduced the distance (physical, temporal, and informational) between opponents. Second, the levels of war and fighting (strategy, operations, and tactics; offense and defense) have leveled out due to the existence of information technologies. Third, the use of joint mobile forces operating in a reconnaissance and information environment is growing.[23] Of note, these trends and a few others, almost word for word, appear lifted from Gerasimov's earlier 2013 speech.

The authors go on to observe that new weapons and methods for using them have radically changed the character and content of armed struggle. New patterns of manpower employment and the conduct of military operations have changed in several ways. As a consequence, there are now no longer clear dividing lines between opponents; flanks are more exposed; orders of battle have gaps; attacker high-tech weapons offer overwhelming superiority; long-range high-precision weapons can be used on a mass scale; vital economic facilities and control centers can be destroyed as never before; reconnaissance, fire, electronic, and information warfare forces of different branches and arms are now integrated; and orbiting satellites are playing a role on a wide scale.[24] Finally, asymmetric means, nonmilitary measures, and indirect means will be used more than before to offset an opponent's superiority.

Thus, this article focuses on the necessity of gaining information superiority, forecasting war's probable direction, and developing an appreciation for the changing character of armed conflict, such as an increased role for nonmilitary operations. In their writings after this article appeared, the authors resorted only to the use of NTW and not NGW. Of interest is that the NGW topic appears to have disappeared in Russian military journals since Chekinov and Bogdanov's 2013 article. Moreover, the authors did not touch on NGW in the seven articles they have written since, which covered topics in *Military Thought* on futurology, the art of war, forecasting, military art, twenty-first century military security, strategy, and the concept of war. They only referred to NTW, indicating a preference for the General Staff's terminology, as the next section demonstrates.

Kartapolov in Early 2015


General-Lieutenant Andrey V. Kartapolov was chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff when he gave a speech at the Russian Academy of Military Science that covered the elements of NTW in early 2015. Regarding Russia's armed forces, he noted,

> Nonstandard forms and methods are being developed for the employment of our Armed Forces, which will make it possible to level the enemy's technological superiority. For this, the features of the preparation and conduct of new-type warfare are being fully used and "asymmetric" methods of confronting the enemy are being developed.[25]

He goes on to assert that the shift from large-scale operations to the use of precision-guided munitions has changed the character of warfare, since they are directed not just against force groupings of a state but also against critical infrastructure deep inside an opponent's state. The United States and NATO, with new strategic missile defense systems, are attempting to offset other nations' abilities to conduct such operations, thus undermining global stability and disrupting the developed correlation of forces in the nuclear missile sphere.[26]

Kartapolov then discusses many of the same elements of Russian military thought as Gerasimov, Chekinov, and Bogdanov. These include the need to develop new weapons, the forms and methods of their use, new changes in the nature of armed struggle, and the increasing use of nontraditional models of confrontation that use both direct and indirect actions. He then spends considerable ink on what he describes as America's anti-Russian campaign and its attempts to remain the world's sole superpower through the introduction of hybrid methods that include information-psychological effects. This involves

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(Graphic translated by Dr. Harold Orenstein)

Graphic from Andrey V. Kartapolov's "Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development of Resources and Methods of Conducting Them. Direct and Indirect Actions in Contemporary International Conflicts," Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk 2 [*Journal of the Academy of Military Science* 2] (2015): 35.

indirect actions that consist of covert activities directed toward igniting internal problems in an opponent's population and the use of so-called "third forces." Political campaigns run by the West, he notes, conduct hidden "information pressure" that accuses others of human rights violations, tyranny, development of weapons of mass destruction, and absence of democracy. Information confrontations are conducted using falsifications, replacements, or the distortion of information.[27] All of these, interestingly enough, sound exactly like the methods Russia used in Ukraine to seize Crimea.

Kartapolov then goes into a long discussion of color revolutions, which he says result in confusion among the West's opponents over who is fighting and for what, what is truth, and what is a lie.[28] Again, this sounds very close to what Russia's state-controlled media has excelled at in areas such as the Baltics, where they concoct their own reality and ignore the truth. He then states that the West's use of NTW methods is violating humanitarian standards, is displacing populations, and is more like the conduct of genocide. The pretext for interference by force is conducted "under the guise of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe and stabilizing the situation." He then asserts that NTW is 80–90 percent propaganda and 10–20 percent violence.[29]

To combat these tendencies, direct action (such as offensive actions) must adhere to the principle of dynamism, as a passive operation will lead to a loss of command and control. Also, he asserts that armed resources must be improved, especially the capabilities of intelligence, command and control, and destruction means, with the capability to strike from great distances.[30]

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It is thus a contradictory view of NTW that Kartapolov presents. He stresses several times how the West, and the United States in particular, uses the concept and does so in a ruthless manner. Then, at the end of his presentation, he clearly states that Russia is preparing to conduct NTW as well in conjunction with the development of asymmetric methods. The NTW diagram (graphic on page 40) Kartapolov uses to explain the concept is attached at the end of this presentation.[31] Note that he equates indirect actions (a Russian focus) with hybrid ones (a U.S. focus). The importance of the diagram is that Kartapolov offers something no other Russian officer has attempted, a view on how future conflicts develop and are handled in phases.



Subsequent to publication of his 2015 speech at the Academy of Military Science, Andrey V. Kartapolov was promoted to colonel-general and appointed as commander of the Western Military District troops in 2015. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Kartapolov notes at the end of his presentation that the development of asymmetric and indirect actions must be introduced into operational training. Further, he adds that new and improved resources and methods for conducting contemporary military conflicts are growing and are "capable of giving birth to other forms of warfare as well."[32] Thus, he implies that NGW and NTW methods may only be steps along the way to the development of new forms and methods of warfare.

Kartapolov's presentation includes several graphics. They discuss the United States' 2015 national security strategy, the development and escalation of military conflicts, basic differences between traditional wars and contemporary conflicts, classical forms of the conduct of armed warfare (here were cover photos of Russian military regulations), changes in the character of armed conflict, priority trends in the development and creation of contemporary combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, and a chart with several types of asymmetric operations.[33]

Conclusions

All three articles focus on developing trends in warfare, the changing character of conflict, and the need for new forms and methods of fighting. Owing to the prominence of the authors, they may be taken as representative of prevailing Russian military thought at the highest levels. Each presentation, however, also has a particular proclivity that is worthy of mention.

In Gerasimov's article, it is the fact that Russia must try to outrun its potential opponents in weaponry and not just copy foreign experience. For this reason, the West must expect Russia's modernization example to continue unabated until, from Putin's point of view, Russia surpasses the West in competency on modernized equipment and preeminence in asymmetric insights and capabilities.

Gerasimov's speech is also the first to express the observation that in contemporary conflict, nonmilitary methods are being used at a ratio of 4:1 relative to military methods. Finally, he focuses on improving Russia's territorial defense concept, which gives the country defense in depth by integrating civilian structures with military ones. This objective seems to have been accomplished with Russia's development of the NDMC.

For Bogdanov and Chekinov, their explanation of NGW as a topic seems to have disappeared. Whether this is because discussion of the concept has now entered classified channels in Russia or if it has simply lost its utility and has been replaced by other concepts is unknown. Irrespective, the discussion of new generation weapons

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has continued. Almost daily in the Russian press, there is mention of weaponry's new generational impact, whether it be weapons based on new physical principles or, as one author noted, weapons that cannot be discussed in the press at this time. The authors further stress that new patterns of manpower employment have evolved and the conduct of military operations has changed.

Kartapolov's article is the most controversial in that he spends an inordinate amount of attention on Western methods of fighting, asserting that hybrid methods were used by the United States and NATO for the past twenty years. He describes the characteristics of NTW and offers a diagram illustrating how NTW might proceed. Then, at the end of his article, he notes that Russia will be implementing NTW and improving it with asymmetric and indirect methods. Perhaps of greatest interest is his statement that new and improved resources and methods for conducting contemporary military conflicts are growing and are "capable of giving birth to other forms of warfare as well."

Meanwhile, U.S. military centers around the country continue to focus on NGW concepts. Undoubtedly, there is value in this, and the effort should continue. But, leaders also need to be made aware of the fact that this concept, a "one off," has disappeared from Russian writings. It is time that an equal amount of focus be placed on NTW, the concept of recent emphasis, which even the authors of the new-generation article appear to have adopted. It is very important to continue to follow what these and other prominent Russian military authors have to say in the future. Their insights on the changing character of warfare, in particular, help all nations obtain another perspective on the path that humanity is taking in accordance with the development of new weaponry. The path is not an optimistic one, as it is littered with potential risks for unintended and perhaps tragic consequences for most nations if many of the concepts—use of hypersonic, nuclear, quantum, etc.—are ever used, especially by rogue nations. ■

Notes

1. For a discussion of these elements, see Timothy Thomas, "Thinking like a Russian Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on the Nature of War" (monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, April 2016), accessed 10 May 2017, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Thinking%20Like%20A%20Russian%20Officer_monograph_Thomas%20(final).pdf.
2. V. B. Andrianov and V. V. Loyko, "Questions Regarding the Use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Crisis Situations in Peacetime," *Voennaya Mysl* 1 (*Military Thought* 1) (2015), 68.
3. "Macron et Poutine: L'entente Contre le Terrorisme," *Le Figaro*, 30 May 2017, cited in Russian Interfax News Agency (in English), 30 May 2017.
4. Valery V. Gerasimov, "Principal Trends in the Development of the Forms and Methods of Employing Armed Forces and Current Tasks of Military Science Regarding Their Improvement," *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk* 1 (*Journal of the Academy of Military Science* 1) (2013): 24–29.
5. Ibid., 24.
6. Ibid., 24, 26.
7. Ibid., 26–27.
8. Ibid., 28.
9. Ibid., 29.
10. Ibid., 25–28.
11. S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "On the Character and Content of Wars of a New Generation," *Voennaya Mysl* 10 (*Military Thought* 10) (2013): 13–24.
12. Ibid., 24.
13. Ibid., 14.
14. Ibid., 15.
15. Ibid., 17.
16. Ibid., 21–22.
17. Ibid., 20.
18. Ibid., 22.
19. Ibid., 17–18.
20. Ibid., 20, 24.
21. Ibid., 23.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 13.
24. Ibid., 16–17.
25. Andrey V. Kartapolov, "Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development of Resources and Methods of Conducting Them. Direct and Indirect Actions in Contemporary International Conflicts," *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk* 2 (*Journal of the Academy of Military Science* 2) (2015): 35.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 29.
28. Ibid., 30–31.
29. Ibid., 33.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 28.
32. Ibid., 36.
33. Ibid., 27–28, 30–32, and 34–35.

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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspects the Sci-Tech Complex 28 October 2015 in Pyongyang, North Korea. (Photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency)

North Korean Cyber Support to Combat Operations

1st Lt. Scott J. Tosi, U.S. Army

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As recently as 2014, some Western cyber experts were describing the cyber capabilities of North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) with apparent indifference, such as Jason Andress and Steve Winterfield in *Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for Security Practitioners*, who characterized the DPRK's capability to carry out cyberattacks as "... questionable, but [it] may actually exist."[1] The well-known November 2014 cyberattack attributed to the DPRK, executed against Sony Corporation as a response to the film *The Interview*, helped change perceptions in the United States of DPRK cyber capabilities—from a minor local nuisance directed at South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) to a major global strategic threat.[2]

While the DPRK has been considered a major strategic cyber threat since the attack on Sony, consideration also should be given to the potential tactical use of cyber capabilities as an extension of its warfighting strategy.

> "... the real purpose of the DPRK's military policy and political aggressiveness has become to control and subdue its own population and retain power ..."

The less familiar tactical use of cyberattacks as a means of warfighting poses a greater threat to ROK and U.S. forces than any politically motivated strategic cyberattack ever could. The DPRK military's materiel is considered technologically obsolete at the tactical level. However, evidence suggests the Korean People's Army (KPA) will conduct cyber operations as an asymmetric means to disrupt enemy command and control and to offset its technological disadvantages during combat operations; therefore, U.S. and partner forces should prepare for this threat.[3]

North Korean Military Strategy

To understand how the DPRK would be likely to conduct tactical cyber operations in support of combat units during war, it is helpful to consider the historical aims and presumed military theory of the increasingly isolated and technologically declining nation. After failing to unify the peninsula from 1950 to 1953, *kukka mokp'yo*—communization of the ROK, through military force if necessary—became and has remained a primary objective of the DPRK, according to Korea expert James M. Minnich.[4] As a 2012 report to Congress pointed out, however, the real purpose of the DPRK's military policy and political aggressiveness has become to control and subdue its own population and retain power rather than to unify the Korean Peninsula.[5] Nonetheless, events such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 and the exchange of artillery fire in Yeoncheon in 2015 have shown that minor provocations have the potential to erupt into open combat. Moreover, combat could become full-scale war. Whether through accidental escalation of force or a premeditated surprise invasion, the DPRK may be fully willing to go to war.[6]

Following its failure in the Korean War, the DPRK expanded and reorganized its military using features of the Soviet and Chinese militaries. Subsequently, it has continued to draw influence, equipment, and doctrine from Russia and China, according to Minnich.[7] To avoid the same fate as the drawn-out invasion of the ROK, the DPRK military appears to have developed a strategy known as *kisub chollyak*, which calls for a quick, decisive war conducted with mixed tactics against ROK and U.S. military forces on the peninsula.[8] This approach has become more intransigent over time due to the DPRK's increasing economic inability to sustain a protracted war. Therefore, to achieve its tactical objectives as rapidly as possible, the DPRK has organized its military to initiate combat with "massive conventional and chemical cannon and missile bombardments while simultaneously employing special operations forces teams," according to Minnich.[9] Estimates of the number of DPRK special operations forces vary between eighty thousand and one hundred eighty thousand soldiers who could conduct asymmetric attacks in the south, intended to enable the large-scale light infantry forces that would follow.[10]

Initially, the DPRK likely considered bombardment and special operations followed by a large-scale invasion force sufficient to quickly disrupt, confuse, outmaneuver, and overwhelm peninsula-based ROK and U.S. military

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forces before U.S. reinforcements could arrive. However, the strategy faced a shock in the early 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union and withdrawal of materiel support that came from it. This shock no doubt was amplified in 1991 by the unexpectedly fast and easy defeat by the United States of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army, which attempted to employ similar tactics and weaponry against the United States as the DPRK had long planned to use against the ROK.[11] The fall of Hussein's numerically superior army to the U.S. military surely came as a wake-up call to China and the DPRK, which were relying on technologically inferior but numerically superior forces to overwhelm their enemies quickly. Technology was proven superior to overwhelming numbers in force-on-force combat. Concurrently, the likelihood that DPRK forces would be easily overmatched by U.S. technological advantages was accompanied by a rapid decline of the DPRK economic and agricultural sectors, which further diminished its ability to project and sustain military forces.[12]

The DPRK's response to these events included building its nuclear program.[13] While U.S. success in Operation Desert Storm implied that the DPRK military could be quickly and decisively defeated by the United States in conventional war, albeit at a potentially high cost of life of Korean civilians, the DPRK's nuclear program introduced a high risk of mass destruction of ROK and U.S. targets, should the United States or the ROK provoke war.

Notwithstanding, while the development of a nuclear deterrence option supported defensive political goals for the DPRK, it did little to advance the prospect of kukka mokp'yo. For that, the DPRK seems to have emulated China's apparent doctrinal changes made in the wake of Desert Storm.

After the United States defeated the Iraqi army—the fifth largest in the world in 1990—in just five weeks, the Chinese military apparently reevaluated its warfighting strategy and tactics.[14] In the 1990s, China developed a strategy of hybrid warfare that relied on relatively cheap technological methods for negating the United States' qualitative military superiority through indirect attacks. In 1999, evidence of the Chinese military's new approach appeared in *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America* (an English summary translation based on a 1999 publication by two Chinese army colonels), which described using several asymmetric measures to defeat the United States, including conducting information warfare aimed at negating the U.S. military's visibility of the battlefield through all means necessary.[15] National security scholars Richard A. Clarke and Robert Knake assert that this strategy has resulted in China's adoption of large-scale cyberwarfare, which would include the stealing of technological information and the tactical targeting of intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets to equalize the battlefield in any force-on-force action.[16]

Believing its nuclear program would deter attacks on its homeland, and having survived the economic and agricultural crisis of the 1990s, the DPRK faced a dilemma in the early 2000s similar to what China faced in the wake of the Gulf War, when it became apparent that China would be vulnerable to defeat by advanced U.S. weapons technology. The DPRK's general response to this dilemma was threefold: increasing the number of special operations forces to conduct unconventional warfare, expanding its electronic warfare and signals intelligence assets to conduct jamming operations, and, most important, creating tactical and strategic cyber operations under what are known as Bureau 121, No. 91 Office, and Lab 110.[17] As with any aspect of the DPRK, it is difficult to verify information about these secretive organizations.

North Korean Cyber Organization

It is reported that Bureau 121, No. 91 Office, and Lab 110 are components of six bureaus under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) that specializes in intelligence gathering under the administration of the General Staff Department (GSD). While the GSD is responsible for the command and control of the KPA, it falls under the Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF), according to Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford.[18] This arrangement would give the RGB direct operational control from the top of the chain of command and ensure the cyber component could conduct operations independently and in support of the KPA based on operational need.

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Bureau 121 reportedly comprises an intelligence-gathering component and an attack component. The unit is thought to operate primarily out of Pyongyang as well as the Chilbosan Hotel in Shenyang, China.[19] No. 91 Office is believed to operate out of Pyongyang to conduct hacking operations for the RGB.[20] Lab 110 is believed to conduct technical reconnaissance, infiltration of computer networks, intelligence gathering through hacking, and planting viruses on enemy networks.[21]

While there appear to be numerous other cyber organizations in the DPRK, those outside the RGB primarily pertain to internal political control or spreading political propaganda to foreign nations. Therefore, their work relates little to tactical or operational cyber support for combat operations.

Estimates of the size of the DPRK's cyber force have ranged from as few as 1,800 hackers and computer experts to nearly six thousand, which would make it the third largest cyber agency behind the United States and Russia.[22] The higher estimate reportedly came from ROK intelligence early in 2015, but the number cannot be verified. Moreover, it was unclear whether No. 91 Office and Lab 110 were included in the calculation, but given the ROK's desire to influence the United States to consider DPRK cyber threats a priority, it is likely their strength was included (some consider the ROK estimates inaccurate due to bias). Furthermore, the ROK's estimate represents 2013 data and, like much intelligence on North Korea, is already out of date.



North Korean army hackers are widely reported to work in the Chilbosan Hotel (photographed here 17 April 2005), partly owned by the North Korean government, in Shenyang, China. Such reports are plausible due in part to the apparent advantages of working from China, such as the ready availability of multiple lines of communication, not to mention modern equipment, training, logistical support, and a reliable source of power. (See, for example, James Cook, "PHOTOS: Inside The Luxury Chinese Hotel Where North Korea Keeps Its Army of Hackers," Business Insider website, 2 December 2014, accessed 12 June 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/photos-chinese-hotel-where-north-korea-keeps-hackers-2014-12). (Photo by tack well, Flickr)

Irrespective, the shortage of concrete knowledge of DPRK cyber organizations is compounded by the nature of DPRK's Internet access. The DPRK has divided its networks into two components. Only government and military agencies can access the outward-facing network routed through China, which hackers use for conducting cyberattacks. The other component is the *kwangmyong*, a monitored intranet of government-selected content.[23] As of January 2013, one "Internet café" was reported


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in the DPRK, in Pyongyang, where citizens reportedly can access only the kwangmyong.[24] The use of Chinese networks to access the global Internet provides a buffer for DPRK hackers to deny responsibility for their intrusions and attacks. Moreover, they can safely conduct outbound attacks while avoiding inbound attacks from the ROK or the United States.[25]

However, use of third parties for outward Internet access also makes DPRK cyber operations reliant on continued cooperation from China and other partners. Despite waning support for the isolated state in recent years, China's support seems assured during peacetime. However, it is not guaranteed if war breaks out.

Since the low level of connectivity functions as protection from outside attacks, the DPRK can focus on developing offensive cyber capabilities. Few DPRK systems or networks if compromised would reduce warfighting capabilities.[26] The high-profile cyberattacks attributed to DPRK hackers have served largely strategic and political purposes. However, cyber support to combat units in the event of full-scale war likely remains a key component of a DPRK strategy.

Cyberwarfare is unique in that once a new methodology or technique has been used in an attack, the victim can create countermeasures relatively quickly to prevent future attacks. Probably for this reason the DPRK has not, and most likely would not, conduct large-scale tactical or operational cyberattacks on the ROK or the United States unless at war. Rather, the DPRK would conduct only small-scale reconnaissance and testing of methodologies on enemy networks. This approach would mitigate the risk of enemies developing countermeasures that would compromise advantages the DPRK wants to maintain for full-scale war.



A satellite image of North Korea compared to South Korea at night. Technological backwardness reportedly compels North Korean army hackers to seek locations outside of North Korea, such as the Chilbosan Hotel in China, where access to technology and communications lines is readily available to conduct cyberattacks. (Image courtesy of NASA)

Although U.S. and partner forces know relatively little about the DPRK's cyber capabilities, China and Russia can be studied as models. China, as North Korea's closest (and perhaps only) ally, provides not only outward-facing networks for North Korean cyber units but also bases of operations, such as the Chilbosan Hotel, and training. Known Chinese cyber actions have primarily focused on technological espionage, something the DPRK probably has little interest in as it lacks the infrastructure to build or maintain technologically advanced weaponry as China does. In contrast, Russia's cyber activities during its 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 military action in Ukraine suggest the DPRK's likely tactical cyber actions in the event of war on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korean Tactical Cyber Support to Warfighting

While a land, air, and sea war on the Korean Peninsula would commence, or escalate, at a specific date and time, the cyber war would begin long before any shots were fired.[27] While, arguably, the cyber war with the DPRK is already ongoing, it would need to increase the frequency and intensity of cyber reconnaissance and attacks before a general war in order to

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successfully support conventional combat units. In the lead-up to war and early stages of war, North Korean asymmetric cyber units would target civilian communications through simple denial of service.

In 2008, Russia preceded its attack on Georgia with distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks for weeks before Russian soldiers crossed the border to test their capabilities and conduct reconnaissance on Georgian networks, planning to attack them again later. Russia attacked Georgian communications, crippling the government's ability to communicate and coordinate against Russian forces.[28] The Russian cyberattacks combined simplicity with sophistication in execution; they allowed Russia to cheaply take down Georgian command and communications. What would have taken days, if not weeks, of bombing and coordination between intelligence and air power took minutes from the safety of Russian computers but achieved the same result. U.S. and partner forces can reasonably expect that as a technologically inferior nation with an obsolete air force and navy, the DPRK would conduct similar attacks.

Furthermore, the DPRK appears to have demonstrated such capability. From 2014 to 2016, the DPRK reportedly hacked "more than 140,000 computers" in the ROK belonging to government and businesses, and it tried to attack the ROK transportation system's control network.[29] The attacks, likely carried out by Bureau 121, enabled the DPRK to gain access to and monitor ROK government and business communications.

If this had occurred during an invasion, the DPRK might have turned off all 140,000 computers, rendering these organizations' communications defunct. It might have been able to shut down or desynchronize the ROK transportation network.

If increased in scope and aggressiveness, such attacks could cut the ROK's communication and information-sharing capabilities with the military. Conducted in conjunction with special operations forces destroying physical communications systems in the ROK, the DPRK might disable ROK and U.S. communications, leaving units on the battlefield blind. Cutting communications in the early stages of the war would cripple the ROK and U.S. ability to coordinate artillery and aerial assets, giving DPRK forces time and space to overwhelm ROK and U.S. forces in the demilitarized zone.

While targeting of communications and critical networks in the ROK would hamper ROK and U.S. efforts, alternative means of communication might still enable the two nations to counter the DPRK's aggression. However, vital secondary means of communication could be neutralized by targeting the ROK power grid, potentially negating the ROK and U.S. advantages over DPRK forces by slowing a timely coordinated response to aggression. Several years ago, such an attack would have been deemed impossible for a nation as technologically backward as the DPRK. Today, such an attack by the DPRK in the event of war is almost certain.

For example, in December 2015, Russian hackers caused a power outage in Ukraine via cyberattack. They installed malware on Ukraine's power plant network and remotely switched breakers to cut power to over 225,000 people.[30] Russia then swamped Ukrainian utility customer service with fake phone calls to prevent the company from receiving customer calls.[31] Given the level of sophistication that DPRK cyber units seem to have reached and the relationship the DPRK maintains with Russia, it is likely that the DPRK has received support from Russia for potentially conducting similar attacks against ROK power plants.

Cyberattacks, in essence, would be an asymmetric approach to compensate for the DPRK's almost nonexistent air force. They could inflict tactical and operational damage on the ROK to enhance the "shock-and-awe" bombardments that likely would precede military invention. By knocking out critical communications, transportation, and support infrastructure, the DPRK would cause confusion and disorder that would facilitate its conventional infantry forces' overwhelming ROK and U.S. forces.

Nevertheless, while these methods could be effective, it is unlikely Bureau 121 would be able to fully take the ROK network offline, although a fractional network disruption could severely hinder ROK and U.S. actions on the battlefield. To fully negate ROK and U.S. technological superiority, the DPRK would need to employ more sophisticated cyberattacks against GPS, radar, logistics support systems, and weapons targeting systems. Exactly how the DPRK would conduct such attacks is outside the scope of this discussion. The threat should be taken seriously, however, as the Defense Science Board warns, "should the United States find itself in a full-scale conflict with a peer adversary, ... U.S. guns, missiles, and bombs may not fire, or may be directed against our own troops. Resupply, including food, water, ammunition, and fuel may not arrive when or where needed."[32]

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Students work at computers 13 April 2013 at Mangyongdae Revolutionary School in Pyongyang, North Korea. The school is run by the military, and school administrators say it was originally set up in 1947 for children who had lost their parents during Korea's fight for liberation from its Japanese occupiers. (Photo by the Associated Press)

Hacking or taking radar and GPS offline, if even for several days before ROK and U.S. forces could recover, could ground air power, offering DPRK units freedom of maneuver on the battlefield. Moreover, the disruption of GPS would not only negate the use of GPS-guided weapons systems, but, more dangerously, it could also cause weapons to fire at incorrect coordinates. The hacking of U.S. satellites, which China reportedly has already shown it can accomplish, could blind ROK and U.S. intelligence to DPRK movements on the ground.[33]

If the DPRK hacked automated logistical networks that supported ROK and U.S. forces on the peninsula, those forces would have difficulty sustaining warfighting capabilities. Tracking, requisitioning, and delivering essential war supplies could be disrupted by a simple DDOS attack that would shut down systems or corrupt data, causing logistical supplies to be sent incorrectly. ROK and U.S. soldiers could quickly find themselves without the resources necessary to fight.

Therefore, the DPRK could use cyberattacks to ensure its numerical superiority and overwhelming volume of firepower could triumph despite inferior materiel. When combined with electronic warfare and special operations forces acting behind the battle lines, this would, consistent with the ideals in *Unrestricted Warfare*, cause ROK and U.S. forces to lose momentum and maintain a defensive and reactionary posture.

Unrestricted Warfare describes the "golden ratio" and the "side-principal" rule. The idea is that the golden ratio, 0.618 or roughly two-thirds, which is usually applied to art, architecture, and mathematics, can be applied to warfare. The authors point out that once the Iraqi army was reduced by the U.S. Air Force to 0.618 of its original strength, it collapsed and the war ended.[34] The side-principal rule, in essence, is the idea that war can be won through nonwar actions. When taking these two theories together, it becomes apparent that while the Chinese may

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believe they could not defeat the United States in war through conventional combat, they probably believe they could defeat the United States if nonwar actions were used to diminish the U.S. military's strength to around two-thirds of its combat power.

For China, the options for achieving this are numerous, as China has increasing resources it can draw upon to carry out nonwar actions for extended periods, be they cyber, financial, or political. For the DPRK, with its goal of kukka mokp'yo and its extremely limited resources, the options are fewer. The DPRK likely would translate the golden ratio and side-principal rule into diminishing ROK and U.S. forces through cyberattacks, combined with numerous other asymmetric means, by one-third. With their systems taken offline or corrupted, U.S. and ROK warfighting capabilities would be diminished or disrupted to a point where, theoretically, the DPRK army could launch a massive ground invasion. Cyberattack, therefore, is a means by which the DPRK likely would strike at enemy warfighting support systems, thereby giving its numerically superior military the space, time, and freedom of maneuver to sustain a fight on the peninsula.

A cyberattack could include a nuclear-detonated electromagnetic pulse that would disable electronic devices within a 450-mile radius.[35] The DPRK could, theoretically, achieve this by detonating a nuclear device in the atmosphere at an altitude of thirty miles. This attack could negate technological advantages of friendly forces on the peninsula, rendering equipment with an electronic component useless. However, given the threat of nuclear retaliation as well as the increased likelihood of U.S. support of a prolonged war, which would most likely result in the DPRK's defeat, this option probably would remain a last resort short of a tactical nuclear strike.

Solutions to Counter North Korean Cyber Capabilities

North Korean leadership likely believes the DPRK could revert the tactical balance of power to that of the 1950s, using its cyber capabilities to gain an advantage. In June 1950, U.S. tactical ground forces were embarrassingly defeated by a numerically superior enemy that was less trained, less equipped, and thought to be less prepared for war. As the United States continues to withdraw permanent combat units from the ROK and revert to a support role, leaving its forces on the peninsula unprepared to mount a major defense, the United States should take action to avoid finding itself in a situation similar to 1950.

DPRK cyber capabilities are not without their vulnerabilities. In 2014, in retaliation for the Sony hacks, the United States conducted a DDOS attack on the DPRK that took the kwangmyong offline.[36] This attack, however, did not retaliate against the cyber units, mostly operating out of China, but instead took the intranet offline. This event highlights a major vulnerability of the DPRK in a time of full-scale war. DPRK cyber operability likely would be at the mercy of the Chinese government. Should the Chinese government decide the continued support of the DPRK was politically unsustainable, the DPRK's cyber capability could become marginalized.

To mitigate the risk of DPRK cyber threats, Army assets must actively partner with ROK forces and reassess the way they view cyber operations. As a preventive measure, Army cyber assets must monitor U.S. networks within the ROK and networks of units scheduled to deploy to the ROK, as these units are the most likely to be targeted by DPRK assets. Rather than actively neutralize identified DPRK cyber threats, Army leaders must assess the intelligence benefits gained by allowing adversaries limited freedom of action in order to study their tactics, techniques, and procedures in the cyber domain.

Army leaders should begin studying cyber operations as a force multiplier from both an offensive and defensive vantage, and not as a discipline outside the tactical or operational domain. Additionally, Army forces stationed in the ROK should develop contingency plans with ROK forces anticipating DPRK cyberattacks similar to those outlined in this article, and they should train in environments shaped by cyberwarfare. In this way, U.S. and South Korean forces could mitigate the significant threat posed by North Korean cyber forces. ■

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Comprehensive Crisis Management Course 17-1 fellows don rubber gloves as they perform a virus outbreak exercise at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. The six-week course ran from 9 February through 15 March 2017 and was attended by over one hundred fellows from thirty-seven different locations. (Photo courtesy of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies)

Advancing Security Cooperation through Executive Education

Maj. Michael Carvelli, U.S. Army

The Asia-Pacific region contains more than half the world's population, two of the three largest economies, and several of the world's largest militaries.[1] As such, it is becoming the world's political and economic center of gravity. The United States' priority is to strengthen cooperation among partners in the Asia-Pacific, leveraging their significant and growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that sustains and strengthens a rules-based order and addresses regional and global challenges.[2] The mission of the Daniel

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K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) is to build capacities, networks, and shared understanding by educating, engaging, connecting, and empowering security professionals in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. It is incumbent upon leaders in all branches of the military to properly capitalize on security cooperation educational opportunities so that U.S. forces can continue to improve their ability to work in concert with allied and partner nations.

Security cooperation (SC) comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.[3] SC encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments. This includes all DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs that build defense and security relationships, promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.[4]

Within the realm of SC, there are several tools available to the DOD to leverage relationships, equipment, and institutions. Leveraging shared experiences and education through the International Military Education and Training program is one way in which the DOD exercises soft power, or the "ability to achieve one's goals without force."[5] Joseph Nye states, "When we learn how to better combine hard and soft power, then we will be what I call a smart power."[6] The ability to vary the mix of hard and soft power enables the DOD to respond to individual events, needs, and necessities globally, as required. Academic forums, including senior service colleges, centers of excellence, and regional centers, provide flexible and adaptable venues to adjust SC strategies in response to domestic and foreign training requirements.

Within the DOD, there are five Centers for Regional Security Study, or regional centers (RCs), that utilize unique academic forums to build partner capacity by focusing on security leaders across the globe.[7] The RCs accomplish their mission through resident and in-region programs, including conferences, seminars, courses, bilateral workshops, alumni outreach events, and research publications. DKI APCSS is one of the five RCs, along with the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC), the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (WJPC), the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), and the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). Each RC is aligned with a DOD geographic combatant command (GCC) as follows:

- GCMC—European Command
- DKI APCSS—Pacific Command
- WJPC—Northern and Southern Commands
- ACSS—Africa Command
- NESA—Central Command

It is significant to note that RC alignment is not restrictive regarding each GCC's area of responsibility. By design, RCs help to bridge the seams between the six GCCs.

Guidance for the conduct of SC is issued through several offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This guidance ensures all activities are aligned to achieve maximum effects across regional and transnational issues. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provides policy oversight and annual guidance to RCs, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs provides regionally focused guidance for Asia-Pacific as a component of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Additionally, global and functional guidance is received from the Assistant Secretary for Defense offices for

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Fellows attending Comprehensive Crisis Management Course 16-1 discuss issues associated with social inclusion impacts on crisis response and resiliency 17 February 2016 at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. (Photo courtesy of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies)

International Security Affairs; Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict; and Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the executive agent providing programming, budgeting, and financial management of the resources to support the operation of the centers.[8]

DKI APCSS offers six courses throughout the year as part of its effort to educate executive-level operators. The Asia-Pacific Orientation and Transnational Security courses last five days each, and the Senior Asia-Pacific Orientation course lasts three days. Comprehensive Crisis Management, Comprehensive Responses to Terrorism, and Advanced Security each last five to six weeks. Policy guidance drives strategic recruiting and seat allocations on an annual basis in collaboration with stakeholders to include embassies, SC organizations, U.S. Pacific Command, and service components. Long courses and the Transnational Security course focus on international partners but include a small percentage of U.S. fellows. Both orientation courses focus on U.S. participants from the whole of government to include the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and myriad other agencies but include a small percentage of international fellows. Curricula include regional perspectives, treaty alliance partners and security challenges, key regional players and security challenges, transnational trafficking, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, terrorism, and others.

The training division of U.S. Pacific Command and each service component—U.S. Army Pacific, Pacific Fleet, Pacific Air Forces, and Marine Corps Forces Pacific—set the guidelines for internal distribution of each course. It is in the best interest of each commander to specially select each attendee to meet the specific needs of his or her organization. A recommended near-term consideration for selection to a course is participation in an operational deployment, training center rotation, expeditionary team movement, or other theater training exercise. Army organizations directly

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benefit from individual participation in several ways: understanding of partner security positions on cultural, political, social, and economic views; new relationships that may be leveraged during turbulent times; and early exposure to regional and global issues. Generating understanding and nurturing nascent relationships provide springboards from which organizations can train and deploy to foreign locations already aware of current situations and able to contact security professionals in the region.

The U.S. Navy's Asia Pacific Hands program is similar to the better-known Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program that has been in operation for several years.[9] Both programs provide an opportunity for a participant to gain a language skill and graduate schooling to provide formal understanding of regional cultures. Although not a substitute for foreign area officers, Asia Pacific Hands works toward building U.S. Pacific Command area expertise, understanding, and confidence in select officers enroute to Pacific-focused operational-level billets.[10] This program was in response to Gen. Martin Dempsey's Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services and Commanders of the Combatant Commands, in which he directed the "Joint Staff to begin exploration of a Hands-like program focused on the Asia-Pacific region."[11] As of the date of this publication, the Navy is the only service that has produced a formal program in response to this directive. Should the other services pursue a similar program, this would be a long-term consideration for the selection of service members to attend one or more of the DKI APCSS course offerings. This would surely provide organizations with personnel who are capable, if placed in the appropriate billet, of advancing SC in training opportunities and operational deployments.

Dempsey, while chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, noted, "Our military has traditionally relied on education in times of uncertainty to develop an understanding of the future security environment, lead adaptation and ensure readiness to face future, unknown challenges."[12] Now, as in many periods in the past, the future security situation is unknown across the globe. Harnessing the power of an educational experience where attendees receive an in-depth analysis of countries, subregions, and key trends within the Indo-Asia-Pacific will enhance the capability and capacity of each organization. This, combined with relationships to security practitioners across the region, will positively contribute to the DOD SC strategy. ■

Notes

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Today's Army maintains significant forces stationed and rotating overseas that provide a visible and credible deterrent. However, should war occur, we must terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. ... In the end, the deployment of the American Army is the ultimate display of American resolve to assure allies and deter enemies.

—2016 Army Posture Statement

As the United States considers changes to its military forces and global force posture, decision makers should fully appreciate the historic role and continued relevance of the joint forces' forward presence. Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a global forward presence, particularly in East Asia, in the Middle East, and in Europe with our NATO allies. However, some in the United States are now questioning the strategic value of a globally engaged military, wondering if the Nation would be better off with fewer global commitments.

As discussions over our strategic posture unfold, decision makers need to keep in mind the origins of the current world order and what is required to preserve it. Overlooking or underappreciating the positive influence of forward-positioned forces, both stationed and rotational, may lead to decisions that will undermine future U.S. efforts to prevent war and ensure the stability of the international system. U.S. retrenchment risks destabilizing regional security architectures that have taken decades to build and are essential to secure U.S. national interests. A present joint force deters wars, assures allies, favorably shapes the security environment, and enables contextual and cultural understanding. Moreover, the U.S. Army component of the joint force forward presence has been, and should remain, a prominent element of U.S. national security strategy since, as will be discussed, the Army is central to each of these critical missions.

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Deterring War

Preventing war and the human suffering it entails has long been a core element of U.S. national security strategy and military strategy. Although diplomacy and economic power have significant roles in forestalling conflict, our military is the ultimate means of deterring aggression.


To deter enemies means to prevent them from taking hostile action by persuading them that the cost of the action will outweigh the benefits. This can be accomplished through two principal approaches: deterrence by threat of punishment or deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment is threatening to inflict pain against aggressors if they take an action that threatens U.S. national interests. Deterrence by denial is accomplished by dissuading potential adversaries from taking actions contrary to U.S. interests by making it clear that these actions cannot succeed.[1] Specifically, the adversary calculates that the likelihood of success is so low the probable gain is not worth the effort.[2] This type of deterrence is preferable under a range of circumstances, especially when deterrence by threat of punishment could be undermined by carefully limited enemy action, designed to stay below the U.S. threshold for response. An example is Russia's operations in the Ukraine, which stayed below the U.S. threshold for response. Additionally, the threat of punishment has its risks, as it might result in the expansion or escalation of conflict.

Deterrence requires capacity, communication, capability, and will.[3] Indeed, the adversary's perception that you will use military force is central to deterrence. While we can never know exactly what conveys evidence of will, deterrence resides in the mind of the adversary. We do

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know that physical presence conveys both commitment and intentionality. U.S. security strategies since World War II also provide lessons of practice that buttress deterrence theory. We know from broad experience what does and does not work, and this knowledge can inform us how to position our forces for the deterrent outcomes we seek.

For the past seven decades, U.S. land forces have had an instrumental role in deterrence. Although air and naval power contribute indispensable capabilities to the joint force, these forces, operating on their own, principally facilitate deterrence by punishment. Land forces in their forward presence role are often the linchpin of deterrence by denial. In addition, the forward presence of land power is the most credible signal of U.S. commitment to a nation or region. Positioning land forces in a contested area causes the enemy's calculus to be far

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Exercise Noble Partner 16 begins with an opening ceremony 11 May 2016 at Vaniani Training Area, Georgia. There were displays of multinational soldiers and their equipment, airborne operations, and speeches from senior officials, including Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili. Noble Partner 16 was a critical part of Georgia's training for the light infantry company it contributed to the NATO Response Force and for enhancing Georgian territorial self-defense capability. (Photo by Sgt. Daniel Cole, U.S. Army Europe)

different than if U.S. forces are offshore. The prospective adversary has no reason to question the will of the United States to respond to aggression. Quite simply, forward-deployed Army forces raise the stakes and create uncertainty among would-be aggressors that armed conflict would achieve their desired objectives.

The absence of U.S. land forces increases an adversary's temptation to act in ways that slide under the U.S. threshold for inflicting punishment. It may also increase an adversary's willingness to try for a *fait accompli* before U.S. forces can be brought to bear. This is seen in the Baltic states, where there is concern that Russia will seize territory and then make the West back down by threatening an expansion of conflict. While over-the-horizon strike assets, as well as the unmatched U.S. ability to airlift forces into theater, are formidable threats, they are reactive, and they cede the initiative to the aggressor. When ground forces are present, the United States maintains the initiative as potential aggressors know the costs of aggression will be outweighed by any potential gains.

Nowhere is this more evident than on the Korean Peninsula. According to historian Allan Millett, "the withdrawal of the U.S. [Army] Fifth Regimental Combat Team from the approaches to Seoul in June–July 1949, sealed Korea's fate. This action, not careless or careful words uttered in Washington or Seoul, heartened the Communists [to attack in June 1950]."[4] Since the end of the Korean War, the continued forward presence of U.S. land forces has made America's retaliation against a North Korean invasion an almost expected automatic response. Many scholars believe that in the 1970s, China's Mao Tse-tung reined in North Korean leader Kim Il-sung when he threatened to repeat his quest to reunite Korea by force.[5]

Today, combat-ready forward-based American soldiers—armed with guns, tanks, and helicopters—communicate in no uncertain terms that the United States is committed to maintaining the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea (ROK). This forward Army presence, coupled with powerful U.S. and ROK military capabilities, deters North Korean aggression.[6]

Similar to the Army presence in Korea, capable forward-deployed U.S. Army units, as part of a NATO combined force, provided a strong deterrent against Soviet aggression throughout the Cold War. Although

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some scholars of the Cold War question whether the Soviet Union had designs on Western Europe, we do know the Soviets were opportunistic.[7] The forward presence of U.S. Army forces ensured that no temptation readily presented itself for Soviet opportunism.


Today, U.S. Army Europe is leveraging forward-stationed and rotational Army forces to deter aggression against its NATO allies. This is done, in part, by the Army's contribution to the European partners and allies through its "Strong Europe" approach and cooperation to make the Army forces in Europe of "30,000 Soldiers look and feel like 300,000" toward the defense of Europe.[8] Since Russia's annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Eastern Ukraine, many of our European partners and NATO allies have feared a militarily resurgent and aggressive Russia. "Strong Europe" seeks to both assure our allies and raise the stakes to deter further Russian aggression in the region.

Assuring Allies

The enduring, well-developed nature of America's global network of alliances makes it easy to take these relationships for granted. These relationships must be maintained with deeds as well as words. While economic cooperation between the United States and its allies advances the fiscal interests of both sides, rotational and enduring forward Army presence addresses many security needs and tangibly assures our partners of our unwavering commitment. Many rightly regard forward presence as the cement that holds our alliances together.[9]

U.S. Army forward presence also helps to curb dangerous, destabilizing security competitions and prevent the emergence of security dilemmas. Presence helps to facilitate regional stability in many places around the world, to include Europe and East Asia. While the international community still faces a range of wars carried out by nonstate actors and other civil conflicts, U.S. forward presence has helped to temper competition among states in many places around the world. Over the past forty years, there has been a dramatic drop in the quantity and frequency of state-on-state conflicts, and we have seen nothing like the two cataclysmic wars that dominated the first half of the twentieth century.[10] Arguably, one of the principal causes of this trend has been the assurance that U.S. forward presence has provided to our allies.

Stemming Regional Arms Races



The certainty that comes with a U.S. security commitment, backed by the forward presence of the Army, persuades many partners and allies not to engage in a security competition with others in the region. Competition more often than not is replaced with cooperation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, former Warsaw Pact members such as Poland and the Baltic states chose to partner with NATO, including the United States. In the Pacific, former foes such as Japan and South Korea now cooperate with the United States to resist Chinese and North Korean threats.

Furthermore, because U.S. presence diminishes the instinctive fear of invasion or armed coercion, nations feel comfortable seeking levels of military force that are unlikely to trigger arms races (and thus regional instability). Over the past several decades, forward-deployed Army air and missile defense units, especially Patriot batteries, have provided assurance to our allies not only in the Middle East but also in East Asia and Europe.

Mitigating Regional Security Dilemmas

U.S. forward presence also prevents the emergence of security dilemmas. These occur when a nation is faced with a decision to either grow its military or to remain vulnerable and thus risk exploitation.[11] For example, Germany developed the Schlieffen plan prior to World War I, fearing it would be in dire peril of losing a war if it

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Planners from the U.S. military and Japan Self-Defense Forces engage in missile defense planning 13 February 2014 during the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Wargame V in the 613th Air and Space Operations Center at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Nathan Allen, U.S. Air Force)

were compelled to fight on two fronts against the expected enemies of France in the west and Russia in the east.[12] The plan aimed to quickly defeat France first so Germany could then focus its efforts on defeating Russia in the east, which it believed was the more difficult adversary. The plan hinged on the rapid mobilization of the German army, for which it overtly prepared, in turn heightening nervousness on the continent.

Aware of German anxiety, the situation presented other European states with a choice: heighten their readiness for war (and risk provoking Germany) or remain weak and risk invasion. Thus, one view is that it was not interests but rather tension and insecurity that led to the onset of the "Great War."[13]

Since World War II, U.S. forward presence has reduced such tension and insecurity by assuring allies in Europe and elsewhere that America would reinforce their security in the face of aggression, especially from the threat posed by the Soviet Union (and later Russia). This presence has had a calming and reassuring effect in many regions, and it has helped to stifle rivalries and head off competitions in Europe, East Asia, and other parts of the globe.[14]

Geopolitical Management

Finally, assuring allies enables the United States to pursue an effective and efficient geopolitical management strategy. Alliances allow the United States to influence outcomes in important regions. What U.S. Army forces are doing in the Pacific is a good example. Through its Pacific Pathways program, the U.S. Army's Pacific Command is implementing a new concept to assure allies in the region by developing long-term, meaningful relationships with them. By participating in joint

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and combined arms exercises such as Ulchi Freedom Guardian in Korea and Yama Sakura 65 with Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, the U.S. Army forward presence is establishing and maintaining bonds that reassure allies regarding U.S. commitments.[15]

Allies who regularly work and train with U.S. Army forward forces contribute to the common defense and shared interests more than they would independently. Through these engagements, developing a comprehensive understanding of each other's method of standards and principles improves interoperability between our forces.

Together, combined U.S. and allied forces who have rehearsed contingencies dissuade other powers or combinations of powers from dominating areas of U.S. interest. Without allies and partners in a given region, the United States would be forced to directly contain emerging powers in the region unilaterally, by maintaining its own large military force there, or to retreat and act according to the rules and preferences of the region's hegemon.[16] Both options are costly, and the latter is exceptionally dangerous.

Shaping the Security Environment

Security environments are by their very nature complex. A multitude of factors—ranging from weak state institutions to contested territories—can provoke and sustain armed conflict in a region. Forward-positioned Army forces allow the United States to help shape security environments by reinforcing fragile states where collapse and chaos linger on the horizon, by building partner capacity to prevent revisionist states from seizing territory and by restraining allies and friends from escalating tensions. These actions, which take myriad forms, help temper the propensity for actors to seek to achieve their aims by coercion and force.

One of the most successful examples of the United States shaping a security environment by reinforcing a fragile state is that of Colombia, one of the oldest democracies in South America. For decades, the United States assisted Colombia in its struggle against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In 2009, Colombia signed an agreement with the United States that allowed U.S. personnel to be stationed at seven military bases in Colombia.[17] Peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC followed some seven years later, and now Colombia enjoys much greater stability.[18] Additionally, Colombia is now positioned to provide reparations and assistance to the nearly six million internally displaced victims of the fifty-year struggle.[19]

Building Partner Capacity

Whether forward-positioned U.S. forces are strengthening mature military forces, fixing the tactical shortcomings of indigenous militaries, or establishing completely new military forces and security institutions, they build the capabilities and capacities required to help maintain stability in a region. This is a central part of U.S. Army Africa's "African Horizons" operational approach, which leverages enduring partnerships to increase stability in both Africa and the broader region. Within this approach, Army forces enable African and European partners to create lasting solutions to conflict in Africa.[20] These partners often contribute to peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the United Nations or the African Union. The improved militaries of these countries also conduct operations against violent transnational extremist organizations that could otherwise exploit Africa's vast, austere spaces as sanctuaries from which to attack our homeland and interests.

The Army has had several such successes in Africa in recent years. In Uganda and Burundi, U.S. forward forces greatly assist in the fight against al-Shabaab by training forces deploying to the African Union Mission in Somalia. This enables a slow but steady improvement in the security situation in Somalia.[21] Similarly, U.S. partnerships with nations in the Lake Chad basin involving regionally aligned Army forces, special operations forces, and other joint forces are steadily degrading the Islamic State-allied Boko Haram and decreasing its territorial control. They are setting the theater and enabling the joint force to support the multinational effort. For example, a U.S. Army forces deployment early in 2017 to conduct base operations support integration in Cameroon is just one part of this effort against Boko Haram.[22] These and other accomplishments in training and engagement often go unheralded, but they are significant contributions to regional security and world order.

Although assisting allies and partners has a moral component, maintaining strong relationships has a very practical purpose. In clearly definable ways, these relationships magnify American military capabilities. When considering the recently coined 4+1 problem set (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and radical Islam), the

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U.S. relationship with its allies is neither a convenience nor merely a means to lend legitimacy to U.S. actions abroad.[23] Alliances strengthen U.S. military capacity and enable power projection. As international relations scholar Bernard Brodie observes, having "strong allies who were contiguous with our enemies has been an incalculable benefit to us. It has enabled us to hit our enemies hard, and to do so on their thresholds rather than ours."[24]

Forward presence can also restrain our allies from taking provocative action or escalating dangerously during crisis. When North Korea struck the *Cheonan*, an ROK naval vessel, U.S. military officials proved invaluable in preventing the escalation of the crisis. The night the ship sank, Gen. Walter Sharp, then U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Korea commander, immediately contacted his South Korean counterpart. Sharp not only offered his condolences over the incident and the loss of Korean life but also helped manage the crisis. In an overt move to demonstrate commitment to the region and at the same time prevent escalation, the United States offered South Korea the privilege of hosting the 2012 nuclear security summit.[25] This, along with the reassurance offered by U.S. presence, enabled the South Koreans to maintain their composure in what could have been the beginning of all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. None of this would have been possible without the strong relationships and trust Sharp and his predecessors had developed with their South Korean counterparts.

Maintaining Operational Access

Forward presence provides yet another vital contribution to U.S. national security—physical access. One of the more perplexing challenges emerging in the future operating environment is the prospect of denied, or at least contested, operational access. It is clear that increasingly capable adversaries will seek to deny the United States operational access to vital regions of the world. We can expect future scenarios in which anti-access/area denial strategies will threaten the Nation's vital interests. Forward presence enables regular contact with the senior military leaders and institutions and, in cases such as South Korea, physical presence that will prove indispensable in future crises. These relationships and physical presence help the United States shape regional security agendas that result in mutually beneficial economic and operational access around the globe. While virtual presence from air or maritime forces is often advocated in lieu of land forces, such presence can, in some scenarios, mean the absolute absence of a permanent on-scene force.

Enabling Contextual Understanding

Gaining an appreciation of the relevant factors that motivate behavior, fuel tensions, and influence the dynamics of a region is difficult work. The activities conducted by both rotational and forward-positioned troops are instrumental in garnering the situational awareness required to prevent and, where necessary, prepare for conflict. For example, the Army's participation in the Sinai peacekeeping mission—the Multinational Force and Observers—not only serves to diminish tensions between Egypt and Israel but also allows the United States to better understand the values, interests, and social subtleties of these two important regional actors.[26] Such insights are achieved not only at the tactical level but also at the strategic level. Operating in a particular place over a long period builds insight and forms of institutional knowledge and cultural awareness that cannot be otherwise attained. Because they operate on land and interact with people, only armies can provide this level of detailed insight, knowledge, and nuanced understanding.

Experiences in recent conflicts support assertions made by Thomas Sutton and Phillip Lohaus in their article on the use of military power outside traditional wartime environments. They explain,

> It is important for armed forces to establish contextual understanding well before conflicts begin. Evolving operational demands require a force that can evaluate and understand the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements influencing actors in the environment.[27]

For example, U.S. Army soldiers participating in NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo benefitted from the contextual understanding participants had gained through sustained operations in a specific location.[28] The same is true with soldiers stationed in other locations around the world who have attained deep understanding of the factors Sutton and Lohaus discuss. While difficult to quantify, contextual understanding gained through forward presence can be an indispensable element in protecting and promoting U.S. interests and gauging the intentions of partners. If Sharp had not had this deep understanding of the South Korean leadership, the results could have been catastrophic.

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Furthermore, the contextual understanding that U.S. ground forces gain while regionally engaged with partner forces significantly contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the actual challenges of conflict in that region and what forces and capabilities would be needed to prevail. This appreciation of the relevant challenges helps ground force development in the Army and joint forces in the realities of future operating environments, rather than generic, inward-looking exercises.[29]

The ongoing civil war in Syria and the turmoil in the greater Middle East, along with the mass migration of refugees into Europe, are bringing home the hazards of regional instability, and many are asking how to restore stability. These are complex problems that require a deep understanding. Forward presence is a critical element required to achieve contextual understanding of such problems, which is a key to finding enduring solutions.

Conclusion

America's strong, global forward presence since World War II has underpinned U.S. foreign policy, deterred war, and supported a stable international order. The forward presence of U.S. Army forces communicates U.S. priorities to the world, strength to our enemies, and commitment to our allies, partners, and friends. Diminished U.S. forward presence, especially of permanently stationed Army forces, will cause a shift in U.S. strategy from proactive engagement to reactive crisis response.

In the aftermath of years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, some advocate retrenchment and an end to U.S. forward presence in many parts of the globe.[30] This approach has drawbacks and dangers. U.S. forward presence has facilitated a global order of deeply advantageous terms for the United States. Withdrawal risks actually increasing regional tensions in many parts of the world rather than diminishing them, which could spur arms races and spawn more frequent conflicts.

Indeed, while retrenchment may appear on the surface to be a bargain, it may prove terribly expensive over the long term. Moreover, overestimating the role of technological and virtual-presence solutions to global challenges risks America's enduring relationships and credibility with our allies, partners, and friends, and it risks encouraging our adversaries. Such a course also fails to appreciate how allies magnify the strength of U.S. military capacity and capability. As one former Army general recently argued, "A 'Fortress America' approach that brings all forces home is unhelpful . . . . Alliances and partnerships are relationships, and no relationship is sustainable if it is only long-distance, episodic, and one-sided."[31] Consequently, American disengagement risks creating instability that could lead to unnecessary conflict.

Since World War II, Army forward presence has been the indispensable glue that has sustained America's global network of alliances, partnerships, and friendships by signaling commitment and constancy. It has deterred wars, assured allies, favorably shaped the security environment, and enabled contextual understanding. This legacy of past success is important to understand and build upon in designing strategies for our nation's security into the future. A clear-eyed assessment will see that Army forward presence is fundamental to American success in an increasingly complex and dangerous world. ■

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inappropriate for the modern battlefield. This article identifies the regressive approaches currently being used by the U.S. Army to develop the Stryker medium-force concept and recommends new directions for its development based on historical analysis and current scholarly research.

Left photo: A convoy of BTR-82A armored personnel carriers participates in the Victory Day parade 7 May 2013 in Moscow. (Photo courtesy of Vitaly Kuzmin, http://www.vitalykuzmin.net/)
Right photo: U.S. Strykers carry soldiers from Battle Group Poland (comprised of U.S., U.K., Romanian, and Polish soldiers) to conduct weapons zeroing 6 April 2017 in Orzysz, Poland. (Photo by Georgios Moumoulidis, Training Support Team Orzysz/U.S. Army)

Materiel Comparison of the Stryker Platform and the Russian BTR Series

The Stryker concept has been in a constant state of flux since its inception. This is to be expected since it is a relatively new concept in the Army. Originally proposed by Gen. Erik Shinseki in the 1990s, the Stryker does not have the same depth and breadth of historical experience for the purpose of assessment compared to many other U.S. weapon systems due for materiel upgrades.[1] For example, the development of the M1 Abrams tank commenced with the XM (experimental model) in the 1970s. It was fielded in 1979 and continues in service today, a long period over which data have been collected, including from its use in combat situations.

The medium vehicle and force concept is not new worldwide. The Soviet Union fielded a medium-armored vehicle in the BTR and began to develop the motor-rifle regiment concept circa 1961.[2] The Soviet concept is distinctly different from World War II-era medium-armored vehicles. Some World War II-era armored vehicles and mobile guns can be said to be medium platforms, but these vehicles were always task-organized with heavier platforms. In contrast, the Soviet motor-rifle regiment was the first mechanized force organized to take advantage of the unique abilities that are afforded unilaterally by a medium force. Though the motor-rifle regiment may be involved in operations with heavy armored forces, it is considered distinct and separate from those forces. Similarly, the Stryker concept resembles the motor-rifle concept in that it is conceived as a stand-alone medium force. However, it differs from the Russian concept in some key areas.

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While some changes to the original concept of the Stryker are expected and necessary, such as the ongoing Stryker upgrade to a double V-hull (a survivability design that deflects blasts from below a vehicle away from the crew compartment), some of these adoptions appear to be ad hoc and piecemeal.[3] Following the current Stryker upgrade to the Stryker Double V-Hull, General Dynamics has proposed several improvements for the next generation of Stryker, including the addition of a 30 mm cannon for some vehicles to increase the Stryker's direct-fire capability.[4]

Of note, this addition mirrors earlier Soviet-era development of medium-armored vehicles. The Soviet Union identified a similar weakness in the armament of its BTR in the 1960s. The BTR was originally fielded with the 12.7 mm DShK heavy machine gun, which is comparable to the current Stryker's armament of the M2 Browning .50 caliber machine gun. The Soviets replaced it with a heavier 14.5 mm cannon in later productions of the BTR 60.[5] Still later, during its modernization program, Russia adopted the even heavier 30 mm Shipunov cannon for the BTR-90 to give it greater direct-fire capabilities.[6] Additionally, Russia also added the 30 mm cannon to the BTR-80 series with the fielding of the BTR-82A. Notably, this gave the BTR offensive direct-fire capability similar to the *Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty* (BMP) infantry fighting vehicle, which mounts the same cannon.[7] This is comparable to the current proposed change to the Stryker main gun, which would give the Stryker direct-fire capability akin to the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.

Furthermore, in the 1990s, the Russian Federation identified an antitank weakness in the BTR and integrated the AT-5 "Spandrel" with the BTR 90.[8] This system is mounted on the side of the turret and can be detached and fired from the ground. Russia also adapted the Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) capability to its BTR-82s with the Kornet antiarmor system.[9] These systems remain in service today throughout the Russian motor-rifle formations and exported BTRs.

Similarly, Raytheon and Lockheed-Martin have proposed extending their Joint Javelin Venture Program (JJVP) to mount the Javelin missile system on a Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station for some Strykers.[10] Like the Spandrel, the Javelin is also mounted on the side of the turret and can be detached and fired from the ground. The addition of the Javelin will give the vehicle and formation antitank capability in addition to the M1134 ATGM Stryker variant.

The proposed Stryker upgrades are, unsurprisingly, in response to a 2016 request by the Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment, which was concerned that its Strykers were overmatched by Russian materiel.[11] Soviet-era materiel, or equipment based on Soviet materiel, is utilized by the clear majority of potential U.S. adversaries.[12] Therefore, this concern is well-founded for the Stryker platform and is not just a specific theater concern to be dealt with at the local-unit level.


These proposed U.S. materiel responses seem unintentionally reactionary at best. Notably missing from most of the conversations about these proposed Stryker upgrades is any discussion of the BTR or the motor-rifle regiment, the peer force that the Stryker could potentially fight against. The BTR has had a 30 mm cannon since the early 1980s and an antiarmor capability since the mid-1990s. This means that the previous generation of the Russian medium-armored vehicle already had overmatch on a proposed upgraded Stryker. When we compare the proposed Stryker armament upgrades to the historical BTR, it appears that the Stryker is thirty to sixty years behind current medium-armored trends. The adoption of these materiel upgrades is not inherently bad or dangerously outdated in and of itself. What is problematic and missing from the upgrades is the next step after the current adoption. We have independently confirmed what the Soviets discovered thirty years ago, namely that a medium force does not work against a heavy force independently.[13]

Top left photo: A modernized BTR-82A armored personnel carrier with 30 mm cannon rehearses 4 May 2015 for the Victory Day parade in Moscow. (Photo courtesy of Vitaly Kuzmin, http://www.vitalykuzmin.net/)

Bottom left photo: The first prototype Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle outfitted with a 30 mm cannon was delivered to the Army in October 2016. (Photo courtesy of the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems)

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(Graphic from Army Field Manual 100-2-3, *The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1991, (obsolete)], 4-9)

Figure 1. Russian Motor-Rifle Brigade

This is important beyond an academic discussion of peer weapons systems. Russia has moved on to its second generation of medium-force vehicles and is actively innovating. Russian materiel testing and acquisitions do not suffer from analysis and adoption problems similar to the United States when it comes to medium-armored force vehicles. The current generation replacement for the BTR, the *Bumerang*, has adopted an engine in the front as opposed to the rear, where it was located in the BTR. The Bumerang also has a back troop ramp instead of a side troop door as was found in the BTR. Both of these adaptations appear to be similar to those of NATO vehicles and are a marked departure from the line of development of the BTR.[14] This means that if we were to catch up to the current line of BTRs today, we would still be behind because Russia is actively modernizing their medium-armored platform.

Doctrinal Comparison of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the Motor-Rifle Brigade and Regiment

The similarities between U.S. and Russian medium forces are not limited to materiel developments. The United States has also started to adopt similar doctrinal and organizational aspects of the motor-rifle formations depicted in figure 1. The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) shown in figure 2 (page 71) is similar to the Russian motor-rifle regiment, utilizing a lighter, faster medium-armored vehicle to bridge the gap between rapidly deployable light infantry and the heavier, slower-to-deploy armor units.


Conspicuously different, however, is that the motor-rifle division has always included a BMP regiment, and the motor-rifle regiment has always included a tank battalion.[15] The Russians have always attached heavy platforms to allow BTR formations to fight

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effectively against an armored threat. Similarly, SBCTs conducting National Training Center (NTC) rotations focused on decisive-action scenarios recently started having tank battalions attached. This is in response to the historically poor showing of SBCTs when confronted with an armored threat during previous rotations.

Russia has seen the lack of a supporting heavy-armor component as a weakness in the Stryker formation since its inception. One critique of the Stryker concept put forward by the Russian *Foreign Military Review* in 2004 was its lack of an armored contingent.[16]

It is unsurprising that Stryker units have had difficulty dealing with an armored threat in exercises. An extensive study by the RAND Corporation in 2004 identified that a medium-armored formation would fare poorly against a competent heavy-armored threat generally, especially without a forced-entry armor system.[17] The ongoing problems with the Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS)—poor performance in the antiarmor role, mechanical and technical issues, and user-reported difficulty in maintenance—make the MGS unable to fulfill its secondary role as a direct-fire support platform to counter enemy armor.[18] Conversely, the ATGM Stryker variant has been shown to be effective as the primary means to counter enemy armor. The TOW 2 missile system remains a proven and combat-tested antitank guided missile.[19] Unfortunately, the SBCT fields only nine of them.[20] Even if the MGS and the ATGM variants worked exactly as proposed, SBCT would still be overmatched by a standard Russian BTR motor-rifle regiment. A motor-rifle regiment fields a tank battalion and 146 BTRs, the majority of which have ATGM capabilities organically. This basic task organization



(Graphic from Army Field Manual 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2015], 1-9)

Figure 2. Stryker Brigade Combat Team

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gives a motor-rifle regiment a huge overmatch when compared against an SBCT.

Lack of Air Defense Artillery

SBCT doctrinal force structure has additional problems when confronting a peer or near-peer threat. Currently, there is no air defense artillery (ADA) organic to the SBCT. In contrast, the motor-rifle regiment is organized with an ADA platoon in each battalion.[21]

This lack of ADA assets has had a very damaging effect on rotational units at the NTC. For example, NTC rotation 14-08 saw a large portion of its ground forces destroyed after the Red Force attack helicopters had attrited friendly-force air weapons teams (pairs of Apache helicopters).[22] The teams were having similar issues to the ground forces in that they were fighting an uphill battle against an enemy that had overmatch from the start. This enemy also could engage in a combined arms maneuver that was impossible for friendly forces to counter due to lack of organic ADA assets. At the NTC, organic ADA gave the Red Force the ability to mitigate aerial risk and thus enhance a freedom to maneuver that was denied to the Stryker battalions. While it can be argued that there are many artificialities at the NTC that do not transfer directly to the conventional battlefield, the direct-fire ADA shortfall is not one that can easily be explained away by such arguments.

Notwithstanding, though no ADA upgrades have been proposed for the SBCT yet, the Army has acknowledged that there is a short-range ADA gap developing in Europe when compared to Russian capabilities.[23] Recognition of this materiel shortfall is another example of the Stryker concept following a similar development pattern to that of the motor-rifle regiment.

Analysis

If we accept that the Stryker concept is developing along similar lines as the motor-rifle regiment, the question becomes, why is the Army slowly aligning its medium force with that of the Russian Federation and the historical Soviet Union thirty years later? I do not believe, nor is it credible, that this parallel development is the U.S. Army intentionally aping the previous Russian experience. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate if it were. I also do not believe that it is being driven entirely to match the capabilities of the Russian Federation's formations together with those of its allies. That is to say, I do not think the Army is consciously mimicking Russian materiel and doctrine simply because it is the adversary we are currently concerned about (i.e., that we would copy whatever the Russian medium force was in theater, not specifically the BTR and motor-rifle regiment). A more credible explanation is that the Stryker force is suffering from a lack of direction and focus and is simply reinventing on its own the wheel Russia made a long time ago.

The Stryker formation does not have a unified concept. Multiple levels of leadership are pulling the organization in different directions. We do not have one ideal of what the medium-force concept is supposed to be that we can devote our training, doctrine, and development toward. As such, we are suffering from organizational ennui that has separate parts of the Stryker formation developing in a vacuum without consideration of what the parts are doing.

The SBCT community wants all the positive aspects of a light force: lower cost, a small tooth-to-tail ratio, greater operational-level speed, etc. But, it also wants the ability to confront a heavy-armored force on its own terms without having to adopt the cost, support, and deployment time required by an armored force. Since these two ideas are mutuality exclusive, we have been forced to adopt a piecemeal response to shortcomings identified during training and training center rotations. This has led to competing ideas on how to train, implement, and support the SBCT, which is why our materiel and doctrinal development have been unintentionally following what the Soviet Union discovered thirty to sixty years ago. Our lack of unified vision has us developing *ex nihilo* the way that the Soviet Union did when it first started its medium-force program. We are now forced to relearn these lessons for ourselves, inadvertently giving our adversaries following the Soviet model a thirty-year head start.

Recommendations

The solution is a radical restructuring of thought around the Stryker concept. First, the Army must drop "Stryker" from doctrinal terms for forces as it focuses thinking around a platform and not a concept. We do not call armored brigades "Abrams brigades" because it would inappropriately limit the doctrinal scope of the brigade. In this same way, the use of Stryker for the medium force is limiting. Junior Army leaders do not have a concept of a medium force,

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and they are not taught to think doctrinally about a formation between a light and an armored formation. Therefore, doctrine does not provide a shared framework to compare and contrast a Russian motor-rifle regiment against an SBCT. This lack of a conceptual medium-force doctrine also exacerbates the continued counteractive directions that the Stryker concept is being pulled in. Similarly, the Stryker should be referred to as a medium-armored platform by doctrine. This would give us a common intellectual structure to weigh medium-armored vehicles and related materiel against each other. As it stands now, junior leaders cannot doctrinally talk about medium-armored capability differences among the Stryker, the BTR, and the German *Gepanzertes Transport-Kraftfahrzeug* Boxer.

Second, if we are committed to having the medium force confront a modern heavy-force threat supported by aviation assets, we need to acknowledge that the medium force will fare poorly without significant combat multipliers, namely organic ADA and more robust direct-fire support not offered by the MGS. One of the RAND Corporation's key recommendations was a restarting of the M551 Sheridan replacement program to provide this direct support.[24] This would mean a new solution program and not returning to the XM8 Armored Gun System, which is 1990s technology.

Additionally, even if the medium force has better organic direct-fire support and ADA, it will still require combined arms to overcome a heavy force. Fighting as a combined arms force should be incorporated into the mission-essential task list for medium-force units, and those tasks should be the focus of joint training, especially training with our Air Force partners. Training with the U.S. Air Force would also ensure that our units are capable to deploy via airlift. The current Army medium force was designed to be transported via air. This ability is essential to lower the time required to build combat power in theater.

Finally, U.S. Army Materiel Command should thoroughly analyze current peer medium-armor systems, especially the BTR and Bumerang. There is a wealth of knowledge available in friendly and competitor forces' experience with their medium platforms. This analysis should focus on which foreign lessons learned should be adopted in the current battlefield environment and which are inappropriate. These findings should then drive near-term upgrades and acquisitions. This would solve the short-term materiel listlessness and give strategists a starting point from which to innovate.

This article is meant as a critique of the current Stryker concept and is therefore generally negative. However, the reader should not take this to mean my intent is in any way to argue that the Stryker concept is wholly ineffective or unnecessary; quite the contrary. Shinseki's argument for the Stryker concept remains sound. Study of the medium-armored concept historically and in current operations shows its effectiveness.[25] The medium force has historically fared better than its heavier counterpart in complex and urban terrain.[26] This has remained true for the Army, as it has adopted the Stryker concept during the war on terrorism. The medium-armored formation's ability to bridge the gap between light and heavy forces during a sustained peer or near-peer conflict is an invaluable capability. The medium-armored force's ability to quickly bring heavy overmatch to a light formation in contact with a light formation, or to provide quick support to a heavy formation with a lower support requirement, is a compelling conceptual argument. The Army's medium concept, when paired with its air mobile capability and high-quality combined arms support, gives it the potential to be the premier medium force worldwide. For this to happen, we must focus our materiel efforts to fill identified gaps and refine our doctrine. If we do not, we will continue to unintentionally recreate the obsolete Cold War-era motor-rifle regiment. ■

Notes

Some of these sources were knowingly taken from Russian state-owned or supported organizations. Any specific capabilities claims by these sources should be considered with that understanding.

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
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Crew members of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's (JMSDF) latest Izumo-class helicopter carrier DDH-184 *Kaga* stand in front of Japan's naval flag 22 March 2017 during a handover ceremony for the JMSDF by Japan Marine United Corporation in Yokohama, Japan. (Photo by Toru Hanai, Reuters)

Understanding Japan's Role in Securing the Western Pacific

Lt. Col. Peter D. Fromm, U.S. Army, Retired

The political-military climate in Japan is undergoing a series of unprecedented changes; these include broad new discussion about Japan's future relationship to Article 9 of its postwar constitution conceived by the United States.[1] Oddly, that Article 9 is now over seventy years old does not seem to have diminished the resonance of its framework in projecting the *image* of intentional pacifism,

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Japanese soldiers prepare to clear rooms down a hallway 18 September 2016 during a bilateral urban warfare exercise in support of exercise Orient Shield 16 at Aibano Training Area, Japan. Orient Shield is an annual bilateral combined arms training exercise designed to improve joint operations, combat readiness, and interoperability between the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, U.S. Army Japan, and U.S. Army and Air National Guard forces. (Photo by Spc. Elizabeth Scott, U.S. Army National Guard)

as it was originally intended to do.[2] Japan's pacifist image is still very important to the region and will continue to be so in the decades ahead.

In a 2001 *International Herald Tribune* article, Michael Richardson quoted predictions made by Chinese professor Wu Xinbo of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai:

> Given the evolving political, security, and economic trends in East Asia, the U.S. security involvement in the region ten years from now will have to be transformed, both in form and substance. ... The U.S. forward military presence will decline, security alliances will become less relevant as an instrument of U.S. policy, and a pluralistic security community will very likely emerge.[3]

The professor was clearly wrong in predicting the decline of U.S. security alliances with East Asian nations. The bilateral alliance with Japan and alliances with most others in the region are as strong as ever, and U.S. cooperation with Japan has evolved into one of the strongest and most important security relationships in the world, a fact the U.S. Pacific "pivot" underscores. Wu, however, was correct in predicting the evolution of a pluralistic security community. Moreover, that security community, led in part by the United States, aims to contain Chinese hegemony. However, the U.S. military needs to ensure it conducts its bilateral relationship with Japan in a way that enhances Japan's role in the East Asian security community and avoids unintended consequences such as those in the Philippines, which now courts China.

The Future Normalization of Japan

In spite of recent debate about reinterpreting Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, a true collective self-defense

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alliance between the United States and Japan is probably decades away.[4] Such an agreement would entail as yet undetermined changes in Japan's political situation and a vital alteration of its constitution, but significant change is inevitable, however distant. In brief, the reasons Japan will move inevitably, albeit slowly, toward true collective self-defense with the United States and other nations are varied. They include that Japan aspires

- to become a truly "normal country," one that exercises the right of collective self-defense under international law;
- to gain respect from the international community as a nation willing to share the burden of world stability;
- to improve its credentials as a legitimate member of the United Nations Security Council;
- to demonstrate to the American public that Japan is willing to become a full partner in a normal defense alliance (which would forestall Japan's having to bend to China's will and hegemony in the region should the U.S. public come to oppose what it views as a one-sided alliance); and, in a seeming paradox,
- to free itself of its too-heavy reliance on U.S. power.

Again, these are the reasons that Japan will normalize—as a military power—in the distant future, but it will move so slowly that the image of the "Peace Constitution" will persist.

In a draft 1995 U.S. Army War College thesis, Maj. Gen. K. Mochida of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) relayed sentiments not uncommon among senior Japanese policy makers today:

> Japan cannot become an active partner in the construction of the new world order as long as there is uncertainty about Japan's future direction both inside and outside of the country. Without such a clearly established and articulated direction, Japan runs the risk of losing the respect of other nations and becoming nothing more than an international "check writer" who is not included in the discussions as to how the "check" will be used.[5]

This is the condition John Dower described as Japan's special problem: "Japan's peculiar dreams of peace have come to involve a gnawing sense of entrapment."[6]

That "sense of entrapment" is still very much alive and well nearly two decades after Dower wrote *Embracing Defeat*. Dower's book is still considered current, as conditions have only changed marginally since *Embracing Defeat* was published. The book is used by U.S. Army Japan in its Leader Certification and Development Program for all new officers, senior NCOs, and senior civilians.

Implicit in Mochida's observation above is the idea that Japan's security connects more to economic issues than to political ones, and that willingness to share military burdens carries a moral responsibility eclipsing the constitutional standards of nonbelligerency. The links between military security and economic vitality are of course not unique to Japan. However, since Japan is the only nation that recognizes, yet rejects, the right of collective self-defense, the linkage is troubling when juxtaposed with Japan's still strong economy (number three worldwide as of 2015).[7] For a country as strong and rich as Japan is to be a mere "check writer" rather than a full participant in world security undermines its position for autonomous self-interest in world affairs. Yet, eighteen years after Dower's observations, incremental progress has been made. Note this observation on the disagreements involved from "The Article 9 Debate at a Glance":

> While the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] insists that the Constitution must be amended to reflect today's realities, politicians on the Left counter that the realities of Japanese security policy should be changed to reflect the provisions of the pacifist Constitution. Many moderates, meanwhile, maintain that the best way to adapt to changing circumstances is to continue to pass new laws under the current provisions of Article 9. In addition, a number of liberal politicians have called

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for constitutional revision with a completely different aim from the LDP's: to more narrowly define and circumscribe the scope of self-defense and the duties of the SDF, including participation in collective security.[8]

There is little agreement on the best way to move forward, and the progress that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made toward true collective self-defense can realistically only be described as limited. On 3 May 2017, Abe released a video message declaring his efforts to add a third paragraph to Article 9 by the year 2020 that would clearly define the existence of Japan's armed forces, yet even that small change, which would be the first alteration to the constitution in its seventy-year history, was met with skepticism at best.[9]

Since the end of World War II, East Asian nations such as China and Korea have feared a militarily recidivist, aggressive Japan, hence the go-slow approach for expanding the scope of employing its military forces is pragmatic. It is difficult to predict when the world, particularly China and Korea, would accept Japan as a true military power and collective defense partner akin to South Korea or Australia.

Even so, regional concerns about an aggressive Japan are unwarranted, and, strange as it may seem, concerns among Japan's Asian neighbors are largely not understood or appreciated by Japanese citizens.[10] Nevertheless, Japan will continue to appear to resist changes to the constitution's meaning while aiming toward normalization, thereby maintaining the facade of a pacifistic posture (maintaining the *image* of pacifism) to ameliorate lingering regional fears (or mere resentment).

The government will continue to maintain the pacifist image to enhance political and economic power internationally, as ironic as that sounds. Although the go-slow approach to normalization is a good thing for the region and for Japan, the Japanese posturing of pacifism—as a slowly dwindling facade—may seem a controversial notion. However, the logic of self-interest underpins the behavior of all nations, and seeming contradictions are just that—merely on the surface. The fact that the debate on change is painfully slow in itself reveals Eastern views of history and national strategy.

There is and has been broad belief inside Japan and perhaps elsewhere in the West that the nation is now fundamentally pacifistic, that World War II somehow changed the Japanese cultural psyche.[11] The Eastern fear of a neo-imperial Japan in the future is the other side of this form of dissimulation. Neither pacifism, which is logically incoherent, nor an equally incoherent political imperialism would best serve Japan's future interests or the interests of anyone. Logic of circumstance suggests that, more for self-interested economic reasons, less for ideological ones, a return to a politically imperialistic Japan is unlikely.

Further, the United States can do much to mitigate Asian fears of Japanese military power by maintaining a U.S. military presence in Japan and by supporting Japan in its chosen pace of change. By encouraging Japan to change in a balanced way, America can help Japan maintain the appearance of contrition for its previous history of Asian expansionism that has until now stabilized the region. The challenge America faces in cooperating with Japan is how to encourage Japanese political changes without implying that America would like to see a radical reinterpretation of Article 9, or its abolition, even if U.S. leaders thought changing Article 9 would be the best course of action in the long term.

Pressuring the Japanese in this area would not be a good idea; they must proceed at their chosen pace to demonstrate they are striving for a harmonious and predictable change. If America miscalculates in trying Japan's patience with its view of the western Pacific, Japan may come to alienate itself from the alliance and rely more on its independent potential for unilateral actions, or even on a renewed relationship with Russia or China, however unlikely that may seem now. Such moves would be destabilizing for the region.

Importance of a Continuing Cooperative Relationship

The partnership between Japan and the United States is vitally important to both countries; it might also be the best hope for the rest of the world in advancing the prosperity of the Earth, given the economies and combined strength of the two nations. Squandering this relationship through carelessness and arrogance would be a moral issue that could quickly have strategic implications. As America's partnership with Japan is a matter of the common global good, it becomes of general interest for the community of states because it represents a fusion of two overwhelmingly dominant world civilizations at the height of their development.

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Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Type 87 self-propelled antiaircraft guns participate in the annual Japan Self-Defense Forces military parade 23 October 2016 at Camp Asaka, Japan. Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe conducted a review of troops. (Photo by Honey Nixon, U.S. Army Japan)

There is nothing deeper than that common self-interest at work between the two countries. That is to say, the relationship is not primarily a friendship, a thing Americans are used to entailing with unconditional affection. The United States' bilateral partnership with Japan represents self-interested peaceful coexistence and cooperation along the main fault line of civilization in the modern world. On the surface, we speak of friendship with Japan, and it is a useful metaphor. We may have friends in Japan on the level of the individual, and that can help. But Japan as a nation is our bilateral partner first and foremost, and—as the Chinese are well aware and may attempt to leverage—it can cease to be at any moment. A political environment in the United States that seeks to minimize or even penalize Japan in some way could be the first step to the ruin of the partnership.[12]

That partnership is not fragile, but it is also something the American policy makers should not take for granted. The Japanese are a people to whom the United States handed an ultimatum twice in the mid-twentieth century; first in 1941, when we told them to get out of the colonies they had annexed or face embargoes, and second in 1945, when we demanded an unconditional surrender. For the Japanese, the Pacific War was one that "took on the qualities of a clash of civilizations."[13] The author of those words, Mochida, wrote, "By this I mean that there was no idea of coexistence; on the contrary, the fighting had at its foundation the amplification of mutual distrust, which lacked fusion/harmony. It could be said that this was a repeat of the conflict between Rome and Carthage."[14] In other words, as Mochida explains it, Japan had deep-seated cultural and ideological interests at stake as well as economic ones in that struggle.

Their involvement in World War II was, as the Japanese saw it, a war of survival fought along a fault line of world views that would determine how the world's civilizations would evolve. Sentiments such as those show how deep the Japanese themselves think the differences between East and West are. Mochida's not mentioning in his analogy the infamous fate Rome imposed on Carthage implies through its absence that Japan would not, and will not, allow itself to suffer a similar total eclipse at the hands of Western

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Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force members carry simulated humanitarian supplies from a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 262, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, 18 November 2016 at Oruma Air Base, Nagasaki, Japan. (Photo by Cpl. Darien J. Bjorndal, U.S. Marine Corps)

dominance. Consequently, if Professor Jay Parker, an Army analyst, is right in his guess that Japan will eventually take the option of getting on China's bandwagon, such would be a step to prevent eclipse by the West.[15]

In turn, that step would signal the East polarizing itself from the West once again. Professor Paul Bracken warns against this possibility in *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*, pointing out, "the sources of conflict in Asia arise from nation-states, not civilizations ... a pullback [by the United States] would prove disastrous for the United States, and for Asia."[16]

What is left to American decision makers today is the task of finding the "fusion/harmony" Mochida talks about. Japan will seek to find a harmony regardless of how the world develops and—as nearly all agree—it would be better for the world at large if that harmony was with America than with the next alternative. As history has shown since the end of World War II, it has been in America's interest to coax Japan out of its American-engineered pacifism and into rational military empowerment to one degree or another. Still, there is form to consider, which is as important as substance is in the Asian East when dealing with the legacy of World War II and the hangover from military rule, and that means that sudden movements would be good for no one. Form is more important than substance in the development of Japan as a "normal country" with military capabilities that could communicate a willingness to use offensive operations. The Japanese word for heart is *kokoro*, and the way in which they grow out of their twentieth century legacy has to reflect the kokoro of peace that they want to communicate.

At the very least for Korea and China, Japan must keep up the face of benevolence, docility, and pacifism for the sake not only of appearances but also of practical political realities. The longer it maintains a strong alliance with the United States, the longer it can take emerging

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from its so-called pacifism in a public way, and the less likely tension will arise among its neighbors.

Importance of History

The main difference between Western and Eastern cultures is their foundational philosophical perspectives—even that phrase is telling. In the West, we have what we call a world "view," and although there are many, they all spring from the same source (i.e., the Judeo-Christian traditions). In the East, people have a "way" of being in the world, and although there are many, they have a common origin different from the West's (the seminal texts of Hinduism and Buddhism and of Confucian and Taoist philosophies). Both perspectives suffer from plagues of fear, ignorance, and prejudice among the poor and the poorly educated. Surmounting these obstacles to effective cooperation from the Western side of the cultural gap is America's obligation to the alliance. History suggests Americans have had difficulty in this regard. Bracken, in *Fire in the East*, calls the Western inclination to shape things according to Western views the "challenge of self-conception."[17] When working with the Japanese, assuming this posture deliberately or unwittingly can have undesirable consequences for the alliance.

Centuries of domination by the military ethos of a political and moral elite have shaped the discourses of the nation, the dominating ideologies that form the psyche of a people, and the way they navigate in the world on every level. Harvard scholar Thomas Cleary reminds the inattentive West that "crucial to understanding Japanese psychology and behavior is an assessment of the influence of centuries of military rule."[18] Not even the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 that culminated in Japanese surrender and the end of World War II, and the abrupt changes that followed those disastrous events, can alter that. Expecting such an alteration would be like telling Westerners to stop using the Judeo-Christian tradition as a lens for viewing the world.

However, as noted above, the legacy of military rule and defeat does not suggest that Japan will again become militaristic—the lingering fear of many nations in the region. It has a historical pattern of pragmatically adapting the ways and ideas of other civilizations (for instance, as in the case of adopting Chinese religion and technology in the sixth and seventh centuries and Western military technologies in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries). This implies rather that the Japanese have good reason to continue to pretend pacifism because that is what is pragmatically the best course of action now for the economic security and stability of the region and to emerge from the perception of relative political-military impotence in whatever way serves Japan's own best interests and its place in the world.

Japan's history shows a clear progression from religious elites, to emperors, to military dictatorship, to military oligarchy, to representative government. Americans need to remember how long a military government ruled in Japan—roughly nine hundred years. Patience, self-reliance, and self-determination are part of the bushido (samurai) ethic that has suffused itself among the general population.[19] These virtues are as important to the country as to its individual citizens, and Japan sees the need to preserve them to keep its own best interests on the table in future power discourses.

The Glue in the United States–Japan Security Alliance

The importance of American military bilateral engagement in Japan, with the Japan Self-Defense Forces and with Japanese society, cannot be overestimated. The alliance depends upon the military and civilian relationship at the ground level, where Japanese and American soldiers and leaders train with each other in cooperative broadening assignments, where the military staffs plan and conduct exercises together, and where local politicians and bureaucrats work with and interact with American bases. Although Japan combines the best geographic and geopolitical factors as the location most suited for America's military command and control center in the western Pacific, there are better reasons for thinking hard about future improvement of the fabric and quality of American presence in Japan. Since Japan represents the economic and cultural pivot for the best interests of America's future, and since Japan is America's most important ally in Asia if not in the world at large, *host-nation relations* should be the top priority of the U.S. military, with exercises taking a back seat to the qualitative nature of alliance maintenance. Military exercises must serve the maintenance of the relationship, not the other way around. Operations serve strategy, and there is no room for parochialism on the part of exercise planners.

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The Army has the lion's share of this maintenance responsibility in spite of it having the smallest footprint of U.S. forces in Japan. The JGSDF is by far the largest and, arguably, the most influential of the branches of Japanese military service.[20] In this sense, the U.S. Army has a significant burden in the maintenance of the bilateral alliance, one that is likely the most crucial among the services given the current state of affairs. The Army, too, is welcome in Japan; there are no significant movements and little sentiment to oust Army presence from Japan, and no efforts to do so are likely. The challenge for American soldiers will be keeping the Army's relationship with the JGSDF at a level that communicates the respect Japan deserves as our ally. Looking out to the future, the Army bilateral engagement program should receive renewed emphasis from the Department of the Army, expressed as a higher rank structure for officers in Japan.

Fifteen years ago, as I was retiring from the active Army as an officer on the U.S. Army Japan staff, I heard a top-level commander of the JGSDF remark, "the U.S. Army still has no interest in Japan; they are just as blind as ever—they see no relevance." That may still be true given the Army's preoccupation with the Middle East, and if so, it needs to change. Understanding Japan and its probable future role in security for Asia is critical to the best-case outcomes for the world at large. ■

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Notes

1. "Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution," Library of Congress website, last updated 29 September 2015, accessed 21 March 2017, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php. See also Kitaoka Shinichi, "The Turnabout of Japan's Security Policy: Toward 'Proactive Pacifism,'" Nippon.com website, last updated 2 April 2014, accessed 3 May 2017, http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/.

2. "The Constitution of Japan," Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet website, accessed 16 May 2017, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

3. Michael Richardson, "China Developing a Navy that Could Confront U.S.," *International Herald Tribune*, 5 January 2001.

4. "The Article 9 Debate at a Glance," Nippon.com website, 31 August 2016, accessed 4 May 2017, http://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00146/.

5. K. Mochida, "The Dawn of a Second Pacific Era" (unpublished manuscript, 1995), draft copy in possession of the author.

6. John W Dower, *Embracing Defeat* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 563.

7. "Gross Domestic Product 2015," World Bank data, 2015, accessed 21 March 2017, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.

8. "The Article 9 Debate at a Glance."

9. "PM's Call for Revision to Article 9 of Constitution Puzzle Even Ruling Parties," *Mainichi*, 4 May 2017, accessed 16 May 2017, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170504/p2a/00m/0na/010000c.

10. This is the author's observation based on sixteen years of living predominately in Japan and the author's personal conversations with a broad cross section of the society, including family, friends, fellow students at the International Christian University, and coworkers spanning from 1972 until present.

11. Pacifism formed the nucleus of Japan's foreign policy in the postwar era. The policy is rooted in the horrors of the Pacific War and Japan's wartime trauma, including the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Article 9 of the postwar constitution, drafted under U.S. occupation in 1947, declares that the Japanese people "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation." See Matt Ford, "Japan Curtails its Pacifist Stance," *The Atlantic*, 19 September 2015, accessed 4 May 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/japan-pacifism-article-nine/406318/. After Abe's success in reinterpreting Article 9, "Tens of thousands of students protested the bill in Tokyo, and opposition leader Tatsuya Okada warned that the bill and other security-related measures would 'leave a big scar on Japanese democratic politics.'"

12. See discussion about Western arrogance toward Eastern countries in E. Valentine Daniel, "The Arrogation of Being by the Blind-Spot of Religion," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies* 33 (2001): 83–102, accessed 1 May 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43294582?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. Professor Daniel, Columbia University anthropologist, presented a lecture at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo on anthropological distinctions between the East and West. He finds full elucidation of cultural misunderstanding deeper than explanation allows. He claims that framing the differences in typical Western ideas about world "views" is a category error, a logical mistake. He speaks of the "innocent arrogance" of Western people imposing the idea of a "view" on the rest of the world.

13. Mochida, "The Dawn of a Second Pacific Era." Because his view reflects what many people in Japan believe but will not say openly, what Gen. Mochida has said about the war from the Japanese perspective is both revealing and important to understanding Japan's current view of their own history: "There were many Japanese who believed in the ideals reflected

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in the Japanese idea to free other nations from the bonds of Western colonization and the Japanese plan to build a sphere of coexistence and co-prosperity. I believe that looking at the current situation in Asia, this idealistic plan is nothing that Japanese should have to be ashamed of now ... Japan ended up in defeat, but as a result of the war many Asian countries were released from their colonial bonds and became independent nations. We are too close to the rainbow now, but as time progresses, it will be important to calmly and objectively evaluate and understand Japanese actions from the Russo-Japanese war to World War II ... It is important to bear in mind that Japan's defeat in World War II served as a symbolic historical turning point which made the Japanese realize the impropriety of the use of force to attempt to dominate other countries. The idea that the use of force to achieve national desires is legitimate had been rooted in ancient history and the practice had continued since then. However, based on our World War II experience, we Japanese came to recognize that this kind of thinking did nothing but cause suffering and delay human progress. This is the lesson that should be learned not only by Japan, but also by the countries who were victorious in the war ... Although there are various sources of friction between the U.S. and Japan today, we Japanese are making the efforts to open our markets in the spirit of harmony, not confrontation."

14. Ibid.

15. Jay M. Parker, "Japan at Century's End: Climbing on China's Bandwagon?" *Pacific Focus* 15, no. 1 (2000): 6. Professor (Col.) Parker believes that, of Japan's three options (continuing reliance on the U.S. security arrangement, rearming as a technological superpower, or accommodation of China's interests), Japan will move away from America and toward China. This has not happened in the fifteen years since he wrote, but it remains a possibility.

16. Paul Bracken, *Fire in the East* (New York: Perennial, 1999), 163.

17. Ibid., 170.


18. Thomas Cleary, *The Japanese Art of War: Understanding the Culture of Strategy* (Boston: Shambhala, 1991), 123. In this sense, as Cleary remarks, "The obvious front is not the measure of what it is supposed to represent, even though the existence of the facades is an inescapable fact of life when dealing with Japanese culture as a political reality."

19. Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Japanese* (Boston: Harvard, 1977), 214. See also Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan* (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1963), 63.

20. U.S. Army Japan, "Command Brief" (Camp Zama, Japan, 2016).

Military Review

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Professional Military Education
Proven in Combat during the Mexican War

Capt. Patrick Naughton, U.S. Army Reserve

Professional military education (PME) is a critically important part of building effective military leaders. This fact is sometimes overlooked due to the misguided belief that experience and field service alone will make the best leader. While these items are significant, when combined with PME, they make a more potent recipe for a truly well-rounded military leader. Ultimately, the decisive test of the success of PME is its relevance and application in combat situations.

The Mexican War (1846–1848) occurred in an often-neglected period in America's history. It is mainly remembered and studied by historians for the insight it gives into the early military careers of many famous American Civil War officers on both sides of the conflict. What is not as readily realized is that it served as the validation and true starting point for the further development and implementation of PME for America's armed forces.

History of Early American Professional Military Education

No program of formal military education was established by America upon its independence from Great Britain. Officers were generally selected from the higher echelons of society, and they received their commissions through family connections or purchase.[1]

This lack of a proper PME program to educate newly commissioned officers was not due to negligence. Many Americans feared the rise of an aristocratic officer class as seen in Europe and were hesitant to implement anything to encourage such a rise. However, then Gen. George Washington adamantly believed in a formal education system for new officers as long as it was appropriately managed. Numerous times, in person and in writing, he declared his desire for the establishment of a formal PME program for the country:

> A military academy instituted on proper principles, would serve to secure to our country, though within a narrow sphere, a solid fund of military information which would always be ready for national emergencies, and would facilitate the diffusion of military knowledge as those emergencies might require.[2]

The establishment of an American PME program began as early as 1795 at a military garrison called West Point, New York. From 1795 to 1797, a military school was established there to educate artillery and engineer officers. Taught by three French officers, the school was short-lived because of funding problems, internal and external tensions due to the foreign instructors, and the competing need for officers on the frontier.[3]

Though the formal school was no more, West Point remained an Army garrison. Between 1797 and 1802, pressure from a number of American officers and politicians for the establishment of a permanent military academy grew. On 16 March 1802, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point (commonly known as West Point) was formally established when Congress authorized the president to organize and establish a school for the Corps of Engineers. West Point underwent a

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Battle of Cerro Gordo (1847), hand-colored lithograph, E. B. and E. C. Kellogg, New York and Hartford. The engagement was a key battle in a campaign that aimed at capturing Mexico City, the capital of Mexico. Many junior officers of the U.S. force participating in the battle would later gain prominence as senior commanders in the U.S. Civil War; among these, Capt. Robert E. Lee. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

number of changes, reorganizations, and expansions to other branches until the formal establishment of a true curriculum in 1817.[4]

Curriculum at West Point

All West Point officers who fought in the Mexican War (hereafter, referred to as the MW) were educated and disciplined under the same basic PME guidelines. This was mainly due to the superintendent who served from 1817 to 1833, Col. Sylvanus Thayer.

From its founding in 1802 until 1817, West Point had no formal curriculum or examination system. However, upon assuming his position as superintendent, Thayer, then a major, quickly implemented a structure broken down by battalions, classes, and subclasses, all dominated by areas of study. In a letter to Secretary of War George Graham, Thayer informed him, "on assuming command I lost no time in calling a meeting of the Academic Staff with a view to a new arrangement of the studies and to the classification of the cadets." He goes on to say, "Each professor or other head of a Department is charged to draw up a programma [*sic*] specifying in minute detail all that is to be taught in his Course." He closed the letter with a note that the end goal of this project was to be a complete four-year study plan, which would be submitted to the War Department for approval.[5]

A set curriculum with an examination system was quickly established, and it became the norm. Thayer also implemented weekly progress reports and a system of measuring merit and class standing among all cadets.[6] In this system, cadets received marks from 0.0 (poorest) to 3.0 (greatest) for all classroom and most practical work. These scores represented how proficient a cadet was in

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a particular subject. Additionally, each subject was assigned a specific weight relating to its importance in the overall scheme of the curriculum. A cadet's daily score in a specific topic was calculated and then aligned with the weight of the importance of the overall subject. These two scores would be calculated and combined with a demerit system of rewards and punishments to determine a cadet's standing among his peers.[7] Table 1 lists the weight assigned against the curriculum that all West Point officers would have been subjected to in the period leading up to the MW.[8]

The Onset of the War

Hostilities between Mexico and the United States had been brewing for years. The catalyst that initiated actual armed conflict between the two nations stemmed, in general, from border disputes over the annexation of Texas and the American belief at the time in "manifest destiny."[9]

In 1845, the U.S. Army was wholly unprepared to go to war. The entire Army consisted of fourteen regiments (two dragoon, four artillery, and eight infantry) with a total authorized enlisted strength of 7,883.[10] About three-fourths of the officers on the line were graduates of West Point, though none were general officers. During the MW, 523 West Point graduates served in the Regular Army. The volunteer forces initially had thirty-six graduates from the academy, but more would be assigned. By the end of the war, forty-nine would be killed, ninety-two wounded, and 447 brevet promotions would be awarded for bravery.[11]

The Army's training was superb, focusing on small-unit, tactical-level field exercises rather than garrison parade-field pomp.[12] However, ironically, the primary weakness of the Army at this time was also its focus on small-unit tactics. Operations against guerrilla-style attacks in the first two Seminole Wars and other conflicts with Native Americans, the Army's small size, and its geographical dispersion across the United States precluded its forces from practicing massive unit engagements and tactics of the type necessary for large-scale conventional war.[13] To help mitigate this, the study of large movements of forces in past conflicts became a standard component of the West Point curriculum, and a large-scale organization mindset was introduced to cadets from the first year by structuring the curriculum based on battalion rather than company level.[14]

Additionally, the study of artillery was emphasized at West Point, which proved crucial during the MW. Even before the reorganization of the curriculum in 1817, Thayer wrote to the secretary of war and the head of the Corps of Engineers requesting the addition

Table 1. Weight of Subjects in West Point's Curriculum before the Mexican War

Subject	Weight assigned in 1820	Weight assigned in 1840
Engineering	2.0	3.0
Natural Philosophy	2.0	3.0
Mathematics	2.0	3.0
Drawing	1.0	1.0
French	0.5	1.0
Chemistry	---	2.0
Mineralogy and geology	---	2.0
Tactics:		
– Infantry	1.0	1.5
– Artillery	1.0	1.5
– Cavalry	1.0	---
Conduct	1.0	---
English:		
– Ethics	---	---
– Geography	1.0	---
– History	1.0	---
– English	---	2.0
– Rhetoric	---	2.0
– Ethics	---	---
– Law	---	---
– Logic	---	---
– Law	---	---
– Grammar	---	---
Ordnance	---	---
Gunnery	---	---
Spanish	---	---
Practical engineering	---	---
Military efficiency	---	---
Military deportment	---	---

(Graphic by author)

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of several officers to the West Point staff. This request included a call for an artillery officer "to take charge of the Material of that arm, to Superintend [*sic*] the artillery drills, The Laboratory, the practice at the cannon, howitzer, & mortar & teach the nomenclature of the pieces."[15] Thayer called these officers "indispensable to the prosperity of this institution."[16]

The schoolhouse preparation for use of artillery proved indispensable as American forces during the MW often faced a fortified and numerically superior enemy where artillery played a critical role. Maj. Samuel Ringgold, a West Point graduate killed during the Battle of Palo Alto, is credited for his innovative efforts in light artillery, focusing on rapid deployment and maneuverability. This technique became known as "flying artillery"; it became one of the building blocks of the branch and is still integral to indirect-fire employment.[17]

Historian and West Point graduate Edward Mansfield, writing about the Battle of Palo Alto in his published MW history, states, "Never was there a more complete demonstration of the superior skill of that arm of the service [artillery] as conducted by the accomplished graduates of West Point."[18]

Engineering and the ability to effectively scout out enemy defensive works were other skills taught at West Point. Thayer, being an engineer officer, understood the importance of this branch of study. In an 1817 letter, he informed the secretary of war of his plan for instruction in this field: "We have transferred Engineering and the branches connected from the 3d to the 4th Years course because it was found that one year (of which only 9 months are devoted to study) is not sufficient for the instruction of that branch."[19]

Thorough reconnaissance conducted by engineers trained at West Point repeatedly proved crucial during the MW. Gen. Winfield Scott, commanding general during the war, wrote numerous after-action reports that are filled with references to future American Civil War officers, and it contains by-name praise for numerous West Point graduates and their abilities as engineers.[20] His report from the Battle of Cerro Gordo demonstrates this:

> The style of execution which I had the pleasure to witness was most brilliant and decisive ... I am compelled to make special mention of the services of Capt. R. E. Lee, Engineers. This officer greatly distinguished himself at the siege of Vera Cruz, was again indefatigable during these operations, in reconnaissance as daring as laborious, and of the utmost value.[21]

This effective combination of engineers and artillery officers trained via their PME experience at West Point was repeatedly observed throughout the conflict. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox, MW veteran and West Point graduate, also makes this observation. In his history of the MW he states,

> The capture of Vera Cruz was an affair, in the main, of the staff and artillery. The engineers located and constructed the batteries with such good judgment and care, that there were few casualties; the fixed ammunition used by the artillery was prepared under the direction of ordnance officers with a skill ensured by their education and their experiments and labors in the laboratory.[22]

The performance of these officers in the MW is graphically illustrated by examining the weights assigned against certain subjects in West Point's curriculum. The information in table 2 (page 88) illustrates the reasons behind these officers' successes in several areas.[23] In addition, by adding the 1860 data, the influence of the MW on the importance of certain subjects in the curriculum is apparent.

The areas highlighted in table 2 reveal why West Point officers were proficient in certain areas. Just before the MW, engineering, natural philosophy (the precursor to modern science), and mathematics were weighted heavily, translating to success on the battlefield (highlighted in green). These areas remained important in the 1860 curriculum, and the importance placed on practical engineering increased as well. The criticality of artillery and ordnance was also realized in the MW, resulting in gunnery and ordnance topics being weighted more heavily in 1860 (green highlight).

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Interestingly, infantry, artillery, and cavalry (highlighted in yellow) lost their weight in 1860. This may be due to the realization that the Army was adept at small-unit tactics, and it needed more operational and strategic topics.

Also demonstrated in table 2 is the rise in importance of military efficiency, military deportment, and overall areas in English (highlighted in blue). This would serve to create an officer better poised to exercise critical thinking on a larger scale.

The analysis above overlooks the importance of the sum of all of the topics in the successful education of West Point officers and what they were able to bring to the fight during the MW. For example, drawing proved critical in mapmaking and reconnaissance. Essentially, all the topics in the curriculum were relevant, and they could be directly applied on the battlefield, which ultimately should be the goal of PME.

Table 2. Weight of Subjects in West Point's Curriculum before and after the Mexican War

Subject	Weight assigned in 1820	Weight assigned in 1840	Weight assigned in 1860
Engineering	2.0	3.0	3.0
Natural Philosophy	2.0	3.0	3.0
Mathematics	2.0	3.0	3.0
Drawing	1.0	1.0	1.0
French	0.5	1.0	1.0
Chemistry	---	2.0	1.5
Mineralogy and geology	---	2.0	1.0
Tactics:			
– Infantry	1.0	1.5	---
– Artillery	1.0	1.5	---
– Cavalry	1.0	---	---
Conduct	1.0	---	---
English:			
– Ethics	---	---	0.5
– Geography	1.0	---	0.5
– History	1.0	---	---
– English	---	2.0	0.5
– Rhetoric	---	2.0	0.5
– Ethics	---	---	1.5
– Law	---	---	1.5
– Logic	---	---	1.0
– Law	---	---	1.0
– Grammar	---	---	1.0
Ordnance	---	---	1.0
Gunnery	---	---	1.0
Spanish	---	---	1.0
Practical engineering	---	---	1.0
Military efficiency	---	---	1.0
Military deportment	---	---	1.0

(Graphic by author)

Commentaries on Performance of West Point Officers in the Mexican War


Gen. Scott, presenting a toast at a dinner party at the close of the MW, loudly and earnestly praised the academy. He declared, "This army, multiplied by four, could not have entered the capital of Mexico" without the West Point-trained officers in his command.[24] Later in life, when asked to provide input on PME at West Point, Scott wrote, "I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories to our share."[25]

In December 1848, Secretary of War Randolph B. Marcy declared, "Among the considerations which render the U.S. Military Academy at West Point an appropriate depository of the trophies of the successful victories of our arms in Mexico is the admitted fact that the graduates of that institution contributed in an eminent degree to our unexampled career of success."[26] Historian Edward Deering Mansfield concluded his

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1849 history of the MW saying, "To this institution, more than to any state, or any arm of the service, or any exertion of valor, is the country indebted for the success and brilliant achievements of the war."[27]

In 1860, shortly before the American Civil War, Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield, inspector general of the Army and MW veteran, was charged to examine and report on the academy. His conclusion of the validity of its PME drew directly from the MW: "I have only to cite the career of our Army in the Mexican War ... I make no hesitation in the assertion that there was no failure in the undertaking of any military operation or expedition during the war resulting from a want of education in the graduate."[28]



Grant at the Capture of the City of Mexico (1860–1870), painting, by Emanuel Leutze (artist) and printed in *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*. The painting depicts future Union general Capt. Ulysses S. Grant leading a contingent of U.S. soldiers to position a cannon inside a church tower that targeted the San Cosme Gate leading into Mexico City during the final battle to capture the capital. Fire from the cannon helped clear the way for Maj. Gen. William J. Worth's 1st Division to enter the city. Lt. George E. Pickett and Maj. James Longstreet (future Confederate States' generals) also participated in the battle. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Mansfield's conclusion would be further supported after West Point graduates performed exceptionally on both sides of the American Civil War. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, West Point graduate and future president, credited West Point for his success in the American Civil War. Grant pointed to the personal relationships that he made during his time at the academy as being crucial to his success while in command: "The acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the war of the rebellion."[29]

Grant's published memoirs contain forty-five references to how his connections to, and knowledge of, other West Point alumni assisted him throughout his life, both on and off the battlefield. As such, networking is another key benefit of PME. Those relationships formed among attendees serve to enhance careers by extending influences beyond the chain of command. The memoirs of Gen. Robert E. Lee, West Point graduate and former superintendent, read similarly and further expound on the importance of this networking process.[30]

Varina Davis, wife to West Point graduate and Confederate President Jefferson Davis, also supported this claim. She wrote in his memoirs, "During all his life he remembered his old companions at West Point and wrote many loving words."[31]

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Military Review

WE RECOMMEND



The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Mexican War: The Occupation of Mexico May 1846–July 1848

By Stephen A. Carney

The Mexican War is an often underappreciated event in the history of the United States that dramatically shaped its social and political character. During eighteen months of fighting, the U.S. Army won a series of decisive battles, culminating in the defeat of the Mexican Army and seizure of Mexico City. At termination, the conflict had added approximately one million square miles of land to the United States, including the important deep-water ports of coastal California. Moreover, it gave the Regular Army experience in large-scale conventional operations that later was applied on a much grander scale by both sides of the American Civil War. To view an online copy of this book, visit http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/073/73-3/CMH_Pub_73-3.pdf.

She went on to credit the taming of the western American frontier as being due to the refined education its young officers received at West Point, especially their ability to bring civilization to the wilderness.[32] She stated that this experience silenced the critics of West Point and their shouts of "toy soldiers" and "shoulder-strap aristocracy" forever.[33]

Davis put his pre-Civil War career in Congress on the line by vehemently defending West Point against proposed funding cuts or threats of closure numerous times.[34] In addition, as secretary of war, he proposed the academy's program be extended from four years to five, demonstrating how highly he regarded West Point.[35]

Lessons Learned for Professional Military Education Today

The superb combat performance of West Point officers during the MW was due to PME combined with practical field experience. The curriculum taught in the classroom directly translated to a force multiplier on the battlefield.

Scott credited his West Point-trained officers for the rapidity of the execution and closure of the MW, and the value of their education is the major lesson from this conflict: the PME obtained by the cadets at West Point was crucial to the success of the Army in 1846 to 1848. This must be the goal of today's PME curriculum—to educate the Nation's soldiers on relevant topics that will translate to rapid and decisive victory on the battlefield.

Identifying gaps created by constrained funding—which affects training dollars for large-scale field exercises, equipment, and supplies—is the second lesson learned from the MW. These gaps must be mitigated by PME. During the MW, it became clear that a fissure existed between training at the tactical level and at the operational and strategic levels of the Army due to budget constraints placed upon the force. However, this gap was in part mitigated by teaching operational and strategic concepts to future officers at West Point. This same identification process must be applied to current PME being offered to military leaders. If an operation cannot be executed in the field due to a lack of funding, then at the very least, the type of operation and its strategic purpose must be studied during PME.

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Conclusion

West Point cannot claim to be the sole reason behind victory in the MW, as many of the untrained volunteer officers and noncommissioned officers performed valiantly and superbly. However, the success of the academy's graduates during that war demonstrates and validates the need for a useful and thoroughly applied PME program in a professional army. PME, combined with practical experience obtained through realistic field training events, will produce a better leader.

The challenge lies not in realizing the importance that PME plays in developing enlisted personnel and officers who can win in future conflicts but rather in formulating a PME curriculum that anticipates what the future of conflict will look like. PME cannot take a "cookie-cutter" approach toward educating future leaders. It must remain flexible and constantly incorporate feedback from those serving in current engagements around the world.

A substantial investment in developing a robust and adaptive PME program rooted in continual reevaluation is crucial. This is the only way the force can mitigate budget constraints and keep Army leaders prepared to fight in future ever-changing and challenging conflicts. ■

Notes

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1st Lt. Patrick Higgins (*foreground*) of 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment surveys a village as Spc. Aaron Trapley and Sgt. Gary Fordyce provide sniper overwatch and Sgt. Nicholas Gauthier provides security during a foot patrol 23 February 2009 near Forward Operating Base Mizan, Afghanistan. To deal with the extreme stress and moral ambiguity of such situations, the authors assert that high standards and methods for ethical decision making need to be inculcated in troops and their leaders through intensive education. (Photo by Sgt. Christopher S. Barnhart, U.S. Army)

The Military Moral Education Program

Checking Our Ethical Azimuth

Maj. Timothy Leone, U.S. Army

Maj. Saythala Lay Phonexayphova, U.S. Army

Horrific war crimes, the sort portrayed in the film *The Kill Team* and the book *Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death*, and major transgressions by senior leaders that make for embarrassing headlines typically dominate the Army's discourse on moral education.[1] While no one argues that those responsible were somehow unaware of their actions being wrong, such events commonly elicit immediate demands for further instruction and improvements in the ethical reasoning of all soldiers. In its haste to respond, the Army repeatedly deploys its intellectual capacity toward solving the wrong problem.

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Failure to identify the root of a complex problem can sabotage even the best intentions. Imagine for a moment a purpose-driven soldier motivated to improve his fitness level. Each morning, he inspires his fellow soldiers by giving 100 percent during physical training. Yet, he shows little improvement. Only after an honest counseling session with his squad leader does the soldier confess that he rewards himself with eight hundred calories worth of coffees, free donuts, and breakfast assortments after each session on the way to conduct hygiene. Immediately, the squad leader recognizes the problem: the soldier is attending to a multifaceted end (general health) along only one relevant line of effort. Similarly, the Army is unaware of its own blind spot in character development.

Recent military initiatives—such as the addition of an ethics block for professional military education and the Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign—have led to a more comprehensive curriculum in ethical theory that seeks to improve soldiers' moral reasoning skills. However, the Army must simultaneously improve its soldiers' moral will—that is, their moral motivations. The proper ends of the Army ethics program include moral action rather than *merely* moral knowledge.[2] These are two deliberate, but not necessarily discrete, ends. One might gain moral knowledge without interest in pursuing moral action. In contrast, one cannot act morally without the prerequisite knowledge (ethical reasoning) that allows him or her to discern right action. The Army must characterize its ethical training as moral education and implement systematic methods of reinforcement so that the profession interprets its ethic as a standard that each member aspires to *be* rather than simply *do*.

The contemporary environment is complicated and growing ever more complex. While the Cold War-era military prioritized efficiency and effectiveness, the modern military emphasizes flexibility and adaptability. Training attends to the former; training prepares soldiers and leaders to succeed in the next *known* mission. Education attends to the latter; education prepares soldiers and leaders to succeed in the next *unknown* mission. While training prioritizes highly specialized, repeatable expertise (battle drills, for example), education prioritizes "big-picture" thought that understands the interoperability of efforts—their necessary causes and likely effects on mission accomplishment. Moral knowledge requires education initiatives rather than further training initiatives.

Similarly, the Army might seek to train soldiers toward the second end suggested above: moral motivations. Training may habituate good activities by virtue of an organized system of rewards and reprimands. That model might achieve more immediate compliance, but it is unlikely to gain enduring commitment. Formerly, in a more centralized formation, that course of action would prove acceptable, feasible, and suitable. However, contemporary low-intensity environments impose upon the military a need for far greater autonomy throughout the force—from the combatant commander to the fire-team leader. Junior leaders find themselves responsible for large swaths of battle space, armed with incredible assets, and able to make major strategic impacts. Rewards and reprimands often require immediacy and deliberate oversight to be effective; operational conditions are not conducive for such a method of reinforcement. This is to say that a punitive system does not work as well in the fight our Army faces today.[3]

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Foundations: Moral Education Matters

Michael Walzer, in his seminal work *Just and Unjust Wars*, best captures the essence of what it means to be a good soldier when he suggests that "soldiers must be 'men of spirit,' like Plato's guardians. ... It is almost certainly true that they fight best when they are most disciplined, when they are most in control of themselves and committed to the restraints appropriate to their trade."[4] According to Walzer, well-disciplined soldiers do not just act morally or fight justly.[5] They *are* moral people who consistently align their actions with objective moral truths—those that the Army explicitly codifies in its professional ethic (normative rules, regulations, values, and creeds). Foremost in this professional ethic is the claim that its people are stewards of the profession who have an "ethical workspace," or nonphysical realm, that they maintain at all times to foster trust.[6] That is, the Army's professional ethic maintains the ideal that Army professionals are ethical beings with stable moral dispositions. Further, they do not set aside ethical obligations and duties during off hours—weekends, leaves, or when they retire.

In requiring that military professionals *be* stewards, the Army accepts the moral principles of virtue ethics in some important ways. We turn to Aristotle, the most well-known virtue ethicist, to provide a theoretical framework that can guide a clearer approach to moral education. For him, the state of *being* moral is more important than acting justly and morally; that is to say that a person's habitually moral actions derive from his or her character.[7] Similar to Aristotle's perspective, we look at ethics as an integral part of how a person should be throughout an entire lifetime. We want soldiers whose actions originate from a stable character that conforms to the Army's professional ethic. When people's interests, values, and passions match with their organizational beliefs, it is more likely that they will be committed to the profession.

Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* explains how people could lead good lives and act rightly from deeply rooted motivations. Aristotle's thesis centers on the question of what is a good life—the Greek term for good life, or human flourishing, is *eudaimonia*. To morally self-actualize, Aristotle proposes a "functionalist" theory of the human good; he claims that just as the goodness of a flute player or sculptor resides in his proper function/purpose (*ergon*), so "the good of man" resides in "whatever is his proper function."[8] Moreover, he stipulates that "the proper function of man ... consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle ... [and that] the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue."[9] Here, Aristotle means that human beings distinguish themselves from other living organisms, because we have a rational capacity that allows us to be people who can achieve excellence, or flourish, not by simply acting but by *being* virtuous. For instance, for soldiers to be excellent, they ought to be people whose actions are consistent over time, and their actions ought to originate from right motivations.

Their virtues should conform to the Principle of the Golden Mean, which says that good actions are between two extreme vices (e.g., the virtue of courage is the mean between cowardice and recklessness). By being a virtuous person, who acts between the mean of two vices, one fosters stability in his or her organization and provides coherence for that person's identity and actions. Thus, to have a good life (to be *eudaimon*) is to live a life in which one engages in excellent activities that utilize abilities unique to human beings. A good life is a life of excellent activity. A morally virtuous person has values that are so firmly instilled in that individual that they are truly part of that person; these values, in essence, are inseparable from the person and guide his or her actions in life.[10]

In regards to practically applying Aristotle's position, we begin by discussing the military's unique group dynamics and highlighting potential benefits in regards to character development. We have made the following two assumptions: first, a better measure of character is one along a spectrum that traverses from vicious to virtuous (in accordance with the Aristotelian Principle of the *Golden Mean*) rather than assuming its uncompromising presence or absence; and second, formal and informal mentorship better motivates ascent along that spectrum than less personal methods commonly employed by more conventional training (to include those that exist within the Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign). Informed by an Aristotelian model, these two assumptions will help us respond to four bad arguments or practices that we often see in the military when it attempts to yield a successful moral education program.

First Bad Argument: "You are a moral person until you prove otherwise." In order to explicate our

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concept of measuring character along a spectrum, we first depict that method within a more quantifiable domain, physical fitness. The military has clearly outlined physical fitness standards of excellence and failure. There is no confusion over how the profession designates, scores, and records those standards. However, the Army anticipates that its largest population of service members will score somewhere well between what they consider an excellent or failing score. For instance, it would be absurd to designate a failing score just below one that represents excellence. However, that same absurdity persists in our understanding of character development; the institution assumes every service member has exceptional character, until he or she does not. For years, the officer evaluation report allowed only for a single check to describe a leader's embodiment of the Army values: commitment to duty, respect, selfless-service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Marking "yes" indicated the officer was fit for service, while "no" condemned him or her as absent decent character; with few exceptions, the latter rarely occurred.

> "The interpretation that everyone's character is exceptional and without any room for improvement is, again, absurd ..."

While different in its form, the revised officer evaluation report instituted in 2014 maintains a similar dichotomy: either one is a moral exemplar or a deviant. Raters now draft descriptive prose in the block devoted to character. However, their comments identify most subordinates as "operating with impeccable integrity and ethic" (or something comparably laudatory). Any comment other than one that speaks to a rated officer's pristine character would greatly damage his or her career. The interpretation that everyone's character is exceptional and without any room for improvement is, again, absurd; not only does it make no intuitive sense, leaders clearly do not employ such a stark distinction in any other category on the evaluation. We must admit that most members of our profession operate in that aforementioned third category that is not necessarily void of high moral character, but could certainly stand to further mature as they might in any other capacity within which they are rated.

Second Bad Argument: "Punishment makes good soldiers out of common men." There is value in returning to the physical fitness domain again. As previously assumed, the majority of military members remain well within the spectrum between exemplar and failure. Admitting the benefits of the conventional "carrot and the stick approach" for those soldiers on the cusp of either designation, one must concede that most do not fear "the stick" of failure, nor are they inspired by the "carrot" to excel, as they likely see it as impossible for them. For the majority, those incentives offer very little to motivate improvement. For them, their relative performance in respect to their performing peer group offers better motivation. In that regard, the military offers a powerful advantage discernible in its unique group dynamics and subculture.

The military has carefully addressed instances of hazing; it must continue to root out inappropriate behaviors of that sort. However, it stands to continue benefitting from appropriately employed peer pressure. Its potential motivation is the predictable result of a phenomenon referred to as Social Identity Theory. Proposed by Henri Tajfel, a former professor at the University of Oxford and a founding member of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, the theory suggests that people base their sense of who they are largely on their group memberships.[11] His hypothesis is that group membership indoctrinates its members in a way that emphasizes the negative aspects of an out group in order to enhance their own self-image. In pursuing his theory further, some argue they have exposed the psychological nature of prejudice by better understanding Tajfel's principles of basic cognition involved in the group-formation process.[12]

First, one categorizes people into a group according to certain common attributes that he or she admires. Second, one assimilates or socially identifies him- or herself with that group by adopting its identity as his

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or her own by establishing an emotional bond with group members. Third, one coheres, or socially compares, him- or herself and his or her group with others through a lens that is predisposed to recognize one's own advantages and an outsider's disadvantages.[13] That is all to say that soldiers likely similarly self-actualize out of desire for inclusion in a peer group they value.

We can apply this discussion of the in-group versus the out-group dynamic to physical fitness. The average soldier is motivated to improve him- or herself in order to remain in the fold. Absent clearly identifiable goals, such as those available to the soldiers on the margins of excellence or failure, those around a soldier motivate and compel that soldier to improve. Sadly, no similar peer pressure exists in the domain of character development. A soldier admires the moral exemplar, and avoids association with the pariah; however, most are generally content and uninspired to grow (as identified above, they may not even understand growth as an option as they interpret themselves as already endowed with "impeccable" status). The Army must impose valuable pressure within the ranks that encourages the already present benefits of group dynamics to perform how it does elsewhere. Educational mentorship, rather than more training, will provide that valuable pressure.

one is valued as a mentor. Why is that? While mentorship requires sincere commitment by both parties, it also requires certain attributes, skills, and characteristics such as humility, sympathy, competence, and relevant experience.[15] If it is so valuable and it requires so much to be successful, why pretend everyone can do it?

It is here that we propose a major shift in the professional military education model: a deliberate emphasis on one-on-one mentorship. When a rater comments on a subordinate's potential for future assignments, one of the most coveted comments should be in a newly created *professional military education mentor* category. While the specifics of such a role would require far more discussion than is within the scope of this article, identifying a subordinate with the promising attributes of a mentor would suggest to the board superior merit in those attributes the Army values most—clearly identifying him or her as a steward of the profession. Further, such identification would impose an obligation to uphold and spread that moral value among the ranks. This identification creates a more accurate understanding of the spectrum of character in the force. Those leaders would serve as moral exemplars. The majority would now populate some newly created middle ground that more accurately reflects reality. With the landscape redrawn, we might consider now the advantages afforded to the military by this new population of mentors in regards to moral education and motivation.

"While mentorship requires sincere commitment by both parties, it also requires certain attributes, skills, and characteristics such as humility, sympathy, competence, and relevant experience."

Third Bad Argument: "Everyone is a moral exemplar and, thus, everyone can be a mentor." Thomas Ricks, a sincere critic of military leadership, earmarks a fascinating dynamic for further discussion in his controversial book, *The Generals*. He calls attention to the inconsistency present in military leadership's unwillingness to fire senior leaders.[14] While professing that generalship is incredibly difficult and requires a unique set of skills and characteristics, the military's reluctance to fire general officers tacitly endorses the notion that everyone promoted to that rank has those rare skills and characteristics. Ricks' suggestion bears import here as well. By virtue of remaining in the military long enough,

In its recent emphasis on moral education, the Army has taken a necessary (but we argue insufficient) step by requiring moral education as an element of soldiers' annual training, resiliency programs, and professional military education.[16] Following its flawed premise that everyone can be a mentor, however, the Army places the moral education and training of its soldiers in the hands of retired or seasoned Army officers, chaplains, and military lawyers. In the Army's eyes, those moral experts set the course for the profession.

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The Army needs to recheck the azimuth on this course, because it does not provide enough resources to the preparation of those who are responsible for the moral education of our soldiers. Some have little education in ethics as an academic discipline and some have no experience as educators. The Army, as a learning institution, must invest in its intellectual development and bring the right educators into the classroom in order to facilitate proper mentorship and learning. Specifically, it should open its faculty to civilian moral philosophers and ethicists (real academics) in order to enrich the classroom, stop privileging tactical experience over ethical understanding, and stop relegating moral discourse only to the realm of religious experts. We do a harm to our soldiers when we fail to recognize that there can be a distinction between the morality of the profession and the morality of a religious discipline. The best person to talk about morality may not be the chaplain in the formation.

Fourth Bad Argument: "Soldiers and junior officers are the only proper audience." Influential political theorist John Rawls offers insight into the dynamic process of moral development in his seminal work, *A Theory of Justice*. Properly interpreted, moral psychological development is a persistent process that occurs throughout one's life among three interdependent stages.[17] With disregard for rank, all service members reside in one of the three stages he articulates; it is our contention that proper moral education will motivate more members toward the third, and most desirable, stage. We suggest that each member of the profession ought to pay consistent attention to his or her moral development. The Army ought to inform its efforts with that premise.

The first stage of moral psychological development strives to implant an objective standard in concordance with a proper authority. Its resultant effort may manifest itself in, "prized virtues [of] obedience, humility, and fidelity to authoritative persons."[18] Without proper moral development at this stage, the second state of evolution, "morality of association," becomes potentially as dangerous as it does beneficial. The second stage allows moral momentum to build by associations that one develops among peers; the second stage, simply understood, amounts to rightly oriented peer pressure. The third stage of moral development, "morality of principles," pursues fuller maturation; the fully matured person acts out of an internal sense of pride that emanates from membership in a decent, principled society. As Rawls articulates, "by acting upon [these principles] men express their nature as free and equal rational beings. Since doing this belongs to their good, the sense of justice aims at their well-being even more directly."[19]

This process is dynamic; at any time, a member participant may experience a set of circumstances that forces them to devolve. This may result from a loss of respect for authority due to perceived impropriety, betrayal by associates, or from the perception that the existent principles that one reveres are no longer serving his or her better interests. The structure must be constantly reinforced and strengthened. A second reference to the structure as dynamic is the way in which its fulfillment of each stage intrinsically provides the necessary foundation and motivation to enter into the next; it is a self-perpetuating process.[20]

Recommendation: Checking the Ethical Azimuth

In gathering the science regarding learning, Drs. Henry Roediger and Mark McDaniel collaborate with Peter Brown to describe a number of successful learning techniques in *Make It Stick*. The authors suggest a number of potentially beneficial teaching techniques that are naturally present in our proposed form of mentorship. The technique we will focus on in our closing remarks is one they refer to as *generative learning*, "the process of trying to solve a problem without the benefit of having been taught how."[21]

What most consider merely "interference" in the process of learning actually offers a critical opportunity for greater retention and greater internalization. One may understand the operative premise in our argument by considering the following example: "when letters are omitted from words in a text, requiring the reader to supply them, reading is slowed, and retention improves."[22] By this exercise, the instructor forces the reader to work harder in order to graft the text onto meanings and heuristics already in his or her memory. That process activates deeper recognition of the relevance of the new information to information already stored and internalized. We suggest that this same sort of thing might occur in a personal one-on-one interaction between mentors and their mentored. The anecdotes proposed will require the learner to construct

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courses of action and assess their likelihood of success, and will provide the learner with an opportunity to receive timely feedback from his or her mentor without lasting consequence. That iterative process of back and forth "filling in the blanks" will certainly result in mutual benefit for both parties.

> The Army is guilty of placing ethics instruction among a list of competing demands and poorly emphasizing its priority.

Effective sessions would result in learning long after the session concludes by way of encouraged reflection. Reflection includes several cognitive activities: "retrieval (recalling recently learned knowledge to mind), elaboration (for example, connecting new knowledge to what one already knows), and generation (for example, rephrasing key ideas in one's own words or visualizing and mentally rehearsing what one might do differently the next time)."[23] We propose that the sort of model we are suggesting makes moral education a persistent process that survives among, not in competition with, the many training requirements with which units already contend.

Currently, ethics training occurs discretely. Predominantly, the Army instructs ethics within professional military education programs and requires small-unit leaders to iterate the major points annually. At both times, the Army is guilty of placing ethics instruction among a list of competing demands and poorly emphasizing its priority. The proposed mentor program demands an open dialogue that occurs as, or when, necessary. While anticipating the necessity that units outline some standards in order to ensure some commonly shared experience, those standards must remain limited to meet the intended spirit of the initiative.

The soldier is more likely to value the topic of ethics and moral instruction if it is taught by an exemplar than if it is modularized and mass-produced in the way it is currently. According to Chaplain Kenneth Williams, in his study of Initial Entry Training, "Based on the qualitative data, leaders played the key role in influencing soldiers' moral and character development. Effective motivation by leaders included encouragement and inspiration, spending extra time with soldiers, giving positive feedback on performance, and using disappointment as a motivational technique."[24] Given this data, it is here that we directly apply pressure along the dimension of moral motivations. Mentors not only instruct the facts and rules of ethics, but they also hold the subordinates accountable to them as a moral agent. That personal dimension serves as an intermediate step toward inculcating the notion that the profession (not merely an individual professional) holds one to account; initially represented by an individual, ultimately he or she is representative of an ideal worthy of one's conformity.

Dialectic is the only way to instruct the topics covered in ethics and moral education. Mentors must inspire subordinates to dig far deeper and reconcile their individual world views with their professional ethic—all while solving real-world problems. This sort of pursuit remains only superficial when conducted in mass; it allows far too many to remain on the sidelines of those critical discussions necessary to develop and mature one's character. This one-on-one proposal demands that sort of valuable interaction.

Being virtuous and establishing caring relationships of mentorship matter in moral education, because the types of people we are and the relationships we form are fundamental to our happiness. Most people want to align their personal and professional values; they seek to maintain their personhood in the military so they can recognize themselves in a mirror before, during, and after service. Similarly, people want to know that the organization (namely, the people within it and their leaders) care about them. This concept of care is significant, because soldiers want to be a part of a trusting profession. As Army Doctrine Publication 1, *The Army*, stipulates, "Trust is the core intangible needed by the Army inside and outside the profession ... [because] the Nation depends upon trust."[25] By emphasizing the importance of moral mentorship, we can better ensure that the byproduct of the organization is trust.

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Members feel as if they are part of a trusting organization that cares for and enables them to maintain their values, ways of life, and outlooks for the future.

When the gunfire and explosions go silent and the soldiers are no longer in their battle fatigues, they should feel like they are complete persons who have done a great service to the Nation. The military profession and the Nation should want their soldiers to recognize who they are as people when they return home to their families. They should see that their physical and mental sacrifices are appreciated because they have taken a road less traveled—one that is unique in its dangers and sacrifices but made possible by an equally unique ethos. The profession and the Nation cannot forget them. We should help them find their roads back home; we can do this by respecting and educating them as people. ■

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Notes

1. *The Kill Team*, directed by Dan Krauss (New York: Oscilloscope, 2014), DVD; Jim Frederick, *Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death* (New York: Broadway Books, 2010).

2. Take the case of the Army's Ready and Resilient Campaign as an example. The campaign does address the issues of moral challenges, to include moral injury, but morality does not have its own category—spirituality does. There is a difference between spirituality and morality. The Army would serve itself well by recognizing the differences between these two concepts.

3. The changes we recommend will require attention to the overarching education of the soldier as a moral agent. Moral education must educate soldiers so that they might discern right actions, and then choose to conduct those actions out of respect for the profession and its ethic. To develop a disposition of moral responsibility, we need to take a new approach to learning; we must encourage full-scale debates about moral issues (a dialectical method) that allows soldiers to question and deepen their personal convictions until they adopt the profession's morals as their own. These changes to the military moral education program will benefit the military in two ways: collectively decreasing the occurrence of moral failures, and individually fostering greater resiliency against moral tragedy by appropriating soldiers' morals within the greater Army ethic.

4. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 4th ed. (New York: Basics Books, 1977), 308.

5. In this paper, we do not recognize a distinction between ethics and morals. There is much disagreement and conflation of the terms and it is beyond the scope of this article to separate them.

6. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 17 September 2012), 2-9. This doctrinal publication further describes that trust is between soldiers; between soldiers and their leaders; among soldiers, their families, and the Army; and between the Army and the Nation.

7. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Martin Ostwald (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999), 15.

8. Ibid., 17.

9. Ibid.

10. Eva Wortel and Jolanda Bosch, "Strengthening Moral Competence: A 'Train the Trainer' Course on Military Ethics," *Journal of Military Ethics* 10, no. 1 (2011): 20.

11. Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, ed. Steven Worchel (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1985).

12. Michael Billig, "Henri Tajfel's 'Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice' and the Psychology of Bigotry," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 41, no. 2 (June 2002): 172, accessed 17 February 2017, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1348/014466602760060165/abstract (subscription required).

13. Tajfel and Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," 35–36.

14. Thomas Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), xx.

15. One of the basic assumptions we make about mentorship is that the mentor *cares* about whom he or she is mentoring. A caring relationship is dynamic but has stable characteristics that are involved with both parties. Humility is a requisite characteristic, like sympathy or empathy, because in a caring relationship, it enables people to account for and consider the feelings of others and act upon them to gain trust. Humility allows individuals to grow, learning from one's mistakes and successes. Absent humility, relationships rely only on unsustainable success to maintain themselves.

16. Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development* (Washington, DC: GPO, 19 August 2014). Topics such as ethics, moral leadership, and ethical reasoning practices are mandated throughout the regulation.

17. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard, 1999), 420.

18. Ibid., 408.

19. Ibid., 417.

20. Ibid., 420.

21. Peter C. Brown, Henry L. Roediger III, and Mark A. McDaniel, *Make It Stick: The Science of Successful Learning* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard, 2014), 94.

22. Ibid., 87.

23. Ibid., 89.

24. Kenneth R. Williams, "An Assessment of Moral Character Education in Initial Entry Training (IET)," *Journal of Military Ethics* 9, no. 1 (2010): 49.

25. ADP 1, *The Army*, 2-2.

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A member from the Iraqi security forces beats an Islamic State insurgent who was captured 1 April 2015 in Tikrit, Iraq. Iraqi troops and Shi'ite paramilitary fighters were battling Islamic State forces in northern Tikrit, which officials described as the Sunni Muslim militant group's last stronghold in the city. (Photo by Alaa Al-Marjani, Reuters)

Navigating through the Challenge of Culture and Law in Postconflict Stability Operations

Lt. Col. John B. (J. B.) Shattuck, U.S. Army, Retired

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Long-term, postconflict stability operations will always be a challenge; complicate the situation with an insurgency and the difficulty of the challenge is further elevated. Critical to meeting this challenge during stability operations is promoting the development of legal institutions, particularly law enforcement, to establish rule of law. This will sound familiar for many who have been deployed over the last sixteen years. Still, there is cultural friction when attempting to understand what rule of law is, what it means, and how it should be applied. Consequently, it is imperative that we recognize understanding our own cultural perspectives and the cultural foundation from which they grow as a prerequisite for attempts to influence others in their perspectives regarding appropriate law enforcement.

There are many examples of short-term, mission-specific task forces manned by specialists that have established a track record for stability mission success in operations with limited and discrete objectives. Among these are the Ebola relief effort in West Africa, the earthquake relief effort in Haiti, and the counterpiracy efforts in East Africa.[1] However, long-term rebuilding of a conquered nation is an entirely different challenge.

During any stability operation, we (U.S. military members) make an honest attempt to learn all about the culture of the people in the affected region. Routinely, however, there is a lack of effort to gain greater understanding with regard to our own cultural perceptions. Consequently, without effective efforts to obtain introspective knowledge of ourselves and our own culture, we are ill prepared to anticipate the cultural friction points we will encounter when we try to influence, or impose, a law enforcement system on a very different culture.

In stability operations that include efforts to change law enforcement perceptions and methods, a key point of cultural concern is an understanding of the prevailing legal traditions of the occupied society, including how they police themselves. Without such understanding, the most important aspects that need to be changed may be overlooked. This may result in training that focuses on the comfortable and familiar routine of teaching and improving law enforcement skills and techniques rather than the more vital efforts to change attitudes and values. Such a circumstance presents the danger of reinforcing, or even empowering, the worst aspects of those segments of the military involved in internal security, and may simply be conducive to instituting a perpetual state of oppressive martial law once the training mission is complete.

In any case, changing cultural attitudes and values is no easy task, and it is well understood that within stability operations it will be tough to effectively establish normalcy ruled by law even backed by knowledge of institutions that need to be modified or newly established. However, prepared or not, the task will fall on the shoulders of the ground maneuver forces. A study by the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute concluded that

> Post-war planning cannot be separated from war planning. All phases of the war need to be coordinated to work towards the same end ... ground forces need to be prepared to take on stabilization and reconstruction tasks after the conflict. Only they are able to do it in the immediate aftermath of the conflict because of the power vacuum. They must be given the proper training to handle these tasks.[2]

Our recent history of organizing and training for stability in long-term, postconflict scenarios in Iraq and Afghanistan, both complicated by an insurgency, demonstrate mixed results at the tactical level. Moreover, with the downsizing of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we seem to have given up on the separate advisor effort under its own authorities, such as Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq. Or, if not given up, then we have pushed them into the background and focused efforts on advise-and-assist brigades (AABs).

Nevertheless, for all such engagements and operations, the challenge is determining where the most gain is made in the limited training time available. Well before any deployment announcements are made, training needs to begin on this basic fundamental: understanding our own culture in a way that is conducive to a deeper understanding of the role of civil law in society generally.

Cultural Preparation

Unfortunately, such essential preparation is not being accomplished: teaching one's own culture as a platform for understanding other cultures is now not normally

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done. As a consequence, it is pretty tough to identify points of cultural friction without a shared understanding of the differences between one's own culture and that of others.

To familiarize our troops with foreign cultures, we set up language labs, provide computer-aided culture instruction, and hire foreign expatriates with cultural experience in a given operational area to teach us about that prevailing culture from their perspective (a mistake, but more on that later). Additionally, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC) can launch mobile training teams prepared to teach any culture in the world. But, unfortunately, among all such training, the segments on self-awareness of one's own culture, together with cultural empathy and perspective, are usually deleted in the push for predeployment preparation and skills training.[3]



We normally do not identify who we are culturally or develop even modest awareness of how our culture may potentially conflict with the target culture of interest. As a result, a stability force is often sent in that understands surface culture practices and issues but stumbles clumsily through a landscape of deeper cultural issues. Much of this stumbling about is unintentional ignorance that stems from lack of effort to understand how we are different.

As previously mentioned, expatriate foreign personnel with experience in a specific operational area are commonly hired to provide cultural insight to soldiers preparing to deploy into that area. While hiring a foreign expatriate culture instructor sounds like a good idea, there is significant potential for getting highly biased or parochial instructors who lack true cultural expertise. Many appear to speak authoritatively from personal localized experience with one segment of a population, but lack the broader, formal scope of cultural knowledge that may include knowing where family, local, and regional culture ends and national culture begins. This problem can be highlighted by imagining that a U.S. expatriate overseas was asked to provide cultural insight to persons preparing to come to the United States on some of kind of relief mission. Obviously, there are many certain generalized observations the expatriate could make about his or her culture from his or her own experience, but there is also the risk of deceptively overgeneralizing that experience for the entire population across the entire nation. To illustrate, a white male from New England and an African American female from the Deep South may have certain common cultural traits and experiences as

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Iraqi army soldiers look on as U.S. soldiers use a sand table to demonstrate how to react to an ambush 24 March 2015 during a training exercise at a training area on Camp Taji, Iraq. (Photo by Sgt. Cody Quinn, U.S. Army)

American citizens but would have significantly different cultural experiences at the family, local, and regional levels. It requires a culturally well-educated expatriate to identify common cultural traits and also to distinguish them for their students from local and regional traits.

So, who should instruct us on our own culture? For the long term, training doctrine and "research efforts must include a greater investment in the human and behavioral sciences."[4] As noted previously, the TCC can provide mobile training teams. In addition, cultural anthropologists could be contracted from local universities, and there are also a limited number of applied anthropologists who work outside of academe as culture advisors who may be available for hire.

Also, in the absence of true cultural experts, as a remedial measure, it may be possible to pool human resources in a unit sufficient to "teach oneself." In the current environment, there may be enough members in the organization who have spent sufficient time engaging at a cultural level with foreign personnel in a stability environment to provide useful and meaningful insight gained from the experience of being an outsider looking in.

Insight into Our Own Culture

So what are the salient elements of our own culture about which we must be aware? There are volumes written about American, North American, and Western cultures, but a few points are particularly salient. Among the most important, a general trait of American culture is the tendency to see only two sides to any issue—black and white, red and blue, cops and robbers, cowboys and Indians, Hatfields and McCoys, home team and visitors, winner and losers, etc.

This tendency is reflected in the multiplicity of recreational sports competitions in the United States. Given enough contestants, these competitions are organized into a schedule of one-on-one contests and called a tournament that must culminate with a winner. The black and white dichotomy is also reflected in the U.S. political system. Unlike European parliamentary systems, which routinely encompass numerous political parties, our two-party political system generally eschews multiple parties, and relegates third-party candidates into the outsider or spoiler role. These

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examples help illustrate that we in the United States have a distinct cultural inclination to categorize all parties as either "my team" or "the other team." The proclivity to see the world in two camps pitted against each other obscures our cultural perception when we encounter a collectivist society that encompasses many tribes, families, sects, and groups; all with their own positions, goals, and plans.

For example, tribal leaders in the Middle East seem to enjoy intrigue and complex dealings, negotiations of assistance and support set amidst a kaleidoscope of shifting alliances. When we attempt to place such leaders in a Western-style taxonomy—sorting individuals and groups into black, white, and gray lists—understanding the relationships of these to each other and attempting to categorize reliable loyalties makes heads spin.

Most troubling to U.S. operatives is the gray list. It is normally populated by persons whose loyalties are unclear to us, or who are in the process of shifting allegiances—a frequent and completely accepted cultural occurrence in some areas. Although a conflict in such a cultural environment may seem to be red versus blue, almost everyone in that environment seems to be a shade of purple. Unfortunately, a typical reaction among U.S. planners operating under their own cultural perceptions has been to group the mostly reddish purple into the red team and the mostly bluish purple into the blue team and be done with it. The end result is a mix of groups that are neither as hostile nor as friendly as the Western-style categorization into groups would lead some to believe.

Experience has shown that operating under a culturally inflexible blue-red construct without nuanced understanding of each part of the whole has often created more adversaries than existed when an operation originally began, and has sometimes led to U.S forces being exploited by self-labeled friends. Furthermore, once a clear understanding is obtained, the entire rest of a tour may be spent trying to get alienated true third-party groups under control and onboard with the end goal.

Additionally, as a strategy against cultural oversimplification, some nongovernmental organizations, such as Doctors Without Borders, deliberately maintain their independence. This confounds unit leaders who cannot seem to brook these wildcards out there following their own agenda.[5]

Avoiding the Pitfall of Ethnocentricity

We humans tend toward an ethnocentric view of the world—seeing and evaluating the world around us through the lens of our own experience and culture. One result is that we work under the assumption that the way we learned to do things is the only correct way.[6] In the military, this ethnocentric proclivity is exacerbated by a predilection toward the kind of excessive pride, esprit de corps, and euphoria stemming from the experience of having already defeated the host-nation armed forces prior to the postconflict stability period. We assume a level of cultural superiority on our own part and a level of cultural mediocrity on the part of host-nation forces. However, such inflated views can blind us to the reality of events and circumstances on the ground, undermine stability operations, and lead to mission failure in circumstances where clarity of cultural vision is imperative.


Looking a little deeper within, our Declaration of Independence provides a glimpse into our core values and beliefs:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.[7]

The fundamental belief in equality among people appears so engrained in the aspirations of the writers of the Declaration of Independence that they felt unburdened to provide proof; they perceived that it was so obvious as to be self-evident. And, there is no more clearer statement of the basic American values that now underpin our national consciousness and behavior. Admittedly, it took some time for these core values to permeate American society and become fundamental cultural mores for all U.S. ethnicities and genders; moreover, there is still room to grow in some respects. Nevertheless, the John Locke-inspired ontological vision provided by the Declaration is the basis for our national narrative and cultural faith in a class-free society.[8] Holding this concept of class-free equality, Americans appear to generally share the belief that a level playing field is necessary to allow each individual to rise as far as his or her own talent and drive will take them. This is further reflected in the passing of laws and policies aimed at establishing equal rights, as well as in the establishment of monitoring agencies such as equal opportunity offices to ensure that the measures put in place to advance equality are being enforced.

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In contrast, the antithesis of the ontological society with its focus on equality, natural rights, and right to the opportunity for individual advancement through merit is the collectivist society. In collectivist tribal societies, social advancement occurs through patronage rather than through individual merit. Such patronage is a common custom, particularly in the Middle East.



(Graphic by author)

Figure 1. Conflicting Behavior with Core Values and Beliefs Behavior Concept

Without the benefit of broad cultural understanding, U.S. military operatives see patronage as antithetical to the level playing field of opportunity they are trying to promote, and they normally categorize it as a type of corruption. U.S. planners often make the further mistake of assuming others in a society are as empowered culturally as we are to make individual choices. Nurtured in a culture where all have the opportunity to rise as far as their talent and drive will take them, we naturally assume this is a universal social reality. However, this cultural sense of individual empowerment does not exist in many foreign cultures. In the eyes of his or her superior, a foreign police officer or soldier may not be considered to be anything more than obedient and docile manpower that exists to serve his or her superior. In such circumstances, individual initiative may be regarded as an actual threat to the existing order; it may even be punishable. As such, some foreign soldiers would never dream of taking the same initiative we expect to see in our own young soldiers. Therefore, without a refined cultural awareness of why initiative is discouraged in some societies, lack thereof may serve to reinforce perceptions of mediocrity in the foreign force.

Motivations, cultural biases, and differences in expectations affect mission accomplishment. In nearly all stability or postconflict resolution efforts, there is a mission-related need to influence, motivate, and shape attitudes and capability in order to complete the overall mission and depart. In attempting to influence behaviors, we have often focused on the differences between what we consider acceptable behavior as opposed to what a local tribe, clan, or unit may think. In approaching the issue as an adversary trying to impose our perceptions and values on a society, we lose the opportunity to find and expand on common ground as we focus on dissimilar values. It is essential therefore to find common ground if we are to move forward.

The Boundaries and Limits of Behavior

When building a methodology for stability operations, it is essential to refine both the limits of tolerance as well as the space for cultural diversity of activity. The art of cultural engagement is navigating through unacceptable behavior and deciding what cannot be tolerated, what can be influenced over time, and what will just have to be accepted as part of the cultural landscape. Beyond the range of acceptable behavior is the realm of what we cannot tolerate during stability operations; this unacceptable behavior conflicts with our core values and beliefs (see figure 1).

In this model, behavioral limits as well as freedom of action can be estimated. When two groups come into contact that share very similar core values and beliefs, the shared range of acceptable behavior is quite large (figure 2, page 106). Conversely, the area of conflictive behavior is small and at each other's cultural periphery of the acceptable or unacceptable. Any conflict between red and


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blue is a periphery issue that is easily resolved without cutting close to the core values and beliefs.

A much greater and more common problem for blue exists when a group with very different core values and beliefs is encountered. A much smaller area of commonly acceptable behavior is seen in figure 3 (page 107). In addition, some of the unacceptable behavior is close to the other group's core values and beliefs. Just to create a hypothetical example, treatment of dogs as a ceremonial food source might be unacceptable behavior to blue but may be a religious ceremony and fall in very close to fundamental beliefs and values in the red acceptable behavior zone.

When red is a group that we find we must influence, our typical focus is on mitigating what we regard as the unacceptable behaviors inside the range of what they regard as culturally acceptable behavior. However, engagement aimed at changing a culturally accepted behavior often causes resentment and indignation, and it can polarize and drive the core values and beliefs of the two groups even further apart.

Where efforts should focus is on shared values, beliefs, and acceptable behaviors, particularly those shared acceptable behaviors close to the red core. This will serve to bring core values closer together over time, bringing more red behaviors into an acceptable zone while bridging divergence. In this construct, some unacceptable behavior must be tolerated, at least for a time, in order to influence, motivate, and shape attitudes over time. For example, over time, the practice of ceremonial dog meals may drift toward the periphery of red's acceptable behavior, find less adherents to the ceremony, and become less of an issue; however, it is unlikely to ever disappear entirely.



(Graphic by author)

Figure 2. Core Values Closely Aligned

The Martial Law-Civil Law Conundrum

A significant application of the art of cultural navigation is the cultural understanding it takes to simply stand up the agencies of normalcy and restore essential services to a functioning civil authority. The most significant of these services is a functioning law enforcement system. The restoration of other services can be more easily established once civil authorities have control of law and order. The institutions of law enforcement include police, judiciary, and corrections; referred to as the civil authority triad.[9] A significant challenge is to understand the cultural underpinnings of civil authority that provide policing as they relate to law enforcement systems operating within a cultural context to support civil authorities.

Let's face it; many may not understand civil law or the rule of law. As a military force, we establish martial law when trying to bring order to areas we control. During a deployment to Iraq on an advisor mission, I heard a colonel serving as the division judge advocate general state that we had no definition for rule of law, but he would describe it as an absence of chaos. To be fair to the colonel, if the definition of rule of law is googled, a long list of subtle variations is found, including "rule according to law; rule under law; or rule according to a higher law."[10] In practice, we typically establish local legal authorities to process and imprison detainees, and are not looking to establish a host-nation legal system to be subservient to. Therein lies a quandary: how is rule of law established if we are unwilling to be ruled by the rule of law institutions we establish? It is a deeper challenge than one may first realize as, like cultural baggage, there are learned legal norms that people are normally not even aware of.

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
Without realizing it, U.S. forces often maneuver about the hard-won territory newly under their control while demonstrating ignorance of and irreverence for the local legal systems they want to emplace. In order to engender the type of respect toward the rule of law we want to develop, it is imperative we ask ourselves what example are we setting, and what lessons are we teaching to those who are standing up and partnering with us?

Further complicating matters is that staff legal expertise necessary to guide the development of law enforcement capability is often directed to other efforts. For example, how often are staff judge advocate officers assigned as a primary mission to become experts in host-nation legal code? Instead, they are often kept occupied with processing damage claims, trying Uniform Code of Military Justice cases, or acting as liaison officers in the civil-military operations center. In Iraq, "major problems ensued because so many international specialists did not understand the Iraqi criminal justice system and the policies, procedures, and nuances required to make things happen in an appropriate fashion."[11] With no shared definition of rule of law and ignorance of the local criminal justice system, it should be no surprise that there are challenges to establishing a professional police force.

At the brigade-combat-team level, the only organic military police are the provost marshal (a captain) and two noncommissioned officers.[12] But, in postconflict, if not sooner, military leaders will find themselves with the task to establish security and rule of law, which then requires them to understand the fundamentals of local policing as it may be some time before professional policing advisors arrive.

> In Iraq's second largest city, only three ... police officers were deployed ... from June to December 2003. Thousands of military troops were tasked with police training and police tasks and were given inappropriate responsibilities and roles.[13]

As uneducated as we may remain in host-nation criminal systems, our knowledge of policing and of police primacy is just as low. Again in Iraq, "there was no police primacy or primacy of rule of law strategy in Iraq; there was instead a military-led and military-dominated attempt at enforcing law and order."[14]



(Graphic by author)

Figure 3. Core Values and Beliefs Widely Divergent

The difference between enforcing law and order (absence of chaos) and policing is a topic beyond the normal professional education and experience of the great majority of military leaders. Military leaders will need to overcome this deficit in order to be successful in establishing effective police forces in future postconflict stability operations.

Far too often it is thought that local police are some kind of light infantry with a badge. Indeed, I have heard well-intended leaders explain the lengths to which they had to go to camouflage an invited police unit at a live-fire training event. It took time to explain why it was

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inappropriate to camouflage a police unit, as well as to explain the concept of the police identifying themselves as representatives of civil authority versus the concept of a military force conducting operations under the law of land warfare in armed conflict.

Additionally, there is a challenge in enforcing law and order, as we are shaped by our military experience and training. To counter an adversary, intelligence is used to predict future action. Law enforcement will use evidence to prove misconduct to hold an individual accountable. As military strategists, gaps in knowledge are inconsequential as long as there is enough to counter an adversary. However, knowledge gaps in a law enforcement investigation represent reasonable doubt in an alleged criminal's guilt. For example, in 2011, our unit captured an individual with rocket launcher rails in the back of his vehicle. He was turned over to the local police and there were high-fives all around. During the military analysis there was enough information to know that we had a bad guy; if he was not launching rockets, he was at least supporting those who were. However, the first questions the investigating judge asked were what rocket did he launch? What damage or injury is he responsible for? With the case incomplete, the individual was released, and only a prediction of this outcome helped stem our normal conclusion from a judicial action like this: "the judge must be corrupt."

Corruption, bribery, kickbacks, inducements, payoffs, and the like; infiltration by those loyal to an insurgency; or loyalty to anything other than the civil authority from which the police's authority comes is even worse. It all exists and challenges the establishment of a professional police force. It is extremely difficult, however, to gaze through the lens of cultural baggage and law enforcement ignorance, and see it accurately.

In 2006, while serving as an advisor to a National Police unit in Baghdad, Iraq, a teammate and I observed two sheikhs arrive for a meeting with a senior national police leader. Knowing these two sheikhs were from a tribe hostile to coalition interests, we followed, curious as to why they would be there. In the meeting that followed, a detainee (clearly from a family of importance within the tribe) confessed to his sheikh that yes, he had committed a number of crimes. With that confession, the national police leader restored the familial honor that was lost by the detention; the hostile sheikh was no longer honor-bound to seek retribution against the police. To the advisors, it was an amazing example of cultural maneuver. However, three days later, the loyalty of the police official was in question as a report of his secret meeting with hostile sheikhs was distributed—never mind that we were in the room for this allegedly secret meeting. For the most part, the author of that report had accurate information, he was simply culturally ignorant and misinterpreted events in his analysis. He could not imagine a loyal member of the blue team meeting with the red team other than to negotiate terms of red team's surrender. From the cultural stand point of the individual who prepared the report, there are no meetings with adversaries until after they are defeated.

Conclusion

First, recognizing how valuable training time is; simple awareness on the part of maneuver leaders can go a long way. Leaders with a sense of empathy, maturity, respect, humility, a sense of humor, and a desire to learn can overcome a great deal as they become versed in local customs, particularly if they are aware of their own cultural knowledge shortcomings. Staff specialists such as the judge advocates, provost marshals, civil affairs officers, and chaplains can educate themselves in the appropriate cultural institutions and then apply cultural expertise to decision making. Additionally, long before the announcement of a deployment in support of a postconflict stability operation, individuals and units can invest available time to learn more about their own culture, the significance of martial versus civil law, and some of the principles of policing. These same topics should be added to the professional military education curriculum.

Next, avoid what can be called the "Dorothy Trap" by continually assessing who potential friends and adversaries are, why they are, and who is none of the above. Remember Dorothy? She lands her utility house in LZ Munchkin in the land of Oz, accidentally killing a local faction leader and unknowingly taking a priceless heirloom, and wonders why the Wicked Witch of the West (who she learns from her "friends" is evil) seems so angry with her. She is sent by the Wizard of Oz to recover the broom of the witch; a suicide mission, and the propaganda section probably has the story of the martyrdom of the

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Staff Sgt. Damian Remijio instructs an Iraqi National Police (NP) officer assigned to the 3rd NP Brigade, 1st NP Division, to keep his sights on a door during a training event 24 June 2009 at Forward Operating Base Hammer, located outside of eastern Baghdad, Iraq. (Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Alex Licea, U.S. Army)

brave foreign fighter from Kansas all ready to go. Even after the wizard is revealed to be a charlatan, he is still on the "friend" list. It is only after the bungled personnel recovery mission that the "good" witch drops the little bombshell that Dorothy had the means to go home all along. She blunders through Oz making enemies, is used by her friends, and never seems to be aware of any of it.[15] How often have some of the same mistakes been made by U.S. forces during postconflict stability operations?

We ultimately must gain cultural understanding—first of ourselves and then of future cultures-in-conflict as crisis events unfold. This understanding must not be only of surface differences; it must include a deeper mastery of skills such as those instructed by the TCC on collective sources of identity, communication norms, engaging and influencing the local populace, and negotiating within the context of their culture. The fundamental values and mindsets in those cultures must also be learned, but the urge to hire foreign expatriates to teach their own culture must be resisted. Leaders need to learn to accept the range of purple-hued neutrals, and to focus on shared values and acceptable behaviors in order to align the interests of many purple, disparate groups with our own.

Leaders will have to understand martial versus civil law, and the law enforcement, judiciary, and corrections institutions necessary to turn control and authority for internal security over to a host-nation's own law enforcement. Next, the host-nation's military will need to be trained to protect the territorial integrity of the nation rather than maintaining internal order in a perpetual state of martial law.

Finally, well before knowing where the next deployment is, time can be dedicated to studying one's own culture; in that way, half of the cultures with which one has to contend is already well understood upon arrival. ■

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(Photo courtesy of https://ukraine-memorial.org/ua/biography/kizilo-andriy-oleksandrovich/)

Maj. Andrei Alexandrovich Kyzylo

May 2, 1993–January 29, 2017

Extract from a Letter to the Editor

(Editor's note: We publish this extract and photo as a reminder that our allies also make heavy sacrifices during armed conflict to preserve their freedom.)

Author Victor Morris ("Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in Ukrainian Antiterrorism Operations," *Military Review* 97, no. 1, January-February 2017, http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2017/ART-010/) recently contacted our staff to inform us that the subject of a photo that accompanied his article, then Ukrainian Army Capt. Andrei Kyzylo, was killed in action while fighting separatists in the Donetsk region of Ukraine. Morris wrote:

> I'm writing because I respect and trust *Military Review*. Andrei, pictured in our January Complex IPB article, was killed in action on 29 January 2017. … He was killed in Avdiivka, eastern Ukraine (23 years old). I sent him the article draft right before Christmas because he was the best student and we highlighted him. I wanted him to be proud. Lastly, as a joint and multinational force, we are that much stronger, but our personal losses are greater. Andrei will be missed.
>
> Sorry for the somber news.



Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in Ukrainian Antiterrorism Operations

Victor B. Morris

Notes

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2. Kate Phillips, Shane Lauth, and Erin Schenck, *U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation*, ed. W. Andrew Terrill (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2006), 15, accessed 27 December 2016, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub653.pdf.

3. Dr. Marilyn Willis-Grider, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC) deputy director, and Alberto J. Lopez, TCC operations, discussion with the author, 12 July 2016. TCC's training team availability and culture training menus are available via phone and e-mail distribution.

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9. Field Manual 3-39, *Military Police Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 26 August 2013), para. 3-23, p. 3-7.

10. Jeffrey Lehman and Shirelle Phelps, eds., West's Encyclopedia of American Law, 2nd ed. (2008), quoted in *The Free Dictionary*, s.v. "Rule of Law," accessed 27 December 2016, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/rule+of+law.

11. Stephen White, *Police Primacy* (Washington, DC: International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, June 2014), 40.

12. MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90, *Force Structure Reference Data* (Fort Benning, GA: MCoE, September 2012), 15.


13. White, *Police Primacy*, 40.

14. Ibid., 41.

15. The events described are an alternate interpretation and military application of the events portrayed in the movie *The Wizard of Oz*, directed by Victor Fleming (Beverly Hills, CA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1939). An alternate interpretation is inspired by the Broadway play *Wicked*.

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REVIEW ESSAY



Queen of Spies

Daphne Park, Britain's Cold War Spy Master

Paddy Hayes, Overlook Press, New York, 2016, 336 pages

John G. Breen, PhD

In early February 2016, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released *Diversity and Inclusion Strategy for 2016-2019* to the public, which offered "a unified roadmap for diversity and inclusion goals, actions, and accountability measures at the CIA over the next three years."[1] This strategic framework was informed, in part, by the 2013 "Director's Advisory Group on Women in Leadership" report, the culmination of an effort led by former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, which addressed the question, why are more women at the CIA not being promoted to the highest leadership positions?[2] The study came to the somewhat unsatisfying conclusion that there was "no single reason" why women in the organization were, presumably, not getting promoted into the ranks of the Senior Intelligence Service. The ten recommendations of the Director's Advisory Group were simply a menu of "best management practices."[3] According to a 2015 statement by then CIA Director John Brennan, the subsequent 2014 Diversity in Leadership Study identified "cultural, management, and organizational issues that contribute to a lack of diversity in the Agency's leadership."[4]

As of 2013, women represented approximately 46 percent of the CIA's workforce—a slight improvement from 38 percent in 1980.[5] Promisingly, the number of women holding the ranks of GS-13, 14, or 15 increased from 9 to 44 percent in that period.[6] These are agency-wide statistics, but what remains unacknowledged is the percentage of women who have made their way to the heights of the Directorate of Operations—leading the case officers who clandestinely recruit and handle the CIA's spies, and who conduct presidentially directed covert action. This is the most important work of the CIA, representing some of the agency's greatest successes and most publicly embarrassing failures. Women have indeed held some senior leadership positions at the CIA—notably, the first-ever female Deputy Director of the CIA, Avril Haines, who then moved on to become the deputy national security advisor to the president in 2014.[7] That said, there has never been a female director of the CIA, nor to anyone's knowledge has there ever been a female Deputy Director for Operations—the officer in charge of the Directorate of Operations.

Paddy Hayes, in *Queen of Spies*, explores the role of women in espionage, detailing the life and career of Daphne Park, who rose to the most senior ranks of the British Secret Intelligence Service (BSIS) as an area controller for

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operations in the Western Hemisphere—United States, Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Hayes takes the reader back to Park's childhood in Africa and to her initial foray into espionage and covert action during World War II with the Special Operations Executive—the organizational equivalent to the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of the CIA. Her subsequent career in BSIS included notable espionage assignments to Moscow, the Congo, and Vietnam. Park served in the Soviet Union at the height of the mid-1950s Cold War, handling clandestine Russian agents in the most challenging of counterintelligence environments. In the Congo, Park was involved in the now infamous removal from power and death of the country's leader, Patrice Lumumba.[8] And, in Vietnam, she was the BSIS representative to North Vietnam, stationed at the British Consulate in Hanoi from 1969 to 1970. Daphne Park retired from BSIS in 1979. She became the principal of Somerville College, Oxford, from 1980 to 1989, and she was named by then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as a board member of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Park's career makes for interesting reading, and the author does an admirable job weaving her exploits into the larger fabric of Cold War intrigue.

Her story is, of course, incomplete without addressing the immense challenges Park faced as she attempted to move up the ladder of an organization dominated by an old-boys' network. Very early in her Special Operations Executive career, when she was training three-man covert-action teams for Operation Jedburgh, Park dared to question the abusive leadership style of her male super only to be dismissed from her position and questioned whether she had been sleeping with her trainees.[9] As h career blossomed in the Congo, so too did unfounded rumors that she was romantically attached to one of h contacts. As Hayes notes, "this was the risk that single women, and not just those in the SIS, ran: any perceiv closeness to a male was considered grounds for tittle-t tle and speculation."[10] BSIS regulations became hurdle to overcome for females hoping to rise to the most sen levels; female BSIS intelligence branch officers were n allowed to marry until well after the end of the Cold War.[11] Hayes relates that Park, as it turned out, had a de-cades-long love affair that she was forced to keep a secret from BSIS—"that option wasn't open to her if she wished to see out her service in SIS."[12]

What makes *Queen of Spies* particularly good is not so much these exemplars of the inane challenges she faced, but the glimpses the author provides into the ultimately triumphant character of Daphne Park. This reader, though, could not help but ask the question, with all the cultural, management, and organizational hurdles put in front of her, what could Park have accomplished in a fully supportive organization? Hopefully, we are now asking similar questions about the role of women in the CIA and in other organizations within the national security enterprise. If the right candidate can be identified, one way to address these questions would be to ensure that the next director of the CIA or director for operations is the best person for the job—and a woman. ■

Notes

1. "CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Releases Diversity and Inclusion Strategy for 2016-2019," CIA website, 9 February 2016, accessed 25 May 2017, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2016-press-releases-statements/cia-releases-diversity-and-inclusion-strategy-for-2016-2019.html.

2. CIA, "Director's Advisory Group on Women in Leadership," unclassified report (Washington, DC: CIA, March 2013), accessed 25 May 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/CIA_Women_In_Leadership_March2013.pdf.

3. Ibid., 14; a summary of the group's ten recommendations appears on p. 2.

4. "Statement from Director John Brennan on Improving Leadership Diversity at CIA," CIA website, 30 June 2015, accessed 25 May 2017, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2015-press-releases-statements/director-brennan-statement-on-improving-leadership-diversity-at-cia.html.

5. "Former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Speaks at CIA in Honor of Women's History Month," CIA website, 19 March 2013, accessed 25 May 2017, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2013-press-releases-statements/albright-speaks-at-cia.html. The General Schedule (GS) is the pay scale for most federal employees; 13 through 15 are the highest GS levels. The next levels up are in Senior Executive Service positions.

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7. "Statement by CIA Director John Brennan on the Selection of Avril Haines as Deputy National Security Advisor," CIA website, 18 December 2014, accessed 25 May 2017, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2014-press-releases-statements/statement-by-cia-director-john-brennan-on-the-selection-of-avril-haines-as-deputy-national-security-advisor.html.

8. Paddy Hayes, *Queen of Spies: Daphne Park, Britain's Cold War Spy Master* (New York: Overlook Press, 2016), 173.

9. Ibid., 32.

10. Ibid., 201.

11. Ibid., 212.

12. Ibid., 244.

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Farewell Lieutenant Colonel Erica Cameron





Our staff will sorely miss the director of the Army University Press and the editor in chief of *Military Review*, Lt. Col. Erica L. Cameron. Although her tenure with us was only one year, she oversaw a remarkable number of changes to this organization.

Under her charge, the Army University Press transitioned into a twenty-first-century publishing enterprise, with a new, easily accessible website, enhanced multimedia production capabilities, and an expanded social media presence. She oversaw the planning for the *NCO Journal's* move to Fort Leavenworth and the publication of the first issue of the *Journal of Military Learning*.

Thank you Lt. Col. Cameron, for your energetic, positive leadership and foresightful vision. We wish you the best of luck in your next assignment and in your Army career! ■



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
Cover photo: Distinguished artist Spiros Karkavelas envisions future urban conflict in which the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Naval Services, and the U.S. Army must combine mutually supporting efforts to conduct operations in a complex environment where sophisticated robotics, electronic warfare, cyberwarfare, and space-based weaponry are employed. (Photo by Art of Spiros, Spiros Karkavelas Entertainment Design)

Next page: A U.S. Army AH-64D Apache attack helicopter assigned to the 1-151st Attack Reconnaissance Battalion flies in front of a wall of fire during the South Carolina National Guard Air and Ground Expo 6 May 2017 at McEntire Joint National Guard Base, South Carolina. This expo is a combined arms demonstration showcasing the abilities of South Carolina National Guard airmen and soldiers while saying thank you for the support of fellow South Carolinians and the surrounding community. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Jorge Intriago, U.S. Air National Guard)



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Greetings!

There has been much discussion recently on the concept of multi-domain battle, currently under development by the U.S. Army. This issue of *Military Review* offers several articles by senior Army leaders that discuss the emerging concept from different perspectives. We begin with the second in a series of articles on multi-domain battle by Gen. David Perkins, commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, that explains why changes to doctrine are necessary and discusses how the soon-to-be-published Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, will set the stage for multi-domain battle doctrine.

Next, we offer an article by the commander of U.S. Army Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown, who provides his views on the impact of the multi-domain battle concept as it pertains to unified commands in general and the Pacific area of operation specifically. Lastly, the commander of I Corps, Lt. Gen. Gary Volesky, and the deputy commanding general of U.S. Army Pacific, Australian Army Maj. Gen. Roger Noble, present their views on multi-domain battle as it applies to theater-level warfighting, based on their practical experiences while supporting the Iraqi military in its campaign against the Islamic State.

Many of the other articles selected for this edition are intended to expand and deepen discussion relative to the concepts provided about multi-domain battle in the three key articles discussed above. With this in mind, we invite our readers to closely peruse our other articles, and we encourage them to compare and discuss the views of these high-level leaders on multi-domain battle and comment on our Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/ArmyUniversityPress/) or on Twitter (@ArmyUPress).

On a different note, the *NCO Journal* has finally completed its long-awaited move from Fort Bliss to its new home on Fort Leavenworth. I'd like to welcome the staff of the journal to the Army University Press family. We look forward to working with you to provide relevant professional content to our Army's noncommissioned officers in all our publication formats.


Finally, I encourage all our readers to look for the "Special Topics" tab on the Army University Press website. The page provides a compilation of material both from Army University Press publications and from other outside sources related to trending topics and specific geographic "hot spots" pertinent to our military. One key purpose of the Special Topics webpage is to highlight topics about which the Army University Press is especially interested in receiving articles and proposals for larger studies. All Army University Press content is conveniently available online at http://www.armyupress.army.mil/. Please continue to read, contribute to, and enjoy *Military Review* and all the other fine Army University Press publications! ■



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


An Army Air Assault School candidate rappels during an assessment 17 May 2017 at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. Twenty-six airmen attended the assessment, which measured candidate aptitude in air assault operations, completion of equipment layouts, and rappelling. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Zachary Wolf, U.S. Air Force)

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Global Challenges

- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- What are the ramifications of increased Russian military presence in the Middle East?
- What are the military implications of China's economic penetration into Latin America, Africa, and broader Asia?
- What must the U.S. military do to prepare for possible contingency operations in the South China Sea?
- What are the security implications of the growing Islamic presence in Europe? Elsewhere in the world?
- What must the Army do to prepare to fight in urban terrain or megacities? What are the ethical challenges to operating in this type of environment?
- What operational and logistical challenges arise from domestic and foreign infrastructure limitations and how can we mitigate them?
- How can we better prepare soldiers to operate against atypical combatants (i.e., nonuniformed or child warriors) and under conditions where noncombatants are difficult to distinguish?



The Changing U.S. Army

- Are U.S. Army rotational units as effective as permanently assigned, forward-deployed units?
- Does the Army need designated security force assistance brigades? How should they be organized?
- Is there a role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?

  How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?
- How does Army doctrine need to change to incorporate the cyberspace domain?
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Preparing for the Fight Tonight

Multi-Domain Battle and Field Manual 3-0

Gen. David G. Perkins, U.S. Army

This is the second of three articles discussing multi-domain battle through the lens of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. This article discusses the rationale and the approach for incorporating aspects of multi-domain battle into Field Manual 3-0, Army Operations, *due to be published October 2017. In recognition of the centennial of American Expeditionary Forces entering World War I, the articles incorporate relevant historical observations and lessons to help drive home the new and differentiate it from the old.*

On 10 September 2001, the Army knew it would fight and win by conducting *full spectrum operations,* and in 2003, the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated U.S.

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dominance on the battlefield.[1] In the following years, however, the force would struggle to adapt as the operational environments changed. The introspection that eventually followed led to new doctrine.

As the pace of change increases, the tension escalates between the need to prepare for future operations and the difficulty of anticipating operational environments. Resisting change, however, is not an option; the Army must adapt at least as fast as the Nation's adversaries change their ways of conducting operations. Even though we can anticipate some changes and forecast certain trends, many characteristics of future environments are unknowable. To mitigate this uncertainty, Army forces must be able to constantly adapt and innovate so we can fight and win in the environments we could face—within the next five years, or "tonight"; within the next five to ten years, or "tomorrow"; and in the future beyond 2030.

The Army needs to forecast mid- and long-term trends and prepare for them to the best of its ability, but also it needs to develop operational principles that can help guide adaptability and innovation during operations and training today. *Multi-domain battle* bridges all these requirements.

The Example of German Doctrinal Change in World War I

From the World War I German experience, it is clear that military success depends on an organization willing to learn, a central concept that can integrate innovation and adaptation, and the ability to proliferate and spur implementation across the force. German tactical success prolonged the war at great cost to the Allies even though German forces eventually lost.

In the summer of 1914, the opposing armies of both the Central and the Allied powers anticipated a short decisive campaign, based on their doctrine and tactics.[2] However, by December of that year, the doctrinal foundations of all combatants were found wanting. Armies adapted in the fight, establishing elaborate field fortifications spanning the entirety of the western front, because none of them could afford to sustain the casualty rates incurred in the first few months of the war. The race was on for new tactics and doctrine to break the stalemate—in a conflict that would claim over 8.5 million lives before an armistice ended the war.[3]

(Graphic on previous page courtesy of the U.S. Army)

Creating new doctrine in the midst of large-scale combat is a costly endeavor because doctrinal tactics are devised using trial and error and are paid for in blood. Among the armies of World War I, the Germans are considered the most successful in changing and implementing tactical doctrine during the war.[4] They applied a dynamic process that used a central concept, complemented with innovation originating at the tactical level and empowered by an organization willing to learn.[5]

Initially, however, German forces mired themselves in rigid doctrine. "Halten, was zu halten ist," meaning "hold on to whatever can be held," reflected German military theory behind an inelastic first-line defense lacking any real depth.[6] As the war progressed, the Allies evolved by effectively using massed artillery to support infantry assaults, with lethal results.[7] Leading up to the summer of 1916, despite failing doctrine and an evolving battlefield, the German military resisted doctrinal changes, and its relative combat power suffered.[8]

It was not that German units were not trying. The failure was one of leadership. Those who survived the front lines were innovative and adaptive. As one German general quipped, "bullets quickly write new tactics," but those new tactics were stifled at the local levels, failing to reach an organization in desperate need of best practices.[9] Even senior staff in the German High Command had identified scalable examples of tactics that proved successful across the western front, but Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn, chief of staff of German forces, saw no need for such changes. It was not until Falkenhayn was removed, and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and Lt. Gen. Erich Ludendorff arrived, that the German High Command would implement much needed change.

The leadership Ludendorff brought to the German High Command enabled the percolation of new ideas that would take hold throughout the force. By December 1916, the

Gen. David G. Perkins, U.S. Army, is the commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy, an MS in mechanical engineering from the University of Michigan, and an MA in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College. He previously served as commander of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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operations section of the German High Command had consolidated field reports and intelligence from across the western front to develop new doctrine. *The Principles of Command in the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare* established a benchmark of when the German military took on the core concept of "operational depth" and applied it as a learning organization.[10]

Throughout 1917, the Germans repeatedly frustrated French and British forces, who fought with dogmatic and formulaic tactical doctrine to disastrous effect. Germany's response was the continued reexamination and evolution of its doctrine.[11] The learning paid off, as the first units to employ elements of *Principles* and other emerging German doctrine regained their relative fighting power advantages that had been in decline since 1915.[12] The Allies eventually recognized the value of Germany's new doctrine, and they tried, without success, to incorporate aspects of it during the winter of 1917 to 1918.



Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg (*left*) was appointed chief of the General Staff with Gen. Erich Ludendorff (*right*) as his deputy 29 August 1916, following the failure of the German attack against Verdun and the subsequent resignation of Chief of the German General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn. Ludendorff was responsible for developing and enacting the Hindenburg Program, an effort to organize what remained of Germany's depleted material and personnel resources in a new total national war effort. As part of this process, Ludendorff took the lead in revamping the army's tactical doctrine that had become largely ineffective. Collecting observations during frequent personal battlefield circulation tours at the front, he developed and promoted a system of flexible defense that initially battered the French and the British armies in 1917. (Photo courtesy of Library of Congress)

The Need to Change Army Doctrine in 2017

Current U.S. Army doctrine effectively guides the relatively familiar low-intensity hybrid fights the Army likely would fight tonight, but that doctrine does not adequately address major combat operations. For example, at the time this article was written, doctrine did not sufficiently account for how to synchronize capabilities in sea, cyber, or space domains during large-scale combat operations against peer opponents. The revision to Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Army Operations*, due to be published October 2017, will begin to correct this deficiency.

Some ideas percolate throughout the operating force and lead to change regardless of their source. An idea comes to the forefront usually because of conditions requiring urgent change. In war, as casualties mount and tactics fail, the urgency is clear and compelling. Generally, however, change slows down as a multitude of possibilities and probabilities circulates

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in a force not engaged in major combat operations. In this murky environment, where leaders lack consensus about problems as well as solutions, change may seem less urgent and more difficult to achieve. Yet, it is in this period of possibilities and probabilities that the opportunity and utility for change exist.

Doctrine, as described in FMs and other doctrinal publications, guides Army forces committed to training, deploying, and operating around the world today—forces who could find themselves conducting the fight tonight. *Concepts*, as described in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) pamphlets, change the Army; the concepts TRADOC is using in 2017 represent how the Army might conduct operations in 2020 to 2040 (at the time this article was written, revisions were in development).

TRADOC concepts guide purposeful, useful, and meaningful change on a large scale to one of the biggest organizations in the world. The core groups who use TRADOC concepts for planning, however, represent less than one percent of the Total Army—people working on the Department of the Army staff, in acquisitions, or as part of the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). Readers should keep in mind that TRADOC normally publishes concepts more than five years before their ideas are expected to evolve into the doctrine that guides operating forces. *The U.S. Army Capstone Concept*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, for example, was published in 2012. It introduced a precursor to multi-domain battle that was called "cross-domain synergy," in which forces would seek "complementarity ... in different domains [to include space and cyberspace] such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others."[13] In the case of multi-domain battle, therefore certain aspects have been studied for the past five years. These validated elements are being integrated into FM 3-0 at the same time TRADOC is further developing multi-domain battle as a concept.

How the Current Force and Doctrine Developed

On 11 September 2001, the United States was thrust into a period defined by war and persistent conflicts. From Afghanistan and into Iraq, the U.S. military employed decisive force that led to quick initial victories and resulted in overwhelming dominance in all domains. However, as the dust of Baghdad settled in late 2003, the doctrine that had prepared the Army for the next fight rapidly became inadequate for the conflicts the Army faced on the ground.

> "As the dust of Baghdad settled in late 2003, the doctrine that had prepared the Army for the next fight rapidly became inadequate for the conflicts the Army faced on the ground."

The Army spent the next few years designing, implementing, and fine-tuning principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures for use against an enemy enmeshed into the population with weapons we were not prepared to face. Slowly, just as the German army in World War I, the U.S. military came to realize doctrine needed to reflect current operational environments, as well as the pace of change.

For the next decade, joint forces focused almost exclusively on defeating improvised explosive devices and building capabilities needed for countering insurgencies. In 2006, the Army published FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, to provide the doctrine operating forces needed (Army doctrinal literature consisted only of FMs until 2009; FMs now emphasize doctrinal tactics).[14] The doctrine in FM 3-24 gave a central framework, and a point of departure, for a situation that had been rapidly changing. New leadership and surge forces applied the new doctrine, and ultimately the government of Iraq and Multi-National Forces–Iraq gained a position of relative advantage. These actions saved American lives, as fatalities dropped from 904 in 2007 to 149 in 2009.[15]

It is critical to understand that during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army accepted risk to

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A Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle lies on its side after a blast from a buried improvised explosive device (IED) 6 January 2007 in Iraq. The Stryker was recovered and protected its soldiers on more missions until another bomb finally put it out of action. Joint doctrine focused on defeating IEDs and conducting counterinsurgency for most of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan until the introduction of Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations*, in 2011 that enlarged the scope of necessary capabilities for future conflicts. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)

maneuver and wide area security.[18] ADP 3-0 made old terms of operational art and science new and relevant again. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations,* did the same, in greater detail. However, the Army has not had an FM 3-0 *Operations* manual focused on large-scale combat operations at the theater army, corps, or division level since 2011.

Despite a few updates since 2011 and a significant revision in 2016, both ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 still offer only limited principles for large-scale combat operations. The need for a new FM 3-0 to address this doctrinal shortcoming in the interim was clear. The new FM 3-0 will drive necessary changes to both ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0, as well as the rest of Army doctrine. Multi-domain battle will be integrated into FM 3-0 in a way that Army operating forces can apply the doctrine *without making significant changes to the current force.*

The Force and Doctrine the Nation Needs

Multi-domain battle captures the idea that military success depends upon capabilities in the air, cyberspace, land, maritime, and space domains and in the electromagnetic spectrum. This is true for the Army and the other services, as well as our adversaries. From the perspective of U.S. forces, it is an idea that will help units avoid a position of relative disadvantage against a peer or near-peer adversary in critical geographic spaces around the world. Multi-domain battle guides closer coordination and integration of capabilities than ever before.

For example, the Army cannot depend on the Air Force to solve tactical problems in a dense, integrated air defense system environment when an enemy has superior long-range fires and capable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Units that go to ground when making contact to await guidance or the delivery of airpower capabilities would likely be destroyed by massed artillery in a close fight.

While joint forces currently employ elements of multi-domain battle, the most egregious doctrinal void has been the lack of principles for multi-domain capabilities in large-scale combat operations. The Army and the other services must be able to converge capabilities across multiple domains in an integrated fashion to gain and then exploit the initiative. In sum, our doctrine needs to guide ready forces with converged and integrated capabilities spanning across domains, as compared to synchronizing a federated set of stove-piped capabilities.

The revision of FM 3-0 will not fill all the doctrinal gaps. Rather, it will provide guidelines to commanders,

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staffs, and leaders as they employ multi-domain capabilities into training, planning, and operations. It will be up to the leaders of today to innovate, iterate, and adapt this doctrine before a major armed conflict, should it occur.

Field Manual 3-0, *Army Operations*, will provide doctrine to help Army leaders anticipate requirements and synchronize capabilities in land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains during large-scale combat operations against peer opponents in the present and near future. (Graphic composite by Jim Crandell, Army University Press. Background picture of Call of Duty: Black Ops 3-OFFICIAL TRAILER & BREAKDOWN!, Flickr.com. Foreground photo by Cherie A. Thurlby, Department of Defense)

Unified Land Operations and Multi-Domain Battle

The emerging concept of multi-domain battle, therefore, is being designed to help shape the Army for anticipated challenges. As a TRADOC concept, multi-domain battle will be about aligning requirements to develop *future* capabilities required to win in the future fight. However, what of the challenges the Army may face tonight? In Europe, the Pacific, and the Middle East, our adversaries have adapted their capabilities to challenge advantages to which we have become accustomed. We must begin the process of change now by recognizing ways to improve and innovate with the technology and capabilities we currently have, and more important, we must begin to shift culturally to a new mind-set for operational problems.

Two sections of FM 3-0 will focus specifically on key elements of multi-domain battle. The first element will be the extended multi-domain battlefield, to be described in a section on anticipated operational environments. It will integrate space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment into how commanders view the overall operational environment. It will say that all battle is multi-domain. The doctrine will guide commanders and staffs in how to converge and integrate multi-domain capabilities during operations.[19]

The second element will consist of an updated operational framework for conducting unified land operations, related to understanding an operational environment. Enemies are likely to initiate hostilities from an initial position of relative physical, temporal, and cognitive advantage, as well as other factors peculiar to the land domain

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across the continuum of conflict.[20] The physical aspect is straightforward: geography, terrain, infrastructure, weapons ranges, and so on. The temporal aspect introduces the added complexity of wide-ranging time-based variables that affect an operation, requiring commanders to think far beyond just synchronization. Virtual aspects will include activities related to information, cyberspace, and electronic warfare. Finally, the cognitive aspect will relate to understanding the enemy and ourselves and also the perceptions and behaviors of populations. Cognitive considerations will be informed by the physical, temporal, and virtual aspects of the operational framework.

To address probable enemy positions of relative advantage, FM 3-0 will discuss the necessity of synchronization, capabilities convergence, and high operational tempo while accepting risks more substantial than those of counterinsurgency or stability tasks.[21] Sound methods of mission command, mobility, reconnaissance-in-depth, protection, and sustainment will be critical to the successful prosecution of large-scale operations. In addition, commanders and staff must bring innovation and flexibility to how they employ tempo and synchronize maneuver, cross-domain fires, and information actions. It is through the convergence of these effects across multiple domains that the Army will prevail against a peer enemy.

In the multi-domain battle concept, joint forces will employ speed of recognition, speed of decision, and speed of action to exploit windows of domain superiority with force-oriented operations to destroy key enemy capabilities. The requirements and considerations of multi-domain battle will provide the framework by which commanders and staffs employ these actions to defeat the enemy. A multi-domain concept emphasizing the opportunity to achieve well-synchronized, high-tempo offensive action, potentially in the form of deep maneuver, will help Army forces defeat enemies with superior long-range fires and air defense capabilities.[22]

Conclusion

We are in the fortunate position of having the humility to accept that we need to improve the way we conduct operations, even though we cannot predict the next fight with absolute certainty. We are revising our operational doctrine, beginning with FM 3-0 in October 2017, so forces can prepare to face the trends that are evident and the unpredictable changes that will arise. From here, it is up to commanders and staffs, professional soldiers, and leaders to apply and further refine doctrine so that we are all ready to fight and win. Victory starts here. ■

Notes

1. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2001 [now obsolete]), 1-4, cited in Bill Benson, "The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century," *Military Review* 92, no. 2 (2012): 5, accessed 19 July 2017, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20120430_art004.pdf. *Note:* Before 2009, all Army doctrine was contained in FMs. A doctrine reorganization effort called "Doctrine 2015," begun in late 2011, created Army doctrine publications (ADPs) and Army doctrine reference publications (ADRPs) for fundamental principles, while FMs became limited primarily to tactics. When published in 2001, FM 3-0 contained "capstone" operational doctrine; the forthcoming 2017 version will not be equivalent. See ADP 1-01, *Doctrine Primer* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2014).

2. Benjamin Maher, "The Origins of Operational Depth in the First World War" (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2016), 18.

3. John Graham Royde-Smith, "World War I, 1914–1918: Killed, Wounded, and Missing," *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, accessed 21 July 2017, https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I/Killed-wounded-and-missing.

4. Timothy Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*, Leavenworth Papers no. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1981), viii.

5. Robert T. Foley, "A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35, no. 6 (December 2012): 11.

6. Maher, "The Origins of Operational Depth in the First World War," 28.

7. Foley, "A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation," 11.

8. Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine*.

9. Wilhelm Balck, *Development of Tactics [in the] World War*, trans. Harry Bell (Fort Leavenworth, KS: General Service Schools Press, 1922), 14.

10. Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine*, 13.

11. Ibid., 35.

12. Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine*.

13. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-0, *The U.S. Army Capstone Concept* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2012), 38.

14. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2006 [now obsolete]), superseded by FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, 13 May 2014.

15. "Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq Coalition Casualties: Fatalities by Year," icasualties.org, accessed 21 July 2017, http://icasualties.org/Iraq/ByYear.aspx.

16. Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, "Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge," (research study, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments, 2003).

17. ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2011 [now obsolete]), cited in Benson, "The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century."

18. ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (2011).

19. Unpublished draft, FM 3-0, *Army Operations*, publication expected October 2017.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

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(Graphic by Staff Sgt. Mark A. Moore II, U.S. Army)

responsibility. First, it briefly discusses the strategic situation in the Indo-Asia Pacific, which typifies the need for a new operating concept to integrate all the United States Armed Forces. Next, it describes the multi-domain battle concept, including the three elements that help define its desired effects: joint integration, technology, and people. Finally, it presents a vignette of multi-domain battle as it might apply at the tactical level.


The Strategic Context in the Indo-Asia Pacific

Given that the international state of play in this region is more tenuous than ever, the multi-domain battle concept is sorely needed. The region contains thirty-six countries in sixteen time zones, more than half the world's population, and twenty-four of the thirty-six megacities on Earth, and it covers more than half the world's surface area.[3] The region contains three of the world's largest economies, seven of the largest militaries, and five of the United States' seven mutual defense agreement partners.[4] According to Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., commander of United States Pacific Command, "approximately $5.3 trillion in annual global trade relies on unimpeded access to sea lanes [such as those in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, and] $1.2 trillion of this sea-based trade destined to, or exported from, the United States."[5] Additionally, "the Strait of Malacca alone sees more than 25 percent of oil shipments and 50 percent of all natural gas transits each day."[6] In addition, the area is disaster-prone, with its typhoons, earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, and other events representing "over 60 percent of the world's natural disasters."[7] In short, global prosperity hinges on the stability and security of this vast and complex region.

These demographic and economic dynamics interact with the increased rate of technological change to add to the political and military complexity found in the Indo-Asia Pacific. Dramatic technological shifts created by unmanned capabilities, robotic learning, artificial intelligence, nanotech, biotech, and big data are only expanding military competition between geopolitical rivals. Much of these new technological tools depend on the use of digital connectivity—with seven billion devices being connected to the Internet in 2016 and a projected fifty billion by 2020—only increasing the already dangerous situation in cyberspace and its dependence on space assets for connectivity.[8]

Technological shifts are also feeding and increasing security challenges in the Indo-Asia Pacific, with some the world's most intractable problems among them.

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(Graphic by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

Figure. Multi-Domain Battlefield

Challenges include an increasingly belligerent North Korea that is sharing its increasingly capable missile technology with Iran, a growing China that is challenging international rules and norms, a revanchist Russia that is increasingly active in the Pacific with a provocative military posture, continuing nuclear-backed friction between India and Pakistan, increasing activities by violent extremist networks operating in partner and ally nations, and political and diplomatic instability from changes in executive leadership of key regional allies and partners. The most dangerous threat in the Indo-Asia Pacific comes from regional actors with nuclear arsenals and the intent to undermine the international order. Sophisticated denial capabilities and less-than-military forces managed by the state but backed by large militaries with interior lines of communication create the danger of *faits accomplis*.

Like the international state of play, the military situation is also increasingly dangerous. Adversaries and enemies have learned from U.S. successes and failures over the last few decades. They recognize that U.S. strengths based on power projection, joint operations, and technological overmatch led to unprecedented tactical success. As such, adversaries have developed capabilities and concepts that attempt to remove those advantages, increasing the complexity of the battlefield for the United States Armed Forces. This has led to an increasingly contested global commons, with a loss of U.S. military dominance in the air and sea due to denial technologies and tactics. Whether opponents take gradual or sudden actions, the United States needs to significantly improve its strategic advantage in the Indo-Asia Pacific, or it will risk losing ground militarily, diplomatically, and economically.

Because of these strategic trends, both positive and negative, U.S. and partner forces need to maintain current military advantages and recapture those that have been lost. Reducing the risk of conflict and ensuring the stability of the current international system depend on our ability to deter key actors from aggressive and detrimental actions. We must interrupt enemy decision cycles and present enemies with multiple dilemmas that create uncertainty and paralyze their efforts. If aggression leads

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to conflict, however, we must be prepared to defeat our enemies unambiguously.

This approach is the driving force behind the multi-domain battle concept, which is designed to overcome denial technologies and jointly affect all domains to create localized areas of overmatch.[9] These effects will then re-enable maneuver for the entire joint force operating in any region, thereby placing an enemy in a position of disadvantage so U.S. forces can gain the initiative.

Elements of the Multi-Domain Battle Concept

The multi-domain battle concept may at first sound like nothing more than traditional joint operations. There is some truth to this. What we are trying to achieve—cross-domain effects—is not entirely new. For example, at Thermopylae and Salamis, the ancient Greeks employed both land and naval forces to defeat the invading Persians.[10] Much closer to our own time, the United States of America owe their independence to the effective employment of American and French ground and naval forces against Lord Cornwallis's army at Yorktown.

Another historical example is the Vicksburg Campaign during the American Civil War. With its ability to control navigation on the Mississippi River, Confederate Vicksburg's artillery, infantry, and cavalry forces constituted a formidable anti-access and area denial challenge to Union forces. Union Gen. Ulysses S. Grant overcame that challenge only by combining the capabilities and effects of his own artillery, cavalry, and infantry forces with the naval ships led by acting Rear Adm. David Dixon Porter.[11]

The introduction of the airplane, the submarine, and the aircraft carrier in World War I, and the incorporation of mobile radio communications and radar systems in World War II, vastly increased a strategic commander's ability to operate across several domains simultaneously. More recently, the development of AirLand Battle in the 1980s and then Air-Sea Battle in 2013 show military thinking evolving along the same general line—how to win decisively, even if outnumbered or technologically overmatched, by integrating operations in multiple domains to present enemies with multiple dilemmas. Different services have regularly supported each other in all domains. Therefore, when Harris says he wants the Army to provide effects outside the land domain, he is not asking it to do something without precedent. From 1794 to 1950, the Army was responsible for coastal and harbor defense, and later for the air defense of the homeland. The Army's Warrant Officer Corps originated from the need in World War I for technical specialists to staff the Army's undersea Mine Planter Service. The idea of or desire for cross-domain effects is not new.[12]

While all the services are being asked to perform their missions in a manner not terribly different from the past, there will be differences. We in the Army can no longer simply focus on the land, leaving the air and sea to other services. Nor can the Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, or Coast Guard simply focus on "their" domains. We must all better integrate our planning, operations, command and control, and effects across all the domains.

To achieve integration requires a new approach, a new mind-set. All U.S. forces must change their distinct service cultures to a culture of inclusion and openness, focusing on a "purple (or joint) first" mentality. The Army must further integrate a mission command mind-set, where every person is empowered to gain the initiative based on his or her role and function. And it must focus on developing leaders who thrive in ambiguity and chaos.

Joint integration. The multi-domain battle concept is expected to integrate three key areas: organizations and processes, technology, and people. Changes in organizations and processes will be designed to provide different and better-focused Army tools to joint forces to overcome the United States' loss of superiority or parity in certain domains, particularly in the air, at sea, and within cyberspace. The Army can no longer focus exclusively on the

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land domain; as part of a joint force, Army forces must provide other services effects in their domains to overcome their operational challenges, and vice versa. This means change must focus on greater ability to have cross-domain effects and more seamless and effective integration across joint forces.

In United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), we are attempting this through three areas. The first is to design and experiment with flexible command and control designs, tailorable and scalable units, and flexible policies in key areas. Second, most of this experimentation will occur as a part of a redesigned exercise program designed to make all events joint and multinational, with the aim point being the Navy's Rim of the Pacific exercise in 2018. Finally, we are supporting increased innovation across the services in cross-component and combatant-command processes.

Technology. Another key area is technological change. We must overcome and leverage the velocity of technological change, rather than losing our overmatch capabilities through slow acquisitions programs. The Department of Defense and the Army have already created the foundation for rapid material solutions with the Strategic Capabilities Office at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Rapid Capabilities Office at Headquarters, Department of the Army. These offices are doing an admirable job of repurposing current technology to innovate in application, a key component of recapturing our tactical edge. USARPAC is tied tightly into these efforts. It is including every piece of equipment in exercises and experimentation. As has been the case in this theater for years, USARPAC takes advantage of the great "battle lab" culture this command has developed over the past decade or more. Technology offers key tools to support decision making, lethality, and protection. We must leverage this technology to empower our men and women and increase their lethality and effectiveness.

People. The final area the multi-domain battle concept addresses is people. The U.S. Armed Forces must use its people to overcome the challenges of being outnumbered, outdistanced, and "outlearned" by adversaries and enemies. People are America's greatest strategic advantage. To leverage this advantage, the Armed Forces must develop agile and adaptive leaders through education and training. Rigorous iterations of decision making, including "impossible" scenarios or "black swans" that soldiers would not expect, can help develop critical thinking skills.[13] Failure must be an option, under the principle that learning exercises develop leaders who will respond better in actual conflicts. Leaders must also receive some measure of cultural education and training that would allow them to experience different ways of thinking. In USARPAC, we are addressing both critical thinking and cultural understanding through a regional leader development program run by and for personnel at the Army service component command level. As the Army's advise-and-assist brigades come online, we will also include unit personnel headed to the Pacific in this education and training pipeline to prepare them for operations in this region.

Multi-Domain Battle in Practice

The following fictional vignette illustrates the multi-domain battle concept applied at the tactical level. This example is based on a hypothetical location in the Indo-Asia Pacific region.

Let us say there was an island chain or a coastal land mass whose location would make it decisive terrain, influencing aerial or maritime navigation or access to a strategic port. Possession of this feature by a certain hostile power would constitute a serious threat to the international order and the stability and security of the Indo-Asia Pacific region.

The hostile power then seized control of the feature and announced it would restrict commercial air and sea traffic, denying access to any nation aligned with the United States. Treaty obligations would require the United States to intervene militarily, though the enemy's arsenal of weaponry and electronics was formidable.

A military option that applied the multi-domain battle concept might include using cyber and space capabilities to temporarily blind and disrupt enemy command and control systems so special operations forces could move in and gain a foothold in the island chain. They then would facilitate Marine amphibious forces to secure the beachhead, an airfield, and other major structures required to create a secure beachhead. Immediately behind them would be Army watercraft loaded with heavy engineering equipment to repair the airstrip, if necessary, and construct hardened defensive positions. Simultaneously, Air Force C-17s and C-130s would bring in an Army Stryker battalion task force with a High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System battery,

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Multinational forces march in formation 15 February 2017 after the official opening ceremony of Cobra Gold 2017 in Utapao, Thailand. Cobra Gold, in its thirty-sixth iteration, is the largest theater security cooperation exercise in the Indo-Asia Pacific. This year's focus is to advance regional security and ensure effective responses to regional crises by bringing together a robust multinational force to address shared goals and security commitments in the Indo-Asia Pacific region. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Marc Castaneda, U.S. Navy)

specially equipped with anti-ship cruise missile pods and a battery of the Indirect Fire Protection Capability weapon system for short-range air defense. In addition, a battery of 155 mm howitzers with hypervelocity rounds would be offloaded as the marines retrograded in the newly empty aircraft to reconstitute for subsequent forced-entry operations, if needed.

Within ninety-six hours, the Stryker battalion task force would be dug in and ready. With Air Force manned and unmanned systems, Navy ships and underwater drones, a suite of Army radar systems (such as AN/TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37, or Sentinel) and the aerial threat detection Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System to see over the horizon, there would be an overlapping multi-domain network of sensors that could operate indefinitely to identify, target, and employ lethal and electronic fires in *all* the domains—land, sea, air, cyber, and space—simultaneously.

The task force might be cut off from resupply or communication for indefinite periods. That is why this task force of about one thousand personnel would be able to support itself for up to thirty days—ten times the current doctrinal requirement of seventy-two hours for a unit of this size. But with advancements in mobile water purification, solar panels, batteries, wind turbines, and wave and tidal energy, as well as additive manufacturing printers to make repair parts, such a unit could be self-sufficient far longer than even much larger ones were in the previous century. They would still need fuel for their vehicles, but with drones and other autonomous platforms enhancing force protection, they could limit the need for fossil fuel-powered vehicles and supplement organic support assets with Air Force's Joint Precision Airdrop System.

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To reiterate, these units might have to operate in extremely austere conditions with limited resources and without a constant ground, sea, or aerial line of communication linking them to other friendly forces. However, these men and women would be ready, with exceptional leaders exercising mission command.

Again, this is just a thought exercise based on how Army forces in the Pacific are thinking about and experimenting with multi-domain battle. Application of the concept may look different in other parts of the world, or even in different areas of the Indo-Asia Pacific. However, it is clear that no matter the geography or the adversary, Army units must be well led, well trained, and well equipped to operate in and across multiple domains in support of a joint force.

One way to ensure this is the case is through holistic operational testing, with Army service component command and subordinate units working hand in hand with the concepts and doctrine developers at United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. Today in the Pacific, this is occurring. We are applying the joint integration, technology, and people aspects of the multi-domain battle concept through rigorous inclusion of concepts and capabilities in all our exercises, which will culminate in a major test at the Navy's Rim of the Pacific exercise in 2018. Moreover, we are considering how to integrate multi-domain approach with our planning, equipping, and leader-development efforts.

The Army should not hesitate to resource and test this effort. Many of the concepts and capabilities found in the multi-domain battle concept will be needed not just for future conflict but also for near-term conflicts that might require us to be ready to "fight tonight." Make no mistake: testing and implementing a multi-domain approach will increase our readiness today, as well as prepare our men and women to win wars if the Nation requires it. ■

Notes

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10. See Barry Strauss, *The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter That Saved Greece—and Western Civilization* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 15.

11. See Terrence J. Winschel, *Triumph and Defeat: The Vicksburg Campaign*, (Mason City, IA: Savas Publishing, 1999), 85–6.

12. Numerous resources address each of these aspects of the U.S. Army's history at the Center of Military History website, accessed 27 February 2017, http://www.history.army.mil.

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A car bomb explodes next to Iraqi special forces armored vehicles 16 November 2016 as they advance against Daesh forces in Mosul, Iraq. Although nearly four hundred thousand civilians had reportedly fled the city, several hundred thousand still remained, caught in the crossfire while Daesh tenaciously defended its last major foothold in Iraq. The battle-seasoned special forces along with other coalition-supported conventional forces made slow progress inside Mosul as they conducted fierce house-to-house fighting against defensive positions that Daesh had months to prepare. (Photo by Felipe Dana, Associated Press)

Theater Land Operations

Relevant Observations and Lessons from the Combined Joint Land Force Experience in Iraq

Lt. Gen. Gary Volesky, U.S. Army

Maj. Gen. Roger Noble, Australian Army


In 2016, the campaign to destroy the Islamic State as a fighting force while also pushing any remaining fighters out of Iraq was in full swing. The combined joint force land component command (CJFLCC) in charge of the joint fight during Operation Inherent Resolve was based on the headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division, but the mission differed notably from previous division-level efforts during

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the coalition-led counterinsurgency fight in Iraq. As a combined joint land component, it was the lead agency for a nineteen-nation coalition that supported combat operations across the entire country, and it was the principal interlocutor and liaison with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) leadership. The ISF consisted of a combination of Iraqi army, air force, special operations forces, and police who together provided the essential and decisive but finite ground-maneuver component. Throughout 2016, they conducted large-scale offensive maneuver-and-hold operations to clear Daesh (a derogatory Arabic language acronym for the Islamic State) from the Euphrates and Tigris River valleys with an emphasis on the principal urban areas including Fallujah and Mosul.

The CJFLCC mission was focused on the military defeat of Daesh and required a diverse and active advise-and-assist network. Mission accomplishment necessitated the establishment of combined, joint, and supporting fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; and logistical networks to enable ISF operations. This was supported by a force generation effort to prepare, train, and equip key units of the ISF for combat against Daesh. The CJFLCC was a principal integrating node at the upper tactical and operational levels inside Iraq, and it held and exercised significant authorities and influence over the coalition support to the ISF-led campaign. The CJFLCC operated across all domains and, to some extent, functioned as a key integrator across all domains. For example, even in this largely landlocked tactical fight, maritime ISR, fires, and strike effects launched from the sea made a significant and sustained contribution to the CFLCC mission.

In this situation, the CJFLCC came head-to-head with the nature of the modern battlefield as it operated against a capable, though not near-peer, enemy whose grasp of action across domains, including cyber and human, was notably high. The year 2016 saw the marked degradation of Daesh inside Iraq as the ISF successfully retook 60 percent of the ground previously lost. This fight has significant lessons for future warfare, including some that may inform the nascent multi-domain battle (MDB) concept (see figure).



(Graphic by authors)

Figure. Proposed Multi-Domain Model

Lessons Learned

Success in 2016 was in part due to MDB-style cross-domain application of capabilities integrated with "old school" ISF-led close combat. To properly share significant lessons learned from this fight, we provide the following key observations.

Observation 1: Global capability sourcing is now the norm. Geography is less of a constraint on sourcing capabilities than at any time in previous history. While physics still applies to constraints, particularly in air, land, and sea, the options to source a diverse range of capabilities globally is now a reality. The range and reach of the physical domain capabilities are at a historical high, and the cyber and human domains are not limited by time or space. Coalition force contributions are also

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now more diverse and add value as multiple options exist across the domains. For example, some nations have different legal frameworks that enable action in cyberspace or in the information environment more quickly or with fewer constraints. This had a direct tactical and operational impact inside Iraq during 2016. Instant and ubiquitous modern communications and information technology have compressed the boundaries between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. And, in some domains such as cyber and human, the boundaries can be meaningless or at least blurred.

Observation 2: The human domain is of preeminent importance, and it is the key to both victory and defeat. Operations in Iraq in 2016 once again confirmed the basic observation that wars are fought by people for human ends and purposes. This has long been a central tenet in both Eastern and Western theories of war; ultimately people (on both sides) decide whether they have won or lost, not platforms or systems.[1]

The nature of the human relationships between the coalition force and the ISF (plus a diverse range of other stakeholders) was pivotal to mission success. While this is always important, the 2016 situation served to drive home the criticality of human relationships. This time, the ISF was unequivocally in the lead, and only the Iraqis had the means and authority to close with and destroy the enemy on the ground in close combat, arguably the priority requirement for campaign success. This time, coalition forces could not do it themselves; they had neither the force nor the authority to do so. Therefore, the coalition advise-and-assist purpose was, at its heart, designed to assist the Iraqis to grow and field the levels of organizational confidence, trust, and respect necessary to win against this enemy on this ground. This was a human/cognitive objective. The innumerable daily connections and interactions that took place around the planning and execution of the campaign against an unconstrained, ruthless enemy were absolutely central to Iraqi success and confidence. We watched and engaged at multiple levels (battalion to Army) and in many places. Over nine months, we witnessed the Iraqis begin to understand and then firmly believe that they could and would win.

The human network and the method of maneuvering and influencing across and through it to build a collective organizational outcome is dynamic and endless, and it is arguably more complex and difficult than any military technical synchronization challenge. Information and capabilities from all domains operated together to achieve this human, cognitive, and emotional outcome. Perhaps the ultimate marker of success was the Mosul counterattack plan and orders, written and issued in October 2016 by Iraqis to Iraqis with coalition commanders sitting respectfully to the side and listening. At this moment, we clearly knew they would take Mosul—no easy challenge—and defeat this enemy. If, as Carl von Clausewitz suggested, war is an act of violence to compel our opponent to do our will, then the Iraqis had reached a tipping point in their ability to compel that had been building and growing since the recapture of Ramadi almost a year before.[2] The coalition contribution exercised a major influence on the rate, nature, and strength of this Iraqi human and organizational evolution.

Observation 3: Multi-domain capabilities are now applied at every level from strategic to tactical. Gone are the days where a localized battalion or company attack relied almost exclusively on capabilities that were provided by the parent brigade or division (e.g., infantry, armor, artillery, engineers). It was common practice in 2016 for action at the lowest tactical level to be directly supported by nationally and coalition sourced multi-domain capabilities (e.g., ISR, information operations [IO], cyber, electronic warfare [EW], military deception, and others). Often this occurred without the direct knowledge or input of the tactical maneuver force itself. In one attack against Daesh forces near the town of Sharquatt in late 2016, a multinational

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Maj. Gen. Roger Noble, Australian Army, is deputy commanding general U.S. Army Pacific. He has had multiple operational tours in coalition headquarters and units. He holds three master's degrees and a first class honours degree in history. In 2017, he was posted as deputy commanding general of Combined Joint Land Force Component–Operation Inherent Resolve (Iraq).

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full-spectrum application of strike, IO, EW, cyber, public affairs (PA), and military deception around a small "economy-of-force" Iraqi ground maneuver force caused the enemy to break and run without fighting. Kinetic fires were comprehensively integrated, and the result approached very close to the MDB ideal. The fires solution was effectively "service agnostic," and was often selected from a range of options sourced from across a coalition joint force.

A large scale, comprehensive, and successful example of MDB was evident in the advance to secure Qayyarah Airfield West, which involved a multidivision advance by the ISF and a contested river crossing of the Tigris using, at the time, all available Iraqi major tactical bridging assets. This advance and attack was enabled and supported by the application of capabilities in all domains drawn from organizations and sources from the strategic to tactical levels. Comprehensive IO, EW, PA, counter-improvised explosive device, and military deception assets integrated with a multitarget strike sequence, drawing on the full set of lethal and nonlethal capabilities to destroy, degrade, and influence enemy target sets in depth. This package of capabilities was integrated and synchronized around the ISF maneuver plan and aimed directly at the full range of threat vulnerabilities.

Observation 4: Expanded capability options are now drawn from beyond traditional military and national boundaries. The traditional military maneuver means and fires are as critical as ever, but they can now be augmented and amplified in ways that are quite literally only limited by the imagination. Many of these capabilities are delivered by nonmilitary agencies and by other countries or actors. The net effect is that options to exploit enemy vulnerabilities—directly or indirectly, lethally or nonlethally—have expanded. Their combined and synchronized application offers a way to exponentially amplify the overall effect on an adversary.

The MDB focus on joint integration is entirely correct but needs to be further expanded beyond military and national boundaries. This requires finding new ways to access and apply the full range of available capabilities. The premier example of this in Iraq 2016 was the evolution of a "new," holistic way of looking at targeting that evolved to encompass and apply all possible means to defeat the enemy. The "old" ideas of kinetic and nonkinetic, and lethal and nonlethal, proved inadequate to capture the full range of options available. Traditional kinetic targeting was merged with the application of "all available means" capable of informing and influencing the enemy and the operating environment. This had to be founded on a comprehensive understanding of the enemy, the operational environment, and the friendly force set. Systemically, it also led to the breaking down of traditional specialty "silos" to build an "all means" approach to targeting enemy vulnerabilities through all domains. This is likely to remain one of the pivotal skills on any future multidimensional battlefield.

Observation 5: Federated planning, trusted information sharing, and decentralized action—is the new norm. Most practitioners in complex, contemporary land operations can relate to the expression "herding cats." One look at the coalition and "other" liaison officer set in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, at any time during 2016 would cement this image. There is a now a need to do even more and find a way to get those same "cats" to run as a pack of wolves.

Given the Daesh enemy, our range of modern capabilities, and the nature of the Iraq mission, a *federated* planning and *decentralized* execution model within a common mission framework proved essential.[3] There was no centralized, detailed control option on the table; the world was just not like that. We learned one may not own or ever even see those who apply a particular capability in support of an operation. They may not be military or even in your national force structure. They may not have identical mission end states but rather carry an overlap in interests or a discrete set of limited common objectives. *You may have limited or no authorities over their employment.* In this environment, it is the commander's priorities combined with the mission objectives, extant authorities, and a federated planning approach applied around a common battlefield framework that enables effective decentralized action by multiple actors. This in turn allows for the widest range of capabilities to be applied in real time without detailed centralized direction or control. (This is not to undersell the ongoing essential requirement for command-directed, relentless synchronization and orchestration by the staff, especially in the traditional military capability lanes.)

Ultimately, all stakeholders will act either as directed or because it is in their mutual interest to do so, and they must all be enabled through federated planning, a common intellectual framework, and constant

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Soldiers with Battery C, 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, Task Force Strike, execute a fire mission with an M777 howitzer 7 August 2016 during an operation to support Iraqi security forces at Kara Soar Base, Iraq. Battery C soldiers supported the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve mission by providing indirect fire support for Iraqi security forces as they continued to combat Daesh and retake lost terrain. (Photo by 1st Lt. Daniel I. Johnson, U.S. Army)

communication and information sharing. Only then are they free and able to run as members of a pack.

Observation 6: Nontraditional command-and-control solutions are the new way to do business, and self-synchronization is increasingly important. Falling directly from Observation 4 is a need to rethink command and control (a military idea) for the multi-domain battlespace. The standard Army solution is to "own" a capability through traditional command and control (C2) arrangements such as operational or tactical control, or to have direct authorities over its employment. Plans are nested and initiated by formal orders based on a hierarchy of authority. Throughout 2016, this traditional approach remained critical, especially in relation to the execution of the decisive ground maneuver fight. The highest risks were incurred in the close combat maneuver fight, and the CJFLCC focus was supporting the ISF's effective application of their finite ground combat force inside an enabling "bubble" of multi-domain shaping support. A principal function of the CJFLCC remained the careful synchronization of effects in support of the main effort ISF close combat force.

The Iraq 2016 experience also revealed that traditional C2 is not the only way to do business in the modern multi-domain battlespace. *Unity of effort* remained the essential requirement and needed to be achieved even when traditional unity of command was incomplete, imperfect, or not possible. *Command relationships* (the human dimension) proved critical and were founded on close personal interaction and open communication between the critical actors regardless of the stated formal C2 status or line diagram. One look at most C2 diagrams of the last fifteen years tells you it is not a simple matter of "working for the boss." For example, no tactical commander will ever own another nation's offensive cyber capability or special IO capabilities, but you can set conditions for their integrated

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employment via inclusive *federated* planning and clear communication. This allows those stakeholders with similar objectives to independently operate in a way that amplifies and reinforces your organic capabilities. In short, it allows for *self-synchronization* to achieve a unity of effort around common objectives and established priorities.[4] At its most limited level, it can actively defend against inadvertent friendly fratricide.

Authorities always remain critically important because they set the control and influence held by a commander by function or in time and space, and they provide great leverage to encourage and regulate the actions of other organizations over which the commander may have little or no direct control. The importance of C2 and authority design and the level of delegation cannot be overstated. For example, the vesting of deliberate strike authority inside Iraq with the CJFLCC commander served as a forcing function for cooperation and drew many actors into a conversation about objectives and mutual interest. The absence of an authority at your level does not mean that capabilities cannot be sourced but rather reemphasizes the importance of federated planning and trusted information sharing. Where authorities are held higher, work needs to be done to ensure the necessary capabilities can be accessed and synchronized in a timely manner. For example, one smart colonel observed, "It is far easier to drop a bomb in this theater than it is to send a tweet."[5] He was right, and we need to work on either the delegation of authorities or establishing mechanisms where capabilities can be appropriately and effectively accessed through the directed authorities structure.

Observation 7: A disciplined, systematic framework that binds the strategic to the tactical is as important as ever. Given the complexity of multiple actors and capabilities operating from the strategic to the tactical levels, the importance of a clear, disciplined framework around which capabilities can be effectively and efficiently applied, organized, coordinated, and self-synchronized is paramount. This is not a new idea, but the experience of Iraq 2016 has served to reinforce this as a fundamental requirement in future multi-domain battle. There is a need to define fights at echelon and for shaping operations in a way tailored to each mission.

The development of a battlefield framework in Iraq in early 2016 based on the doctrinal close, deep, and rear construct was central to creating a common targeting picture that enabled federated target development and the application of multiple means—lethal and nonlethal—in a coherent way. It also allowed a nesting of inform-and-influence efforts by multiple actors from across the coalition and those who were operating from both inside and outside of Iraq. Even without direct interaction between actors, the framework allowed self-synchronization and deconfliction. This also provided a mechanism through which the employment of scarce assets such as ISR and strike could be regulated and applied. Also pivotal to dealing with the complexity and range of cross-domain action by multiple actors was the development and employment of a purpose-designed assessment methodology that was tailored to mission and grounded in a systematic analysis of measures of both effectiveness and performance tied tightly to mission objectives.[6] This is another example of difficult but essential work that remains, probably forever, a mix of art and science.

Based on the Iraq experience, there is an unequivocally clear need for the multi-domain battlespace to operate around a battlefield architecture and systematic framework that allows and supports the effective and efficient application of all capabilities.

Observation 8: Policy, procedures, and systems have a critical impact on mission accomplishment. What can practically be done is heavily influenced by an organization's policy, procedures, and systems. By their nature, these things are historical. In the case of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems, they are complex, extensive, and expensive. One primary lesson from Iraq 2016 is that there is a need for a "first principles" review of policy, including doctrine, procedures, and systems in the light of the multi-domain reality.[7] One obvious weakness remains information sharing across organizational and national boundaries. Despite fifteen years of war, the bureaucracy remains a twentieth century design that is slow, rules based, and formulaic. This is an international problem that requires a concerted relook by multiple actors, agencies, and nations. It will certainly take hard work and may mean carrying the fight against traditional gatekeepers, but it needs to be done before the next big fight.

Shared understanding and situational awareness provide a further absolutely pivotal example of requirements that are central to allowing effective and efficient

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An Australian soldier assigned to Task Group Taji conducts bayonet training 3 January 2016 with soldiers assigned to the 71st Iraqi Army Brigade at Camp Taji, Iraq. The combined task group consisted of around three hundred Australian Defence Force personnel drawn largely from the Australian Army's 7th Brigade, alongside approximately 105 New Zealand Defence Force personnel. This training was critical to enabling the Iraqi security forces to counter Daesh as they worked to regain territory from the terrorist group. (Photo by Spc. William Lockwood, U.S. Army)

multi-domain capability application. During 2016 in Iraq, the on-the-run development of a CJFLCC off-the-shelf, coalition-accessible, software-generated common operational picture was central to galvanizing coherent action and ensuring effective force protection. Once built, this tool spread like a positive systemic virus and grew as more and more agencies (higher, lower, and lateral) tracked it or contributed directly to it. It allowed multiple actors to "see" the fight from wherever they were located globally and to focus their efforts around friendly force "truth." It was one simple tool that had a far-reaching positive impact because of the shared understanding it generated.

Observation 9: The quality of people remains the most important element. Not everyone can handle complexity, especially under pressure and in a high threat, time-constrained environment. This is not a new observation, but it remains a fundamentally important one. Iraq-style MDB in 2016 needed complex-problem solvers who were able to overcome institutional and intellectual boundaries. For example, one National Guard captain almost single handedly corralled the plethora of IO stakeholders and linked them to both the coalition plan and the Iraqi psychological operations network. There was no textbook or doctrine for that. Simultaneously, more senior and experienced personnel struggled with "how to get anything done in this place." The clear need is for resilient, critical thinkers who are good with humans and who are self-aware, determined, and output focused. People need to be adaptable (able to do new things), versatile (able to do many things), and agile (able to change what they are doing quickly). The specialists need to be more general and the generalists more interested in specialties. We need an end to silos, or at least we need permeable walls. The key is selection, training, and especially education and then experience. As stated above, not everyone is able to handle the challenges of the MDB operating environment, and the capacity to do so cannot be assumed. Such capacity is not especially resident

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draw inputs from a diverse range of coalition, Iraqi, national, interagency, international, and nongovernmental actors, entities, and organizations.

4. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future," *Proceedings* 124, no. 1 (January 1998): 28–35. The authors defined *self-synchronization* as "the ability of a well-informed force to organize and synchronize warfare activities from the bottom up. The organizing principles are unity of effort, clearly articulated commander's intent, and carefully crafted rules of engagement. Self-synchronization is enabled by a high level of [knowledge of] one's own forces, enemy forces, and all appropriate elements of the operating environment. It overcomes the loss of combat power inherent in top-down command directed synchronization characteristics of more conventional doctrine and converts combat from a step function to a high-speed continuum." Self-synchronization is defined here as doing the right thing at the right time for the right reason without having to be directed by someone higher in a chain of command.

5. J5 combined joint force land component command, comment to author Maj. Gen. Roger Noble, June 2016, Baghdad.

6. A campaign assessment methodology is the process and system designed and implemented to assemble data and input that allows for the ongoing systematic analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of campaign execution in pursuit of the specified mission objectives. A robust assessment methodology allows for a systematic ongoing review of progress and the identification of critical issues, and it facilitates and assists in the timely and targeted command-directed modification of the plan in response to the real-world outcomes of campaign execution.

7. A "first principles review" is an analysis of a policy without immediate deference to standing convention, policy, and thinking. It is a review from scratch and through an analysis of its core elements. The focus of this type of review is on the primary purpose in order to construct a solution that works in the contemporary context: what are we trying to do, why, and how do we best do it; not, what do we do now and how could we adjust? This does not mean disregarding mandated legal or policy requirements, but it can include scrutiny of those requirements and actions to modify the law or policy if this is considered essential or necessary.



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In Defense of the Theater Army

Lt. Col. Nicholas R. Simontis, U.S. Army

The Army's ability to set the theater is essential to preventing conflict and, if deterrence fails, allowing the Joint Force to seize the initiative while protecting the force and restricting the enemy's options.

—The U.S. Army Operating Concept

The theater army and its theater-assigned Army forces set the theater and the joint operations area for the employment of landpower in contingencies and campaigns.

—Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations

Theater armies have a rich and storied history, conjuring images of Courtney Hodges commanding First Army, George Patton commanding Third Army, and Alexander "Sandy" Patch commanding Seventh Army, along with Eighth Army commanded by Robert Eichelberger in the Philippines during World War II, and later by Matthew Ridgeway in Korea.[1] Following combat operations, the roles of theater armies evolved to suit operational and strategic requirements, executing missions ranging from occupation duties to training Army Reserve and National Guard units. In a more recent example, Third Army served as combined forces land component command (CFLCC) during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, and later as combined joint forces land component command (CJFLCC) and then combined joint task force (CJTF) for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). Despite this history and the unique role theater armies fill, these headquarters are a recurring target for reduction and possible elimination in the ongoing efforts to reduce force structure.

According to doctrine, theater army responsibilities are straightforward. However, possibly due to the fact that most officers have little experience with theater armies, there is a great deal of misunderstanding regarding their roles.[2] Because of this, theater armies are a target of convenience in the quest for force reduction, but recent recommendations go too far, eliminating vital theater army roles and functions. In reality, the responsibilities of theater armies are far more expansive, requiring specialized sets of capabilities.

Contrary to misunderstandings regarding their doctrinal role in today's environment, theater armies are becoming more strategically necessary than ever. Owing to their unique capabilities, theater armies can form the backbone of joint or multinational forces, serving as a joint or multinational force integrator and providing a platform that facilitates joint force interdependence.

This article proposes that theater armies should be retained. They have provided and can continue to provide viable options for conducting significant operations using the principles of mission command. These include maintaining a vital, persistent forward presence; conducting shaping through theater security cooperation and military engagement; providing regional expertise; and laying the foundation for, and forming the gateway through which follow-on ground and joint forces can deploy and fight as necessary.

From Reduction to Elimination

Recommendations to modify the organizational structure of theater armies/Army service component commands (ASCCs) have been ongoing for some time. Early efforts at reduction originally sought to scale down only the mission command responsibilities of theater

Cpl. Charles H. Johnson, 783rd Military Police Battalion, waves on a "Red Ball Express" motor convoy rushing priority materiel to the forward area 5 September 1944 near Alenon, France. Red Ball Express truck convoys, manned primarily by African American troops, provided rapid cargo delivery throughout the European Theater, including critical fuel and ordnance for Patton's Third Army during its attack eastward toward Germany. (Photo courtesy of the National Archives)

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To-days
TONNAGE
TARGET
RED BALL
HIGHWAY
20.000 TONS
19.000 "
18.000 "
17.000 "
16.000 "
15.000 "
14.000 "
13.000 "
12.000 "
11.000 "
10.000 "
9.000 "
8.000 "
7.000 "
6.000 "
5.000 "
4.000 "
3.000 "
2.000 "
1.000 "
STAY ON THE
BALL
KEEP 'EM
ROLLING!

armies, calling into question their ability to command operational forces, particularly for extended periods. In 2011, Field Manual (FM) 3-93, *Theater Army Operations,* signaled this intent. It recommended the elimination of the operational command posts (OCPs) originally intended to form the foundational structure for joint task forces (JTFs) or joint force land component commands (JFLCCs) designated to run major operations.[3] In 2014, FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations,* which replaced FM 3-93, echoed this same sentiment, stating, "theater armies have limited capabilities to serve as a JTF or JFLCC, and then for only a short duration or limited contingency operation."[4] However, FM 3-94 omitted a key piece of contextual information found in FM 3-93: the proposed addition of a fourth corps headquarters to allow the theater army "to be relieved of its previous responsibility to transition to a JTF, JFLCC, or ARFOR [Army forces] headquarters."[5] This fourth corps headquarters would permit a rotational mission command structure, while maintaining a corps headquarters for contingency needs. Clearly, the intent of FM 3-93 and FM 3-94 was to leave theater armies/ASCCs in place, merely removing direct mission command responsibilities and relying instead on corps headquarters to execute those responsibilities when necessary. The Department of the Army (DA) did, in fact, eliminate OCPs in later years, but without establishing a fourth corps headquarters as originally called for. Now, some observers recommend the elimination of ASCCs altogether.

The *Elihu Root Study: The Total Army* proposed eliminating theater armies and replacing them with corps headquarters.[6] Several months later, David Barno and Nora Bensahel made the same recommendation, proposing the replacement of theater armies with "dual-hatted operational headquarters that also have warfighting capabilities," which can be translated as corps headquarters.[7] In reality, however, replacing theater armies with augmented corps headquarters merely shuffles the deck while actually reducing overall Army expeditionary capability unless additional corps headquarters are added, a requirement that runs counter to the current goal of reducing structure. All of these proposals are shortsighted and fail to appreciate the current and potential roles of theater armies.

Understanding Theater Army Roles and Responsibilities

The requirements for theater armies and their several command relationships are delineated in Army Regulation 10-87, *Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units,* and laid out doctrinally in FM 3-94. These requirements center on providing administrative control over Army forces in theater, assuming extensive theater sustainment responsibilities, providing operational control of designated Army forces in theater, supporting theater security cooperation and theater engagement plans, and setting the theater—establishing and maintaining conditions for the employment of land forces and support to joint forces in the theater.[8] Yet, merely reviewing a list of these extensive and wide-ranging requirements does not lend a holistic appreciation of the unique roles fulfilled by theater armies. An alternate way to understand theater army roles is in terms of a *conduit* and ***four infrastructures,*** as the following paragraphs describe.

A theater army/ASCC serves two masters—the Department of the Army (DA) and the geographic combatant commander (GCC), acting as a conduit between the two headquarters. In this conduit role, the theater army strives to balance GCC theater requirements with Army capabilities, while advising the Army on theater-specific requirements that help shape the force, informing structural, manning, and equipping decisions. This input, shaped by the current and projected operational environment in theater, can then inform the development of the Army's input to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. This role as a conduit between DA and the GCC is thus critical to helping the Army tailor its structure in order to execute its mission of "providing

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Staff Sgt. Joshua Tyree blocks the bright sunlight as Pfc. Patrick Davis scans an Afghan man's iris with a Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment device 29 April 2012 during an Afghan-led patrol in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan. Tyree and Davis are paratroopers with 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division. A key function of the theater army is to establish the intelligence infrastructure required to support land forces. (Photo by Sgt. Michael J. MacLeod, U.S. Army)

prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combatant commanders."[9]

In addition to acting as a conduit, a more practical way of understanding the roles of theater armies is in terms of their responsibility for establishing and maintaining four overarching infrastructures to support the theater; the theater army, through supporting commands, maintains the theater-wide sustainment, medical care and support, communications, and intelligence infrastructures necessary to support land forces.[10] These infrastructures together support the GCC's theater campaign plan and form the foundation necessary to execute the full scope of military operations, from combined exercises by rotational forces to contingency operations in response to crises or military conflicts.

In essence, these infrastructures together comprise the theater architecture that enables a wide range of options for land forces as well as supporting the joint force through Army support-to-other-service functions. Moreover, particularly in the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command areas of responsibility, the theater-setting functions and forward platforms provide the groundwork for strategic force projection ranging from special operations teams to conventional combat divisions that assure access in the face of ongoing area denial efforts to limit access to contested regions.

Attendant Functions

Broadly speaking, the theater Army provides the four infrastructures discussed in addition to handling statutory Title 10 responsibilities and serves as a DA-GCC conduit. These activities encompass the overall theater army functions. However, there are several other more narrowly scoped specific functions wrapped into these broad functions that merit particular attention.[11]

Mission command. First and foremost among these functions is mission command. Previous and

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current doctrine describe theater armies as having only limited duration mission command capability, yet U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) has executed this responsibility repeatedly, controlling ground operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2002 as the CFLCC, then becoming the CFLCC for operations in Iraq in 2002.[12] More recently, U.S. Central Command designated USARCENT as the CJFLCC for operations in Iraq and Syria in September 2014, and then as the CJTF-OIR in October 2014.[13] While the headquarters did require joint augmentation, the speed with which USARCENT established the CJTF was only possible due to the forward presence of the OCP in Kuwait, along with the enabling commands providing the necessary support infrastructure for the rapid reception and integration of joint and coalition partners. Contradicting doctrine, USARCENT served dual roles as the theater army and the CJTF for fifteen months until relieved by III Corps.[14] This suggests that a better way to think of mission command by theater armies is as a viable option for establishing a CJFLCC or a CJTF quickly, thereby providing rapid response and setting conditions for a corps or other headquarters to deploy and assume responsibility when appropriate.



Maj. (Dr.) Thomas Wertin and Lt. Col. (Dr.) Ronald Martin, both of the 28th Combat Support Hospital out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Sgt. Jose Mendez from the 8th Forward Surgical Team out of Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, operate on an Iraqi soldier 1 April 2007 who was wounded in a truck bombing in Iraq's northern city of Mosul. A key function of the theater Army is to establish the medical infrastructure required to support land forces. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army)

Joint security coordinator. A second important capability of theater armies lies in their potential role as joint security coordinator (JSC) for the GCC, if so designated. The protection cell within the theater army generally has staff responsibility for this function unless a joint security coordination center is established. The protection cell assesses risks, develops plans, and integrates and synchronizes actions and activities with a goal of protecting the force. The theater army often resources many of the necessary capabilities to meet JSC requirements, and the JSC role often includes responsibility for joint and multinational forces. The necessity and importance of the JSC role will likely increase as the trend toward hybrid or gray zone conflict continues and expands.[15]

Fires. A third important and often-overlooked capability of a theater army concerns fires, specifically, integrated air defense (IAD) and cross-domain joint fires. The theater army's IAD cell facilitates planning from a ground perspective in close coordination with the area air defense coordinator, supporting the joint force commander's air defense priorities. Elements of the

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IAD cell, along with subordinate air defense artillery brigades, often work with regional partners (within the limits of disclosure) to ensure overall synchronization and integration of IAD capabilities, as well as to build partner capacity. This is an area of increasing concern in the face of anti-access/area denial threats and the growth in adversary missile and rocket capabilities. The fires cell and its joint fires section perform a similar role, integrating Army and joint fires capabilities focused on regional planning, supporting GCC theater and contingency planning, and availing themselves of opportunities to conduct combined and cross-domain training and build partner capacity.

The integration of Army AH-64 Apaches operating from naval surface platforms that frequently occurs in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility provides an apt example of cross-domain capability routinely practiced by USARCENT and U.S. Navy Central. This is an area ripe for further development.

Planning. A final important capability of theater armies concerns theater-focused planning from a land force perspective. The theater army commander and staff immerse themselves in theater events on a daily basis, interacting frequently with their counterparts from other components, GCC planners, and counterparts with regional partners, and often with division and corps planners for input to contingency plans. A theater army, by its very nature, is a planning headquarters, constantly looking at the environment and into the future, asking "what if?" This planning role is particularly important given the theater army's conduit role described above. The interactions between the theater army, the GCC, and DA should enhance the effectiveness of planning by all three headquarters.

Additional Thoughts

Theater army structure and organization can and should be improved, but that does not imply slashing structure across the board, as occurred with the elimination of OCPs, or scrapping the formations altogether and replacing them with augmented corps headquarters, as some recommend. In the case of USARCENT, the headquarters mitigated the elimination of the OCP through the assignment of a rotating National Guard division headquarters.[16] While this is a viable interim fix, there is no net savings in personnel; there is merely a change in their origin and the funding process, shifting the burden from the active Army to the National Guard. Furthermore, there is a longer-term cost to the quality of regional relationships and military engagements due to the more frequent turnover of OCP personnel. Similarly, replacing theater armies with augmented corps headquarters merely swaps headquarters and shuffles personnel with a net effect of reducing Army expeditionary capability unless additional corps headquarters are added, which is at best an unlikely prospect. Replacing theater armies with some other headquarters is needlessly disruptive and provides no evidence of demonstrable structural improvement, efficiency, or improved effectiveness.

The alternative is to take advantage of one of the unique qualities of theater armies—the ability to tailor them appropriately to the theater in which they serve by adjusting their organization to reflect theater and GCC requirements efficiently. This already occurs, but opportunities for improvement remain. An example is to align and synchronize the various sustainment functions between G4, Theater Sustainment Command, Expeditionary Support Command, and the sustainment brigades to eliminate duplication of functions. Along the same line, sustainment functions should be integrated with other services to improve interoperability and sustainment efficiency while eliminating duplication of services across the joint force. Significant opportunities for developing such "joint force interdependence" exist and should be pursued.[17]

A final thought on theater armies is that they provide a unique platform for developing strategic leaders as well as for increasing the strategic and joint competence of the theater army staff. Due to the wide-ranging roles of a theater army, the commander and staff interact regularly with DA and the GCC, along with functional component commands, the other components, Army direct reporting units such as Medical Command, Network Enterprise Technology Command, and U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, as well as regional counterparts in theater. Thus, senior leaders through junior majors and captains enjoy opportunities to regularly interact with other services and headquarters that are not available elsewhere in the Army.

The broad focus required to establish and maintain the four infrastructures obliges the commander and staff to take a more wide-ranging view of these functions than is possible in most other Army assignments. The

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theater army's unique role, the many niche capabilities it fills for the GCC, and the directed responsibilities and functions under Title 10 that comprise Army support to other services require staff officers in a theater army to interact regularly with higher and adjacent Army and joint headquarters. The theater army serves as a bridge from the strategic to the tactical, serving GCCs and the joint force, and providing its leaders and staff with an operational viewpoint that is unique in the Army.

Conclusion

Recognizing the need to project forces around the world, the *Army Operating Concept* describes how the Army intends to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars, all while operating as part of the joint force and working with multiple partners.[18] Accordingly, the *Army Operating Concept* describes twenty required capabilities including functions such as developing a high degree of situational understanding; conducting security force assistance; integrating joint, interorganizational, and multinational partner capabilities; and setting the theater to provide strategic agility.[19] Theater armies execute eleven of the twenty capabilities listed, and they contribute in some fashion to most of the remainder, demonstrating they are key to maintaining strategic credibility.[20]

Theater armies are the face of the land component to our regional partners, demonstrating U.S. commitment, assuring access through forward presence, and maintaining the ability to project land forces wherever and whenever needed. Clearly, the singular role and capabilities of theater armies will only become more important in the current and anticipated environment; they cannot be replaced, nor should they be. ■

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Notes

Epigraph. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win In A Complex World* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 31 October 2014), 23.

Epigraph. Field Manual (FM) 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2014), para. 2-10.

1. Regarding terminology, while many of the force structure recommendations pertain to Army service component commands (ASCCs) generally, this paper focuses more specifically on ASCCs provided by the Department of the Army to geographic combatant commands, which serve dual roles as theater armies and ASCCs. This paper uses the term "theater army" in reference to these particular headquarters.
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3. FM 3-93, *Theater Army Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2011 [now obsolete]), x.
4. FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, para. 2-1.
5. FM 3-93, *Theater Army Operations*, x.
6. Syed Najeeb Ahmed et al., *Elihu Root Study: The Total Army* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2016).
7. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, *The Future of the Army: Today, Tomorrow, and the Day After Tomorrow* (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2016), 18.
8. Army Regulation 10-87, *Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2007), 1-2, 4-13; FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, paras. 2-1 to 2-12.
9. "Mission," Army.mil website, accessed 24 May 2017, https://www.army.mil/info/organization/.
10. James L. Terry, U.S. Army, retired, used this example on numerous occasions during his tenure as commander, U.S. Army Central/Third Army, 2013–2015. Used with permission.
11. Working-Capital Funds, 10 U.S.C. § 2208 (2015).
12. "USARCENT [U.S. Army Central] Historical Summary (1918–Present)," USARCENT website, accessed 24 May 2017, http://www.usarcent.army.mil/About-USARCENT/History/.
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14. Ibid.
15. For additional information on joint security coordinator duties and responsibilities, see Joint Publication 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 13 November 2014).
16. Dr. John Bonin (professor, U.S. Army War College), e-mail to author, 7 December 2016. Used with permission.
17. Adm. Jonathan Greenert, "Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence," *Joint Force Quarterly* 76 (1st Quarter, January 2015): 11, accessed 11 July 2017, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-76/jfq-76.pdf.
18. TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept*, i.
19. Ibid., 31–33.
20. Ibid. The eleven capabilities are [in abbreviated form]: (1) develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding; (2) shape and influence security environments; (3) provide security force assistance; (4) prevent, reduce, eliminate, and mitigate the use and effects of weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive devices; (5) assure uninterrupted access to critical communications and information links; (6) develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders; (7) project forces; (8) establish and maintain security across wide areas; (9) integrate joint, interorganizational and multinational partner capabilities; (10) set the theater; and (11) coordinate and integrate Army, and joint, interorganizational, and multinational fires.

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THE U.S. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF'S PROFESSIONAL READING LIST

The U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List is divided into six categories: Strategic Environment, Regional Studies, History and Military History, Leadership, Army Profession, and Fiction. These sublists are intended to steer readers to topics in which they are most interested. Each book is suitable for readers of any rank or position.

The books offer entry points into the literature discussing military art and science. They are provided as selected works that can help soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and anyone interested in the Army to learn more about the Army profession and to sharpen their knowledge of the Army's long and distinguished history, as well as the decisive role played by land power in conflicts across the centuries.

A sustained personal commitment to critical study of a wide range of readings constitutes an essential responsibility for members of the Army profession. The U.S. Army today confronts extraordinary complexity in the strategic environment with new and emerging missions competing with core war-fighting requirements that challenge Army professionals. This reading list serves as a guide to the many topics worthy of professional consideration, contemplation, and serious discussion.

The appearance of a title on this reading list does not imply that the Chief of Staff endorses the author's views or interpretations. Nevertheless, these books contain thought-provoking ideas and viewpoints relevant to our Army. To view the reading list, visit http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/105/105-1-1/CMH_Pub_105-5-1_2017.pdf.

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Military Review has primary interest in the geographic flashpoints of conflict noted below:

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6—Russian-sponsored conflict
7—Russia-Baltic confrontation
8—Islamic State in Africa
9—Saudi Arabian/Iranian conflict
10—Islamic-extremist ideological insurgency in Europe
11—U.S.-Mexico contention along border
12—Impact of unregulated immigration on security and stability of diverse countries/regions

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People hold a banner reading "We demand a referendum" as they shout slogans during a pro-Russian rally 8 March 2014 in Donetsk, Ukraine, and as Russia was reported to be reinforcing its military presence in Crimea. (Photo by Sergei Grits, Associated Press)

Expanding Tolstoy and Shrinking Dostoyevsky



How Russian Actions in the Information Space are Inverting Doctrinal Paradigms of Warfare

Maj. Scott J. Harr, U.S. Army


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In February 2013, Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov published "The Value of Science is in the Foresight," which describes a twenty-first century battlefield replete with new methods, capabilities, and applications of war that transcend accepted contemporary definitions and uses of military power.[1] Subsequent Western debate on Gerasimov's discourse (dubbed the "Gerasimov Doctrine") often focuses on whether Gerasimov's ideas represent old or new ways of war and whether Gerasimov intended to describe a distinctly Russian style of warfare for the twenty-first century.[2]

To be sure, the evolution of military thought and science is an ongoing discussion within Russia that involves not just Gerasimov, but other prominent Russian military officers as well. So, as retired Lt. Col. Timothy Thomas points out, it is wise for Western military analysts to not exclusively categorize trends in Russian warfare.[3] However, the Gerasimov Doctrine represents the most powerful and relevant current adaptation of Russian military thought, and it describes a new type warfare that emphasizes Russian development of capabilities to defend and win in the cyber and information domains as the critical domains of future warfare (vice actual kinetic combat).[4] In any case, Russian actions on the international stage have demonstrated a style of warfare that comprehensively integrates all instruments of national power (in militaristic ways) to achieve strategic objectives countering Western influence. The title of the renowned Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy's masterpiece *War and Peace* alludes to discrete conditions of the modern Russian approach to warfare. Like Western concepts of the "gray zone," the Tolstoyan concept expands the spectrum between war and peace to include levels of conflict that satisfy neither of the extremes—yet remain viable arenas to promote strategic interests using force. Likewise, akin to the boundaries of criminality that timeless Russian author Fyodor Dostoyevsky explored in his classic work *Crime and Punishment*, current Russian modes of warfare have shrunk the criminal boundaries of war and blended the rules of warfare to enable more interaction among the instruments of national power to pursue strategic interests.

In a metaphorical sense, depicted in figures 1 and 2 (page 41), Russian actions in warfare under the Gerasimov Doctrine have "expanded Tolstoy" (i.e., created more fluid conditions between war and peace) while "shrinking Dostoyevsky" (i.e., reducing the criminal boundaries of national activities to prosecute war). As a linchpin that increasingly knits the contemporary modes of Russian warfare together, the broad range of information operations (IO) has played a major role in Russian actions, inverting the paradigms of warfare espoused by U.S. doctrine and thus presenting the U.S. joint force with significant challenges.


Given the above discussion, the intent of this paper is to outline the major ways that recent Russian IO



(Graphic by author)

Figure 1. Expanding Tolstoy and Shrinking Dostoyevsky Construct Explained

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(Graphic by author)

Figure 2. Expanding Tolstoy and Shrinking Dostoyevsky in Terms of Contemporary Understanding of War

ıctions (as part of the Gerasimov Doctrine) have nverted commonly held U.S. paradigms of warfare. Upon illuminating the role of IO in forging new ıpplications of war that depart from U.S. notions, this paper distills the major implications for the U.S. joint orce in terms of policy, doctrine, and capabilities. On his basis, recommendations can be made regarding ıow to populate, train, and equip the joint force (espeially Army forces) to counter and proactively guard gainst Russian IO actions that undermine or deliberately target U.S. interests in contested areas.

Paradigm Inversions: Three Ways Russian IO Actions Challenge American Conceptions of War

One long-held paradigm of U.S. approaches to warare necessitates that combat power be dedicated toward he destruction of the enemy. Modern joint doctrine still speaks of the Clausewitzian concept of center of gravity as the main source of an enemy's power that should be attacked with the full force of combat capabilities to ensure an enemy's defeat.[5] This paradigm appears as simple and obvious as the front plate on a Claymore mine that reads "Front Towards Enemy." However, Russian IO actions, as a Gerasimov Doctrine application of combat power, demonstrate that in the era of limited "wars of choice," concerted and weaponized IO efforts can be directed toward *friendly* audiences and centers of gravity to deliver decisive effects cultivating and sustaining public opinion supporting government and/or military action. According to analyst Stephen Blank, Russia can use the decisive force of IO on its own domestic population because Russia has "securitized" the information instrument of national power.[6] That is, Russia has convinced its population that information is a national security matter and the government therefore has a compelling interest in controlling it. Russian actions controlling the information that it feeds to its population have been on full display during the Russian annexation of the Crimea, where political scientist Ioana-Nelia Bercean notes that domestic support of Russia's actions remains high.[7] The combat potential of Russia's paradigm inversion is clear

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Moldovans protest a NATO summit 9 July 2016 in Warsaw, Poland. Moldovans of ethnic Russian descent together with pro-Russian ethnic Moldovans increasingly act in concert in organized efforts such as demonstrations to put pressure on the Moldovan government to acquiesce to Russian government policy demands. Reportedly cultivated and supported by Russian agents, these efforts specifically promote agitation against Moldova to decrease that country's association with the European Union and NATO. (Photo by Denis Bolotsky, Sputnik)

when juxtaposed against the influence of public opinion in recent American military efforts: while public support for American campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan dwindled over time to induce massive strategy shifts, Russia continues to target its own population with IO actions that preserve and monopolize public opinion justifying its counter-Western actions contending with American strategic objectives in Europe.

Another time-honored paradigm of Western war (from the Clausewitzian tradition) frames *war as an extension of politics*. Reflecting this dynamic, the joint force under U.S. law serves its civilian political masters in executing national strategy and foreign policy delineated by elected political elites. Russia's IO actions, on the other hand, delve into and rely heavily on political messaging and political tampering to achieve strategic ends. In this sense, its IO actions treat *politics as an extension of war*. Such actions have found fertile ground in the former Soviet states of Eastern Europe. The Republic of Moldova serves as a striking current example of the effects of Russian political IO actions. According to Moldovan military reports, many political parties in Moldova have been infiltrated by pro-Russian personalities who have overt links to Moscow and regularly visit Russian leaders.[8] The direct input from the Russian information machine to Moldovan politicians exerts pressure on Moldovan society in the form of anti-Western statements or pro-Russia endorsements from political pulpits. Russia's treatment of politics as an extension of war has had positive effects reshaping Moldovan public opinion, as recent polling figures suggest a significant drop in support of the European Union and NATO.[9] Perhaps more famously (and distinctly more ominously), Russian political IO actions have been implicated and heavily investigated in the tampering and release of information associated with recent U.S. presidential election processes.[10] If true (or perhaps even if untrue), the inversion of the Western paradigm specifying the relationship between politics and war portends foreboding consequences for sovereign states, as IO operations can seemingly influence regime changes without the firing of a single bullet.

Finally, a paradigm of U.S. joint warfare frames all operations within the context of "legitimacy" that,

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accordingly, identifies the imperative that all operations be perceived as legitimate and credible. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, elevates the concept of legitimacy into one of the principles of joint operations and defines it as a "decisive factor of operations" based on the "actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness" of an operation.[11] In this paradigm, to ignore legitimacy is to sacrifice the purpose and effects of the operation. Russian IO actions have demonstrated a penchant for inverting this paradigm so that legitimacy does not validate operations, but rather operations validate their legitimacy. Russian manipulation of social media and the cyberspace realm of IO provides the most pertinent example of Russian efforts in this space. Scholar Jessikka Aro notes how a modern component of Russian information warfare consists of government paid commentators who troll social media sites and post propaganda, fake news, and overtly pro-Russian messages designed to confuse audiences or reinforce pro-Russian information themes.[12] This aspect of information warfare plays on the twin concepts of deniability and attribution to create chaos. As analyst Oliver Fitton puts it, efforts in cyberspace and social media are difficult to conclusively attribute to official Russian instruments of power and therefore give the Russian apparatus deniability in these operations.[13] Without the burden or imperative of being perceived as legitimate or credible, Russian IO actions can spin, craft, and create narratives that suit their objectives by continually flooding the information space with messages that advance their interests.

Overmatch: The Limits of Joint IO Doctrine and Policy

Russian IO actions employ and integrate all instruments of national power to exploit seams and gaps in U.S. joint IO doctrine and overarching policy. By turning the propaganda effects of their IO actions against their own people to control public opinion, Russian actions trespass into areas of manipulation that the democratic principles that undergird joint policy and doctrine cannot (with good reason) emulate. Indeed, both policies that govern the conduct of IO—Department of Defense Directive 3600.01, *Information Operations*, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3210.01C, *Joint Information Operations Proponent*—strictly and explicitly prohibit IO activities "intended to manipulate audiences, public actions, or opinions in the United States."[14] In democracies, the ends cannot justify the means, which, while potentially ceding a critical IO advantage to Russia, actually reinforces civil society and suggests an effective counter-IO strategy that will be discussed in the next section.

JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, characterizes IO as "the integrated employment, *during military operations*, of IRCs [information related capabilities] [emphasis added]."[15] This makes it clear that, institutionally, the joint force generally views IO as a force multiplier for military actions. But Russian IO efforts, under the "securitized" concept mentioned earlier, have expanded the scope of what constitutes a "military operation" into all domains of national power that far outpaces U.S. joint doctrine conceptions of IO applications. To illustrate, the instruments of national power are doctrinally represented in JP 3-0 in terms of the separate domains of diplomacy, information, military, and economic, commonly depicted using the acronym "DIME." For Russia, however, the separate block letters of DIME do not capture the roles and level of integration between their instruments. Rather, a cursive depiction of DIME—with connected letters—better captures the highly integrated Russian approach, and the term "national instruments of war" (not power) better articulates the blended construct of the Russian securitized environment. Figure 3 (on page 45) visually depicts the different constructs of national power. The Russian construct integrates IO actions across all instruments and provides venues for action that joint doctrine and policy cannot legally

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or operationally follow without undermining the same liberal democratic institutions and values that the joint force exists to preserve.

Russian IO actions that de-emphasize or ignore aspects of legitimacy and credibility inevitably gain degrees of speed and agility that U.S. joint doctrine and policy cannot hope to match. Confusing and disrupting adversary decision cycles (which often represent the core aim of Russian IO actions) merely requires that the volume of produced messages outpace an opponent's ability to interpret and decipher the true strategic intent of the message to take meaningful action. Analysts denote this characteristic of Russian IO as a doctrine of "reflexive control" and highlight how Russia has successfully used the tactic to shroud its actions in Ukraine and the Crimea, creating a paralyzing confusion that has largely prevented U.S. action.[16] In contrast to the free-wheeling tactics of reflexive control, U.S. joint doctrine and policy demand extensive coordination for IO actions that must account for all interagency stakeholders. Figure 4 (page 46) highlights the doctrinally recommended composition of an IO joint planning cell taken from JP 3-13. The construct calls for the coordination of no less than *twenty-three* separate operational and planning representatives to fully synchronize IO actions.[17] Furthermore, IO policy directives are teeming with mandates to coordinate actions through oversight bodies such as the Executive Steering Group that consists of joint staff members from multiple directorates.[18] While this architecture may emphasize and achieve IO coordination aimed at preserving whole-of-government legitimacy and credibility in the information space, in the meantime, Russian IO actions can swiftly and decisively outmaneuver such cumbersome regulations to achieve effects.




Russian "propaganda" poster, 25 July 2010. Translation: "To find and not let go! Together against Terrorism." (Photo by Vitaly Kuzmin, http://www.vitalykuzmin.net)

The Doctrine of Contested Acknowledgment for the Joint Force

Given the areas of overmatch outlined above based on both political and institutional constraints that are unlikely to change, and given Russia's steadfast commitment to investing in and fighting according to the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine, Russia will likely maintain critical advantages in the information space

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
(Graphic by author)

Figure 3. Comparing DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic) in the Russian Securitized Context

into the foreseeable future. This admission of Russian overmatch by no means suggests that the United States should concede this domain to a powerful near-peer adversary. Rather, a doctrine of contested acknowledgment should be adopted by the joint force to counter and meet Russian IO actions that threaten or undermine strategic interests. Under this doctrine, the joint force pragmatically acknowledges Russian advantages in this domain while simultaneously contesting them to the utmost without sacrificing combined arms or joint lethal capabilities—which, despite what the Gerasimov Doctrine calls to the contrary, will remain the most decisive capabilities in exerting national power during conflicts. Implementing this doctrine against Russian actions in Europe relies on U.S. State Department (DOS) efforts to bolster and project narratives of U.S. prosperity and freedom abroad as well as increased and sustained Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to train, advise, and assist partner nations within Russia's sphere of influence in IO techniques and principles.

It is important to clarify here that U.S. efforts in this regard need only focus on sovereign states that are either NATO partners or have undergone steps to initiate NATO membership. U.S. assistance, then, would be invited and welcomed by states that have, in essence, declared their intentions to emulate Western-style governments and economies (a certain level of these intentions is required for NATO membership, as per its charter).[19] While NATO expansion, as rightly noted by Dr. John Mearsheimer, has been a key

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Legend

EW—Electronic warfare
EWC—Electronic warfare cell
IO—Information operations
J-2—Intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-2T—Deputy directorate for targeting
J-2X—Joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element
J-39—Information operations staff
J-4—Logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5—Plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6—Communications system directorate of a joint staff
J-7—Force development directorate of a joint staff
J-9—Civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
JCEWS—Joint force commander's electronic warfare staff
JIACG—Joint interagency coordination group
MILDEC—Military deception
MIS—Military information support
MISO—Military information support operations
MNF—Multinational force
Ops—Operations
OPSEC—Operations security
PA—Public affairs
Rep(s)—Representative(s)
SOF—Special operations forces
STO—Special technical operations

(Graphic from Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2012], II-6)

Figure 4. Recommended Information Operations Planning Cell

agitator promoting friction in U.S.-Russian relations since 2008, it is also important to recognize that many of the eastern European nations, as free sovereign states, have chosen Western methods of government and commerce despite Russian influence and pressure to "rejoin" the Soviet Union. To concede these states to a so-called Russian sphere of influence (losers of the Cold War and purveyors of an ideology far short of the liberty and democracy valued in the West) for fear of antagonizing Russia would sacrifice American ideals for the sake of Russian appeasement.

Put bluntly, if Russia sees American efforts in eastern Europe as a threat, then there is a simple way to diffuse the tension: Russia can democratize its government or undertake other reforms to make their ideology more attractive to its former Soviet states. Clearly, no one should promote a strategy that threatens to return U.S.-Russian relations to the Cold War era. However, because states have (or should have) the right to pursue their own national interests, then those that beckon America's assistance should be heeded. While the augmented train, advise, and assist role of the United States under the doctrine of contested acknowledgment may risk more tension with Russia in the short term, if Americans truly believe in the viability of their values, this approach is better in the long term at holding Russia accountable for its actions and preventing the dangerous spread of ideologies detrimental to the human condition.

As noted earlier, the propaganda advantages that Russia creates by securitizing its informational instrument of war for domestic support represents a double-edged sword that suggests a powerful U.S. counteraction in the IO domain. As the leading tool of diplomacy and foreign policy and part of an

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interagency "manning" response, DOS experts should augment their embedment with current DOD personnel in U.S. European Command to lead a coordinated effort to saturate contested IO realms with images and messages of American prosperity and freedom. These messages will undermine the authoritarian mechanisms within the Russian political system that allow for total population control and manipulation. Fundamentally, if Russians begin to perceive that the "grass is greener" in America through IO campaigns ruthlessly waged by whole-of-government U.S. entities, they may push back on their government and, ideally, deny it the sustained advantages shaping public opinion that have allowed Russia to succeed in recent international conflicts at the expense of U.S. strategic interests. In this effort, the DOD plays a supporting role by assisting in the delivery of IO messages and by conducting shows of military force that propagate narratives of American confidence and invincibility.


It is also important to clarify how American messages of prosperity and liberty, propagated in Russia and eastern Europe, differ from the alleged and infuriating Russian efforts to meddle in and influence U.S. politics. Firstly, while the alleged Russian efforts to influence American politics centered on Russia providing *negative* information about the United States and candidates though cyber hacking, American efforts in the doctrine of contested acknowledgment would rely on simply advertising the *positive* benefits of a free society. So, while not directly poking holes in the Russian government, messages would simply inform the Russian population that perhaps a better, freer way of life exists. Secondly, Russian IO, due to their dubious nature, frequently rely on deniability and the impossibility of attributing such actions to the Russian government. U.S. messages as part of the contested acknowledgment doctrine, on the other hand, would welcome attribution because it would simply highlight the virtues of civil society in a democracy. So, for example, if Russia accused the United States of planting a message showing peaceful protests in the United States, the United States could simply take credit and essentially say "yes, those are peaceful protests against the government because that's the level of freedom we enjoy in the United States." Finally, this type of democracy promotion by the United States offers a way to spread American ideals and values without the "regime change" model that experts like Mearsheimer have identified as both the primary Russian perception of American democracy promotion methods and a huge agitator of U.S.-Russian relations.[20]

The DOD assumes the lead role in the doctrine of contested acknowledgment by undertaking augmented "train, advise, assist" missions in the contested space within the European Command area of responsibility. Military information support operations (MISO) forces represent the best, if limited, manning solution for these actions. The launching of the European Reassurance MISO Program and the expansion of authorities and IO training proposed in 2016 represent prudent actions that should be approved, replicated, and expanded.[21] Training partner forces with expertly trained and equipped MISO soldiers yields the twofold benefit of developing durable capabilities within partner forces while also giving countries with differing political constraints the means to (potentially) leverage IO in ways that the United States cannot organically accomplish. If the joint force expects to be adequately manned, trained, and equipped to contest the IO domain, augmenting and incentivizing MISO recruitment may be a key starting point.

Conclusion

In April 2003, as American tanks thundered into Baghdad, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, Iraq's information minister (derisively known as "Baghdad Bob"), vehemently broadcasted denials of an American presence in Iraq while simultaneously forecasting wild predictions of American defeat and destruction.[22] Obviously discredited by the reality of events on the ground, Baghdad Bob viscerally illustrates the limits of IO in the face of overwhelming combat power. While many such as Gerasimov have boldly predicted that modern forms of war will supplant decisive combat, nothing in the history of humanity and war validates this prediction. Even in the face of Russian IO overmatch, the U.S. joint force should not sacrifice lethal combat capabilities or, worse, notions of liberal democratic ideals to match Russian actions stride for stride in the information space. Rather, by steadfastly adopting a doctrine of contested acknowledgment, the joint force can pragmatically face the realities of Russian IO applications in the operational environment while simultaneously degrading them and, in this way, preserving American ideals while defending American interests. ■

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15. JP 3-13, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2012), I-1.

16. Bercean, "Ukraine: Russia's New Art of War."

17. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*. The suggested information operations (IO) cell requires extensive coordination between interagency entities. While JP 3-13 repeatedly states and emphasizes that, with IO, "it is not the ownership of the capabilities and techniques that is important, but rather their integrated application in order to achieve a JFC's [joint force commander's] end state," for practical purposes, the IO cell construct nullifies the usefulness of coordination by ensuring IO actions are not responsive enough to the environment relative to adversaries' (e.g., Russia's) capabilities.

18. CJCSI 3210.01C, *Joint Information Operations Proponent*, A-1.

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Vladimir Putin officially banned this popular meme of himself with his face painted in drag. That reaction inadvertently made the meme more popular than ever, and it became an international sensation. According to the author of this article, Putin's "thin skin" makes him an easy target for ridicule. (Artist unknown)

Weaponizing Ridicule

J. Michael Waller, PhD

The fifth rule: Ridicule is man's most potent weapon. It is almost impossible to counterattack ridicule. Also it infuriates the opposition, who then react to your advantage.

—Saul Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals*

Venezuelan women stripped off their pants and threw them at riot police, taunting the already demoralized young men to "man up" and put them on. Jeering crowds laughed at the confused paramilitary forces, chanting for them to "wear some pants" and side with the people against the tottering Maduro dictatorship. Suddenly, the

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truncheon-wielding, helmeted police and their armored vehicles didn't seem quite so menacing. Once the public could make fun of the repressive machine, everyone knew the police state's time was running out.

Improvised street theater across Venezuela in the spring of 2017, with the occasional Molotov cocktails adding drama to provoke overreaction among the security forces, marked the tipping point for a corrupt regime that had brought itself to the breaking point. The people laughed in the face of their oppressors. Their fear evaporated.

When a police state loses its ability to instill obedience or fear, it cannot long survive. When terrorists lose their ability to terrorize, they lose their most vital psychological weapon. Terrorism being by definition a form of psychological warfare—the name says it all, which is to instill terror among populations and leaders—the perpetrators cannot exist in perpetuity if they fail to cow the people.

Killing terrorists and their supporters is only part of the counterterrorism arsenal. Yet, hunting down and killing them has been the primary means of counterterrorism in a war apparently without end. Sometimes the worst thing to do to an enemy is to mock him or her. Ridicule, mockery, and their related tactics have been weapons against evil—and evildoers' weapons against all things good—throughout recorded history.

"The devil ... the proud spirit ... cannot endure to be mocked," wrote Sir Thomas More, the closest friend and confidant of King Henry VIII, who would lose his head to the executioner's axe for being what he called "the king's loyal servant, but God's first."[1]

Ridicule can work when philosophy, theology, or reason fails. "The best way to drive out the devil, if he will not yield to texts of Scripture, is to jeer and flout him, for he cannot bear Scorn," said Martin Luther, a leader in what would become the Protestant Reformation.[2]

Authors Douglas J. Feith and Abram N. Shulsky echo Luther, writing, "One of the most potent weapons of the Enlightenment in its battle against religious fanaticism and intolerance was ridicule."[3]

The same can be said about most conflicts today. Ridicule has received little attention in modern military thinking. The military is not supposed to be funny. But neither are diplomats nor spies. Ridicule seldom if ever becomes a factor in military or diplomatic strategic planning, and rarely at the tactical or operational levels, even though many of our priority targets, large and small, are ripe for a good laugh.

Al-Qaida leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi lost his aura of invincibility in 2006 when the U.S. military released raw outtakes of a captured video showing the terrorist chief to be a befuddled, pudgy bumbler in a black ninja costume who didn't know how to operate a machine gun.[4] But some in the U.S. military didn't get the value of ripping down al-Zarqawi in this way, arguing that the machine gun, an M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, is "complicated to master" and requires extensive training. Plus, the M249 in question was an "older variant, which makes its malfunctioning unsurprising."[5] Arab journalists, on the other hand, saw the value immediately. Iraqi television broadcast the video over and over for days.

Dictators, terrorists, and totalitarian ideologues, almost by definition, cannot tolerate being laughed at. Nor can anyone with an inflated ego and thin skin. Ridicule is their Achilles' heel. And, humor is a robust underground phenomenon in any society. The Soviet leadership was so fearful of humor that the KGB had what Russian comedian Yakov Smirnov called a "Department of Jokes." That was not the real name of the department, which had a more anodyne designation as a subunit of

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An antigovernment protester holds a poster with a caricature of Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro 2 March 2014 during a rally against his government in Caracas. The poster reads, "What the hell does SOS mean?," "Peace no, bullets yes." Subsequently, thousands of antigovernment demonstrators marched in the capital trying to keep up the momentum during months of protests demanding Maduro's resignation. (Photo by Jorge Silva, Reuters)

the KGB's political enforcement section, the Fifth Chief Directorate, but Smirnov's nickname for it made the KGB look all the more weak and bizarre (although all jokes still had to be KGB approved).[6]

The Nazis took a different view. Early after Adolf Hitler's rise to power in 1933, the Nazis banned comments critical of the regime, but did not ban jokes. Some German historians say that the Nazis considered jokes to be an escape valve for ordinary Germans' tensions and frustrations. During the losing years of World War II, however, the Third Reich took jokes as a form of military defeatism, punishable by imprisonment or death, although historian Rudolph Herzog, author of *Dead Funny: Telling Jokes in Hitler's Germany*, found that the jokes were a pretext for purging undesirables.[7] A persuasive case can be made that excessive denunciation of humorists and jokers, playing up the threats they present, using shows of force, and even physically attacking them, can strengthen the purveyors of ridicule and deepen their appeal.

Cost Effective

Ridicule costs nothing to deploy. It requires no expensive hardware or special procurement budget. As such, it has no pork-barrel political constituency in Congress and no career path in the armed forces. Because ridicule effectively costs nothing, it cannot be accounted for as a tool or weapon. The lawyers and accountants who increasingly dominate military thinking and action cannot "bean count" ridicule the way that they can easily account for spent munitions, wrecked vehicles and gear, dead and mutilated servicemen, and

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endless disability benefits. Military promotions tend to be for tangible, accountable time and actions, with occasional intangibles like gallantry and valor, not difficult-to-account-for innovations like ridicule that can weaken and destroy an enemy more effectively than kinetic, bean-countable force. So, we miss endless opportunities to take out our enemies and put our adversaries in their place.

Take an opportunity in early 2017, when Russia sent its creaky *Admiral Kuznetsov* aircraft carrier on its first-ever deployment from the Baltic to the Syrian coast. NATO maritime countries wrung their hands at the development. What if, instead, they simply made fun of the diesel-belching monstrosity? They could have caused an Internet sensation by dogging the *Kuznetsov* in full public view. What if, rather than marvel at Russia's new naval aviation capabilities, the alliance simply made fun of the mechanically plagued *Kuznetsov*? One wag suggested on Twitter that the British send a Royal Navy salvage tug to escort the *Kuznetsov* as it sputtered its way through the English Channel. At the time, Russian aircraft recklessly buzzed NATO warships and even reportedly penetrated NATO airspace. By making fun of Moscow's flagship on its first Mediterranean combat run, the alliance could have slapped Vladimir Putin down a few notches instead of elevating him toward his craved status as a military peer.

Such a stunt is not "information" in the informative or cyber sense of information operations (IO). It's political theater. It isn't "military information support operations," whatever that is, the awkward terminology having stripped the very essence from its former name, psychological operations (PSYOP). But political theater can be PSYOP. Without a proper name, we deprive ourselves from using what we have in hand for the psychological effect on a target. We would never think of using a tugboat to weaken the intimidating first-ever presence of a Russian aircraft carrier. Instead, policy makers moan and groan about what to do, while bloggers and Twitter activists virtually blew the *Kuznetsov*'s prestige out of the water.[8]



This graffiti, written on a school wall in Daraa, Syria, February 2011 reputedly by then fourteen-year-old Naief Abazid, says "Your turn, Doctor." The graffiti referred to the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and it implied that Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was next. In response, the government arrested and tortured Abazid and twenty-two other boys, prompting violent protests across Syria and sparking the war against Assad that continues today. (Photographer unknown)

Vulnerable Leaders

Let's look at some examples of some vulnerable national leaders around the world, and then at some vulnerable adversaries on the tactical and operational levels. First, we must resist the urge to recoil in twenty-first-century horror at forms of ridicule that many in the modern West feel are misogynistic and bigoted, and consider the appropriateness against the relevant targets in their own societies.

Russia. Vladimir Putin has a thin skin. He has a crass sense of humor, but he is vulnerable when the laugh is on him. A group of psychologists and policy strategists has

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argued that Putin's carefully cultivated tough-guy image is an overcompensation for his own insecurities about his personal sexual identity.[9] Putin is so thin-skinned that he officially banned a popular meme of him with his face painted in drag. That reaction inadvertently made the meme more popular than ever, becoming an international sensation. NATO militaries have now begun to consider memetic warfare, which employs memes as a form of psychopolitical conflict.[10]

Egypt. An indicator that a regime is ripe for a ridicule attack is when that regime passes laws and issues decrees to ban public insults against those holding political power. In the case of Egypt after the February 2011 revolution against Hosni Mubarak, the Islamist successors made such a ban part of the new constitution. The democratically elected regime of Mohammed Morsi, which quickly tried to consolidate power into a theocratic Muslim Brotherhood dictatorship, would tolerate no jokes.

That constitutional ban didn't deter Egyptian funnyman Bassem Youssef, who hosted a popular television program modeled after Jon Stewart's *The Daily Show*. Youssef had aimed his merciless wit against Mubarak without reprisal, but the Islamists quickly had enough of him after Morsi became the butt of his jokes. Youssef aired a regular gag of poking fun at Morsi's repeated use of the word "love" in political speeches. To the tune of love songs, Youssef caressed a red pillow bearing an image of Morsi's face. These and other offenses were now a crime that earned international headlines. Youssef "made fun of President Mohammed Morsi on television," the London *Telegraph* reported.[11] International public opinion, led by Stewart himself, arguably spared Youssef from prison. The comedian now directs his wit at the Sisi government that ousted Morsi, with no repercussions.

Humor and ridicule can create a battlespace of its own. In Youssef's case, the Islamists fired back with their own acidic comedy. Abu Islam Ahmed Abdullah, whose show *Hezbollah* is aired on the Ummah Channel (these are real names, not jokes), appeared to express physical attraction to Youssef, calling him more beautiful than famous Egyptian actresses, and urging him to cover his face like a woman.

For comedic jihadists, the humor is one-way. Abu Islam said that Islamic sheikhs who have become involved in politics should be held above criticism, "because God gave them the right to enlighten people on what is right and what is wrong and that they can judge who will go to heaven and who will go to Hell."[12] The Morsi regime and other Islamists called for restrictions on freedom of expression against Egyptian artists in general with high-profile intimidation campaigns.[13]

Qatar. The United States considers the dictatorial regime of Qatar a reliable friend and ally in the war against violent extremism, even though the Qatari regime and its ruling family finance the indoctrination, training, and operations of jihadists worldwide. We have conditioned ourselves to think of Qatar as a partner because Qatar "lets" us use the massive Al Udeid military base we built there, much of it at our expense. Why we consider Qatar a friend and ally when it finances the people who kill us is beyond the scope of this article, but let's look at the thin-skinned intolerance of the regime as an Achilles' heel if times get tough. Qatar can dish it out to the rest of us with its Al Jazeera television and Internet channel, but it can't take it.

The Qatari regime sentenced a poet to life in prison for the crime of "insulting" the emir. The offense: deriding the family dictatorship as a bunch of "sheiks playing on their Playstations."[14] The poet, Muhammad Ibn al-Dheeb al-Ajami, supported the regime-backed Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa, and seemed to call for a democratic revolution in Qatar, though he was careful not to say so specifically. Calling for the overthrow of the ruling al-Thani family is a capital crime in Qatar. In one of his poems, al-Ajami said, in Arabic, "If the sheiks cannot carry out justice, we should change the power and give it to the beautiful woman."[15] Such putdowns don't seem like much to people in democratic societies, and the ridicule isn't particularly profound, but it shows the weakness of jihad-exporting petro regimes and the simplicity of taking advantage of their leaders' emotional and psychological insecurities.[16]

Syria. The Syrian uprising prior to Islamic State (IS) attempts to control the country began after the Assad regime arrested schoolchildren for painting antigovernment graffiti in what appeared to have been a well-organized, low-budget provocation.[17] The children were not arrested for vandalism but for political crimes. Faced with no real journalism and a weak Internet presence, Syrian artists became increasingly courageous in skewering the Ba'athist Assad regime with the psychologically lethal weapon of satire.

Dictator Bashar al-Assad is said to be extremely sensitive to ridicule, in part for his own political survival

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and in part because of a physical feature—an unusually long neck—that makes him an easy target for cartoonists, puppeteers, and other artists.

"From the beginning the regime has known it's dangerous to use the image, to use art," Syrian artist Aram Tahhan told CNN. "The camera is the equal of any weapon from the point of view of the regime."[18]

Many of the authors needed no Internet. They spread their message through songs, cartoons, and poetry. They moved from their traditional skirting of social boundaries to becoming literal iconoclasts, smashing regime personalities and symbolism head-on. Others used the Internet to reach audiences both in Syria and around the world. A group of ten artists, calling themselves Masasit Mati, created cheap, easy-to-smuggle finger puppets of regime leaders to star in a video lampoon called "Top Goon."[19] The very simple—and very funny—puppet show ripped down the regime's fragile cult of personality around Bashar "Beeshu" al-Assad, his henchman, and his glamorous wife. The simple performances also heaped ridicule on the regime for its atrocities.

These short, comical puppet shows were popular in Syria and around the world, and reduced the regime to repressing puppets. The puppets themselves were an ideal format for underground video resistance. Easy and inexpensive to make, small enough to hide or discard in an emergency, and mercilessly funny caricatures of various Syrian regime figures, the puppets carried out a brilliant divisive operation to embolden the average Syrian and marginalize what was left of the regime. The short and entertaining shows are worth watching and promoting as examples of cultural resistance to dictatorship, and as ideas for battling other adversaries, such as the regime in Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. Top Goon has its own YouTube channel in Arabic, and videos with English captions and subtitles.[20] The entire campaign was possible by a small grant from the government of the Netherlands.

Before the emergence of IS, some foreign observers urged that satirical artistic expression be supported as a tool in Syria against the well-organized, disciplined, militant, and generally unhumorous Muslim Brotherhood, which sought to take control of Syria.

"A creative and resolutely non-violent form of opposition to Bashar al-Assad's regime has taken hold in Syria, as the country's artists respond to the crisis with newfound boldness and purpose, despite the clear dangers in doing so," wrote CNN's Tim Hume.[21]

"Since the uprising, the artists have broken through the wall of fear in Syria and are thinking in another way," said Syrian journalist Aram Tahhan, one of the curators of an exhibition on Syria's creative dissent—Culture in Defiance—on display in Amsterdam. "The uprising has changed the artists' thinking about the task of art in society, how they can do something useful for society," Tahhan said in the CNN report. "They have rewritten everything."[22]

"With works spanning from painting to song to cartoons, puppet theater to graffiti to plays, the exhibition traces the way that Syrian artists have used a range of creative techniques within traditional and new media to create political, populist art that both brooks 'the red line' of dissent and engages the public in unprecedented ways," according to CNN.[23]

North Korea. The totalitarian family dynasty of North Korea may be more absorbent than it seems. The Internet has made Pyongyang acutely sensitive to satire and ridicule. After the 2004 release of the "South Park" puppetry of *Team America: World Police*, rumors circulated in Washington that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il ordered the assassination of producers and directors Trey Parker and Matt Stone.[24] *Team America's* vulgar humor did no damage to American power and prestige, even though it satirized what was then the Global War on Terrorism. But, it pierced the choreographed imagery of Kim's propagandistic persona and turned him into a global object of ridicule.

Kim's son and successor, Kim Jong-un, is even more thin-skinned. When introduced to the world as the successor to his ailing father, South Koreans derided him as a "fat pig" and a "Teletubby."[25] Apparently facing substantial opposition from the ruling elite, Kim Jong-un consolidated his domestic political power through a regime of fear, executing longtime loyalists through the most humiliating and bizarre methods and assassinating his own half-brother. A decade after the release of *Team America*, James Franco and Seth Rogen starred in the action-comedy *The Interview*, in which the CIA recruited their talk show characters to assassinate Kim under the pretext of having him on their television program.[26] The North Korean foreign ministry warned that release of *The Interview* would be an "act of war" that would trigger a "merciless" response.[27]

Bloody as he is, the chubby North Korean dictator appears intensely conscious about his hard-to-control

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Russia's only aircraft carrier, *Admiral Kuznetsov*, 2 August 2012. The mechanically plagued ship is a target ripe for public ridicule, according the author of this article. (Photo courtesy Wikimedia Commons)

weight. In 2016, the Chinese government censored websites that called the 275-pound tyrant "Kim Fatty the Third."[28] When U.S. Sen. John McCain referred to Kim as a "crazy fat kid," the North Korean government called the comment "a provocation tantamount to declaration of war."[29] In the bizarre world of North Korea's hermit regime, where personal image and psychological intimidation are the only means of keeping power, playing on Kim's obsession with his personal appearance could become an important psychological factor in bringing the regime to heel and even hastening its collapse.

Too sensitive to employ? Many of the real-world examples above raise policy questions for the United States and its NATO allies. Has Western society become too sensitive to find such mockery acceptable? In an absurd way, it has become politically and socially normal for the United States to kill and maim people around the world, but forbidden and even immoral to make fun of them. One of the problems to consider is, have we become too politically correct to use ridicule adroitly against targets in traditional or fundamentalist societies because of our own social prejudices and fears about offending (as opposed to killing) others?

Terrorists: The Case for Calling Them Nincompoops

What greater prestige can we confer on a sexually confused jihadist loser than to denounce him and his cause, by name, as existential threats to the United States of America? Why not just call them what they are? Or better yet, why not refrain from calling them anything at all, but let others deliver the message more effectively, without diminishing U.S. prestige?

The purpose of waging terror as a strategy or tactic of warfare is to terrorize populations and decision makers. Terror is a psychological phenomenon of electrochemical reactions within the human brain. We inadvertently assist terrorists in accomplishing their missions when we allow them to instill fear and terror in our individual minds and our societies. We confer prestige upon terrorists by building them up as worthy adversaries or existential threats. And, while concepts for tearing down the enemy's prestige have circulated for more than a decade, there has been little result beyond isolated tactical operations in the field.[30]

What if we just called them out as nincompoops as a matter of national policy? "They blow each other up by mistake. They bungle even simple schemes. They get intimate with cows and donkeys," Daniel Byman and Christine Fair noted in *The Atlantic*. "Our terrorist enemies trade on the perception that they're well trained and religiously devout, but in fact, many are fools and perverts who are far less organized and sophisticated than we imagine. Can being more

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Military Review

WE RECOMMEND



In *Fighting the War of Ideas like a Real War*, J. Michael Waller advances the thesis that employing propaganda and public diplomacy to fight so-called "small wars" is a vital strategic dimension upon which final success actually hinges. He asserts that the war against Islamic terrorists and jihadi insurgents should be seen as first and foremost a war of ideas; however, the author contends this assertion has been frequently overlooked by policy makers, resulting in persistent failure of war efforts. He specifically addresses what he claims are shortfalls in the U.S. strategy for coping with the current operational environment, especially with regard to effectively dealing with Islamic extremism that directly leads to international terrorism. Subsequently, the author discusses the necessity for developing a basic, but uniform and consistent, communications strategy together with a regimen of simple actions that the U.S. government might adopt to wage global ideological conflict on all fronts. He develops recommendations regarding how the United States might mobilize and synchronize its communications resources and policies in a cohesive and comprehensive strategy that aims to simultaneously divide and isolate the enemy while gaining the ideological confidence and support of allies and neutral parties. As part of that strategy, he argues that the U.S. message strategy should be shifted out of the State Department, given to the Department of Defense, and executed primarily through military combatant commands.

realistic about who our foes actually are help us stop the truly dangerous ones?"[31]

How afraid would we be of our enemies, then? How could we better prioritize our targets and how we hunt them down? What can we do better to provoke them into fratricide among themselves? Let's look at highlights from Byman and Fair's essay:

- "Even in the aftermath of the botched Times Square bombing ... the perception persists that our enemies are savvy and sophisticated killers."
- "To be sure, some terrorists are steely and skilled—people like Mohamed Atta ... but the quiet truth is that many of the deluded foot soldiers are foolish and untrained, perhaps even untrainable. Acknowledging this fact could help us tailor our counterterrorism priorities—and publicizing it could help us erode the powerful images of strength and piety that terrorists rely on for recruiting and funding."
- "Nowhere is the gap between sinister stereotype and ridiculous reality more apparent than in Afghanistan, where it's fair to say that the Taliban employ the world's worst suicide bombers: one in two manages to kill only himself. And this success rate hasn't improved at all in the five years they've been using suicide bombers, despite the experience of hundreds of attacks—or attempted attacks."
- "If our terrorist enemies have been successful at cultivating a false notion of expertise, they've done an equally convincing job of casting themselves as pious warriors of God. The Taliban and al-Qaida rely on sympathizers who consider them devoted Muslims fighting immoral Western occupiers. But intelligence picked up by Predator drones and other battlefield cameras challenges that idea—sometimes rather graphically."
- "One video, captured recently by the thermal-imagery technology housed in a sniper rifle, shows two Talibs in southern Afghanistan engaged in intimate relations with a donkey. Similar images abound, including ground-surveillance footage that records a Talib fighter gratifying himself with a cow."
- "Tawdry though this predilection for porn may be, it is not necessarily trivial. There is, after all, potential propaganda value in this kind of jihadist behavior. Current U.S. public diplomacy centers on selling America to the Muslim world, but we

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should also work to undermine some of the myths built up around our enemies by highlighting their incompetence, their moral failings, and their embarrassing antics. Beyond changing how the Muslim world perceives terrorists, we can help ourselves make smarter counterterrorism choices by being more realistic about the profile and aptitude of would-be attackers."[32]

Byman and Fair's approach is exactly opposite the U.S. "narrative" of the past seventeen years. And, it is precisely on target, for it tears apart the pious, self-sacrificial idealism of the enemy—an idealism that the American approach, in many ways, has inadvertently reinforced—and denudes the enemy and their wealthy petrostate sponsors of their moral authority and their sense of invincibility. Furthermore, such exposure plays to social and cultural norms of pride and shame that are far more profound in Muslim states than in Western secular societies.

Some service personnel have collected prurient gun camera and drone videos from Iraq and Afghanistan and posted them online with their own comments. One shows a jihadist who mistakenly sets himself on fire after torching the American flag. Another shows Iraqi insurgents through an infrared scope as they take turns, one holding down a helpless donkey by the neck, while the other pleasures himself in it from behind. Someone created a version of the video set to the Bloodhound Gang's song "The Bad Touch," popularly known by its catchy refrain, "Let's do it like they do on the Discovery Channel."[33] The posts are generally juvenile, crass, and unsophisticated, and apparently never directed at the necessary audiences but instead to the service member's friends. However, they give a sampling of what the United States and its allies commonly have at their disposal.

Then there is the Detroit photo of the Nigerian Christmas bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, with his explosive underwear that failed after the detonator was doused by sweat from his scrotum, and the Saudi bomber who failed to murder Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism chief but blew himself up with a pound of plastic explosives and a cell phone detonator jammed up his bottom.[34] These types of terrorist enemy are not invincible. They are nitwits. They are losers. We should portray them as such. We should make them too radioactive for other radicals to find attractive.

Afghans Do It Their Way

When such themes are too distasteful or inappropriate for U.S. forces to execute, we may find willing local partners. Locals are almost always better at getting under one another's skin than foreigners are, and can be the most credible messengers for our purposes.

The Afghan military began heaping public ridicule on the Taliban for global impact around 2011, in ways acceptable to social norms and without diminution of American military prestige. In one instance, on or about 28 March 2011, Afghan troops paraded two captured transvestite Taliban members before international journalists in Mehteriam, east of Kabul. The prisoners apparently had been caught dressed as women. The bearded prisoner stood dressed in a lovely purple traditional dress and green hijab, complete with delicate lace and embroidery. The other, clean-shaven, sported a beautiful tangerine-colored gown with needlepoint floral designs and a locally fashionable jangle belt. Apparently the transvestite Taliban had dressed as women to get close to Americans and kill them. If the U.S. military was involved, there was no public evidence; all credit went to the Afghan military in a story and photo gallery that the Associated Press carried worldwide.[35]

Islamic State/Daesh

We find little to make fun of regarding IS. However, there are still stories and pieces of evidence that resourceful PSYOPers can use to grind down the invincible image of IS, if not through ridicule, at least through other forms of derision. Following the lead from Arab partners, more nations are referring to IS as "Daesh." This Arabic acronym translates to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in English, but the terrorist group finds the use of this moniker offensive. Daesh has threatened to cut out the tongues of people using the word.[36]

Dangers of Ridicule

Used carelessly or indiscriminately, ridicule can create enemies where there were none and deepen hostilities among the very peoples whom the user seeks to win over. Weaponizing ridicule presents dangers to friendly locals who can do it best. As a testimony to both the vulnerability to ridicule and the courage of individuals who take on murderous opponents with laughter, comedians have paid with their lives.

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Syria's Ba'athist regime responded to ridicule with horrific brutality. Agents broke the hands of an opposition political cartoonist, mutilated and murdered a singer, and cut out the vocal chords of a poet who recited verse that offended the government. Instead of backing down, Syrian artists ratcheted up their satirical assault on their tormenters.[37]

Prominent Somalian comedian Abdi Jeylani Malaq Marshale, known popularly as Marshale, was one of the fallen. He gleefully skewered Islamist extremists, impersonating al-Shabaab insurgents as part of his comedy routine until jihadists assassinated him in 2012.[38] He knew he was on the terrorists' death list but kept making fun of them anyway. "He had not done anything wrong to anybody, as far as we are concerned, but they shot him in the head and shoulders," a presenter at Kulmiye radio told the BBC. "This is a black day for the entire entertainment industry. He was a leader in Somalia comedy and everybody liked his performance."[39]

The physical dangers to courageous local comedians present opportunities for others to provide them protection—either at home or in exile—as well as studio, broadcasting, and online resources to continue to reach their audiences and targets.



Abdi Jeylani Malaq Marshale was a popular Somalian writer, actor, and comedian on radio and television who was known for his parodies of local Islamist militants and the Transitional Federal Government. He had been threatened by the al-Shabaab insurgent group in 2011, forcing him to hide in the northern Somaliland region for several days. On 31 July 2012, Marshale was shot by two unidentified, pistol-wielding men shortly after leaving the Kulmiye radio station and before arriving at his home in the Waberi District of Mogadishu. He later died from head and chest wounds at the Medina Hospital. (Photo courtesy of VOA Somalia)

Conclusion

Satire and ridicule are effective, inexpensive instruments of psychological warfare. They require few resources and little infrastructure. Whether the situation calls for young Venezuelan women taking off their pants to taunt the manhood of riot police, sending a salvage tug to wreck the prestige of a menacing warship, waging memetic warfare with homemade memes, or launching a full-scale campaign to cause terrorists and dictators to self-destruct, ridicule is a powerful tool to capture popular imagination and give people courage while tearing down a target.

The U.S. government, though poorly conditioned to use ridicule as a strategic tool, nevertheless has all the capabilities it needs to start experimenting. Under proper leadership, PSYOPers can begin immediately at the battalion level while others explore ridicule more deeply as a strategic weapon. We can then open our eyes to see the weapons at our fingertips all around us that we had never noticed before. ■

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Fabian Strategy for a Twenty-First Century Hannibal

Reinvigorating U.S. Strategy in Iraq and Syria

Maj. Kyle D. Packard, U.S. Army

After nearly sixteen years of persistent conflict, the United States has come full circle—there is yet another large, ungoverned space filled with Islamic militants intent on waging jihad against the West. The ability of the Islamic State (IS) to amass an estimated twenty thousand fighters on its way to defeating the Iraqi security forces was the final confirmation that the U.S. strategy for the Middle East has failed both to eliminate the threat presented by IS and to spread liberal democracy in that region.[1] An appreciation of how U.S. strategy evolved from the Bush to the Obama administrations, and why these two strategies failed, is essential to informing a new strategy for victory.

Force must play a leading role because hope of a purely diplomatic breakthrough seems naive when one side's *raison d'etre* is so closely tied to the other's destruction. While a ground invasion and counterinsurgency effort may well suit such conditions, the American people have already shunned the generational effort required.[2] A decapitation strategy, with its reliance on drones and special operations, has proven to be more sustainable, though the enemy's hydra-like resilience suggests the United States can do no better than share Israel's fate of endlessly "mowing the grass."[3] Syria's cauldron presents another way for force to take center stage.

Illustration of George Washington in Frank Keating's *George: George Washington, Our Founding Father* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 3 January 2012). George Washington was able to defeat a larger, better equipped British force through a guerrilla-style war of attrition. This approach is known as the Fabian strategy after Roman General Quintus Fabius Maximus, who thwarted the invasion of Rome by Carthaginian General Hannibal using similar methods. (Illustration by Mike Wimmer)

The Bush Administration: A Ways-Means Mismatch

The shock of 9/11 gave new life to old ideas. In the American political tradition of describing world events as the struggle of good versus evil, Islamic radicalism assumed the role communism had vacated. As with the U.S. effort in southeast Asia some five decades ago, a Manichaean bent in U.S. foreign policy confused peripheral for vital national interests.[4] When Islamic radicalism anywhere became a threat everywhere, a miscalculation of the means and public will

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necessary to defeat a global movement on the periphery of U.S. interests occurred just as it had in Vietnam. In an address to a joint session of Congress shortly after 9/11, President George Bush reintroduced this Cold War worldview to the nation: "Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."[5] The Bush administration's chosen ways and means, or lack thereof, were equally clear: American military power would transform the Middle East via force, the economy would not be mobilized, and the American public would not be burdened with a tax increase to pay for the war. The Bush administration's strategy is therefore best captured as unlimited war pursued by limited means.

An assumption of a quick military victory followed by spontaneous political revolution underestimated the probability and costs of transforming the Middle East. Although it was correct to assume U.S. military superiority, the Bush administration's emphasis on military power prevented a clear-eyed assessment of the extent political reconciliation, let alone transformation, was even possible.[6] As prewar expectations of a quick victory were dashed, the realities of nation building under an insurgency exposed the limits of public tolerance for expending blood and treasure on the periphery of U.S. interests. From the beginning of the Iraq war, Baathist-enabled Islamic militant groups were in an existential fight, choosing to fight alongside jihadists rather than face a newly empowered, revenge-minded Shia majority.[7] In comparison, once the memory of 9/11 began to fade, and radical Islamism proved unable to threaten the American way of life, the political costs required to match the insurgency's effort in Iraq proved to be unsustainable.[8]

A strategic reassessment, triggered by Iraqi domestic politics circa 2006, could have prevented this misallocation of resources. Unfortunately, the decision to surge forces was based upon maintaining credibility rather than identifying a sustainable path to victory.[9] Sustainability in a democracy rests on public support. Lives and money expended must roughly equate to both the public's perceptions of the effort's relative importance and the probability of its success. To be sure, a misalignment of this type does not doom a strategy out of hand. It does however curtail the timetable for success; victory must be swift. Otherwise, even a correct strategic approach will be robbed of the time necessary to see it through.

Optimism does not equate to approval, tacit or otherwise. U.S. public optimism about Iraq reached 65 percent in late 2008, a year into the surge. Paradoxically, a CNN/ORC poll taken fifty times between 2006 and 2011 averaged a 33 percent public approval rating for the war effort, while never recording support above 40 percent or below 29 percent. And from 2006 to 2014, when CNN/ORC pollsters asked whether the outcome in Iraq justified the loss of American life, affirmative responses peaked in 2006 at only 29 percent and trended downward to 18 percent in 2014.[10]

The surge undoubtedly created the conditions by which the United States could exit honorably from Iraq; however, it also made clear that the public would deny policy makers the option of maintaining surge-level conditions indefinitely. Resolving the sectarian differences at the heart of the insurgency required an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces.[11] An enduring U.S. security buffer was needed for any hope of a Sunni-Shia power sharing agreement.[12] The United States should therefore have taken steps to drive down casualties to make a long-term U.S. troop commitment more tolerable to the American public. The inability to sustain such an effort helped cement the power of a Shia-dominated government, whose mistreatment of its Sunni population would make the Islamic State possible.[13]

The American experience in Iraq highlights the obstacles to waging protracted limited war in a democratic society.[14] Though a generational commitment, fueled by resolute public support for a counterinsurgency approach, makes for an interesting counterfactual, an open-ended commitment of blood and treasure at the periphery of U.S. interests rings incompatible with democratic society.[15] Advancing democracy for democracy's sake has its limits. The lesson is twofold. First, force can only create the time for a political alternative to radical Islamism to take root—for which no timeline exists. Second, any subsequent strategic approach must account for the resolve of a war weary public.

The Obama Administration: A Ways-Ends Mismatch

In contrast to the Bush approach, the Obama administration's strategy regarding combatting Islamic extremism was best defined as a limited war pursued by limited

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means. When compared to the view of his predecessor, President Barack Obama did not view the world as a zero-sum game between the West and radical Islam; consequently, there was a clear delineation between vital and peripheral interests. In 2013, in his hallmark national security speech, Obama emphasized, "Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless 'global war on terror,' but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America."[16] To achieve this, the Obama administration's strategy preference was to partner with states affected by Islamic militants to provide limited military assistance as opposed to relying on large U.S. troop deployments.[17]

> "Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless 'global war on terror,' but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America."

Beginning in 2013, the crux of the Obama administration's strategy lay in soliciting greater participation in the counterterrorism effort by legitimate governments. In theory, this would reduce political costs, shift the burden to other militaries, and bolster the legitimacy of regional allies.[18] But, in reality, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria together with those within the weak or failed states of Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan precluded the administration from attaining partners of consequence. With no way of stabilizing the areas where Islamic extremist groups were thriving, the de facto U.S. approach became a decapitation strategy in which the only effective strategic choice was to attrit terrorist leadership.[19] Though drone strikes and clandestine raids may have eked out a modicum of temporary security at a sustainable rate, societal political deficiencies at the root of insurgent motivation were left unaddressed under the somewhat delusional assumption that Islamists might reconcile their hatred of modernity once a sufficient, yet unknowable, amount had been killed.[20]

Subsequently, experience has shown that a decapitation strategy cannot degrade, and ultimately defeat, IS. Despite the success of drone strikes in eliminating enemy senior leaders, a decapitation strategy only changes the names and faces of those threatening the United States; it does nothing to support the growth of moderate governments that can provide viable political alternatives to radical Islamism. The United States can neither kill itself out of the war nor mark time while it waits for the end to an Islamic reformation. Here the lesson is singular: a decapitation strategy expends a sustainable rate of effort to achieve proximate goals acceptable to the American public, but it fails to tackle the war's root cause.[21]

The problem of addressing the root causes of insurgent wars is now exacerbated by the fact that the West has tired of seemingly fruitless interventions in the Middle East. Consequently, it is unlikely that NATO or individual U.S. allies will demand action; and, as long as the war stays confined to Iraq and Syria, it is even more unlikely that the domestic pressure to launch a ground invasion will increase to any significant level.[22] It would therefore appear that U.S. strategic options are limited. On the contrary, it is the very lack of a large U.S. presence in Iraq that provides the United States with a new low-cost, high-payoff strategic option.

Turning the Tables on the Fabian Gridlock


Political preferences aside, a consensus among American politicians still exists that the threat posed by Islamic extremism warrants military action. However, the political commitment required to independently bring about a military solution simply does not. The sum of events has all the hallmarks of a military misfortune, where victory seeks destruction, but the only sustainable approach accomplishes nothing beyond mowing the grass. The United States must learn, anticipate, and adapt.[23]

The solution lies with an innovative form of the strategy responsible for winning American independence employed by Gen. George Washington. He was able to defeat a larger, better-equipped and

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better-trained British-led force by adopting a Fabian strategy, a strategic approach named after Quintus Fabius Maximus, a Roman general, who, in 221 BC, thwarted the invasion of Rome by Carthaginian general Hannibal by using a guerrilla-style war of attrition to isolate and starve the enemy force. Similarly, the American Fabius—Washington—lured, isolated, trapped, and defeated a superior British army.

The preceding survey of the twenty-first century U.S. strategic experience by presidents Bush and Obama against radical Islamism found one administration lured into the clutches of a Fabian trap, with the other desperately trying to extricate itself before defeat. A Fabian strategy traditionally favors the weaker belligerent. Qualitatively and quantitatively disadvantaged, the weak avoid decisive engagements to harass overextended lines of communication with hit-and-run, guerilla-like tactics. Victory hinges upon extending hostilities beyond the moral and political commitment of the stronger side, before an accusation of cowardice forces action the weaker side cannot win. Properly executed, the stronger belligerents eventually succumb to Fabian-style attrition as their will to continue falters long before any tangible considerations are ever in doubt. All this is predicated upon correctly predicting sustainability of the conflict: the weaker side must be able to run a carefully calculated marathon, while the domestic circumstances of the stronger require a sprint.[24]



The marble statue of Roman Dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus named *Statue of Fabius Cunctator* (1773–1780), by artist Joseph Baptist Hagenaue, located in the Schönbrunn Garden at Schönbrunn Palace in Vienna. Photo taken 24 January 2007. (Photo to courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

As a test of wills, a Fabian strategy may seem inappropriate at first. The United States is militarily superior to any potential foe, let alone those in Syria, and its public has already shown an aversion to long-term commitments for what are perceived to be less than existential crises. Thus, the United States may now appear militarily to be more Carthage than Rome, more Hannibal than Fabius. However, failure up until the present to achieve political objectives through military efforts necessitates reevaluating all strategic possibilities for the future. Toward that end, the state of play in Syria and Iraq lends itself to a contrarian conception of what protracted war can offer the equivalent of a twenty-first century Hannibal. The zealous commitment of IS, combined with a small U.S. footprint where the fighting is most intense, presents an opportunity to reverse the Fabian strategy, neutralizing the disadvantages typical of the stronger belligerent. The arc of the radical Islamic movement provides key insights on the vulnerabilities of IS to such an approach.

Increasingly more dogmatic interpretations of Islam throughout the last forty years have given rise to progressively more violent groups, eventually leading to IS. Finding politics incompatible with a more stringent interpretation of Islam, disillusioned members of the Muslim Brotherhood first found common cause with the centrality of violence in Salafism in the 1970s.[25] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan then cemented violence and the concept of martyrdom as a political instrument of change for the war's Salafi-jihadist veterans, who later coalesced around al-Qaida's vision of an international caliphate by the 1990s.[26] The cultish adherence to martyrdom in Salafism eventually superseded al-Qaida's political ends, as personified in the schism between Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who gave the Iraq War its sectarian hue in 2006. This trend toward increasingly apolitical ends culminated with rise of the Islamic State and its vision of absolute violence in pursuit of an end of times prophecy.[27] With IS, violence

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and death have become ends in and of themselves as war simply grinds away in a perpetual march toward the prophesied Islamic apocalypse.

To be sure, planting the black flag in Syria marks a low-point in the West's struggle against radical Islamism. But for IS, geopolitical considerations are secondary to ideology.[28] Establishing the caliphate inaugurates the war with both nonbelievers as well as Shia Muslims that will culminate with the end time.[29] Syria is at the center of such prophecies.

Additionally, involvement by Iran and Russia must now be factored into the Syrian conflict. Tehran's special relationship with the Assad regime and desire for regional hegemony have made for de facto Iranian involvement in Syria. And, whether Putin's involvement in Syria is linked mainly to Russia coveting Tartus as a warm water port on the Syrian coastline, or is merely a tool for domestic distraction, IS stands in his way. Irrespective of ends, two U.S. adversaries—Russian and Syria—have willfully tied themselves to breaking the largely Sunni Islamic State's apocalyptic drive. Consequently, the time for the United States to exact a pound of flesh has come.

A New Strategy for Victory

A new U.S. strategy is needed to simultaneously contain the war within Iraq and Syria while attempting to protract it with the aim of pitting the will of IS against Iranian and Russian regional ambitions. The United States should exert the current, sustainable rate of effort to exact incremental costs on overly invested adversaries. This new strategy would effect a reversal of the Fabian strategy (e.g., the stronger side playing not to lose, but exhausting its weaker foes in the process). As with the Anbar Awakening, political compromise could be expected to occur when the adversaries will to continue is sufficiently exhausted.[30]

To effect such a change in strategy, an overt operational shift would be unnecessary. A small number of U.S. special operation forces would continue to train and assist the moderate opposition, reducing U.S. exposure to the costs of direct combat. Air strikes would complement the moderate opposition's ground campaign, effectively compensating for their tactical deficiencies. Arms shipments would continue as well, in an attempt to offset Russian air and Iranian ground support. Under such circumstances, there would be no need to align with the Russian cause or covertly support a less than moderate opposition. The distinction lies with intent.

The official position of the United States would continue to call for the destruction of IS and the removal of the Assad regime. Rather than pursue such objectives offensively, the United States would shift to a defensive mindset. The goal of which would be to deny any side a decisive advantage, thus protracting the war. By simultaneously depleting Russia and Iran, whatever political compromise emerges will have no other choice but to lean westward, leaving the United States in a position to leverage reconstruction aid for liberal reforms.

Negotiations provide the playbook for the most effective method of ensuring a protracted conflict. As they have already shown no intent of abiding by international norms, the operational pause that accompanies negotiations allows Assad and his benefactors to recover from potentially catastrophic setbacks. The military alternative, or the proactive method of ensuring a protracted conflict, would be to pursue indecisive lines of operations in the style of Gen. George McClellan, the civil war general infamous for his indecisiveness. The means of prolonging the conflict are flexible, as there are an infinite number of ways to keep an already wounded opponent bleeding.

To mitigate the risks of protracting the war in Iraq and Syria, the United States will need to sequence efforts in other theaters and account for the influence of the United Nations. First, the decapitation strategy should continue in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan, as an attack on the U.S. homeland would end any hopes of keeping the war in Iraq and Syria at a distance. Next, the United States should sustain current troop levels in Afghanistan to maintain the status quo. Finally, the United States must control the narrative of the humanitarian crisis. The United States could either fund the $669 million required to implement the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' plan to stem the refugee crisis in Europe or provide Turkey with direct aid.[31] Regardless, preventative action should be taken to fend off calls for an intervention under the Responsibility to Protect or to stem refugee flows.[32] If any of these efforts are compromised, there should be an immediate reassessment of whether containment and protraction remains viable.

The last sixteen years have been a referendum on wars of choice in the Middle East. The American people

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appeared to have concluded that the generational effort required for democratization of the Middle East by force is unacceptable. A decapitation strategy gives all appearances of being acceptable, but is insufficient in scope to bring about a self-sustaining peace. Protracting the war merges the necessary with the acceptable, seizing upon the sustainability of a decapitation strategy to achieve ends only once thought possible with a commitment to population-centric counterinsurgency.

Conclusion

In Syria sits a bubbling cauldron of secular interests and messianic prophecy. Iran and Russia have since leapt into the fray, seeking to prevent this witches' brew from boiling over. And, while the United States is certainly not unaffected by these developments, the changing circumstances have opened doors to strategic options heretofore inconceivable: a large contingent of U.S. ground forces no longer serves as a common target. Replaced with a mixture of proxies, special operations forces, and air power, a light footprint pursues ends at an acceptable rate. Sustainability provides strategic flexibility.

However, despite a window of opportunity opening, strategic orthodoxy is squandering an opportunity for force to achieve universal ends against radical Islamism. The strong ought to exploit the superior will of the weak. In this reversal of the Fabian strategy, the United States permits the apocalyptic drive of IS to fuel the conflict; uses adequate military power to extend it; and traps Iran and Russia inside. The United States has waged war in the Middle East for far too long on the assumption that anything other than complete exhaustion of its adversaries could produce victory. Force has consequently blundered along unable to achieve the desired political ends for nearly a generation. In turning the tables of the Fabian strategy upon the enemy, force and policy can align to bring about a self-sustaining peace. ■

The opinions expressed here are the author's alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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
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An Islamic State (IS) propaganda video (ca. March 2015) on YouTube reputedly shows fighters studying the Quran at an undisclosed location in Iraq. The fighters are said to be on holiday from a prolonged period of territorial conquest, which included attacks on Yazidis, Kurds, and diverse denominations of Iraqi Christians. The video was subsequently removed. (Screenshot from IS YouTube video)

The Mission Command of Islamic State

Deconstructing the Myth of Lone Wolves in the Deep Fight

1st Lt. Michael P. Ferguson, U.S. Army

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And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the [unbelievers] wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush.

—At-Tawbah 5

Some in the Western world apparently have concluded that individual attackers who claim allegiance to the Islamic State (IS)—but lack formal orders from its leaders—are lone wolves or entirely self-radicalized terrorists. However, using Army doctrinal principles to conduct a careful analysis reveals that the theocratic ideology of IS influences individual attackers to consider themselves directed by IS despite their not being formally enrolled members of that militant organization. This is because IS uses a simplified but highly effective form of ideological mission command that guides such followers around the world to plan attacks that have strategic implications. Individual attackers who target civilians they likely regard as uncommitted enemy forces represent a *deep* fight that has become, in effect, IS's decisive operation.[1]

Downplaying the significance of such attacks for lack of the attacker's direct physical or command links to the organization is counterproductive to the effort to limit its recruiting power. By examining IS literature in the context of its apocalyptic grand strategy, we may observe how IS, sometimes called Daesh, links operational art to strategic objectives through an inherent mission command philosophy.[2] More important, these findings contribute to seeking a potential solution to the most pressing inquiry: How does one defeat an idea?

Mission Command and Islamic State

Mission command is a longstanding philosophy that Army doctrine began to emphasize with the publication of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command*, in 2012. This ADP was partially a response to the increased uncertainty of operating environments and the growth of transnational terror groups that benefit from a highly adaptive and decentralized composition.[3] In the Army, mission command empowers subordinate leaders by providing a framework for the disciplined conduct of operations. More specifically, ADP 6-0 describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, "combine the art of command and science of control to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and accomplish missions."[4]

Conversely, IS's application of a mission command philosophy relies on a shared understanding of history, theocratic jurisprudence, and fatwas issued by historical leaders such as Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328), Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (1941–1989), many of which justify the targeting of civilians, including Muslims, in war.[5] While living under the rule of Islamized Mongols, Ibn Taymiyyah diverged from popular Islamist thought and issued several fatwas legitimizing the killing of Muslim tyrants. Certain Salafists used these fatwas to validate the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, and they continue to cite them today.[6] As IS's leaders are empowering such ideas, individual terrorists, sometimes erroneously labeled in the West as "lone wolves" or "self-radicalized," have taken initiative to operationalize their ideology.

These terms have gained such traction that politicians have been known to structure their policy proposals around tackling the "issue of self-radicalization" and "lone-wolf attacks."[7] Such proposals operate under the false assumption that these problems are separate from, and should therefore be treated differently than, attacks on U.S. soil that are formally directed by a distant commander, even though they originate from the same source: ideology. While military operations and domestic security are certainly separate affairs both politically and legally, the ideological nature of the terrorist threat to the homeland and our forces abroad is not unique to either environment. A jihadist who takes initiative based on his understanding of the commander's intent is no less dangerous and his actions are no less significant than one who receives a verbal or written order. The philosophy of mission command is driven by such initiative and carried out within the framework of a

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
shared understanding. This paper addresses these misnomers further while examining the principles.

Although IS's approach to mission command demonstrates how its followers understand situations and accomplish missions, this philosophy would be of little value were IS not able to synchronize random attacks in its deep fight with the group's strategic objectives. Before we explore the principles, we must first examine the connection between the operational art of ideologically motivated terrorist attacks and the strategic ideology of IS.

Operational Art and the Strategic Goals of Islamic State

The Army describes operational art as "the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose."[8] Attacks conducted as guided by IS's ideology are examples of such tactical actions. A fundamental strategic objective identified in Salafi-jihadi ideology (the ideology of IS and al-Qaida) is the initiation of the prophesied Muslim Armageddon. This end-time event is supposedly triggered through a prolonged war of attrition against the West, its ideas, and its systems of governance, culminating in its destruction. All goals are supplementary to realizing the foretold defeat of a large "crusader" army in Dabiq (in northern Syria), which supposedly leads to the fall of Rome and Constantinople.[9]

This prophecy is so central to IS's ideology that its first English language periodical is named after the city of Dabiq. The name of its other online magazine, *Rumiyah*, refers to the inevitable fall of Rome and the Vatican. Every issue of *Dabiq* magazine begins with a quote from its modern intellectual pioneer, former leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: "The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and it will continue to intensify—by Allah's permission—until it burns the crusader army in Dabiq."[10] Through the onset of widespread disorder, IS hopes to make populations more sympathetic to the absolute control of sharia (Islamic religious law), and ultimately susceptible to the imposition of a global caliphate once the West is drawn to its demise in Dabiq.



Rumiyah is the current formal online magazine of the Islamic State (IS). It first appeared as a replacement for *Dabiq*, the former official online magazine of IS, in September 2016, probably due to the imminent loss of the town of Dabiq to Turkish-led forces. The town of Dabiq is the supposed site of the final battle between Islamic and non-Islamic forces at the end of the world according to Islamic prophecy and tradition. Similarly, *Rumiyah* is an allusion to the prophesied destruction of Christianity symbolized by the conquest and destruction of Rome. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia)

Palestinian jihadist Abdullah Yusuf Azzam's seventy-page fatwa, *In Defense of Muslim Lands*, declared offensive jihad the individual responsibility of every Muslim in the absence of a caliphate.[12] Now, with the existence of IS, that fatwa enjoys greater legitimacy in its followers' thinking as the leaders endorse global jihad in the form of attacks carried out in the deep fight.

Pakistani Brig. S. K. Malik draws similar conclusions in his popular 1979 book, *The Quranic Concept of War*. In it, he argues it is incumbent upon all Muslims to fight for God's sovereignty on earth as long as the heretical nation-state system remains in place and sharia is not universal law.[13]

In the twenty-first century, radicals focus increasingly on a loose interpretation of Islamic laws related to killing. Specifically, they highlight those laws that hold individual citizens of democratic states responsible for the "supposed crimes of their government" because they have given the consent to govern through the democratic process.[14] This outlook reinforces the Salafi belief that there can be only one state and one governing system (a global IS under sharia), thereby branding the authority of any other state illegitimate. It is such ideas that lead some Islamists to regard carrying out ideologically influenced attacks as an obligation in the deep fight against secular governments and their citizens, thus functioning as the link between tactical actions and strategic objectives. Their goal is to lure the West into a close fight by way of harassing

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A screenshot from a surveillance camera shows Zale Thompson, labeled a self-radicalized Muslim, raising a hatchet 23 October 2014 moments before striking a group of four uniformed New York Police Department (NYPD) officers in Jamaica, Queens, New York. Thompson was shot dead by two of the officers. (Photo courtesy of NYPD)

attacks in the deep fight, thereby enabling their apocalyptic prophecy to become manifest.

While ideologically motivated attacks may not pose an existential threat to the degree of, say, North Korea, they still influence Western policy and should therefore not be treated with misguided euphemisms such as "lone wolf" in an attempt to downplay the ideology's reach.[15] As early as 2014, Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, now serving as U.S. secretary of defense, testified that IS had "grown into a strategic threat" that would use its territory as a "launching pad for transnational attacks." He went on to caution against patronizing or dismissing IS's threats, even if its followers "[could] not yet carry out their grandiose pronouncements."[16] Nevertheless, how they apply an organic form of mission command is critical to how they might propagate their operational art in pursuit of their strategic goals.

The Principles of Islamic State's Mission Command

The mission command philosophy offers six principles, outlined in Army doctrine. Each of these is inherent within IS's ideology. We will focus on the first five principles and explain why the sixth, *mission orders*, does not appear to be demonstrated.

Build cohesive teams through mutual trust. While trust must be nurtured consistently in a traditional Army, IS establishes this connection through allegiance to its religious ideology. Army doctrine explains there are "few shortcuts to gaining the trust of others," and this trust is "gained or lost through everyday actions."[17] Discussing the key attributes of mission command in his 2012 white paper, Gen. Martin Dempsey describes trust as "the moral sinew" that binds our joint force together, "enabling the many to act as one" in the application of combat power.[18] He goes on to reiterate the importance of a commander's role in developing this trust by integrating mission command into "operational art, planning, and

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execution," a complex process that requires a breadth and depth of knowledge to be effective.

In the case of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's alleged lineage from the *Quraysh* tribe, of which the prophet Muhammad was a member, is aimed at obligating religious allegiance among the faithful. Claiming a blood connection to Muhammad is intended to promote mutual trust and common identity among IS's members, regardless of cultural, ethnic, economic, or geographic diversity factors, by exploiting the narrative of a shared legacy consisting of centuries of support for Islamic legal declarations.[19] As a result, there is no need for the command to spend time building teams outside the central leadership organization because terrorists build teams regardless of their directed or undirected status.

Terrorist attacks are global communication devices that function as vehicles for the attackers' ideology. Communicated through modern media systems, the message reaches millions of people instantaneously and draws sympathetic individuals into radicalization.[20] The more shocking the attack, the larger the audience and the further the reach of the message. Inevitably, more recruits become entangled in IS's ideological dragnet.

IS projects to its audience the impression that social inclusion, loyalty, and brotherhood personify its movement. By connecting its followers to an ancient order of allegedly pious warriors defending a golden age of religious purity, members of IS become fused in allegiance to a mutual code of conduct that supersedes all worldly relationships. Once the ideology takes hold of followers' thinking, small cohesive teams are self-actuating, operating autonomously based on a shared understanding of their duty.

Create shared understanding. One of the greatest challenges for commanders and staffs "is creating a shared understanding of their operational environment, their operation's purpose, its problems, and approaches to solving them."[21] While standing armies rely on adaptable mission orders and evolving policies to establish a shared understanding of priorities, under Salafi doctrine these factors do not change.

It is easy to imagine why Islamists pursue jihad with such vigor. Narratives of the battles in which Muhammad participated—some of the most sacred references in Salafism—read like action films. Oxford historian Martin Lings' depiction of the Battles of Hunayn and Uhud and the Siege of Ta'if are examples. Envisioning Muhammad's washing the enemy's blood off his face with water that had pooled in his companion's shield presents powerful imagery to young jihadists.[22] It is no wonder the followers of an ideology that demands emulation of the Prophet would be so eager to confront pagans in glorious battle.

Looking beyond historical battles, IS's shared understanding is further supported by centuries of theocratic jurisprudence and political violence.[23] In the tenth and eleventh centuries, Ibn Hanbal's disciples advocated killing those who blasphemed Islam. Caliph al-Qadir supported this stance and enforced it as law.[24] More than a century later, the Hanbali scholar Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (deceased in 1166) argued that heretics should be offered three chances to repent and convert before they would be condemned to death.[25] It is also worth noting that, in the turbulent centuries of early Islam, many caliphs were killed by sectarian insurgencies claiming the then current body of authority was impure.[26]

Today, the argument is sometimes made that in the absence of a Muslim empire capable of imposing such laws on mankind, modern day Islamist extremists who subscribe to such medieval interpretations of Islamic law view attacks against civilian targets as the most swift form of "justice."[27]

Conventional armies require constant framing and reframing of the environment to focus efforts, dictate training priorities, and work toward a common goal. In contrast, the ideology of Salafism produces a transnational and cross-cultural unity of effort guided by the commander's intent because it provides a shared understanding of three elements:

- The ideology defines the enemy (*kafir* [unbelievers], *taghut* [tyrants], and classic liberalism).[28]
- The ideology defines the operating environment (*dar-al-harb* [house of war or unbelief] and *dar-al-islam* [house of Islam]).[29]
- The ideology defines the desired end state (a global caliphate brought on by Armageddon).

Provide a clear commander's intent. The commander's intent—also known as "the purpose of the operation"—is usually specific to a particular mission for standing armies.[30] The intent of IS's commander is unchanging and pounded into the head of interested jihadists by other IS leaders.[31] It is unmistakably clear to the followers of Salafi-jihadism: fight the unbelievers wherever you find them—show no mercy and strike "terror into their hearts."[32]

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Because, for the IS member, there is no higher authority than God and his Prophet, IS pronouncements often reference the numerous battles Muhammad waged against heretics and pagans to justify offensive jihad. Islamist scholars, such as Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, have contorted the concept of defensive jihad to depict any act of terrorism as a defense of Muslim lands. More specific were arguments made by the late Anwar al-Awlaki, who insisted an earthly caliph was not needed to declare offensive jihad if a Muslim was oppressed by unbelievers.[33] Malik expressed similar convictions regarding the spiritual center of gravity in war, suggesting terror is the most effective weapon against Western opponents because it erodes their will to fight.[34]

In the age of globalization, when Western influence is nearly inescapable, what could be considered the first jihad verse in the Quran stands out as particularly relevant: "Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they have been wronged."[35] Drawing the West into a global conflagration through ideologically motivated attacks serves the strategic objectives of IS, and the ideology imparts a divine authority to its pronouncements.

One of a commander's roles outlined in ADP 6-0 is to influence audiences by developing teams "inside and outside their organizations."[36] To IS, there is no outside element. There are only those forces engaged in the deep fight (the fight against what it considers uncommitted enemy forces). Carrying out an attack after declaring loyalty to IS makes the follower as much a member of IS as any guerrilla fighting in Iraq or Syria. Ideologically motivated terrorists prosecute the deep fight while considering themselves embedded behind enemy lines, and they do not require mission-specific intent to carry out operations that promote strategic objectives.[37] This element is as vital to IS's vision as any insurgent fighting in the Middle East—if not more so.

To clarify, we need to think of individual attacks as the vanguard of IS's deep fight, not impulsive actions of wayward rogues, while Middle East guerrillas in conflict with military forces represent the *close* fight.[38] Influencing this deep element to disrupt *uncommitted enemy forces* (in the case of IS, this means all unbelievers)—a function clearly conveyed by IS's ideology—is similar to the commander's responsibilities outlined in Army doctrine.[39]

The clarity of intent is simple so there need not be any contact (physical or even chain of command) between the organization and its followers for them to pursue operational goals and fulfill strategic intent. This renders the terms lone wolf and self-radicalized inaccurate because such labels imply a detachment or even a disassociation with the group to which jihadists claim allegiance. Profession of the *shahada* (Islamic declaration of faith) and loyalty to al-Baghdadi enter radicals into an ethereal realm where they operate under a shared understanding with clear intent. This is the organization's preferred approach because attacks on civilians in the deep fight attract greater attention and more recruits than military engagements.[40]

Exercise disciplined initiative. The U.S. Army defines initiative as taking appropriate action in the absence of orders. In this context, the entirety of IS's deep fight relies on initiative within the commander's intent. Because ideologically guided terrorists receive no formal orders, they operate based on a shared understanding that failing to take initiative once jihad has become an individual obligation may condemn their souls to hell.[41] Islamists in the deep fight are impelled to act by this hallmark of their ideology, and it is reinforced by regular calls to action.

To the jihadist, discipline when taking initiative is only relevant inasmuch as it allows an attack to come to fruition. Modern armies have myriad considerations when navigating their planning methodologies, but these factors are not inputs into the metrics that gauge degrees of success or failure in operations by terrorists. Increased simplicity and a higher threshold for operational risk present greater opportunity for the application of initiative.

Accept prudent risk. Prudence may be a factor in the planning phase of terrorist attacks but survivability during execution is not. Historically speaking, an Islamic martyr did not often take his own life. Rather, he opted to "place himself in a situation in which he would most likely be killed and thereby did not violate the Quranic prohibition on suicide."[42]

Most jihadists operate under the assumption they will die during their attack, and for good reason. Quranic verses glorifying death and advising against clinging "heavily to earth" give license to the belief that falling in battle affords greater comfort in the "hereafter."[43] Individual radicals do not need IS commanders to give them orders to assume risk because their ideology demands it. Risk becomes somewhat of a marginal planning factor when the acceptable loss

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An Islamic State (IS) instructional video titled "Explanation of How to Slaughter Disbelievers" features a balaclava-wearing terrorist in a kitchen explaining how to make bombs. The video was subsequently removed. (Screenshot from IS YouTube video)

rate is one hundred percent. This expands opportunity and operational payoff exponentially, considering the "willingness to accept prudent risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses."[44]

The ideology of Salafi-jihadism (a combination of religious verses, historical references, and fatwas) is, in effect, a doctrine of mission command that encourages and enables decisive operations in the deep fight. Attacks are carried out not by anomalous lone wolves but, for the most part, by a centralized wolf pack with a collective mind. The only principle lacking is mission orders, because IS doctrine *is* the mission order.

The Mission Command Systems

The economy of IS's mission command systems plays a significant role in achieving its objectives without the need for conventional mission orders. Militaries must negotiate a delicate process of budgeting and long-term planning to secure and maintain the resources necessary for proper maintenance of the mission command systems.[45] These systems are provided through the initiative of the individual jihadist or cell at no cost—monetary or otherwise—to IS's command group.

IS recruits personnel through autonomous and ideologically homogenous networks that exploit the benefits of multipurpose public information systems, such as social media. In this sense, multipurpose means IS can operationalize ideology through freely accessible public information systems that not only supply it with personnel but also help it maintain networks and distribute processes and procedures. Individual cells become responsible for resourcing facilities and equipment at their level, removing the burden of command from IS. Moreover, this allows it to highlight selectively the most effective operations, for which the leaders take credit. By making the deep fight essentially the decisive operation, the return on investment is profound, as IS may pursue its strategic objectives while assuming little risk and expending minimal resources.

As demonstrated in recent terrorist attacks in the United States, deep Islamists operate independently,

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without material support from IS's leaders. They have no mission orders, yet their operations reflect IS's mission command. They only need a shared understanding that allows them to take disciplined initiative within the commander's intent based on their own assessment of risks; all these mission command elements are provided by their religious ideology.[46]

Changing the Paradigm

We need to refine the public discussion on IS. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the establishment of a caliphate makes bolder the distinction between the realms of Islam and unbelievers, thus further obligating individual jihad in defense of God's lands—particularly those lands occupied by unbelievers. In this context, the term "occupied" is more inclusive than conventional wisdom assumes. IS's followers believe the world belongs to Allah; therefore, it is not only Muslim nations with foreign troops on their soil that are considered occupied and in need of liberation but also the entire world.[47] Ibn Taymiyyah wrote that all humans were commanded by God to abandon disbelief, while Sayyid Qutb reinforced the obligation to emancipate all of humanity from godlessness through preaching or jihad.[48]

No matter how much their numbers dwindle, Salafi-jihadists will continue operations, at least until they believe their prophecies are disproven. Their ideology insists that the fiercer the battle becomes, the nearer they are to "the threshold of the promised victory, aided by the Mahdi and Jesus."[49] These beliefs have precedent. During the Battle of Badr, though vastly outnumbered by his Quraysh enemies, Muhammad was ultimately victorious.[50] One could argue that IS's true believers feel confident when surrounded by "crusader" armies.

The battle against IS is one of powerful ideas. Hoover Institution fellow and Israeli intelligence veteran Shmuel Bar articulates this succinctly:

> This war of ideas is a religious war. Whether or not the West sees it as such, it has been so defined by the adversary. ... Islamist terrorism derives legitimacy and justification from Islamic mores and legal thought, and any attempt to deal with it divorced from its intellectual, cultural, religious, and legal fountainhead will be in vain.[51]

The tendency to try to validate terrorists' credentials by linking them to human figures in the Middle East through phone calls or e-mails after an incident reflects a poor understanding of their ideological inspiration. Even more puzzling is the relief presumably associated with failing to discover such connections, as if the implications of the attack are somehow lessened since no direct contacts exist.

Take, for instance, the Orlando and San Bernardino attacks. Press briefings and newspapers flooded quickly with assurances that there was no indication IS "trained or instructed" the shooters, despite their having pledged allegiance to the group and taken action in accordance with its ideology.[52] These attacks show that persons with no formal ties to foreign terror groups are taking initiative to realize the objectives of foreign terror groups. What, then, would be the benefit of IS leaders' assuming the risk of establishing formal, traceable connections if they can achieve their objectives without doing so? We are not fighting an incoherent and disjointed enemy; seemingly independent attackers are indeed carrying out the mission of IS despite their not having specific orders.

Nonetheless, the desire to connect attacks to physical persons is understandable, as it narrows the ways and means through which the state may pursue solutions. If a singular physical target assumes responsibility for the attack, the elimination of said target creates the temporary illusion of a remedy, but the problem will persist.[53]

Instead of promoting education regarding the differences between jihadists and the vast majority of practicing Muslims, some deny there is any connection between Islamic terrorism and Islam.[54] This is erroneous and counterproductive. Denying Islamic terrorism's clear connections to feudal Islamism breeds the very complacency such denial hopes to discourage by ensuring the ideology of our enemies remains esoteric. Restricting this ideology to the dark corners of public discourse makes it much easier for the public to unproductively channel its anger in the wake of terrorist attacks toward what many perceive as the larger and more visible target: the Muslim religion as a whole. Consequently, failing to expose the intricacies of the Salafi ideology and debate its legitimacies or lack thereof in the public sphere could lead to further dilemmas stemming from misinformation; it will not reduce them.

Followers of IS enjoy a shared conviction that, like their heroes who came before them, modern apostate Muslim leaders will brand them "un-Islamic" and persecute them for their piety. For example, the father of Hanbalism, Imam Ibn Hanbal, was imprisoned for his extremism, as was Ibn Taymiyyah and Sayyid Qutb

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many generations later.[55] Consequently, the greater the resistance jihadists face from populist Islam, the more cohesive they may become in their sense of righteousness. This would only reinforce the binary lens through which jihadists view the world, and, in their eyes, further legitimize the indiscriminate targeting of impure nation-states and the citizens who inhabit them.

Conclusions and Recommendations

A significant conclusion drawn from this study is the need for a disinvestment in the belief that terrorist attacks with unity of effort must be defined as the product of command-directed mission orders. The term lone wolf is a misnomer that should be discarded because it downplays the significance of such attacks. IS is capable of, and intent upon, linking operational art to strategic objectives through an ideological mission command approach that underscores the deep fight. Let us instead simply call them jihadists or Islamist terrorists.

Conversations surrounding the ideological center of gravity of IS sometimes end in a question: How does one defeat an idea? The answer is found in a process of observable repudiation of their prophecies by way of public action.

Ideologically motivated attacks are examples of operational art on a path to achieve IS's strategic goal of drawing the West into a final confrontation where the caliphate supposedly triumphs over a "crusader army" in Dabiq. The destruction of IS in Dabiq may offer a window of opportunity because it will not only nullify IS's close forces but also will discredit the ideology empowering its deep element tasked with disrupting supposed uncommitted enemy forces in the West. Discrediting this ideology will isolate it and draw clear lines of delineation between the global Muslim population and the extremists among them. This will also fix the targeted ideology, making it more vulnerable to attack from information operations and reform initiatives.

Before we can reduce the benefits of IS's shared understanding, we must first develop shared understanding of its deep operations. Testifying before a House Intelligence Committee on the threat of IS in 2014, Mattis prioritized clearly: "The robust and coherent strategy to shatter the enemy's designs must start with our comprehending their irreconcilable world view."[56] Understanding how IS's mission command mobilizes the deep fight by connecting operational art to strategic objectives is a step in the right direction. ■

Notes

Epigraph. Quran 9:5. At-Tawba is the ninth chapter of the Quran.

1. Throughout this study, the Islamic State's (IS) ideologically motivated attacks are portrayed as the spearhead of a *deep* fight targeting uncommitted enemy forces, as described in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], May 2012 [now obsolete; superseded November 2016 by ADRP 3-0, *Operations*]), p. 1-11.

2. IS and Daesh can be used interchangeably.

3. Numerous studies suggest that inculcating a mission command philosophy will help meet the increased demand for "decentralized initiative" from our leaders. The largely unconventional environment in which our forces have operated for the last fifteen years has underscored the need for, and at times deficit of, creative ingenuity within our ranks, per Curtis D. Taylor, *Breaking the Bathsheba Syndrome: Building a Performance Evaluation System that Promotes Mission Command* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015), 3. Additionally, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey reinforces the heightened need for leaders who possess superior "creativity, adaptability, critical thinking, and independent, rapid decision-making," in Dempsey, "Mission Command" (white paper, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 April 2012), 6, accessed 18 July 2017, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/missioncommandwhitepaper2012.pdf.

4. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2012), ii.

5. Shmuel Bar, *Warrant for Terror: Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad* (Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 49–55. Numerous fatwas throughout Islam's history justify the targeting of civilians and other Muslims in war under certain conditions.

6. Mona Hassan, "Modern Interpretations and Misinterpretations of a Medieval Scholar: Apprehending the Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyya," in *Studies in Islamic Philosophy: Ibn Taymiyya and his Times*, eds. S. Nomanul Haq, Yossef Rapoport, and Shahab Ahmed (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 355–56.

7. "Hillary Clinton on Tackling Self-Radicalization: 'We Need to Get to Work,'" National Public Radio transcript, 13 June 2016, accessed 18 July 2017, http://www.npr.org/2016/06/13/481860102/hillary-clinton-on-tackling-self-radicalization-we-need-to-get-to-work. This National Public Radio interview occurred shortly after the Orlando nightclub attack that took forty-nine lives.

8. ADP 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, November 2016), 4.

9. Patrick Sookhdeo, *Unmasking Islamic State: Revealing their Motivation, Theology and End Time Predictions* (McLean, VA: Isaac Publishing, 2015), 46–48.

10. "The Return of the Khilafah," Dabiq 1, Ramadan 1435 (July 2014), 1, accessed 27 July 2017, http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-14/

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isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf. This quote appears on the first page of every issue.

11. Sookhdeo, *Unmasking Islamic State*, 18–20. IS leaders believes there is no separation between religion and state because shari'ah is the path to a utopian human existence.

12. Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, "Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Iman," accessed 28 July 2017, http://johnclamoreaux.org/smu/islam-west/s/azzam-def.pdf.

13. Sebastian Gorka, "The Enemy Threat Doctrine of Al Qaeda: Taking the War to the Heart of our Foe," in *Fighting the Ideological War: Winning Strategies from Communism to Islamism*, eds. Katharine Comell Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo (McLean, VA: Isaac Publishing, 2012), 199–200.

14. Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 41–42.

15. John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 69–80. The argument could be made that all terrorism is strategic to this end. The worst attacks are usually those deemed unimaginable before they occur.

16. Testimony by James Mattis (U.S. Marine Corps, retired, former commander of U.S. Central Command), *Hearings on the Threat Posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qa'ida, and other Islamic Extremists, Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*, 113th Cong. (18 September 2014), accessed 19 July 2017, http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/mattistestimony09182014.pdf.

17. ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, pp. 2–3.

18. Dempsey, "Mission Command" white paper, 6. Perhaps there is no more apt depiction of how IS's mutual trust drives the commander's intent: by allowing the many to act as one.

19. For more on this, see Jonathan P. Berkey, *The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

20. Scott Helfstein, *Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism* (West Point, NY: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012), 21. The four phases of radicalization: awareness, interest, acceptance, and implementation.

21. ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 3.

22. Martin Lings, *Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources* (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2006), 193, 317–20.

23. Sookhdeo, *Unmasking Islamic State*, 18–27, 37–60.

24. Patricia Crone, *God's Rule: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 302. Caliph al-Qadir (991–1031) often beheaded those blaspheming the Prophet or the early caliphs (*Rashidun*).

25. Ibid., 391.

26. Berkey, *Formation of Islam*, 71–102.

27. The *shahada* states this explicitly, as do many *ahadith* and numerous diatribes in every issue of *Dabiq*. Furthermore, this is expressed liberally in IS propaganda; see "The Kafir's Blood," Rumiyah 1 (2016), 34, accessed 19 July 2017, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/rome-magazine-1.pdf.

28. Meijer, *Global Salafism*, xi, xiv. *Kafir*: unbelievers. *Taghut*: tyrants (usually in reference to moderate Muslim leaders).

29. Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (New Delhi: Islamic Publications Ltd., 2002). *Dar-al-harb*, House of War (The U.S. and Western territories), and *dar-al-islam*, the House of Islam. Sayyid Qutb uses these terms frequently in his work.

30. ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 3.

31. Judaism is portrayed as an embodiment of the anti-Christ in certain Islamic folklore, such as Ibn Hanbal's "Long Hadith." David J. Halperin, "The Ibn Sayyad Traditions and the Legend of Al-Dajjal," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 96, no. 2, (April-June 1976): 213–25, accessed 19 July 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/599824; see also Lizzie Dearden, "ISIS Calls on Supporters to Wage 'All-out war' on West during Ramadan with New Terror Attacks," The Independent, 26 May 2017, accessed 28 July 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-ramadan-2017-all-out-war-west-new-terror-attacks-manchester-suicide-bombing-islamic-state-a7758121.html.

32. "The Kafir's Blood," 36.

33. Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, 31–39.

34. Gorka, "Enemy Threat Doctrine," 199–200.

35. Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, 39–40.

36. ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 10.

37. "The Murtadd Brotherhood," *Dabiq* 14 (2016), 17.

38. ADP 3-0, *Operations*, 10. The deep fight involves "efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner." To IS, every man, woman, and child living outside sharia are uncommitted enemy forces. *Close* operations involve "operations that are within a subordinate commander's area of operations."

39. "The Kafir's Blood," 35; IS, "The Murtadd Brotherhood," 17.

40. "The Murtadd Brotherhood," 17. IS tells its followers abroad to stay in their country of residence and attack civilians "behind enemy lines" if they cannot make the *hijra* to Syria. The attacks are no longer shaping operations.

41. Bar, *Warrant for Terror*, 36–37.

42. Ibid., 60.

43. Ibid., 59–60.

44. ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 5.

45. Ibid., 11–12. The five mission command systems are personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment.

46. "The Kafir's Blood," 34–36.

47. Bar, *Warrant for Terror*, 18–19. See also Qutb, *Milestones*. Qutb believed people are born in a state of awareness that Islam is truth. Consequently, those who fail to accept this truth remain willfully trapped in a spiritual prison from which they must be "liberated."

48. For Ibn Taymiyyah's statement, see Livnat Holtzman, "Human Choice, Divine Guidance and the Fitra Tradition: The Use of Hadith in Theological Treatises by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya," in *Studies in Islamism: Ibn Taymiyya and His Times*, eds. S. Nomanul Haq, Yossef Rapoport, and Shahab Ahmen (Oxford,UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 177; for Qutb's statement, see Qutb, *Milestones* (1964), 20–21.

49. Soohkdeo, *Unmasking Islamic State*, 50. This is in reference to the final battle between the *mujahid* and crusaders in Dabiq, which prompts the arrival of the *Mahdi* (prophesied messiah) and Jesus's destruction of *al-Dajjal*.

50. Lings, *Muhammad*, 149–56.

51. Bar, *Warrant for Terror*, 113.

52. Lizette Alvarez and Richard Perez-Pena, "Orlando Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub, Leaving 50 Dead," *New York Times* online, 12 June 2016, accessed 17 July 2017, https://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting.html.

53. The killing of Osama bin Laden is one example. His death alone could not contain the spread of his ideology.

54. Phillip Swarts, "CIA Director Echoes Obama: Islamic State is not Islamic," *Washington Times*, 14 March 2015, accessed 28 July 17, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/14/john-brennan-cia-director-backs-obama-islamic-stat/.

55. Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, 31–32.

56. Mattis, *Hearings on the Threat Posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant*.

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III Corps during the Surge
A Study in Operational Art

Maj. Wilson C. Blythe Jr., U.S. Army

The role of Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno's III Corps as Multinational Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) has failed to receive sufficient attention from studies of the 2007 surge in Iraq. By far the most comprehensive account of the 2007–2008 campaign is found in Michael Gordon and Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor's *The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama*, which focuses on the formulation and execution of strategy and policy.[1] It frequently moves between Washington, D.C., U.S. Central Command, and Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF–I) while using tactical actions within Iraq in an illustrative manner. As a result, the campaign waged by III Corps, the operational headquarters, is overlooked in this key work.

The III Corps campaign is also neglected in other prominent works on the topic. In *The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, Thomas Ricks emphasizes the same levels as Gordon and Trainor. However, while Ricks places a greater emphasis on the role of III Corps than is found in other accounts, he fails to offer a thorough examination of the operational campaign waged by III Corps.[2] Kimberly Kagan's *The Surge: A Military History* delivers a predominately tactical portrait of the campaign, focusing on various brigade operations.[3]

A more personality-focused account is offered in Fred Kaplan's *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War*; it recounts the Army's adoption of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine rather than the surge campaign.[4] And, because of his position as the executive officer to the MNF–I commanding general, Col. Peter Mansoor's *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War* naturally gravitates toward Gen. David H. Petraeus.[5] None of these accounts examine the critical role that Odierno's headquarters played in the 2007–2008 surge campaign.

During its second tour in Iraq, III Corps achieved success in reducing the level of violence in Iraq and creating room for political progress such as the February 2008 "trifecta" package of legislation, which included the Provincial Powers Law, limited amnesty, and the 2008 budget.[6] Odierno's command laid the groundwork for successful campaigns in 2007 and 2008. Given the attention garnered by COIN doctrine and the Army's purported focus on the "graduate level of war," what is most striking about III Corps's operations was Odierno's use of concepts and terminology firmly rooted in conventional campaigns. III Corps's achievements as an operational headquarters were rooted in the successful application of operational art.

Operational art is a way to conceptualize how to fight wars using campaigns of multiple, simultaneous, and successive operations across a theater of operations to achieve a unifying goal.[7] While neither downplaying nor minimizing the importance of Army COIN principles, a study of MNC–I's 2007 campaign in Iraq through the neglected prism of operational art suggests that the campaign's success was due to the successful application of already established operational principles rather than from a revolution in the profession of arms.[8]

In December 2006, Odierno's III Corps assumed responsibility for MNC–I from Lt. Gen. Pete Chiarelli's

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Pfc. Brandie Leon, 4th Infantry Division, pulls security 3 March 2006 while on patrol in east Baghdad to help maintain peace after attacks on mosques in the area. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Jason Ragucci, U.S. Army)

V Corps. The security situation in Iraq had deteriorated throughout 2006 (see figure 1, page 80). The 22 February 2006 bombing of Samara's Shia Askariya shrine, also known as the Golden Mosque, caused the nascent ethno-sectarian tensions to explode into open conflict. The bombings spurred large and violent protests throughout Shia neighborhoods in and around Baghdad as well as in other predominantly Shia cities such as Najaf, Karbala, and Basra. With this attack, the conflict devolved from an insurgency to a sectarian civil war that, in November 2006 alone, would claim 3,462 Iraqi lives.[9]


Odierno was charged by the MNF–I commander at the time, Gen. George Casey, with breaking the cycle of sectarian violence. The incoming corps's operational approach was different than its predecessor's. The focus of Chiarelli's V Corps was to consolidate the coalition footprint. As Chiarelli later recalled, "I was told that my job was to get us down to fifty FOBs [forward operating bases] by the end of 2006. My instructions were pretty clear. You will not have 110 FOBs. There were 110 FOBs when I went in 2006."[10] The reduced U.S. presence would be accompanied by a rapid transition to the Iraqi Security Forces as the United States shifted to an overwatch role. This operational focus contributed to the V Corps campaign devolving into a series of disjointed and unconnected tactical actions. Tactically, the result was a failure to retain terrain, and it amounted to U.S. forces being forced to retake the same ground each day after

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surrendering it the previous evening (see figure 2, page 81).[11]

Odierno defined his first priority as securing the Iraqi people, which to him meant defeating an insurgency composed of Sunni and Shia extremists, most notably al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and Iranian-backed Shia Special Groups. The MNC–I operational concept now focused on how to seize and retain the initiative so that the coalition could defeat extremists. Though transition to Iraqi control and responsibility for security was still the eventual goal, MNC–I no longer emphasized it.[12]

While the difference may seem minor or semantic, the change in emphasis was profound, since it indicated that III Corps would no longer measure its progress through the reduction of the coalition footprint in Iraq resulting from the closure of bases; the off-ramping of unit deployments to Iraq; or the usage of sewage, water, electricity, and trash removal metrics. Though it continued to use logical lines of effort, under Odierno, MNC-I placed an increased emphasis on physical lines of operation.[13] At the tactical level, the change in emphasis alleviated the perceived pressure to concentrate onto fewer and fewer bases and allowed tactical units to live on small bases among the population as they had done in the early days of the war. III Corps took a traditional approach to its campaign in 2007 and the first two months of 2008.[14]



(Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History)

Figure 1. Al-Qaida in Iraq, December 2006

Even prior to the announced surge of five additional brigades to Iraq, Odierno planned to conduct multiple simultaneous operations throughout the country.[15] Past corps offensives had focused on a single problem area at a time, such as Fallujah or Najaf, and were in reality tactical battles rather than operations. These battles lacked a pursuit or exploitation phase, the absence of which allowed the enemy to retreat along its physical lines of operation in order to regroup in the safety of its support zones. In keeping with its objective of defeating the insurgency, Odierno's corps launched a series of corps offensives to eject the enemy from territory and to retain the liberated terrain by maintaining forces there. These sustained offensives connected tactical actions across Iraq to better attain strategic ends, a key to the successful practice of operational art.[16]


III Corps's first offensive operation, Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (Enforcing the Law), focused on clearing and retaining terrain throughout Baghdad and its surrounding belts—those provinces encircling the city and controlling access to the capital. Supporting divisional operations in the belts interdicted the flow of accelerants—III Corps's term for the fighters, weapons, and explosives necessary to carry out the attacks and thus trigger the subsequent reprisals—into the capital through offensive

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operations designed to seize and hold terrain in these enemy support zones. This was Odierno's opening gambit in an attempt to transform the insurgent support zone around Baghdad into a coalition security zone and push extremists away from the capital (see figure 3, page 82).[17] In June, MNC–I followed up Fardh al-Qanoon with another corps-level offensive dubbed Operation Phantom Thunder that consisted of simultaneous operations in Baghdad and the surrounding belts. Phantom Thunder aimed to clear extremist support zones and rear areas. It was the first operation to take place with all five surge brigades in country, and the extra combat power allowed Odierno to hold the seized terrain, thus thickening his security zone and preventing the reestablishment of extremist support zones.[18]

By August, it was clear that MNC–I's series of offensive operations had produced an improvement in security throughout those areas of Iraq where the coalition had been able to surge. Odierno was concerned that the extremists planned to draw the coalition away from the areas that MNC–I had successfully cleared and secured so they could return and fill the vacuum left by the coalition. This had been the fate of previous coalition offensives, where MNC–I's failure to conduct simultaneous operations or to pursue had allowed extremists to regroup. Odierno saw that an aggressive pursuit was the best way to dismantle the extremist networks.[19]

In order to both disrupt an expected enemy Ramadan offensive and keep AQI and Special Groups off balance, MNC–I launched Operation Phantom Strike on 15 August 2007. Phantom Strike consisted of "a series of targeted operations designed to intensify the pursuit of extremist elements across Iraq."[20] With the deployment of five additional brigades, a combat aviation brigade, and division headquarters, MNC–I possessed the forces necessary to both hold the already-secured areas and to conduct targeted operations throughout Iraq (see figure 4, page 83). The nearing end of the surge limited the time that the coalition had to take advantage of its full combat potential.[21] Operation Phantom Phoenix carried the pursuit deep into the upper Diyala River Valley and sought to set the conditions for the planned battle for Mosul. However, this battle did not occur after III Corps was replaced by XVIII Airborne Corps in February 2008 because events in Basra necessitated a shift in focus by the government of Iraq and MNC–I. Both of the exploitation and pursuit operations, Phantom Thunder and Phantom Phoenix, saw MNC–I take steps to extend its operational reach in order to allow it to disrupt the enemy in the few remaining areas of Iraq the coalition did not have enough combat power to control.[22]




(Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History)

Figure 2. Disposition of U.S. Forces Central Iraq, Early January 2007

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In order to successfully attack the enemy throughout its depth, MNC–I had to efficiently and effectively use all of the tools at its disposal. Despite the surge of forces into Iraq, the coalition presence was still not large enough to secure every area of the country. Under Odierno, MNC–I designated a Stryker brigade as the operational reserve, sometimes referred to as the "above ground strike force." Though the designation of such a force originated with V Corps, it realized its full potential under III Corps. The strike force was not a battle-space owner but was instead used to weight the main effort, such as during Fardh al-Qanoon when it was used to clear neighborhoods in order to facilitate the deployment of surge brigades into Baghdad, or later to conduct clearing operations in Diyala Province. The Stryker reserve added flexibility to Odierno's operations and allowed him to achieve a decisive combat power advantage wherever he chose to commit it. Another way that Odierno weighted offensive operations was by the efficient use of enablers. III Corps effectively supported the main effort with the limited available Army attack aviation, engineers, unmanned aerial vehicles, and intelligence assets.[26] Likewise, the additional forces generated by the surge of the Iraqi Security Forces, along with the Sons of Iraq program, allowed MNC–I to extend its operational reach and push further into insurgent sanctuaries than would have possible with even the additional U.S. surge brigades.[27]




(Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History)

Figure 4. Multinational Divisions (MNDs) / Forward Areas of Operations (FAOs), June 2007

By the end of the III Corps's deployment in February 2008, the situation in Iraq was remarkably different than when it had assumed duty as MNC–I in December 2006. In January 2008, III Corps's last full month in country, there were six hundred war-related Iraqi fatalities throughout the country (see figure 5, page 84). This was a dramatic reduction in violence from when Odierno's corps arrived in November 2006 a month that witnessed nearly 3,500 Iraqis deaths in the war. This success was rooted in the successful application of operational art. Under Odierno's leadership, III Corps became an effective operational headquarters. It conducted a series of simultaneous and sustained offensive operations throughout the enemy's operational depth, which fragmented enemy support zones and disrupted their operations. The tempo of these corps offensives coupled with an active exploitation and pursuit kept the enemy off balance

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(Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History)

Figure 5. Al-Qaida in Iraq, December 2007

and prevented enemy forces from regrouping. Despite the focus on joint security stations at the tactical level, at the operational level, both the enemy and MNC–I viewed terrain in a conventional though noncontiguous way, with support and security zones, lines of approach and communication, rear areas, etc. MNC–I's ability to synchronize its operations in space and time was aided by Odierno's use of enablers, weighting of the main effort with his Stryker reserve, and extension of MNC–I's operational reach through the use of Iraqi forces.[28]

Despite the focus of much of the analysis of U.S. operations during the surge on a supposed COIN-dominated revolution in the profession of arms, MNC–I built its operational concept on a solidly traditional framework and owed its success to the effective application of some of the oldest, most well-established principles of operational art, rather than to a COIN-dominated leitmotif.[29] ■

Notes

1. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012).

2. Thomas E. Rick, *The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008* (New York: Penguin, 2009).

3. Kimberly Kagan, *The Surge: A Military History* (New York: Encounter Books, 2008).

4. Fred Kaplan, *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013).

5. Peter Mansoor, *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013).

6. On 13 February 2008, the Iraqi Parliament passed three important pieces of legislation: the Provincial Powers Law, which defined the relationship between the federal and provincial governments; it also called for provincial elections by 1 October 2008 as part of the reconciliation process a limited amnesty was given to detainees in Iraqi custody; and the 2008 budget, which allotted $48 billion for capital expenditures and ensured that the federal and provincial governments had the financial resources for public spending.

7. The elements of operational art are end state and conditions, center of gravity, decisive points, line of operation and line of effort, basing, tempo, phasing and transitions, operational reach, culmination, and risk.

8. See, for example, Kaplan, *The Insurgents*.

9. Michael O'Hanlon and Jason Campbell, "Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq," Brookings Institute website, 28 January 2008, 5, accessed 19 December 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20080131.pdf; H. R. McMaster (former advisor to Gen. David Petraeus on the counterinsurgency field manual), interview by Steve Clay, 20 November 2009, transcript, Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6–7.

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10. Peter Chiarelli (former commanding general of V Corps), interview by Frank Sobchak, 6 May 2014, transcript, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Study Group, 40.

11. Chiarelli, interview, 40; McMaster, interview, 13; Col. Dave Pendall, interview by Frank Sobchak, 6 March 2014, transcript, CSA OIF Study Group, Hanscom Air Force Base, MA, 14.

12. Raymond T. Odierno, "The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later," The Heritage Foundation website, 5 March 2008, accessed 20 December 2016, http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-surge-in-iraq-one-year-later; Raymond T. Odierno (former commanding general of III Corps), interview by Mike Visconage, 19 October 2007, transcript, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Baghdad, Iraq, 9.

13. For a discussion of lines of operation and lines of effort, see chapter III of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011) or chapter 2 of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 11 November 2016).

14. McMaster, interview, 11 and 14–15; Odierno, "The Surge in Iraq"; Odierno, interview, 19 October 2007, 9.

15. Surge brigade combat teams (BCTs): 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne Division (arrived 14 February 2007); 4th BCT, 1st Infantry Division (ID) (arrived 15 March 2007); 3rd BCT, 3rd ID (arrived 15 April 2007); 4th BCT, 2nd ID (arrived 15 May 2007); 2nd BCT, 3rd (arrived 15 June 2007).

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20. Simmons, DOD Roundtable,1–2.

21. MNF–I CG SECDEF Weekly Update 12–18 August 07; MNF–I CG SECDEF Weekly Update 26 August–1 September 07; Odierno, interview 19 October 2007, 6; Maj. Gen. James Simmons, DCG Support, 4 and 27 August 2007, DOD Roundtable, 1-2; Kagan, *The Surge*, 135 and 152; Kagan and Kagan, "The Patton of Counterinsurgency"; William Epley, "Surge Paper," CMH files, 11.

22. Raymond T. Odierno, interview by Mike Visconage, 7 September 2007, transcript, CMH, Baghdad, Iraq, 7; Kagan and Kagan, "The Patton of Counterinsurgency."

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25. Andrade, *Surging South of Baghdad*, 17, 21; Hickey, interview, 6 and 26.

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27. Col. Paul Funk and Lt. Col. Patrick Michaelis, interview by Steve Clay, 4 February 2010, transcript, Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 38.

28. O'Hanlon and Campbell, "Iraq Index," 28 January 2008, 5; Michael O'Hanlon and Jason Campbell, "Iraq Index," Brookings Institute website, 31 July 2008, 5, accessed 20 December 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20080731.pdf.

29. Kagan and Kagan, "The Patton of Counterinsurgency"; Odierno, "The Surge in Iraq"; Lt. Col. Kent Strader, interview by Lt. Col. James Powell, 26 March 2014, transcript, Chief of Staff of the Army's Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group, 10.

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
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Solving Deployment Challenges Using a Systems Approach to Understand the Defense Transportation System

Col. Dennis C. Major, U.S. Army
Maj. Calvin E. Townsend Jr., U.S. Army



As many biologists and organizational behavior experts have shown, events or problems rarely occur in isolation. Rather, successes or challenging setbacks transpire as interactive behaviors or patterns within systems and networks.[1] An understanding of how the components of systems interact is especially critical when considering how the Defense Transportation System (DTS) processes units for deployment. Because of the system's vast number of interdependent parts, solving common deployment readiness challenges depends on observing its components "from the balcony" as interrelated functions, versus attempting to evaluate individual issues as isolated phenomena while standing "on the dance floor." This type of investigation is sometimes called systems thinking. Researchers Melanie Minarik, Bill Thornton, and George Perreault, citing Peter M. Senge, suggest that systems thinking is suitable "when many complex issues surround a particular challenge, when there is a high dependence on the actions of many people, and when there is the potential for ineffective coordination among the people involved."[2] All these conditions apply to the DTS.

Therefore, this article examines the DTS from a systems perspective. The study identifies five common problems that hinder the readiness of Army units to deploy as well as five practical solutions that could improve the system's overall functioning: (1) ensure deployability of a unit's equipment by allowing the unit at least six weeks to prepare it; (2) ensure accurate property records by evaluating unit deployment data quarterly and by publishing orders to update organizational equipment lists (OELs) as soon as units receive notification of deployment; (3) ensure efficient and accurate use of information systems by making them user-friendly and fully integrated; (4) ensure a unit's movement priorities are accomplished by applying command emphasis and operations staff planning; and (5) ensure effective coordination among Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) terminal brigades and battalions (i.e., ports of embarkation [POEs]), installation transportation offices (ITOs), and units by conducting meetings early and often.

Soldiers with 68th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB), 4th Sustainment Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, provide fuel to vehicles from 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 4th Infantry Division on 2 December 2016 during rail load operations at Fort Carson, Colorado. The 68th CSSB provided logistical support to 3rd ABCT, loading its entire set of equipment onto trains to begin the movement of the brigade to Europe in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. (Photo by Capt. Scott Walters, U.S. Army)

Structure of the Defense Transportation System

The DTS is the global transportation infrastructure, managed by U.S. Transportation Command. The structure consists of military and commercial resources such as aerial ports, automated information systems, highways, railways, and seaports. This infrastructure also includes essential customs, in-transit visibility, and traffic management services that enhance the Department of Defense's ability to project power around the world.

As illustrated by figure 1 (page 88), each organization interacting within the DTS is working as a gear in a synchronized effort to move maneuver forces from home station to their designated point of assembly. With that said, everything begins with a supported geographical combatant commander (GCC) generating requirements for forces. Once the capabilities are approved by the joint staff, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), as the force provider, matches Army forces to the appropriate organizations. From this point, transportation requirements are analyzed and determined by U.S. Transportation Command based on the supported GCC's timelines and mission objectives. This article considers surface and maritime assets for its transportation feasibility analysis of the interconnected components of the DTS.


Once a GCC and the U.S. Transportation Command agree that a surface deployment meets operational requirements, the SDDC begins to identify organic (military) or commercial assets to support the operation. Afterward, FORSCOM pushes the transportation information (e.g., mode or timeline)

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to the designated unit, simultaneously pushing the data to the servicing ITO.

The ITO is a critical component of this system. It is responsible for assisting units throughout the movement process while also serving as the linchpin between each unit and the servicing SDDC terminal transportation battalion. The Combined Arms Support Command is responsible for training unit movement officers (UMOs) throughout the Department of the Army.

unit is properly prepared for deployment. As illustrated in Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, one essential aspect of deployment planning is possessing a working knowledge of the "total deployment process."[3] Not only is it important for members of DTS components to understand the overall deployment process, but also FORSCOM organizations must grasp the importance of defining units' mobility requirements and identifying critical milestones.



(Graphic by author)

Figure 1. Agency/Organization Interconnectedness Forming the Defense Transportation System

This overview of how the different agencies and organizations must function cooperatively with one another to deploy a unit shows the importance of taking a systems view for overcoming deployment challenges. The next section discusses five common challenges and offers recommendations for overcoming them.

Challenge Number 1: Needing Time for Equipment Readiness

The GCCs initiate the deployment process by defining requirements and determining when resources are required in theater, also known as a required delivery date. Once a required delivery date is established, FORSCOM is responsible for "backward planning" to ensure the

Unlike during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, when units deployed within the Army force generation cycle, now Army units must posture themselves to deploy in an expeditionary fashion with assigned equipment.[4] Therefore, FORSCOM planners must ensure units are given the appropriate time to achieve success. In the six to eight weeks before the assigned available-to-load date (ALD), units should be focusing on preparing their equipment to move from the fort to the port.

However, there is a growing trend of units who are about to deploy conducting major training events (e.g., Joint Readiness Training Center or National Training Center exercises, convoy live-fire exercises, and field

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training exercises) with the same vehicles identified for deployment—in some instances, only one week before their ALD. The absence of ample time and space for units to prepare could lead to non-mission-capable equipment being towed onto transportation assets or shown on unit deployment lists (UDLs) without being validated promptly, which could in turn affect the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System validation process as well as the availability of adequate transportation assets.[5] As one can imagine, equipment being towed off a vessel does not enhance the GCC's strategic message of projecting combat power around the world.

To strengthen the GCC's messaging of showcasing force projection, units should cease using designated equipment approximately forty-five days or more before their ALD. To meet training requirements, senior commanders should task other organizations on the installation to loan deploying units the necessary equipment, if available.

Challenge Number 2: Needing Accurate Property Books and Organizational Equipment Lists in Advance

UDLs are necessary documents to validate transportation requirements. However, before the UDLs can be developed, units must ensure OELs are created in the Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movements System II (TC-AIMS II). The Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 15-01, *Command Deployment Discipline Program* (*CDDP*), recommends that company-level commanders update their OEL semiannually or upon significant property book changes.[6] However, during one major deployment exercise, less than 50 percent of the subordinate organizations had created OELs in TC-AIMS II. This is a significant issue.

If units fail to reconcile their property book with their OEL on a quarterly or semiannual basis, inaccurate data probably will be transmitted to the Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES), thus potentially impacting vessel allocation along with the overall buildup of combat power. For example, if a unit is issued mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles in lieu of up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, and it fails to reconcile its property book and OEL, planning dimensions will not be updated in the system. This will cause the UDL to be built with inaccurate information since the two vehicles are drastically different in size. The SDDC may not acquire the appropriate amount of space to support the deployment, thereby possibly compelling equipment to be left on the pier awaiting a follow-on move. As a result of such errors, the unit's combat effectiveness will likely be hampered.

To mitigate such a planning failure, commanders above battalion level should evaluate their subordinate organizations' deployment data on a quarterly or semiannual basis, as recommended by the *CDDP*. Also, upon deployment notification, commanders should publish a warning order and an operation order requiring their formations to update OELs, which will lead to accurate UDLs.


Challenge Number 3: Needing Efficient Information Systems

As the battalion sergeant major and the authors of this article were conducting battlefield circulation within the 10th Mountain Division and Fort Drum area, a logical question arose as to why the TC-AIMS II rejected nonstandard or modified dimensions when creating or updating OELs. From the battalion sergeant major's perspective, this problem definitely presented second- and third-order effects, and we agreed. On the one hand, the Army directs unit commanders to build and maintain

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Sixty-eight soldiers from the New Jersey Army National Guard's 50th Infantry Brigade Combat Team load more than 170 tactical vehicles onto rail cars 2 May 2017 at Morrisville Yard in Morrisville, Pennsylvania. A total of 700 vehicles and trailers were headed to Fort Pickett, Virginia, for the Army National Guard's eXportable Combat Training Capability Exercise 17-01. (Photo by Master Sgt. Matt Hecht, U.S. Air National Guard)

OELs to sustain an expeditionary posture. However, the system does not retain accurate information, forcing UMOs to reinsert actual data at the time of deployment—in essence, when populating the UDL. This network interface issue causes delays and inefficiencies at the strategic level. This is a significant matter, especially given that maintaining accurate OEL is the initial step of deployment readiness.

After conducting some analysis, the 841st team identified that the real issue resided within the Computerized Movement Planning and Status System (COMPASS). In accordance with the *CDDP*, UMOs are directed to submit updated OELs through their chain of command to the ITO on a semiannual basis or when significant changes to the property book occur. Here lies the issue. When a unit modifies a piece of equipment and uploads the accurate dimensional data into TC-AIMS II, if the information is two percent greater than the standard characteristics found in Technical Bulletin 55-46-1, *Standard Characteristics for Transportability of Military Vehicles & Other Outsize/Overweight Equipment*, COMPASS will return an error message, although the data were accurate.[7]

However—it must be noted—this default function may be in place as a precautionary factor to prevent the input of incorrect information.

Some transporters may see this as an insignificant obstacle, but this can be a frustrating experience for UMOs, who are assigned this task as an additional duty and, in most cases, are not transporters by trade. Also, OELs may then contain inaccurate information as the UMOs cannot bypass the software programming. Therefore, during a real-world movement sequence or timeline, one must ask, "In a time of haste, what is the likelihood that a UMO will input accurate data when creating their UDL when the system has already rejected the information?" In the authors' opinion, the odds are moderate, at best.

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In view of this, if data inconsistent with Technical Bulletin 55-46-1 are entered during the OEL development phase, the system should generate a message to verify the provided dimensions. It should allow an UMO to verify the data and then bypass the standard when appropriate. This would lead to more accurate records.

Demonstrating the importance of data accuracy, if a deploying unit (with the assistance of their servicing ITO) loaded 965 pieces of equipment into TC-AIMS II, it is likely that no more than 350 items would be viewable in GATES. The remaining 615 would be dropped from the system. Of the 350 pieces in this scenario, only 12 items would be valid in GATES and prepared to manifest, which is less than a 1.3 percent accuracy rate. Any time this issue arises, it is classified as a "sequencing problem" between the Integrated Booking System and GATES. Resolving this issue entails days of crosstalk at the battalion, brigade, and headquarter levels at SDDC.

Ultimately, this shortcoming is creating inefficiencies throughout the DTS. (The complex relationships and inconnectivity between DTS information systems are depicted in figure 2 on page 92.) With this in mind, U.S. Transportation Command and the SDDC should lead an effort, with participation of all essential stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, to create an end-to-end information system that ensures systems interface, booking capabilities, and in-transit visibility accessibility—all to enhance efficiencies throughout the deployment process.

Challenge Number 4: Needing Effective Operational Planning

Per Field Manual 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, the staff element responsible for the movement-and-maneuver warfighting-function tasking, along with publishing orders and plans, is the operations staff officer (G-3 or S-3).[8] The deployment process is also considered as a major operation that requires the G-3 or S-3 to publish an operation plan or operation order. Instead, however, over several strategic deployments, we have noticed that operations sections at the division level and below are rarely involved in the deployment process. This means that when an operation order is published consisting of critical responsibilities, timelines, and milestones—which, in most cases, are not distributed—commanders and operations staffs are pushing all the movement responsibilities onto the brigade mobility officer (BMO).

The first issue with pushing the majority of the functions onto the BMO is he or she has zero tasking authority, which means some unit commanders may place emphasis on other priorities, and they may order their UMOs to perform other tasks outside of preparing the unit for deployment. ATP 3-35 clearly highlights the need for command emphasis throughout the planning and preparation phases of the deployment process: "Without unit command involvement and emphasis ... the [BMO and] UMO will not have the resources required to accomplish [their] tasks."[9]


Second, the BMO may not possess a firm appreciation for the link between the deployment and employment of forces. Because of this potential lack of expertise, the BMO may not properly prioritize equipment for shipment based on capability, especially if the equipment is required to remain on pier due to unforeseen circumstances. Moreover, the BMO may not monitor critical assets to facilitate the buildup of combat power. Having said this, one must ask, "Are we effectively mentoring these young BMOs as they are assigned to these key positions?" Schoolhouse training is not enough.

For an organization to operationalize the commander's intent, staff personnel must have a firm understanding of the linkage between deployment and employment. The process of transitioning ideas to reality mandates that operations staffs develop feasible plans and orders with the assistance and coordination of the BMO to ensure that the right capabilities are in the right location, at the right time, and in the right quantities. This operationalizing process also requires the assistance of external partners.

Challenge Number 5: Needing Effective Coordination among Terminal Brigades and Battalions, Installation Transportation Officers, and Units

The terminal brigades and battalions possess a unique skill set that has atrophied across the Army. Over a twelve-year span, operational units have deployed within an Army force generation rotational cycle, transitioning from the *train/ready* force pool through the *available* and *reset* force pools to repeat the procedures all over again. In this model, units deployed to a known location, with

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Legend

AMC—Air Mobility Command
CCDR—Unified combatant commander
CMOS—Cargo Movement Operations System
COMPASS—Computerized Movement Planning and Status System
FORSCOM—U.S. Army Forces Command
GATES—Global Air Transportation Execution System
GCCS—Global Command and Control System
IBS—Integrated Booking System
ITO—Installation transportation officer
JOPES—Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
NIPRNET—Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
SDDC—Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SIPRNET—SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
TC-AIMS II—Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System II
UDL—Unit deployment lists
USTC—U.S. Transportation Command

(Graphic modified from Army Techniques Publication 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment* [Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 23 March 2015], A-4)

Figure 2. The Interconnection between the Transportation Information Systems that Comprise the Automated Data Flow within the Defense Transportation System

theater provided equipment in place, replacing a similar unit; with theater provided equipment, there is little requirement for units to coordinate with terminal brigades and battalions except for containerized equipment. In contrast, as we return to expeditionary deployments, terminal brigades and battalions must assist deploying units with the efficient movement of organic assets from their home station to their designated assembly area.

UMOs are now capable of accessing TC-AIMS II from their unit area home station, which should improve the property book and OEL reconciliation process. If not appropriately managed, ITOs and units may experience a breakdown in communication and coordination because units are not forced to interact with their servicing ITO, as frequently happens. This could become a significant issue since the ITO is the linchpin between the unit and SDDC resources. This makes movement-and-support coordination ever more essential, especially early in the deployment process. However, there is a way to bridge any potential interaction gaps.

It is critical that SDDC terminal brigades and battalions (i.e., POEs) and ITOs engage with the deploying units early and often. This is particularly the case for the terminal battalions. If these organizations assist with identifying critical shortfalls at the fort versus the port, it is beneficial for all parties and throughout the DTS. Joint Publication 3-35,

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Deployment and Redeployment Operations, calls such engagements "movement and support meetings."[10] The manual suggests, "at the tactical/unit level, identifying and resolving transportation shortfalls and/or limitations must ... occur early. ... Another key interface required during these support meetings is between the deploying units and the C2 [command and control] elements of the air and sea POEs."[11] These engagements are critical for successful deployments.

Although this is an unfunded requirement, the SDDC is postured to support the effort with the assistance of the Deployment Support Command. The Deployment Support Command is an Army Reserve organization aligned with SDDC. Therefore, in support of the SDDC Total Force Integration Strategy, Army Reserve deployment and distribution support teams are aligned to continental United States-based active-component terminal brigades and battalions to advise and assist units during the deployment process. These teams are ever more critical as ITO staffs are experiencing staffing deficiencies. In essence, these deployment and distribution support teams are augmenting ITOs at coordinated times during deployment preparation.

Summary

Having an appreciation for the interrelated parts of the deployment process reveals why deployment readiness challenges should not be evaluated as isolated phenomena. As with any system, if one component behaves differently or fails, this failure could have a cascading effect on the entire network. Components could also include current policies. To address deployment readiness issues, we must solve problems by taking a comprehensive look at how the parts of the DTS comprise the whole. Improvements in five critical areas could significantly improve the functioning of the whole: allowing units at least six weeks to prepare their equipment, updating unit deployment data quarterly and as soon as units receive notice to deploy, making information systems user-friendly and fully integrated, dedicating command emphasis and operations staff planning to movement priorities, and conducting early and frequent meetings among SDDC components, ITOs, and units. ■

Notes

1. Lee J. Sweetlove and Alisdair R. Fernie, "Regulation of Metabolic Networks: Understanding Metabolic Complexity in the Systems Biology Era," *New Phytologist* 168, no. 1 (October 2005): 9–24. The authors provide a discussion of metabolism as a whole system rather than divided into its mechanistic parts.

2. Melanie M. Minarik, Bill Thornton, and George Perreault, "Systems Thinking Can Improve Teacher Retention," *The Clearing House* 76, no. 5 (May-June 2003): 231. Minarik, Thornton, and Perreault cite Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline* (New York: Currency and Doubleday, 1990).

3. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], March 2015), 1-3.

4. During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, units were supplied with theater-provided equipment. However, to maintain an expeditionary posture today, units must prepare to deploy with organic equipment.

5. *User's Guide for JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System)* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1 May 1995), iii, 16–17. "JOPES is a combination of joint policies and procedures (guidance), and automated data processing (ADP) support used to plan and execute joint military operations."

6. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 15-01, *Command Deployment Discipline Program* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, December 2014), 12.

7. Army Technical Bulletin 55-46-1, *Standard Characteristics (Dimensions, Weight, and Cube) for Transportability of Military Vehicles and Other Outsize/Overweight Equipment (In TOE Line Item Number Sequence)* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1 February 2015).


8. Field Manual 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 5 May 2014).

9. ATP 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, 2-5.

10. Joint Publication 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 31 January 2013), B-B-5.

11. Ibid., IV-3.

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Brazilian police of *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* (BOPE, a special operations unit) conduct interagency training in the Rio de Janeiro subway with members of the Marine Corps Special Operations Task Force 10 June 2016 ahead of the 2016 Rio Olympics in Brazil. (Photo by Ricardo Moraes, Reuters)

Brazilian Organization for Combating Terrorism during the Rio 2016 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games

Col. Alessandro Visacro, Brazilian Army

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Major international public events, by their very nature, combine extreme vulnerability with extensive media exposure. These factors alone are enough to create favorable conditions for the convergence of a number of normally diffuse threats—primarily nonstate actors operating domestically and transnationally, ranging from what are known in Brazil as antisystemic movements (groups opposing established power structures) to extremist organizations (such as supporters of the Islamic State).[1] Such scenarios are attractive to neoanarchists, revolutionaries, criminals, and terrorists who are willing to exploit state weaknesses in the physical and informational domains.

Even in a context where institutions are functioning normally, events of great magnitude pose a complex security challenge, invariably requiring capabilities that are available in the armed forces. For this reason, military forces have been used recurrently throughout the world to ensure a safe and peaceful environment—without them, it would be impossible to hold a major event under the auspices of the state.

The Rio 2016 Olympic Games and the subsequent Paralympic Games ended a long cycle comprising eight major events hosted in Brazil.[2] Over the course of nine years marked by a continual process of improvement, Brazil's Ministry of Defense helped provide protection and security, and it was responsible for the joint efforts of the armed forces, in close collaboration with civil agencies, intelligence organizations, and law enforcement. It achieved extraordinary success, especially considering the magnitude of the challenges faced by the Brazilian government since 2007, year of the XV Pan American Games. Although the Ministry of Defense's involvement rightfully did not bring it any prominence or monopoly over the management of security, the armed forces' vast set of capabilities made them an actor of notable importance, even with their diligent attempts at discretion.

Because of the nation's particularities, the context in which the Brazilian armed forces were employed may be considered unique. Even so, the situation offers insights about the use of the military in a postindustrial age characterized, above all, by the prevalence of nonstate armed violence. Several fundamental characteristics—such as the ubiquity of the media, harsh public criticism, severe legal constraints, besiegement by human rights organizations, the interagency environment, and even the deployment of troops within the confines of the national territory—create a scenario that is incongruous with the one idealized by traditional armies in a Westphalian order.

In view of the foregoing, Brazil's recent experience deserves to be considered as an interesting source of study. In order to share some of the lessons learned and best practices, this article presents a brief analysis of security provisions during the 2016 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, focusing primarily on combating terrorism—a topic that, due to its sensitive character and growing importance, has demanded increasing engagement by the military.

Complexity, Vulnerabilities, and Great Apprehension

Even considering the magnitude of previous major events, the Rio 2016 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games stood out. Altogether, there were thirty days of competition events that demanded a herculean effort from eighty-eight thousand civilians and service members involved in a robust security structure.[3]

Approximately eleven thousand athletes from more than two hundred countries brought roughly half a million tourists to the city of Rio de Janeiro during the games.[4] Twenty-five thousand accredited journalists from around the world reached an estimated one billion spectators with their continuous broadcasts.[5]

The athletic events took place in thirty-two venues, distributed into four clusters around the city. At the opening ceremony alone, 5 August 2016, there were approximately eighty thousand people in Maracanã

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mosquito that transmits the dengue, chikungunya, and Zika viruses also placed the success of the Olympics at risk, discouraging athletes and tourists from traveling to Brazil. In addition to the economic, political, and health crises, an acute public security crisis plagued the city of Rio de Janeiro—the metropolis was thrown into turmoil by a fratricidal dispute among armed gangs linked to international arms and drug trafficking.

Adding to all these concerns, the threat posed by international terrorism grew in importance as the opening date of the games approached. Representing a sort of countdown, a sequence of attacks throughout the world starting in November 2015 generated an atmosphere of apprehension:

- 13 November 2015 (about nine months prior to the opening of the Rio Summer Olympics), multiple attacks in Paris, including at the Stade de France and Bataclan nightclub, left 130 dead and hundreds wounded.[8]
- 2 December 2015 (eight months prior), fourteen people were killed and another twenty-two were wounded in an attack at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California.[9]
- 22 March 2016 (four months prior), a bomb attack at the Brussels airport left 31 dead and 270 wounded.[10]
- 12 June 2016 (fifty-five days prior), one shooter killed forty-nine people and wounded dozens at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida.[11]
- 28 June 2016 (thirty-eight days prior), a bomb attack at the Istanbul airport killed 41 people and wounded more than 230.[12]
- 1 July 2016 (thirty-five days prior), an attack in Bangladesh left twenty-one dead and thirty wounded.[13]
- 14 July 2016 (twenty-one days prior), during the French Bastille Day celebrations, a truck hit more than one hundred people in Nice, and eighty-four died.[14]
- 22 July 2016 (thirteen days prior), an attacker at a shopping mall in Munich, killed nine people and wounded twenty-seven.[15]
- 1 August 2016 (just three days before the opening ceremony in Rio de Janeiro), a homemade nail bomb similar to the one used in the Boston Marathon bombing exploded at a shopping mall in Brasília without injuring anyone.[16]

Fortunately, events in Rio ran counter to the most pessimistic predictions. The Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games were successful, thanks largely to the well-designed and effective security structure that supported them.

Governance of Security Operations

The multiple actors directly and indirectly involved in the security of the games resulted in a diversified task organization, as well as a complex architecture of governance, command, and control.

Brazil is a federal republic comprising twenty-six states and the Federal District. Each unit of the federation has its own public security forces, comprising the state police forces (civil and military, i.e., investigative and preventive) and civil defense—responsible for disaster prevention and management. At the federal administration level, the Ministry of Justice oversees the Federal Police Department, the Federal Highway Police, and the small National Public Security Force, formed with officers from the state-level "military" police. The Brazilian Intelligence Agency, the central body of the Brazilian Intelligence System, is subordinate to the Office of Institutional Security of the Presidency. Finally, the three military services (Navy, Army, and Air Force) operate under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense.

Respecting the legal responsibilities of each institution while seeking maximum synergy among them and abiding by the principles regulating the relationships among the units of the federation (the "federative pact") required a creative arrangement for the Olympics. In addition, overcoming obstacles posed by distinct organizational cultures and moving beyond disparate interests required a lot of time and energy from all those who truly strove to build strong partnerships. An important milestone in this process was the adoption of the Strategic Integrated Security Plan for the Rio 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games (*Plano Estratégico de Segurança Integrada para os Jogos Olímpicos e Paralímpicos Rio 2016*, known as PESI Rio 2016).[17]

Designed to integrate public security, defense, and intelligence efforts within a centralized government strategy, PESI established the fundamental principles by which institutional relations were governed.[18] In addition, the plan determined that governance of the games would focus on transparency and smooth decision making at all levels, especially with regard to the

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flow of technical, tactical, and operational information. To that end, it proposed the creation of the Integrated Security Executive Committee (*Comitê Executivo de Segurança Integrada*, known as CESI) at the national level, composed of officials from the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Presidency, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defense, and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, as well as representatives from the states and municipalities that hosted the games.[19] In order to ensure CESI's presence and reach, a network of local Regional Integrated Security Executive Committees (*Comitês Executivos de Segurança Integrada Regionais*, known as CESIRs) was created.

In order to coordinate assets and integrate available capabilities for public security, the Ministry of Justice created the Extraordinary Secretariat of Security for Major Events. The Ministry of Defense, in turn, established joint area defense commands, supported by centralized joint commands, as shown in figure 1 (page 99).

The Brazilian armed forces have a long tradition of being used in the country's internal security. Using military forces for internal security is legally supported by the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, as well as by a set of complementary laws that regulate the domestic operations of military units.

During the Rio 2016 Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games, the Ministry of Defense's efforts proved decisive in enabling the country to honor its commitment to the international community. More than forty-three thousand service members were deployed to provide security during the games, and they accomplished a wide array of tasks and missions, among which the following stand out:

- conduct aerospace defense;
- conduct maritime, river, and airport operations;
- protect strategic structures;
- ensure safety of expressways and vital roads for urban outflow;
- oversee handling and security of explosives and controlled products;
- conduct cyber defense;
- collaborate with civil defense;
- provide support for the safety of dignitaries;
- provide a contingency force;
- conduct counterterrorism; and
- conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense.

Integrated Committee for Combating Terrorism

Terrorism is a complex political and social phenomenon that is hard to combat and eradicate. Understanding terrorism requires a holistic approach that must incorporate a criminological dimension but not be limited to it. Fighting terrorism requires an integrated effort since no single state agency can handle it in isolation. For this reason, interagency operations are properly considered the cornerstone of preventing and suppressing terrorism.


Encouraging interagency efforts by "promoting the integrated action of government agencies with a stake in the issue" was the main mission of the Center for Coordination of Actions to Prevent and Combat Terrorism at the Office of Institutional Security of the Presidency.[20] Created in June 2009 during the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the center had a short life. It was deactivated in February 2011, during President Dilma Rousseff's first term.

Hence, as the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, the Confederations Cup, World Youth Day, and the FIFA World Cup approached, Brazil did not have an interministerial body effectively vested with the authority and responsibility for fostering interagency cooperation. Given a wide array of sometimes disparate institutional interests, the model of governance adopted had sought to accommodate them by defining two areas of responsibility: public security and defense. A subordinate area called preventing and combating terrorism was nominally assigned to the military.

However, this arrangement proved inadequate to the Brazilian reality, because, in practical terms, it simply assigned to the Army Special Operations Command the difficult task of leading joint actions within the Ministry of Defense and, to no avail, interagency efforts at the national and local levels. Thus, as the Olympic Games approached, the model of governance adopted in previous major events became the subject of reasoned criticism and was eventually reassessed.

The heart of the problem was primarily the question of unity of command—a principle of war held in high regard by soldiers, who were unwilling to relinquish it in the name of adopting an interagency panacea. However, the Brazilian context revealed clearly and objectively that unity of command was simply not an option, since all the institutions involved refused to

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Total strength of armed forces employed in providing security during the games: 43,481
(*) Host city for Olympic soccer

(Graphic by author)

Figure 1. Brazilian Armed Forces' General Security Organization for the Rio 2016 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games

subordinate themselves to one another. Moreover, the interagency process could not serve as an excuse for removing institutional roles clearly defined in the current legal system. It was necessary to respect the calling, purpose, and legal responsibilities of the individual services, law enforcement, and other security agencies. In addition, the expertise obtained by some intelligence agencies and special operations forces (military and police) in their respective fields of action was undeniable.

According to PESI Rio 2016, the CESI and CESIRs were to devote special attention to the integration of efforts to combat terrorism, developed along three main *eixos de atuação*, loosely translated as lines of effort, which were intelligence, public security, and defense.[21] To achieve such purposes, a temporary advisory structure was created, the Integrated Committee for Combating Terrorism (*Comitê Integrado de Enfrentamento ao Terrorismo*, known as the CIET), illustrated in figure 2 (page 100).


The CIET's interagency dynamics were governed by a set of strategic protocols for combating terrorism, developed based on the fundamental principles contained in the PESI Rio 2016. Over time and despite their differences, the CIET environment proved adequate for improving the mechanisms for interagency cooperation. The level of integration achieved was unprecedented. It included shared access to available databases, redistribution of targets, and emphasis on complementary capabilities. This process led to the effective engagement of the Army Intelligence Center in combating terrorism alongside the Joint Command for Preventing and Combating Terrorism and its partners.

The CIET was also responsible for conducting a national public awareness campaign before the event, since the Brazilian population generally displays a low level of perception of terrorist threats. The campaign's results were tangible. During the Olympics, for example, seventy-eight cases of suspect materials abandoned in public places in the six host cities were reported.

Joint Command for Preventing and Combating Terrorism

The Joint Command for Preventing and Combating Terrorism was the temporary structure created under the Ministry of Defense for the purpose of planning, coordinating, and conducting actions to combat terrorism and provide for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense. It was nothing more than a joint special operations command.

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(Graphic by author)

Figure 2. Lines of Effort and Composition of the Integrated Committee for Combating Terrorism

The Joint Command for Preventing and Combating Terrorism played an important role throughout the painful process of interagency cooperation, making significant efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. From the very beginning, it engaged in negotiations with representatives from the Federal Police Department and Brazilian Intelligence Agency that culminated in the creation of the CIET and in the signing of strategic protocols that shaped the new model of governance for combating the terrorist threat.


Although it was directly subordinate to the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, the Joint Command adopted a coordination of forces that brought it very close to joint area defense commands (see figure 1, page 99). In addition to deploying special operations task forces and CBRN-defense troops in all six cities that hosted Olympic events, it assigned liaison teams known as integrated tactical coordination centers to the other commands that had territorial defense responsibilities (area defense commands and sector defense commands, see figure 3, page 101). This enabled it to also act at the local level, promoting interagency partnerships while maintaining a high level of readiness and rapid crisis response capabilities.

For twenty months, the Joint Command for Preventing and Combating Terrorism conducted intensive and careful preparation, drawing primarily from its own experience with the other major events that preceded the Olympics. An extensive and detailed plan guided the execution of specific training events and reconnaissance of possible soft targets in all host cities. Joint interagency rehearsals and exercises were conducted in hotels, airports, subway stations, shopping malls, tourist attractions, and sports arenas. The troops were effectively prepared for the specific context of Rio 2016—a scenario vastly different from that experienced in 1972 during the Munich Olympics, for instance.

Flexible Force Architecture

An act of terror is characterized, on the tactical level, by the execution of an action with "kinetic" effect such as detonating explosives in a bombing attempt or indiscriminately opening fire in a public place. However, terrorist aims go far beyond the mere demonstration of brutality through the graphic images that are instantly recorded and repeated incessantly in subsequent days. The focus of terror is, in fact, on the so-called "information environment," as terror seeks to achieve political and strategic goals

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(Graphic by author)

Figure 3. Organization of the Joint Command for Preventing and Combating Terrorism

that are far broader than the localized sacrifice of innocent lives. In other words, contrary to what it may seem, the real weapons of a terrorist are not assault rifles or explosive devices but rather the television camera and the instant media coverage generated from images captured with a simple mobile phone.

Traditionally, throughout the world, the state security apparatus has provided satisfactory responses at the tactical level—countering terrorism through actions with kinetic effect, defined by verbs such as *capture, arrest, neutralize, eliminate,* or *rescue.* More often than not, however, states have failed at the political and strategic levels, demonstrating an inability to provide timely and effective responses in the information environment, in contrast to their effective actions in a narrow tactical setting. This dichotomy represents the essence of the asymmetry between terrorism and counterterrorism, as shown in the table (page 103).

The problem becomes more acute in countries such as Brazil, where, despite the innovative rhetoric, a model of reactive counterterrorism from the 1970s still prevails both in law enforcement agencies and in the armed forces—a model that is essentially based on the use of well-established tactical courses of action. However, in the information age, preventing and combating terrorism should be based on a combination of lethal and nonlethal capabilities, backed by state policies designed to shape the environment and eradicate extremist violence at its source. Initiative, aggressiveness, and foresight should also (and above all) be employed in the information environment.

During the Rio 2016 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games, the Joint Command for Preventing and Combating Terrorism's main goal was to ensure that through interagency cooperation, preventive and defensive measures were appropriately combined with offensive enforcement actions. While its priority was, naturally, to prevent terrorist attempts, the possibility of reacting to a successful attack was not ruled out.

According to risk assessments produced by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, the potential threats to the security of the games did not come from sophisticated terrorist cells that infiltrated into the national territory with the purpose of transforming Brazil into

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Brazilian Army chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive defense soldiers sweep Maracanã Stadium for bombs 25 July 2016 in Rio de Janeiro. (Photo courtesy of the Brazilian Army)

the scene of a major attack. Instead, the so-called "lone wolves," or self-radicalized natives, represented a greater danger. Therefore, the degree of unpredictability of a possible attack was significantly greater. On the other hand, the expectation of lethal, but less developed or less sophisticated, actions demanded that the state's first response also be decisive.

The solution originally conceived was based on "responses by legal layers." In other words, responses would consist of successive measures of growing intensity, following the exhaustion of the capabilities available in law enforcement agencies. This type of approach certainly was incongruous with the nature of the threat described by intelligence analysts. Therefore, the concept of "composition of capabilities" was developed, which was designed to offer the most appropriate response for each type of scenario, through close collaboration among the various actors involved. To that end, it was necessary to carry out a detailed mapping of the available resources and to produce a realistic and detailed diagnosis of police and military special forces, identifying their main strengths and weaknesses in terms of personnel, equipment, and technical and tactical training. One aim was to reduce the distance between command and control centers by reducing the bureaucracy of interagency connections in order to provide the agility required by the mission. Complementary protocols were put in place at the tactical level to ensure that the necessary capabilities would be available at critical locations and times. This process culminated in a flexible force architecture capable of responding decisively to what was considered the worst-case scenario: multiple attacks, simultaneous or successive, that were geographically dispersed, with or without the use of CBRN agents.

Security Operations in Rio

Brazil did not have a regulatory instrument that defined the crime of terrorism until a few months before the opening of the Olympic Games. In March 2016, President Rousseff sanctioned Law No. 13.260, known

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as the "Antiterrorism Law," providing the legal basis for preventive actions to be carried out effectively. Then, on 21 July, the Federal Police's Antiterrorism Division launched the first stage of Operation Hashtag, with the purpose of dismantling a network of individuals who called themselves "Defenders of Sharia." In addition to supporting the Islamic State, members of the group had clearly demonstrated on social media that they intended to carry out an attack during the Olympics. Altogether, sixteen people were detained by the Federal Police at different locations across the national territory.

Table. Terrorism and Counterterrorism Asymmetry

	Terrorism	Counterterrorism
Level	Political and strategic	Tactical
Dimension	Informational	Physical
Objective	Nonkinetic	Kinetic
Action	Extreme act of armed propaganda	By extension, this should be, in theory, an act of counter-propaganda—but that has not been the case.

(Table by author)

During the first week of the games, a serious incident involving the National Public Security Force tested the entire security apparatus gathered in the city of Rio de Janeiro. On 10 August 2016, a police car inadvertently entered one of the communities of the Maré complex of slums—a densely populated area, home to criminals and drug traffickers.[22] The vehicle received rifle fire. Pvt. Hélio Andrade died, and two other police officers were injured. The large presence of the national and international media gave the incident a lot of visibility and exposed the acute public security crisis established in that city decades ago.

Early that evening, the Special Operations Command of the Rio de Janeiro Military Police met at the regional integrated command and control center in order to provide an immediate and effective response. During the night, the National Public Security Force isolated the southern portion of the Maré complex. At dawn 11 August 2016, the Special Operations Command of the Rio de Janeiro Military Police deployed the Special Police Operations Battalion inside Vila do João neighborhood, site of the incident. The Federal Police Tactical Operations Command was also called in, and their teams entered the urban enclave with the men from the Special Police Operations Battalion. The Joint Command for Preventing and Combating Terrorism offered help by sending the 1st Special Forces Battalion Task Force, reinforced by a company of paratroopers and nine wheeled armored personnel carriers. The operation, which brought together the best police and military special operations forces in the country, was successful, and there were no further incidents like this through the end of the Paralympic Games.

Conclusion

Given the threat posed by extremist violence throughout the world, the recurrent use of military forces to provide security during major international public events is a trend that is expected to last. In fact, we can further state that because of the harmful action of nonstate armed actors, there is a growing demand by governments and society for the application of available military capabilities within national territorial boundaries.

In this context, the threat posed by terrorist organizations was recognized as one of the main risks to the Rio 2016 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games. To confront it, the Brazilian government was forced to seek original solutions appropriate for its domestic scenario and consistent with its own interagency dynamics. The nation's particularities suggested caution against merely incorporating foreign dogmas and precepts or adopting predefined solutions at the risk of producing unrealistic expectations that would have been completely incongruous with the country's reality.

The structure conceived was consistent with the nature of the threat—a flexible force architecture supported

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by partnerships established in the heterogeneous interagency environment. Assessments revealed that despite serious shortcomings, the state's security institutions, including the armed forces, had enviable capabilities, some of which are not possessed by many countries in the northern hemisphere. The primary challenge was to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize all the actors involved in order to ensure that the capabilities required for the satisfactory management of a crisis would be applied with precision at critical times and places.

According to the assessment of a staff officer from the Joint Command for Preventing and Combating Terrorism, the reason why Brazil did not become the scene of a major terrorist attack during the Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games was not due to an incorrect risk analysis. On the contrary, it was because of successfully executed preventive and proactive measures—such as Operation Hashtag launched by the Federal Police's Antiterrorism Division. However, it should be noted that in the current geopolitical environment, no country on the planet is immune to extremist violence. Although we acknowledge the success of the Olympics in Brazil in terms of dealing with terrorism, there is still a lot to be done. ■

Notes

1. This paper uses *antisystemic* to describe violent criminal groups such as black blocs. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the author's.

2. The events in Brazil were the XV Pan American Games Rio 2007, the V World Military Games Rio 2011, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development Rio + 20 (2012), the FIFA Confederations Cup 2013, World Youth Day (2013), the 2014 FIFA World Cup, the Rio 2016 Olympic Games, and the Rio 2016 Paralympic Games. Nevertheless, in Brazil, the use of troops in such missions has as a recent precedent the participation of the armed forces in the security of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Eco 92), held in the city of Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.

3. Valéria Bretas, "Os Grandes Números da Olimpíada no Rio," Exame website, 1 August 2016, accessed 6 July 2017, http://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/os-grandes-numeros-das-olimpiadas/.

4. Agência EFE, "Os Jogos Olímpicos do Rio de Janeiro em números," Época Negócios website, 8 May 2016, accessed 6 July 2017, http://epocanegocios.globo.com/Olimpiada/noticia/2016/08/os-jogos-olimpicos-do-rio-de-janeiro-em-numeros.html.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. The distance between Manaus and São Paulo is 2,437 miles by road. The distance between London and Kiev, Ukraine, is 1,502 miles by road.

8. "Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night," BBC News, 9 December 2015, accessed 30 June 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994. Note: The author acknowledges research support provided by Maj. Felipe Guimarães Rodrigues, U.S. Army, to document the events listed in notes 8 through 16.

9. "Everything We Know about the San Bernadino Terror Attack So Far," *Los Angeles Times* online, 14 December 2015, accessed 30 June 2017, http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-san-bernardino-shooting-terror-investigation-htmlstory.html.

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12. "Istanbul Ataturk Airport Attack: 41 Dead and More Than 230 Hurt," BBC News, 29 June 2016, accessed 30 June 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36658187.

13. Julfikar Ali Manik, Geeta Anand, and Ellen Barr, "Bangladesh Attack Is New Evidence That ISIS Has Shifted Its Focus Beyond the Mideast," *New York Times* online, 2 July 2016, accessed 3 July 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/world/asia/bangladesh-hostage-standoff.html; Madison Park, Saeed Ahmed, and Steve Visser, "Dhaka Cafe Attack: Bangladeshis Mourn Hostages, Officers Killed," CNN, 5 July 2016, accessed 3 July 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/03/asia/bangladesh-dhaka-shooting/index.html.

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15. Joern Poltz and Karin Strohecker, "Munich Gunman Fixated on Mass Killing, Had No Islamist Ties," Reuters, 24 June 2016, accessed 3 July 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-crime-munich-idUSKCN1021YZ.

16. James Beal and Nick Parker, "Rio Bomb Threat: Eco-Terrorists Who Detonated Pressure-Cooker Bomb Last Week 'Declare War' on the Olympics in Revenge for Bulldozing Wildlife," The Sun online, 9 August 2016, accessed 3 July 2017, http://afimacglobal.com/pdfs/AFIMAC%20-%20The%20Sun.pdf.

17. Presidência da República do Brasil, *Plano Estratégico de Segurança Integrada para os Jogos Olímpicos e Paralímpicos Rio 2016 (*PESI Rio 2016*)* (Brasília: Agência Brasileira de Inteligência [ABIN], 2015).

18. Ibid., 7–8. The principles governing institutional relations were complementarity, cooperation, discretion, efficiency, technical excellence, integration, interoperability, situational leadership, and respect for diversity and human dignity.

19. Ibid., 20.

20. Márcio Paulo Buzanelli, *Porque é Necessário Tipificar o Crime de Terrorismo no Brasil*, Revista Brasileira de Inteligência (Brasília: ABIN, no. 8, set. 2013), 16.

21. Presidência da República do Brasil, PESI Rio 2016, 20–21.

22. Matt Roper, "Olympics Soldier is Shot Dead and Comrades Wounded in Bloodbath after Driving into Rio Slum Run by Drugs Gang by Mistake," *Daily Mail* online, 10 August 2016, accessed 3 July 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3734009/Now-Olympic-soldier-shot-dead-comrades-wounded-bloodbath-Rio-slum-running-drugs-gang-mistake.html.

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Sgt. 1st Class Ray Garrin, Company B (Medical), 173rd Airborne Brigade, treats Vietnamese citizens 13 June 1966 as part of a Medical Civic Action Program during Operation Hollandia in Long Hải, Vietnam, in what was then the South Vietnamese province of Phước Tuy. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army Medical Department Center of History and Heritage)

Praise the Host and Pass the Fish Sauce

Medical Advisers in the Vietnam War

Maj. Scott C. Woodard, U.S. Army, Retired

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I was not sure what to expect when I was first assigned as the officer in charge of an embedded training team in support of the Afghan National Security Forces in 2006. I had once read David Donovan's *Once a Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in Vietnam*, the autobiographical story of an adviser in Vietnam, but he was a combat arms officer, and I was a Medical Service Corps officer.[1] Recognizing that the role of advising was not a new military mission, I wondered what the experience of medical advisers had been in our last sustained war, Vietnam.

As one reads through memoirs, reports, and analyses written before the January–February 1968 Tet Offensive, the goal of enabling a fledgling country to become self-sustaining was emerging and doing well. The medical field, in particular, benefited from dedicated advisers and other medical personnel providing education and assistance to their military medical counterparts. In addition, civilian and military patients reaped the harvest sown by the various medical assistance programs.

The roles of advisers in Vietnam, specifically those in the Army Medical Department, are presented here as a reminder of the valuable work those individuals accomplished and as potential historical lessons for similar future counterinsurgency missions.

Maj. Scott C. Woodard, U.S. Army, retired, is a historian in the Office of Medical History at the U.S. Army Medical Department Center of History and Heritage, having previously served in the Army for over twenty-two years. He holds a BA in history from The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, and an MA in military medical history from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. From December 2006 to December 2007 he served as the officer-in-charge of a medical logistics embedded training team with the Afghan National Army. Woodard is a certified military historian from the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

The Command

The U.S. advisory effort in Vietnam began in 1950 with Military Advisory and Assistance Group–Indochina support to the French. In 1955, it then became the Military Advisory Assistance Group–Vietnam (MAAG-V) and was augmented with the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission the following year. It initially focused outward on fighting an invasion from North Vietnam, while other nonmilitary agencies worked internally with the Vietnamese Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps.

Beginning in 1959, MAAG–V turned toward the emerging insurgency, refocusing on counterinsurgency operations. As the situation deteriorated in South Vietnam from 1961 to 1964, adviser and combat support to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN, also known as the South Vietnamese Army) increased. Advisers, however, were forbidden to participate in direct combat alongside Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and to operate near international borders. Consequently, the advisers organized into mobile training teams that rotated throughout conventional units, ranger units, and the Montagnards in the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program. To oversee this increased adviser population and mission, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established in 1962.

With the chaos following the death of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem in late 1963 and an increase of successful Viet Cong attacks in the south, Gen. William C. Westmoreland took command of U.S. forces during a tumultuous period in June 1964. American cadre assigned to ARVN units were deemed at an acceptable level, and beginning in 1965, U.S. command interest turned toward the buildup of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam. Consequently, MACV became an operational headquarters for these forces and focused less on the advisory and counterinsurgency roles from previous years. Now, the main U.S. effort was command and control of combat units instead of embedded advisers. Because RVNAF units did not serve under U.S. commanders, unity of effort replaced unity of command and resulted in advisers having a U.S. chain of command and their advisees having a separate chain of command. South Vietnamese units answered to South Vietnamese commanders while American advisers answered to other Americans in charge of combat forces. This disjointed union created a physical battle space where U.S. and RVNAF units occupied positions near each other, but not necessarily in synchronization. American advisers would now have an even more difficult situation.[2]

To mitigate the risks involved in focusing primarily on the command and control of U.S. forces, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

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Sgt. 1st Class Fred A. Edwards, a medical sergeant assigned to Special Forces Operational Detachment-A, Ha Tien, examines a patient's teeth circa 1967 in Ha Tien, approximately 150 kilometers southwest of Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City). Edwards operated a twelve-bed hospital in Ha Tien while training and mentoring his counterpart, Sgt. Nguyen Tong, a Vietnamese Special Forces medic. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army Medical Department Center of History and Heritage)

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mission morphed into combat assistance teams providing combat support coordination.[6]

The Advisers

In South Vietnamese divisions, U.S. advisers were assigned down to the battalion level beginning in December 1961. Since the process of conducting counterinsurgency dictated a requirement for civil-military interaction, provincial coordination was led by a province senior adviser (PSA) who was paired with the South Vietnamese district chief. When the PSA was military, his deputy was a civilian and vice versa. Medical noncommissioned officers were also a critical part of the adviser teams.[7]

However, the reality of this effort was that many first lieutenants with two years in the U.S. Army and no combat experience "advised" commanders twice their age with twenty-five years of combat experience. As is seen in the early advising roles, most American military advisers were unfamiliar with the society, culture, and language of South Vietnam. In fact, they were unfamiliar with the advisory role itself. According to a senior adviser in 1960, the advisory role was "entirely new and challenging to most American soldiers ... [who] spent most of their lives giving and executing orders. As advisers to South Vietnamese counterparts, they neither give nor take orders; they have a much less positive role—that of giving advice, providing guidance, and exerting influence."[8]

Advisers often found themselves performing three roles: a U.S. Army officer in charge of soldiers, a fellow combatant with the South Vietnamese, and a mediator between the two forces. By March of 1965, advising became a position of tactical combat support, changing from the earlier mission of training and advising of the early 1960s. Still, these difficult duties appeared simple compared to those of the PSA advisers, who were required to juggle the former in addition to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and various other nongovernmental organizations within a given province and district.[9]

The Role

In the beginning, advisory duty was sought after by soldiers desiring to perform a combat duty. As the U.S. effort in Vietnam became more involved in direct action in 1965, the enthusiasm shifted to leading the buildup of U.S. forces in combat. Additionally, the role of a provincial adviser placed a soldier into areas outside the normal realm of his previous warfighting training.[10] Westmoreland addressed the role of the adviser in 1967:

> You are still the 'heart and soul' of our total commitment to South Vietnam .... Your job is a most difficult and sometimes frustrating task. Under any circumstances, the relationship of adviser-to-advised is a testy and tenuous one. Here, that relationship is compounded by daily decisions with life or death consequences, and by communications problems complicated by language difficulties and different national origins. The training of the U.S. military officer is characterized by conditioned traits of decisiveness and aggressiveness. The essence of your relationship with your counterpart is constituted by patience and restraint. As a threshold to development of a meaningful affiliation with your counterpart you must succeed in the reconciliation of these contrasting qualities.[11]

By November of 1967, assignment to the various adviser programs was backed up by preferential treatment in the form of promotion consideration, next assignment choices, family location, and advanced schooling. These improvements, however, became a moot point as U.S. forces decreased their presence in South Vietnam around 1970. Cultural and language training was incorporated into the preparations given to advisers at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, while civil affairs training was given at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Additionally, advisers might get specialized training at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute in Washington, D.C., and instructor training in South Vietnam.[12]

Dai Dien and Counterpart Relationships

Former RVNAF officers remarked that the advisory movement was a synthesis of "Vietnamese experience with U.S. Army professionalism," and the American adviser was the "representative," or *dai dien*, of the U.S. government.[13] A key element of any advisory relationship is the rapport both parties have with one another. However, entrenched French influence, personal loyalties, and corruption often generated vast differences between the RVNAF officer corps and their U.S. advisers.

Among the many challenges were those that arose from the language barrier. To function optimally, those advisers assigned to regional forces and provincial forces

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required some fluency in Vietnamese, but according to South Vietnamese officers, advisers "rarely achieved a desirable fluency for effective professional communication."[14] Cao Van Vien, the former RVNAF chairman of the Joint General Staff, observed, "I know of no single instance in which a U.S. adviser effectively discussed professional matters with his counterpart in Vietnamese."[15]

Interpreters helped to overcome some of the language barriers, but that resolution was fraught with problems due to reliance upon a third party to properly convey precise and often nuanced information in Vietnamese, negotiate meaning across cultures, and then receive and properly convey information back in equally nuanced English. Additionally, the preference for indirectness was perceived by the Americans as dishonest.[16] William Shelton, an adviser to the South Vietnamese from 1961 to 1962, explained how the Vietnamese would say they were going to do what they believed the Americans expected and then do something else.[17] The problem may have been the different style of communication or a different notion of how to express politeness, even as a lack of candor, which greatly frustrated the U.S. advisers.[18]

As relayed by Stuart Herrington, a former district intelligence adviser from 1971 to 1972, disdain was a two-way street, where many Americans looked down upon the seemingly uneducated "little people," and their Vietnamese counterparts frowned upon Americans' arrogance, waste, and lack of respect for cultural traditions.[19] A Vietnamese officer might display contempt for an adviser who was not of the proper rank or experience compared to his Vietnamese colleague. One U.S. Marine Corps adviser in Vietnam, John Miller, reported that within Vietnamese culture, the "cult of the commander" was alive and well.[20] A subtle approach was key in facilitating the environment for the Vietnamese counterpart to incorporate any recommendation. However, seemingly obvious problems and solutions faced daily screamed immediacy for the American working at full speed for one year, while the Vietnamese could never meet this expectation when working at a problem for twenty years.[21]

Balancing the intimacy of the relationship also created challenges. Partnering too close raised fears that familiarity would breed contempt and that the counterpart would not take advice seriously. In contrast, partnering in an aloof manner risked not developing a working relationship at all. On the one hand, maintaining a professional, detached distance left maneuverability for the adviser to bring pressure in shaping the decision making, as might be needed.[22] On the other, an adviser might inadvertently diminish the commander's authority when the Vietnamese soldiers began to see that it was the American who was able create a victory from potential defeat with his ability to call upon helicopter and artillery assets. An effective adviser allowed the counterpart to develop his own plan based upon tactful suggestions and quiet, low-key coordination of support.[23]

Another challenge the adviser faced was lack of time. In a culture that relies heavily upon the formation of personal relationships as a prerequisite for doing business, advisers were expected to develop effective relationships that ordinarily would have taken years to foster. For example, as a former ARVN division and corps commander describes at the tactical level, a one-year tour of duty usually became a de facto six-month tour because of the rotation policies in theater. In contrast, at the district level, advisers served for eighteen months and usually had much greater influence on locals. Success reflected the relationship built between an adviser and his counterpart. A commitment of time spent was interpreted as a sign of mutual respect, positive attitude, and genuine desire to help, which was the recipe for good relations and, therefore, better outcomes.[24]

Medical Advisers in Counterinsurgency

Just as in previous wars, medical soldiers deployed into medical or nonmedical organizations. As a supporting specialty in a nonmedical unit, Army Medical Department soldiers were often one or two deep and filled critical roles. Life support for American advisers was the responsibility of the RVNAF. The MACV command surgeon was responsible for any U.S. support provided to the medical adviser under the director of the Logistics Advisory Directorate (J-46), who also served as adviser to the assistant chief of staff (J-4) on matters concerning RVNAF logistics.[25]

When serving in a medical unit, while primarily focused on support for U.S. troops, advising was often a collateral duty performed in support of counterinsurgency operations. Medical personnel assigned specifically to advising teams were focused solely on advising the Vietnamese in their particular medical specialty.

Maj. Robert J. Lander, of the Medical Service Corps, was assigned to MACV, Advisory Team 10 to the

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Capt. Edmond P. Zimsky treats a Vietnamese woman in 1968 during a Medical Civic Action Program in a hamlet of Dat Loi, Vietnam. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army Medical Department Center of History and Heritage)

RVNAF 4th Area Logistical Command in the Mekong Delta in December 1967. In this role, Lander supervised fellow U.S. medical advisers (a medical supply officer and a medical maintenance repairman) and advised three station hospitals, one field hospital, twelve sector hospitals, sixteen subsector dispensaries, a field medical depot, a veterinary detachment, and a preventive medicine unit. His RVNAF counterpart, a very competent physician and a graduate of a French medical school, was the newly appointed 4th Area Logistical Command surgeon and former 4th Corps surgeon.[26]

Lander recognized that a close relationship was critical in achieving good results. As a result, he described his method of advising his counterpart on implementing suggestions as "low key"; he was not demanding. A proposed suggestion might be discussed over beer or dinner two to three weeks after a specific inspection. For example, during the time period, Lander lamented the lack of funding to fully equip the subsector hospitals in his area of operations and the lack of evacuation platforms. The majority of wounded ARVN soldiers had to wait at least eight hours before getting to a hospital. In an attempt to advise his Vietnamese counterpart's subordinates on how to rectify this problem, his approach was to not overwhelm them with too many advisers. Instead, he pressed to make the already existing Vietnamese system work for them and did not try to impose a foreign system on them. In elaborating on this approach, he observed, "We have a system—the Vietnamese have a system and if it is made to work it will work."[27]

Medical Assistance Programs

Medical units in Vietnam contributed to the various programs aimed at countering the Viet Cong threat to

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the civilian population in the various hamlets and villages across the country. This support was obtained through the Provincial Health Assistance Program (PHAP), the Military Provincial Health Assistance Program (MILPHAP), the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), and the Civilian War Casualty Program.[28]

Provincial Health Assistance Program and Military Provincial Health Assistance Program. Initially begun in the early 1960s by USAID, the PHAP was intended to improve health services by training doctors, nurses, and medics. The intent of this training was to better Vietnamese hospitals and help control malaria. Although civilian surgical teams were stationed at different provincial hospitals, this task proved overwhelming, and the teams could not substantially improve the civilian health-care system due to the fighting. As U.S. forces increased, MACV directed U.S. Army medical units to begin serving in these same civilian institutions. Partnering with USAID, MACV instituted MILPHAP in 1965 with the intent to develop a sustained national health-care system for Vietnamese citizens. As teams augmented the provincial hospitals and dispensaries, they improved continuity in medical care and evacuation even though they were augmenting a Vietnamese civilian system with U.S. military assets.[29] At least through 1967, the teams were directed to not take over the facilities but to instead help and teach Vietnamese medical personnel.[30] Some U.S. teams, however, did replace the Vietnamese staff by 1970.[31] This augmentation of U.S. military medical assets did provide the above mentioned access and care. However, the program's intent was to institute a national health-care system. By filling Vietnamese medical gaps with U.S. medical teams, they did not fulfill the mandate of "Vietnamization" of the health-care system.

Capt. Larry P. Kammholz, Medical Corps, served as the medical officer in a MILPHAP in the Moc Hoa area of the Mekong Delta between 1966 and 1967. His unit consisted of three physicians and twelve enlisted men. Throughout his memoirs, Kammholz discusses the importance of interaction with civil authorities in coordinating medical care for so many underserved people. It was a continual process in working out who the "good guys" were and who was providing more business for the doctors. Partnering with USAID officials and local leaders became essential. Often, making do with less medicine, supplies, and translators was a part of the job. However, successes culminated in trusting friendships with fellow providers and doing well for those who were hurting.[32]

Medical Civic Action Program. In 1963, the U.S. Army assumed control of MEDCAP, a joint program developed by the U.S. Embassy and MACV that became the most well-known medical venture during the Vietnam War. The purpose of MEDCAP was to meet civilian medical needs in the Vietnamese countryside, foster mutual respect and cooperation through partnered U.S. Army and ARVN medical teams, and build credibility for the government of South Vietnam. This partnership facilitated training in medical procedures for the Vietnamese.[33]

Initially, U.S. military advisory teams and Special Forces had primary responsibility for conducting MEDCAPs.[34] Medical stability operations through MEDCAP I (as the original mission became known) focused on Special Forces and MACV medical advisers partnering with the ARVN, with the U.S. personnel attempting to take a back seat. All pharmaceuticals were requisitioned from ARVN supply depots.[35]

In describing the programs following his tour as the MACV surgeon, then Col. Spurgeon Neel detailed the importance of creating self-sufficiency in the RVNAF as part of the counterinsurgency effort. Of its potential to transcend the distrust in the central government, he wrote that "medicine is a universal language, and provides immediate high-impact communication within any culture, anywhere in the world."[36]

Capt. James Erwin Anderson Jr., Medical Corps, was a physician assigned to Medical Civic Action Team 20, a component of MAAG-V in 1963, and served in the Da Nang area of operations. He recorded that his six-man team (one to three were American advisers, and the rest were Vietnamese soldiers) would visit different villages throughout the area conducting sick call and provide follow up during return visits. As stated earlier, apart from providing medical relief, the additional intent of this program was to foster credibility for the government of South Vietnam. Consequently, highly visible participation by Vietnamese counterparts was critical to its success. Thus, it was standard procedure that two medics conducted screening and examination, two performed dispensing and treatment, and two maintained the medical records, with the Vietnamese medical personnel prominent. However, there was rarely an ARVN

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physician available, so training and scope of practice focused at the senior noncommissioned officer level.[37]

Treatment of the most common diseases was not hampered by this lack of a physician, since two-thirds of all patients presented with arthritis, bronchitis, pyoderma (skin disease characterized by pus), helminthiasis (worm infection), and headache. Most surgical requirements involved draining skin infections. In accomplishing those missions, the language barrier was again an impediment. Any interaction using an interpreter doubled the time required to accomplish a conversation; consequently, sick call procedures took twice as long with interpreters.[38]

In deploying to outlying villages, a field ambulance or helicopter would carry all the equipment for the team. The supplies came from an official list of medicines that could be requisitioned through the ARVN medical supply system and funded by USAID. Additionally, the team distributed training booklets produced in English and Vietnamese that laid out common procedures, diagnosis, and treatments, and maintenance of supplies.[39]

In evaluating his experience as a lesson for future medical advisers, Anderson observed the dilemma of seemingly short-term solutions for chronic illnesses and the inability for patients to even increase their standing by allowing them to pay something for the services if they chose.[40]

As U.S. Army forces were built up in 1965, conventional forces began participating in the program. Though the original MEDCAP I program continued, the MEDCAP II program allowed for rotating teams from large medical units to service remote hamlets where permanent care was not available. This filled the gap created from MILPHAP services at permanent sites. By working through members of the RVNAF, the way was intended to have medical care continued by the Vietnamese themselves.[41]

By 1967, supplies were soon obtained through normal U.S. supply channels. Building upon the success demonstrated in medical programs, dental and veterinarian services were incorporated.[42]

Civilian War Casualty Program. As the Vietnam conflict became more violent and expansive, the Department of Defense was tasked to provide care for civilian casualties of the war. As a result, the Civilian War Casualty Program (CWCP) was established, and it began operating in earnest in late 1967. The original concept was to build two separate systems: one for civilian Vietnamese patients and one for U.S. military patients. However, this eventually merged into a "joint occupancy" system rather than entirely separate CWCP hospital systems.[43]

Consolidation of the programs streamlined construction and evacuation coordination, and allowed civilians to have treatment closer to their homes. Eventually, all Vietnamese military hospitals and civilian hospitals merged into a common system, thus providing a better system of care for all of Vietnam.[44]

End State

As discussed in the introduction, advisory efforts and the medical portion of the strategic counterinsurgency were working well before the Tet Offensive in 1968. Reports touting the amount of vaccinations given, the numbers of patients seen, or other metrics all measured input into an evaluation of a medical system. While a measure of disease reduction is an outcome, in American reports it was often measuring the results of U.S. efforts. Any truly effective counterinsurgency stability operations program must measure the outcomes derived from the host nation. The student must show the teacher that he has mastered the subject. Instead of reporting the number of classes taught to ARVN medics, the real measure is how many patients were treated and evacuated by those ARVN medics. The bureaucracy of MACV and the U.S. Army seemed to only measure effectiveness by the quantity of "inputs" during a six- to twelve-month officer evaluation report. The lag time from an academic theory of effectiveness to real-world application may be longer than a twelve-month tour.

What happened? In 1975, the Republic of Vietnam fell despite having received years of advice and material aid. In hindsight, the previous 1st Division, IV Corps, and the last I Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Ngo Quong Troung remarked, "The advisory effort should have endeavored first to bring about an effective command, control, and leadership system for the ARVN before trying to improve the combat effectiveness of small units."[45]

As revealed in a critique of the adviser role of U.S. personnel in Vietnam, part of the Indochina Monographs series, former senior RVNAF officers wrote that U.S. advisers did remarkable work. However, the inability to instill motivation and leadership into the officer ranks ended up reflecting the political regime plaguing the struggling country and ultimately led to its end.[46] Those

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former senior leaders in the RVNAF (chairman of the Joint General Staff; commander of the 1st Infantry Division, IV Corps, I Corps; chief of intelligence; commander of the Central Logistics Command; and Joint General Staff Chief of Staff, to name a few) praised the tough mission accomplished by U.S. advisers:


> The success of giving advice or receiving it is an art that depends a great deal on personal virtues and the individual's approach to human relationships. Professional competence and experience did not always make a good adviser if he was not at the same time a man of tact and good manners. Irascibility and haughtiness would not solve problems, but only make them worse. The key to success depended on flexibility, restraint, and understanding. A good adviser was neither too passive nor too aggressive. He would accomplish little if he waited for his counterpart to come to him for advice and only provided it when asked. On the other hand, if by overzealousness, he flooded his counterpart with a cascade of problems, real or imagined, and aggressively told him to do this and that or tried to do everything by himself, his good intentions would be defeated. For unmeasured aggressiveness sometimes gave a counterpart the impression that he was being spied on or under scrutiny or surveillance. His self-preservation instincts would prevent him from cooperating wholeheartedly or worse, push him into rebellion and he would refuse to cooperate and let the adviser do it all.[47] ■

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army Medical Department, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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A Look Back in Time

During periods of conflict, *Military Review* has often been used as a venue to pass along lessons learned from the field, especially through the medium of short entries. The featured short extract below provides insights and recommendations to field surgeons deploying to the war in Europe during World War II. To view the entire May 1944 edition of *Military Review*, Volume XXIV, Number 2, visit http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/1138/rec/9.

Hints for Battalion Surgeons

A MEDICAL officer, battalion surgeon for an artillery battalion in Italy, writes:

SUPPLIES

"Bring from the States an ample supply of practical, everyday drugs, especially cough syrups, gargles, adrenalin, and coramine in 1-cc ampules. If you can manage it, keep them in a chest with a large flat top and doors opening outward, which will be handy not only to store them in but to facilitate their transportation and immediate access to them. An electric otoscope and hot water bottles are worth bringing.

"Get plasma as soon as possible. It is invaluable, as are the morphine Syrettes.

TRAINING

"Training at home should emphasize that the functions of an aid station in the field are identical with those of a dispensary in garrison. Train personnel to give immunizations; it will save valuable time. Practice moving around at night in blackout so that strangeness and fear of dark are eliminated.

LOCATION OF AID STATION

"Battalion Surgeons will find that a personal reconnaissance of forward positions is essential.

"The aid station must be located as close to all batteries as possible. This eliminates long litter carries and the waste of valuable time. A house should be used as a station if possible but don't pick one the enemy will think is a CP or OP. Tents are impractical in a forward position. Setting up a station in a vehicle is unsatisfactory because of vulnerability to shell fire and lack of space. Proximity to a road we find is the most valuable adjunct to an aid station.

THE AID STATION IN ACTION

"We feel our treatment here in the forward area should anticipate definitive treatment later and should prepare the patient as much as possible along those lines.

"X-ray all patients injured by flying bodies. Apparently slight wounds have revealed the presence of foreign bodies at a distance from the point of penetration.


"Be ultraconservative in the initial treatment of all battle casualties when in a position where an evacuation hospital or surgical group can be reached within one to two hours.

MISCELLANEOUS

"Telephone communications to the gun batteries and CP are essential.

"Excellent lighting can be obtained from a 'Sealbeam' headlight and a vehicle battery. Coleman lanterns are unatisfactory because of lack of 'white' gasoline. Kerosene lanterns can be used as night lights, but kerosene is relatively scarce."

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The Ghost Warriors

Inside Israel's Undercover War against Suicide Terrorism

Samuel M. Katz, Berkley Caliber, New York, 2016, 432 pages

Lt. Col. John H. Modinger, PhD, U.S. Air Force, Retired

Samuel Katz, an internationally recognized Middle East expert and bestselling author, creates a true tour de force with *The Ghost Warriors*. Katz masterfully weaves together a patchwork of political drama, resilient and dastardly characters, innovative methods, hastily organized operations, and the inevitable fog and friction accompanying any violent conflict into a gripping, gruesome, yet easy-to-read testimony to the daily bravery and ingenuity of Israeli counterterrorism operatives. These operatives are tasked with infiltrating terrorist networks and stopping them—on a shoe-string budget—with little or no time to prepare, leveraging actionable intelligence, keen insight, and hunches honed over decades.

One Israeli counterterrorism group in particular, *Ya'mas,* is the focus of Katz's extraordinarily detailed exposé—an exposé done with the direct assistance of many former and active members, along with members of other elite units who worked side by side with them. Ya'mas remains a stealthy organization, albeit not as much after the publication of this work. The organization is comprised of Arab-speaking Jewish, Druze, and Muslim citizens of Israel who convincingly masqueraded as Palestinians to infiltrate and seize high-value targets associated with the bombing spree accompanying the Second Intifada (or Second Uprising), an explosion of violence that began in 2000 and lasted until about 2008.[1] Its chief goal was (and still is) to eliminate not just trigger pullers but the multilayered infrastructure supporting them. As Katz points out, few of the world's elite counterterror units maintain a continuous plainclothes undercover capability, and none possesses cultural and language capabilities to mirror Ya'mas.

Having traveled throughout Israel many times myself, when I saw the terrain and the proximity of Arab and Israeli communities against the backdrop of a tortured, tumultuous past, I was always struck by the relative tranquility despite unending reports about regional volatility. Of course, that seeming tranquility is deceptive. It is maintained (most of the time) thanks to unrelenting, often tedious, work nearly always executed behind the scenes by shadowy figures. These stalwart sentinels—tireless *Shin Bet* (Israel's General Security

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Service) intelligence officers, nerves-of-steel field operatives with more coffee coursing through their veins than blood, and seasoned team chiefs juggling innumerable variables at a frenetic pace, in crowded cafés, congested streets, and the bowels of hot, dank, cramped spaces filled with smoke—patiently wait to pounce on targets with honed, cat-like senses. At once, their mandate is both simple and complicated: track, target, and eliminate the violent zealots taking refuge within the Palestinian communities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, often aided and abetted by the infamously corrupt and morally bankrupt Palestinian National Authority (Fatah) and Israel's nemesis in the Gaza Strip, Hamas.

The work of these units has largely gone unreported and unnoticed—until now. While this makes for a riveting read, it remains to be seen whether such disclosures are a good thing. Accounts likes those detailing the operational aspects of, say the Osama bin Laden raid, are fascinating but may undermine future operations by revealing tactics, techniques, and procedures that afford special operations forces advantages in the field until the enemy learns how to adapt to them.

Surprisingly, Katz says getting the story did not involve exhaustive prying—members of these units wanted the story to be told.[2] Katz confides his biggest challenge was deciding which operations to include, which makes one wonder if a sequel is in the works. One can only speculate as to why these Israeli operatives (and maybe the Israeli government) felt this story had to be told now.

According to his investigation, over the course of the Second Intifada, Ya'mas units participated in thousands of missions—testimony to the scale of the threat. For perspective's sake, he notes that crack counterterrorist teams such as the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team or Germany's GSG 9 might carry out ten to twenty operations per year.

Many human rights groups allege Ya'mas and other counterterrorism units are nothing more than "hit teams," circumventing due process. That is a problematic assertion, though, since Ya'mas's motto is, according to Katz, "We'd rather snatch you than scratch you." Basically, there is more to be gained from apprehending the targets than killing them, because the strategic goal is to take down the entire network versus individual operatives. Unraveling the threads making up the terrorist tapestry is a painstaking process dependent upon precise intelligence obtained through a variety of means, including interrogation of arrested subjects. Katz contends such self-restraint on the part of Ya'mas and other counterterrorism units was quite amazing given the carnage and frequency of attacks across Israel during the period in question. That may be true, but such restraint was also self-serving.

The book is a severely truncated collection of fascinating, often heart-pounding, and sometimes almost comical snippets from Ya'mas exploits in the three sectors it works: the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Their work is deadly serious and often carried out with little time for preparation and planning. Their stunning successes, despite the hurdles, is most assuredly due to the fact members of these units are among the most elite cadre within the Israeli counterterrorism effort, who, according to Katz, think little of the long-term health and psychological consequences of perpetually living on a knife's edge.

It would have been interesting to get more insight into their personal lives—and the stresses the career puts on them and their families—but the author may have been astounded by his good fortune and, thus, opted not to press into largely unexplored territory more aggressively. For those energized by thoughts of such a life, a closer look into their private lives—if you could call their lives private, given how much they invest in the job—would likely give many pause and raise the inevitable question: "Could I do it?"

These men (sometimes dressed as women), "walk as if between rain drops—able to understand the customs, mindset, nuances, and vulnerabilities of the Palestinian communities, and to move within them undetected."[3] Unlike more conventional counterterrorism forces, their battles revolve almost exclusively around face-to-face encounters and hand-to-hand combat, utilizing a skill set whereby they "think, look, speak, and act like the enemy they hunt."[4]

For the American military, especially its Special Forces, there may be a lesson within these pages, but it comes with certain caveats. In the current struggle with the Islamic State, greater emphasis on co-opting local minorities, thoroughly trained and equipped, to infiltrate deep within the Islamic State


Lt. Col. John H. Modinger, PhD, U.S. Air Force, retired, is an associate professor with the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS

CALL FOR PAPERS

Multi-Domain Battle



The U.S. Army is a learning organization, and it is constantly adapting to the technological, military, and strategic conditions of our times. Occasionally, conditions shift to the extent that the character of war changes and we must invest significant intellectual energy to reimagine how we fight. This is such a time.

As AirLand Battle shaped the force of the 1980s and beyond, the critical analysis and creative thinking we apply today toward developing a new operational approach will drive our Army's organization, doctrine, training, equipment, and posture for decades to come. It is incumbent upon us, the practitioners of the profession of arms, to apply our knowledge and experience to this challenging task.

To participate in the professional discourse,

- familiarize yourself with the context, perspectives, and arguments of multi-domain battle and other alternative assessments;
- identify vital questions and problems, and envision potential solutions;
- engage in discussions with colleagues to test your ideas and clarify your thinking; and
- refine your argument, write an article, and submit it to Army University Press. For submission guidelines visit http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Publish-With-Us/#mr-submissions.

We encourage ideas from all viewpoints—military and civilian; private to general officer; company to theater army; tactical, operational, and strategic; land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains; operational warfighting functions; institutional force management, development, and acquisition functions; Active and Reserve Components; Army and other service; and joint, interagency, and multinational.

Access our website on multi-domain battle, "New Extended Battlefield: The Future of War," by visiting http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Online-Publications/New-Extended-Battlefield/.

"safe havens" might prove very fruitful. However, given the global nature of U.S. commitments versus the regional focus of Israel, such expertise, as shown by Ya'mas operatives—fighting on home turf, with their own families and friends in the crosshairs, and a deep, some would argue sacred, commitment to Israel—is not likely to be developed in considerable depth by an American force fighting in one place today and another in the not-too-distant future.

Katz asserts that the Second Intifada was actually a full-on war by Palestinian terrorist groups against Israel, despite the fact Western news organizations did not treat it as such. Thus, he characterized it as a "war" fought in the shadows. No doubt, for the people involved, the families forever scarred, and the intensity of it all, it probably did rival war. Yet, in terms of lives lost and such, and with terrain changing hands, it probably would not.

This is an outstanding work, both for the story it tells and its readability. While there is a discernible pro-Israel lean to this nonfiction tale, *The Ghost Warriors* provides readers an excellent look inside a previously unknown but very potent counterterrorism unit that saved, and no doubt continues to save, myriad lives, both Israeli and Palestinian. The nuanced descriptions, harrowing details, and fast-paced narrative combine to deliver a genuine page-turner. This is a worthy addition to any professional reading list or library. ■

Notes

1. It may not be so surprising, given the voracious global appetite and fascination with the doings of special operators whose assignments tended to remain in the shadows until more recent times.

2. The First Intifada was the first major large-scale Palestinian insurgency in the West Bank and Gaza. It lasted from December 1987 until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. The Second Intifada is usually dated from September 2000 when Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount to the Sharm El Sheikh summit in February 2005. Intifada is derived from the Arab word meaning to "shake off," which can be thought of as synonymous with "insurrection."

3. Berkley Publishing Group, "The Ghost Warriors: Inside Israel's Undercover War Against Suicide Terrorism," press release, 12 January 2016.

4. Ibid.

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LETTER TO THE EDITOR

NORTH KOREA: IS ICBM A THREAT?

The North Korean nuclear program is a horrible example of the results of American leadership failure, deferring action to the next administration.

As to China's role in deferral, it is an open question. Agreements were signed but were violated immediately, so we seek new agreements. Sanctions are not a policy, just a pretense of policy. All they have accomplished is starvation of millions of North Koreans. China has never enforced sanctions and will never dare to do so. They have not worked elsewhere either, so we seek more sanctions.

Now North Korea claims it has an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). What to do? The United States has basically one option; China has several options. By stopping all imports and exports through or from its territory, China could collapse the North Korean economy quickly. It could attack the nuclear facilities, also an American option. It could simply invade and occupy the country. It may have means of bringing about a change of regime. Does it really care enough to do anything? Perhaps, to induce regime change, but not to block trade, destroy, or invade after all. North Korea is not threatening to attack China with its ICBM. The United States as far as we know has only considered a military attack on nuclear facilities. Think again.

Chinese culture is horrified at the prospect of uncertainty and chaos. Now, there is no alternative. Its apparent plan to replace Kim Jong-un with a relative ended with the relative's murder in Malaysia. But even a palace coup or massacre was unlikely to go smoothly, nor was there a guarantee that a new ruler would behave as hoped for; South Korea might have its own candidate among the refugees.

The panic reaction to the successful launch of an alleged ICBM is unwarranted. It is irrelevant at this time, perhaps a diversion. North Korea is not going to attack the United States. It is homicidal, but not suicidal. Nor is it going to invade South Korea unless it is convinced that the United States will not retaliate.

The current North Korean strategy is about money to keep its elite happy. It is more afraid of internal unrest than of foreign attack. Counterfeit currency, drugs, and ransom have all been tried. It is a criminal administration. Other nations have better missiles for sale, at low prices. It is exporting labor, possibly draining its armed forces. What else? North Korea has a lot of uranium-238 and plutonium in various packages—compact, portable, extremely valuable. Does it have a paying customers already? I am sure it is in the market. That is the current threat, and it is insurgent. Destroying missile launching sites will not end it.

The ICBM program is a long-run strategy. The objective is the looting of South Korea by conquest. To achieve this goal it is necessary to prevent intervention by the United States in South Korea's behalf, as it did once before. The thinking is that a threat to destroy Los Angeles will do the job. This strategy is behind schedule and cannot succeed because no president I can think of in the present or future would stand by idly. It is a coercion strategy. However, the strategy could be implemented anyway; North Korea is capable of wishful thinking and risk taking. It will not have a credible capability to attack the continental United States for a number of years, so let us leave this legacy to the future. Meanwhile Kim Jong-un has uranium-238 to sell.

China, South Korea, perhaps other nations might have secret agents in the palace of the Kims. The chaos following a coup is preferable to a military attack on nuclear facilities. A change of regime is also needed to rescue Seoul from its current role as a potential hostage. First conduct a coup, then deal with the nuclear issue while retaining the option of attacking missile sites. And keep in mind that China, not just North Korea, is anxious to have the American military out of South Korea, one way or another.

There is need for Chinese-American cooperation following a regime collapse in North Korea. Humanitarian aid for the people should be relatively easy. Establishing a stable and peaceful regime acceptable to both nations would be more difficult. That job would best done by South Korea. It is no business of America, beyond the nuclear threat. But the imperial ambitions of the Chinese leadership are unpredictable. That is another story.

There is a third Korea which might be a factor in Chinese thinking. It is the millions of ethnic Koreans living close to the Korean Peninsula. What if North Korea were a decent place, or offered easy access to South Korea or the first two Koreas were united? It is one ethnic minority that would have a place to go. Leave that to future generations of Koreans.

Charles T. Stewart Jr., Washington, D.C.

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Painting of the Rev. Jacob Duché as he offers the first prayer for the Continental Congress 7 September 1774 in Philadelphia. Original by Tompkins Harrison Matteson, 1848. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

The Birth of the U.S. Army

In its first session in the summer of 1789, Congress faced numerous decisions regarding the administration of policies granted in the recently ratified U.S. Constitution. These included approving President George Washington's cabinet appointees and federal judges, setting up the federal treasury, writing the Bill of Rights and further amending the Constitution, determining how to deal with Native American neighbors, preparing a plan to reduce the Revolutionary War debt, and deciding on a location for the U.S. capital. Lastly, it needed to come to terms on the creation of one national, professional U.S. military.

While vestiges of the Continental Army still remained from American Revolution, there was no official U.S. army. Under the Articles of Confederation (the precursor to the Constitution, ratified in 1781), individual states had the power to organize civilian-soldier militias, but the Articles held no real long-term solutions for a professional national military. Recognizing this as a serious shortfall to the security of the new Nation, Washington wrote a letter to the members of Congress on 7 August 1789 urging them to authorize an official U.S. military.

Washington wrote, "It may not be amiss to observe I am particularly anxious it should receive an early attention as circumstances will admit, because it is now in our power to avail ourselves of the military knowledge disseminated throughout the several States by means of the

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well-instructed officers and soldiers of the late Army, a resource which is daily diminishing by death and other causes."

Secretary of War Henry Knox read Washington's letter to Congress on 7 August. After the reading, the House of Representatives "ordered" that creating a military would be added to their agenda, and members began discussing the budget for maintaining this then-theoretical military as well as how much to spend on Native American encounters. However, the Senate necessitated a second letter from the president before it took action on the matter.

A 10 August letter from Washington urged the Senate to create an army, since both the House and Senate had passed legislation that stated Native American encounters were a matter of the federal government, not individual states. Without having a professional military working for the federal government, he reasoned, Congress has no way of enforcing their Native American policies. The members of the Senate agreed to add creating the military to the end of its agenda and to consider the measure before Congress broke. On the last day of session, 29 September, the Senate, after returning it to the House twice, passed the bill that established the armed forces of the United States of America. This created the base for the current professional military, the largest employer in the United States. ■

ed by Paige Cox,

Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States

Tuesday, September 29, 1789

The House proceeded to reconsider the last amendment proposed by the Senate to the bill, entitled "An act to recognize and adapt to the Constitution of the United States, the establishment of the troops raised under the resolves of the United States in Congress assembled, and for other purposes therein mentioned:" Whereupon,

Resolved, That this House doth recede from their disagreement to the said amendment.

Ordered, That the Clerk of this House do acquaint the Senate therewith....

Mr. Partridge reported, from the Committee for Enrolled Bills, that the committee had examined two enrolled bills, one, entitled "An act to recognize and adapt to the Constitution of the United States, the establishment of the troops raised under the resolves of the United States in Congress assembled, and for other purposes therein mentioned;" the other, entitled "An act to allow the Baron de Glaubeck the pay of Captain in the Army of the United States;" also, an enrolled resolve for continuing John White, John Wright, and Joshua Dawson, in office until the fourth of February, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-nine, and had found the same to be truly enrolled: Whereupon,

Mr. Speaker signed the said enrolled bills and resolve.

Ordered, That the doorkeeper of this House do provide one or more stoves, and necessary fuel, for the accommodation of the House at its next session.

Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate, to inform them that this House, having completed the business before them, are now about to proceed to close the present session, by an adjournment on their part, agreeably to the order of the twenty-sixth instant; and that the Clerk of this House do go with the said message.

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Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2017

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Mark A. Milley—General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

Gerald B. O'Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army



Cover photo: A Stryker vehicle belonging to the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, based out of Fort Lewis, Washington, fires a tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided missile at a range 17 June 2009 during the brigade's rotation through the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. (Photo by Pfc. Victor J. Ayala, U.S. Army)

Next page: Romanian, U.K., and U.S. soldiers from Battle Group Poland began Bull Run II, an alert and readiness exercise 5 September 2017 at the Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland. Bull Run II is a two-day exercise to test the speed of assembly, collective defense, and interoperability of the NATO battle group. (Photo by Capt. John W. Strickland, U.S. Army)

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WINNERS!

2017 General William E. DePuy Special Topics Writing Competition

The 2017 theme was "What needs to be fixed in the Army?"

1st Place
Lt. Col. Thomas Holland
"How the Army Ought to Write Requirements"
(In this edition, page 100)

2nd Place
1st Lt. James Tollefson
"Fixing Army Doctrine: A Network Approach"


3rd Place
Capt. Molly Kovite
"Mission before Comfort: A Mission-Focused Approach to Gender in the Army"

Honorable Mentions

Lt. Col. Trent Lythgoe, "An Army Overseas: Expeditionary Maneuver through the Maritime Domain"

Cadet Noelle Walker, "Growing a Garden in a Wasteland: A Case for Preventative, Cognitive Therapy for Soldiers Suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury"


For updates and information on the DePuy writing competition, please visit http://www.armyupress.army.mil/DePuy-Writing-Competition/.



Themes and Suggested Topics

Institutional

- How do we change our culture and develop leaders to:
  - overcome seventeen years of institutional/operational experience?
  - see/understand/seize fleeting opportunities?
  - develop the situation in contact and chaos?
  - offset "one-off" dependencies and contested domains?
  - rapidly exploit positions of advantage?
  - survive in hyper-lethal engagements?
  - continuously present multiple dilemmas to the enemy?
  - decide and act at speed?
  - fully realize mission command?
- What are the greatest threats the Army faces (either externally or internally)? How should the Army deal with them?
- Case studies of how to properly integrate emerging technology.
- What is needlessly duplicated in the Army (e.g., what should be done away with, how should the Army adjust, and how would it benefit)?



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- What must be done to adjust junior leader development to a modern operational environment?
- What must we do to develop a more effective means of developing and maintaining institutional memory in order to deal with emerging challenges?
- What is the role for the Army in homeland security operations? What must the Army be prepared for?
- Impact of nepotism on the officer development system.
- Impact of funding shortfalls on readiness.
- The potential adverse impacts on military standards due to factors associated with poor integration of new cultures, ethnicities, or racial considerations and how to mitigate them.
- How is gender integration changing the Army and how it operates?

Global Security

- What nations consider themselves to be at war or in conflict with the United States? How are they conducting war, and what does this mean for the Army?
- What operational and logistical challenges are foreseen due to infrastructure limitations in potential foreign areas of operation and how can we mitigate them?
- What lessons did we learn during this year's hurricane relief operations?

Soldiers assigned to 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment provide "enemy" fire from a mountaintop 28 August 2016 during Decisive Action Rotation 16-09 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Spc. JD Sacharok, U.S. Army)



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General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

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39 North Korea Policy

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The author espouses changed regime over regime change as a U.S. policy regarding North Korea, discussing where the United States went wrong in the past and what it should do in the future.

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Maj. Ren Angeles, U.S. Army

Broadening assignments, specifically with Army service component commands, prepare officers for future assignments along their career paths. The author draws from personal experience to highlight the positive aspects of these assignments for officer development.

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Capt. Stephen Petraeus, U.S. Army
Capt. Daniel Reynolds, U.S. Army

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Lt. Col. Benjamin A. Bennett, PhD, U.S. Army

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Lt. Col. Craig Whiteside, U.S. Army, Retired
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Lt. Col. Thomas "Bull" Holland, PhD, U.S. Army

The Army's lack of an evidence-based requirements system is a consistent cause of failure in Army acquisition programs. The winner of this year's DePuy writing competition opines that the Army should adopt a consistently proven industry method for writing the best requirements. (First place, 2017 General William E. DePuy Writing Competition)

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Europe 1815–1914

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2018 General William E. DePuy

Special Topics Writing Competition

This year's theme: "World Hot Spots: Which of the world's hot spots is the Army least prepared for? Should resources be diverted to prepare for them? What is the most efficient way to become ready for conflict in this region?"

Articles will be comparatively judged by a panel of senior Army leaders on how well they have clearly identified issues requiring solutions relevant to the Army in general, or to a significant portion of the Army; how effectively detailed and feasible the solutions to the identified problem are; and the level of writing excellence achieved. Writing must be logically developed and well organized, demonstrate professional-level grammar and usage, provide original insights, and be thoroughly researched as manifest in pertinent sources.

Contest opens 1 January 2018 and closes 16 July 2018

1st Place	$1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place	$750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place	$500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*

For information on how to submit an entry, please visit
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Multi-Domain Battle

The Advent of Twenty-First Century War

Gen. David G. Perkins, U.S. Army

This is the final article in a series discussing multi-domain battle through the lens of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. This article discusses how the Army must adapt to meet the requirements for a future force operating in a multi-domain environment.

In July 1940, the U.S. Army could no longer dither about preparing to conduct armored warfare. France had just fallen to Germany in a lightning-fast campaign led by combined arms mechanized and motorized formations that integrated airpower at the tactical and operational level while synchronizing all elements of combat power on a scale and in a manner for which the Allies had no effective solutions. German success in such a short timeframe illuminated both that World War I-based doctrine had run its course and that the failure to adapt to changes brought by advances in technology had left the U.S. Army on its heels, facing a war that would eventually unfold on two fronts and requiring a modern army that did not yet exist. In a

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matter of years, the U.S. Army would transform from a small active force of less than 250,000, devoid of modern equipment, to a modern army capable of defeating the Axis in Africa, the Pacific, and Europe.

Lessons of the Past—Failure to Adapt

After World War I, the Army failed to effectively modernize, despite efforts over two decades to do just that. At the beginning of the Second World War, the U.S. Army found itself little better off than it had been in 1920.[1] This failure to maintain a modern military during the interwar period was the result of a poor understanding and visualization of what constituted a modern force. The difficulty of securing money to modernize was exacerbated by the lack of a compelling vision of future combat. Still, the Army did try.

Significant efforts to modernize the U.S. Army began in 1920, when the Army took on a strategy of readiness specifically focused on personnel and mobilization as the core components to victory in modern war.

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However, prioritizing personnel and mobilization came at a direct cost to overall force modernization. Given limited resources, it was difficult to promote or coordinate equipment and organizational modernization efforts in a cohesive manner.

As an example, over the next twenty years, the United States failed to produce a capable armor force. In part, this was due to an inability to field modern tanks. Infantry Branch created a set of requirements for the production of a tank that could not be met by a vehicle under the weight of fifteen tons. Fifteen tons was the maximum weight that could be carried on Army pontoon bridges, the capabilities of which Engineer Branch was unwilling to commit research and development funds to increase. At a stalemate, neither side saw finding a solution a priority.

Even in 1939, with the invasion of Poland, the War Department pushed the chief of cavalry to deactivate horse cavalry units and provide personnel for new mechanized forces.[2] He refused, stating, "Under no circumstance will I agree to any further depletion of my horse cavalry. To do so would be a betrayal of the nation's defense."[3]

With limited funding, the Army defaulted to funding personnel and mobilization capabilities. These decisions ultimately played a role in a U.S. armored force meeting German panzers for the first time without adequate protection, firepower, and training.[4] Drawing lessons from this period, it is clear that we must understand the operational environment and visualize how the Army will operate with concepts that accurately address the requirements of future warfare.

In 2018, the U.S. Army requires concepts that allow us to begin a modernization program to meet anticipated threats. The complexity of war on land continues to grow as the number of actors able to employ capabilities in the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains increases. The interrelationship of military activities within domains becomes much more problematic than when forces enjoyed nearly uncontested

Previous page: Artist Spiros Karkavelas envisions combat on a future urban battlefield. Success in a complex environment like this will require coordinated, mutually supporting efforts by all U.S. services across the entire multi-domain battlefield. (Artwork by Art of Spiros, Spiros Karkavelas Entertainment Design, artofskar.blogspot.com; modified by Jim Crandell, Army University Press)




Figure. Conflict Continuum

superiority in each of them. The Army's dominance on land has become dependent, if not contingent, on access to the air, cyber, and space domains. These domains are a challenge not just because they will be contested. They also challenge our previous views of responsibilities at echelons of command and geographical containment of actions and effects. When the next major fight comes, twenty-first century large-scale ground combat will arrive with it, whether the Army is prepared or not. To be ready, the Army must work toward an accurate vision of the future battlefield and understand its operational environments. Multi-domain battle is the start of this process. It is an evolving warfighting concept designed to win in an ever-changing complex world, leveraging the lessons of the past with twenty-first century capabilities.

Multi-Domain Battle: A New Concept for a New World

In 1940, the U.S. Army began to learn the hard way how to become a modern military force.[5] We face indications of similar challenges today. Operational environments are evolving through technological advancements and diffusion, increasingly weaponized information, and divergent political systems designed to upend the current international order. These

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challenges demand a new perspective on how the Army fights both in purpose and in design.

The nature of war will remain unchanged. However, the continuum of conflict must be understood in the current and future context. There is and always will be strategic competition. You are either winning or losing, present tense. Seldom will conflict result in a permanent win or loss. The linear depiction of peace to war and back again must be revised to reflect the cyclical nature of war where there are only positions of relative advantage. The continuum of conflict is defined by *competition* short of conflict, *conflict* itself, and the *return to competition* (see figure, previous page).

Our adversaries and potential adversaries have studied and learned from our battlefield successes since the first Gulf War. With that knowledge, they are adapting their methods of warfare, while accelerating the modernization and professionalization of their combat forces. They seek to gain strategic advantage by offsetting the advantages we have enjoyed over the last twenty years. Through these new methods, they are competing now below the threshold of open armed conflict while continuing to posture to more effectively engage in large-scale combat, if it were to come to that. To offset our key advantages, three macro lessons are guiding their new approach to warfare. First, do not let the United States and our allies gain access to the area of operations. Once fully established, we have the operational advantage in logistics, firepower, and command and control necessary to overwhelm anyone. Second, try to fracture the joint team by isolating our air, sea, and land forces to prevent mutual support. It is the synergies of our interdependent joint capabilities that make us dominant. Third, fix us and do not allow our forces to maneuver and bring all of our elements of combat power (including leadership) to bear in the close fight.

We can expect all domains to be contested. Adversaries possess significant integrated air defenses and long-range fires, as well as sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and information, electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities. It is no longer possible to maintain total dominance in all domains all of the time.

Multi-domain battle is a concept designed to overcome our adversary's integrated defensive capabilities, avoid domain isolation and fracturing, and preserve freedom of action. The joint force must be able to penetrate adversarial defenses at a time and place of our choosing, in more than one domain, by opening windows of domain superiority to allow maneuver inside our adversary's integrated defense. The rate and speed of current and future world events will not allow us the time to synchronize federated solutions. In order to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas, we must converge and integrate multi-domain solutions and approaches before the battle starts. We must become sensor-shooter agnostic in all our platforms, and we must maintain a common operating picture.

Evolving Capabilities from Vision to Reality

Success of multi-domain battle is contingent on our ability to match the concept to the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities capabilities and material modernization requirements. Some of the emerging required capabilities to achieve this follow:

Long-range precision/cross-domain fires. The U.S. Army is developing multipurpose munitions and sensors for long-range precision fires and air-delivered electronic warfare. The goal is to have both lethal and nonlethal fires that are delivered from the land domain to produce effects in all domains. The ability to deliver precision fires at extended ranges is essential to mitigate risks associated with semi-independent maneuver and create the conditions necessary for deep maneuver to defeat the threat's integrated fires complex.

Next generation combat vehicle. The next generation of combat vehicles will incorporate new weapons with greater range, as well as utility for urban environments. Designed to be optionally manned, they will be smaller in size, allowing greater maneuverability in restricted areas. They will have reduced fuel and bulk ammunition consumption rates while also incorporating integrated active protection combined with advanced-material armor. The next generation of combat vehicles will incorporate emerging technologies such as networked targeting systems, directed energy weapons,

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semiautonomous wingman teaming, and increased-range munitions.[6] These will enable the type of semi-independent maneuver that multi-domain battle requires.

Future vertical lift. Future vertical lift will play a critical role in moving combat power directly into the fight and ensuring casualties retain access to lifesaving treatment—despite distances. In multi-domain battle, aviation reconnaissance units will cover greater areas, aviation attack units will apply increased adaptability to take advantage of fleeting opportunities and respond more quickly to friendly ground units in need, aviation assault and transport units will move larger forces further and faster to build combat power at decisive points, and medevac units will move casualties over greater distances within the "golden hour" of lifesaving treatment. Future vertical lift, using supervised autonomy, will provide commanders additional options of manned and unmanned platforms dependent upon mission requirements and level of risk.

The network. The network will increase the speed and flow of the right information to the right people, enabling faster understanding and action while simultaneously denying our adversaries freedom of maneuver on the "electronic battlefield."[7] To do this, the U.S. Army is creating a single end-to-end network framework and advanced cyberspace offensive and defensive capabilities. The network will deliver a common understanding of the operational environment while sharing information horizontally and vertically across all services and partners—managing information from home station to the tactical edge. Offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, using artificial intelligence, protect the friendly network and create windows of opportunity while disrupting and denying the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Air/missile defense. The Army is taking steps to defend key fixed sites and provide effective air and missile defense protection of maneuvering forces by modernizing short-range air defense and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems as well as developing onboard aerial and ground vehicle advanced protection systems. Survivability of units will be dependent on the success and distribution of these capabilities. As an enabler, increasing ground-based fires will support joint force commanders with more options while simultaneously providing force protection against enemy missile and manned and unmanned air system attacks. As a deterrent, positioning and demonstrating these abilities will frustrate adversaries' aims to fracture the joint force.

Soldier lethality. The soldier and squad are the cornerstone of the U.S. Army. Our Army is only as good as our soldiers' ability to perform both physically and cognitively. They must have overmatch with their weapons and equipment to succeed in high-intensity combat. Lethality must be balanced between fire and maneuver with systems to increase the delivery of accurate and lethal fires while increasing individual soldier maneuverability. In terms of lethality, the Army is increasing close- and long-range small arms accuracy via new fire control systems, munitions, and weapon designs. The introduction of robotics in terms of exoskeleton suits and manned-unmanned teaming will improve maneuverability by decreasing the individual soldier's load while also increasing small unit range, coverage, and responsiveness.

Organizational design. One example of force design and experimentation pertaining to the multi-domain battle concept is the multi-domain task force (MDTF). The MDTF is experimenting under the guidance of U.S. Army Pacific. It delivers operational fires to enable joint force freedom of maneuver at the earliest stage of deployment and conflict. The MDTF achieves this by deploying and managing capabilities like long-range precision fires, air and missile defense, attacking enemy networks, and defending the friendly network. While still experimental, the first MDTF is a major step toward realizing the multi-domain battle concept.

From Parochialism to Understanding

Between 1920 and 1939, there was no greater challenge to modernization than branch and service parochialism. We cannot allow that to happen again.

Parochialism was mitigated in the past with significant and effective results. A great example of overcoming parochialism is the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force's 31 Initiatives. As part of AirLand Battle, 31 Initiatives brought modernization efforts that had been in the works since the early 1970s to a combined recommendation shared between the Air Force and the Army.[8] Central to the success of this interservice effort was a shared Terms of Reference (TOR) that articulated a common understanding of demands on the present force as well as the process to design and field the best affordable AirLand combat forces.[9] The TOR began with Army doctrine in FM 100-5, *Operations*, as the point of departure to

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conduct joint training and exercises—to reach a shared understanding of what AirLand Battle would require.[10]

For multi-domain battle, we have already begun to build the components for future collaboration in the spirit of the 31 Initiatives. As with AirLand Battle, multi-domain battle naturally challenges domain-based parochial positions. It readily identifies that land components cannot dominate without convergence across domains. With publication of the first version of the concept we are working to establish a clear point of departure for additional multiservice and joint collaboration, and building a coalition of leaders committed to developing a shared understanding and visualization of the future force and multi-domain battle.

The idea of a coalition of leaders from across the services is not aspirational. From inception, the U.S. Marine Corps partnered with the Army to develop the original multi-domain battle white paper and concept (version 1.0). The Marines brought their extensive experience in both combined arms maneuver and cross-domain maneuver. The Air Force also committed to working multi-domain battle issues. They helped identify U.S. Army natural bias to think spatially at the cost of functional perspectives when viewing the operational framework.[11] The Air Force, through the Air Combat Command (ACC), also committed to conducting multiservice exercises, experiments, and wargames on multi-domain battle to increase shared understanding and visualization. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Air Combat Command are working jointly to develop a converged operational framework to visualize multiple domains simultaneously. Finally, there are the invaluable roles of U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Army Pacific, which have provided, and continue to provide, opportunities to operationalize multi-domain battle through exercises and taking on the first MDTF.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army must continue to strive to be a premier learning and innovative institution. Multi-domain battle and the subsequent Army capabilities will continue to be assessed through our iterative processes of think, learn, analyze, and implement. To get where we want to go, it is critical to understand that multi-domain battle, at this stage, is still a concept. Transitioning the Army from the constabulary force of 1917 to a modern army took over twenty years and two world wars. Transitioning the Army from the Vietnam War to AirLand Battle took over ten years. In the years to come, multi-domain battle is our concept to drive change. We will invariably find that the ideas, capabilities, and requirements we generate are not always correct—what will be critical is that we adapt and innovate consistently with a common joint vision and shared understanding.

Twenty-first century warfare is coming. In many respects it has already arrived. The challenge the Army and Joint Force face today is whether we can adapt. The battlefield has simultaneously compressed and expanded globally.[12] Unlike the past, we will not have two years to correct the mistakes of twenty. The force that is postured, resilient, and able to converge its capabilities across all domains will win. We must be that force. Victory starts here. ■

Notes

1. David E. Johnson, "From Frontier Constabulary to Modern Army," in *The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941*, eds. Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 204.

2. "Memorandum, Brig. Gen. F. M. Andrews for the Chief of Cavalry, G-3/42070," 23 February 1940, file 322.02, Office of the Chief of Cavalry, correspondence, 1921-42, Box 7b, Record Group 177, National Archives and Records Administration.

3. "Memorandum, Maj. Gen. J. K. Herr for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3," 28 February 1940, file 322.02, Office of the Chief of Cavalry, correspondence, 1921-42, Box 7b, Record Group 177, National Archives and Records Administration.

4. Ibid., 201.

5. Johnson, "From Frontier Constabulary to Modern Army," 191.

6. "U.S. Army Future Force Development Strategy (unsigned)," May 2017, 26; "U.S. Army Tanks, Strykers, and Bradleys Are Getting Active-Protection Systems to Fend off Enemy Fire," Business Insider website, 8 June 2017, accessed 7 September 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/us-army-tanks-strykers-and-bradleys-getting-active-protection-systems-2017-6.

7. "U.S. Army Future Force Development Strategy," 24.

8. Richard G. Davis, *The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air Force–Army Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987).

9. Ibid., 38.

10. Ibid., 35; Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982 [obsolete]).

11. James M. Holmes and David G. Perkins, "Multi-Domain Battle: Converging Concepts toward a Joint Solution," *Joint Force Quarterly* (forthcoming).

12. *Ground Force Modernization Budget Request, Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives*, 115th Cong. (24 May 2017) (statements of Lt. Gen. John M. Murray and Lt. Gen. Paul A. Ostrowski), accessed 21 September 2017, https://armedservices.house.gov/legislation/hearings/ground-force-modernization-budget-request-0.

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The Return of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*

Lt. Gen. Mike Lundy, U.S. Army

Col. Rich Creed, U.S. Army



When the U.S. Army rescinded Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations,* and published Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations,* in 2011, the world was a different place.[1] The likelihood of large-scale ground combat against an enemy with peer capabilities seemed remote. While the Russians had intervened in Georgia with ground forces in 2008, there were few indications that they would engage in further physically aggressive behavior. Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea seemed to have little to do with Army concerns. The Korean Peninsula remained tense, but resumption of war seemed no more likely than at any other time since the 1953 armistice. The Army's two remaining armored brigade combat teams in Germany were directed to return to the continental United States, and the Army was downsizing while building momentum toward a decision that would make a significant portion of Army forces in Korea rotational as well.

The strategic environment has changed significantly since then. Russian aggression against the Ukraine and increasingly bellicose behavior by the North Koreans and Iranians are prime examples. The rapidly modernizing Chinese military added to the sense that the Army needed to quickly adapt to the increased possibility of large-scale ground combat against adversaries significantly more capable than al-Qaida, Iraqi insurgents, and the Taliban. As a result, the Army began training for large-scale combat operations during mission command training program exercises and at its "dirt" combat training centers after a decade-long hiatus. It also discovered our current tactical doctrine for large-scale combat operations was inadequate.

In 2016, the Army chief of staff directed Training and Doctrine Command to write an operations manual that would provide the doctrinal basis for prevailing in large-scale ground combat against enemies whose military capabilities, in regional contexts, rivaled our own. While the Army had some doctrine that was relevant to fighting big wars, it lacked a single, up-to-date, unifying doctrinal manual focused on large-unit tactics for use against contemporary threats. There was also a definitive need to address Army operations along the continuum of conflict and the roles the Army fulfills for the joint force as our adversaries challenge the status quo in various regions around the world.

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Previous versions of FM 3-0, *Operations*, and its predecessor, FM 100-5, contained useful ideas relevant to current problems, but none adequately addressed all the challenges of today's operational environment. Reasonably informed professionals can and do argue which challenges are the most serious, but most might agree that they fall into three general categories. The first, and arguably most important, is that the Army's culture needed to change. The focus on regularly scheduled deployments of brigade combat teams, higher echelon headquarters, and supporting formations to conduct counterinsurgency operations (COIN) from static bases against enemies with limited military capabilities created a view of ground combat incongruent with the realities of fighting large-scale combat against a peer threat. Few leaders with significant experience training or fighting against peer threats remain in our tactical formations, and those with experience at more senior levels were out of practice after a decade or more focused on COIN. The new FM 3-0 addresses the need to change our Army culture by describing the operational environment and threat, emphasizing the important roles of echelons above the brigade level during operations, and addressing the training readiness considerations in each warfighting function during large-scale ground combat.[2]

> "Since 2003, seldom have units larger than a platoon been at risk of destruction by enemy forces, and no units faced enemy forces able to mass fires or maneuver large-scale forces effectively."

The second category of challenges is improving our Army's readiness to prevail in large-scale ground combat against opponents with peer capabilities. Our Army and our doctrine became optimized for limited contingency operations that primarily focused on operations where counterinsurgency and stability tasks made up the bulk of what both units and headquarters were expected to do. Since 2003, seldom have units larger than a platoon been at risk of destruction by enemy forces, and no units faced enemy forces able to mass fires or maneuver large-scale forces effectively. The problem is that the ability to effectively shape security environments and prevent conflict through credible conventional deterrence, or to consolidate gains to achieve the desired political purpose, comes from the demonstrated readiness to prevail in large-scale ground combat against the most lethal threats. This is why the core of FM 3-0 addresses large-scale ground combat operations at the brigade, division, and corps level. It describes the tactics and procedures used during both the defense and the offense, and those familiar with previous editions of FM 3-0 or FM 100-5 are unlikely to be surprised by what they read in those three chapters. There are no new tactical tasks, but there is a renewed recognition and deeper discussion of the tactics required to employ capabilities within and across multiple domains to enable freedom of action for subordinate echelons.

What is new from previous editions, however, are the chapters focused on operations to shape, operations to prevent, and operations to consolidate gains. A large proportion of the Army engages in these operations around the world continuously, and how well the Army does so has a significant

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influence on both the likelihood of large-scale ground combat and the strategic outcomes of that combat should it occur. FM 3-0 thus addresses the operations the Army conducts across the continuum of conflict as it fulfills its strategic roles as part of the joint force, recognizing that it is the demonstrated capability to prevail in large-scale ground combat that enables the effective prosecution of missions supporting the other strategic roles. As a result, the manual also contains a renewed emphasis on the roles of the Army's corps and division echelons to employ capabilities as formations.

Corps and divisions play a central role in large-scale ground combat, which is not and cannot be a brigade combat team (BCT)-centric endeavor. When properly constituted, trained, and led, echelons of command unburden subordinate formations by narrowing their focus, reducing their spans of control, and maintaining the broader perspective in time and space necessary for effective planning. The division is the first echelon able to effectively plan and coordinate the employment of all multi-domain capabilities across the operational framework. The same is true for the corps during operations that require multiple divisions. Each higher echelon has a perspective that should look at time, geography, decision-making, and the electromagnetic spectrum differently. This is not a new military idea but reflects a significant change from the formative experiences of the majority of our Army's leadership during a time when divisions and corps were serving in the roles of joint headquarters or more focused at the operational versus tactical level.

The third category of challenges pertains to the reality that the U.S. Army does not enjoy overwhelming advantages against every opponent it may be required to fight. FM 3-0 recognizes that some adversaries have equal, or even superior capabilities that may put Army forces at a position of relative disadvantage, particularly in a regional context. Some threat capabilities, particularly integrated air defense systems and long-range surface-to-surface fires, severely impede freedom of action in the air and maritime domains, meaning that the other services may not be able to help solve ground tactical problems as quickly or easily as they did in Iraq and Afghanistan. Against some opponents, U.S. Army cannon and rocket artillery is likely to be both outranged and significantly outnumbered, which would present a tactical problem even if friendly forces were not contested in the air domain. The potential combination of relative disadvantage in the ground, maritime, and air domains has implications for how Army forces conduct operations against enemy formations designed around long-range fires systems, which employ maneuver arms in support of fires more often than the other way around. Understanding the various methods our adversaries and potential foes employ (systems warfare, isolation, preclusion, information warfare, and sanctuary) is therefore critical to devising tactical plans to defeat them, and it is important to understand that these methods are likely to manifest themselves differently in each situation.


Unlike AirLand Battle, which was focused on one enemy, or previous iterations of FM 3-0, which really didn't focus on any particular threat, this edition of FM 3-0 is focused on peer or near-peer adversaries (Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea) in the current operational environment. For that reason, the operational challenges our Army faces span the range of military operations across all domains, and they needed to be addressed. FM 3-0 is not optimized for any one type of operation or single threat, but rather benchmarked against the most potent adversary capabilities and methods that have proliferated worldwide, and accounts for what the Army is required to do—from large-scale ground combat to shaping the security environment through regional engagement, and all operations in between. FM 3-0 does not change the Army's foundational operational concept, which remains unified land operations. What it does is better account for the reason behind the operations we conduct to clarify the interrelationship between strategic purpose, planning, readiness, and the tactical tasks assigned to units.

Organization and Purpose

FM 3-0 arranges operations by purpose, in accordance with the four Army strategic roles. The Army *shapes the operational environment, prevents conflict, conducts large-scale ground combat*, and *consolidates gains*. Army forces do this as part of the joint force, generally in a multinational context, for a joint force commander. Previous versions of FM 3-0 and FM 100-5 did not adequately emphasize the critical linkage between tactical tasks and achieving the strategic purpose for which we conduct them. Categorizing types of operations by purpose aligns with the joint phasing construct found in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, while emphasizing that there is not always a direct linear relationship between those phases

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(see figure 1).[3] Chapters 3 (Operations to Shape) and 4 (Operations to Prevent) of FM 3-0 describe operations conducted short of large-scale ground combat, when adversaries seek to use methods below the threshold of armed conflict to upset the status quo or subvert friendly nations. Chapters 5 (Large-Scale Ground Combat), 6 (Defense), and 7 (Offense) focus on large-scale ground combat, and chapter 8 (Operations to Consolidate Gains) addresses the echeloned transition from large-scale ground combat to the final achievement of the operational or strategic purpose.



(Graphic from U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*)

Figure 1. Army Strategic Roles and Their Relationships to Joint Phases


Achieving the strategic purpose of operations is the underlying theory of victory in FM 3-0 and is addressed at the end of chapter 1. There are few acceptable permanent solutions to conflict at the strategic level. The majority of conflicts in the world are managed over long periods of time, with each side trying to increase and exploit positions of relative advantage. In effect, the joint force is either winning or losing a competition that provides opportunities to achieve favorable results during operations short of armed conflict, during armed conflict, and during the transition that occurs after armed conflict. The Army, acting in performance of its strategic roles as part of the joint force, conducts operations across the conflict continuum to ensure the United States maintains a position of advantage relative to actual and potential threats. Operations to shape or prevent are successful when they defeat an adversary's purpose, such as an attempt to destabilize the desired status quo or subvert a friendly state. We win during large-scale ground combat by destroying or defeating the enemy's conventional capabilities and will to resist. We effectively consolidate gains when we follow through to ensure the enemy cannot constitute other forms of resistance to protract the conflict or change its nature in ways that thwart our purpose. In short, FM 3-0 provides a context for commanders and their staffs to successfully practice operational art appropriate for the range of military operations.

Old and New

Any discussion about new doctrine for large-scale ground combat operations tends to generate the discussion that the U.S. Army is pining for the "simpler" days of the planning for the Soviet threat in Europe as an escape from the challenge of COIN. Another is the Army is seeking to bring back large-scale combat as a justification for maintaining force structure. Neither is the case. Chapter 1 describes a very different operational environment than that of thirty-five or even five years ago. The intellectual approach is to specifically account for today's adversaries and the broad categories of operations the Army conducts to confront them as part of the joint force. Incorporating the Army chief of staff's guidance with regard to preparing the Army for large-scale land combat against an opponent with peer capabilities was critical, and FM 3-0 makes it clear that there are linkages between what the Army does during operations short of conflict and what it needs to do if it is to prevail in war. FM 3-0 accounts for both what is enduringly fundamental and what has changed in the context of current environmental realities, Army organizations, and Army capabilities.

There are several big ideas that are not necessarily new to operations but have not been adequately addressed in recent doctrine or experience. We specifically

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The strategic support area describes the area extending from a theater of operations to a continental United States base or another combatant commander's area of responsibility, that contains those organizations, lines of communication, and other agencies required in the field. It includes the air and seaports supporting the flow of forces and sustainment into the theater.

The joint security area is a specific surface area, designated by the joint force commander to facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communication that support joint operations.

The consolidation area is the portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for freedom of action in the close area and to support the continuous consolidation of gains.

The support area is the portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations.

The close area is the portion of a commander's area of operations assigned to subordinate maneuver forces.

The deep area is the portion of the commander's area of operations that is not assigned to subordinate units.

The zone between the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and the fire support coordination line (FSCL) is typically the area over which friendly ground forces intend to maneuver in the near future and is also the area where joint air interdiction operations are normally executed through the air support operations center/direct air support center. Joint Publication (JP) 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*

Interdiction best describes how Army and joint fires are typically employed in the deep area interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives.

(Graphic from U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*)

Figure 2. FM 3-0 Operational Framework for Unified Land Operations

sought to account for the importance of friendly and threat capabilities across multiple domains and the information environment. As a result, we modified the operational framework to approximate the extended battlefield framework found in the multi-domain battle concept (see figure 2).[4] Doing so recognizes the realities of the operational environment, current Army and joint capabilities, and the planning considerations essential for winning. The new operational framework adds the strategic support area, joint security area (JSA), consolidation area, and deep fires area to the previously designated deep, close, and support areas.

The strategic support and joint security areas encompass where Army activities occur outside the areas of operation for which Army tactical level commanders are responsible. Army forces transit and operate in those areas, but the areas themselves are primarily the purview of the other services, combatant commanders, and joint headquarters because they largely encompass domains other than land. We added them because Army forces are heavily influenced by what happens there and have planning responsibilities for Army activities in those areas and the information environment. The deep fires area is that part of the deep area that is beyond where Army

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forces would immediately plan to maneuver with ground forces and where primarily joint and Army cross-domain capabilities would be employed. The strategic support area, JSA, and deep fires area actually describe what already existed in fact but were not accounted for in previous large-unit tactical doctrine. It is the consolidation area that reflects the biggest change to the operational framework in terms of how Army forces look at areas of operation at the corps and division level.

> When we plan operations and allocate forces, we must account for the requirement to consolidate gains as part of making accurate, responsible staff estimates.

The consolidation area was designed to solve an age-old problem during operations. The Army has long wrestled with the security challenges behind its forces while maintaining tempo in the close and deep areas, particularly during offensive operations when brigade combat team rear boundaries shift forward and increase the size of the division support area beyond the capability of the units operating there to control terrain, secure populations, or protect themselves against bypassed enemy forces. The typical solution was to assign combat power from brigades committed to operations in the close and deep areas to the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) during exercises, which was satisfactory as long as the division bypassed only small enemy formations and the training scenario was metered to keep the enemy forces from being too aggressive. Actual experience against Iraqi forces during the first few months of Operation Iraqi Freedom indicated this approach entails significant risk both during and after execution of large-scale ground combat operations. The enemy cannot be allowed time to reconstitute new forms of resistance to protract the conflict and undo our initial battlefield gains. Against more capable threats, we need to address the problem directly by planning for and employing the necessary *additional* combat power beyond what is required for the close and deep areas to consolidate gains during large-scale combat operations.

During the Cold War in Europe, the Army could depend upon its allies to quickly provide the combat power necessary to consolidate gains as large-scale combat ended in a particular area of operations. While this is still the case in Korea, and likely to be true when fighting as part of NATO, there are other places in the world where Army forces would need to consolidate gains ourselves, at least initially. This is especially important when we conduct high tempo offensive operations that bypass significant enemy maneuver forces to avoid being fixed while inside the range of enemy long-range cannon, rocket, and missile fires. FM 3-0 says that corps and division commanders *may* designate a consolidation area to a subordinate echelon as an area of operations to facilitate freedom of action by unburdening units in the support, close, and deep areas. For a division, this would be typically executed by an additional BCT that must be accounted for when the theater army conducts force tailoring for the joint force commander. A corps would assign a division responsibility for its consolidation area, which would expand as its divisions moved forward and unit boundaries shifted to maintain momentum.

Consolidation areas are dynamic, as the units assigned them initially conduct offensive, defensive, and the minimal stability tasks necessary to defeat bypassed forces, control key terrain and facilities, and secure population centers. Over time, as the situation matures, the mix of tactical tasks is likely to be equal parts security and stability in each consolidation area. However, security-related tasks always have first priority. Planning and execution to consolidate gains must account for all potential means of enemy resistance and be approached as a form of exploitation and pursuit if we want to create enduring outcomes. It is critical to avoid giving enemies the time to reorganize for a different kind of fight.

As mentioned above, the forces assigned consolidation areas are additive and not intended to draw combat power away from the close area. When we plan operations and allocate forces, we must account for the requirement to consolidate gains as part of making accurate, responsible staff estimates. The requirement to consolidate gains doesn't go away when we ignore

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it, and the longer the delay in addressing it the greater the impact on the force's ability to sustain tempo and the more challenging the requirement likely becomes overall. The Army has always been tasked to consolidate gains. It did so with varying degrees of success in the Indian wars, after the Civil War during Reconstruction, during the Spanish-American War, during World War II and Korea, and in Vietnam, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan. How successful we did it informs how the outcomes of those wars or conflicts are viewed today.

> "Brigade combat teams fighting in the close area generally lack the time or ability to effectively plan and employ multi-domain capabilities other than those already under their control."

There are obvious implications to this idea. Follow-and-support units task organized to conduct combined arms operations are essential. The units could be in theater, or forces arriving later in the deployment process. Coalition units could often be well suited for assignment to consolidation areas. The biggest implication is that more forces are required and must be allocated to defeat the enemy on the battlefield and consolidate gains to attain a strategic objective than to just simply defeat the enemy on the battlefield.

Army Echelons and the Operational Framework

FM 3-0 recognizes the importance of cyberspace and space-enabled capabilities, electronic warfare, and the heavily contested information environment. It pulls key aspects of the latest doctrine in those areas into the operations conducted by theater armies, corps, and divisions. Converging those capabilities in support of ground forces to gain and exploit positions of advantage is a critical role played at the division level and higher. Brigade combat teams fighting in the close area generally lack the time or ability to effectively plan and employ multi-domain capabilities other than those already under their control. Mobility, lethality, and protection dominate the cognitive focus at the brigade and lower echelons during ground combat. Theater armies, corps, and divisions are far enough removed from the close fight to have a broader perspective across the operational framework and are where the capabilities resident in each domain are orchestrated and synchronized to converge in time and space to enable freedom of action for subordinate echelons. It is they who identify and exploit windows of opportunity.

How we think about the operational framework has changed. The first difference to consider is that we no longer discuss linear versus nonlinear constructs. Instead, FM 3-0 has contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operation to better account for the nonlinear nature of all operations, regardless of the physical lines on a graphic overlay. The next, and largest difference, is that each area of the operational framework has *physical*, *temporal*, *cognitive*, and *virtual* considerations that correlate with the focus of a particular echelon. Without an echelon-specific focus in time and space across multiple domains, the likelihood would be that everyone focuses on the close fight and current operations.

The operational framework considerations provide commanders and staffs a way to look at multiple domains and the information environment in the context of operations on land. The considerations are as interrelated as the domains in any specific situation and have different implications for different echelons operating in different areas of the operational framework. The physical and temporal considerations pertain to space and time, and have been with us a long time. Cognitive considerations are those things pertaining to enemy decision making, enemy will, our will, and the behavior of populations. Virtual considerations are in regard to activities and entities that reside in cyberspace, both friendly and threat. Taken together, the four considerations allow commanders and staffs to account for the reality that all battle is multi-domain battle and has been for a long time.

Maritime capabilities have influenced land combat for more than two thousand years. Air capabilities have done the same for more than a century, while space capabilities have been with us for more than

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forty years. Even cyberspace has played a critical role for almost two decades. By explicitly expanding the operational framework beyond a tactically focused physical model, FM 3-0 accounts for the employment of capabilities unbound by range constraints during operations short of armed conflict, during small-scale contingencies, during large-scale ground combat, and as we consolidate gains to achieve enduring outcomes to our tactical operations.

The Way Ahead

The new FM 3-0 has significant implications for the Army as it reorients on large-scale ground combat while simultaneously conducting other types of operations around the world to prevent peer and near-peer adversaries from gaining positions of strategic advantage. Many of the considerations necessary to achieve military success in the current operational environment are fundamentally unchanged, but what has changed is important. Army forces do not have the luxury of focusing solely on large-scale land combat at the expense of the other missions the Nation requires them to do, but at the same time, they cannot afford to be unprepared for those kinds of operations in an increasingly unstable world. Being prepared for large-scale ground combat generates credible deterrence and contributes to worldwide stability. Being prepared requires doctrine suitable for theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades to conduct operations with the right mix of forces able to execute tactical tasks to achieve operational and strategic goals. We look forward to a spirited professional discussion across our Army as we integrate our new operational doctrine into the force. That professional discussion will undoubtedly inform more changes in the future and make us a better Army. ■

Notes

1. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2008 [obsolete]). Change 1 to this version was published in 2011; Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2011 [obsolete]).


2. FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 6 October 2017).

3. Ibid., figure 1-4.

4. For more on the multi-domain battle concept, see David G. Perkins, "Multi-Domain Battle: Driving Change to Win in the Future," *Military Review* 97, no. 4 (July-August 2017): 6–12.

Military Review

WE RECOMMEND



ssential to Success: Historical Case Studies in the Art of Command at Echelons Above Brigade is the latest book from Army University Press. Commissioned as a companion to the Army's 2017 version of FM 3-0, *Operations*, it contains twenty engaging and thought-provoking chapters by scholars and former large-unit commanders who analyze key decisions, enabling factors, and limiting factors in large-unit combat operations from the Second World War to current conflicts.

The U.S. Army's recent history of small-unit operations, combined with increased potential for large-scale combat against peer or near-peer rivals and advances in technology and social media call for a reassessment of command at senior levels. *Essential to Success* highlights situations faced by commanders of the past, and it explains and contextualizes the problems they faced, the decisions they made, and the outcomes of those decisions. The book invites readers, commanders, and their staffs to think critically and apply historical experience to large-scale ground combat of the future in an attempt to preserve American lives and valuable national resources.

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General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, congratulates servicemen and veterans during a speech 1 October 2016 on Russia's Ground Forces Day, noting their significant contribution to the protection of Russia's national interests. (Photo courtesy of Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation)

Contemporary Warfare and Current Issues for the Defense of the Country

General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

Translated by Dr. Harold Orenstein; Foreword by Timothy Thomas

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Foreword

In March 2017, Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov spoke on the topic "Contemporary Warfare and Current Issues for the Defense of the Country" at a conference held at the Academy of Military Sciences. This speech is presented here in direct translation (without conversion to vernacular English).[1]

Gerasimov discusses several elements that characterize war today and what tasks to tackle. First, he lists the features that characterize contemporary military conflicts. They include noncontact operations, weapon costs, the use of robotics, various forms for employing forces, the use of information-psychological and information-technical effects, and other factors. Second, he discusses hybrid operations and the "flip side," which he labels as a new perception of peacetime, when security and sovereignty are threatened by means other than violent measures, (i.e., nonmilitary means). Third, he lists tasks for the Academy of Military Science to study, to include the current forms of confrontation and the methods to oppose them, the development of counters to hybrid warfare means used by the West against Russia, the development of forms and methods of operations under various conditions, and the problems associated with organizing force regroupings. Fourth, he notes that Russia's military capabilities have been improved via the balanced development of all services and branches. Specifically, he highlights five areas: the development of high-tech weapons, new communication means, intelligence, automated command and control, and radio-electronic warfare. Fifth, he underscores one thought on several occasions—that the use of military force is still the best way to describe "war." Additionally, Gerasimov warns that there has not been enough attention paid by military scholars to certain topics including "combat operations against irregular enemy formations; employment of groupings consisting of regular forces and national militia detachments; combat under urban conditions, including where fighters are holding civilians as 'human shields'; and post-conflict normalization."

Finally, it should be noted that Gerasimov's speech offered a good example of "how to think like a Russian officer," as he mentions key elements associated with their military science: trends, forecasting, the correlation of types of struggles, and forms and methods. Special attention should also be paid to how Gerasimov characterizes "hybrid operations" as a U.S. and NATO activity and "hybrid warfare" as promoted by mass media and "as an established term is, at present, premature." It is significant that when he states "the Russian army has shown skill [in Syria] in conducting new-type warfare," new-type warfare is understood is the emerging depiction for Russian thinking on war.

Timothy Thomas, Foreign Military Studies Office

Remarks by General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, "Contemporary Warfare and Current Issues for the Defense of the Country"

War has always been a constant companion of humanity. It was born before the appearance of the state and is one of the factors of the development of the state.

It is natural that the problem of defining the nature and essence of warfare has always been at the center of attention of domestic and foreign scholars. Clausewitz singled out the political nature of war, treating it as a continuation of politics by other means. He understood "other means" to be violent ones. He compared war to "extended single combat," defining it as "an act of violence having the goal of forcing the enemy to carry out our will."

Snesarev and Svechin—eminent Russian and Soviet military theorists at the beginning of the twentieth century—made a significant contribution to the development of "the science of war." The principal trends of waging war, which are a result of not only political, but also economic and social relations, are an example of their research.

By the beginning of the 1990s, a firm understanding of war as a means of achieving political goals exclusively on the basis of employing means of armed struggle developed.

War as a phenomenon occupies the minds of both domestic and foreign military specialists. At present, the United States has a classification of military conflicts, including traditional and nontraditional warfare. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, American theorists proposed the inclusion of "hybrid warfare" in this classification. This refers to actions that occur in a period that cannot possibly be associated purely with war or with peace.

In domestic science and practice, a more weighty approach to the classification of

General of the Army Valery Gerasimov is the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and first deputy defense minister. He is a graduate of the Kazan Higher Tank Command School, the Malinovsky Military Academy of Armored Forces, and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. He served in a wide variety of command and staff positions before his current assignment, including commanding the 58th Army during combat operations in Chechnya.

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contemporary military conflicts has been determined. It takes into account a greater number of attributes of wars and armed conflicts.

According to the *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, wars, together with armed conflicts, comprise the general content of military conflicts. They are "a form of resolving interstate or intrastate conflicts with the employment of armed force." At the same time, there is no definition of "war" in official international or domestic documents.

The term "war" is used in domestic military science. It is defined in the *Military Encyclopedia*. Today, the military and scientific community is dynamically discussing issues regarding a clarification of the concept of war.

Some scholars and specialists adhere to the classical treatment of the nature and content of war. Here, the objectivity of the evolutionary development of warfare as a phenomenon and the necessity of introducing changes into its theory are not rejected. Others recommend a fundamental reexamination of views on the nature and content of the concept of war, taking into consideration that armed struggle is not an obligatory attribute.

At present, one can encounter in print and in public discussion such phrases as "information warfare," "economic warfare," "hybrid war," and a multitude of other variants of the use of the word "war." All this must be analyzed and discussed. It is evident that a healthy scholarly discussion can only be something good for domestic military science.

The General Staff is focusing the necessary attention on resolving this issue. In 2016, a discussion on the nature of the concept of war under contemporary conditions was organized at the General Staff Military Academy.

A meeting of the military security issues section of the Security Council's science board also examined this issue. During the discussion, general guidelines were developed regarding the necessity of analyzing the characteristics and features of contemporary military conflicts and clarifying their genesis and development.

Military conflicts at the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century differ from one another with respect to composition of participants, weapons employed, and forms and methods of troop activities. At the same time, military conflicts have not gone beyond the bounds of the conventional nature of war; their components are types of struggle such as direct armed struggle, political struggle, diplomatic struggle, information struggle, et al. New features have appeared in them such as a change in the correlation of the contribution of one type of struggle over another to the overall political success of a war, the overwhelming superiority of one of the sides in military force and economic might, etc.

> "A substantive feature of contemporary military conflicts is the increasing employment of the latest robotic complexes and unmanned aerial vehicles with varied designations and actions. New forms of employment of different forces and means have appeared."

There are a number of features that are characteristic for contemporary military conflicts.

The experience of NATO operations in Yugoslavia, which heralded the era of so-called "noncontact" or "remote" warfare, has not received widespread circulation. The reason is an objective one: restrictions of a geographic and economic nature were imposed on the achievement of the goals of the war. The cost factor for weapons and war began to play an important role in the selection of methods for conducting military operations.

A substantive feature of contemporary military conflicts is the increasing employment of the latest robotic complexes and unmanned aerial vehicles with varied designations and actions. New forms of employment of different forces and means have appeared. For example, during the operations in Libya, a no-fly zone was established and a naval blockade was carried out in combination with the joint operations of private military companies from the NATO countries and the opposition's armed formations.

The leading countries of the world have declared that gaining information superiority is an indispensable condition of combat operations in their concepts

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for the employment of armies. To resolve this task, mass information and social network resources are used. At the same time, the forces and means of information-psychological and information-technical effects are involved. Thus, in conflicts in the Middle East, the mobilized capabilities of the social networks Facebook, Twitter, and other information-technical effects were used widely for the first time.

The conflict in Syria was an example of the use of "hybrid" methods of operation. Traditional and nontraditional operations of both a military and nonmilitary nature were used simultaneously in this conflict. In its first stage, Syria's internal conflicts were transformed into armed assaults by the opposition. Then, with the support of foreign advisors and dynamic information effects, these actions acquired an organized character. As a result, terrorist organizations, supplied and directed from abroad, joined the opposition to the government.

The United States and NATO countries are actively introducing "hybrid operations" in the international arena. For the most part this was conditioned by the fact that this operational variant does not fall under the definition of aggression.

The mass media are calling these methods "hybrid warfare." However, using the phrase "hybrid warfare" as an established term is, at present, premature.

An analysis of the conflicts of the beginning of the twenty-first century points to a number of trends with respect to their transformation.

Today the blurring of the line between a state of war and peace is obvious. The flip side of "hybrid operations" is a new perception of peacetime, when military or other overt violent measures are not used against some state, but its national security and sovereignty are threatened and may be violated.

The spectrum of reasons and approaches for the use of military force is broadening. It is being used increasingly more often to support the economic interests of a state under the slogan of protecting democracy or instilling democratic values in some country.

The emphasis in the content of methods of confrontation is shifting in the direction of extensive employment of political, economic, diplomatic, information, and other nonmilitary measures, implemented with the involvement of the protest potential of a population.

Nonmilitary forms and means of struggle have received unprecedented development and have acquired a dangerous, sometimes violent nature. The practical use of nonmilitary methods and means can cause a collapse in the energy, banking, economic, information, and other spheres of a state's daily activities. One can cite as an example the results of the cyberattacks on Iran's energy infrastructure in 2015.

"Nonmilitary forms and means of struggle have received unprecedented development and have acquired a dangerous, sometimes violent nature. The practical use of nonmilitary methods and means can cause a collapse in the energy, banking, economic, information, and other spheres of a state's daily activities."

An analysis of the characteristic features, traits, and trends in the development of contemporary military conflicts indicates that one general feature is inherent to all of them, one way or another: the use of military force. In some conflicts, as in the two U.S. wars against Iraq or in the NATO operation against Yugoslavia, this is almost classical armed struggle. In other conflicts, as, for example, in Syria, armed struggle is conducted by one side in the form of antiterrorist operations, and by the other side in the form of operations by illegal irregular armed formations and terrorist organizations.

Thus, the main content of contemporary warfare and warfare in the foreseeable future remains as before, and its principal indicator will be the presence of armed struggle.

Taking all these factors into consideration, it is still practical to keep the definition of "war" as given by the *Military Encyclopedia*.

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In addition, the issue of determining the essence of war is not closed; it is current and requires continuous study and careful consideration. With this goal, a roundtable discussion on the theme, "Contemporary Warfare and Armed Conflicts: Characteristic Features and Traits," will be held in August of this year [2017] within the framework of the program of the ARMIIA-2017 international military-technological forum. Scholars from the Academy of Military Sciences should most actively participate in the round table and forum. It is necessary to continue work on interdepartmental standardization of military-political and military terms and definitions.

The growth of conflict potential in the world emphasizes the urgency of a number of tasks in the field of the country's defense. The principal one remains as before—the guaranteed repulsion of possible aggression from any direction in the relationship of the Russian Federation and its allies. In peacetime, when carrying out measures for strategic deterrence, it is necessary to ensure the neutralization of threats to the country's security by relying on available forces and means.

In this regard, the role and importance of forecasting and assessing military dangers and threats is growing. It is advantageous to implement them together with an assessment of economic, information, and other threats to the Russian Federation.

The capabilities of the armed forces are being improved by means of a balanced development of all services and branches and the development of high-tech weapons, contemporary means of communication, intelligence, automated command and control, and radio-electronic warfare.

At present, large-scale outfitting of the Strategic Rocket Forces with contemporary missile complexes is underway. The Navy is acquiring new atomic submarines with ballistic and cruise missiles that are unparalleled in the world. Strategic aviation aircraft—our legendary TU-160s and TU-95MSs—are being modernized. This will make it possible that, as a whole, 90 percent of the strategic nuclear forces will be outfitted with contemporary equipment by 2020.

The strike potential of high-tech weapons in the armed forces will increase fourfold by 2021. This will make it possible to safeguard Russia's security along the entire border perimeter. The percentage of contemporary weapons and military equipment in the Ground Forces will reach no less than 70 percent by 2021. The Aerospace Forces will acquire new-generation aircraft, which will increase the combat capabilities of aviation 1.5 times. The Navy will be supplied with contemporary ships equipped with high-tech, long-range rockets.

"The capabilities of the armed forces are being improved by means of a balanced development of all services and branches and the development of high-tech weapons, contemporary means of communication, intelligence, automated command and control, and radio-electronic warfare."

Robotics is playing a substantial role in increasing combat capabilities. The large-scale, but reasonable employment of various types of robotic complexes will increase the effectiveness of troop operations and ensure a substantial reduction in personnel losses.

Today, the armed forces have acquired a unique opportunity to verify and test new models of weapons and military equipment under complex climatic conditions.

It is necessary to continue to generalize the experience of the employment of the means of armed struggle in the Syrian events and to extract lessons to fine-tune and modernize them.

Victory in any war is achieved not only by the material, but also by the spiritual resources of the nation, its cohesion, and the attempts by all forces to oppose aggression. Therefore, the Russian Federation's military-political leadership is exerting considerable efforts to restore the people's faith in the army. Today the armed forces are arriving at a fundamentally new level of combat readiness, and this is finding full support in Russian society.

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In the interests of further increasing the prestige of the armed forces, it is important to develop ties between the army and society. For this, it is necessary to improve systems for training servicemen and for the military-patriotic education of young people.

The resolution of current tasks for safeguarding the country's military security is impossible without their careful and advanced study.

At the same time, as the experience in Syria has shown, today we are resolving many tasks through practical experience, without having the opportunity to draw upon the recommendations of military science.

Thus, military scholars have not given the necessary attention to the problems of conducting combat operations against irregular enemy formations; the employment of groupings consisting of regular forces and national militia detachments; combat under urban conditions, including where fighters are holding civilians as "human shields"; and post-conflict normalization.

During the operation for stabilizing the situation in Syria, missions that were new for the troops were often resolved on the spot, taking into account the experience that had been acquired and expedience. Here, the Russian army has shown skill in conducting new-type warfare, organizing coalitions, and working with allies.

Russia's growing combat might and the capabilities of the armed forces to resolve strategic missions on a remote theater of military operations was demonstrated to the world community.

Practical experience has been acquired in planning and conducting air operations, delivering massive rocket and air strikes, and employing air-, sea-, and land-based high-tech weapons.

Deck aviation of the heavy aircraft carrier *Admiral Kuznetsov* took part for the first time in combat operations, completing more than sixty sorties.

Under the guidance of Russian military advisors and with the continuous support of Russia's Aerospace Forces' aviation, large gangs were crushed in the provinces of Latakia, Aleppo, and Damascus. Control was reestablished over Palmyra.

It is extremely important that the combat experience that was gained be maximally used in the combat development and preparation of command-and-control organs and of the troops.

On the whole, the role of military science remains, as ever, fundamentally important, and its results should be drawn on in practice. In this regard, I would like to linger on the priority tasks of the Academy of Military Sciences and of military science on the whole.

First and foremost is the study of new forms of interstate confrontation and the development of effective methods for countering them.

It is necessary to focus special attention on determining preventive measures to counter the unleashing of "hybrid warfare" against Russia and its allies.

It is necessary to effectively study the features of contemporary military conflicts and, on the basis of this, develop effective forms and methods of troop and force operations under various conditions.

The problems of organizing and implementing force regroupings on remote theaters of military operations require separate research.

Nor have the general tasks of military science lost their urgency. They also require further work, development of new ideas, and acquisition of new knowledge.

I am sure that the scholars of the Academy of Military Sciences, together with representatives from Russia's military-science complexes, are making an important contribution to the resolution of these and other problems, which will make it possible to increase the defensive capabilities and security of our country. ■

Note

1. "Sovremennaia voiny i aktual'nye voprosy oborony strany" [Contemporary Warfare and Current Issues for the Defense of the Country], *Journal of the Academy of Military Sciences* 2, no. 59 (2017). Translated by Dr. Harold Orenstein. The article appears under the general heading of "Military-Scientific Conference at the Academy of Military Sciences."

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Compelling Reasons for the Expansion of Chinese Military Forces

Lt. Cmdr. Cindy Hurst, U.S. Navy, Retired



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In March 2015, during the ongoing civil war in Yemen, the situation deteriorated as Saudi Arabia led air strikes against Houthi forces. In an unprecedented move, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy fleet withdrew from an escort mission in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia to directly assist in evacuation operations in Yemen.[1] The warships managed to evacuate over 600 Chinese citizens and 279 foreign citizens, demonstrating China's growing commitment to protect its overseas assets. This marked a new milestone for the country.

China has long stood firm on its policy of noninterference. Over the past two decades, however, with global tensions heating up, China's growing global investments, and the increasing number of Chinese citizens traveling and working abroad, there has been a significant shift in actions being taken by China to assist its overseas citizens.

An opinion piece published in the East Asia Forum explained that the concept of "protecting nationals abroad" first caught the attention of China's top leadership as early as 2004. By 2012, it had become a priority of the Chinese Communist Party. According to the article, China now faces new global risks, since Chinese companies, workers, and tourists are now located all over the world.[2]

While the efforts of embassy personnel to facilitate the evacuation of Chinese nationals and foreign citizens from dangerous situations are not surprising, the more recent commitment of military resources is. These are signs of a new trend, one of increased military intervention and an extended overseas military presence in the years to come. This article provides some possible insights into China's perception of its transitioning role and what we might expect in the future based on its involvement in overseas evacuations over the past several decades.



A Chinese soldier of the People's Liberation Army Navy stands guard 29 March 2015 as Chinese citizens board the naval ship *Linyi* at a port in Aden, Yemen. China's Defence Ministry said its warships had completed an evacuation of Chinese nationals with more than 570 people safely transported across the Red Sea to Djibouti to be flown home. The Chinese characters on the banner read, "Welcome Chinese compatriots on board." (Photo by stringer, Reuters)

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Evolution of China's Commitment to Overseas Citizens and Assets

Since Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms opened up China to the rest of the world nearly four decades ago, an increasing number of Chinese citizens have been traveling abroad. Each year their numbers climb. In 1978, approximately two hundred thousand Chinese citizens traveled overseas. By 2003, that number increased one hundred times to 20.2 million.[3] In 2014, over one hundred million Chinese citizens had traveled abroad.[4]

There has also been a marked increase in the number of Chinese working abroad. By the end of 2006 an estimated 675,000 Chinese worked overseas, mostly in developing countries. That same year, more than ten thousand Chinese enterprises had set up businesses in over two hundred countries and regions.[5] By 2012, there were more than five million Chinese nationals working abroad.[6] They can be found in both developed and developing countries.

The growing number of Chinese citizens working overseas can be attributed to a number of factors. For example, China's saturated domestic markets and inadequate access to domestic resources have prompted companies to operate in other countries. The nonrenewable nature of petroleum, coupled with China's current and forecasted requirements, has scattered the country's oil companies across the globe in search of energy.

Oftentimes, Chinese companies have sought opportunities in some of the more volatile, less desirable regions of the world, attracted by decreased competition and easier access. Potential competitors often avoid doing business in certain locations for a variety of reasons, ranging from legalistic (i.e., sanctioned countries) to moralistic (i.e., countries accused of gross corruption, genocide, or other atrocities). However, China's business policy makes it an ideal partner for such countries. While China willingly renders aid to corrupt and problematic countries with no questions asked, Western organizations demand transparency and accountability.

China's growing involvement in unstable countries increases its need to protect its assets and citizens. In the past, any assistance to Chinese citizens came from other countries, sometimes through coordination by Chinese embassies, but with no involvement by the Chinese military. For example, in March 1997, foreign militaries stepped in to evacuate their citizens from Albania when the country slipped into anarchy fueled by failed investment schemes. The German army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the British, French, and Greek navies were among some of the foreign militaries carrying out evacuation operations. At one point, Greek armed forces evacuated 250 people—mostly Chinese, Jordanian, and Egyptian nationals—via a missile boat and frigate. However, there was no indication of any involvement by the Chinese military during the crisis.[7]


The following year, after an escalation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the Chinese government facilitated the evacuation of Chinese business people and part of the Chinese embassy staff from Eritrea.[8] Again, there was no indication that the military was involved. Two years later, during a military coup in the Solomon Islands on 7 June 2000, the Chinese Foreign Ministry set up an emergency group and assisted Chinese citizens in evacuating the islands, including seeking assistance from other countries.

In 2004, during the 10th National People's Congress, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing promised that more effort would be given to caring for the interests of the Chinese people in the international arena. Luo Tianguang, director general of the Department of Consular Affairs under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said the ministry had been working hard to improve the system by providing better consular protection.[9] According to Luo, the ministry had built an emergency response mechanism to be activated during any major incident involving mass deaths, injuries, or property loss of Chinese citizens' overseas.[10] As part of the plan, the ministry had set up a twenty-four-hour telephone hotline and various departments to step in when necessary.

During March 2005, in Kyrgyzstan, opposition supporters seized the presidential headquarters and ousted Askar Akayev's government from power. Rioting and looting took place and, among other things, dozens

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Soldiers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army 1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division prepare to provide Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen with a demonstration of their capabilities 12 July 2011 during his visit to the unit in China. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley, U.S. Navy)

of Chinese shops were ransacked. With four Chinese businessmen injured, the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek arranged for special planes and cars to help Chinese citizens evacuate from the country. Approximately ten thousand Chinese citizens lived in Kyrgyzstan at the time.[11]

In 2006, diplomats from the ministry's consular division helped evacuate about eight hundred Chinese citizens from Solomon, East Timor, Lebanon, and Tonga.[12] The increased consular intervention in evacuations prompted the Chinese government in 2007 to vow to improve protection of the "growing numbers of Chinese citizens living and working abroad."[13] In 2008, an outbreak of civil war in Chad prompted Chinese embassy officials to arrange for the evacuation of over four hundred Chinese engineers and experts working with Chinese funded enterprises in the country.[14]

Over time, consular intervention and action increased. In late 2009, Beijing arranged to have eleven commercial aircraft evacuate 3,100 Chinese citizens from Thailand following the dissolution of the ruling party and the banning of Premier Somchai Wongsawat from politics over vote-buying allegations that sparked turmoil in the country.[15]

In 2010, China turned to chartered planes to airlift 1,200 Chinese citizens from Kyrgyzstan after ethnic violence broke out in June. This was reportedly the largest evacuation operation using charter flights.[16]

There was no evidence of involvement by the Chinese military during any of the aforementioned evacuation operations. However, later in 2010, Gu Weijun, a scholar with the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, outlined five ways he believed that Chinese troops would be used in the future. Stressing the need for more armed intervention to protect and evacuate Chinese overseas expatriates, Gu pointed out that China's citizens and expatriates living abroad had encountered an increasing number of attacks in recent years. He argued that China's global economic expansion meant that it would also need to expand its military globally and, "in the future, China's use of troops

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


Figure. People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Expanding Global Presence

overseas will be inevitable."[17] Then, in 2011, for the first time, the Chinese military stepped in to perform an international evacuation of Chinese citizens abroad.

Militarization of China's International Evacuation Operations

In February 2011, as Libyan Prime Minister Muammar Gaddhafi's regime stood on the brink of collapse, both the PLA Navy (PLAN) and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) were tasked to assist in the evacuation of over thirty-five thousand Chinese nationals from Libya. This marked an important turning point for the PLA.

As part of the effort, the PLAN summoned its frigate, *Xuzhou*, which was part of a flotilla off the Gulf of Aden protecting Chinese vessels and personnel sailing through the Somali waters. *Xuzhou* was ideally located to assist in the evacuation effort. The decision to task *Xuzhou* set a new precedent and attracted the attention of scholars and PLA analysts inside and outside of China. Some claimed that "the move reflected an array of strategic interests for

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Beijing—and could prove to be the first of many such missions."[18] Maj. Gen. Ji Mingkui, a professor with the PLA's National Defense University, suggested that the role of the PLAN abroad should expand into other less traditional areas: "We will not only dispatch warships to evacuate our people overseas (when needed) in the future, but in other ways ... to protect our national interests overseas because our navy's mission will be expanded as time goes on."[19]

The *Xuzhou*, which had special forces troops, a Z-9 helicopter and hangar, and a "store of surface-to-air missiles" lacked the capacity to transport any evacuees. Instead, it escorted merchant ships tasked with rescuing Chinese civilians while remaining alert for any significant increase in the threat level.[20]

In addition to the PLAN, the PLAAF also contributed evacuation efforts in Libya. In one article, PLAN Capt. Liu Jun recounts the day the PLAAF was summoned to provide assistance to the evacuation. He explains that, upon receiving the command, his regiment thought they had misheard. The distance between the airfield in which his (unidentified) PLAAF regiment was located and Sabha, Libya, was more than 9,500 km (5,903 miles). It was the longest flight path ever taken by the PLAAF, and it spurred a new way of thinking about building battle effectiveness. Liu raises the question, "In the past, everyone compared the military to the Great Wall and emphasized our duty to defend our territory and position consciousness. However, today, where are the frontiers that we have to defend?"[21] China's 2013 defense white paper offers more details in the PLAAF's role, explaining that "the PLAAF sent four aircraft at short notice, flew forty sorties, evacuated 1,655 people (including 240 Nepalese) from Libya to Sudan, and took 287 Chinese nationals from Sudan back home."[22] The White Paper further states, "vessel protection at sea, evacuation of Chinese nationals overseas, and emergency rescue have become important ways and means for the PLA to safeguard national interests and fulfill China's international obligations."[23]

The 2011 evacuation from Libya was truly a milestone. Not only was it the biggest evacuation effort in which China had participated, but it drew attention to the growing importance of these types of operations. Following China's use of the *Xuzhou* to provide security for the 2011 evacuation from Libya, Song Xiaojun, a Beijing-based military analyst, concluded that the

> PLAN's participation in the humanitarian crisis in Libya would help our army to fight for more funding and resources for our defense budget. With more ... Chinese workers and technicians working overseas, in ... countries with unstable political situations, our country needs to protect their lives and safety as they are also working for our overseas investments.[24]

By 2014, Libya was once again in turmoil, as rival militia clashes in the Libyan capital of Tripoli and the eastern city of Benghazi left at least 214 people dead and nearly 1,000 more wounded. Fearing that the fighting would escalate into a full-fledged civil war, countries (China among them) rushed to evacuate their citizens caught within the turmoil.[25] Between May and September 2014, over one thousand Chinese citizens were evacuated from Libya.[26] While there are no indications that the PLA assisted in the evacuation, that September China opened a twenty-four-hour global hotline, "12308," to help Chinese citizens abroad. According to Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the hotline would allow Beijing to be briefed "in a timely manner about the suffering and demand of Chinese citizens abroad" and deliver help when it is needed.[27] A Chinese antiterrorism studies researcher from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations attributed the increase in China's consular assistance service to "the increasing complexity of security overseas."[28]

An Unprecedented Evacuation from Yemen

In March 2015, the PLAN once again sprang into action, this time in Yemen. As mentioned above, with an ongoing civil war, the atmosphere in Yemen deteriorated as Saudi Arabia led air strikes against Houthi forces. With the situation escalating, a number of countries, China included, began evacuating their citizens.

China has a special interest in Yemen. Having established diplomatic relations with Yemen in 1956, bilateral relations were upgraded to "ambassadorial level" in 1963. Over the years, China has invested heavily in Yemen's development and construction sectors. However, energy has since become a huge draw. In September 2012, the China National Corporation of Overseas Economic Cooperation agreed to construct three natural-gas-fueled power plants in the country. Then, in 2013, both countries reached a deal to build a series of power plants with a combined capacity of five gigawatts (a gigawatt is equal to one billion watts, enough to power between 300,000 and 750,000 homes if it were in the United

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States.)[29] And, by 2014, Chinese companies Sinochem Corp and Sinopec were producing approximately twenty thousand barrels of oil per day (80 percent of Yemen's total production).[30] In 2014, Beijing was selected for a $508 million project to expand two container ports in Aden and Mokha. China is reportedly financing the projects through a soft loan. It has also offered millions of dollars in relief aid for displaced Yemenis, medical supplies to the Yemeni-Chinese Friendship Hospital, and grants and loans to Yemen's defense ministry.

Similar to the 2011 evacuation from Libya, China tapped into its PLAN escort mission in the Gulf of Aden. This time, however, instead of summoning one ship, China summoned three ships—two missile frigates and a supply ship with two shipborne helicopters onboard. Also in contrast to the 2011 operation, the PLAN physically carried out the evacuations as opposed to serving in a security or escort role. Yemen marked the second time the PLAN was involved in evacuating Chinese and other citizens.[31]

Approximately six hundred Chinese nationals—embassy personnel, oversees students, medical workers, journalists, and technicians working for Chinese companies in oil exploration and production, communication, and other industries—were evacuated. In addition to Chinese citizens, according to Hua Chunying, a spokesperson from China's Foreign Ministry, China also helped ten countries evacuate 225 of their citizens.[32]

Interestingly, only one year earlier, China had conducted another major evacuation, this time from Vietnam, following a wave of anti-Chinese riots. The unrest was caused over a Chinese oil rig *Haiyuang Shiyou 981* moving into disputed waters in the South China Sea and resulted in two Chinese workers being killed and over one hundred injured. Many of those evacuated were workers employed at Chinese-owned factories or construction projects in Vietnam.[33]

The evacuation from Vietnam, however, did not involve the PLA. Instead, Chinese officials dispatched four passenger ships to evacuate more than 3,500 Chinese nationals affected by the violence. Each of these ships, the *Wuzhishan, Tongguling, Zijing 12,* and *Baishiling,* had a capacity of one thousand passengers. Most of the evacuees on the four ships were workers from Metallurgical Corporation of China, a state-owned contractor helping construct an iron and steel complex in Vietnam's Ha Tinh Province.

Why China opted to send either PLA forces or charter ships and aircraft in these situations is not completely clear. In the case of Vietnam, it could be that China did not want to come across as using military force due to the already volatile situation in the South China Sea. To introduce the PLAN or PLAAF to the situation could have further stirred the pot of ongoing tension. In the case of the Yemen and Libya evacuations, sending the PLA might have been born out of convenience and reassurance that Chinese forces were not making a show of power, but rather simply ensuring Chinese citizens had a safe passage home. The perceptions of the PLA differed in each situation and environment. Understanding that brings a modicum of clarity to China's motivations.

Beefing Up Global Presence

Along with its escort mission in the Gulf of Aden, China has been taking other steps that are creating a more global military presence. Whether intentional or not, in each case, China has been opening up new security options from which to be able to draw in the event of future evacuation operations. The PLA has been expanding its presence through escort missions, peacekeeping missions, and most recently a forward-deployed base reportedly serving as a logistics hub for these missions (see figure, page 32). In addition, China now has an aircraft carrier in its inventory, with more on the way, giving the country even greater global reach.

Escort missions in the Gulf of Aden. The PLAN has been conducting escort missions in the Gulf of Aden since late 2008 as part of the UN's antipiracy operations.[34] The first fleet assigned to the mission consisted of two destroyers and one supply ship originating from China's Hainan Island. Onboard were approximately eight hundred crew members, including seventy soldiers from the Navy's special forces. The destroyers were equipped with missiles, cannons, and light weapons.[35] Since then, the PLAN has had a task force in place to conduct naval escort missions. It launched its twenty-third mission on 7 April 2016.

International UN peacekeeping missions. China has been a regular contributor to UN peacekeeping missions for over twenty-five years. Since 1990, over thirty thousand Chinese peacekeepers have served in more than thirty peacekeeping missions around the world, with the highest concentration in Africa. Recent missions indicate an even more dramatic shift toward

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The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Jiangkai II class guided-missile frigate *Xuzhou* (FFG 530) steams past the forward-deployed Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS *Stethem* (DDG 63) 20 November 2015 after participating in a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and a search-and-rescue exercise in the East China Sea. *Stethem* visited Shanghai to build relationships with the PLAN and demonstrate the U.S. Navy's commitment to the Indo-Asia-Pacific. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kevin V. Cunningham, U.S. Navy)

the commitment of its forces. For example, on 26 March 2015, China sent a peacekeeping infantry battalion to Juba, South Sudan. This commitment of armed and more capable personnel set a new standard and marked a profound shift in the country's attitude toward UN peacekeeping missions. Since Chinese peacekeepers are drawn from a pool of some of the most qualified members of the PLA, these forces are an excellent source of support for evacuation operations if needed.

Djibouti: China's first overseas military base. In 2013, the National Defense University of the PLA submitted a proposal to the Central Military Commission (CMC) to build a military base in Djibouti. Approved by President Xi Jinping and operational in 2017, this marks China's first overseas military base.

According to various Chinese sources, when China first began conducting escort missions in the Gulf of Aden, the ships and their crews received no breaks, remaining at sea for six months straight. This caused depression and mental anguish amongst Chinese sailors. The base in Djibouti gives Chinese ships a port to freely access whenever needed for port calls to improve personnel morale. It also meets the logistical needs of the task force and the supply ships that transport goods to the ships.[36]

Some sources claim that the base is not responsible for combat operations, referring to it instead as a "support facility." According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the base will provide logistics to Chinese troops and naval vessels participating in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations.[37]

Other Chinese sources in favor of the base explain that "regional peace and stability serve the interests of all countries and meet the shared aspirations of China, Djibouti, and other countries around the world."[38]

Chinese reports, however, seem contradictory as to the function of and intention behind the Djibouti base. Chinese officials insist that the base is nothing more than a support facility, but what does this mean exactly? One report explains that

> China's overseas interests are expanding. At present, there are thirty thousand Chinese enterprises all over the world and several million Chinese working and living in all corners of the world. Last year [2015] ... the stock of China's overseas assets reached several trillion U.S. dollars. So, it has become a pressing task for China's diplomacy to better protect our ever-growing overseas interests.[39]

However, according to the same report, "The PLA's responsibilities today have gone beyond the scale of guarding Chinese territories. The PLA must protect China's interests anywhere in the world. Overseas military bases will provide cutting-edge support for China to guard its growing overseas interests." In addition, one Navy commander alludes to building more bases by pointing out that Djibouti provides China with experience to build (additional) overseas military bases. As the report notes, "Djibouti is just the first step."[40]

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United Nations (UN) trucks transport the military personnel of the Chinese engineering company of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to a 1.8 kilometer-long road rehabilitation project 11 April 2008. The road provides greater access to the Ruzizi One Dam Power Plant, the only source of electricity for eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Africa. (Photo by Marie Frechon, UN)

Aircraft carrier diplomacy. Another example of the expansion of China's overseas military presence, and another source to draw from for evacuations, is the country's first aircraft carrier, the *Liaoning*. Commissioned in 2012, the *Liaoning* was originally a Soviet aircraft carrier known as *Varyag*. China purchased the unfinished hull in 1998 and, after towing it from Ukraine three years later, completely modernized the hull, radar, and electronic systems. While the *Liaoning* was originally intended to be used for training missions, it was reported to be combat ready in November 2016, and one month later, China reportedly staged the first live-fire drills involving the carrier.[41] According to the Taiwanese Defense Ministry, China is building two more aircraft carriers that will be the same size as the *Liaoning*. Some sources believe a second carrier will be complete by 2020.[42]

While the *Liaoning* has attracted international attention and raised some concern over China's military expansion, the country has downplayed it by describing it as "aircraft carrier diplomacy." According to an article published in *China Military Online*, "aircraft carrier diplomacy can improve the overseas environment for investment and the living environment of overseas Chinese and Chinese nationals, and help protect the state's overseas assets and the life and property of overseas Chinese and Chinese nationals."[43]

The article further states that,

> if the massive and powerful aircraft carrier taskforce is used as an effective tool of foreign exchange, it can influence and improve China's relations with the investment destinations and host countries, and prevent anti-Chinese events. In case of a crisis, we can also quickly dispatch the aircraft carrier task force to relevant sea areas to bear down strongly on the anti-Chinese forces, stop their violent actions, and take emergency measures when necessary to evacuate both Chinese citizens in

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China-funded enterprises and Chinese nationals and overseas Chinese.

Training in Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

The PLA has been speeding up its emergency responses and "improving the mobilization of national-level resources."[44] In March 2016, China established the Overseas Operations Office. According to *Janes*, the office is a component of the Operations Bureau of the Joint Staff Department, one of the fifteen primary departments now under the CMC.[45] The CMC Joint Staff Department is the headquarters and command organ of the PLA. The Overseas Operations Office, which is run by the PLA, is reportedly responsible for directing and coordinating actions, including overseas evacuations, carried out by Chinese troops overseas. Due to the diverse international nature of its tasks, it is expected to have a high level of political and diplomatic savvy, or what one article describes as "policy capacity" so that it can effectively spearhead international operations. In other words, with each unique military operation—such as overseas escort, rescue, and evacuation operations—having unique requirements, there are different expectations and actions that need to be taken. A hostage rescue might require special negotiations. An evacuation might require special consent from a foreign government for PLA troops to enter.

The responsibilities of the Overseas Operations Office are also believed to include participating in joint actions with foreign militaries. The Overseas Operations Office first made its debut in March 2016 during a two-day "Joint Evacuation-2016" China-U.K. joint noncombatant evacuation operations tabletop exercise held in Nanjing. It was reportedly the first evacuation drill "jointly conducted by the Chinese and a foreign military." According to Zhang Junshe, a military expert, the Chinese Navy has gained a wealth of experience from its past evacuations in Libya and Yemen. Meanwhile, China was further able to benefit from the British Navy, which has "rich experience in overseas evacuations." Finally, the exercise helped to pave the way for China to work with foreign militaries on similar operations in the future.[46]

Conclusion

Turbulence, terrorism, and piracy, as well as natural disasters and epidemics in some areas, have posed threats to China's overseas interests. The changing international arena is forcing the country to rethink its strategies. According to "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces,"

> With the gradual integration of China's economy into the world economic system, overseas interests have become an integral component of China's national interests. Security issues are increasingly prominent, involving overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication, and Chinese nationals and legal persons overseas. Vessel protection at sea, evacuation of Chinese nationals overseas, and emergency rescue have become important ways and means for the PLA to safeguard national interests and fulfill China's international obligations.[47]

The latest white paper on *China's Military Strategy* lists safeguarding "the security of the country's overseas interests" and its "security and interest in new domains" as a strategic task to be shouldered by its armed forces.[48]

China's use of its military in evacuation operations shows growing capability and confidence in that capability. While some might view China's increasing use of its military overseas as a threat, China sees it as a necessity. Furthermore, as China expands its overseas interests abroad, the Chinese government and military are forced to increase their involvement. China is taking steps that indicate the PLA will become increasingly more active in the evacuation of its citizens overseas, which means that it will most likely also increase its presence in other ways overseas. The question is, how far will it go? ■

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Soldiers drive sixty-eight ton M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks and twenty-seven ton M2A3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles across a floating bridge over the Imjin River 8 April 2016 near Seoul, South Korea. The Imjin River is the seventh-largest river in Korea and flows from North Korea into South Korea across the Demilitarized Zone. Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, crossed the bridge assembled by the Republic of Korea Army 6th Engineer Brigade as part of a four-day, combined arms river crossing exercise. (Photo by Sgt. Christopher Dennis, U.S. Army)

North Korea Policy

Changed Regime

Col. James M. Minnich, U.S. Army

The denuclearization of North Korea has been a failed policy objective of the United States and South Korea for twenty-five years. Missteps, hubris, and sophistry clutter past approaches to forestall a nuclear-armed North Korea, but they need not portend today's policy path. Lost opportunities abound, but it is not too late to peacefully eliminate Pyongyang's burgeoning nuclear arsenal. North Korea's denuclearization will be a byproduct of a successful engagement policy, not its singular objective. The North Korea solution that is needed is a policy of *changed regime*, not regime change. A changed-regime policy will transform North Korea from within by resolute engagements from without

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and will require an all-weather security guarantee of the entire Korean peninsula, both North and South Korea. An effective changed-regime policy will embrace parallel pursuits that include security, relations normalization, cooperative prosperity, and alternative energy substitutions, while delimiting ardent ambitions to heal all ills at once.

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Changed-Regime Policy

Washington, Pyongyang, and Seoul are the only three relevant parties to a future agreement. Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow, and other aspirants will be beneficiaries, and may be benefactors, of a future agreement, but they will detract and dilute prospective processes with parochial positions. The objective of a changed-regime policy is the establishment of conditions that successfully encourage Seoul and Pyongyang to pursue an agreement that permits both to coexist peaceably. Pyongyang's pursuit of national security is not unique. Security is the leading priority of all countries, and every other interest ranks a distant second in importance. Dr. Joseph Nye evoked perhaps the quintessential analogy when he wrote, "Security is like oxygen—you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about."[1]

Security. National security fears stoke enmity between Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang, and spoil prospects for productive negotiations. To begin a sustainable, far-reaching negotiation process, Pyongyang must agree to a provisional suspension of its programs for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles; Washington and Seoul must concurrently agree to a provisional suspension or scope (size, duration, purpose) of their semiannual combined military exercises—Key Resolve and Foal Eagle in the spring, and Ulchi Freedom Guardian in the fall. These initial steps should persuade relevant parties to return to the negotiation table. North Korea has three times reliably frozen its nuclear activities and missile launches. With genuine security inducements, a commitment to do so again is probable. Pyongyang equates a proven nuclear weapons arsenal with its national security and regime survival. Therefore, it is fanciful to believe that North Korea could be compelled to eliminate and irrevocably abandon its strategic armaments, absent a consistently stable security environment where it amicably coexists with the United States and South Korea. This endeavor is not only possible, it has been Pyongyang's pursuit and the basis of all four denuclearization agreements that have been penned. Like Seoul before it, Pyongyang can be persuaded to abandon its nuclear weapons program, but not while it perceives an existential threat.

Relations normalization. Normalizing political and economic relations has been centric, as it has been elusive, to previous agreements with North Korea. North Korea has long been rebuffed in attempts to normalize relations with South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Normalization begins with an immediate exchange of capital liaison offices to implement agreement protocols and cascades with a thickening of relations by lifting sanctions, extending trade, reuniting families, repatriating remains, opening tourism, and exchanging culture, education, and sports. If, however, Pyongyang is continually curbed from relations with the broader community of nations, extraordinary will be the task to effect North Korea's positive transformation.

Cooperative prosperity. Developing cooperative prosperity with North Korea gives meaning to an establishment of economic relations. Furthermore, it accentuates principled commerce and prosperity by enlarging

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trade opportunities beyond China while providing Pyongyang with substantive alternatives to its exports of weapons, counterfeit merchandise, illicit activities, and nuclear and missile technology and expertise. Seoul and Pyongyang could cooperatively reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex, an inter-Korean economic zone that hosted 125 South Korean companies that employed fifty-three thousand North Korean workers. They could then expand the complex to its earlier envisioned size of 1,500 companies and 350,000 North Korean employees.[2] North Korea's economic zones offer broader opportunities to expand international commerce, as does its abundant mining industry. As North Korea guarantees the security of visitors, Seoul and Washington could lift restrictions on its citizens visiting the popular Mount Kumgang resort area, with the probability of also opening other areas for tourism.

> "Endeavoring to hold Pyongyang accountable for its former wrongdoings is a path that forfeits an opportunity to effectuate a changed future."

Alternative energy substitutions. Pyongyang's proven ability to manufacture fissile material from nuclear reactors and uranium enrichment facilities will drive an agreement that seeks to proscribe Pyongyang's peaceful use of nuclear energy. North Korea, however, is unlikely to permanently forswear nuclear energy, and attempts to mandate a permanent energy substitution will be strongly rebuked on the principle of sovereignty. Washington does not need Pyongyang's permanent disavowal, but it will require a resolute suspension of nuclear energy until trust is generated to a degree that allows Pyongyang to possess nuclear reactors and uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities without concerns of diversion to a nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang will have to be weaned from nuclear energy with generous offers to repair its electrical grids and improve its production of coal and hydropower electricity. Partnering in alternative energy sources will offer significant collaborative opportunities with North Korea, opportunities that should be embraced.

Delimiting competing interests. North Korea is replete with ills, and every earlier denuclearization agreement failed from attempts to right all wrongs. Future agreements must delimit competing interests that prioritize policies addressing human right abuses, asymmetric military capabilities, conventional force structures, terrorism, illicit activities, abductions, etc. Most of these will self-correct over time through a policy of changed regime. Endeavoring to hold Pyongyang accountable for its former wrongdoings is a path that forfeits an opportunity to effectuate a changed future.

Washington and Seoul will need to disassociate Pyongyang's satellite program from its long-range missile program and explicitly address Pyongyang's sovereign and legitimate pursuit of a satellite space program in a future agreement. No other country is sanctioned for launching satellites into orbit to include India, Iran, and Israel; Pyongyang will not accept that it is the global exception. Pyongyang has repeatedly agreed to forego launching its own satellites in favor of a proxy undertaking this task. This offer, or some other acceptable measure, should be seriously pursued.

Nuclear Weapons and Missiles

In September 2016, North Korea conducted its fifth successful underground nuclear weapons test. Today, Pyongyang has upward of thirty nuclear warheads, but its capacity to manufacture uranium-235 increases its warhead stocks at a rate of two per annum. This rate of growth increases, as does its robust ballistic missile arsenal. The North Korean People's Army (KPA) has approximately six hundred short-range ballistic missiles that are road-mobile and can range throughout South Korea. It has three liquid fuel variants: Hwasong (HS)-5/SCUD-B, HS-6/SCUD-C, and HS-7/SCUD-D and SCUD-ER; and one solid fuel variant: Toksa/KN-02. Its arsenal includes about two hundred medium-range ballistic missiles of two road-mobile variants that can target Japan: Nodong is liquid fueled, and Pukuksong-2/KN-15 is solid fueled. The KPA has approximately

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fifty road-mobile variants of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) that can range Guam: Musudan is liquid fueled, and HS-12/KN-17 is solid fueled. It has road-mobile, liquid fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can range Chicago (HS-14/KN-20 and HS-13/KN-08), but neither variant has been operationally deployed.

In 2016, the KPA successfully tested the Pukuksong-1/KN-11, a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with an estimated range of two thousand kilometers; however, this system has yet to be operationalized. Eighteen months ago, the KPA's ballistic missile program had only proven its short-range ballistic missiles and Nodongs. It has since successfully tested SLBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs. The KPA's SLBM test on 24 August 2016 and its medium-range ballistic missile/KN-15 tests on 12 February and 21 May 2017 successfully demonstrated the KPA's solid fuel engines and a burgeoning second-strike nuclear arsenal of sea-based and mobile land-based platforms. Successful launches of two Musudan IRBMs on 22 June 2016 for the first time placed Guam in reach, and the successful launches of ICBMs on 4 July and 28 July 2017 placed much of the U.S. mainland within striking range. These advancements in ballistic missile technology are by far more worrisome than North Korea's anticipated sixth test of a nuclear weapon.[3]

Risks Abound

Disquietingly, much is at stake because of Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear weapons. At the forefront of risks are nuclear strikes, preventive wars, conflict escalation, worsened relations, unabated humanitarian crisis, proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, and a weakened Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[4] While North Korea is not seeking a first-strike capability, it is difficult to imagine that Pyongyang would refrain from employing nuclear weapons in the face of externally provoked instability that presents an existential threat to its national security or regime survival. Disturbingly, existential threats could be concluded by Pyongyang from ill-informed perceptions of pending attacks, which raises caution regarding hyperbolic wars of words.

Prevention and preemption are not synonymous. The rationale of a preventive war is grounded on a premise of striking first in anticipation of an adversary initiating a future conflict. However, there is no legal or moral legitimacy in a preventive war. This is evidenced post-World War II by the U.S.-led effort that tried and condemned Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan for their preventive attacks upon their neighbors. American writer Philip K. Dick broached the principal of precrime in his 1956 story "The Minority Report," where law enforcement agents eliminated persons who would commit crimes in the future.[5]

The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 is a modern example of a preventive war. Advocates wrongly conflated United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1441, which warned Iraq of "serious consequences," with a United Nations (UN) Charter, chapter VII authorization to "use force."[6] In a BBC World Services interview on 14 September 2004, then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan decried the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq as illegal and in contravention of the UN Charter.[7] Aspirants of prevention advocate that preventive strikes can curb an adversary from taking military action. The opposite is also true.

Preventive strikes can provoke an adversary's use of military force, and in the case of North Korea, there is no upside to inciting a North Korean attack upon the region. This type of conflict escalation is preventable and should be avoided. At the July 2017 Aspen Security Forum, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford remarked that a military option with North Korea would be horrific on a scale not seen since World War II.[8] That gives reason for pause, considering the devastation of the 1950s Korean War with as many as four million casualties.[9]

Relations in the region are worsening under the weight of the North Korean nuclear crisis. U.S. relations with China steadily deteriorate from the prospect of war with North Korea, the forward deployment of the antiballistic missile defense system known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), secondary sanctions against China, and pressure on China to curb Pyongyang's actions. This weight is similarly deleterious on relations between the United States and South Korea, and between South Korea and China. Trust was an early casualty of the failed agreements between Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington. As inconsequential as that may seem, trust is essential in international dealings and will be central to a future agreement with Pyongyang.

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Siegfried Hecker, a Stanford University physicist, examines metal lathes that were used for machining uranium metal fuel rods in the fuel fabrication facility 13 February 2008 at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in Yongbyon, North Korea. (Photo by W. Keith Luse)

So, care must be taken not to unnecessarily complicate future relations with Pyongyang.

Human suffering in North Korea extends beyond injustices, extrajudicial executions, and prison camps. Pernicious and pervasive are food insecurity for three-quarters of the population, malnutrition among one-third of children, and clean water scarcity in one-quarter of all homes. Infectious diseases like tuberculosis, malaria, and hepatitis B are endemic. The human condition in North Korea is a casualty of Pyongyang's excision within northeast Asia.

Absent meaningful trade options, Pyongyang may resort to expanding its export of military arms as it proliferates its mounting nuclear and ballistic missiles programs, stockpiles, and know-how. This is a serious and increasing risk, following the 5 August 2017 enactment of UNSCR 2371, which bans Pyongyang's legitimate exports of coal, iron/iron ore, lead/lead ore, and seafood; prohibits all new joint ventures or cooperative commercial entities; and proscribes countries from hiring North Korean laborers.[10] Criminal proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies is not the only concern, as evinced by South Korea's national debate on developing its own nuclear weapons and broader international discussions that portend a nuclear-armed Japan and South Korea. For Tokyo and Seoul to legally pursue a nuclear weapons path, both would have to follow Pyongyang's lead by first withdrawing from the NPT; according to former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, the 1993 announcement to withdraw from the treaty by Kim Il-sung was so upsetting that the United States considered a preventive military strike against North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear research facilities.[11] Entered into force in 1970,

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the NPT is an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons technology as it promotes the cooperative and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Only five NPT signatories, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), are permitted to possess nuclear weapons: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China. All other 191 NPT signatories are prohibited. Four non-NPT signatories also possess nuclear weapons: Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The NPT has flaws, but proliferation's path is deleterious to global security.

> "Today's policy path toward the next negotiation to denuclearize North Korea is found by first understanding and then not repeating previous failures."

Twenty-Five Years of Failed Denuclearization Policy Efforts

Policy approaches to denuclearize North Korea began in earnest in 1991, but success has proven elusive. Despite four separate denuclearization agreements by the fifteen heads of state who have led or now lead the United States, South Korea, and North Korea, Pyongyang has developed nuclear weapons that can now target the U.S. mainland. It is the threat of a nuclear strike upon the United States and its forward-deployed forces that drives that country to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons capability. It is North Korea's fear of a U.S. strike upon it that drives Pyongyang to possess a credible nuclear arsenal. Today's policy path toward the next negotiation to denuclearize North Korea is found by first understanding and then not repeating previous failures.

Inter-Korean Joint Denuclearization Declaration, January 1992. With the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc and the Kremlin's struggle to retain positive control of its nuclear weapons, President George H. W. Bush ended the foreign deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons by signing the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives on 27 September 1991.[12] With an aspirational aspect, this unilateral initiative successfully induced the Kremlin to do likewise. Seizing the international moment, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo, in a nationwide televised broadcast on 8 November 1991, established national policy by declaring South Korea a nuclear-weapons-free state and offered to validate its status through international inspection protocols. Roh then called upon North Korea to undertake corresponding measures. Seventeen days later, the North Korean foreign ministry affirmatively responded with a willingness to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreements upon its 5-megawatt electrical (5 MWe), gas-cooled nuclear reactor, which had been operational since December 1985.

This agreement, however, was conditional on the concurrent removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the peninsula, and a U.S. security guarantee against targeting North Korea with nuclear weapons. On 11 December 1991, Seoul swept away a second of Pyongyang's deep-seated security anxieties by announcing its willingness to suspend Team Spirit 1992 in exchange for the North's assent to nuclear inspections at Yongbyon. Team Spirit, initiated sixteen years earlier, was an annual theater-level military exercise that flowed tens of thousands of U.S. forces to Korea for a ten-day, force-on-force major military exercise of two hundred thousand combatants. On 13 December 1991, inter-Korean prime-minister-level talks, which had convened several times since September 1990, achieved the first ever South-North agreement.

The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, also known as the Basic Agreement, was an equal agreement that pursued reconciliation, nonaggression, exchanges, and cooperation.[13] Its companion agreement, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (JDD), was accepted by both prime ministers on the last day of December 1991 and then signed on 20 January 1992.[14] Unlike other aspirational agreements, the JDD was a comprehensive declaration that prescribed nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, and proscribed all forms of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs, stating that the parties

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shall neither test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons, nor possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. On 30 January 1992, Pyongyang signed the IAEA Safeguard Agreement; three months later, it submitted a detailed inventory of its nuclear facilities to the IAEA and then immediately received the agency's director on a site visit followed by ad hoc inspections.

As an implementing mechanism to negotiate and employ a reciprocal inspection regime, the two Koreas agreed in late February to form the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC). The first meeting of the JNCC was held four weeks later, and it eventually convened thirteen times in ten months before mutual suspicions stymied progress. On 25 January 1993, frustrated at the perpetual grind and slog of the JNCC, South Korea announced before the 13th JNCC its planned resumption of Team Spirit 1993 on 9 March. Pyongyang immediately reeled. The day before Team Spirit commenced, Kim Jong-il, then-supreme commander of the KPA (and future president), ordered the nation to a state of semi-war readiness, the first instance since 1983. As pressure mounted, Pyongyang invoked Article X of the NPT and submitted a qualified ninety-day notice of treaty withdrawal on 12 March 1993.

The ensuing three months were tense. By mid-May, the United States and North Korea had convened mid-level talks, which were upgraded to high-level talks in early June. Finally, on 11 June 1993, only one day before the effectuation of North Korea's NPT withdrawal, Washington and Pyongyang signed their first ever Joint Statement, wherein the two parties offered the other security assurances against the threat and use of force, and agreed to advance peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, respect each other's sovereignty, non-interfere in each other's internal affairs, and support peaceful reunification of Korea.[15] Concurrent with the signing of this Joint Statement, Pyongyang suspended its NPT withdrawal, just one day before effectuating treaty abdication.

Eight months later, IAEA inspectors regained access to the Yongbyon nuclear facilities for its first inspections since early 1993. The IAEA was soon at loggerheads with North Korean officials for denying a request to analyze spent fuel rods. Relations further digressed as the IAEA refused to observe refueling operations without authorization to analyze fuel samples, and then Yongbyon technicians refueled the 5 MWe reactor without IAEA oversight. On 10 June 1994, the IAEA suspended its oversight mission at Yongbyon, the UNSC pressed for sanctions against North Korea, and the United States planned a missile strike against North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear reactor and related facilities.

In final action to avert conflict, President Bill Clinton dispatched former President Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang on 16 June to meet with President Kim Il-sung in what quickly became a successful attempt to gain Pyongyang's consent to freeze its nuclear program and resume high-level dialogue with the United States. Had either side delayed the meeting, the de-escalation of this crisis may have ended quite differently, as the eighty-two-year-old Kim died only days later on 21 July. As expected, his son, Kim Jong-il ascended to power and assented to the previously arranged denuclearization negotiations with Washington. Over the intervening months, senior-level negotiators from the United States and North Korea met in Geneva to hammer out the Geneva Agreed Framework, or more commonly referred, the Agreed Framework, which was signed on 21 October 1994.[16]

U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, October 1994 to October 2002. The Agreed Framework was straightforward with only four articles. First, Pyongyang would freeze and later dismantle its 5 MWe, gas-cooled nuclear reactor and its plutonium reprocessing facility in exchange for two one-gigawatt light water reactors (LWR) by 2003, and an interim provision of five hundred thousand tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) annually until completion of the LWRs. Second, Washington and Pyongyang would normalize political and economic relations. Third, both parties would work together for peace and security on the Korean peninsula. And, fourth, they would strengthen the NPT. Implementation began well, as Pyongyang froze its reactor and reprocessing facility, which was verified by an on-site IAEA inspection team within the first five weeks of the agreement, but challenges and suspicions quickly followed. U.S. deliveries of HFO to North Korea were irregular, unpredictable, and late; the multinational consortium Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization took years to contract the LWR construction; and the U.S. legislature excoriated the agreement. As these and other detractors persisted, pundits and politicians routinely portended Pyongyang's

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imminent implosion as they recommended slow-rolling the deal in the prospect of not having to make good on the agreement. Consequently, capital city liaison offices were not exchanged, relations were not normalized, and trade and investment never materialized.

In April 1996, Washington engaged Pyongyang in dialogue to end its sales of ballistic missile systems, components, and technology, a security concern that was outside the scope of the Agreed Framework. Pyongyang sought economic remuneration for compliance, but Washington balked and instead offered to ease economic sanctions, a condition that already applied to the Agreed Framework, but which had been withheld. Washington quickly acted, sanctioning Pyongyang in May 1996 for missile-technology-related transfers to Iran, in August 1997 for unspecified missile proliferation activities, and in April 1998 for the transfer of missile technology to Pakistan. In June 1998, Pyongyang again offered to end its missile sales if financially compensated; Washington responded by labeling North Korea a rogue state.[17]

Four years on with little to show but halting HFO deliveries and cajoling to end its ballistic missile sales, North Korea conducted its first launch of a three-stage Paektusan-1 (Taepodong-1) rocket in a failed attempt to place the Kwangmyongsong (KMS or Brightstar)-1 satellite into orbit, on 31 August 1998.[18] This launch raised tensions in the region out of concerns of ICBM advancements and growing vulnerabilities to a North Korean nuclear strike. On 12 September 1999, North Korea responded to the U.S. request by self-imposing a moratorium on long-range missile tests for the duration of talks with the United States, and Washington agreed to a partial lifting of economic sanctions.

Three days later, Washington advanced a "new, comprehensive and integrated approach" to its North Korea policy.[19] This comprehensive approach unilaterally attached several new conditions upon North Korea, including verifiable elimination of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program before normalization of political and economic relations, cessation of the North's missile sales program, and termination of its medium-range and long-range missile production programs. Pyongyang detected Washington's alteration of the Agreed Framework. Finally, on 15 December 1999, five years after signing the Agreed Framework, a construction firm was contracted to build the LWRs (it was August 2002 before site preparations were completed and concrete poured, and then two months later the Agreed Framework was dead).

Suddenly, in the last months of Clinton's presidency, U.S.-North Korean relations dramatically shifted, owing to an unanticipated inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in mid-June 2000. In late June, the United States eased sanctions on North Korea; in early July the United States offered to move toward economic normalization; in mid-July North Korea offered to end its missile development program in exchange for an agreement that would launch its satellites; in mid-July Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met with Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun; in mid-October Kim Jong-il's special envoy, Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, met with Clinton in the White House; and then, in late October, Albright met with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang to assess the possibility of a U.S.-North Korean summit before Clinton left office in January. Within two weeks of Albright's return from Pyongyang, rapprochement faced its end in the wake of the 7 November U.S. presidential election. President George W. Bush assumed office certain that the United States had negotiated a bad nuclear deal with a rogue regime that was cheating on the agreement.

On 7 March 2001, following a summit with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, Bush voiced harsh criticism of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, expressed distrust in the North as a partner in denuclearization, and presaged the end of the Agreed Framework. Immediately, the Bush administration undertook a North Korea policy review that unilaterally altered the Agreed Framework to include "improved implementation [measures]; verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports; and a less threatening conventional military posture."[20] Pyongyang was again subject to Washington's alteration of the agreement. In 2002, Washington sounded the death knell of the Agreed Framework, bookmarked in January by the U.S. president's categorization of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as "an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world," and in October by an embellished U.S. accusation that allegedly induced a North Korean admission of its undisclosed highly-enriched uranium program.[21] The effects of this accusation/admission ended Clinton's Agreed Framework, including shuttering the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization's shipment of HFO

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U.S. Army Col. James M. Minnich (*second from right*), secretary of United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission, speaks to North Korean People's Army Senior Col. Pak Ki-yong (*left*) during Secretary Talks of the Military Armistice Commission 11 September 2013 at the Korean Demilitarized Zone. (Photo courtesy of author)

in November 2002 and its construction of LWRs in December 2003, and squashing the effects of two historic summits—one between North Korea and South Korea in June 2000 and the other between North Korea and Japan in September 2002.


North Korea reeled. In December 2002, Pyongyang (a) alerted the IAEA of its intent to restart its nuclear reactor and reopen its facilities frozen by the Agreed Framework, (b) removed all IAEA seals and observation devices from its nuclear facilities and materials, and (c) ejected the IAEA inspection team from its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. Then, on 10 January 2003, Pyongyang lifted its NPT withdrawal suspension, becoming the only nation to withdraw from this treaty. In the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003, North Korea announced its intent to harvest weapons-grade plutonium from eight thousand spent fuel rods that had been in storage and under IAEA observation since 1994. In an April 2003 meeting between U.S. and North Korean diplomats at the UN, the Americans were reportedly told that North Korea had decided to manufacture nuclear weapons by reprocessing the spent fuel rods as a deterrent against the United States executing an Iraq-like invasion of North Korea.[22]

Framed by a doctrine of preemptive strike and democratic regime change in the 2002 *National Security Strategy* and victorious from its preventive war with Iraq in early 2003, U.S. representative James Kelly announced Washington's policy position in a trilateral meeting with China and North Korea on 23 April 2003: Pyongyang must accede to a "complete, verifiable, irreversible, dismantlement" (CVID) of all nuclear activities—peaceful use and weapons. Pyongyang agreed, but on condition that the U.S. would provide the North with a security guarantee, normalization of relations, and economic aid. The U.S. position was clear: a nuclear CVID before any discussion of U.S. concessions.[23] Just three days preceding this meeting, the *New York Times* broke a story

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Military Review

WE RECOMMEND



The North Korean People's Army

Origins and Current Tactics

James M. Minnich

Though first published in 2005, this book remains an extremely useful, extensively researched, and very detailed primer on the North Korean army. The actual text—minus the introduction, forward, and appendices—is around one hundred pages and is a quick read. However, for an individual attempting to quickly familiarize him- or herself with the origin, military ideology, strategy, combat formations, and tactics of the North Korean military, the appendices, bibliography, and glossary of key terms are as valuable as the text itself.

The author, Col. James Minnich, is an expert on North Korea. He has more than two decades of experience in the area, having served as a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer in U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). In addition to an MA in East Asian studies from Harvard University and a Masters in Military Arts and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, he is also an alumnus of the Republic of Korea Army College and Sogang University's Center for Korean Studies.

If you are a student of Korean history, or a serving member of the military preparing to deploy to Korea, this book is a "must read, must keep close at hand."

on a leaked memo that was purportedly approved by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and circulated to key members of the administration urging the United States to work with China to topple North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.[24] Three weeks later, the newly elected South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun met in summit with President Bush and stressed his objections to military conflict with North Korea, as he accentuated in his newly crafted *Peace and Prosperity Policy*, Roh's version of his predecessor's *Sunshine Policy*.[25]

Six Party Talks, August 2003 to December 2008. The United States refused Pyongyang's repeated requests for bilateral dialogue, but agreed to meet in Six Party Talks with China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea. These talks began in late August 2003 and convened over a five-year period in seven protracted rounds. No progress was made throughout the first two years of talks, as Pyongyang sought from Washington normalization of relations and a nonaggression pact, and Washington demanded denuclearization without conditions. In early 2005, Condoleezza Rice, in her confirmation hearing, labeled North Korea an "outpost of tyranny" that must be dealt with, as the South Korean government made public its opposition to a U.S. contingency plan for its forces to advance into North Korea in the event of internal instability.[26] On 10 February 2005, Pyongyang's state news agency, the Korean Central News Agency, carried a North Korean foreign minister statement that announced Pyongyang's possession of nuclear weapons for self-defense.

Progress in the Six Party Talks remained elusive for the first two years of these multilateral negotiations, but during the fourth round of talks, the United States reversed its prohibition from directly negotiating with Pyongyang and relented from its demand that North Korea renounce peaceful-use nuclear technology. The Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 was not significantly different from the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea agreed to eliminate its nuclear weapons program, recommit to the NPT, and submit to IAEA inspections. In exchange, Washington (and other parties) agreed to normalize diplomatic and economic relations with Pyongyang, promote economic cooperation, provide energy assistance (to include LWR), and negotiate a permanent peace regime in Korea.[27]

Exiting the negotiation room, Christopher Hill addressed the press with a statement of qualification

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on the U.S. position regarding the Joint Statement, declaring that North Korea also needed to resolve its "human rights [abuses], biological and chemical weapons programs, ballistic missile programs and proliferation, terrorism, and illicit activities."[28] He further stated that the United States would take concrete actions to protect itself from any of North Korea's illicit and proliferation activities. This statement directly referred to a U.S. Treasury Department action that had just been undertaken to designate Banco Delta Asia, a small bank in Macau, as a money-laundering concern for conducting financial services with North Korea.[29] The U.S. action to freeze $25 million of North Korean funds stalled the Six Party Talks until Washington released the funds twenty-one months later. During this interregnum, Pyongyang ended the missile test moratorium with its first (failed) launch of an ICBM on 5 July 2006, and its first nuclear weapons test on 9 October 2006.

Washington's hardline approach toward Pyongyang not only ended the Agreed Framework, it precipitated Pyongyang's eviction of IAEA inspectors, abrogation of the NPT, reoperation of its nuclear reactor, weaponization of spent fuel, termination of an eight-year self-imposed missile moratorium, launch of an ICBM, and test of a nuclear weapon. Incensed by North Korea's first nuclear test, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1718 on 14 October 2006 as the United States sought greater resolve from Seoul and Tokyo.[30] Washington progressively realized that a solution to end North Korea's nuclear pursuit would eventually require honest negotiations with Pyongyang.

On 13 February 2007, the six nations agreed to phase one of a plan to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement.[31] Per the implementation plan, Pyongyang would disable the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and receive IAEA inspectors. In exchange, the United States would release the $25 million, engage in talks to normalize relations, excise North Korea from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST), remove sanctions imposed under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), and work to provide HFO. While it took Washington four more months to release the funds, it took Pyongyang only one day from receipt of the funds on 25 June 2007 to welcome a small team of IAEA inspectors back to Pyongyang. Those inspectors witnessed and verified the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor on 18 July 2007.[32]

Less than three months later, the six parties signed phase two of a plan to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement, which committed Pyongyang to submit a written declaration of its nuclear weapons program; it did so on 26 June 2008.[33] In exchange, Washington agreed to relax economic sanctions under TWEA, remove Pyongyang from its SST list, and (with the other parties) provide one million tons of HFO. While Washington did immediately relax TWEA sanctions, it withheld delisting North Korea as a SST until completion of accelerated verifications.[34] North Korea balked at this unilateral condition and threatened to restart its nuclear reactor, and it barred IAEA inspectors from its nuclear facilities on 9 October 2008.[35] Two days later, Washington delisted Pyongyang as a SST, and then the same day Pyongyang readmitted IAEA inspectors to Yongbyon.

The seventh round of Six Party Talks was held 8–11 December 2008. Between the sixth and seventh rounds of talks, South Korea, Japan, and the United States each elected new heads of state. Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro and South Korean President Lee Myong-bak were hardliners who had assumed office earlier in 2008, and U.S. President Barack Obama was within six weeks of inauguration. In the seventh round, under a threat to discontinue energy aid to North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan pressed Pyongyang to accept a written verification protocol that would allow inspectors to take and test nuclear material from Yongbyon. Pyongyang refused to yield, prompting Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to immediately end all HFO deliveries. Pyongyang recoiled. Three months into Obama's presidency, North Korea launched a three-stage Unha-2/Taepodong-2 rocket in a failed attempt to place in orbit the KMS-2 telecommunication satellite.

On 13 April 2009, the UNSC issued a presidential statement of condemnation against the launch, which provoked Pyongyang's withdrawal from the Six Party Talks on 14 April in a statement that charged the UN for infringing on its sovereignty in contravention to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.[36] With the end of meaningful dialogue, Pyongyang evicted IAEA inspectors, harvested weapons-grade plutonium from all eight thousand spent fuel rods, began construction of a 25-30 MWe LWR, developed its uranium-enrichment program, and conducted a second nuclear test on 26 May 2009. In response, Seoul immediately joined the

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Consequently, the deal died after Pyongyang's third attempt to place a weather satellite into orbit on 13 April 2012 with its launch of an Unha-3 rocket. Pyongyang persisted and finally succeeded in placing a functioning satellite into orbit with the launch of an Unha-3 rocket on 12 December 2012. Six weeks later, the UNSC strengthened international sanctions with the passage of Resolution 2087 on 22 January 2013.[38] In the face of toughening sanctions, North Korea conducted its third underground nuclear test on 12 February 2013, just two weeks before South Korea's first female president, Park Geun-hye, assumed office from Lee Myong-bak. During Presidents Obama's and Park's remaining years in office, both pursued policies of pressure without negotiation against North Korea.

In his 2015 New Year's address, Kim Jong-un sought talks with South Korea. On 10 January, Kim further proposed a return to six-party talks by offering a temporary moratorium on nuclear weapons testing in exchange for a temporary suspension of U.S.-South Korea combined military exercises.[39] Pyongyang then reached further by offering to suspend launches of its missiles and satellites, and production of its fissile material; in exchange, it sought only a temporary reduction in the scale of combined military exercises. Pyongyang pressed more with a request to focus first on establishing a peace regime to improve security on the peninsula, which in its estimate would negate a need for nuclear weapons and missiles.[40] U.S. State Department spokesman John Kirby responded that "denuclearization had to be part of any such discussion."[41]

The UNSC tightened sanctions with Resolution 2094 in response to Pyongyang's third nuclear test; Resolution 2270 in response to its fourth nuclear test on 6 January 2016; UNSC Presidential Statement in response to its second successful satellite launch on 7 February 2016; and Resolution 2321 in response to its fifth nuclear test on 9 September 2016.[42] Seoul walked away from all inter-Korean contact after the fourth nuclear test and second successful satellite launch with the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Washington enacted the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, mandating sanctions against entities contributing to North Korea's weapons programs, arms trade, human rights abuses, and illegal activities.[43] Absent a constructive dialogue mechanism or reciprocal agreement, Pyongyang advanced its strategic weapons program with successful testing of Pukuksong-1/KN-11 SLBMs on 23 April and 24 August 2016; Musudan IRBMs on 22 June; Pukuksong-2/KN-15 IRBMs on 12 February, 5 April, and 12 May 2017; HS-12 IRBM on 14 May; and HS-14 ICBMs on 4 July and 28 July 2017. The second ICBM launch had an estimated range of 10,400 km, which could target Chicago.

In early 2017, the United States and South Korea both inaugurated new presidents. U.S. President Donald Trump entered office on 20 January, declaring that all options were on the table concerning North Korea, and President Moon Jae-in entered office on 10 May with a mandate to peacefully resolve the North Korea crisis through inter-Korean engagements.

Going Forward

Shakespeare's locution of "what is past is prologue" articulates the difficult position of Washington and Seoul to now advance the denuclearization of North Korea after twenty-five years of mutual disingenuousness, which has created a milieu wherein Pyongyang possesses nuclear weapons and ICBM capabilities.[44] What is certain is that Pyongyang will not voluntarily disarm with doubts of national security and regime survival. Consequently, North Korea cannot be induced to denuclearize by offers of aid, trade, and engagement.

Pyongyang views denuclearization as capitulation, not normalization. Pyongyang does, however, long to be accepted as a normal state that enjoys good relations and trade with its neighbors. Such a prospect has been shunned over the years in favor of policies of coercion, of which there are many. Strategic patience is a policy of pressure without negotiations. The imposition of sanctions is a policy of public privation that actually buttresses the despot. Regime change topples a dictator in a hope that someone better will emerge. Preemption and prevention policies suffer from dubious legality with elusive effects. Containment is a policy that acquiesces on acquired ability, prohibits proliferation, and seeks stasis. Outsourced diplomacy is another policy option, but this suggests a paucity of policy and a shifting of responsibility to a proxy with differing motives. There is another policy option.

A policy of changed regime advances the shared aspiration of peace on the Korean peninsula. Such a policy will transform North Korea through

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consistent engagement, which may take decades to realize. At only thirty-three, Kim Jong-un's young age advantages stability in pursuing a changed-regime policy. Moreover, Kim has offered the hand of negotiation several times. South Korean President Moon Jae-in will govern until 2022, and he is receptive to broad engagements with North Korea to peaceably end enmity on the peninsula. Washington can view this crisis through the mistakes of earlier agreements and interlocutors, and choose a policy path that leads Pyongyang along a course that obviates the need for nuclear weapons as a guarantor of security and survival.

Albright's October 2000 visit with Kim Jong-il elucidated possibilities when Kim stated that Pyongyang would refocus resources from the military to "economic development, with the right security assurances," and that he had come to view U.S. forces in Korea as stabilizing to the region.[45] In August 2009, former President Clinton visited Pyongyang, where Kim Jong-il opined of a time where the United States might find in North Korea a "new friend in Northeast Asia in a complex world."[46] That time is now, as the intensity of today's crisis pulls policy makers to define a policy that will achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. That solution is a policy of changed regime. ■

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
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Assessing the Value of Serving in an Army Service Component Command as a Broadening Assignment

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Broadening (Institutional/Enterprise) – [infantry] officers experience diverse areas of responsibility. These are the assignments where the Army gains from the officer's experiences and returns him to the Institutional force to help build and train the next generation of leaders or sends him to lead a staff section in a Joint or ASCC HQs.

—Lt. Col. Patrick Harkins

Broadening assignments provide key developmental experiences to officers as they continue to serve in our Army in different levels of responsibilities. The "muddy boots culture" of purely tactical experiences for career advancement has been recognized as wholly inadequate in providing sufficient broadening experience to deal with the complexities of an ever-changing operational environment.[1] A better mixture of broadening assignments is needed to help prepare officers for the different types of roles and responsibilities characteristic of the more complex security challenges they will face.

As I write this, I am reminded of the words expressed by Dr. Tim Hentschel during my time at the Command and General Staff College about whom gets assigned to a broadening assignment with an Army service component command (ASCC). Like most infantryman, there was a certain degree of self-denial that it would not be me, some other poor infantryman would get this assignment. Even though the research shows the need for broadening experiences, the embedded on-the-ground culture of infantrymen and other branches still fosters some reticence toward broadening experiences that take time away from service with field units.[2] Having said that about my initial reaction, my experience as a staff officer with an ASCC has not been what I had imagined it to be. There is more to this assignment than I expected that indeed is broadening in terms of insight and practical experience.

Putting careful effort into determining the types of broadening assignments that provide officers with opportunities to learn and grow as professionals means focusing on what will best prepare them for future assignments along their career paths. There is no "one size fits all" to



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Previous page: Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter (*center*) departs the Baghdad International Airport 18 April 2016. Carter announced the next phase of the fight against the Islamic State during a troop talk in Baghdad that included addressing the requirement for detailed land-component participation in training and support to Iraqi ground forces. (Photo by Sr. Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz, U.S Air Force)

the developmental methodology. As a result, it is important to gauge the effects of different broadening assignments to determine their value in providing officers with the right developmental experiences. To that end, the intended purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the experiences and impact of an ASCC assignment on career development so that readers may develop a better sense of both its utility as a broadening experience and as an opportunity to learn how to better manage staff resources at the ASCC level.

What Is an ASCC?

What an ASCC is most widely known for is that it works to provide access to the region or operational environment, to acquire basing privileges, and to obtain overflight authorizations to allow U.S. forces to execute their missions in theater. However, it does significantly more than that. Prior to my assignment to an ASCC, previous assignments and participation in exercises gave me limited insight on what an ASCC did but not enough to fully understand the whole gamut of its responsibilities.

The breadth and depth of the roles and responsibilities of an ASCC are remarkable. Army Regulation 10-87, *Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units*, defines ASCCs as operational-level organizations that serve as the primary Army components for combatant commanders throughout the different geographical commands.[3] In practice, an ASCC is primarily responsible to the secretary of the Army for the administration and support of Army forces assigned or attached to combatant commands. However, depending on its designation, an ASCC has the flexibility to perform myriad tasks that support the combatant commander to set conditions throughout an area of operations. As such, an ASCC can provide an array of options for the combatant commander to achieve desired end states.[4] For example, the ASCC supporting U.S. Central Command retains operational control of Army forces via the delegation of Central Command leadership. In this capacity, it performs Army support to other services as well as Department of Defense-specified executive agencies.[5] In addition, an ASCC can be designated by the combatant commander to perform duties as a joint forces land component command or joint task force as contingencies arise.[6]

To provide a broader framework, I will use U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) as an example of a geographic ASCC to give a clearer picture of the depth and complexity of these types of organizations and the kinds of support they offer to combatant commanders. To understand the totality of what an ASCC does, the best place to start is by looking at the mission statement of an ASCC. A good mission statement will provide an accurate description of what an organization does. At present, USARCENT's mission statement reads, "USARCENT shapes the environment to improve access and interoperability, sets the theater to deter adversaries, and is prepared to transition to Phase I of contingency operations."[7] The mission statement is expansive because it reflects the span and complexities of tasks that an ASCC is directed to perform in its designated area of operations. The USARCENT mission statement has evolved over time and continues to evolve as the operational environment and the strategic focus of the combatant commander change. As such, ARCENT has adapted and adjusted its role in the performance of numerous operational and strategic tasks. For example, it has performed duties as both theater army and combined joint task force, and it continues in both those roles. Currently, USARCENT supports three main lines of effort: set the theater, shape the environment, and unified land operations. Prior to that, it served as a combined joint task force, Operation Iraqi Resolve, from October 2014 to September 2015.[8]

Understanding Staff Work

The idea of being a staff officer is not very enticing. It feels extraneous to me as an infantry officer. But the level of satisfaction one gets from accomplishing a challenging task may well provide the same feeling of satisfaction one gets from service on the line. Though it was truly hard for me to feel and express pride in working as a staff officer, it does have its merit and value. Like any other significant work, meaning is found on the quality of the work done and on its impact on others. It took a shift in mindset on my part to appreciate the value of good staff work.

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U.S. military logistics leaders and experts from across the Department of Defense discuss long-term logistics planning 6 April 2017 during the Joint Logistics Coordination Board at the U.S. Central Command forward headquarters at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. The board was part of a week of planning conferences that included two separate sessions aimed at ensuring the joint logistics enterprise aligns efforts across the CENTCOM area of responsibility to maintain an effective readiness for both current and future operations. (Photo by Staff Sgt. R. Alex Durbin, U.S. Air Force)

Most of my time during my tour of service as a staff officer with USARCENT was spent as a planner. I participated in three-star level exercises, multiple planning efforts, and working groups. My experience might be unique to my job description, but the work I have done is like that of most staff officers who work at USARCENT. As a planner, I routinely attended different meetings throughout the week. Most of my time was spent listening to briefings, providing staff input to planning efforts, participating in working groups, interacting with people, and sometimes previewing soon-to-be published new Army doctrine.

At first glance, this type of daily existence seems mundane. It even sounds morbid as I read back over this paragraph. This type of existence at face value would put off a lot of people—nobody that I know signed up to join the Army to do staff work. However, whether we like it or not, staff work is a part of what we do daily in the Army. As officers, a great deal of our time is spent doing the unenviable task of leading and participating in planning efforts. It took me some time to acquiesce to this inglorious task.

Being a planner requires knowing what information is critical to a planning effort or working group. This is not very easy, because sometimes you go into a planning effort blind or at least unaware of the requirements. Most often, operational planning teams and working groups do not provide an overview before starting. Not all working groups are created equal. Effective working groups and planning efforts are well led and organized. As a planner, you must

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understand the requirements one needs to provide that are relevant to the effort and others might not know in a planning effort. You must be knowledgeable of important data that are relevant to the operational planning team.

It is a common mistake to commence planning efforts or working groups without setting the right conditions. Plunging headlong into a task without sufficiently preparing participants with the appropriate base knowledge creates frustrations. It is a mistake in my mind to expect individuals to know something without providing the right references. Those who are new to the unit cannot be expected to know everything they need to know. New members of working groups must be provided an overview to help them understand key information. Teaching them where to access and acquire more information should enable them to catch up.

The demands of being a planner are various and difficult at times. What one does is time consuming and constantly changing. Work is never done. At times it feels like a thankless job, especially when one is caught unaware and not particularly prepared for what is asked in a meeting. Staff work is wrought with challenges, and one must be always be in the know of the new developments, which is not an easy chore. Sometimes people take one's work for granted, especially when things are going well. One gets little credit for the things that go well and a lot of anguish when things do not go well. It is almost Sisyphean at times.

What Could Be Done Better?

To make the assignment in an ASCC a true broadening experience, there are ways to enhance these assignments. Officers would be more well-rounded if they rotated to different positions every year throughout their time. I think that this is doable with some innovation and willingness. It will benefit the Army a great deal by having officers who have well-rounded skills and experiences from working in an ASCC.

Maneuver company-grade officers who have not spent time in command should not be assigned to an ASCC. Their time to learn and master the basics is limited. Without company-grade field experience, they will have a knowledge gap that might be hard to overcome later on. Where staff experience is necessary, maneuver company-grade officers will be better served spending critical developmental time at echelons of command at the brigade level and below.

Where staff service with an ASCC is deemed appropriate, leadership development programs should focus on bridging the knowledge gap required for such service and enhancing regional expertise. This will allow officers in ASCC broadening assignments to gain deeper understanding of the different countries in the region. Acquiring knowledge in these areas has multiple benefits. We are fortunate in USARCENT to have a dynamic leadership development program that enhances regional knowledge.

Time in theater will also provide valuable experience for officers. Working with partner nations through exercises and partnership programs benefits everyone. However, with constrained resources, such direct partnership opportunities might not be feasible on a large scale but are worth considering for their potential to enhance the broadening experience. Furthermore, immersion and real-world interaction with officers of partner nations would aid in developing personal relationships that could potentially deescalate future tensions arising among nations by leveraging personal connections with senior military officers of different nations that were formed while serving with U.S. officers in combined activities during their development years as relatively junior officers.

Balancing the requirements with risk when it comes to personnel must be done correctly. Sending the right individuals to broadening assignments and providing them with a range of experiences will enhance their professional growth, but filling the ranks of a unit with less than adequate personnel dooms the organization to mediocrity. It also causes frustration when individuals with the wrong background and experience struggle to perform a job. The two-levels-up-and-one-down methodology may not work well in an ASCC. The experience-level requirement cannot be filled by randomly assigning mere bodies.

Reflection on the Overall Value of the ASCC Assignment

The breadth and depth of the responsibilities of an ASCC provides opportunities to expand one's knowledge of many different problem sets and potential solutions. Those aspiring to higher levels of responsibility will benefit from learning about the operational and strategic tasks an ASCC performs. Additionally, having proximity to general officers and seeing how they formulate visions and intent as well as make decisions offers lessons

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in leadership that are hard to quantify. Seeing the challenges and requirements that a senior leader must contend with enables future senior leaders to prepare for those future demands. Therefore, the experience in an ASCC assignment forges a path toward greater depth of knowledge and skills that future senior leaders can use to create success.

It is very easy to lose sight of what is important. Sometimes we need a little reminder that we all have roles to play in the grand scheme of things. We cannot all be commanders; all of us must do staff work to enable commanders to make the best military decisions and provide the best military advice to strategic leaders. Getting it right has enormous consequences, as the recent experiences in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan demonstrate. The human and economic toll is very significant.

Doing your best everyday may not get its due reward, but the satisfaction of doing one's best and contributing to an important effort that makes a difference is reward enough, as it helps one achieve self-fulfillment. Self-satisfaction comes to the person in the arena who toils day in and day out to fulfill his or her obligation to a calling or job he or she feels is worthy of doing.[9]

In his book *Team of Teams*, Gen. Stanley McChrystal states that the role of senior leaders is no longer that of a heroic leader but rather that of an emphatic crafter of culture; a gardener.[10] If the role of future senior leaders is to be good crafters of cultures, then perhaps an assignment in an ASCC is worth it because it is a good training ground for developing the skills needed to become an effective gardener of organizational culture. ■

Notes


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light armor was no match for the main gun rounds from enemy tanks combined with the cannon fire from enemy infantry fighting vehicles. Few Strykers survived the engagement in the open ground against the heavier enemy force, and that engagement blunted the spearhead of the brigade's attack. In the aftermath of this defeat, it is likely that many of those involved were asking themselves: Is there a better way to employ the Stryker? That question was not new, of course. In the early days of the Stryker, critics observed that "it does not provide the firepower or the protection to transform army light infantry units into a 'medium weight force.'"[1] Given the Stryker's inherent limitations, how should it be employed against a mechanized opponent? And, fifteen years after the introduction of the Stryker brigade combat team (BCT), has the Army determined its role on the battlefield?

We will attempt to answer the thorny question of how Strykers might best be utilized on the battlefield. First, we will look back at the origin of the Stryker BCT and how it was initially envisioned. Then, we will provide a brief recap of the Stryker's use in Iraq and Afghanistan, looking at the role it assumed during missions in the respective counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Next, we will discuss the Army's overall shift from a focus on COIN operations to the core competencies of high-intensity warfare. Finally, we will take a look at several examples of the Stryker being used in this new role at the NTC and examine what operational approaches best capitalize on the inherent strengths of the Stryker platform. We will close with a discussion of the way ahead for training and employment of the Stryker in the future.

Fielding and Validation of the Stryker

When Gen. Eric Shinseki became the Army chief of staff in June 1999, he had a clear vision for changing the structure and strategic responsiveness of the Army.[2] Central to this vision was the creation of a new interim BCT at Fort Lewis, Washington—one that would be a model for future brigades to be fielded or transformed. These new brigades would employ a "medium-weight" armored vehicle—light enough to be transportable by C-130 cargo aircraft but heavy enough to provide basic protection and firepower to infantry squads. This idea of a "medium" unit to bridge the gap between light and heavy forces has deep roots in the Army, perhaps described most succinctly in "Three Kinds of Infantry" by then Col. Huba Wass de Czege. The vulnerability of light units initially sent to Operation Desert Shield in 1990 highlighted the need for this type of unit.[3]

In November 2000, the Army announced that it had selected a wheeled vehicle known as the LAV III (third-generation light armored vehicle), which would be developed into several variants for reconnaissance, mortar, command, and infantry-carrying roles. Delivery of the vehicles began in spring 2002, when Company A, 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry (known as 5-20 Infantry), received the first fourteen Strykers (as the vehicle had been newly named) and began training with them. The first major test of the newly formed Stryker brigade took place during Millennium Challenge 2002, a major joint exercise that included transportation of Strykers by C-130 aircraft from Fort Lewis to Fort Irwin, California, and return movement by high-speed sealift catamaran. Brigade-level training exercises at the NTC and also at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Louisiana served as the final validation of the fully-equipped Stryker brigade, now organized as the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division.[4]

These exercises showcased both the shortcomings and strengths of the Stryker. In vehicular combat against a mechanized opponent at the NTC, Strykers were quickly "destroyed," but they excelled in restricted terrain and infantry ambushes against their armored foes.[5] The JRTC exercise better highlighted the new possibilities enabled by the operational mobility of a Stryker

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brigade. Col. (retired) Charles Hodges, a battalion operations officer at the time, recalled the brigade attacking the infamous Shughart-Gordon urban warfare training facility twelve hours earlier than a typical light infantry unit, catching the enemy off balance and winning the battle decisively as a result.[6] Though the Stryker brigade was still regarded with some skepticism, it was certified to deploy by the U.S. Army Forces Command after completion of its brigade-level training exercises.

Stryker Employment in Operation Iraqi Freedom

3rd Stryker BCT arrived in Iraq in December 2003, the first of many Stryker deployments that would follow over the next eight years. This deployment served as the first showcase of the Stryker vehicle and the associated reorganized brigade.[7] Two of the most unique aspects of the Stryker brigade proved to be its operational mobility and its advanced command-and-control network compared to the mechanized and light units already operating in Iraq. Without the logistical support requirements of a heavy mechanized force, Strykers could pivot much more quickly from operating in one region to another across hundreds of miles. Hodges recalled the flexibility of the Stryker brigade during Operation Black Typhoon in Iraq:

> All three Stryker maneuver battalions were involved ... one night where we were truly spread all over Nineveh Province, from Mosul all the way out to the Syrian border. 5-20 Infantry was doing raids on the Syrian border, we were doing a major operation in Mosul and down in [Qayyarah West Airfield], all at the same time ... it showed the depth and breadth we could operate in.[8]

In addition, the Stryker platform itself proved to be very effective in urban combat. Lt. Col. Theodore Kleisner, who served in 3rd Brigade on later Iraq deployments as a company commander, offered some thoughts:

> The Stryker ferried more people and more stuff. A HMMWV had five people, two stayed with it, so maybe three dismounted; [Strykers] dismounted nine. As far as the uniqueness of the Stryker goes, we used it to [enable our infantrymen to] get over walls, to get into second floors. We did rolling dismounts, dismounts at the "X." ... We used Strykers to maneuver around and to stop bullets. We stayed in them until we thought we were at a point where we needed to establish dominance of terrain.[9]

During the "Surge" in Iraq in 2007 and 2008, Stryker elements were moved rapidly and repeatedly. A notable example is the experience of 5-20 Infantry, which was shifted from Mosul to Baghdad to Baqubah over the course of 2007.[10] By the time U.S. involvement in

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Strykers from Company C, 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment conduct a short halt 20 May 2016 during training at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Spc. Lawrence Wong, U.S. Army)

Iraq began winding down in 2010, there were eight Stryker BCTs, nearly a quarter of the active force. However, Strykers began to see heavier employment in Afghanistan, with 3rd, 5th, and 4th Brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division deploying in subsequent years.[11]

Transition to Decisive Action

As American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan drew down, the Army began looking for a new focus after a decade of COIN-oriented training and combat. Col. Ross Coffman, the commander of the Operations Group at the NTC, described it: "As we move from the majority of our forces being deployed in support [of] OIF/OEF to what we have today, the decision was made at the Army level to move toward decisive action operations at our training centers. ... If you can do decisive action, you can do anything."[12] *Decisive action* is the term used by the Army to describe a combination of wide area security and combined arms maneuver operations, but informally the term is used to describe the shift from COIN-focused operations toward more traditional conventional warfare against opponents with near-peer technology and force structures. Coffman elaborated: "The [decisive action training environment] scenario is a prescriptive enemy set ... based on evolution of enemy forces, we introduce additional capabilities ... we are replicating a near-peer threat depending on the level of training [at which] the rotational unit arrives."[13] As a result of the Army's change in focus, its training centers took up the challenge of developing training scenarios to rebuild traditional maneuver competency on a high-intensity battlefield. The Operations Group at the NTC helped drive this shift, providing new training options to Army division commanders, who used the rotation to ensure unit readiness for the most likely deployments. Coffman explained, "The numbers of forces, type of terrain and environment can all be changed .... We develop scenarios that play to the strengths of that organization while also improving their weaknesses by forcing commanders to make decisions in a time-constrained environment."[14]

By late 2011, the Army also began holding field tests of the new near-peer enemy force at training centers with rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. The 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment and the 173rd Airborne Brigade each conducted a month-long exercise against a near-peer enemy set, providing a valuable baseline for further development of the decisive action training environment.

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As the Army was shifting focus from COIN to decisive action, changes were also taking place at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, home of the original interim BCT. In 2012, there were three independent Stryker brigades stationed on the post, all falling under the direct control of I Corps. The brigades had been on a near-continuous deployment cycle since their conversion to Stryker formations in the early 2000s. The repeated deployments had reduced their equipment and personnel readiness to relatively low levels. At this point the 7th Infantry Division was reactivated to serve as a headquarters for these three brigades and to transition them from their deployment-focused training cycle to a steadier state of deployment readiness.

Lt. Gen. Stephen Lanza, the I Corps commanding general, served as the initial commander of the 7th Infantry Division. He recalls: "The first direction was 'build back the readiness of the Stryker formation' .... When we took over the division, the Strykers were in a tremendous amount of disrepair, to the point where we had to stand down the brigades to build Stryker readiness, because they were just not ready."[15] He further elaborated: "When we stood up the division, we had a 26 percent nondeployable rate, we had OR [operational readiness] rates that were [low]—we could not fight decisive action because we were stuck in ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation]."[16] A focus for the newly established 7th Infantry Division was training Stryker formations for combat against a near-peer threat. Lanza said, "There's a lot of things that had to change in terms of our approach to Stryker training at home station, because we were focused on COIN ... and we had a big discussion about the platform itself, because we did not want to employ it as a Bradley."[17]

The deficit in experience commanding Strykers in maneuver against a near-peer threat led 7th Infantry Division to work with the NTC to develop the first full decisive action rotation for a Stryker brigade. Lanza recalls the process of creating this rotation:

> A lot of our initial discussion was designing a CTC [combat training center] rotation ... with the requisite kind of force ratios and requisite kind of OPFOR [opposing force], in terms of what a Stryker would do in combat .... We did not want to have a *mano a mano* rotation where Strykers would be fighting other kinds of armored vehicles .... The focal point was always delivering infantry into the fight .... So we had to build a COFOR, correlation of forces model, to make sure we had the right force ratios for what a Stryker would do in combat.[18]

This planning and development culminated in January 2014, when 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division deployed to the NTC for the first of this new type of training exercise. Both of the authors of this paper were present at the rotation—one as an assistant operations officer within 5-20 Infantry and the other as a liaison officer from the elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment participating in the exercise. The rotation was different from a typical mission rehearsal exercise conducted before a deployment from the start. The brigade deployed into a tactical assembly area with no pre-positioned buildings or logistical support, and then further broke down into battalion-level assembly areas from there. This was no small feat, considering the level of reliance Stryker formations had on fixed forward operating bases for logistical support in Iraq and Afghanistan. From these tactical assembly areas, the battalion launched separate attacks. 5-20 Infantry initially attacked through the "central corridor" of the NTC to seize several pieces of prominent terrain prior to conducting a seizure of Ujen, one of the larger mock cities. The battalion, generally operating unilaterally, suffered heavy casualties in the process. As Lanza observed, "Strykers in the attack, against a prepared position with enemy armor, [do not succeed] without the other enablers that he [Stryker commander] needs and the other support that he needs."[19]

This attack was followed by a defense, which better highlighted the strengths of the Stryker formation. The battalion was able to utilize dismounted javelins in restrictive terrain to great effect, although it did not have the capability to truly block an armored enemy force. Lanza again shared his thoughts: "When you take Strykers in the defense, and you dismount javelins, and you put them in [restricted] terrain, that was the biggest fight that Col. Bair [the Stryker BCT commander] won, was in the defense."[20] The defense was followed by a counterattack and a breach, both of which saw the Stryker battalions overmatched by enemy armor. As this was the first training exercise of this type at the NTC, significant shortcomings still existed in the design and execution of the Stryker-specific scenario.

Upon returning from the NTC, 3rd Brigade immediately began a new training cycle to correct

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U.S. Army Lt. Col. Edward J. Ballanco, Commander of the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, briefs his subordinate commanders 9 May 2016 during Decisive Action Rotation 16-06 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Sgt. Stephen J. Schmitz, U.S. Army)

shortcomings identified from the January 2014 rotation. A premium was placed on training of the mounted crews and the Stryker platform. Col. David Foley, who took command of 3rd Brigade near the end of this rotation, recalls the training progression: "What we inherited was a more platform-based formation .... We're going to man, field, become very lethal in our two- to three-man crew and then enhance that with the infantry squad and that absolutely countered everything I saw in the JRTC and initial fielding."[21] This could be seen in the company live-fire exercise conducted just prior to the NTC rotation, which included several mounted engagements for the Strykers in open terrain.

3rd Brigade again deployed to the NTC for Rotation 15-08.5 in July 2015. Two companies of Abrams tanks were attached to the brigade; 5-20 Infantry essentially became a Stryker-Abrams combined arms battalion. This configuration would prove to be less than ideal, as there was less synergy between the Stryker and the Abrams than between the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the Abrams. Lt. Col. Edward Ballanco, the battalion commander of 5-20 Infantry, described one shortcoming: "The main difference between a Stryker and a Bradley is that a Bradley is far more maneuverable than a Stryker."[22] On roads, Strykers and Abrams tanks could move at about the same speed, but maneuvering off-road in rolling desert terrain, the wheeled Strykers were far slower than the tracked tanks. This made it difficult to maintain a consistent tempo while maneuvering in the open, and it also deprived the tanks of the shock and speed with which they can normally attack. When the tanks did maneuver independently, they found themselves without infantry support to clear restricted terrain, and they were quickly destroyed by enemy antitank weapons.

Ultimately, the Stryker lacked the protection, firepower, and maneuverability to truly conduct a movement to contact across open terrain. Ballanco elaborated: "The Stryker ... didn't have as good a weapon, didn't have a mounted TOW, didn't have a 25 mm [cannon]."[23] As

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with the previous rotation, the brigade saw its greatest success in the defense, while suffering heavy casualties during movement-to-contact missions and deliberate attacks. A further shortcoming was seen during obstacle-breaching operations—the Stryker Engineer Support Vehicle was unable to proof a lane wide enough for a tank after conducting a breach through an obstacle. So, even with Abrams tanks to provide the assault force for a breach, the Stryker vehicles were unable to create a path for them through an obstacle. Foley and his battalion commanders returned from this rotation with several lessons learned, and a new focus as they trained for the next rotation, only eight months in the future.

in the field utilizing the full spectrum of communications systems. When the eight-month lull between the two NTC rotations was complete, 5-20 Infantry had conducted dozens of company-level force-on-force exercises and monthly war-gaming exercises.

NTC Rotation 16-06 was different from previous rotations in several respects. Maj. Gen. Thomas James, the commander of 7th Infantry Division and the senior trainer for Rotation 16-06, stated, "One of the things I took away from the rotation with [2nd Brigade] and with [3rd Brigade] is that because of the uniqueness of the Stryker formation, we have to pay even more attention to ... how we shape conditions to enable a Stryker formation to get to a position of advantage."[25] The dialogue between James and the NTC resulted in a rotation that was much more fluid and realistic for a Stryker formation than previous rotations.

> "... because of the uniqueness of the Stryker formation, we have to pay even more attention to ... how we shape conditions to enable a Stryker formation to get a position of advantage."

A Shift in Training Focus

Following NTC Rotation 15-08.5, 3rd Brigade, now reflagged as 1st Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, received orders to return to the NTC for another rotation earlier than expected, in the early summer of 2016. Thus, a compressed training plan was developed to prepare and certify the brigade. 5-20 Infantry modified its training plan in several key ways to incorporate the lessons learned from NTC Rotation 15-08.5. Ballanco described his method of employing the Stryker during these exercises: "We'd take advantage of the restrictive terrain all the time, try to use [the Stryker] as a support-by-fire platform wherever we could, but of course the main weapon being the javelin ... so we need to be experts with that weapon system."[24] To reinforce his style of maneuver, he devised several changes to the battalion training plan. First, the battalion conducted several additional company-level force-on-force mock battles, allowing commanders and leaders to experience fighting against a thinking opponent rather than the more constrained maneuver of a live-fire exercise against wooden targets. Second, integration of Stryker infantry carrier vehicles and dismounted infantry was heavily stressed both in field exercises and in tabletop war-gaming exercises held for the battalion's officers. Finally, a full battalion-level field exercise tested the ability of the battalion staff to control several companies maneuvering

1st Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, as 3rd Brigade was now renamed, began an early summer training rotation in May 2016. (The authors of this paper commanded Company A and Company C of 5-20 Infantry during this training.) 5-20 Infantry departed the bivouac area for the training area on 4 May and immediately established a desert laager, postured for immediate movement to an assault position. The next evening, the entire battalion departed its laager site for an attack on several pieces of restricted terrain. Company A led the battalion's attack, moving sixteen kilometers through a mobility corridor known as Whale Gap to a dismount point 2.5 kilometers from their final objective. This dismount point was selected deliberately to protect the vehicles from enemy antitank weapon systems. From that point, the entire company dismounted into the restrictive terrain and cleared enemy forces from a prominent ridgeline, utilizing company mortars for fire support. The company rested the following day and prepared for the next mission, and then moved another fourteen kilometers the following night to another objective.

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This first battle period highlighted two strengths of the Stryker formation in combined arms maneuver. The Stryker has excellent operational mobility, and can move along roads to quickly deliver a large body of dismounted infantry to an objective while preserving combat power. The missions conducted by Company A would have taken considerably longer if conducted by a light infantry force without vehicular support. Second, the Stryker formation can much more quickly refit, conduct troop leading procedures, and prepare for the next mission than an armored force. Fewer refueling assets are required, indirect fire support is integral to the company team, and digital systems inside the vehicle allow mission orders to be quickly disseminated by higher headquarters. Additionally, the use of the "Arms Room" concept allowed Company A to effectively resupply additional ammunition and water, and replace AT-4 antitank weapons after consolidating on the objective.[26] Therefore, Company A could conduct an ambitious follow-on mission less than twenty-four hours after seizing their initial objective.

The next phase of the training exercise saw Company C tasked to conduct a bold flanking maneuver to the far eastern boundary of the NTC. This order was issued to Company C at 0600 hours, with a tentative start time of 1800 hours. The battalion was widely dispersed at this point, with Company C fifteen kilometers to the east of the rest of the battalion task force, twenty kilometers from the battalion operations center, and separated by several major terrain features. Company C used the twelve hours allocated to refuel, rearm, resolve several vehicle maintenance issues, and issue a mission order. Upon departing the assembly area, Company C moved across severely restricted terrain that had previously not been used as a route. This route brought Company C into an assault position northeast of a mock city, which the company attacked shortly after dusk. The route followed by Company C bypassed a massive obstacle belt south of the city and allowed the lead elements of the company to seize a foothold in the city before being detected by the enemy. By the time direct-fire contact was established with the enemy, two buildings in the city had been secured, and all of the company's Strykers were established in a supporting position north of the city where they could employ their heavy machine guns and grenade launchers to isolate the enemy. The city was seized entirely under cover of darkness, and the company repositioned shortly after dawn to a blocking position to stop an enemy force spotted by friendly forces.

This operation highlighted the strengths of the Stryker formation in a slightly different way. During the attack on the city, Company C used its Strykers not only as a method of transportation but also as a support platform for infantry maneuver. The heavy machine guns mounted on the Strykers with thermal cameras served both to spot and eliminate enemy forces as they moved in and out of the city. As with Company A's operation, the agility of the Stryker was highlighted as a tremendous asset. Within two hours of seizing a city and establishing a hasty defense, the entire company packed up and repositioned to a follow-on blocking position with their antitank weapon systems to help stop an enemy armored force. Finally, the mobility of the Stryker platform and the light logistical support requirements allowed the battalion to operate across a wide geographical area and enabled C Company to conduct its flanking movement to the east across restrictive terrain.

The bold movement also illustrated the impressive digital systems employed by Stryker formations. At the battalion level, the commander was capable of providing effective mission command for three Stryker companies conducting missions simultaneously across twenty kilometers, from Company C at the city to Companies A and B on hilltops 760 and 780, respectively.

The final task for 5-20 Infantry in Rotation 16-06 saw the entire task force conduct a seventy-kilometer movement across the entire breadth of the training area at the NTC to attack the enemy's rear area. During this movement, the battalion seized two villages, conducted breaching operations on five separate mine obstacles, and forced the enemy to reallocate a significant portion of its forces to rear-area security instead of its main defensive positions. Once again, the operational mobility of the Stryker force allowed it to move long distances and put a large infantry force into a position of advantage against the enemy.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Stryker Formation

Over the course of three decisive action rotations at the NTC for 3rd Brigade (now 1st Brigade), several trends are clear. The first is that the Stryker formation cannot be used in the same way as a combined arms battalion of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and

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Abrams tanks. Alone, for example, the Stryker cannot engage an enemy mechanized force in open terrain. As Coffman put it, "There are limitations with the Stryker, mainly on firepower and its standoff with our enemy, as well as protection to those individuals riding in the back, as it only defeats smaller caliber weapons."[27] Its weapon systems are overmatched in range and destructive power, and its armor does not protect it from an enemy infantry fighting vehicle such as a BMP with a 30 mm cannon. This is not to say that a Stryker cannot integrate with tanks or a heavy formation in a different way—it just cannot take the exact role used by a Bradley. Maneuvers across open terrain against mechanized enemy forces are not situations in which Strykers excel, whether augmented with tanks or not.

However, Strykers can be effective and lethal when used in ways that emphasize their natural strengths. NTC Rotation 16-06 offered several examples of these types of missions. Stryker units excel when the vehicles themselves are not needlessly exposed to enemy antitank fire, the infantry are brought to fight in restricted terrain where they can negate the advantage of enemy mechanized forces, and a high tempo is maintained. In every instance cited from that training exercise, care was taken to dismount infantry before the Stryker vehicles were in range of enemy antitank weapon systems. This prevented the vehicle, which holds a squad and a heavy machine gun, from being destroyed at long range. Once the infantry is in restricted terrain, Strykers can be moved forward to help suppress enemy positions with their heavy machine guns. This symbiotic relationship between the dismounted infantry and the Stryker characterizes all the success seen in training and in the use of the Stryker in offensive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The high tempo that a Stryker unit can maintain is also an advantage. Less refit is needed between operations compared to a heavy unit, and the infantry can rapidly be moved after a mission is received, as compared to light infantry. This high tempo allows Strykers to quickly exploit enemy weaknesses as they are encountered.

Finally, to see how the Stryker can fit into the Army at the strategic level, one need only look at its inception and the reason the system was created. The Stryker can effectively move a large body of infantry across a long distance, especially on road networks that would be damaged by armored forces. Strykers are also much more rapidly deployable than heavy brigades, allowing them to quickly respond to a crisis for which light infantry would be ill-suited. Had Strykers existed in Desert Shield in 1990, they would have been able to rapidly reposition around Saudi Arabia as needed. A light infantry unit simply does not have the transportation assets to do the same thing. As Coffman observed, "The biggest benefit that I see is the intratheater mobility; so quickly moving inside of the theater to reposition [units] of infantryman at the decisive point as required."[28] As seen in Iraq and at the NTC, a Stryker unit can quickly pack up and move across a wide geographical area with little to no logistical support. This enables it to bring infantry where they are needed or, as Coffman put it, "deliver fresh legs to the objective."[29] This is in contrast to a light infantry unit that requires significant external logistical support to move. And, even when augmented with cargo trucks, a light infantry unit still is not as capable as a Stryker unit. The Stryker provides protection against small arms fire and a robust communications suite, allowing soldiers to arrive at their objective safe and situationally aware. Alternatively, a heavy brigade can bring substantially more combat power to an objective as compared to a Stryker brigade, but this comes with the cost of a significantly larger maintenance and sustainment footprint. The fuel requirements of a heavy brigade dwarf those of a Stryker brigade. This can become even more pronounced if a unit is rapidly deployed, in which case a heavy brigade will be hamstrung while waiting on sustainment assets. A Stryker unit can far more quickly be repositioned both inter- and intratheater. Thus, the Stryker, when utilized properly, can fill a unique niche that places it between the traditional roles of the light infantry and the heavy armored force.

Conclusion

Going forward, it will be useful to see how Strykers operate as part of a true combined force. The Army has yet to conduct a full-scale division-sized training exercise pairing an Armored BCT with a Stryker BCT to test how both organizations can best use their strengths. Lanza noted that the idea has been surfaced at the highest levels: "One of the things we were discussing is: should we have a hybrid rotation?"[30] An exercise of this type would allow the Army to test theories about interoperability between the different types of brigades that have yet

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to be seen outside of war games and command post exercises. It might also finally resolve the role of the Stryker in combined arms maneuver, which has been, to this point, an open question.

There have been several debates in the military of late about whether the Stryker should be augmented with 30 mm cannon to be more like a Bradley fighting vehicle, or even if it should be scrapped entirely. Ultimately, though, if we were to deploy Stryker formations tomorrow for a major land conflict, it would be as they are currently equipped, and not as we might desire. The Stryker is a major part of the Army's infantry force, and as such, it is imperative that we as an Army know how to utilize it if we are called upon to do so.

This article has investigated the best ways in which to utilize the Stryker at the operational and tactical levels by looking at its original purpose and the way in which it has been utilized in recent training exercises. It is our conclusion that the Stryker can be an effective part of a fight against a near-peer adversary, but only if it is used in a way that plays to its strengths and avoids its weaknesses. The lessons learned from training exercises over the past three years offer a blueprint for updated Stryker doctrine to solidify the role of the Stryker on the mechanized battlefield. ■

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26. The "Arms Room" concept is a key principle that guides employment of Stryker formations. Essentially, it allows a commander to tailor a soldier's individual load to include only equipment needed for the current operation while storing the remainder of their supplies in the Stryker vehicle. In this manner, commanders can keep their soldiers' loads light while maintaining the ability to rapidly reequip and resupply their units for a follow-on mission as needed.

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U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to the 54th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade, and Italian army soldiers from the 8 Reggimento Genio Guastatori Brigata Paracadutisti Folgore assemble a medium girder bridge 13 February 2017 near Rovigo, Italy. The 173rd Airborne Brigade, based in Vicenza, Italy, is the U.S. Army contingency response force in Europe, capable of projecting forces to conduct the full range of military operations across the United States European, Central, and Africa Commands' areas of responsibility. (Photo by Graigg Faggionato, Training Support Activity Europe)

Enabling Brigade Combat Team Success in Europe

Lessons Learned

Lt. Col. Benjamin A. Bennett, PhD, U.S. Army

Russia's 2014 illegal occupation of Crimea, its invasion of eastern Ukraine, and its persistent provocations of its neighboring states suggest that it intends to permanently redefine national boundaries within Europe.[1] In response to this growing threat, the U.S. Army has dramatically increased its presence throughout the region.

As part of that increase, in the past two years, U.S. Army Europe has engaged in an aggressive exercise program designed to demonstrate American

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capability and deter further aggression, has established an enduring rotation of an armor brigade within Europe, and has permanently enhanced its presence in the Baltics and Poland.[2] These initiatives have significantly increased the likelihood that units not permanently assigned to Europe will gain exposure to the European operating environment.

Units generally deploy to Europe as part of a brigade combat team (BCT), and the engineer, intelligence, and signal capabilities of the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) are the backbone of a BCT's expeditionary capability. These assets provide the brigade the ability to locate and anticipate threat activity, increase survivability, provide mobility, and fix adversaries. They give the commander the ability to synchronize the effects on the battlefield and are critical to the success of any BCT operation. The lessons hereafter discussed are distilled from twenty-four months of repeated deployments across the European theater by the 54th BEB of the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), or IBCT (A). These ten lessons are offered as suggestions designed to increase the success of other BCTs operating within the region:

- Arrive with a plan to build readiness.
- Become a student of the Russian way of war.
- Prepare for decentralized operations.
- Develop an interoperability framework.
- Integrate strategic messaging into all activities.
- Be prepared to provide mission command for maneuver elements.
- Invest in route reconnaissance.
- Employ the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to build counter-UAV tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- Develop beyond-line-of-sight mission command expertise.
- Change the UAV paradigm.

Arrive with a Plan to Build Readiness

Europe provides unparalleled opportunities to build readiness and train leaders. During its two years of deployment experience, the 54th BEB engaged in live-fire exercises in Ukraine, Poland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Turkey, Italy, Slovenia, and France. As part of these exercises, the battalion conducted live airfield repair operations in France and Germany, detonated ordnance to create complex abatis countermobility obstacles using live trees in a forested environment, constructed fuel-oil demolition charges, employed antipersonnel obstacle breaching systems, and developed techniques for the Shadow UAV to observe and adjust fire from 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers. The battalion flew UAVs in the Baltics, Germany, Poland, and along Europe's southern flank. The 54th BEB also supported three *decisive action training environment* (DATE) rotations serving under various multinational headquarters, and it participated in an organic 173rd IBCT (A) DATE rotation at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany.

Many of the countries hosting training events with U.S. forces are aggressive in capitalizing on the opportunity and optimizing their time in this unique training environment. Additionally, many countries are unencumbered by the regulatory restrictions present in other training locations. Most partners will invest significant energy and the necessary resources to maximize training opportunities.

Arriving with a predetermined set of key training objectives and ensuring these objectives are integrated into the design of exercises during initial and mid-planning conferences will significantly increase the effectiveness of any training event. Importantly, units should leverage the subject-matter expertise located within 7th Army Training Command and JMRC during such planning. They are tremendous resources able to assist units in locating ranges and other training venues, provide external evaluation, assist in target development, and mitigate risk.

Lastly, there are twenty-four NATO centers

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of excellence located across Europe. These centers are nationally funded and accredited institutions that "train leaders, assist in doctrine development, identify lessons learned, improve interoperability, develop capabilities, and test and validate concepts through experimentation."[3] These centers vary in focus and include counter-improvised explosive devices in Spain, military engineering in Germany, command and control in the Netherlands, human intelligence in Romania, strategic communications in Latvia, cooperative cyber defense in Estonia, and the joint chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense located in the Czech Republic.[4] The opportunities to train leaders and build readiness in Europe are unparalleled and are often only limited by the creativity of those participating and a unit's tolerance for risk.

Become a Student of the Russian Way of War

The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) notes that "Russia has observed the American lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as their own from the 2008 invasion of Georgia, and applied these to the development of their own forces."[5] As a result, the Russian military has invested heavily in modernizing the technical capabilities of their force and the professionalism of their formation. According to the AWG, "This new [Russian] military barely resembles its former Soviet self and presents a near peer threat unlike any the U.S. military has faced in a generation."[6]

It is important to ensure leaders at all levels understand the implications of these investments. Notable advancements in Russian capabilities include their ability to employ a "sophisticated blend of unmanned aircraft systems, electronic warfare jamming equipment, and long range rocket artillery."[7] For example, as witnessed in eastern Ukraine, Russian forces have become adept at linking their UAV systems and indirect-fire capabilities. They developed and integrated over fifteen separate UAV designs and have demonstrated the ability to link UAV sensor information to multiple indirect-fire systems. As Phillip Karbler has observed, Russian forces "are able to identify a target complex, net multiple sensor inputs, and produce a mass strike with high-lethality area fires."[8] In many cases, this transmission from UAV sensor to firing element took place in as little as fifteen minutes and achieved devastating effects.

Dispersion, concealment, the ability to rapidly displace, and redundant mission-command systems are critical to survival in this environment. Any rotation to JMRC will replicate this environment and will afford units multiple opportunities to develop this expertise. Focusing leader professional development activities on Russian capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures will assist in ensuring leaders at all levels understand the implications of Russian advancements. *The Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook* produced by the AWG (available from the Center of Army Lessons Learned) and Karbler's "Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War" are good primers and are recommended as required reading prior to operating in this environment.[9]

Prepare for Decentralized Operations

No other battalion within the BCT will experience the same level of decentralized operations as the BEB. Wherever the BCT is employed, it is likely that elements within the BEB are present to provide support. On several occasions, the 54th BEB has deployed elements to seven different countries simultaneously. To effectively mitigate risk, a clear understanding of approved activities must be established at each echelon of command. Leaders at all levels must clearly understand what risks can be underwritten at what levels and who is responsible for approving specific activities. Clear reporting expectations and command-and-support relationships established prior to any training event, with a deliberate confirmation mechanism at each echelon of command, will significantly mitigate confusion.

Notable examples where misunderstanding can cause delay and potential conflict are with the execution of UAV and demolition operations. Both of these activities have risk mitigation elements that may not be readily identifiable by those not routinely responsible for their employment. A technique worthy of consideration is to route deliberate risk assessment worksheets through the supporting unit for acknowledgment prior to sending to the supported unit for final approval. This approach serves to ensure that those headquarters ultimately responsible for executing certain high-risk training events are able to capitalize on the resident subject-matter expertise within the supporting unit and ensure the activity is being conducted within acceptable margins of safety. This helps ensure that both the supporting elements and

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U.S. paratroopers assigned to the Company D, 54th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade, conduct preflight checks on an RQ7B Shadow tactical unmanned aircraft system (UAV) 20 October 2015 at Aeroclub Postonja in Slovenia during Exercise Rock Proof V. The author contends that the strict requirements for setting up this UAV before use make it especially vulnerable to indirect fire attack in the modern operational environment. (Photo by Paolo Bovo)

the supported maneuver units have a clear understanding of expectations so that misunderstandings are minimized and risk ownership is clearly defined.

Develop an Interoperability Framework

The vast majority of U.S. training conducted in Europe will involve the participation of at least one NATO ally, and often several. A key objective of any multinational training event is to increase interoperability among elements. Increased interoperability between allies and partners helps to assure access to contested environments, to deter conflicts, and to assist in maintaining security and stability; and it is a critical component of our national strategy.[10] Critical to this endeavor is developing a deliberate framework for identifying interoperability opportunities and achieving interoperability objectives. A deliberate approach provides intellectual focus, minimizes the likelihood of missed opportunities, and increases the probability of achieving tangible and measurable interoperability gains. This framework should leverage the expertise of allies and focus within a doctrinal construct.

NATO defines interoperability as having three dimensions: the procedural dimension, the human dimension, and the technical dimension. These apply to the strategic through tactical levels of warfare and describe three categories of interoperability challenges. The procedural dimension focuses on doctrine and procedures with the goal of standardizing execution between formations. The human dimension describes education, training, and cultural influences; and the technical dimension focuses on the interoperability of equipment.[11]

Units should capitalize on opportunities to build interoperability by learning from the other nations in Europe. There is a tremendous amount of resident expertise within NATO. For example, the French 11th Airborne Regiment conducted a real-world contested rapid runway repair operation in Mali in 2014, a skill of critical importance to U.S. airborne engineers. In another example, the Lithuanian army is extremely

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Engineers from 3rd Platoon, Bastion Company, 54th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade, and 1 Troop, 1 Field Squadron, 1 Canadian Combat Engineer Regiment, pose between abatis and crater obstacles they created with demolitions in Pabrade, Lithuania, during Exercise Iron Sword 2016. Eleven NATO countries participated in the exercise, held 20 November to 2 December 2016 in Rukla and Pabrade, Lithuania. Iron Sword exercises validate mission command systems and tactical capabilities at the battalion level through offensive and defensive operations. (Photo by 1st Lt. Sarah Melville, U.S. Army)

proficient at building countermobility obstacles utilizing timber materials prevalent throughout the Baltics (knowledge that will be critical in any defense of the Baltics scenario). Additionally, the Latvians possess significant expertise using high frequency (HF) communication systems, which are generally less susceptible to jamming. Identifying these areas of expertise and establishing training opportunities to absorb the knowledge of partner formations increases interoperability while also increasing the readiness and effectiveness of U.S. formations.

Integrate Strategic Messaging into All Activities

Strategic messaging is not the sole responsibility of a brigade public affairs office. It is the responsibility of leaders at every level and should be integrated into the organizational culture. As Gen. Philip Breedlove, former commander of U.S. European Command noted,

> Strategic communication is the most powerful tool European Command has to challenge Russian disinformation and propaganda. Russia overwhelms the information space with a barrage of lies that must be addressed by the United States aggressively in both public and private sectors to expose the false narratives pushed by Russian-owned media outlets and their proxies.[12]

Leaders should endeavor to incorporate strategic messaging into all activities, integrating relevant themes and messages of higher headquarters, and establishing systems to seize opportunities to highlight activities and capabilities.

Placing command emphasis on strategic messaging encourages leaders to become invested in this task. Leaders quickly realize that producing a two-page article on key training events and submitting it to the public affairs officer for clearance and dissemination is

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not an overly burdensome task. To expedite strategic messaging, one successful technique is to prepare the shell of an article prior to each key training event. Most elements of a training event can be prepared before the actual event including known elements, locations, and training focus. As the event unfolds relevant details, quotes, and pictures may be collected and integrated into the article with limited additional effort.

During its twenty-four months of deployment experience, the 54th BEB used this technique to provide over forty internally prepared strategic messaging articles and videos to the 173rd IBCT (A)'s public affairs team for dissemination. This technique assists in meeting timeliness and relevance requirements established by most publication venues.

Strategic messaging became an adjunct activity to development of written communications as a professional skill set for leaders. Written communication is an integral component of the battalion's leader development program. In the 54th BEB, a policy was implemented that each day the battalion staff duty officer would submit a one-page current event paper on the topic of their choosing to discuss with the battalion commander prior to each morning's physical training. Not only did this serve as an informal counseling venue, it also conditioned the officers to practice, improve, and build confidence in their written communication skills. Article publication was also established as a recovery task following key training events.

In our battalion experience, once leaders overcame the intimidation of publishing their first article, they would sustain the initiative with limited prompting from the chain of command. Incorporating strategic messaging became second nature and self-sustaining. These efforts contributed to U.S. Army Europe's initiative to make thirty thousand soldiers look like three hundred thousand.

Be Prepared to Provide Mission Command for Maneuver Elements

Maneuver brigade commanders should expect their engineer battalion leadership to possess the requisite expertise to employ maneuver capabilities. Depending on the BCT's exercise commitments, BEBs may be tasked to provide mission command for maneuver elements. Such opportunities serve as a vehicle to expand the BCT's operational reach and should be embraced by BEB headquarters.

In the last two years, the 173rd IBCT (A) has employed its BEB as a maneuver headquarters on two separate occasions in support of major U.S. European Command and NATO exercise requirements. On both of these occasions, the BEB employed an organic sapper company as a maneuver element and received augmentation from multinational infantry elements. During Immediate Response 15 in Croatia and Slovenia, the battalion employed one rifle company from Croatia and one from Slovenia, and during Trident Juncture 15 in Spain, the battalion employed a reconnaissance troop and two Spanish motorized rifle companies against a British-led multinational armored brigade.

There is no better opportunity to train leaders within an enabler-focused headquarters on the intricacies associated with supporting maneuver than to make them responsible for their employment. Prior to assuming this mission, the BEB staff needs to conduct a detailed mission analysis of the organic capability shortfalls associated with performing this mission and request augmentation from the BCT staff. These shortfalls are primarily located within the fires and mission command warfighting functions.

Invest in Route Reconnaissance

Essential to an early victory against a Russian threat will be the speed at which forces can assemble in their designated defensive positions. Decisive to the speed of assembly is a clear understanding of the trafficability and obstacles along designated routes. One way to obtain this clarity, and to achieve freedom of maneuver, is to have current and accurate route information. Engineers play a critical role in the collection and analysis of route reconnaissance data and this activity should be incorporated into routine travel across Europe.

The Automated Route Reconnaissance Kit (ARRK) is an extremely useful tool and will save time and add precision and accuracy to these endeavors.[13] The ARRK provides geo-referenced engineer trafficability information that can be integrated with a BCT's mission command systems. Additionally, by using the included camera, video imaging can be taken of bridges and sent to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Operations Center for precise calculation of the military load class, greatly saving the time required to determine this critical route variable.

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Although not a modified table of organization and equipment item, ARRK systems can be obtained through the Engineer Research and Development Center of the Corps of Engineers at Vicksburg, Mississippi. At no cost to the unit, the 54th BEB was able to obtain four ARRK systems (one per sapper element) and receive a week-long home station train-the-trainer block of instruction. This system has been employed throughout the Baltics and continues to be integrated into mission planning.

Employ the UAV to Build Counter-UAV Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

A technique to improve a unit's dispersion, concealment, and other counter-UAV tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) is to employ the Shadow UAV in a manner that allows friendly units to see themselves. Opportunity for friendly forces to observe how their forces appear through the lens of a UAV provides an excellent opportunity for organic and multinational partners to experiment, refine, and ultimately perfect their counter-UAV tactics. This approach also provides UAV operators and intelligence personnel opportunities to seek out targets while building flight currency, which ultimately improves detection capabilities.

Slovenia, Poland, Germany, and the Baltic states each provide UAV flight locations within range of established maneuver training areas. Synchronizing UAV operations with concurrent maneuver training, ensuring that footage is available to ground units for viewing, and including counter-UAV TTPs as a deliberate part of the after action review process will significantly improve a formation's counter-UAV effectiveness.

Develop Beyond-Line-of-Sight Mission Command Expertise

In his remarks during the 2016 Association of the United States Army Convention, Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark Milley described an environment where Army units may be forced to operate in noncontiguous battle space and face adversaries with significant cyber and communication denial capabilities.[14] In such an environment, units must have redundant mission command systems and develop communication protocols that reduce the effectiveness of threat interference as "Russia has invested heavily in electronic warfare systems which are capable of shutting down communications and signals across a broad spectrum."[15]

Employment of HF radio technology at the brigade level is one way to help mitigate this threat and increase effectiveness across extended areas of operation. HF systems offer a redundancy to satellite communication (SATCOM) systems, are more difficult to jam, and increase interoperability among several NATO allies.

Unfortunately, there are a finite amount of SATCOM networks available to support all of the Department of Defense. As the number of units increases, so does the demand for this limited resource. It is easy to envision a scenario where the demand for SATCOM reaches a threshold where a BCT is only allocated one or two SATCOM networks. If units are dispersed beyond the operating range of retransmission frequency modulation (FM) systems, and opposing threat cyber capabilities successfully disrupt warfighter information network-tactical systems, units will be severely limited in their ability to communicate. Developing a robust HF capability within a BCT can help mitigate this likelihood.

In anticipation of these communications limitations and threats, the 173rd is aggressively developing a communication model that emphasizes FM for company-to-battalion communications and HF for battalion-to-BCT communication. This approach increases redundancy of beyond-line-of-site systems, decreases demand on SATCOM, and reduces the combat power required to secure valuable FM retransmission sites. Additionally, the ability to communicate with NATO allies (which may be operating as adjacent or integrated units) is increased as many allies are proficient in HF communication.

Change the UAV Paradigm

The advancements in Russian indirect-fire capabilities render the TTPs used for Shadow UAV operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ineffective. Establishing the entire Shadow launch and recovery system on a developed airfield and leaving it in place for the duration of an entire multi-hour Shadow mission will ensure its detection and destruction by reconnaissance and indirect-fire systems. To increase survivability in this environment, UAV platoons must adopt an artillery mentality of "fire and rapidly displace" focused on minimizing exposure, particularly during the launch and recovery phase of a UAV mission. This requires organizations to understand the difference between risk mitigation during peacetime and during

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combat, how to identify minimum equipment requirements, and how to develop surrogate equipment sets to train displacement techniques.

Currently, Army regulation requires that the full launch and recovery systems be in place during flight operations so if an aircraft develops an in-flight emergency it can immediately recover to an established landing site.[16] This requirement reduces the possibility that an operator will have to activate the recovery parachute (which causes extensive airframe damage) to recover the aircraft during an emergency.

While such measures reduce the risk to equipment in a permissive environment, this regulation does not adequately address risk against a near-peer threat in a combat environment. The conservative approach employed in a permissive environment that is engrained into UAV operators at present does not adequately account for the commander's role in the risk mitigation process necessary for a nonpermissive environment. Commanders are responsible for weighing risk and should have the authority in combat to evaluate the risk of damaging an airframe due to an in-flight emergency weighed against minimizing the likelihood of the entire equipment set and UAV platoon being detected and annihilated by enemy artillery. To minimize this combat risk, a commander should have the prerogative of electing to minimize the platoon's time exposed and signature by not having the landing site established during a multi-hour flight.

To train this technique, leaders need to have a thorough understanding of what is required for peacetime operations and the minimum equipment necessary to physically launch, sustain the flight of, and recover the Shadow. Separating a Shadow flight into these three distinct phases and identifying minimum equipment packages necessary to engage in these activities will allow formations to develop methods to reduce signature during each phase.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army is heavily invested in maintaining stability within Europe through the permanent presence of rotational forces and an extremely aggressive exercise program. These initiatives will assist in deterring aggression through the demonstration of the extreme lethality of U.S. Army BCTs. The unique capabilities located within the BEB are a decisive component of this lethality. The increased opportunities to capitalize on training in Europe—tailored to the European operating environment—will ensure that Army BCTs continue their demonstrated ability to impose their will on adversaries, provide options for decision makers, and, alongside NATO, contribute to the defense of Europe. ■

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One of the growing trends cited by a 2017 National Intelligence Council report is the increased urbanization of the global population.[1] In an attempt to prepare the force for this future operating environment, the U.S. Army leadership is shifting its focus to improving capabilities to operate in urban settings. With one eye on the future, it would be smart to keep the other on the recent coalition-backed effort to liberate Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, which serves as a valuable window into the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of modern urban warfare. While the Islamic State (IS) may not be the prototypical foe Army leaders expect to fight in the future, this jihadist group's dogged defense of the city features many tactics that may be copied well into the future by other adversaries.

Of the many innovations observed during the Mosul campaign, an important one to highlight is IS's industrial production and utilization of suicide bombers. For context, in 2016, the group employed over one thousand bombers in three countries.[2] Through experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. Army soldiers and leaders have become quite familiar with the dangers of suicide bombing and have developed effective techniques to defend against this tactic over time. Yet, like most tactics, adversary use of suicide bombings has continued to evolve rapidly in the battlefield proving grounds of Syria and Iraq.

With the convergence of global urbanization trends and outbreaks of urban conflict, the increased use of suicide bombers in largely conventional fights to liberate Iraqi and Syrian cities provides a valuable case study for examining the basic evolution of whom executes IS suicide bombings, IS targeting methodology, and the diverse supply chain that sustains such a prolific bombing campaign.

Past as Prologue

IS's use of suicide bombers dates back to its very first campaign in the summer of 2003, when it was known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's group, or Tawhid wal-Jihad.[3] One operation featured Zarqawi's own father-in-law, Yassin Jarad, who detonated a truck full of explosives in a crowd near the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, Iraq, killing Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim, the leader of the largest Shiite political party, along with scores of others.[4] Jarad was a foreign national from Jordan who had been with Zarqawi since Afghanistan. Like Jarad, many of the early suicide bombers of the IS movement (known as al-Qaida in Iraq [AQI] after 2004, and the Islamic State of Iraq after 2006) were also foreign to Iraq; however, most had not been with the group very long. Researchers from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point used captured personnel records of the movement from 2006 to show that the majority (56 percent) of foreign fighters entering Iraq volunteered to conduct suicide operations, compared to those who chose instead to be traditional fighters.[5]

Foreigners were not the only ones executing suicide operations in Iraq from 2003 to 2006. But, since the majority of the attackers were unnamed, it is difficult to determine the actual breakdown by nationality.[6] According to a 2005 *Time* magazine interview of a prospective bomber from Fallujah, Iraqi suicide bombers were coming into their own that year, so much so that Zarqawi created a new AQI brigade to manage these volunteers.[7] The group recruited heavily among Iraqis during this period and eventually became dominated by former members of ideologically similar Iraqi insurgent groups.[8]

Research into the types of targets indicates that AQI (and its later designations) consistently targeted Iraqi security forces and civilians over coalition units and bases.[9] While individual foreign fighters and even local Iraqis volunteered to strike out at the occupation, Zarqawi and his successors carefully re-vectored these "smart bombs" toward more strategically impactful targets—namely, the Iraqi security forces who would be in place after coalition forces eventually left.[10] The movement used truck bombs 70 percent of the time in an effort to maximize casualties and damage, particularly against hardened targets, and most of the attacks (52 percent through 2006) occurred in Baghdad.[11] The strategic logic of weakening

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indigenous forces first worked very well for the group, until the coalition and its new Sunni tribal partners (formerly anticoalition insurgents themselves) defeated the Islamic State of Iraq in 2007–2008.[12]

The initial military defeat influenced IS to make several adjustments to its tactic of suicide bombing. Without a sympathetic population to safely harbor the foreign fighters who made up the majority of the early suicide bomber candidates, the IS movement struggled to sustain a consistent campaign. One thirty-eight page after-action review written by a jihadist commander points out the difficulties of operating in Anbar Province after 2007, especially with foreigners subject to easy identification by hostile local citizens.[13] This realization has been a major impetus for IS to control and administer territory as a de facto government, which allows it to secure both the important aspects of its state-building project and control the immigrants and locals who are actively involved in expanding the influence of its ideology.

In the interim period between the comprehensive defeat of IS in 2008 and its return to significance in 2013, the group heavily relied on suicide bombing as a tactic to prove its relevance to supporters and prospective recruits alike. Eschewing foreign fighters, the group relied on locals to perform a less frequent, but still significant, campaign of suicide bombings against important Sunni tribal leaders allied with the government as well as against key government ministries in the capital.[14]

The added focus on Sunni targets, in addition to Iraqi security forces and Shia pilgrims, should come as no surprise for a group whose long-term strategy is probably best described by the aptly titled *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass*, which was written by a non-group member yet acknowledged by the group as largely accurate.[15] Since the summer of 2003, insurgents targeted Iraqis with suicide bombings almost 83 percent of the time, and these attacks caused 19 percent of all Iraqi civilian casualties by 2010.[16] In 2010 there were more than seventy-five suicide bombings in Iraq; while down from 353 in 2007, only Afghanistan had more that year.[17]

A Modern Caliphate of Questionable Methodology

There are many factors that facilitated the return of IS. However, among such factors, the disintegration of Syria has been an especially significant one. Foreign fighters, inspired by the increasingly sectarian tones of the Syrian civil war and fueled by the perception of massive Sunni persecution by the Assad regime, began to arrive again in Syria in large numbers, facilitated once again by the creation of a hospitable location to shelter fighters. Although suicide bombings began to increase dramatically in both Syria and Iraq again, there were indications that by 2014 the majority of foreign fighters intended to work or live in the caliphate, or even fight on the front lines, and were not interested in conducting suicide operations. A 2016 analysis of IS captured records found that in contrast with the 2006 time period, only 11 percent of immigrants volunteered for suicide operations of any kind.[18]

This dynamic, whatever the cause, is reflected in who volunteers for suicide bombings and how IS directs them in its operational planning. Researcher Charlie Winter analyzed one year's worth (late 2015 to late 2016) of suicide bombings (923) and concluded that these attacks were "primarily perpetrated by *local* operatives against *military* targets ... a tactical shift with strategic implications that will change the insurgent and terrorist landscape for years to come."[19]

According to the analysis, 76 percent of all suicide operations took place in Iraq as part of a coordinated counterattack against the effort to liberate major cities, with a surge capability of fifty-eight suicide bombings in one week alone during the Mosul campaign.[20] In contrast, this corresponds closely to the highest *monthly* total (in early 2007) during the coalition surge campaign.[21] Examining the entire population of IS suicide bombings, 70 percent were truck or up-armored vehicle bombs, and foreigners perpetrated just 20 percent of all attacks.[22] Military targets were hit 84 percent of the time, and these were often part of a larger series, or were a wave of bombings in limited offensive operations (Ramadi, 2015) or counterattacks in urban areas (Mosul, 2016–2017).[23]

Therefore, the analysis indicated a significant change in the tactics and operational execution of suicide operations from previous practices. The key factor resulting in the change was a new emphasis on IS seeking to control territory for significant periods of time.

To peel back further some of the factors behind this evolution, we looked deeper into human aspects of recruiting and managing suicide bombers, as well

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Islamic State (IS) militants used drones, such as the one shown in this IS-released photo, with limited success, to attack civilians in Mosul during the battle for that city in 2017. An 18 February 2017 drone attack on the popular market Hay al-Intsar killed three and wounded ten civilians. The authors of this article suggest that drones may gradually replace suicide bombers as weapons of terror as global jihadist forces gain experience and increase their sophistication in drone use. (Photo courtesy of Iraqi News)

as the logistics of sustaining this industrial capacity of launching human bombs.

The Harvesting of Human Bombs

As of 2016, IS draws from two categories of suicide operators: volunteers and impressed fighters, and civilians. The majority are volunteers and feature prominently in most propaganda videos—delivering farewell speeches and then driving off in their up-armored vehicle fitted out with a large improvised explosive device. Later in these videos, an explosion is shown, accompanied with promises of future victory due to the operators' sacrifice. In the early days of the IS movement, volunteers were strictly segregated from the regular fighters, and their interaction limited to serving as a logistical supply item—often matched with the vehicle carrying the improvised explosive device minutes before their final act. In contrast, today's volunteers are often experienced fighters familiar with the organizational values of IS and are willing to sacrifice for its collective goals.[24]

While IS has thoughtfully avoided using experienced fighters in the past, the establishment of the caliphate and the intervention of countries such as France and the United States are part of a high-risk strategy that now requires maximum sacrifice. As such, the group has invested in building up the skills of its welders and mechanics in order to up-armor civilian vehicles now that its supply of captured military vehicles is low. Originally making vehicles that looked like something out of the *Mad Max* series, IS designers now produce vehicles that are subtly armored or disguised in order to minimize detection between launch and detonation in order to maximize effects on the target.[25]

The strategic impact of large suicide campaigns has in the past been reliant upon the human element—both operators and leaders—as well as equipment. The correlation of manpower to equipment means that the better equipment used, the less qualified the operator may be and vice versa. On one hand, the group's objective is to increase the

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As demonstrated in this December 2016 photo, armor added to a vehicle is camouflaged by painting it the same color as the rest of vehide. This was the first stage of a three-stage Islamic State process to prepare vehicles for use as suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices against Iraqi forces in Eastern Mosul, Iraq. (Photo by Hugo Kaaman)

quality of suicide bombers and equipment used for the missions. On the other, since human operators for suicide missions are a finite resource, the group needs to try to increase the use of expendable members for this mission and limit the sacrifice of more valuable members. This leads to the question, how can IS achieve these goals?

A Unique Human Resource Management Problem

A reliance on qualified, dedicated volunteers for such a prolific campaign is going to be a limiting factor in an industrial suicide bombing campaign regardless of the efficacy of any local IS recruiting efforts. This problem has been compounded by the coalition's reduction of IS's border access from Turkey, which squeezed the flow of foreign fighters into the so-called caliphate. While the control of territory has been the key driver of IS end strength, IS has been reluctant to tap into the pool of dedicated local fighters because they are needed to fight the multi-front war that IS has instigated against all of its neighbors, as well as against interventionists. IS, therefore, has had a strong motive to modify its suicide-bomber human resourcing policies.

An interview with a former IS fighter established that IS commanders in the Mosul campaign preferred dedicated, but low-ranking, members with no special skills for suicide bomber employment. However, once the tempo and pace of the Mosul battle accelerated, the group began to use more coercive means to produce operators for its suicide machinery. One pool of candidates IS mined was their internally disciplined and subsequently incarcerated fighters. It seems logical that by sending a person who is a liability or continually fails to adhere to in-group values, the group is killing two birds with one stone by utilizing the problem fighters in a suicide mission. Accordingly, when IS fighters were convicted of a serious crime, some were allegedly given two

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options: execution or the opportunity to "volunteer" for a suicide mission with the potential for achieving spiritual redemption and possibly even lasting worldly fame in a martyrdom video. According to the defector mentioned above, the majority of people in this position chose the suicide mission, either out of a desire to repent and help the group, or because they saw in such an assignment the slim possibility for escape.[26]

One theoretical problem with using reluctant suicide bombers is that they would require more supervision and probably be less successful than true volunteers. In this case, this type of shirking would waste valuable organizational resources; this is a particular concern when using local fighters who could easily escape during a mission and then hide amongst families or tribes. More importantly, according to one Iraqi legal authority we spoke to, these fighters realize that if they surrender to Iraqi authorities, according to the law, they can receive shorter prison sentences if they are low-level members or have been forced to join IS. There is also the possibility that due to the extensive corruption within the legal system, they will be able to buy their way out of prison after they are sentenced.[27]

An example of this dynamic happened in October 2016, when an Iraqi woman working within the IS religious police—the *hisbah*—was involuntarily sent to infiltrate enemy lines near Hawija while wearing an explosive belt. According to Iraqi soldiers who witnessed the incident, the woman threw away her belt prior to reaching her target and tried to blend in with the civilians. As a member of the hisbah working among the population of Mosul in a policing role, she was well-known to some of the civilians who then notified the soldiers at the checkpoint, leading to her arrest.[28]

All of these factors make forced, local suicide bombers much less effective than foreigners. Foreign fighters believe they have no other option than to execute the mission, making them much more effective and trusted bombers. Were these bombers to surrender, they would likely receive capital punishment, and because they would be killed either way, they perceive it as better to execute the mission so their deaths are not in vain. In contrast, Iraqi militants mostly throw away their explosive belts and try to melt away, but I have never seen a story about foreign fighter doing the same. They usually blow themselves up," said Mudhhar Hamad, an officer from Hashd al-Ashayari, the Arab Sunni militia in Hawija.[29]

In addition to normal recruiting from the ranks, IS's control of territory produced a large pool of local civilians to solicit, or if necessary, coerce into conducting suicide operations. These were people, possibly women and children, who could blend in with refugees and internally displaced persons to get deep inside enemy territory. Although these proved to be very effective bombers in many cases, IS's utilization of civilians does have some limitations. Though similar to the problem of using forced group members, using coerced civilians leads to a higher risk of mission failure due to a lack of discipline, training, and experience. As locals, they have the opportunity to abandon their missions and run away, with low chances of IS prosecution if caught. So how does IS ensure these suicide candidates complete their missions? They sometimes do so by using unorthodox methods such as drugging the operators, which prevents them from thinking and compels them to lose whatever aversion they might have to executing the mission.

In the fall of 2016, a sixteen-year-old boy was found asleep wearing a suicide belt near Hawija. The boy stated that an IS leader gave him an energy pill to help him resist hunger and thirst on the mission, but instead, it incapacitated him. According to his Iraqi captors, he was discovered and jailed, and then woke up some time later with little knowledge of what happened.[30]

Equipment

Since the group's growing manpower issues are a limiting factor on sustaining the intensity of its suicide bombing campaign, IS has sought to compensate by increasing the quality of equipment used to increase chances of mission success. The urban environment in Mosul also required some serious adjustments to earlier IS campaigns post-2014. It was no longer enough to take a civilian sedan, load it with explosives, marry it up with a driver, and then drive it to a target. Several problems emerged with this scenario. IS found that unimproved cars could not reach their intended targets due to bad roads, roadblocks, and targeting by a much more aware Iraqi security force who developed better counters to suicide car and truck bombs. Since such failures are extremely costly for an armed group, the group adapted.

First, they gravitated toward four-wheel-drive cars instead of sedans, as such cars are more likely to navigate the obstacles in the urban combat environment. Second,

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they continued their use of improvised armor to keep them from being easily neutralized by a counterterrorism force. Armor was typically added to the front of the car (with a window left to see) in order to deflect incoming direct fire. Metal plates were are also typically added to the wheel wells to protect them from incoming rounds. However, in an effort to camouflage the improvements, IS used paint and other visual modifications to make these cars look normal, especially from the air. Third, the group worked on individual modifications for vehicles to enable disabled fighters to operate the vehicles against incoming fire until reaching the designated targets.[31] In the end, IS control of territory facilitated the development of an in-house capability for these modifications, which were completed close enough to the front lines to allow unfettered employment of these vehicles.

The Future of the Suicide Mission

As is common with extended periods of combat, the speed with which tactics adapt is dependent on the quality of forces, amount of experience, and prevailing culture of innovation that allows the development of effective counters. Regarding the tactic of using suicide bombers in urban combat, IS made an extensive effort to adapt its tactics to achieve some operational results that matched its tremendous investment of human resources and capital. While at first suicide vehicles were effective in both rural and urban settings, the increase in surveillance techniques caused overt suicide vehicles to lose their effectiveness in rural areas due to the greater possibilities of aerial detection. Subsequently, IS was compelled to limit suicide operations to within a very short range due to the high risk of early detection.

Because the main goal was to reduce the number of operator casualties while increasing the success of missions, IS experimented with automation to eventually remove humans from suicide missions. One example of such attempted transformation was the increased use of remotely operated and weaponized drones.

Currently, in those areas remaining under IS control, the use of such drones has not been effective enough to replace the tactic of suicide bombers completely, but the use of remotely piloted drones as bombs could become the dominant reality in a very short period of time. Several problems currently inhibit use of this relatively new weapon. First, there is a current shortage of drones for them to be used in a disposable manner. Drones have been used to drop small amounts of explosives and return to base, but drones are mainly prioritized for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes. Second, the drones do not yet have the capability to carry the same amount of explosives as cars. Once IS or other armed groups are able to overcome these limitations, we could expect to see drones employed as guided missiles that can directly hit an important target, such as a high-ranking commander, with a substantial amount of killing power.

Conclusion

For those charged with thinking about adaptations for future warfare, the battle of Mosul is an excellent opportunity to catch glimpses of the emerging character of future urban combat. A dominant feature of the fight for Mosul was the use of suicide bombers. However, use of suicide bombers has always been an asymmetric response to one side's lack of precision weapons in modern warfare, and once a suitable replacement is developed, we can expect traditional human suicide bombing to recede as an effective tool—despite its serving as a signaling function for the ideology of a cause by demonstrating the determination and sacrifice by select fighters. Instead, the development of large and capable suicidal drones needs to be considered as the next probable successor to suicide bombing and an indication of the increased lethality of the battlefield resulting from applications of new, cheap, and available technologies. ■

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Current U.S. standard operating procedures for logistical-support units frequently result in geographic concentrations of command-and-control and support elements, demonstrated in this June 2017 photo from the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany. This TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures) presents extremely vulnerable targets for enemy artillery using massing and targeting techniques known to be employed by the Russian armed forces. During force-on-force training in which the authors of this article participated at the JMRC, the opposing force routinely gave high priority to targeting logistical support units during the opening stages of each exercise, resulting in a dramatic degradation of the maneuver brigade's operational reach due to a devastating loss of logistical support capability. (Photo courtesy of Vyper Team, Joint Multinational Readiness Center)

Logistical Operations in Highly Lethal Environments

Capt. Jerad Hoffmann, U.S. Army
Capt. Paul Holoye, U.S. Army

A major shock to leaders throughout NATO has been the reemergence of the potential for massed enemy fires not seen since the Eastern Front of World War II, foreshadowing the devastation that could be inflicted on organizations by enemies focused on efficiency of massed fires in the event of large-scale war. Similarly, strategic threats stemming from the proliferation of new and sophisticated conventional capabilities are emerging around the world that are designed to exploit U.S. Army weaknesses. As a result, the U.S. Army is currently having to reinvent itself to fight near-peer

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enemy forces once again, something it has not had to seriously contemplate for several decades.[1] Addressing the emerging security threats, Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chief of staff of the Army, has stated that "a future conflict is going to be highly lethal, very highly lethal. Unlike anything our Army has experienced since WWII."[2] In such an environment, leaders must develop their units to be flexible enough to fight a near peer in the offense and in the defense, and then seamlessly shift into stability operations as stated in Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations*.[3]

At the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), situated in the Oberpfalz region of Bavaria, Germany, the permanently assigned observer coach/trainer (OCT) teams regularly observe brigade support battalions struggle when confronted with Russian techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs). This lack of familiarity and detailed knowledge stems from an almost exclusive focus on training for counterinsurgency (COIN) threats over the last fifteen years. It has resulted in the atrophy of conventional combat skills, which were once second nature to U.S. forces assigned to Europe during the Cold War. COIN threats, for the most part, do not involve fighting under contested airspace, struggling for control over theater support areas, vying for domination in the cyber battle against sophisticated enemy electronic capabilities, or dealing with the effects of overwhelming massed fires. Therefore, training priorities did not emphasize cover, concealment, dispersion, and operating without emitting a signal. As a result, proficiency in these and other related conventional warfighting skills were not exercised at the lowest levels and have thus been largely lost.

This loss of conventional skills means that, without a significant reemphasis on survivability training, logistics units risk being destroyed rapidly in the event of a large-scale conventional war. This ultimately results in significant degradation to operational reach and maneuver tempo for the entire force. Therefore, the number one priority for logistics units preparing for a highly lethal conventional-force environment is survival. To achieve that end, the following are recommendations for how to adjust logistical-unit training for expeditionary operations in terms of a mindset reorientation and training adjustment in order to develop new TTPs.

The Russian Fires Threat


The quality of Russian artillery has been a source of Russian national pride since Peter the Great. One result is that historically, Russia had world-class artillerymen.[4] Keeping with that legacy, in the current Russian military culture, field artillery is not just the "King of Battle." It is called *bog voiny*, or "God of War."[5]

In U.S. doctrine, fires elements support the maneuver elements. In the Russian military, the opposite is true. Russian armored formations seize ground in order for fires to move into effective firing positions and engage with overwhelming fire superiority. To meet the forecast requirements for modern warfare, the Russians have also modernized their artillery platforms to have ranges greater than fifty kilometers. These exceptional platforms, together with Russian employment strategies, were extremely effective during the Ukrainian conflict. Russian armed forces have proven unflinching, willing, and adept

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During Saber Junction 17, a training exercise conducted at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, a maneuver battalion had three nodes attacked simultaneously: a company command post (Co CP), the battalion tactical command post (BN TAC), and a company trains command post (CTCP) collocated with the unit maintenance control point (UMCP). The red lines depict the flight path of opposing force (OPFOR) tube artillery fire missions. Two OPFOR fire missions were used for each location; the circles show the areas affected. The fire missions brought chaos to the battalion for hours as all three nodes were forced to treat and evacuate casualties and find new locations from which to conduct operations. These missions crippled the supply chain of a maneuver battalion and shifted sustainment priorities for the brigade support battalion. Six accurate fire missions caused ripples throughout the brigade and degraded its operational reach for hours. (Photo courtesy of JMRC)

at massing their fires to destroy everything inside a one square kilometer. The old Soviet army had five distinct methods of fire, and it is reasonable to assume that the Russian army maintains a doctrine that is very similar:

- During *rapid fire*, each crew begins to fire at their own pace without sacrificing accuracy or exceeding the tube's capability.
- In *systematic fire*, each tube is fired in unison at set intervals to achieve desired effects. This is most often used when coordinating with a forward observer.
- *Counterbattery fire* is the suppression or destruction of enemy batteries. This is considered the most important mission for an artillery unit because this is the preferable way of gaining fire superiority over an enemy.
- *Maneuver by fire* is the use of fires with maneuver elements. This can be used in conjunction with offensive and defensive operations. Within each maneuver operation, there are special artillery tactics as well.
- In the last method, *fire with direct aiming*, an artillery unit acts as both forward observer and firing battery.[6]

As a consequence of the increased range of Russian artillery and Russia's application of well-honed methods of fires delivery, U.S. brigade support battalions are now increasingly susceptible to enemy fires.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Threat

Additionally, since the 2008 Georgian campaign, Russia has been developing its unmanned aerial system (UAS) program to identify targets. Russia has both military and over-the-counter commercial-grade drones that will layer degrees of coverage over an area of interest and relay target information between drones to a stationary ground force. Ukrainian units reported that once their unit locations were identified, they had five to fifteen minutes before accurate Russian fires hit their positions.[7] Russian forces now have demonstrated a unique

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A Russian self-propelled howitzer fires a 152 mm shell toward a Georgian position 9 August 2008 outside the South-Ossetian settlement of Dzhava, Georgia. (Photo by Denis Sinyakov, Reuters)

ability to leverage unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in a way that we have never encountered before in a near-peer adversary. This is potentially devastating to support units, and here is why.

The current prevailing mindset of logistics leaders that rotate into JMRC is to collocate battalion field trains command posts (FTCP) within the brigade support area (BSA). This is done in an effort to gain a more accurate overall brigade logistic common operating picture. However, the concentration of field trains in a confined place creates a large unit footprint that is easily observed by enemy UAVs. This makes such concentrations of units immediately subject to fires before they can react.

As a consequence, the BSA has been identified in every fiscal year 2017 exercise within twenty-four hours from the start of the rotation. Once targeted by the opposing forces, the degradation to the brigade's operation reach is devastating due to all of the FTCPs' proximity to the BSA. The lesson learned is that when an enemy has the demonstrated proclivity and capability to mass effective, long-range artillery against rear areas, logistical units need to spread out and increase their mobility in order to survive. This type of survival requires disciplined companies executing clearly understood standard operating procedures (SOPs) in order to be effective. Survivability must be taken into account when developing the brigade's concept of support for an operation when fighting a near peer.

The most essential lesson learned is that establishing the large logistics footprints that U.S. formations are accustomed to is no longer possible in the type of threat environment that is emerging.

The Need for a Dispersion Oriented Mentality

Gen. Mark A. Milley stated, "To avoid being detected and targeted by precision weapons, soldiers must split into small units and keep either on the move or under cover. Static bases will be sitting ducks."[8] Pursuant to this guidance, the U.S. Army must create a mentality that embraces dispersion. Despite the need to adjust TTPs to be ready for recent innovations in UAS detection capabilities, logistics units have not been exercising or standardizing detection mitigation practices

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Sgt. 1st. Class Victor Figueroa helps conceal the 13th Expeditionary Sustainment Command's support operations tent 26 October 2016 during a command post exercise forward on North Fort Hood, Texas. Such exercises are intended to train support headquarters elements to deploy to an immature theater in an austere environment during a decisive action scenario. However, the authors of this article assert that the size, weight, complexity, and large electronic "footprint" of such command posts have made them extremely vulnerable to attack because they are too slow to establish, too easy to identify from aerial reconnaissance, and too slow to relocate when threatened. (Photo by Capt. William Brink, U.S. Army)

during JMRC training rotations. One method units can begin to employ is arraying platoon and company locations into base clusters.

Base clusters make it more difficult for enemy UASs and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to identify unit locations. If a logistical unit is discovered and targeted by enemy fires, cluster formations will mitigate total destruction of personnel and commodities.

After detection, units only have minutes to displace their formations before enemy fires strike. A large concentration of logistical headquarters elements can take hours to move, even if displacement criteria is rehearsed. In contrast, displacing one company is easier than an entire brigade-support network concentration. Also, the chances of enemy positive identification on an entire logistical footprint is reduced.

Base Cluster Preparation and Mission Analysis

It is critical that commanders and staff members execute mission analysis prior to combat operations to determine what is realistic in terms of formation size, how to implement dispersed formations, and how to prepare for multiple relocations that may have to be carried out on short notice. The analyses must identify key terrain features, the infrastructure network, and the support requirements (given the limits of article-length analysis, only terrain is covered in-depth in this article). Units that practice base clusters should develop SOPs that are unique to their organization and enable leaders at the lowest level to practice disciplined initiative. They should include SOPs for

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The U.S. Army demonstrates a new command post wireless solution that provides Wi-Fi to the command post leveraging Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 1 satellite equipment in May 2015 during Network Integration Evaluation 15.2 on Fort Bliss, Texas. Implementation of Wi-Fi offers the potential of eliminating the need to lay complex wire systems, which would simplify and facilitate speedier displacement of a command post element. (Photo by Amy Walker, Program Executive Office Command, Control and Communications-Tactical)

preplanned communication windows, isolated personnel procedures, and displacement criteria.

One Key Recurring Planning Deficiency

At JMRC, units are not leveraging terrain to their full advantage. Base clusters require terrain features between each element. For example, the distribution company could be near an intersection while the medical company is separated by a nearby ridge. Logistical units need to strive to stay out of open areas and use cover and concealment as much as possible. Additionally, the maintenance company does not need to be near the distribution company and the intersection. The maintenance company can be completely concealed in a wood line. Such effective use of natural conditions minimizes the resources and the time devoted to camouflage and concealment.[9]

Planning and executing base clusters is difficult, but it is essential to help ensure survival. Therefore, commanders need to prioritize survivability training built around the cluster concept and visualize what requirements will be needed. Experience will come with time. The hardest part will be taking the first step and training this concept at home station.

Training Needs for Survivability TTPs

The Asymmetric Warfare Group recently stated that "all combat support units within range of IDF [indirect fire] systems must practice exceptional survivability TTPs."[10] JMRC has identified three areas that need to be improved immediately.

The first training priority follows Milley's vision of a future conflict, "Our units will have to move constantly. ... In the future battlefield, if you stay in

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one place longer than two or three hours, you will be dead."[11] This is especially true for battalion and company headquarters.

The recent Russo-Ukrainian conflict appears to validate this observation. Ukrainian battalion executive officers reported that they moved their headquarters constantly and never stayed in one spot more than seventy-two hours to avoid targeting by fires. They may stay in a general area but never in the same spot.[12]

To accomplish this refinement of survivability TTPs, U.S. forces need to focus on setting security, digging fighting positions, covering all vehicles with camouflage, and setting up the new communications network. These tasks are not specific to the company level. Company, battalion, and brigade soldiers must become extremely proficient at breaking down and setting up the command post. In this process, leaders and soldiers must capture and prioritize what needs to be set up first and what is a luxury that can be dispensed with. Also, leaders need to refresh their formations' understanding of "priorities of work," ensuring specific subordinates are assigned responsibilities in accordance with those tasks.

The second training priority, also cited as a priority by Milley, is "to employ every known method of concealment."[13] Logistics units are no different when stationary; units must be able to conceal their positions. Moreover, the modern battlefield goes beyond simple camouflage requirements such as face paint and foliage on vehicles. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-37.34, *Survivability*, explains that "placing a low priority on camouflage and concealment activities because of time constraints, minimal resources, or convenience could result in the mission failure and unnecessary loss of life."[14] Units at JMRC have been slow to implement camouflage for platforms that operate in various sections of the electromagnetic spectrum. These platforms include cell phones, heaters, and email enablers. Using a flashlight has the potential to give away a unit's position and invite enemy fires onto that location. Therefore, as priority targets for enemy fires, sustainment units must take every precaution to reduce risk. This can be achieved through clear orders before an operation or going without digital systems for as long as possible. ATP 3-37.34 is an excellent reference for commanders for camouflage best practices.

The most effective way to employ camouflage and concealment listed in ATP 3-37.34 is light, noise, and movement discipline.[15] Logistics leaders need to reembrace field craft and develop SOPs that can be enforced by noncommissioned officers. To that end, ATP 3-37.34 has an entire appendix on how commanders can develop SOPs for their units.[16]

The third training priority is a subtask of concealment. Commanders must train their staffs and units to operate without the digital systems that we have become accustomed to during the last fifteen years of conflict so that the mission can continue if network communications are degraded, destroyed, or themselves become an operational-security liability. This is going to be very difficult at first, as the U.S. Army has become dependent on systems that constantly share data such as Global Combat Support System-Army, Joint Capability Release, Blue Force Tracker, and Command Post of the Future. However, sharing that data comes at an operational-security price. All cloud-based systems continually ping a satellite in orbit to relay communication. This creates a potential fatal vulnerability, since each of these systems can be observed and monitored by someone looking across the electromagnetic spectrum. Consequently, using such systems may perpetually give away the location of the unit to skilled adversaries, putting the unit in danger.

Additionally, generating the bandwidth to support Command Post of the Future, Outlook, and Defense Switched Network phones requires a command-post node or joint-network node. These mission command enablers require an unblocked view to the satellite. This can become difficult in a wooded area and the command-post and joint-network nodes are often placed in an open field where they can be seen with the naked eye and their locations compromised.

The problem is not just limited to digital systems. Frequency modulation and high frequency communication, even if properly encrypted, can be intercepted, triangulated, and give away a unit position. Therefore, commanders would be wise to take TTPs from NATO allies who have not become dependent on digital systems. Among such, communication windows are used where company command posts are only authorized to "blast" short, thirty-second communications, to which the battalion is expected to respond within the next twenty-four hours with guidance in communications

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> In the debate of efficiency versus survivability, survivability must always win.

bursts of less than thirty seconds. Consequently, a culture shift across the U.S. Army is needed in which commanders must genuinely have trust in their subordinates and allow them to take disciplined initiative. Constant communication will only get soldiers killed.

The Way Forward

The threat of Russian fires against logistical formations is a problem U.S. forces have not encountered for nearly a generation. The days of large forward operating bases such as Bagram or Camp Victory are not realistic in a high intensity, conventional force-on-force environment. The destruction of a major Ukrainian ammunition depot in March 2017 dramatically reinforces this point.[17]

To protect U.S. Army logistical formations against a sophisticated blend of UASs and long-range artillery, units need to disperse while leveraging terrain to their advantage. Leaders should focus on making their units mobile, concealed, and empowered to conduct disciplined initiative. In the debate of efficiency versus survivability, survivability must always win. Soldiers are no good to the Army if they are dead. In the words of Gen. Milley, "for those that wish to do us harm, the U.S. Army will beat you harder than you've ever been beaten before."[18] ■

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
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Epic Fail

Why Leaders *Must* Fail to Ultimately Succeed



Maj. Timothy Trimailo,
U.S. Air Force



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When a reporter asked him how it felt to fail a thousand times, Thomas Edison replied, "I didn't fail 1,000 times. The light bulb was an invention with 1,000 steps."[1] For Edison, failure was not just an option but a requirement for eventual success. Without the many setbacks he faced during the invention process, Edison would not have learned from his mistakes and ultimately bring a commercially viable light bulb to mankind. Unfortunately, modern society tends to downplay failure, deny its occurrence, or experience shame when others recognize it first. In adolescent sports, for example, league organizers hand out participation trophies to all the participants rather than embracing the fact that some people win and others lose. Even some of the most prestigious universities in the United States are reluctant to give underperforming students failing grades.[2] Upon graduation from these institutions, these students are unprepared for the cruel, unforgiving realities of the world.

Those in control of these adolescent sports leagues and universities are impeding the development of these young people due to their distortion of the line between success and failure. Simply put, today's society is coddling the Nation's future leaders and setting them up for later, more significant, failure by not letting them experience failure early in life.

The modern trend of failure aversion is also prevalent in the military. Commanders and mentors are not allowing junior leaders to fail early on in their careers. This phenomenon is likely due to several factors. First, the military is a difficult and unforgiving business that involves death and destruction, so an aversion to risk and failure is an expected byproduct. Second, senior leaders experience an enormous amount of scrutiny by the



Department of Defense, Congress, and public opinion, causing them to micromanage junior officers more than ever before to preclude failures that they perceive might reflect badly on them. Additionally, military leaders are often "type A" personalities who demand maximum control over operational variables.

Consequently, some of these senior leaders often punish even minor failures with severity, sometimes degrading the potential for future promotion for otherwise promising young leaders. Much like in the civilian world, this zero-tolerance failure policy is hurting the next generation of leaders in the military by stifling initiative and making them risk averse. They either have not been allowed to fail and recover early on in their careers, or they leave the military based on limited promotion opportunities stemming from a previous failure from which they perceive they cannot recover. Moreover, in a world of increased external scrutiny and access to new micromanagement tools through new technologies, the institutional trend toward failure avoidance and fear of admonishment for failure is only becoming more pronounced.

This is extremely unfortunate, however, because leader development requires some failure. Failure that occurs in the proper context allows individuals to learn from mistakes, promotes resiliency and moral courage, and builds the capacity to balance risk and reward in future decision making under the more serious conditions of actual operations, including combat.

Fail and Learn Early or Fail Big Later

In September 2013, the commandant of the Marine Corps fired two general officers for failure to "exercise the level of judgment expected of commanders of their rank" after fifteen insurgents breached security at a base in Afghanistan and destroyed numerous aircraft.[3] The validity of the decision to relieve these commanders and the character and experience of the officers in question is beyond the scope of this essay, but avoiding this type of failure at senior levels should be a primary goal as the military develops its leaders.

Unfortunately, this example likely will not be the last major failure by a senior American officer. Whether it be a method for interacting with subordinate troops, the selection of an appropriate tactical mission task during operational planning, or the management of a unit training plan, failure as a junior leader in such endeavors provides the necessary experiential forum for trial and error. As leaders rise through the ranks in the military, they build a personalized set of tools to leverage as the problems they encounter become more complex.

Another reason early failure facilitates learning from mistakes can be derived from an analysis of the alternative. In some instances, a record of continual success taken for granted can breed eventual failure since meaningful learning often does not occur under circumstances of persistent success. For example, Italian motorcycle company Ducati began racing bikes on the competitive racing circuit in 2003. After some initial success attained by applying learning from early poor race results, the engineers failed to continue looking at race data to incrementally improve their bike design for future races.[4] As Francesca Gino and Gary Pisano point out, initial success for Ducati limited the incentive to continue organizational learning, causing the company to later fail due to an accrued culture of complacency.[5] As applied to military leader development, this vignette illustrates the natural condition of success. Simply put, too much success can lead to overconfidence and lethargy, which in turn hinders continual learning and improvement. In contrast, leaders must embrace the concept that learning from failure is an inevitable necessity for continual improvement and performance optimization.

The final aspect of failure as a catalyst for learning is that it helps leaders identify the indications and warnings of failure before it occurs in the future. Kathy Malloch and Tim Porter-O'Grady assert that highly successful leaders are preoccupied with failure because this preoccupation makes them focus on the minute details and address indicators of failure quickly and decisively.[6] Failure provides a means of analyzing all aspects of the individual and the organization to help identify the critical factors that lead to failure. By analyzing these indicators after an unsuccessful event, the leader can identify similar indicators in the future to proactively avoid failure. With reference to

Previous page: Sgt. Gregory Padilla (*second from left*) gives a status report to 2nd Lt. Randy Jozwiak (*left*) during a live-fire exercise 20 July 2015 as part of Northern Strike 15 on Camp Grayling Joint Maneuver Training Center, Michigan. Padilla is a team leader and Jozwiak is a platoon leader assigned to the 1st Battalion, 126th Cavalry Regiment. (Photo by Sgt. Seth LaCount, U.S. Army)

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the previous example of the two Marine generals in Afghanistan, it is possible that learning from tactical mistakes at the junior level could have helped those individuals pinpoint indicators of a base breach ahead of time to avoid failure on such a large scale.

There is a caveat to the argument that leader development should encourage learning from failure at the junior level. The focus should not be misconstrued as an effort to ensure junior leaders fail but rather on providing them with an environment that tolerates mistakes in a context where those mistakes lead to self-assessment, learning, and correction to avoid future failure. As philosopher George Santayana asserted and Winston Churchill later reiterated, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."[7] While failure is necessary for deep learning to occur, those who do not actively learn from mistakes will be far more likely to repeat them. Consequently, for the military officer, failure in the proper context and environment should be regarded as an opportunity to learn from mistakes, avoid the pitfalls of perpetual success, and identify warning signs of future failure on a larger scale.

Fail, Recover, Repeat

In addition to learning from mistakes, overcoming adversity and bouncing back from failure is an important step in the development of a leader. As two scholars in leadership, Warren Bennis and Robert J. Thomas observe, "the skills required to conquer adversity and emerge stronger and more committed than ever are the same ones that make for extraordinary leaders."[8] The way in which a developing leader reacts to difficult situations directly correlates to that individual's ability to overcome adversity in the future. These experiences provide the leader with a newfound understanding of self and an increased ability to deal with future hardships. However, if growing leaders are not given a chance to bounce back from adversity because they are shielded from failure, they remain untested and are more likely to confront difficult future situations in negative ways. In other words, these leaders are not developing what Bennis and Thomas refer to as "adaptive capacity," because they do not have the opportunity to do so.[9] On the other hand, leaders who develop this capacity and build individual resilience are far more likely to promote that behavior within their subordinates and units as they climb the organizational ladder.

In addition to building individual resilience, failure as a junior leader also helps develop moral courage. A key aspect of moral courage is the ability to admit mistakes without fear of humiliation and shame.[10] The willingness to admit mistakes is an unnatural quality, especially for the stereotypical competitive leaders within the military. That being said, the ability to adapt and overcome failure as a junior officer helps build the confidence needed to be comfortable enough to admit mistakes later in a leader's career. As Peter Olsthoorn asserts, the unit cohesion that builds physical courage in the military is the same element that makes individuals more likely to blindly conform and, thus, less likely to exude moral courage.[11] Moreover, the emphasis of unit success combined with the tendency toward modulating individual failure is hindering the development of moral courage in growing military leaders. While team building and unit cohesion are critical to operational success, senior leaders must also focus on developing individual qualities in subordinates to include moral courage.

Critics of the argument that failure early in one's career breeds resilience and moral courage might assert that these traits are inherent in, or absent from, every individual and are not qualities that can be developed. Traditional Nicomachean ethical principles, for instance, assert that one can learn most skills but cannot acquire moral virtues above and beyond what is already inherent in the individual.[12] While each human being certainly possesses some level of individual morality and resilience, the trials and tribulations of failure during formative years can assist in building the aptitude for these traits

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and the willingness to employ them in the future. The military needs its leaders to overcome failure early in their careers to develop individual resilience and moral courage. These abilities not only assist leaders in the conduct of future personal behavior but also in encouraging these traits in subordinates, which fosters a culture of practicing moral courage.

The Thin Gray Line between Success and Failure

Learning from failure and developing resilience and moral courage in the face of adversity are extremely important in leadership development, but military leaders must ultimately take risks with nearly every decision they make as senior leaders. Army doctrine states that accepting prudent risk assists commanders in seizing an opportunity to gain and maintain the initiative on the battlefield.[13] In other words, the Army embraces the fact that military operations involve risk and leaders must take acceptable amounts of risk to facilitate success in conflict. The ability to identify prudent risk, however, is a skill developed as a junior officer. Aside from thorough analysis, the most effective way to truly understand what risk is prudent and acceptable is to cross the line into unacceptable risk at some point. When a leader takes an unacceptable risk, failure is far more likely to occur. This experience further reinforces the leader's ability to discern prudent risk from unacceptable gambling and employ informed judgment to make critical decisions on the battlefield.

The goal of accepting prudent risk is to increase the probability of harnessing great reward. Risk is often viewed as negative and something people should avoid, but thoughtful, habitual risk-taking is actually a requirement for high-level success.[14] Tim Kane refers to this quality in leaders as the "bias for action" that entrepreneurs possess, or a desire to proactively and carefully take risk to maximize returns.[15] The only way to garner maximum reward in any business is to take a risk. In the military context, leaders who take prudent risk on the battlefield are the ones who enjoy the greatest successes in conflict as well. As Gen. David Perkins asserted at a 2013 Army Mission Command Symposium, retaining a position of advantage on the battlefield is difficult since that advantage is always relative to the enemy and is always temporary, since the enemy is constantly adapting to the evolving operational environment.[16] In other words, prudent risk-taking is a requirement for waging warfare in the modern era. However, if military leaders do not take risk, experience failure, and learn from mistakes early on in their careers, then they will not fully understand the characteristics of prudent risk-taking and will never fully harness the vast rewards available through taking risks. Put another way, risk-taking and failure can buy down future risk. Military leaders earn their paychecks by effectively managing risk and maximizing the chances of success.

An alternative point-of-view on risk and failure is that the violent nature of military operations requires leaders to minimize risk at all costs to avoid failure and subsequent loss of life. The media and the American public criticized American military leaders after the intervention in Iraq in 2003 for deploying too few personnel and for not having a reasonable plan for the post-war stability effort.[17] According to the critics, these leaders had miscalculated the risk involved in this type of military effort. However, this example does not validate the assertion that risk should be avoided at all costs. On the contrary, it proves that misunderstood risk is dangerous, but prudent risk-taking can garner high payoffs. While the merits of the campaign in Iraq are not the subject of this essay, the argument is that leaders must take a risk in the face of less than perfect information, and that miscalculations of risk early in their careers can inform the balance of risk and reward to enhance judgment later as a senior leader. If this balance is learned through failure at earlier stages, senior leaders can avoid loss of life to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in military operations through informed decision making and the management of prudent risk.

Conclusion

Leader development requires some level of failure. It allows leaders to learn from past mistakes, it builds individual resiliency and moral courage, and it develops the capacity to balance risk and reward in decision making to promote future success. Learning from mistakes is a human requirement, but it is necessary for leader development as well. It facilitates personal growth and helps leaders understand and visualize success and the warning signs of failure, but it also reduces the complacency promoted by a perception of inevitable perpetual success. Failure can also breed resiliency and moral courage, because it teaches the leader to

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overcome adversity, acknowledge mistakes, and come out the other side of difficulty with new self-actualization, confidence, and toughness. While these qualities are inherent in each person from birth, they are also taught through trials and tribulations. Finally, the military profession requires leaders who can accurately balance risk and reward. Without risk-taking, there is no return on investment, and military leaders must embody that entrepreneurial spirit in order to seize an opportunity and maintain the ever-changing position of relative advantage over the enemy. On the other hand, the key to effective risk-taking is analysis and prudency. All three of these points illustrate why military leaders must fail early in their careers to be effective organizational leaders at higher echelons.

Today's operational environment is complex, dangerous, and unforgiving. Joint doctrine asserts that "the commander is the central figure in operational art, due not only to education and experience but also because the commander's judgment and decisions are required to guide the staff through the process."[18] Today's military leader requires education, experience, and judgment that feeds reasonable decision making. Unfortunately, today's leaders are not allowing their junior officers to take prudent risk and learn from failure at lower echelons. While this practice might improve chances for successful operations today, it hinders the growth of the junior leaders who will be charged with defending the Nation in the future. Those officers must experience and learn from failure today to become more resilient, more confident in their moral courage, and more adept at balancing risk and reward in future operations. Just as Edison responded to a reporter about his failures on the path to inventing the light bulb, the military leader is also an invention with a thousand steps. ■

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The cancelled Future Combat System (FCS) acquisition program was the most financially ambitious procurement program ever attempted to date by the U.S. Army. It involved an effort to develop a range of complementary systems simultaneously, many of which could use interchangeable parts and software. After massive cost overruns and numerous failures to meet development timelines and capabilities, the FCS was cancelled in June 2009. Shortcomings with requirements are cited by the author as central to the program's failure. (Graphic adapted by Arin Burgess, *Military Review*)

How the Army Ought to Write Requirements



Lt. Col. Thomas "Bull" Holland, PhD, U.S. Army

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The U.S. Army's recent history is replete with spectacular acquisition program failures. An incalculable number of meetings, symposia, working groups, and studies have been dedicated to "righting the wrongs" in Army acquisition. As the failure of Defense Innovation Unit Experimental 1.0 proved, mimicking the behavior of innovators is not the same as adopting a culture of innovation.[1] The "fail fast" mentality of successful innovators is predicated on collecting and analyzing evidence about customer needs (i.e., requirements). The Army's lack of an evidence-based requirements system is a consistent cause of failure in Army acquisition programs. The Army should adopt a consistently proven industry method for writing the best requirements.

Failure

In his 2015 testimony to the Senate, Secretary of the Army John McHugh stated, "The Army's track record on acquisition programs is too often a tale of failure."[2] There is rarely a single, identifiable root cause for the failure of any acquisition program. Many of the problems with an acquisition program can be overcome after the program is initiated and the error is detected. Decision makers may end a program because the cost of correcting management errors or funding errors is too expensive, but the regulatory tools to make those changes are available. The one error no acquisition program can survive is the one the Army makes all too often—the wrong requirement.

The Army's most significant acquisition program failure is the Future Combat System (FCS). With a planned cost of almost $200 billion, the FCS is still the most financially ambitious program ever attempted by the Army. The FCS failed for many reasons but shortcomings with requirements were cited as central to the program's failure. One of the many requirements failure-related lessons learned from the analysis was that "insufficient analysis and mismanagement of expectations can lead to unrealistically ambitious requirements."[3]

FCS may have been the largest acquisition failure in the Army's history, but it certainly was not the only significant one in recent history. The Crusader self-propelled artillery and Comanche helicopter programs were both expensive failures, costing the Army $9 billion.[4] As was the case with FCS, these two programs were based on unrealistic requirements, which no amount of time or money could overcome.

The Army's challenges with acquisition programs has not been limited to developing new-to-the-battlefield technologies. The Army has also recently struggled to procure some of warfare's most mature technologies. Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark Milley asked the following rhetorical questions about the requirements document for the Army's replacement of the 9 mm pistol: "This thing has been out there for nine years, ten years? Requirements? A 367-page requirement document? Why?"[5] Each of the cases listed have a common thread: opinions were substituted for evidence in the requirements development process.

The Way the Current Process Works

A surface-level understanding of the Army acquisition processes reveals why getting requirements right is critical for any acquisition program. An Army acquisition program must use three systems to produce a result: a funding system, a management system, and a requirements system. The funding system—the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system—is directed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and by the Office of Management and Budget.[6] The management system—the Defense Acquisition Management System—is directed by multiple public laws. However, the requirements system—the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)—was created by the Department of Defense (DOD) and is still administered by the DOD.[7] All of the acquisition management decisions and budgeted costs for an Army acquisition program are based on the JCIDS requirements documents; if the requirement is wrong, nothing else can be right.

The OSD and each of the services have been requesting changes to acquisition laws for as long as there have been acquisition laws.[8] Requests for changes to the Goldwater-Nichols Act have recently given the service chiefs more power

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Sgt. Andrew Finneran, a 101st Airborne Division infantryman, fires a Sig Sauer pistol during partnered weapons training 29 May 2015 at Tactical Base Gamberi in eastern Afghanistan. The Sig Sauer P320 was selected as the replacement for the 9 mm Beretta in 2017. However, many—both in and out of the Army—heavily criticized the acquisition process for the pistol, characterizing it as overly bureaucratic, slow, expensive, and wasteful, and arguing that a much improved capability over the existing standard service pistol already existed "off the shelf." (Photo by Capt. Charlie Emmons, U.S. Army)

in the acquisition system.[9] Also, the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act is a recent law that changed the standards for acquisition management decisions.[10] Additionally, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act changed certification standards across the DOD.[11] The Clinger-Cohen Act established the role of a chief information officer in each service, and the recent Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act further empowered these chief information officers to execute acquisition programs.[12] The number of additional requested changes that became neither policy nor law are too numerous to list. Through all of these legal and policy changes, the one system that has remained mostly unchanged is also the one system over which the DOD has almost total change authority—JCIDS. Understanding the requirements development process reveals why the process does not change.

JCIDS sets standards for requirements formatting, staffing, and approval, but this process also relies on the *content* of the requirements to come from the Army and its sister services. The Army's process is very robust and is designed to ensure that every aspect of a JCIDS requirement is derived from a defined capability gap, concept, and Army Warfighting Challenge.[13] This process also has robust oversight with approvals required from the vice chief of staff of the Army, the Army G-8, the G-8 director of capabilities integration, the director of Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), the ARCIC Concept and Learning Directorate, and the commanding general of the appropriate Army center of excellence.


The ARCIC director sought to improve this process for writing the requirement for the Ground Combat Vehicle program by adding experts and senior leaders from the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems, the Army Research Laboratory, the Tank and Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center, the Army Materiel Command, and the Army G-3.[14] Where this process succeeds in collaboration it fails completely in evidence-based content. Every person involved in the writing of these documents offers their opinion but no one is required to offer any evidence to support that opinion.

There are no footnotes, endnotes, or references necessary to define a requirement in a JCIDS document.

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Neither experimentation nor research is necessary to propose and approve a threshold attribute, key performance parameter, or key supportability attribute in a JCIDS document. This does not mean that decisions in the process are irrational. This also does not mean that there are no interoperability necessities that will dictate space and weight requirements. It does mean that no one is required to justify and then test a hypothesis about any aspect of the requirement. Therefore, the absence of an evidence-based decision-making system leaves a process where only opinions can be provided and discussed.

To mitigate this problem, there are lessons the Army should learn from successful companies to move to an evidence-based requirements process.



Deconflicting the opinions of experts is always subjective and often impossible. Successful innovators rely on the evidence gained through experimentation to define product requirements. (Graphic by BMNT Partners)

Successful Industry Practices

Business models for developing technologies for a profit are end-to-end solutions that cannot be adopted by the Army acquisition enterprise for several reasons, not the least of which is a lack of competition. Every successful business model relies on market forces and competition to drive innovation, efficiency, and productivity. Consumer choices in a competitive marketplace provide companies with evidence for business decisions. The Army cannot adopt models based on a competitive marketplace because the Army is prohibited by law from competing with industry.[15] Consequently, the Army requires a model for technology development that is not designed with the end goal of making a profit and does not rely on competition to make evidence-based decisions about requirements.

In his most recent book, *Competing against Luck*, Dr. Clayton Christensen describes how successful innovators gather evidence about customer requirements to test hypotheses about developing technologies.[16] Christensen provides examples across multiple industries that show how successful innovators are those who use an evidence-based approach to correctly define requirements, which he terms "jobs to be done."[17] Christensen is not the only successful author and entrepreneur who saw the power of favoring evidence over opinion and provided concepts the Army could adopt.

For over a decade, Steve Blank has been teaching students across the globe how to be successful entrepreneurs. His course at Stanford University, "Lean Launchpad," was adopted by the National Science Foundation to teach scientists how to apply this evidence-based approach in order to find the right customer requirements for their discoveries. The National Science Foundation's adaptation of Lean Launchpad is called Innovation Corps. Blank

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applied the principles he teaches in Lean Launchpad to see that the Army had a need that no current business model, including his own, could address. His partnership with Alexander Osterwalder, best-selling author of *Business Model Generation*, produced a business model targeted at the Army's requirements development shortcomings: the "Mission Model Canvas."[18]

Osterwalder's initial concept, The Business Model Canvas, provides a proven methodology that for-profit businesses may use to connect key segments of their businesses. Osterwalder and Blank adapted the Business Model Canvas after considering the viability of the model in organizations that have no profit motive. The result of this collaboration is the Mission Model Canvas.

Blank continued to evolve the concept of focusing on nonprofit businesses by adapting his Lean Launchpad course to a new course focusing specifically on innovation in defense technology development. Where Lean Launchpad used the Business Model Canvas, the Mission Model Canvas is the basis for Stanford's new course, "Hacking for Defense." Hacking for Defense provides a pedagogy that the Army can adopt to move from an opinion-based requirements generation process to an evidence-based requirements generation process.

Hacking for Defense

Hacking for Defense implements an evidence-based requirements system by introducing the concept of a "minimum viable product."[19] The minimum viable product is the most rudimentary prototype that will allow a requirements developer to test a hypothesis. For example, when testing a hypothesis about whether thermal scans of farming fields are useful for farmers or not, a minimum viable product would be a mock spreadsheet of the data produced, not a mock-up of the thermal sensor. The value in this approach is not only the depth of thinking required to form a good hypothesis, but the speed with which requirements developers can confirm or deny each hypothesis. This is what it means to "fail fast."

This hypothesis testing process is iterative and constantly adds targeted, valuable information to the requirements development process. This is the same way the scientific method works and, more importantly, it is *why* the scientific method works. Expert opinions matter in developing hypotheses, but only the facts produced from experimentation matter in supporting hypotheses.

The methodology behind Hacking for Defense is tested and validated. The concepts in the Lean Launchpad course have been taught at Stanford University for over ten years, because they continue to be validated by students who have become successful entrepreneurs. The Innovation Corps curriculum is taught at over a dozen universities, and hundreds of scientists have completed courses. Hacking for Defense was adapted from the successes and lessons learned in each of these courses, and it is designed to address the Army's most significant requirements development challenge.

The need for changes to prevent further failures in the Army acquisition enterprise is undeniable. The system in this enterprise most in need of change is the requirements process governed by JCIDS. The core problem with how the Army implements JCIDS is the lack of a process and culture that values hypothesis testing and evidence over positional power and experience. The value of an evidence-based requirements process is demonstrated by multiple authors and entrepreneurs. The Hacking for Defense class demonstrates that proven successful business principles can be adapted into a comprehensive system to address the Army's requirements challenges. ■

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
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he Army University Press announces the publication of *Through the Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Lens: Perspectives on the Operational Environment*, Volume II. This scholarly work was written by members of the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations (DJIMO) faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The chapters in this volume focus on topics that have a strategic-level planning flavor, are related to the instruments of national power, and will be of interest to all security professionals. The informative commentaries are written in the context of current challenges that our national level leaders face today. It is our hope that the readers will enjoy the authors' diverse opinions that often challenge conventional ideas while contributing to their understanding of our complex security environment. To view this publication please visit http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/DJIMO%20Volume%202%20(Web).pdf.

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Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division train in the vicinity of a protected cultural site 28 July 2005 on Fort Drum, New York. Part of 10th Mountain Division predeployment training involves learning to recognize and protect sensitive cultural and historical sites during operations by conducting training on and around actual protected sites found on Fort Drum. (Photo courtesy of authors)

Integration of Cultural Property Protection into a Decisive Action Training Exercise

Maj. Kristoffer T. Mills, U.S. Army
Laurie Rush, PhD

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Since the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014, its deliberate and discriminant campaign to stamp out non-Islamic cultural history by destroying ancient and culturally significant non-Islamic sites has captured the attention of the world. An effective strategic response to calculated genocidal actions perpetrated by forces such as IS requires a sophisticated understanding of the role cultural property has in creating and sustaining community identity. Cultural property as defined in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict defines cultural property

> as including religious and historic structures, monuments, archaeological sites; objects such as works of art, manuscripts, books, and other objects and collections of artistic, historical, scientific or archaeological interest; and repositories such as museums, libraries, and archives.[1]

It is incumbent upon those engaged in stability operations to understand how such destruction of cultural property is an expression of aggressive power aimed at reducing a cultural community's capacity for resilience and continued existance. Supporting the stabilization of communities attempting to recover from the atrocities of genocidal occupation that aimed to eradicate not only the existence but also the entire history and memory of a people requires education and training to be able to identify, respect, and protect cultural property on the battlefield.

In September 2016, the G-9 (civil-military operations) office, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) initiated a unique partnership with the Cultural Resources Branch (CRB) at Fort Drum, New York. The deputy G-9, Maj. Kristoffer Mills, consulted with the installation's Cultural Resources Program manager (CRM), Dr. Laurie Rush, to gain a better understanding of the culturally significant sites within the Fort Drum training area while planning for a brigade-level exportable combat training capability exercise, which is a field training exercise based on the Decisive Action Training Environment. This particular exercise, Mountain Peak 17-02, was conducted on Fort Drum to prepare the unit for a subsequent training rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

The initial purpose of reaching out to the CRM was to build a "no strike list" for the exercise scenario that would be based on actual Fort Drum protected sites. As the planning progressed for the exercise, the deputy G-9 realized that Fort Drum's Cultural Resources Program (CRP) could facilitate civil-military operations training scenarios, and the CRM recognized an opportunity to inject training on cultural property protection throughout the 10th Mountain Division. The partnership between the G-9 office and the CRB has since continued to enhance 10th Mountain Division training and operations in this area.

Background

The Fort Drum CRB is subordinate to the Environmental Division of the garrison public works office, and it is a functional office within Installation Management Command. Unfortunately, training units traditionally view these types of offices as a hindrance because many installation archaeologists approach cultural resources stewardship by telling soldiers, trainers, and range control what they are not allowed to do and where they cannot dig, while also imposing restrictive latitudes for maneuver within the training areas. As a consequence, archaeology maps of Army installations have sometimes been referred to as "measles" maps by military

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Laurie Rush, PhD, is an anthropologist and Army archaeologist, serving as a civilian in support of the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York. She initiated a series of projects to support implementation of cultural property protection (CPP) during U.S. military operations and codirected the recent NATO project for development of CPP policy, doctrine, and best practices. She has a BA from Indiana University Bloomington, an MA and PhD from Northwestern University, and is a fellow of the American Academy in Rome and a Smithsonian research associate.

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Army archeologists conduct a test dig 2 August 2007 on Fort Drum, New York, to assess the potential value of further excavation at the site. Maneuver training around such sites habituates soldiers to incorporating protection of culturally important locations into their operational planning and their actions on the ground. (Photo courtesy of authors)

planners—archaeological sites characterized as symptoms of a disease infecting a military installation.

Unfortunately, this somewhat adversarial approach to management of training lands also results in the failure of military leadership to recognize that installation archaeologists represent social science education and expertise that can be of extreme value to personnel preparing to deploy and operate in the complex cross-cultural battlefield environment that today characterizes much of the potential operational area globally. In view of the need to prepare for such complexity, Department of Defense (DOD) archaeologists are potentially a great resource for units preparing to deploy because they are trained in analysis of cultural behavior, predictive modeling for patterns of occupation across a wide range of environments, and recognition of evidence of past human behavior that includes sophisticated approaches to imagery analysis.

In contrast to many other DOD installations, Fort Drum's CRP emphasizes the use of archaeological sites and cultural property in the training areas to provide realistic training opportunities. It makes no sense to prevent U.S. military personnel from operating around significant cultural property on training lands at domestic U.S. installations when they are preparing to deploy to some of the most archaeologically rich and sensitive areas of the world, such as the ancient Mesopotamian cities of Iraq and Afghanistan's historical Silk Road. Recognizing the significance and importance of training with regard to cultural property, the Department of the Army endorsed the use of installation cultural resources as training assets in its most recent guidance to cultural resources managers.[2]

As the home of 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum has also benefitted from the opportunity to learn about cultural property challenges directly from the

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experiences of military personnel who have returned to the installation after multiple deployments. 10th Mountain soldiers and trainers work extremely hard to ensure that training opportunities adjust and respond to lessons learned from forward deployments. The CRP has supported these efforts, especially when the challenges include cultural property. For example, when soldiers reported that Iraqi insurgents were using headstones as firing points, the Cultural Resources Team (CRT) constructed culturally reminiscent replica cemeteries and added them to urban sprawl and urban terrain training sites on Fort Drum so that dealing with such scenarios could be practiced. And, after the global news media featured reports of damage to the ancient city of Babylon by U.S. and Polish forces in 2004, the CRT constructed mock ruins in the training areas to offer field training opportunities to identify, avoid, and respect ancient places as well as sites regarded as sacred by indigenous peoples during the course of military operations.[3]



The "distinctive Blue Shield emblem" is described in Article 16 of the 1954 Hague Convention. The emblem is used to identify cultural property and those personnel responsible for its protection. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Using Former Communities as Training Opportunities

Citizens who lost their homes in the 1940s on Fort Drum provide additional incentive for making actual archaeological sites available to military personnel. Five northern New York villages were vacated when the installation expanded. These were initially managed as off limits due to their designation as National Register-listed archaeological districts, much to the annoyance of some former residents.[4] As one of the citizens pointed out, "we gave up our homes for military training, not for archaeology."[5] However, in response, the cultural resources staff turned to the Integrated Training Area Management program and the Land Rehabilitation and Maintenance (LRAM) managers for help with transforming off-limits acreage filled with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century ruins into a training opportunity that would protect the remaining features, offer an educational opportunity, and be safe for soldiers.[6] The LRAM staff cleared the historic features of vegetation so that the CRM and the LRAM manager could develop prescriptions for stabilization and protection.

The first property listed by the National Register was the archaeological district of historic Sterlingville. This company town was established in the mid-nineteenth century for the purpose of manufacturing pig iron. The village, situated on a crossroad, featured two churches with associated cemeteries, a school, a hotel, a general store, a post office, and multiple village homes, in addition to the iron furnace and associated mill pond. The Army purchased it in 1940, evicted the residents, and destroyed all the structures.[7] Foundations, wells, cisterns, and other robust features were all that remained by 2002 when the CRM and LRAM personnel began to transform the property into a training asset. Its location on a crossroad, relatively close to the cantonment, made the village especially valuable for a wide range of training scenarios from traffic checkpoints to bivouac.

The greatest challenge when transforming an area such as Sterlingville is to create protection for historic features while retaining evidence for the soldiers that they are operating in an area designated as historic. Standard treatments include covering crumbling foundations with geotextiles and filling them with sand and gravel—the parking lot approach, reinforcing beautifully laid masonry walls with pressure-treated wooden framework structures, sandbagging small features such as cisterns, and even using recycled tank treads to cover features to be used as potential vehicle fighting positions. Once complete, the area was signed "Historic Area; Training Permitted; No Digging."

The Blue Shield, an international symbol of protected cultural property per the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, was also added to some of the signage to provide familiarization.[8] The trainers also eventually added some wooden structures to the properties where

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the features had been completely covered by the fabric and fill, so that the village began to once again take on the appearance of a community.

The initial approach of the cultural resources and LRAM managers in terms of potential use of the cultural resource training assets was a version of "If you build it, they will come." The sites are left for the trainers and soldiers to use in any way they found to be useful. During the early years of 10th Mountain engagement in Iraq, the replica ruins were often used for identification of triggers for improvised explosive devices, and historic Sterlingville emerged as an extremely important location for marketplace and checkpoint challenges.

In 2014, the CRP had an opportunity to advise the division on how the sites could be used more proactively to enrich scenario opportunities for the annual Mountain Peak military exercises. In preparation for the exercise, one of the division exercise planners approached the CRM to learn more about the nature and locations of cultural resources in the training areas. The CRT provided a field briefing with a tour of historic Sterlingville, replica sites and features, historic cemeteries, indicators for historic features hidden in the landscape, and the Conservation Corps camp complete with dam, pond, and picnic area. The planner worked with the CRT to prepare signage for the cultural properties that fit scenarios associated with the fictitious country of Atropia, its neighbors, ethnic groups, and insurgents. He offered the CRM an opportunity to brief the red force, who were going to be playing insurgents in the scenario on how to read the historic landscape. This scenario would use the cultural features to their best advantage.

It was not until 2016 that the CRT would be able to build on this modest beginning to offer more significant support to 10th Mountain Division field exercises and Mountain Peak exercises. The increased support was due to the proactive approach and contributions of the division G-9.

Laying the Groundwork for Cultural Property Protection Exercises

As plans for 2016 Mountain Peak unfolded, the first product the Cultural Resource Branch contributed to exercise planning was the map of the culturally significant sites on Fort Drum, which are protected by local, state, national, and international laws. These sites include cemeteries, abandoned towns, homesteads and farms, foundations, churches, ancient Native American ceremonial places, and archeological sites dating back ten thousand years or more. All of these sites are historically significant to local communities, Native Americans, and interested global citizens, and they are preserved by the federal government on behalf of all the American people. Initially, the CRM provided this information to the exercise planners who were responsible for implementing the elements of environmental protection required for all training on Fort Drum in compliance with all New York state and federal environmental protection laws and regulations.

It is important to note that the map of protected sites on Fort Drum and similar maps for all U.S. domestic training installations are analogous to the cultural property inventories of protected sites and institutions that operations planners must consider for all forward operations under not just 1954 Hague but also laws of armed conflict, domestic law including Section 402 of the National Historic Preservation Act, and DOD and Army regulations such as U.S. Central Command Environmental Regulation 200-2, *Environmental Quality: CENTCOM Contigency Environmental Guidance*.[9] These inventories contribute to the "no strike" component of the targeting process, so the opportunity to implement target avoidance during an exercise is another valuable aspect of the efforts to integrate such exercises into Fort Drum training.

Once the inventory was established and shared, the next step was for the CRM and her team to provide guided tours of the training areas to show locations of protected sites, mock training sites, and various examples of the methods for identifying and marking culturally significant locations. These tours offered an understanding of the human terrain in the training areas, with the hope that skills developed at home for "reading" a crosscultural landscape could be applied in challenging situations overseas.

Installation tours of cultural property by subject-matter experts may also serve as a stand-alone training opportunity. These locations can be incorporated into land navigation exercises, and Fort Drum has established cultural property guides for staff rides and offers field exercises for Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets during which they are challenged to identify aboriginal stone features within the wider Fort Drum forested landscape.

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The CRP has also created multiple products to support warfighter education and training for cultural property protection, including archaeology awareness playing cards for Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan; a pocket guide; and specialized cultural property briefings.[10] The playing cards are distributed widely throughout the DOD to promote cultural property protection and have inspired a series of comparable materials across the international community. The cultural property pocket guide has been widely distributed, and the deputy G-9 included the guide as an appendix to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) of the operations orders for the exercise.



To support overseas predeployment training, the 10th Mountain Division issues playing cards to soldiers that describe actions to be taken to protect sensitive historical and cultural sites. (Photo courtesy of authors)

A Fort Drum-specific cultural property briefing created by Rush was also included as an appendix in Annex K and incorporated into pre-mission training for units.[11] The briefing provided information on how to identify and respect cultural property, and it emphasized the strategic value cultural property possesses for both friendly and enemy forces.

The aforementioned products, tour, and materials assisted the deputy G-9 in writing a detailed Annex K and Annex V (Interagency) for the Mountain Peak 17-02 tactical operations order, and enabled the development of robust scenarios to support civil-military operations training. However, there was one problem—there was a lack of available and qualified role players to support the exercise and its associated master scenario event list (MSEL) injects. The solution to this problem came from the CRP when the CRM and her team of ten dedicated professionals offered to provide their assistance and expertise as role players.

Exercise Execution

The Fort Drum Cultural Resource Program provided a significant amount of support to the deputy G-9 in the development of Annex K and Annex V, as well as the development of the scenario and MSEL injects. In addition to complementing the planning support to the exercise, members of the CRT volunteered their time to serve as various Atropian characters to add more realism to the scenarios. The CRM was scripted as the senior government official, or the Atropian minister of cultural affairs, antiquities, and archeology (MoCAAA). The ten personnel on staff were scripted as various role players that constructed multiple nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international governmental organizations (IGOs), and an indigenous native Atropian organization (see figure, page 112).

The benefits of cultural resources personnel functioning as role players is that they are intimately familiar with the training area and understand the cultural and historic significance of the sites because the training area serves as their workplace outside of the office in garrison. By profession, the role players were either archeologists

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or anthropologists, so the deputy G-9 created scenario organizations that reflected their real professions. Prior to the execution of the exercise, the role players were provided detailed scripts, talking points, rules of engagement, and background stories of their respective organizations and characters. The deputy G-9 also facilitated rehearsals and strategized possible questions, discussions, and issues that might be encountered during the key leader engagements (KLEs) and interactions with the training units. He provided daily exercise updates to keep the role players informed of events that occurred in the scenario so that they remained better prepared for their roles.

- Atropian Minister of Cultural Affairs, Antiquities, and Archeology (MoCAAA)
- Deputy Minister, MoCAAA
- Security, MoCAAA
- Security, MoCAAA
- Director, Atropian Cultural Resource and Environmental Preservation Organization (ACREPO)
- Deputy Director, ACREPO
- Director, Council of the Atropian Native Indigenous People (CANIP)
- Deputy Director, CANIP
- Regional Director, World Islamic Humanitarian Assistance Group (WIHAG)
- Assistant Regional Director, WIHAG
- DART/OFDA (USAID)

Figure. Atropian Governmental Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and U.S. Government Interagency Organizations

The CRB had additional resources that contributed to the realism of the training. Between the ten personnel, there were enough costumes, jewelry, and props so that each person was wearing some type of traditional "Atropian" clothing. The role players were dressed in scarves, beads, turbans, robes, sashes, belts, vests, and daggers. The most significant contribution was that the office had replica artifacts that were incorporated into the scenarios. The inclusion of the artifacts added yet another level of realism and depth to the exercise.

Most importantly for the G-9, the presence of actual objects promoted training and awareness of cultural property protection. The artifacts included tablets, a stamp, and a goblet, which were emplaced by observer/controllers in enemy territory with the expectation that the artifacts would be recovered during sensitive-site exploitation by the training unit. The CRM's character introduced the artifacts into a scenario during the initial KLE with the brigade commander, where she presented photographs of the stolen artifacts in the form of catalog information from the National Museum of Atropia. Atropian delegations from the various NGOs, IGOs, and private organizations provided information about the artifacts, and emphasized the cultural significance and specific handling instructions for each artifact. The inclusion of the artifacts provided an opportunity for the training unit to hone their interpersonal-communication and rapport-building skills during KLEs. It also exercised several staff sections within the brigade to include the civil-military operations (S-9), intelligence (S-2), and operations (S-3) sections, the public affairs and legal officers, and the attached civil affairs company. The brigade commander immediately built rapport with the Atropian government officials and delegation representatives, and conveyed to his staff the importance of returning the artifacts to the Atropian government. He also understood the tremendous potential to capitalize on the possible strategic messaging opportunities and the potential to gain invaluable intelligence from the recovery of the artifacts. Success in recovering the artifacts proved to be both a strategic and tactical success for the brigade.

The successful integration of cultural property protection during the brigade exercise at Fort Drum was replicated during a second exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana, to support 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. Unfortunately, the ten personnel from the CRO could not travel to Fort Polk, but the CRM accepted the deputy G-9's invitation to be a role player and advisor during the exercise. She returned as her Atropian character, MoCAAA, to conduct two KLEs with 3rd Brigade, and to meet with the brigade

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Col. Scott Naumann, commander of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, and his staff meet with civilian role players 1 December 2016 during Mountain Peak 16-02 at Fort Drum, New York. The role players act as local nationals to help train the units on interacting with their host-nation leaders. (Photo by Maj. Kristoffer Mills, U.S. Army)

to coordinate training for their academic week in preparation for deployment in support of Operation Inherent Resolve.

During the initial KLE, the CRM introduced herself and expressed her concerns about the combat operations' potential impact on the cultural sites in the unit area of operations. At the subsequent KLE the following day, she presented photos of Atropian artifacts stolen from the Atropian National Museum that was looted and destroyed by enemy forces. The brigade S-9, legal officer, and protections cell officer took the photos and disseminated guidance to subordinate battalions on the proper handling of the artifacts. The brigade public affairs officer also published a press release about the KLE and that the main topic of the meeting was the missing artifacts.

Two days later, another role player was introduced to the scenario. This role player was an Atropian landowner who discovered a bag with two artifacts while cleaning trash left behind by enemy forces. The landowner also came to request compensation from the unit as a result of maneuver damage. This inject provided an opportunity for the staff to take advantage of the strategic messaging opportunity and to demonstrate their competency in respecting a host nation's cultural property. The inject also provided an opportunity to collect additional information about the enemy force.

The next day, another role player entered the scenario to add more depth. This role player was a subordinate archeologist who worked at the provincial level. He came to the brigade to request the artifacts at the behest of the minister. While meeting with the brigade, he also stated that he encountered enemy forces while inspecting archeological sites in the unit's area of operations. This particular inject provided an opportunity for the unit S-2 to ask questions of the role player to not only understand ways to protect the archeological sites but to also collect information about enemy activities.

During this second exercise, aspects of cultural property protection were injected into the scenario to provide unique training opportunities that would otherwise not be available to the unit. The cultural property protection-focused scenario injects drove the civil-military operations training objectives for the units. The unit conducted KLEs in order to build rapport with the host-nation government, the injects afforded

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U.S. Army soldiers walk down the Great Ziggurat of Ur, a temple at the ancient city of Ur and an archaeological site on the outskirts of Nasiriyah 13 May 2009 about 320 kilometers southeast of Baghdad. The U.S. military transferred control of the site to Iraqi authorities on the same day. (Photo by Nabil al-Jurani, Associated Press)

opportunities to promote strategic messaging through the public affairs office, information provided by role players allowed the S-2 to conduct military source operations to support intelligence operations, and the staff exercised their ability to understand the policy and laws associated with cultural property. Prior to the conclusion of the exercise, the brigade S-9 repatriated the stolen artifacts and returned them to the Atropian government. Considering the upcoming mission and destination for 3rd Brigade, the most important training provided was the understanding and appreciation for cultural property protection.

Tip of the Spear

As increased attention is placed on the defeat of IS and the restoration of stability in Iraq and Syria, the international community will continue to emphasize the importance of implementation of meaningful protection of cultural property during the course of military operations. Fort Drum has also provided expertise to international military efforts to establish cultural property protection policies, doctrine, and best practices, including leadership for a NATO Science for Peace and Security-funded series of advanced research workshops devoted to the subject.

In the summer of 2016, ROTC interns at Fort Drum provided cultural property inventories for Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, and Latvia in support of cultural property protection injects for a NATO exercise in the Baltic Sea.[12] According to NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples, these data were used effectively to contribute to injects where vibrations from heavy vehicle traffic were threatening a historic church and where an ancient seaside castle required special protection.[13] In the after-action report, there was consensus that these injects added meaning and realism to the training effort.

At Fort Drum, the integration of the CRB and inclusion of cultural property protection into an U.S. Army exercise was most likely unprecedented in the

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history of the modern force, according to the CRM, who has been working with the DOD for almost twenty years. The successful incorporation of cultural property protection and role players provided by the CRB demonstrates innovation in providing civil-military operations training that provides opportunities for units to interact with host-nation government officials, NGOs, IGOs, and private institutions.

The collaboration between the 10th Mountain Division G-9 and CRB, and the resulting successful injects, offers a division- and brigade-level training model for the rest of the Army that can also be duplicated by other military organizations across the globe. The United Kingdom recently ratified The Hague Convention and, as a result, the UK Ministry of Defence has identified the Fort Drum injects as a best practice worthy of study.[14] The United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization is interested in providing cultural property protection training to UN member militaries and has consulted the Fort Drum CRM for assistance.[15] Also, the Austrian military has used the historic Sterlingville training asset concept to develop the villages found on their training areas in a similar fashion and are incorporating their ruins into exercises.[16]

The collaboration between the CRM and the deputy G-9 is innovative, and in terms of DOD archeology, is the "tip of the spear" for cultural property protection training. The creative inclusion of artifacts into training scenarios and military exercise participation by CRB personnel provides tremendous opportunities to share lessons learned with NATO partners and UN members as they develop strategies and programs to implement cultural property protection into military training. Additionally, there is an opportunity to update and expand current U.S. military doctrine addressing cultural property protection as the only existing dedicated doctrine to the topic at present is the Graphic Training Aid 41-01-002, *Civil Affairs Arts, Monuments, and Archives Guide*, October 2015.[17]

Conclusion

As multinational, coalition partners cooperate to defeat IS and other organizations that would eradicate parts of human history for their own political objectives, the international community must also cooperate and leverage every capability possible to preserve and protect the cultural heritage of past civilizations. Tragically, too many ancient sites and artifacts have been lost to the hands of time and human malfeasance, but there remains hope and opportunities to protect and preserve the record of human history as it has developed among all peoples for our children and future generations. ■

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
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14. Timothy Purbrick (lieutenant colonel, The Royal Lancers, Army Reserves staff officer, Concepts Branch, Army Headquarters, UK), personal communication, travel to Fort Drum, New York, to study the Fort Drum approach, 12–14 June 2017.


15. Request for support from UNESCO's Giovanni Boccardi, chief of unit, Emergency Preparedness and Response, and Jan Hladik, secretary of the 1954 Convention. Laurie Rush was invited faculty for UNESCO Cultural Property Protection Training for African peacekeeping forces at the Regional Peacekeeping Training Center, Harare, Zimbabwe, September 2017.

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REVIEW ESSAY



The Pursuit of Power

Europe 1815–1914

Richard J. Evans

Viking, New York, 2016, 848 pages

Mark Montesclaros

Sir Richard Evans adds his considerable powers of analysis to this work, the seventh volume in *The Penguin History of Europe*, which spans ancient to modern Europe in a series of nine single editions. The author is a professor of history and president of Wolfson College in Cambridge, and his contribution, *The Pursuit of Power*, is the most recent publication in the series. Chronologically it predates the next volume in the series, *To Hell and Back: Europe 1914–1949*, by Sir Ian Kershaw, published earlier in 2015 and analyzed by this reviewer in the July-August 2016 edition of *Military Review*.

Evans employs the same holistic style that was so effective in his renowned *Third Reich* trilogy, which encompasses far more than simply political or military history. In that series—which spanned the Reich's coming to power, its conduct while in power, and its prosecution of World War II—Evans covered such diverse topics as culture, the economy, religion, science, the Holocaust, and resistance movements. Aimed at the general reading public, if not the specialist, the *Third Reich* trilogy was a highly acclaimed model of synthesis and scholarship. The same attributes are evident in *The Pursuit of Power*.

Evans began writing *The Pursuit of Power* in 2009, which attests to the level of effort and perseverance required to compose a history of Europe that spans one hundred years in a single volume. Evans's slice of *The Penguin History of Europe* covers the post-Napoleonic period to the eve of World War I, specifically 1815–1914. Why those benchmarks? In his very useful preface, Evans explains that those years in particular signal the high-water mark for the continent; that is, during that timeframe, Europe stood first globally in a number of important areas, which he highlights throughout the text. Additionally, the author makes a keen early observation that sets the tone for the entire book: "Europe is best seen as a social, economic, political, and cultural region sharing many common characteristics and stretching from Britain and Ireland in the west to Russia and the Balkans in the east." Thus, Evans places a premium on considering Europe as an entity whenever possible in his treatment, rather than as an accumulation of regional histories or individual

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country narratives. *The Pursuit of Power* is thus unique and works on multiple levels of analysis.

The organization of the book is elegant in its use of thematic "lines of effort." It also reflects Evans's intent to approach his history of Europe in a manner different from previous writers. The author divides the book into eight chapters of roughly equal size, each in turn consisting of ten sections. Exactly half of the chapters—1, 3, 7, and 8—cover political history and are organized chronologically. They include, amongst an impressive scope of topics, an excellent synthesis of 1815 Europe, the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, the Italian and German unifications of the 1870s, and the dissolution of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. Chapters 2 and 4 cover socioeconomic themes, each encompassing roughly a half century in time. Here, Evans tackles such seminal developments as the emancipation of the serfs, the rise of industry and the working class, the decline of the aristocracy, urbanization, and European emigration. Chapters 5 and 6 are uniquely titled "The Conquest of Nature" and "The Age of Emotion," respectively, reflecting what the author considers as broad "cultural" history. The former describes the state of nineteenth century "globalization" and the shrinkage of time and space with developments in transportation, commerce, medicine, and the adaption of standard time as well as the metric system. The latter focuses on broad intellectual and cultural movements, in particular the transition from Enlightenment principles to those of Romanticism and later, Realism. In this fascinating chapter, Evans spans an eclectic variety of subjects, including religion, literacy and language, education, the arts, gender issues, and the rise of nationalism. Organizationally, *The Pursuit of Power's* unique design provides the basis for a holistic synthesis of European history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In addition, the even-numbered chapters provide a respite to the book's political emphasis in the odd-numbered ones, giving the book a unique balance, increased readability, and immense breadth.

As indicated by the book's title, all of the lines of effort outlined above lead to the author's underlying end—to describe how multiple actors and entities in Europe pursued power. (Indeed, the author's choice of "power" in the volume's title contrasts with the one that precedes it in the *Penguin History* chronology—Tim Blanning's *The Pursuit of Glory, Europe 1648–1815*). Evans's periodization is thus bookended by the Napoleonic Wars and World War I—continental and global conflagrations, respectively. Why the intervening years were peaceful in comparison is at the core of Evans's explanation; although Europe was not at war, there were a number of forces at work that combined to make the next one possible, if not inevitable. As the author articulately explains, multiple entities pursued power against the backdrop of the Napoleonic legacy and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848. Some were desperately trying to hold onto power—the aristocracy, the decaying Habsburg and Ottoman empires, and collective, "conflict prevention" groupings such as the Concert of Europe and the Holy Alliance. Others entities, borne of the forces of change throughout the century, were intent on obtaining or accumulating power. These were as varied as nations seeking global or regional hegemony via the "great game," or individuals seeking greater levels of emancipation and basic civil rights. As Evans weaves this hugely complex tale, the pursuit of power in all of its manifestations provides the basis for the global conflagration to come: "Well before August 1914, the outbreak of a general war was widely anticipated across Europe, hoped for by some, feared by others. Nevertheless, when war actually did come, it was a surprise to almost everyone." Thus, in the context of the three aforementioned *Penguin History* titles, glory gives way to power; power precedes the "hell" of the world wars. Evans's book superbly connects the dots between the volumes that bookend it; collectively, the three encompass over three centuries of European history.

In essence, *The Pursuit of Power* displays Evans's sheer ability to synthesize and analyze a vast amount of historical information and communicate it to the reader in a way that makes sense. This ability to connect the dots—that is, to draw relationships and comparisons between disparate events and trends, is the greatest attribute of the book. The author has a way of putting things clearly yet concisely in order to help one understand complex ideas. For example, when describing the European context at the outset of the book, the author observes, "Had the Europe of 1785 looked at itself in a mirror thirty years later, in 1815, it would not have recognized what it saw." He also does not hesitate to question other historians' conclusions; for example, one of the prevailing views is that the revolutionary upheavals of 1848 and the national unifications of 1871 are separate and distinct events. Evans offers a different perspective: "In

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many respects, it makes sense to see the whole period of 1848 to 1871 as a single period of revolutionary change, rather than focusing individually on each of the short-term upheavals that followed one another with such breathtaking speed during these years." *The Pursuit of Power* is replete with such commentary and analysis, adding context and breadth to an understanding of the seminal events and trends in European history between 1815 and 1914.

Also of note is Evans's insistence that the book not be a collection of individual national histories, without linkages either to each other or to the continent as a whole. He is also a master at covering regional variations, which he does across a wide variety of topics—the state of the peasantry, industrialization and rise of the working class, and political and intellectual movements, to name but a few. As expected, Evans gives ample coverage to the Great Powers such as Britain, France, and Russia. Nevertheless, he also provides sound insight into developments in the Iberian Peninsula, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and eastern as well as southern Europe, with particular attention to the fascinating and complex demise of both the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. This remarkable breadth is refreshing for those accustomed to narratives that focus almost exclusively on events in central Europe, with little to no coverage of peripheral states. In the same vein, Evans also incorporates a global approach in *The Pursuit of Power*. He constantly reminds the reader of the position of Europe in the worldwide hierarchy, again, discussing a wide range of issues—trade, commerce, the abolition of slavery, and the spread of culture and ideas internationally. This is most evident in chapter 8, "The Wages of Empire," where the author makes cogent observations regarding the acquisition of colonial possessions: "Such acquisitions reflected Europe's worldwide hegemony in the nineteenth century. They were made possible by industrial growth, military supremacy, and above all by improved communications." He also argues that European prominence in international commerce was underwritten by the power of continental navies, in particular that of Great Britain. With the risk of sounding repetitive, Evans is superb at drawing relationships between events and trends in nations or regions, tying them in with continental developments, and then articulating a European perspective in a global context.


In addition to covering broad brushstrokes such as revolution, intellectual thought, and sweeping social change affecting the whole of Europe, Evans is equally adept at describing the life of "ordinary Europeans" who witnessed such events as they occurred. In this regard, one of his helpful innovations is using personal vignettes that introduce and place into context the main themes to follow. His first chapter on the immediate post-Napoleonic aftermath in Europe, for example, effectively uses the diary of a German foot soldier, Jakob Walter, who accompanied Napoleon on his ill-fated Russian Campaign of 1812 as a conscript in the Grand Army. Walter not only survived that horrific ordeal but also, quite remarkably, captured his personal thoughts in a diary that did not surface until the 1930s. Through the example of Walter, the author contextualizes the general war-weariness in Europe and attitudes toward Napoleon in particular. In a similar vein, the author opens "The Challenge of Democracy" with a narrative featuring Emmeline Pankhurst, an Englishwoman who symbolized the British suffragist movement and campaigned tirelessly for female emancipation in Great Britain. Again, Evans uses the Pankhurst example as a basis for exploring the general topic of emancipation, not solely female, across the European continent. The author's use of vignettes such as these not only sets the historical context but also helps the reader form a personal connection to distant, nineteenth century voices.

There are a few potential criticisms of *The Pursuit of Power*, some imposed by the limitations placed on the series' authors. For example, because of the single volume format, the book is densely packed with facts and analysis, over eight hundred pages worth, and requires concentration and perseverance on the part of the reader, especially those not familiar with the nuances of European history. (Evans recommends that the reader tackle the book from start to finish). Additionally, format rules dictate that the *Penguin History* contributors use primarily secondary sources, without the use of endnotes

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or footnotes. This may be off-putting to some who are looking for additional or more specific source information. Evans's command of the literature, over decades of teaching and writing, may intimidate some due to the wealth of complex relationships, not to mention names, dates, and so forth.

These shortcomings, however, in comparison to Evans's superb writing and unique ability to make complex issues clear and understandable to the general reader. As stated, this is his most significant contribution. All told, *The Pursuit of Power* is a superb addition to *The Penguin History of Europe* series and effectively sets up the final two volumes by Sir Ian Kershaw, the first published in 2015, as noted above. With Kershaw's upcoming *Fractured Continent: Europe 1950–The Present*, the series will be complete and brought up to date. Richard Evans's new work is indispensable to an understanding of twentieth-century as well as today's Europe, and is highly recommended to the general reader as well as the specialist in European affairs and nineteenth-century history in particular. Anyone who reads *The Pursuit of Power* will benefit from an enlightened as well as broadened perspective of the continent from a master historian. ■

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LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Response to J. Michael Waller's "Weaponizing Ridicule"

(*Military Review*, September–October 2017)

The Cowardice of the Mass Murderer



Vladimir Putin officially banned this popular meme of himself with his face painted in drag. That reaction inadvertently made the meme more popular than ever, and it became an international sensation. According to the author of this article, Putin's "thin skin" makes him an easy target for ridicule. (Artist unknown)

Weaponizing Ridicule

J. Michael Waller, PhD

The fifth rule: Ridicule is man's most potent weapon. It is almost impossible to counterattack ridicule. Also it infuriates the opposition, who then react to your advantage.

—Saul Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals*

Venezuelan women stripped off their pants and threw them at riot police, taunting the already demoralized young men to "man up" and put them on. Jeering crowds laughed at the confused paramilitary forces, chanting for them to "wear some pants" and side with the people against the tottering Maduro dictatorship, finally, the

MILITARY REVIEW [illegible] October 2017

To view this article, please visit http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2017/Waller-Weaponizing-Ridicule/.

The occurrence of mass murders, particularly those allegedly related to religious beliefs, has become almost commonplace. Efforts to reduce the incidence of mass murders have not been successful. We can speculate as to the reasons for this lack of success—the wide variability in circumstances, in methods employed, and in attributes of perpetrators. I will suggest another approach, recognizing that there is no magic solution.

This approach focuses on the potential mass murderer, on altering implicit rewards entailed in the murderous act. Perpetrators may see themselves as heroes, as exacting justified revenge, as bearers of religious righteousness. They appear immune to negative attributions such as "evil," or "monstrous," or "traitors." Indeed, they may expect, even gloat, when defamed. However, an attribution that is unexpected and not readily dismissed is that of COWARD, a description used by President Obama in commenting on the killings in Baton Rouge and Dallas. That label is justified because the victims of the mass murderer are defenseless. The prospect of being regarded as a coward may well have an inhibitory function for many potential murderers.

This function can be reinforced by a formal procedure in which the mass murderer's name and label of coward are inscribed in a chart maintained by a government agency such as the FBI, or the Surete, or


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Scotland Yard. Distress at being labeled a "coward" is further enhanced in those potential perpetrators who believe in a hereafter. The possibility of being considered a coward in eternity dampens any images of a lifetime of bliss. Of course, being labeled a coward is not a panacea and cannot be expected to inhibit the behavior of all potential mass murderers.

If the murders were a political act, supporters of the perpetrator may maintain that he or she is a hero in that they risked their lives for a political goal. But political, religious, or other justifications for a murderous action that entails the killing of noncombatants are irrelevant. The deliberate murder of an innocent, unsuspecting individual remains an act of cowardice.

The inhibitory function of the label of coward can only be effective if the community at large believes that individuals who murder the defenseless are cowards. I know that I do. ■

Seymour Feshbach, PhD, Professor Emeritus of Psychology, UCLA



(Photo courtesy of Feshbach)

2nd Lt. Seymour Feshbach, 1943

Seymour Feshbach enlisted in the U.S. Army in June 1943. After basic training, he entered the Officer Candidate School program at Fort Benning, Georgia, where he earned a commission in the Infantry. He initially served at several stateside posts until being assigned to a task force that was earmarked for participation in the invasion of the Japanese mainland. However, while he was in the Pacific staging for the invasion, the U.S. nuclear attack on Japan resulted in an abrupt end to the war. He was subsequently reassigned to Korea, where he completed his World War II military service. Following World War II, he finished his undergraduate studies at the City College of New York (CCNY) and entered the graduate program at Yale University where he pursued a doctorate in psychology. During this time, he also met and married a fellow scholar with whom he would later have three children.

Upon graduation, and before initiating his academic career, he was recalled to active duty for the Korean War and selected for assignment to the Pentagon, where he served for the duration of the war. Subsequent to the Korean armistice, he began his career in psychology at the University of Pennsylvania during which his major area of concentration was research into the dynamics of aggressive behavior, particularly in the reduction of aggression. He later moved to the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), where he spent the balance of his career. In his later research, the focus of his research shifted from the study of aggression to other areas, particularly analysis of patriotism and nationalism. At UCLA, he served as chair of the Psychology Department and head of the University's Academic Senate. He also served as president of the International Society for Research on Aggression, and president of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. His work has been widely recognized through various awards, including UCLA's Karpf Peace Prize, as well as invitations to accept prestigious positions of responsibility.

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Response to Retired Lt. Col. Tim Thomas's "The Evolving Nature of Russia's Way of War"

(*Military Review*, July–August 2017)



Staff conversations, which included General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov (*second from left*) and then General-Lieutenant Andrey Valerievich Kartapolov (*second from right*) were held 15 July 2015 at the Russian Ministry of Defense in Moscow with representatives of the Republic of Korea. The writings and published speeches by both men are widely regarded as reflecting dominant strategic concepts guiding development of the Russian military. (Photo courtesy of the Russian Ministry of Defense)

The Evolving Nature of Russia's Way of War

Lt. Col. Timothy Thomas, U.S. Army, Retired

This article discusses the three Russian military articles about which most Western military analysts specializing in Russia have focused their attention over the past four years. Unlike oth analyses of those articles, this one offers a different perspective in that it compares them side by side, examining the text of the original versions and not merely the press reports a out them. New graphs and tables included in the original versions are natural, and a few are discussed further. a one is included here. The article is intended to do four things in particular. First, it demonstrates that five elements of Russian military thought continue to dominate

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To view this article, please visit http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2017/Thomas-Russias-Way-of-War/.

I've had the privilege of being able to talk to the author of "The Evolving Nature of Russia's Way of War" on multiple occasions. What I've learned from Mr. Thomas about Russian strategy interests me as a Latin American researcher for a variety of reasons, including Russian influence on Cubans, and by extension, Venezuelans (whom together we can refer to as Bolivarians). Russians have influenced Bolivarian strategic culture directly through training and education, but the shared Marxist legacy might be of most interest to us. For instance, as the "Evolving Nature" article reminded me, the Bolivarians pursue what they call the "combination of all forms of struggle." Beyond the article, however, one of Thomas's books, *Recasting the Red Star*, touches on the influence of Marxist thinking on strategy-making, and discusses the centrality of deception. It all makes one want to ask, "What is the Russian deception today, and where are they unfolding it?" Might it not be, if the Russian global strategic goal is to gain increasing strategic advantage through control over hydrocarbon energy markets, that the geographical locus of the deception is eastern Europe? Might it not be—as Latin Americanists would dream—that the geography of the main Russian strategic effort is globally disperse with centers like Nigeria, Iran, Indonesia, and, of course, the country with the largest proven hydrocarbon energy reserves in the world. A Ukraine ploy would make for a perfect deception according to the notion of reflexive control. Playing to our predispositions, the Russians can gather almost every bit of American military attention away from South America and the Caribbean. What presence and influence does the United States currently have over the political parties, industries, and military units of Cuba and Venezuela? About as close to none as can be. Meanwhile, Russians are all over it. Sad. ■

Geoff Demarest

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
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
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
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Robot Nudging


Changes to tactics, techniques, and procedures most often originate out of necessity. The December 1944 issue of *Military Review* included a short article that described such a situation. "Robot Nudging," shown here, told the story of an innovative approach to air defense discovered by a British Royal Air Force pilot.

During World War II, the British faced the threat of thousands of German V-1 flying bombs fired from occupied territory in France and the Netherlands. British forces implemented several techniques to combat these early cruise missiles with varying degrees of success. These techniques included the use of antiaircraft guns, barrage balloons, and intercept aircraft.

The *Military Review* article details a technique discovered out of desperation by an RAF pilot in an intercept aircraft who had run out of ammunition. The pilot used the wing of his aircraft to knock the bomb off course. Labeled "bomb nudging," this technique was soon added to the list of possible air defense measures employed in defense of Great Britain.

To view the entire December 1944 edition of *Military Review*, Volume XXIV, Number 9, visit http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/969/rec/3.


For another example of World War II innovation, read the story of the Culin hedge cutter on the inside back cover of the July-August 2016 *Military Review* at http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160831_art024.pdf.



A photo of shadows on the ground shows a Royal Air Force Supermarine Spitfire maneuvering alongside a German V-1 flying bomb 31 December 1943 in an attempt to "topple" or deflect it from its target. (Photo courtesy of The Imperial War Museums)



A V-1 Fieseler Fi 103 in flight. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)



Robot Nudging

From a British source.

ONE of the methods used by RAF Spitfire pilots to deal with flying bombs was to range alongside them and shoulder them off their course so that they would crash and explode harmlessly on open ground.

This "bomb-nudging" procedure was the impromptu discovery of a pilot who ran out of ammunition after destroying two flying bombs. Deciding to take a chance with the third, he ranged alongside the "diver," delicately slid his starboard wing beneath its port wing, flicked his control column, threw the bomb's gyro mechanism off balance, and sent the machine spinning to the earth.

The pilot promptly reported the success of the maneuver and all fighter stations were informed, but the novelty of the method led to its being rather discouraged and it was not officially sponsored until scientific investigation proved that at high speed the air cushion between the two machines sufficed to deflect the flying bomb.

Bomb-nudging was not invariably successful because, after the first attempt, the gyro-pilots of the high-flying divers sometimes enabled them to recover balance, compelling the attacking fighters to repeat their dash twice or even three times before achieving their object.

A Mustang pilot accidentally found another road to conquest. Screaming down in a power dive onto a flying bomb, he overshot it and tore ahead. Pulling out of the dive, he saw it splash in the Channel and realized that the slipstream of his aircraft had thrown the bomb out of control, downed and drowned it. This method, too, was added to the list of the killers' recipes.

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